On the Christian Idea of Man

Author(s): Josef Pieper

Source: The Review of Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Jan., 1949), pp. 3-16
Published by: Cambridge University Press for the University of Notre Dame du lac on behalf
of Review of Politics
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 On the Christian Idea of Man
By Josef Pieper
THE secondpartofthe SummaTheologicaofthe"UniversalDoctor,"
ThomasAquinas,beginswith the followingsentence:Becauseman
has beencreatedin God'simage,now after havingspokenof God, the
archetype,we must still deal with His image whichis man. (Summa
TheologicaI, II, Prologus.) There is somethingpeculiarabout this
sentence;its meaningmust not be misunderstood. It is stated as a
matterof fact but its meaningis not to be taken for granted. This
first sentenceof Moral Theology expressesa fact which has almost
entirelydisappeared fromthe knowledgeof Christiansof today;namely,
the fact that moraldoctrineis primarilyand aboveall a doctrineabout
man;thatmoraldoctrinemustplainlyrevealthe conceptionof man,and
that, therefore,the doctrineof Christianmoralsmustconcernthe Chris-
tian modelof man. This fact was a matterof coursein'the Christian-
ity of the high Middle Ages. This fundamentalconception-which,
to be sure,was not definitelytakenfor grantedas the polemicalwording
shows-compelled Eckhartto say two generationsafter St. Thomas:
peopleshouldnot thinkaboutwhatthey oughtto do, they shouldrather
thinkaboutwhatthey oughtto be. But lateron Moral Theologyand
above all Moral preachingand expositionhave more or less lost this
awareness. This is so true that textbooksof Moral Theology, which
explicitlyprofessedto be written"in the spiritof St. Thomas"differed
with him on this main point. Here lies the root of the fact that the
averageChristian; of today does not expect to find in moraldoctrine
anythingabout the true being of man or anythingabout the idea of
man at all. On the contrary,the averageChristianis wont to associate
with the conception"moraldoctrine"the idea of a doctrineaboutthe
deed and especiallyabout the omission, about the permissibleand
especiallyaboutthe impermissible, aboutwhat is biddenand especially
aboutwhatis forbidden. But the first moralthesisof the "Universal
Doctor"remains:moraldoctrinemustdeal with the trueconceptionof
man. Naturallyit must also treatof actions,of duties, of command-
mentsand of sins. But its primarysubjectis the rightbeing of man,
the idea of the good man.
The resolutionof this problemof the Christianidea of man can be
given in one sentence,even in one word: Christ. The Christianought
3
4 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

to be anotherChrist;he oughtto be perfectlike the Fatherof Jesus

Christ. Butthisideaof theperfection of the Christian,
all-comprehen-
sive and, therefore, needsto be analyzed,appliedand
inexhaustible,
interpreted.Withoutsuchinterpretation proceeding fromtheempirical
natureof manandreality,this ideawouldalwaysbe exposedto the
dangerof abuseandmisunderstanding, causedby short-circuiting. It is
impossible to derivedirectlythe concreteactionin the concrete situa-
tion fromthe highestandultimateideaof perfection."Beperfectas
yourFatherin heaven."It is preciselythisformulation of theultimate
ideaof a Christian to whichthefourthCouncilreferred in its famous
sentenceof the analogiaentis:Inter Creatoremet creaturamnon potest
tanta similitudonotari,quin inter eos maiorsit dissimilitudonotanda.
Such a great similaritybetweencreatorand creaturecannotbe
mentionedwithoutat the sametime mentioninga still greaterdis-
similarity.Thissentenceis directedagainstthe possibilityof a direct
deificationof man. Man, the Christian, albeitthe perfectChristian,
remainsa creature,a finitebeing,even in eternallife. Now there
certainlyis morethanone wayof interpreting this ultimateChristian
idea, not only "theoretically"
but also historically.There are, for
instance,an Eastern-Christian
and a Western-Christian formof inter-
pretation.
ThomasAquinas,the greatteacherof WesternChristianity,
decided
to expressthe Christian
ideaof manin seventheseswhichmaybe sum-
marizedas follows:
1. The Christian
is a manwho-in faith-becomesaware
of theTriuneGod.
2. The Christian-inhope-waitsfor the finalfulfillment
of hisnaturein theEternalLife.
3. The Christian-inthe divinevirtueof charity-inclines
towardsGod andhis fellowmen withan affirmationex-
ceedingall naturalpower of love.
4. The Christianis prudent,thatis, he doesnot permitthe
YesandNo of thewillto disturbhisviewof reality;on
thecontrary,hemakestheYes or No of thewilldepend
on thetruthof actualthings.
5. The Christianis just, that is, he is able to live in truth
"withtheother";he is conscious
of beinga member
with
 CHRISTIAN IDEA OF MAN 5

