What Does the Second Form of the Ontological Argument Prove?

Author(s): H. Jong Kim

Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 56, No. 1 (Aug., 2004), pp. 17-40
Published by: Springer
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What does the second form of the ontological argument prove?

H. JONGKIM
Claremont,CA, USA

Some forty years ago, Norman Malcolm and Charles Hartshorne,philos-

ophersfrom two distinctiveschools of thought,championed,independently
of each other, a form of ontological argument based on chapter III of
Anselm's Proslogion as well as on various chaptersof Reply to Gaunilo.1
While different aspects of the argumentare emphasized by Malcolm and
Hartshorne,this second form of the ontological argumenthinges on the
following two points: (1) necessary existence is constitutiveof the concept
of God,2 and (2) therefore,in understandingthe concept of God, one under-
stands that God necessarily exists in fact or in actuality.WhereasMalcolm
vacillates between affirming only (1) and both (1) and (2),3 Hartshorne
affirmsboth (1) and (2); however, he holds that Anselm's formulationof
the actualexistence of God is somewhatconfused. My argumenthere is that
while (1) has some sense, (2) is a confusion arising from confoundingthe
logical or conceptualexistence of God with the actualexistence of God.4

Let us begin with (1): their claim that the notion of necessary existence is
constitutiveof the concept of God.5Both Malcolm and Hartshornecorrectly
appealto how the concept of God is understoodwithin the theistic traditions
in orderto show, contralogical positivists, the sense of the concept of God
and the sense of the necessaryexistence of God. Thus, Malcolm writes,
In the NineteenthPsalm it is said: 'before the mountainswere brought
forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from
everlasting to everlasting, thou art God.' Here is expressed the idea
of the necessary existence and eternity of God, an idea that is essen-
tial to the Jewish and Christianreligions. In those complex systems
of thought,those 'language-games,'God has the status of a necessary
being. Who can doubt that?Here we must say with Wittgenstein,'this
language-gameis played!'6
18 H.JONGKIM

And, accordingto Hartshorne,

[J]ustsuch a theoryis implicit in the very idea of God as unsurpassably

excellent. This theory(which can only be crudelystatedhere) is thatthe
basic referentof "possible"is to the divine capacityto createand enjoy
creatures.This capacity is neither a law of naturenor a mere rule of
logic, but the presuppositionof any existence and of any law, meaning
or truthwhatever.WhatGod could notpossess could not be, and since he
could not possess his own nonexistence,this could not be, andthe notion
of it is nonsense. Here the ontological impossibility appearsas also a
logical one, butbecause the conceptof God andits logical contentis put
into the equation.We cannotconsistentlyconceive God as worshipfully
supremeand yet not the groundof all possibility and meaning.I believe
thatno less thanthis is implied in the concept of "Creatorof all things,
visible and invisible."7

Indeed,insofaras one looks at the concept of God as found in the tradition,

insofar as a believer affirmsthat God is "creatorof all things, visible and
invisible,"insofar as a believer confesses that "beforethe mountainswere
broughtforth, or ever thou hadst formed the earthand the world, even from
everlastingto everlasting,thou art God," God's necessary existence too is
affirmed.Viewed within the tradition,it is indeed the presuppositionof any
existence and of any law, meaningor truth,and is acceptedas "thegroundof
all possibility and meaning."Indeed, to worship God is to affirmthat God's
existence is a necessarycharacteristicof God.
But this is also where Malcolm and Hartshornebegin to stray from the
traditionaluse of the concept. Ratherthan affirmingthat the notion of the
necessaryexistenceof God is a confession,they seek to providephilosophical
justificationfor that notion. Malcolm and Hartshorneunderstandthe notion
of necessary existence in two ways. First, it is claimed that God is under-
stood withinthe traditionas the SupremeBeing. Since necessaryexistence is
superiorto contingentexistence, God, as the SupremeBeing, it is claimed,
must necessarily exist. Second, it is claimed that the notion of necessary
existenceis a constituentof the conceptof God. Thus,it is claimed,thatwhich
possesses the notion of necessary existence, unlike concepts that possess
othernotionsof existence, must exist or not exist. Since thatwhich possesses
necessaryexistence must exist unless it is logically contradictoryor emptyof
significance,insofaras the conceptof God is neithercontradictorynor empty
of significance,it is argued,God must exist. However,neitherunderstanding
of necessaryexistence takenalone can move beyondthe languageof worship
where God's existence is confessed to the proof that God necessarilyexists.
The first way, namely, that necessary existence is superior to contingent
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORMOF THE ONTOLOGIC
AL ARGUMENTPROVE? 19

