M ARSHALL Marine Investigation Report

I SLANDS
Marine Investigation Report

Grounding of the Tankship

Inside This Report:
NINO (IMO# 8517047) Off the Coast
1 Introduction of South Africa on 18 July 2002
2 Authority

3 Vessel Particulars &

Findings of Fact

10 Conclusions &
Recommendations

11 Acknowledgements

12 Appendix I

13 Appendix II

Oil Tanker NINO

This Report, and any appended Maritime Administrator’s
Decision, sets forth certain findings which have been
ascertained or determined up to the time of its issuance,
and is published to alert the shipping industry and the
public of the general circumstances of this accident. While
every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the
information contained in this Report, this Administration and
its representatives accept no liability for any error or omission
alleged to be contained herein.
On 18 July 2002, the Marshall Islands Registered Oil Tanker NINO (IMO#
8517047), laden with 7,378.29 metric tons (mt) of assorted gas oil cargo,
was enroute from Durban to Mossel Bay.
At approximately 0215 hrs, the NINO ran aground off the coast of East
London, South Africa. Immediate attempts to re-float the vessel were
made by working the rudder from hard port to hard starboard with the
propulsion at full power astern.

Extracts may be published without specific permission

Upon realization that the NINO could not be re-floated without assistance,
providing that the source is duly acknowledged; otherwise
the ship was ballasted down to minimize hull pounding in the surf and
please obtain permission prior to reproduction of the Report.
avoid catastrophic failure of the cargo tanks. Salvors arrived later that day
Office of the and non-essential crew were evacuated by helicopter.
M aritime Administrator
After offloading over 2,000 cubic meters (m3) of cargo and fuel oil, the
11495 Commerce Park Drive
NINO was successfully re-floated on 31 July 2002, and subsequently
Reston, Virginia 20191 USA
Tel: +1-703-620-4880 Fax: +1-703-476-8522 taken in tow to Algoa Bay to evaluate the extent of damages. The NINO
was eventually taken to Durban to offload the remainder of the cargo and
Contact: Nick Makar
undertake repairs, which were completed in February 2003, amounting
E-mail: maritime@register-iri.com
to a total of 925 mt of steel renewed.

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 Marine Investigation Report
Marine Investigation Report

Disclaimer
The Flag Administration has a mandate to promote safety of life and property at sea, and the prevention of
pollution. This is achieved in part by conducting investigations of marine casualties involving vessels in the
registry for remedial purpose in accordance with the Republic of the Marshall Islands Maritime Act 1990
and Maritime Regulations. Marine investigations, which are administrative in nature, look to the cause of
difficulties experienced, means of avoiding them in the future, possible violations of law, and any faults or
failures on the part of personnel, shipowners or operators which might require action in respect of any licenses,
certificates or documents.

It is not the function of the Administration or the purpose of the investigation to assign fault or determine civil
or criminal liability with respect to enhancing the litigation posture of any party. The Administration must
report, or cause to be reported, the circumstances and proximate cause or causes of a marine casualty and
contributory factors. However, where it is determined that there exists evidence of criminal conduct under the
laws of the Republic of the Marshall Islands on the part of any seafarer holding a Republic of the Marshall
Islands Certificate of Competency or other official document, the matter would be referred to the Ministry of
Justice of the Republic of the Marshall Islands for appropriate action.

Authority
An investigation under the authority of the Marshall Islands Maritime Regulation 6.38 was conducted to
determine the cause of the casualty and recommend remedial measures.