othersin the Church,in the nation,and in everycom-

munity.
6. The Christianis brave,that is, he is readyto suffer
woundsand,if needbe, deathfor thesakeof truthand
therealizationof justice.
7. The Christian is moderate,thatis, he doesnot allowhis
willto haveandhiswillto enjoyto destroyhimself.
Theseseventhesessuggestthatthe ethicsof classicaltheology,as
an explanationof the ideaof man,is essentially a doctrineof virtues.
Moreexactlytheyinterpret theBiblicaldescription of theperfectionof
the Christian
by means of the sevenfold image of the threetheological
andthe fourcardinalvirtues. It is, I think,mostimportant to reveal
oncemoreto the generalconsciousness of ourtimethis grandfresco
of theideaof manas originally expressed in classical
theology,a fresco
whichhas fadedto someextentand-even worse-whichhas been
paintedovermanya time. This ideaof manis significant not merely
as a matterof "historical"interest,as a matterof showing"how it
actuallywas." This interpretation of the ultimatehumanideal is one
that continuesto hold good and it is, I think,trulyessentialfor us to
see clearlyand to acceptthis idea of man. I shall now try to mark
the contoursof thisimage,aboveall in the realmof the fourcardinal
virtues,particularlyat thosepointswherethe imagehas fadedor has
beenpaintedover.
At the outsetsomethingmust be said aboutthe conceptionof
virtuein itself. A few yearsago, in a speechbeforethe Academie
Francaise on virtue,PaulValerysaid: "Virtue,gentlemen, the word
virtueis dead,or at leastit is dying. It no longerpresentsitselfas a
directexpression of a conceivable realityof our time. Rather,I have
heardit mentionedin socialconversation only rarelyand then in an
ironicalsense. ThiscouldmeanthatI mixwithbad companyonly,
unlessI addthatI don'tremember everhavingfoundvirtuein today's
books,in those most oftenread and most highlyesteemed.Furthermore
I do not knowof any paperwhichprintsit, nor,I am afraid,would
riskprintingthiswordwithouta humorous intention.So it hascome
aboutthatthe words'virtue'and 'virtuous' canbe foundonly in the
catechism, in the Academyandin comicoperas."This diagnosisof
PaulValeryis undoubtedly correct.But thereis no reasonto be too
muchsurprised byit. On theonehand,it certainly indicates
anentirely
 6 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

