Solving the Problem of Sectarianism

It has been a long time since the Muslim world was so doctrinally divided, but f
rom this desperate situation good things for the Muslim world could develop
by LAITH SAUD
The issue of sectarianism in Iraq has diverse implications. First, the issue has
lent itself to the debate over American policy in the country. Politicians argu
e over the role of the US amidst a "civil war". For the non-Muslim world, sectar
ianism in Iraq has shattered myths of a monolithic, single-minded, Muslim world
community. With the assistance of a pro-war media this new appreciation for dive
rsity amongst Muslims, however, has been coupled with suggestions that Muslims s
omehow cannot "get along" with one another. Last, but certainly not least, Musli
ms have been caught off guard by an issue that most were not familiar with in th
eir respective communities. Sectarianism has never been as severe a problem in t
he Muslim world as it is currently being portrayed. The question then arises: wh
y now? For centuries Sunni and Shi'a Muslims, amongst others, have interacted, i
ntermarried, traded and corresponded. When we examine the current crises in Iraq
, some issues need to be raised as to the Muslim response.
First and foremost, I do not feel it is necessary to address the issue of whethe
r the occupying forces provoked sectarianism in Iraq. Of course they did. As som
eone who was born in Iraq of a Sunni father and Shi'a mother and has countless f
amily members who are Sunni, Shi'a and even Kurdish, the current climate of viol
ence in Iraq is incomprehensible without acknowledging the role played by the US
in engendering it. Upon invasion and occupation, the provisional authority in I
raq, headed by Paul Bremer, systematically marginalized non-sectarian technocrat
s in favor of sectarian ideologues. Many of these individuals had not been in Ir
aq for decades and had little more than a sectarian platform to stand on. Yet Am
erican involvement in this regard is somehow still up for debate. Debate is usua
lly healthy but debating the obvious is not. This protracted discussion stems fr
om preponderance over the image of America in the world. Is America truly innoce
nt or is America evil? The problem with this sort of questioning is two-fold: fi
rst, by continuing to debate the factuality of American "innocence" in Iraq, we
unwittingly perpetuate the status quo by holding the door open to American invol
vement in Iraqi affairs. So long as the "jury remains out"-so to speak-on the va
lue of American policy, we delay the withdrawal of American troops by maintainin
g the very possibility that the occupation can yield positive results. Illegal a
nd immoral occupations should not be extended indefinite deadlines before they a
re forthrightly condemed; this is simply not rational, yet this is the continued
case in Iraq. I am not suggesting that an end to the occupation will end the cr
isis in Iraq, but it is a necessary condition for doing so.
What we are more concerned with, rather, is the second more serious problem impl
icit in this debate. An exclusive concern with American involvement in Iraq resu
lts in an American-centric discourse. It sidelines what is a more essential issu
e, namely the role played by Muslim institutions. Asserting that the presence of
the Americans (or the British, or the French, or the Israelis) in Muslim lands
is a source of sectarianism in the Muslim world is a redundant and, ultimately,
useless claim. Of course foreign occupation is a source of division as the stand
ard dictum of "divide and conquer" applies in all occupations. But to continue t
o blame occupations (or any other type of foreign involvement, covert or otherwi
se) is like blaming the wind for carrying our sails while we refuse to bring the
sails down. The wind does not stop blowing, regardless of how desperately we wi
sh that it might.
Sectarianism has taken on a momentum of its own and has manifested itself in the
discourse of Muslim institutions. Sheikhs from Saudi Arabia denounce Shi'a as "
non-believers" while sheikhs in Iran do the same in regards to Sunnis. This cycl
e of excommunication is first un-Islamic, but secondly it also seems to be movin
g along unhindered by more knowledgeable voices. In other places, during times o
f political and social uncertainty many have taken recourse in the only security
available-identity. This trend is not limited to Iraq; however, Iraq is only th
e most extreme case. Iraqis feel they have little choice but to seek forms of as
sociation for the sake of mutual security in the absence of a strong national id
entity, politicized and made concrete in the form of a state. This trend is seet
hing just beneath the surface of many Muslim countries; we now see evidence of i
t in Lebanon, as the weakness of the state was exposed in the face of Israeli br
utality this past summer. Sectarianism is also beginning to rear its ugly head i
n the Gulf, as Iran has been able to shrewdly challenge and consequently undermi
ne the authority of Gulf state regimes. As the vulnerability of many Muslim stat
es becomes increasingly known, is the larger Muslim world going to become subjec
t to the same sort of sectarian instability seen in Iraq? Perhaps, but this does
not have to be the case.
As I said before, sectarianism has never been a major problem in the Muslim worl
d; so it may seem strange to suggest that Muslim institutions have presided over
its development. Yet they have, precisely because of their relative silence ove
r the issue. Muslim have been permitted to practice their faith in an Islamic va
cuum-usually becoming thoroughly acquainted with Jewish and Christian belief, at
least more so than Jews or Christians are familiar with Muslim belief, but some
how not being exposed to different currents within the rich and diverse heritage
that is Islam. This was not always the case.