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 Marine Investigation Report

Vessel Particulars* FINDINGS OF FACT

Vessel Name
NINO 1. Background Voyage Events
Owner 1.1 The NINO is a single hull 10,947 gross ton (gt) oil tanker constructed in 1988
Nino Shipping Company at Brodosplit Shipyard, Yugoslavia. The cargo area is comprised of six Center
Flag (C) Tanks, ten Wing Tanks—five Port (P) and five Starboard (S), and two Slop
Marshall Islands Tanks, with double bottoms extending the entire length of the cargo spaces. The
ship is fitted with a single main engine (7,758 HP) directly coupled to a variable
Vessel Type
Oil Tanker pitch propeller. Electrical power is provided by two auxiliary generators, and
power can also be supplied when underway via a shaft generator. Service speed
Official Number is 15 knots, and total compliment on board is 26 persons.
1474
IMO Number 1.2 At approximately 0600 hrs, on 11 July 2002, the NINO
8517047 arrived at Durban, South Africa, carrying a cargo of MOGAS
Length 97. Discharging commenced shortly thereafter, and was
151.30 meters completed at 2305 hrs on 15 July 2002. Tank cleaning was
carried out, and notice of readiness was tendered at 0700 hrs
Breadth on 16 July 2002 upon completion.
22.40 meters
Depth 1.3 At 1015 hrs, on 16 July 2002, cargo loading operations
12.15 meters commenced. The loading was completed at 0330 hrs on 17
Gross Tonnage July 2002, with the following cargoes:
10,947 metric tons MOGAS 97
Net Tonnage 2,692.69 mt into tanks #4C, #5P and #5S
5,888 metric tons
MOGAS 97 ULP
Deadweight 987.47 mt into tanks #2P and #2S
16,231 metric tons
ADO (Gas Oil)
Year Built 3,968.13 mt into tanks #1C, #5C, #3P and #3S
1988
Classification Society 1.4 The NINO departed from Durban at 0800 hrs on 17
Det Norske Veritas July 2002, bound for Mossel Bay, to load a completion MOGAS 97
cargo of approximately 7,000 mt of MOGAS 97. Drafts MOGAS 97 ULP
Class Notation
at departure were 5.8m forward, and 8.55m aft. According ADO (GAS OIL)
1A1 ICE-1B Tanker for
Oil ESP E0 HL(1.5) to the passage plan, the voyage was to have taken just
under 48 hours with ETA Mossel Bay at 0800 hrs on 19 July 2002. The
Engine/Power conditions at the time of departure were reported to be wind force 8 in a
Motor Diesel / 7,758 HP South-Westerly direction with sea force 6 and swell from a North-Easterly
Speed direction. The weather conditions remained unchanged for the day.
15.00 knots
Persons on Board 1.5 On the evening of 17 July 2002 before midnight, the Master attended
26 the bridge to evaluate the progress of the vessel. The 3rd Officer was on duty,
and reported that all was well. The NINO was observed to be approximately
Cargo Carried 9 miles off the coastline, steering 230° by the gyro, making a true course
2,692.69 metric tons MOGAS 97
East of the intended course line, further off the coast. The Master prepared
987.47 metric tons MOGAS 97 ULP
the night orders for the watch, and amended the passage plan, instructing
3,968.13 metric tons ADO
the 3rd Officer to maintain the current track to the east of the intended track,
* At the time of the Casualty and to instruct the 2nd Officer to do the same. In addition, he directed the 3rd