naturalphenomenon, the naturalfate of greatwords. On the other

hand,it is quitepossiblethatin a de-christianized era,demoniacalrules
of languagewilleffectively prevail.Accordingly, thegoodwillappear
as ridiculous in the "usage"of a language.Apartfromthispossibility
wemustnot forgetthatChristian moralliteratureandmoralpreaching
havenot alwaysmadeit veryeasyfor the averagemanto perceive the
truesenseof the conception and the realityof virtue.
Virtuedoesnot signifythe merecorrectness of an isolatedaction
or omission.Rathervirtuesignifiesthat man is rightin the super-
naturaland naturalsense. Virtuemeansthe enhancingof the being
of man.Virtueis, as Thomassays,theultimum potentiae(Quaest.disp.
de virtutibus in communi 17), theultimateof whatmanis ableto be.
The virtuousman "is"the manwho developsgoodnessthroughhis
deedsout of his innermostinclinationand substance.No less im-
portantthanthe correctandtruenotionof virtueis a trueinsightinto
the hierarchy of the virtues. Today thereis muchtalk aboutthe
"heroic" character of Christianity or aboutthe "heroic" conceptionof
life as the distinguishing characteristic
of Christianlife. Suchexpress-
ions are only half-trueand thereforehalf-false.The first and dis-
tinguishing virtueof theChristian is the supernaturalloveof Godand
neighbour. And all the divine virtues are superiorto the cardinal
virtues. And underthe cardinalvirtuesbraveryis not the first,but
thethird.
II
Amongthe cardinalvirtuesprudence ranksfirst. Prudenceis not
onlythe firstamongotherwise equivalent virtues;but it "givesbirth"
to all moralvirtue. Thisthesisaboutthepriority of prudence, thetrue
meaningof whichwe arescarcely ableto conceive, more
expresses than
a mereaccidental sequence of the cardinal virtues. As it is, it expresses
thefundamental constitutionof realityin relationto therealmof ethics.
Goodpresupposes truthandtruthpresupposes reality. Forwhatdoes
the priorityof prudence mean? It meansnothingbut the realization
of goodpresupposing the awareness of reality.The firstthingthatis
demanded of anactivemanis thatheshouldbeknowing, asSt. Thomas
says(Quaest.disp.de virtutibus card.17). Whoeverdoesnotknowthe
trueconditionof realthingscannotdo good;for good is thatwhich
complieswith reality. Naturally,here "knowledge" does not mean
knowledge in the senseof the exact notions of moder science.What
it doesmeanis realcontactwithobjectivereality. This contact,for
 CHRISTIAN IDEA OF MAN 7

instance, may be reached by a mode of revelation superior to the

"scientific" mode. To prudence belongs also the quality of docility,
which means an attentive submission to the genuine knowledge of a
superiormind. In prudence the unbiased perceptionof reality is decisive
for our actions. So the prudent person, on the one hand, looks at the
objective reality of things, and on the other hand, concerns himself with
the willing and doing. But it is the reality at which he looks in the
first place. And then, in virtue of the knowledge of reality he decides
what is to be done and what not, and how it should be done and how
not. So, really, all virtue depends upon prudence. And somehow all
sin contradictsprudence, omne peccatumopponitur prudentiae (Summa
Theologica, II, II, 119, 37). Our habit of language, which is also our
habit of thinking, has rather considerably deviated from this statement.
According to our usage, prudence seems to be an evasion rather than
a presupposition of good. It is hard for us to believe that it should
always and necessarily be prudent to be just and true. And prudence
and bravery above all seem to be most incompatible: to be brave is
mostly imprudent.
But we have to rememberthat the true sense of this connection is as
follows: the just and the brave acting, all good acting, is not just and
brave and good unless correspondingto the truth of real things; it is the
virtue of prudence in which this truth of real things becomes effective,
fertile and decisive. This doctrine of the priority of prudence has an
immense "practical"importance. It includes, for instance, the educa-
tional principle that education and self-education aiming at moral de-
velopment must be rooted in the virtue of prudence, that is to say, the
ability to see objectively the realities surroundingour acts, and to make
them decide our course of action. Furthermore,the classical doctrine
of the virtue of prudence offers the only chance to overcome
radically
the phenomenon of "moralism." The substance of moralism, which
most people regard as a thing peculiarly Christian,is that it severs what
we are from what we ought to do, that it proclaimsa
duty without per-
ceiving and without showing that duty is rooted in what we are. On
the contrary, the nucleus as well as the proper concern of the doctrine
of prudence is as follows: to prove as necessary the coherence of what
we ought to do with what we are; in the act of prudence what we
ought
to do is decided by what we are. Moralism says: good is what should
be, because it should be. The doctrine of prudence says: good is what
agrees with reality; it should be because it correspondswith reality. (It
8 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