Sectarianism and Islamic History

Obviously questions surrounding succession to the Prophet Muhammad were the firs
t to implicate tensions in the nascent Muslim community. It is important to poin
t out, however, that there were really no doctrinal disputes during this period
(notwithstanding certain developments surrounding Muhammad b. al-Hanifiyaa and t
he practices of al-Mukhtar al-Thaqafi in Basra). Doctrinal issues did not emerge
within the Muslim polity until well into its imperial enterprise. It is crucial
to point out the imperial component of Muslim politics. The special status acco
rded to the first four Caliphs in the Sunni Muslim tradition does not suggest a
whimsical nostalgia for the companions of the Prophet, but reveals a deeper appr
eciation for the authority of Muslim leaders before they eventually became ruler
s of empires. The reverence that Shi'a Muslims have for the Imams mirrors this a
ffection by esteeming moral leadership over the imperial leadership of the state
.
During the reign of the Umayyad dynasty (661-750 CE), doctrinal issues began to
emerge in the Hijaz and southern Iraq. The most vivid of these was the issue of
free will versus pre-determination in Islamic belief. The question was whether w
e as human beings possessed free will or were our actions determined by God. Obv
iously this deeply philosophical and theological question raised even greater qu
estions about the nature of God's omnipotence and judgment. Yet, what is more im
portant for our purposes is that it raised questions about the Muslim state and
its rulers as well. If all things were predetermined, were not the rulers in pla
ce a reflection of God's plans for the community? In other words, should we as M
uslims oppose rulers that God has apparently put in place for us? The Umayyads i
nformally endorsed this position by marginalizing Muslim scholars and preachers
who opposed it. Hasan al-Basra (d. 728), the famed Muslim personality, continued
to openly oppose the doctrine and wrote a letter to the Umayyad Caliph Abdul-Ma
lik, citing the sunnah of the Prophet in support of free-will. The issue, of cou
rse, was not resolved but it is important for us to reflect on the debate's sign
ificant political roots. When we question our ability to act freely, we are ques
tioning our ability to change the world-a deeply political question. When we que
stion who should rule the Muslim polity, as did the Shi'a and Kharijites, we are
 also questioning who should not. Can this community be led by kings and, on occ
asion, pre-modern tyrants? If not, what is our mandate, as Muslims, to change it
?
These questions were at the forefront of the Abbasid revolution (c. 750). The Ab
basids opposed the Umayyads as imperial kings and "superficial" followers of the
Prophet. There were many who supported the Abbasid revolution: Arabs, non-Arabs
, Shi'a and others. Jaf'ar al-Sadiq, the prestigious and influential sixth Imam
in the line of twelve, is reported to have attended meetings in regards to the A
bbasid campaign. The Abbasid regime quickly assumed imperial characteristics the
mselves, however, and sidelined movements that opposed the imperial enterprise.
Between the eight and eleventh centuries Muslim life could be classified as soci
ally stable and politically transformative. They led the world in philosophy, li
terature and medicine and ruled much of it by the sheer nature and ingenious of
the Imperial infrastructure. Avenues of economic development and cultural exchan
ge under the Arab-Islamic empires were expanded to unprecedented degrees. Yet, i
n spite of this socio-economic strength, this period also saw the rise and fall
of the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Fatimad Dynasties as well as the appearance and dis
appearance of the Buyids and Seljuks (amongst others). It was during this period
of political transformation that the issue of legitimacy was most pressing-and
since Muslims were responsible for these transformations they had to account for
the substance of it all, dialogue and debate was in high gear.
Early catalogues on Islamic 'sects" such as al-Shahrastani's Book of Creeds and
Sects, are largely ignored and difficult to find these days. In this work the au
thor attempts, and largely succeeds, in writing an objective treatise on religio
us belief. Today, rather, many mosques are armed with small evangelical style pa
mphlets, that offer simple religion for people on the go. Thoughtful and systema
tic works are largely marginalized. A reasonable question to ask is, "why are su
ch works missing today?"
Points of Consideration
Two interconnected phenomena are currently exacerbating sectarian problems in th
e Muslim world. First, since the advent of the nation-states formed during the c
olonial period, Muslim scholars have been cut off from one another unlike ever b
efore. Advances made in travel have been undermined by borders, visas, passports
and other modern constraints that are themselves often subject to greater polit
ical rivalries. When was the last time scholars from the Arabian Peninsula spent
considerable time in Qum or scholars from Qum in Cairo? The second problem is t
hat so many Muslim scholars are so closely tied to corrupt or repressive regimes
that we have lost faith in the rare attempts made to bridge the divide. For exa
mple, a conference was held last year in Mecca, where Sunni and Shi'a scholars s
igned declarations refuting sectarianism in Iraq; the participants there, howeve
r, were seen largely as compromised voices that either by choice or compulsion s
ought to condemn the resistance.
In order for us to begin a process of reconciliation we must seek it in the sphe
re of the political, as this is the point of tension, but it seems only non-alig
ned Muslim scholars can bring about sincere and objective discussion in this reg
ard. We have to return to the fundamental question-who should lead a Muslim soci
ety? Raising this question provokes two reactions. First, it reminds Muslims of
their right to define their political reality. Secondly, it tells current leader
s that they are failing in this regard. Many may be apprehensive about such a di
scussion considering that this point is already determined in Shi'a belief. But
is it? According to most Shi'a the last Imam is in occultation and thus the floo
r is open for temporal leadership. Ayatollah Khomeini's solution in Iran of the
"Rule of the Jurist" is only one solution that Shi'a often debate. With this ope
ning in mind, Sunnis and Shi'a have a great opportunity to find a common solutio
n; this moment should not be squandered by our fear to raise the question.
LAITH SAUD is a college lecturer in the social sciences and a member of the Peop
le's Struggle Movement â an organization politcally opposed to the occupation of Ir
aq