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Officer to inform the 2nd Officer to send the vessel’s ETA for reported it to be showing about 248°. When the course was
Mossel Bay at midnight to the Charterers Agents. The Master steadied, the helm was placed back onto auto pilot.
then left the bridge and turned in at about 2345 hrs.
2.5 The 2nd Officer then reported that he went back to the
1.6 Shortly thereafter, the 2 Officer arrived on the bridge and
nd
starboard radar to check the display; however, land was still not
relieved the 3rd Officer after checking the NINO’s position using showing. At this time, the port radar was switched from ‘stand-
the starboard radar, GPS and gyro. The 2nd Officer stated that all by’ to ‘on’ but the port radar only displayed a yellow screen.
equipment appeared to be functioning normally after carrying The starboard radar was checked again, and as before, only the
out watch change over procedures. The port radar was reported heading marker was showing and the shore line was not seen.
to be on standby at the time. Also at this time, one ship was
observed overtaking the NINO approximately three miles off 2.6 Furthermore, visibility at this time was reported to be
the starboard side. The course of the NINO was also confirmed poor due to the development of rain squalls. The 2nd Officer
and recorded as 230° by the gyro and as 250° magnetic. remarked that the Mbashe light could only be seen for a
brief period as the NINO passed abeam of it. Thereafter, no
2. Sequence of Events land markers could be ascertained. Throughout the watch,
visibility was reported by the 2nd Officer to be about 3 miles,
2.1 The next fix was taken by the 2nd Officer at 0100 hrs. The
with showers. Winds were observed to be force 7/8 from the
vessel’s position of 32°21’S / 29°03’E was fixed by visual
South West, and seas with a North-Easterly swell.
bearings off the shore light at Mbashe Point, and confirmed by
GPS. The course remained 230° by the gyro. Both the 2nd and
2.7 According to the 2nd Officer’s statement, at 0200 hrs the
3rd Officers reported that position fixes were taken hourly, and
gyro heading was checked again and observed to display a
that this was standard practice onboard the ship.
course of 230°. However, at this time the magnetic compass
was now observed to be showing a course of 290°. Alerted
2.2 According to statements provided by the 2nd Officer, at
by this considerable deviation, the 2nd Officer proceeded to
approximately 0115 hrs, the Able Bodied Seaman (AB) on
the chart room to fix the position of the NINO by GPS. After
watch with the 2nd Officer advised that he felt unwell due to
taking the first fix, he observed the vessel to be very close
the movement of the vessel in bad weather, and that he needed
to shore, then took a second fix to re-check the position and
to use the toilet. The 2nd Officer permitted the AB to leave
confirmed the position to be correct.
the bridge with the expectation that he would return shortly
thereafter. However, the 2nd Officer reported that the AB did
2.8 The 2nd Officer stated that he returned to the helm, took
not return to the bridge. A replacement was not called.
control off auto pilot, and put the wheel hard over to port. It
was further stated the vessel did not readily come around and
2.3 A short time later, upon checking the starboard radar,
continued on the same course, rolling heavily.
the 2nd Officer observed that the heading of 230° continued
to be displayed on the radar; however, the shore line did not
2.9 Keeping the helm at hard over to port, the 2nd Officer
show. The 2nd Officer stated that he cycled through the various
reported calling the Master just prior to the NINO running
ranges, but the shore line could not be picked up.
aground. The Master reported being awoken by the shuddering
of the vessel, just prior to being called by the 2nd Officer. In
2.4 Then, at approximately 0135 hrs the gyro off-course
either event, the Master proceeded directly to the bridge and
alarm sounded on the steering console. The 2nd Officer recalled
arrived just as the vessel was aground.
observing the heading displayed on the starboard radar and
the gyro swing to a course of 130°. The magnetic compass
3. Grounding Incident
heading at this time was not reported. Then, according to his
statement, the 2nd Officer accounted taking helm off automatic 3.1 At approximately 0215 hrs on 18 July 2002, the NINO
steering and altering course on hand steering to starboard, was hard aground off East London, South Africa. When
bringing the vessel around until the heading marker on the the Master arrived on the bridge, he reported observing the
gyro came back to 230°. When the vessel was brought onto propulsion set to full ahead. The Master stated he immediately
230°, the 2nd Officer checked the magnetic compass and placed the propeller pitch to zero degrees, and operated