is perhaps important to perceive

herethedistinctlyinnerconnection of
"Christian" moralism withmoder voluntarism.)And a third"practi-
cal"and"actual" pointmustbe intimated.The fundamental attitude
of justness(in the senseof agreement withreality),of objectivity,as
expressed in the classical
doctrineof prudence,was summarized in the
MiddleAges in the followingsentence,a sentencebothgrandand
simple:Wiseis manif all thingstasteto himas theyreallyare. Now
it is an important experienceof modernpsychology or, moreexactly,
of modernpsychotherapy thata manto whomthingsdo not tasteas
theyare,whoinsteadtastesin all thingsnothingbut himselfbecause
he looksonlyat himself-thatthismanhas lost not onlythe realca-
pacityforjustice(andforallmoralvirtue)butalsohispsychical sanity.
Thusa wholegroupof psychicaldiseasesis substantially due to such
egotisticlackof objectivity.Suchexperience sanctionsand illumines
theethicalrealismof thedoctrine of thepriority
of prudence.Prudence
is oneof thespiritual regionswherethe mysterious connectionbetween
sanityandsanctity, betweenillnessandsinbecomesvisible. A psycho-
logicaltheorywhichdoes not wilfullyoverlookthemis likelyto see
verydeepconnections here. The ethicaldoctrineof prudence should
be ableto illuminein an amazingwaythe centralnotionof self-decep-
tion (whichis nothingbut a lackof objectivity in perceiving reality,
andwhichis rootedin thewill).
III
Prudenceand justiceare morecloselyconnectedthanappearsat
firstsight. Justice,
wehavesaid,is theabilityto livetruly"withothers."
Now it is easy to see that this abilityto live in community (which
nearlysignifiesthe abilityto live at all) dependsuponthe objective
perception andacknowledgment of reality.Thismeansthatthisability
dependsuponprudence.Only an objectivemanis just;and lackof
objectivityandinjusticemean,evenin theveryusageof language, almost
thesamething.
It is prudencein whichthe realcapacityfor beinggoodis rooted;
the man
only prudent has,inpresupposition, thecapacityforbeinggood.
Thisis whyprudence ranksso high. Buttherankof justiceis basedon
the factthatjusticeis the highestandtruestmodeof thisgoodnessit-
self. Sucha statement mustbe emphasized since"Christian" middle-
classpeoplehavefor somegenerations proclaimed altogetherdifferent
thingsas the primaryand truecriterionof a good man,specifically,
 CHRISTIAN IDEA OF MAN 9

"morality" so-called.A goodmanis primarily just. Manasa member

of thecommunity hasthetaskof realizing justice.Onecanalmostsay
thatit is not so muchthe individual whorepresents justice(although,
the
naturally, strictlyspeaking personalonecan be "virtuous"),
and
but We, the socialentity,the people;whichmeansthatjusticeis the
perfection of theWe.
Now, thestructure of eachcommonwealth is basedon threefunda-
mentalrelations; andif thesethreerelationsarerightwe cansaythat
justicerulesin it. First,therearethemutualrelations of themembers;
the justnessof theserelationscorresponds to the exchangeof justice
(justitiacommutativa).Second,thereare the relationsof the whole
to themembers; thejustness of theserelations
correspondsto distributive
justice(justitiadistributiva).Third, thereare the relationsof the in-
dividualmembers to the wholeWe; the justnessof theserelationscor-
responds to "legal"justice(justitialegalis). Thesethingsmaysound
verynatural,as if theywerea matterof course. But theyarenot a
matterof course. The socialdoctrineof individualism, for example,
seesonlyone of thesethreerelations, namely,the mutual relationsof
theindividual members.Individualism doesnot acknowledge the true
independence of the socialwhole, and thereforeit knows of no actual
connection of the individuals to the whole,not of thewholeto the in-
dividuals. And accordinglythe justitia commutativais the uniqueform
of justicewhichindividualism knowsof, if it is consistent.On the
otherhand, anti-individualism has createda "universalistic" social
doctrinewhichfranklydeniesany existenceof relationsamongin-
dividualsas individuals,andwhich,in consequence, declares thejustitia
commutativa to be an "individualistic
misconception." The realityof
the "totalitarianstate"showsthat suchan "academic theory"is not
inclinedto remainon the levelof mere"theory"; its coercivepower
hardlyadmits"private" relationsamongindividuals whomerelycome
togetheras functionariesto servetheendsof thestate.
St. ThomasAquinasalsosaysthatthe wholemorallife of manis
closelyboundto the bonumcommune; the justitialegalis,therefore,
reallyhasa veryparticular rankandplace. Butwe mustnot overlook
the ambiguity of this statementof St. Thomas. One of its sensesis
this: thereis a trueobligationof the individual with respectto the
common weal,andthisobligation the
comprises whole man. Theother
senseis this: all individualvirtuehasan importance for the common
weal. This meansthatthe commonwealneedsthe virtueof all in-
10 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

thatit cannotbe realized

dividuals, unlesstheindividual
membersof the
are
community good, not only just,but good, virtuous
in the most
andsecretand,so to speak,"private"
individual way.
IV
Anothererroraboutjustice(at bottomquiteliberalistbut not at
all limitedto the era of liberalism)declares:it is possibleto be just
withouthavingto be brave. This is not so muchan erroraboutthe
natureof justiceas an errorabouttherealstructure of "this"world,in
whichjusticeis to be realized.For"this"worldis constructed in such
a mannerthatjustice,andgoodgenerally, couldnotbe successful of its
ownaccordwithoutthefightingman,readyto dieforit. Evilis mighty
in "this"world:thisfactbecomes manifestin thenecessity forfortitude
whichmeansreadiness to endureinjuries;for the sakeof therealization
of good. So, St. Augustine says,fortitudeitselfis anirrefutable witness
of theexistence of evilin theworld. Now.it is a badandfalseanswer
to the liberalisterrorto believethatit is possibleto be bravewithout
beingjust. Fortitude asa virtueispresentonlywherejusticeis intended.
Who is not justcannotbe bravein the strictsense. ThomasAquinas
says: "Thepraiseof fortitudedependsuponjustice"(SummaTheo-
logica,II, II, 123,12). Thismeans:simultaneously I maypraiseany-
one for his fortitudeonly if I can praisehimfor his justice. True
fortitude, therefore, is essentially
connected withthewillof justice.
It is no lessimportant to perceivethatthe ideaof fortitudeis not
identicalwiththeideaof an aggressive fearlessness at all costs. There
evenis a sortof fearlessness whichis opposedto thevirtueof fortitude.
Herewe mustconsiderthe placeoccupiedby fearin the structure of
humanexistence. The commonand mitigatingforeground-talk of
everyday life is basedon thedenialof theexistence of anythingterrible.
The terribleis pushedbackinto the realmof mereappearances. This
mitigation, effective not
(or effective) at all times today findsa remark-
ablecounterpart in the factthatin thephilosophical, psychological and
poeticalliterature of ourtimeno conception playssucha largepartas
theconception of fear. Anothercounterpart of thateveryday attempt at
making human existence harmless and"fearless" is a newstoicism which
hasfoundan imposing humanrepresentation anda fascinating formula-
tion in literature.This new stoicismis "proclaimed" aboveall by a
groupof menwhoconsidertheeventsof thelastwarsas a destruction
whichincludesthe promiseand the threatof new, still greaterand
 CHRISTIAN IDEA OF MAN 11