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the steering gear from hard port to hard starboard to check
freedom of movement. The gear appeared to be responding
properly as the Master operated the steering gear.
3.2 The crew was called out to emergency stations, instructed
to don life jackets, and secure all watertight doors and
ventilation flaps around the accommodation due to the surf
breaking over the stern. The Master ordered hand soundings
to be taken of all double bottom tanks and spaces, including
tanks and spaces beneath the engine room and steering gear.
Surf Breaching Over Stern
3.3 The propulsion was gradually placed into full power
astern while engineers checked that all engine parameters were
acceptable. Simultaneously, the rudder was repeatedly worked
from hard port to hard starboard in an attempt to rock the vessel
free. The re-floating attempt was continued for about an hour
until 0400 hrs, at which time it was determined that the vessel
was hard aground, and would not be able to be re-floated without
assistance. At this time, the main engine was stopped, and the
vessel was ballasted down to its maximum extent to minimize
pounding of the hull in the surf, and to avoid a subsequent
breaching or catastrophic failure of one of the cargo tanks. The
port anchor was also put down at this time.
4. Salvage Operations
4.1 Assistance was requested by the Master to the
shipmanagers on the morning of 18 July 2002, and a salvage
team was immediately mobilized. The salvage Master and
salvage team were able to board the vessel early in the
afternoon by helicopter. 16 non-essential personnel of the
27 crew were evacuated by helicopter from the vessel later
in the day. Late in the afternoon, it was suspected that the
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Master had suffered a mild heart attack. He remained onboard
with his condition monitored under the guidance of medical
practitioners. However, he was later transported off the vessel
for medical attention as his condition had not improved.
4.2 Over the next several days, pollution abatement, anchor
handling / tug and support vessels arrived on scene. Electrical
power onboard the NINO was provided by the emergency
generator, as the auxiliary generator engine coolers were
clogging up with shells, hampering salvage efforts. Eventually,
generator coolers were rigged to circulate cooling water from
ballast tanks, enabling the generators to be run and provide
power for operating transfer pumps.
Overflight View of NINO Aground
4.3 Soundings were taken around the vessel, and regular over
flights throughout the salvage operation reported no evident
pollution. The salvage plan consisted of consolidating all fuel
oil bunkers, and slop oils (black oil) to #6C cargo tank, and to
transfer the cargo stored in the Wing Tanks to Center Tanks in
order to utilize the Wing Tanks for further ballast. Ultimately,
a portion of the cargo and black oil would be lightered before
undertaking efforts to re-float the vessel.
4.4 Consolidation of cargo and black oil to the Center Tanks
was completed on 23 July 2002. Lightering of black oils in
#6C commenced on 26 July 2002, but had to be aborted after
offloading approximately 170 tons of black oil due to the
development of a minor leak in the transfer hose. A re-floating
was attempted with high tide after observations confirmed the
NINO shifted bodily and changed heading slightly. The first
re-floating attempt proved to be unsuccessful.

 Marine Investigation Report

4.5 On 30 July 2002 a new floating hose was obtained,

the transfer of the remaining black oils from #6C was
completed, and the lightering of cargo from #1C and #5C
commenced. At about 1900 hrs on 31 July 2002, movement
of the NINO was confirmed. Transfer operations were
secured shortly thereafter due to the development of a small
leak in the second transfer hose. Approximately 2 hours
later, the NINO was successfully pulled clear, and towed to
Algoa Bay to survey damages and the condition of the hull.
Total amounts transferred were 1,528 m3 of cargo (ADO)
and 529.6 m3 of black oil. NINO Aground Off East London, South Africa

4.6 Eventually, the NINO was taken under tow to Durban

for the discharge of the remaining cargo and docking for
repairs, as the discharging could not be accomplished in Port
Elizabeth as originally planned. She arrived in Durban, South
Africa on 12 August 2002.

5. Damage Summary
Lightering Operation Underway
5.1 According to the tank soundings taken prior to the initial
re-floating attempt, areas of suspected damage included the
#3 Port Double Bottom (DB) water ballast tank, Starboard
cargo Slop Tank, CPP header tank, Port and Starboard DB
diesel oil storage tanks, fuel oil overflow tank and lube oil
sludge tank. With the exception of the water ballast tank and
Starboard cargo Slop Tank, all the suspected areas are aft
underneath the forward section of the engine room. Despite
the breaching of the fuel oil and lube oil tanks, no pollution
was reported sighted or readily apparent.