apocalyptic catastrophes. And the thesisis: life is alwaysterrible, but

thereis nothingso terriblethata strongmancouldnot endureit with
greatness.But if you readthe books,for example,of ErnstJuenger,
whois oneof themostremarkable headsof thisnew"Stoa,"youhave
to agreethatnearlyall dreams of these"adventurous hearts"aredreams
of anxiety.
To thisquestionthe ultimateandmostprofoundChristian answer
is: the notionof the fearof theLord. But this conception runsthe
riskof beingdepleted,deprivedof its reality,and concealedby the
Christian common-consciousness. The fearof theLordis notthesame
as "respect" for the absoluteGod,but realfearin the strictsenseof
theword. Thecommonsignification of fear,anxiety,fright,horrorand
terroris thattheyareall different answers to thedifferent
manners of
the diminution of being,the ultimateone of whichis annihilation.It
is not at all thewayof Christian theologyto denythe existence of the
fearsome in humanlife;furthermore, the Christian doctrineof life does
not say thatmanshouldnot or mustnot fearthe fearsome.But the
Christian asksfor theordotimoris;he asksfor whatis reallyandulti-
matelyfearsome; andhe is afraidof fearingperhapsthatwhichis not
at all reallyanddefinitely fearsome, andafraidof considering perhaps
as harmless thatwhichis definitelyfearsome.Thatwhichis properly
fearsome comesto this: thepossibility of man'svoluntarily separating
himselffromhisultimateoriginof being. Thisis theultimateperilof
his existence.And it is man'sfearof thispossibleseparation fromthe
UltimateOriginof being,to whichthefearof theLordis theadequate
answer.Thisfearwhichaccompanies all humanlife, eventhatof the
saint,as a realpossibility, is a fear that cannotbe overcome by any
mannerof "heroism."On the contrary, thisfearis the presupposition
of all genuineheroism.Thefearof theLordas a fearis to be endured
andsuffered rightup to thedefinitesecurity of theEternalLife. When
fortitudesavesus fromlovingourlife in suchmannerthatwe lose it
-then thisimpliesthatthefearof theLord,as a fearof losingEternal
Life,is the basisof all Christian fortitude. It shouldbe considered,
however, that the fearof the Lordis the negativecounterpart of the
hopefulloveof God. St. Augustinesays:all fearis thefeelingof love.
The fearof the Lordis the "fulfillment" of the naturalanxietyof
manwithrespectto the diminution of beingandof annihilation.All
moralgoodnessis likewisea sortof extensionof naturalinclinations.
And man fearsthe nihilby nature. And as the naturaldesirefor
12 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

life in community is accomplished in the virtueof justice,and as the

naturaldesirefor self-dependence is perfectedin the virtueof magna-
nimity,and as the naturalimpulsefor enjoyment is perfectedin the
virtueof temperance-sothe naturalanxietyof annihilation becomes
alsodestructive, unlessperfected in thefearof theLord. The factthat
thefearof theLordin its properformas "timorfilialis"is a gift of the
Holy Ghostand not, as for example,with the cardinalvirtues,the
naturalfulfillmentof a naturalhumanfaculty-thisfactimpliesthatonly
realizedsupernatural perfectionis ableto freemanfromthe tyranny
of unsatisfiedanxiety.As it is, thedestructive effectof thisunsatisfied
anxietyandits tyrannyareprovednot onlyin ethicalspheresbutalso
in the sphereof the naturalpsychical life-as psychiatry mayconfirm.
Hereis oncemorea pointclearlyrevealing thecoherence of sanityand
sanctity. The distinctness, however,is limitedto the fact of this co-
herence:in whatprecisemannersanityand sanctityand aboveall
guilt and illnessare interwoven and on whichtermsthis connection
becomes effective-astatement aboutthisis hardlypossible.In anycase
the "sanity" of justice,of magnanimity, of temperance, of fearof the
Lordand of all virtueconsistsin theirconforming to the objective
reality,bothnaturalandsupernatural. Compliance withrealityis the
principleof bothsanityandgoodness.

V
Earlierwe notedthatthe naturaldesirefor enjoyment canbecome
destructive.Thisfactis concealed by theliberalist thesis:manis good.
Enlightened liberalism,by virtueof its mostfundamental presupposi-
tionscouldnot acknowledge the possibleexistencein manof a revolt
of inferiorspiritualforcesagainstthe government of mind;it denies
thatmanhas lost the spontaneous innerorderof his naturethrough
originalsin. And so,judgedfromthisaspect,thevirtueof temperance
necessarilypassesfor somethingnonsensical and objectless.For the
virtueof temperance presupposesthat the above-mentioned destructive
revoltof the sensesagainstthe mindis possibleand is perceivedas
possible. This depletionof the virtueof temperance by enlightened
liberalismthecommondoctrineof manyChristians (I willnot saythe
doctrineof theChurch,noreventheology)hascountered by an over-
accentuation of this veryvirtue. So for the Christiancommoncon-
sciousnessthevirtueof temperance, in its typicalformsof chastityand
abstinence,hasbecometheconspicuous andall-dominating traitof the
 CHRISTIANIDEA OF MAN 13

Christian ideaof man. Now this answerof Christianity has, never-

theless,remained a childof its adversary, thatis, of liberalism.This
dependence upontheliberalistic-individualistic
adversary becomesmani-
fest in so far as the virtueof temperance is the most"private" among
thefourcardinalvirtues;temperance refersto the individualas an in-
dividual.So the most"private" virtuepassesfor the mostChristian
virtue.In classical theology,however, this"private" characterof temper-
ancewastheveryreasonfor declaring thisvirtueto be thelastinstead
of thefirstof thefourcardinalvirtues.
The overvaluation of temperance has hadveryconsiderable effects
andextensions.The fact,for example,thatin oureveryday usageof
language the words "sensuality," "passion,""desire," "inclination"have
receiveda verynegativemeaningalthoughthey are ethicallyneutral
conceptions, is partlydueto thisovervaluation of temperance.But if
by the word"sensuality" is exclusivelymeantsensualityas revolting
againstthe spirit,and by "passion" exclusivelybad passion,and by
"desire" exclusivelymutinous desire-then of course,thereareno names
leftforthenon-mutinous sensuality,which St. Thomassays,belongsto
virtue. And this defectof the usageof languagestronglyinclines
towarda dangerous confusionof notions,evenof life itself. On the
otherhand,this defectof the usuageof languagehas arisenfroma
confusionof notionsandof life.
Perhapsit maybe good to cite herean examplefromthe Summa
Theologicawhichschowswhatthe "Universal Doctor"thinksof this
matter. It is an example,not a principle, but an examplewhichillus-
tratesa principle.In the SummaTheologica(SummaTheologica,I,
II, 22-48)thereis a chapteraboutthepassiones animae,thepassionsof
the soul. The expressioninvolvesall motionsof the sensuousfaculty,
suchas love,hate,desire,delight,sadness,fearandanger. Oneof the
approximately twenty-five questionsof this chapterdeals with the
"remedies againstgrief and sadness"(SummaTheologicaI, II, 38).
In fivespecialarticlesSt. Thomasenumerates fivesuchremedies.Be-
forementioning themwe shouldlike to posethe question:Whatin-
formationcouldbe giventodayby the moralcommonconsciousness
of Christianity
concerning the "remediesagainstthe sadnessof soul?"
Everyone mayanswerthe questionhimself. The firstgeneralremedy
mentioned by St. Thomasis: anysortof delight,for sadnessis likea
wearinessof the soul,but delightis likea rest. The secondremedy:
tears! Thethirdremedy:thecompassion of friends.The fourth:the
14 THE REVIEWOF POLITICS

contemplation of truth(whichis moreableto alleviategriefthe more

a manloveswisdom). As to thefifthremedy mentionedbySt. Thomas,
we shouldbearin mindthatwe havea textbookof theologybeforeus,
andcertainlynot an ordinaryone. The fifthremedyagainstsadness
of soulis: sleepingandbathing,for a sleepanda bathcausea feeling
of well-beingin thebodywhichin returnreactsuponthesoul. Natur-
ally,St. Thomasis wellacquaintedwiththepossibilities
andnecessities
of a supernatural overcoming of humansorrow;he is even of the
opinionthatthereareformsand degreesof humansorrowwhichcan
onlybe overcome energies.But St. Thomas,on the
by supernatural
otherhand,does not thinkof puttingasidenaturalpossibilities-for
example, sleepingandbathing.Andhe doesnotat all feelembarrassed
to speakaboutthemin the midstof a theological discourse.
VI
All fourof thecardinalvirtues-prudence, justice,fortitude,
temper-
ance-are principally connectedwith the naturalsphereof human
reality. Butas Christian virtuestheygrowout of thefertilegroundof
faith,hope and charity.Faith,hopeandcharityarethe answerto the
realityof the TriuneGod,whichis supernaturally revealed to theChris-
tianbytherevelation of JesusChrist.And thethreetheological virtues
arenot onlythe answerto thatreality,but theyareat the sametime
thefacultyandthesourceof thisanswer;theyarenot theansweritself
but theyare,so to speak,alsothe mouthwhichaloneis ableto give
this answer.All threetheologicalvirtuesare closelyconnectedwith
eachother;"theyare,"as St. Thomassays in his tractabouthope,
"flowing backintothemselves in a holyring;whoby hopehasbeenled
to charityhasalsoa moreperfecthope,justas hisfaithis stronger than
before"(Quaest.disp.de spe,3 ad 1).
As thecardinalvirtuesarerootedin thetheological virtuesthesuper-
naturalethosof the Christiandiffersfromthe naturalethos of the
gentleman,that is, the naturallynobleman. This originitself,the
mannerandmeansof thecoherence of naturalandsupernatural virtue,
is expressed in the well-known sentencethat gracedoes not destroy
naturebutpresupposes andperfectsit. Thissentenceseemsto be very
clearandreallyis so. But its clearness cannotaffectthe impossibility
of makinga mysterycomprehensible a
by simplestatement.And there
is nothingmoremysterious thanthemannerin whichGodactsin man,
andmanin God.
 CHRISTIANIDEA OF MAN 15