5.2 Damages to the cargo Wing Tanks were not initially

evident. It was later discovered that cargo tank #6S, which was
empty, had been holed and was flooding. Diver surveys from
25–27 July 2002 confirmed a gash of 4 meters in way of the Close-Up of Hull Damages
Starboard Slop Tank, the rudder bent at approximately a 60°
angle 1.5 meters from bottom the bilge keel on the starboard
side bent upwards, and a split in the shell plating starboard side
in way of frames 50–55. It was not possible to survey the port
side on site while aground due to dangerous surf conditions.

5.3 While at anchor in Algoa Bay, on 1 August 2002, divers

discovered #3S and #4S cargo tanks open to the sea. The
remainder of the hull was relatively intact, with consistent
indentation running from stem to stern and ranging from
100–400mm. No oil egress was noted. The propeller blades
were also observed to be heavily damaged.

Stern Hull Damages

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 Marine Investigation Report
5.4 Repairs to the damages were undertaken in Durban.
In total, 925 mt of steel was renewed. The repairs were
completed in February 2003.
Damages to Rudder/Propeller
6. Navigational Equipment
6.1 The NINO was fitted with all minimum navigational
equipment required by, and in accordance with, relevant
SOLAS Chapter V Convention requirements—with the
exception of the radio direction finder, for which two
GPS Units were carried. The ship also carried two gyro
compasses. According to available maintenance logs, the
standard magnetic compass was last adjusted on 23 January
2002. It was reported that since the vessel had undergone
its last dry-dock period in June 2002, there had been no
problem with either gyro compass.
6.2 According to statements provided, the vessel was
operating with one gyro compass providing heading
information and the heading input into the ARPA. The
starboard radar was in use with the port radar unit on stand-
by. The 10cm starboard radar is the ARPA radar, and was set
to true motion, utilizing speed input from the GPS and the
heading marker being set by the gyro input. The range on
the radar unit was reported as being set at 12 miles.
6.3 Both gyros onboard the NINO can be run simultaneously,
with the input being controlled by a switch on the bridge.
This switch will control which gyro is providing the input to
The Republic of the Marshall Islands
the ARPA and auto-pilot, and can be changed over at any
time in the event of a failure or problem with the gyro
currently providing the input. According to available
information, it is apparent that only one gyro was
running. Therefore, the mate on watch could not switch
over to the other gyro without first leaving the bridge,
going to the gyro room one deck below, starting the
second gyro and allowing for a period of approximately
four hours for the unit to stabilize. However, it could not
be confirmed as to why only one gyro was running, or
which gyro was in operation.
6.4 As per deck log book entries, the magnetic compass
error prior to 0200 hours on 18 July 2002 was consistently
observed to be 20°W. Therefore, when steering a course
with gyro heading at 230°, the magnetic compass heading
displayed would be observed to be 250°.
6.5 It was also reported that there had been an intermittent
problem with the port radar unit a few months earlier.
However, the 2nd Officer stated the port radar unit was
last operated a month prior with no anomalous conditions
observed. Both the port and starboard radar units had been
serviced during the dry-dock period in June 2002.
7. Working Hours
7.1 While underway, a four hour watch rotation
is employed in which the Chief Officer, 2nd Officer
and 3rd Officer stand watches in four hour increments,
with an eight hour period in between for rest, meals,
and maintenance/collateral duties. However, during
cargo operations and tank cleaning operations, the 2nd
and 3rd Officers work in alternating six hour shifts,
with the Chief Officer undertaking the watch duty for
the entire duration—remaining “on call” and assisting
with operations as necessary. This six hour operational
rotation does not include time used for additional
maintenance or collateral duties.
7.2 The STCW Code requires bridge team members
take mandatory rest periods of at least 10 hours in any 24
hour period. As in the case of a four-on/eight-off watch
rotation, one of the two separate rest periods must be at
least six consecutive hours.
7.3 Prior to the grounding incident, the NINO was in port
at Durban, from 11 July 2002 to 17 July 2002, during which