Nevertheless,the differencebetweena Christianand a gentleman

becomesclearlymanifestand in many ways. The Christiancan, for
example,appearto act contraryto naturalprudencebecausein his acting
he must conformto realitieswhichonly faith perceives. Incidentally,
about this supernaturalprudenceSt. Thomas has writtena sentence
which, I think, is particularlyimportantfor the Christianof today.
"Obviously,"St. Thomas says, "the naturalvirtue of prudencepre-
supposesquite a degree of acquiredknowledge." Now, when the
theologicalvirtues augment in a supernaturalmanner the cardinal
virtues,what aboutprudence? Does gracereplacethe naturalknowl-
edge of naturalthings? Does faith supersedethe objectiveestimateof
the concretesituationor the concretedeed, or does it replaceit? In
this case, how can graceand faith be useful to the "plainman,"who
does not possessthisknowledgewhichis sometimesratherdifficult? To
thesequestionsSt. Thomasgives, I thinka quitegrand,and also most
consoling,answer: "The men who requirethe adviceand counselof
others can, providingthey are in a state of grace, advise themselves
in so far as they ask for the adviceof otherpeopleiand that they (this
is most important)are able to distinguisha good counselfrom a bad
one" (SummaTheologica,II, II, 47, 3). If they are in the state of
grace! It goeswithoutsayingwhythisansweris consolingin the present
situationof the plain Christian.
The differencebetweena Christianand a gentlemanis
especially
evidentin the gap dividingChristianfortitudefrom the natural
bravery
of the gentleman. This point really closes the considerationof the
Christianidea of man. The differencebetweena Christianfortitude
and a merelynaturalfortitudelies eventuallyin the
theologicalvirtue
of hope. All hope says: it will turn out well, it will end well.
Super-
naturalhope says: for the man who stays in the
realityof grace it
will turn out well in a mannerwhichinfinitelyexceedsall
expectation;
for this man it will end with nothingless than EternalLife.
Now it may come to pass that in an era of
temptationto despair,
all imminentand secularprospectsfor a
"happyend" becomegloomy.
So it can come to pass that there is
nothing left to the naturalman
limitedto naturethanthe desperatefortitudeof an "heroicend." And
particularly the true gentlemanwill considerthis way as the
only possi-
bility; for he of all personswill be able to renouncethe "wayout of
happiness"(as ErnstJuengersays). In short,sometimesit mayhappen
that supernaturalhope remainsthe
unique possibilityof hope at all.
16 THE REVIEW OF POLITICS

This is not to be understood in anysenseof "eudaemonism," it is not

a questionof anxietyabouta lastpossibility of subjective happiness. The
Biblicalsentence"MayHe kill me,nevertheless I shallhopein Him"
(Job,13,15.) is farfroma "eudaemonic" anxietyabouthappiness.No,
the Christian hopeis firstand aboveall theexistential adjustment of
manto fulfillment, to the ultimaterealization, to the fullnessof being
(to which,of course,the fullnessof happiness or ratherof beatitude
corresponds). If then all natural hopes sometimes becomesenseless,
it meansthatsupernatural hope for man remains trulytheuniquepossi-
of his
bility adjusting being. The desperate fortitude of the "heroic
end"is at bottom"nihilistic," sinceit believesthatit cansuffertheun-
known. Christian fortitude,however,is fed by hopefor the abundant
realityof Life,for the EternalLife,for a newheavenand for a new
earth.