 Marine Investigation Report
time the vessel was actively engaged in cargo operations and
tank cleaning for the entire duration.
7.4 Analysis of working hour information provided by the
2nd and 3rd Officers revealed that in the 96 hours prior to
the casualty, the 2nd Officer averaged less than six hours
of sleep per day, taken in three hour increments during the
six hour rest period between each six hour watch period.
Furthermore, during the 24 hour period on 17 July 2002,
the day before the grounding, according to the working hour
records, the 2nd Officer reported having only four hours of
sleep between 2000–2400 hrs.
8. Standing Orders
8.1 Onboard the NINO, the Master provides Standing
Orders for all watch standing deck Officers. These are official
orders issued by the Master, intended as the foundation for
supplemental instructions, duties and daily orders for the
bridge team to follow during the course of the watch. The
Master’s Standing Orders provide general instructions, as well
as specific instructions, for the Officer of the Watch (OOW) to
follow during specific circumstances such as taking over the
watch, use of navigational aids and equipment, navigation in
coastal waters, restricted visibility, when to call the Master, etc.
Each OOW signs these orders, attesting to full understanding
of the orders prescribed within.
8.2 Under the Master’s Standing Orders, excerpts of note
read as follows:
General
“… It is of special importance that at all times the officer of
the watch ensures that an efficient look out is maintained.”
Periodic Checks of Navigational Equipment
“Operational tests of shipboard navigational equipment
should be carried out at sea as frequently as practicable
and as circumstances permit, in particular when hazardous
conditions effecting navigation are expected: where
appropriate these tests should be recorded.
The officer of the watch should make regular checks
to ensure that:
(a) the helmsman or the automatic pilot is steering
the correct course;
(b) the standard magnetic compass error is determined
at least once a watch and, when possible, after any
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major alteration of course; the standard and gyro
compasses are frequently compared and repeaters
are synchronized with their master compass…”
Navigation in Coastal Waters
“The largest scale chart on board, suitable for the area
and corrected with the latest available information,
should be used. Fixes should be taken at frequent
intervals; whenever circumstances allow, fixing should
be carried out by more than one method…”
Calling the Master
“The officer of the watch should notify the Master
immediately in the following circumstances:
(a) if restricted visibility is encountered or expected
(-5nm);
(b) if the traffic conditions or the movements of others
are causing concern (-4nm);
(c) if difficulty is experienced in maintaining course;
(d) on failure to sight land, a navigation mark or to
obtain soundings by the expected time;
(e) if, unexpectedly, land or navigation mark is sighted
or change in soundings occurs;
(f) on the breakdown of the engines, steering gear or
any essential navigational equipment;
(g) in heavy weather if in any doubt about the
possibility of weather damage;
(h) if the ship meets any hazard to navigation, such as
ice or derelicts;
(i) on any other emergency or situation in which he is
in any doubt;
Despite the requirement to notify the Master immediately
in the foregoing circumstances, the officer of the watch
should in addition not hesitate to take immediate action for
the safety of the ship, where circumstances so require.”
8.3 Additionally, the Master provides daily orders/
instructions in a document titled “Master’s Bridge Order
Book.” The daily Standing Orders prescribed in the Bridge
Order Book are designed to take into account the particular
situation and circumstances relevant to the operation of the
ship that day. Entries are made by the Master, and counter-
signed by each OOW.

 Marine Investigation Report
8.4 Just prior to midnight on 17 July 2002, the Master’s entry
into the Bridge Order Book read as follows:
“Pls keep sharp look out during all watch. Every 1 hours
made safety round, check gyro and magnetic compass,
check navigation lights, check vsl’s position and steering
course all passage plan. Keep radar 6 and 12 miles range.
Pls follow Master standing order and CSM check list
No. 03, 10, 12.
If any doubt call the Master immediately.”
9. Checklists
9.1 Company Check List No. 03 refers to the Passage Plan.
For the voyage from Durban to Mossel Bay, the Passage Plan
contained 17 Action Points. The Action Points dictate when
and where particular events should take place, such as course
alterations, securing or making deck equipment ready, taking the
pilot onboard, etc. Each Action Point also stipulates the position
fixing intervals and methods. In the subject voyage while
underway, the primary method of position fixing is indicated as
VISUAL, and the secondary as RADAR, with intervals of either
10 or 30 minutes (depending on the Action Point).
9.2 Company Check List No. 10 refers to navigation in
coastal waters, and provides a series of check-offs which
should be taken into account when preparing the passage plan
and for consideration during coastal navigation. An entry
is to be made in the Deck Log Book when the check list is
used during the watch. APPENDIX I lists the check-off items
contained within Check List No. 10. Of note, the company
stipulates a policy whereby the sole look-out is to be suspended
when navigating within 10 miles of the coast. Sole look-out
watchkeeping is a practice whereby the OOW may also be
the sole look-out. Under section 3.2.1.1 of the STCW Code,
this practice may only be undertaken in daylight conditions.
Furthermore, as recommended by the “Bridge Procedures
Guide” published by the International Chamber of Shipping
(ICS), before undertaking sole look-out watchkeeping, the
Master should be satisfied that the OOW has had sufficient
rest, anticipated workload is well within the capabilities of
the OOW, back-up assistance has been clearly designated, all
bridge equipment is fully functional, etc.
9.3 Company Check List No. 12 refers to the Change of
Bridge Watch, and detail guidelines and procedures which
should be met to the satisfaction of the Officer taking over
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the watch. APPENDIX II lists the check-off items contained
within Check List No. 12. The OOW should not hand over
the watch if there is any reason to believe that the relieving
Officer is unfit to carry out his duties. Likewise, the relieving
Officer should also be satisfied that all other members of the
bridge team are fit for duty as well. In any situation where
either OOW is in doubt, the Master should be advised.
9.4 The Company Check Lists referred to in the Master’s
Standing Orders are based on guidelines contained within the
ICS “Bridge Procedures Guide.” Likewise, most aspects of
the Master’s Standing Orders mimic the guidelines published
within the ICS “Bridge Procedures Guide.”
10. Deck Log Book Extracts
10.1 In accordance with the company Check List instructions,
an entry is to be made in the Deck Log Book when the check
list is used during the watch. Review of the Deck Log Book
entries for the previous day on 17 July 2002 revealed that the
first entry at the beginning of each watch rotation recorded
that the Bridge Check Lists No. 03, 10, and 12 were carried
out. Each entry also logged that the auto pilot was checked by
switching from Auto to Manual, then back to Auto.
10.2 However, on 18 July 2002, the first log entry for
the 0000–0400 watch cited “the Bridge Watch c/o was
completed.” There was no recordation that Check Lists
No. 03, 10, and 12 were completed. Furthermore, the entry
at 0100 hrs omitted voyage information detailing heading
information (true, magnetic, and deviation).
10.3 The next entry at 0200 hrs stated:
“02:01—Gyro was failure, vsl was proceed in bad
weather rough sea wave 8 met res, have observed the
radar display not in sight any shore objects.
02:01—By Master order turned altered course to sea
side but high waves pushed vsl to shore.
02:15—vsl aground…”

 Marine Investigation Report
Conclusions
1. The grounding of the NINO on 18 July 2002 was the result
of a failure on the part of the 2nd Officer to maintain an effective
navigational watch during the 0000–0400 watch period.
2. Under STCW Code, the OOW may only be the sole look-
out in daylight conditions and in specific circumstances.
Also, company procedures specifically do not permit a sole
look-out when navigating in coastal waters. The 2nd Officer
permitted the AB to leave the bridge with the expectation
that he would return shortly thereafter. However, explicit
instructions for the AB to return immediately to the Bridge, or
call for a substitute, were not given. Therefore, an ineffective
bridge team and look-out was available for the conditions
encountered during the 0000–0400 watch on 18 July 2002.
3. There was no record of the operational test of shipboard
navigational equipment at the change of watch. If these tests
are not possible at the watch change over due to operational
circumstances, whereby undertaking such tests would
impose a risk to the vessel, they should be carried out at the
first available opportunity.
4. Position fixes were not taken and documented at sufficiently
frequent intervals during the 0000–0400 watch, given the
circumstances encountered. Reportedly, prior to the grounding,
position fixes were taken only once an hour, and recorded once
a watch. Furthermore, the Master’s Orders regarding when to
take position fixes, which specified fixes to be taken once an
hour, do not coincide with the frequencies prescribed by the
passage plan, which specified fixes to be taken at 30 minute
intervals, and the Company Check List #10 for navigation in
coastal waters, which specified fixes to be taken at 15 minute
intervals. According to the Deck Officers’ statements, position
fixes were only taken once an hour, which is not in accordance
with the passage plan or Company Check List #10.
5. Assistance was not called by the 2nd Officer in a timely
manner upon the reported failure of the starboard radar unit
to display the shore line, and the failure of the port radar unit
to operate when switched on. Due to the visibility limitations
encountered, immediate investigation of the root cause of
the radar display failures would have been prudent. Also,
in accordance with good radar practice, if the accuracy or
performance of the radar unit is in doubt, it should not be
relied upon for navigation.
The Republic of the Marshall Islands
6. Additionally, assistance was not called by the 2nd Officer
upon the alleged failure of the gyro compass in operation during
the 0000–0400 watch on 18 July 2002. Based on statements
pertaining to the 2nd Officer’s inability to switch over gyro
compasses without leaving the bridge, it is understood that
only one gyro compass was running. Barring any defect, both
gyro compasses should be run while the vessel is underway to
provide an immediate back-up in the event of a failure of the
gyro currently selected to provide heading information. This
arrangement is also a condition for the exemption from the
radio direction finder requirement.
7. Furthermore, upon a suspected failure of the gyro compass,
the heading information provided should not be relied upon
for navigation. The reported sounding of the off course alarm
could have been triggered by dubious heading information, in
which case a comparison with the magnetic compass heading
would confirm the accuracy of the gyro compass heading.
Also, the vessel’s position was not verified after making the
reported course alteration.
8. The Master’s Standing Orders contain instructions and
procedures that address various events encountered during
the 0000–0400 watch on 18 July 2002. It is evident based on
statements from the 2nd Officer and Log Book extracts that the
Master’s Standing Orders were not followed with regards to:
• ensuring an efficient look-out is maintained;
• recording of operational test of the shipboard
navigational equipment;
• navigation in coastal waters—position fix intervals, and;
• calling the Master on reported failure to sight land,
and reported failures of navigational equipment.
9. Fatigue may have also been a contributing factor based
on evidence provided. Despite being afforded with the
minimum mandatory rest periods stipulated by the STCW
Code, the working hour records suggest that the 2nd Officer
did not get adequate rest prior to assuming the watch at 0000
hrs on 18 July 2002.
Recommendations
1. It is recommended that ship management bring these
findings to the attention of their personnel, to further
awareness and raise the importance for Masters to ensure
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 Marine Investigation Report

that proper bridge team management is understood, orders

and guidelines are adhered to by the OOW, and that all
crewmembers get adequate sleep during available rest
periods prior to assuming their duties.

2. It is recommended that a copy of this Decision and

Report of Investigation be forwarded to the Secretary-General
of the International Maritime Organization and to other
interested parties as well.

Acknowledgements
1. The Republic of the Marshall Islands recognizes the
efforts of all the crews and members of the salvage teams for
providing rapid aid and assistance to the crew of the NINO
upon receiving notice of this incident.

The Republic of the Marshall Islands 11

 Marine Investigation Report

Appendix I

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 Marine Investigation Report

Appendix II

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