existence, disregardsthe very distinctionin kind that is confessed in theistic

traditionsconcerningGod's existence and contingentexistence. The second
way, namely the acknowledgementof the differencesin kinds of existence,
can only show thatthe necessaryexistence is internallyconsistentwith other
characteristicsof God;however,it cannotshow thatGod actuallyexists.
Further,while these two ways are not contradictories,they are contraries.
If one affirmsthe firstway (namely,necessaryexistence is superiorto contin-
gent existence), then one cannot affirmthe second way (namely, necessary
existenceis differentin kindfrom othertypes of existence) since any compar-
ative can only be applied to differences in degree and not in kinds. And,
conversely,if one affirmsthe second way, then one cannot affirmthe first
way since the recognitionof the differencein kind forbidscomparison.Yet,
in theirattemptsto give philosophicaljustificationfor the notion of necessary
existence of God, both Hartshorneand Malcolm confoundthese two uses of
the notion of necessary existence precisely because they realized, I believe,
that neither of the two understandingstaken alone can achieve their aim.
Because they do so, not only do they commit the logical fallacy of affirming
contraryrelationsbetween the two understandings,but also neitherof them
moves beyond the language of worship where God's existence is confessed
to the proof that God necessarily exists. Let us then investigate how each
of these two ways is espoused and confoundedin the Second Form of the
OntologicalArgument.
The first way employs the claim that necessary existence is superior
to other types of existence. This is more apparentin Malcolm than in
Hartshorne.Malcolm builds his case for the necessary existence of God
by employing some 'neutral' criteria of limitedness and dependence that
binds all beings/things. This is curious, given that Malcolm recognized in
his discussions of eternity,omnipotenceand omniscience, God's properties
are not determinedby the same measureas we determinepropertiesof other
beings/things.8As he recognized, God's eternity does not mean that God
has existed/will exist longer than anyone or anythingelse, God's omnipo-
tence does not mean that God is more powerful than any other being, and
God's omniscience does not mean that God has more knowledge than any
otherbeing. Otherwise,God becomes a contingentbeing like Malcolm'sown
example of "Jonesis the tallest man in the world."9If perchance,there is
a greaterbeing (e.g., a being with more power) than God, then God cannot
be God. This is to pose some measure of duration,power and knowledge
apartand away from God, which goes againsthow those concepts are under-
stood within the traditionitself: In the tradition,God is not God because
God possesses the most power and knowledge over all other beings; rather,
because God is God, God is understoodto be the source or the groundof
20 H. JONGKIM

all power,knowledge,andbeing. Thus, thereis no sense in tryingto measure

God's duration,poweror knowledgeas thereis when we comparethe relative
duration,power or knowledgeof contingentbeings/things.
Malcolm correctly notes the similar point concerning the existence of
God.10However,althoughhe explicitly acknowledgesthis differencein kind
between existence of God and existence of other beings/things, Malcolm
neverthelessignores this differencewhen he explainsthe notion of necessary
existence by appealingto unlimitednessand independenceof God. He treats
bothunlimitednessandindependencein termsof limitednessanddependence
of contingentbeings/things.Again, Malcolm startspromisinglyby looking at
the use of independencein the actualChristiantradition.He states,

Whetherwe believe Him or not we must admit that the 'almightyand

everlastingGod' (as severalancientprayersbegin), the 'makerof heaven
andearth,andof all thingsvisible andinvisible' (as is said in the Nicene
Creed),cannotbe thoughtof as being broughtinto existenceby anything
or as dependingfor His continuedexistence on anything.To conceive
of anything as dependentupon something else for its existence is to
conceive of it as a lesser being thanGod.11

Yet, Malcolm then interpretsthis use in terms of mere degrees. His explana-
tions and examplesconcerningthe superiorityof independenceover depend-
ence and unlimitedness over limitedness show as much. To explain the
superiorityof unlimitedness,Malcolm employs the example of dishes. He
holds thatif thereare two sets of dishes, identicalin every aspect,except that
one set is fragile while the otheris not, then the non-fragileset is superiorto
the fragile one since that set of dishes does not dependon carefulhandling,
etc.12Of course, in this sense, the non-fragile set is superiorto the fragile
set. AlthoughMalcolm does not explicitly make an analogouscase for God
and otherbeings, implicit in Malcolm's discussion is that God is superiorto
otherbeings in a similarmanner.Why else would he employ this example?
Since God is not dependenton othersfor God's existence, while otherbeings
are (food, parents,etc.), Malcolm implicitly affirms,God is superiorto other
beings. In this way, Malcolm turnsGod's independenceinto somethingakin
to the non-fragilityof dishes, but only more so. Malcolm claims the same
in his discussion of unlimitedness.He correctly states that "God is usually
conceivedas an unlimitedbeing. He is conceived of as a being who could not
be limited, that is, as an absolutelyunlimitedbeing."13Yet, he employs the
example of two engines, one that requiresfuel, and the other that does not
in orderto show the superiorityof unlimitednessover limitedness.He claims
thatthe latterengine is superiorto the firstengine since it is not limitedlike in
the first.God, he claims, is unlimitedin a similarway. Whereasotherbeings
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORMOF THE ONTOLOGIC
AL ARGUMENTPROVE? 21

andcreaturesarelimited,God is unlimited.Whereasthe existence of plantsis

limitedby theirdependenceon moistureand types of soil, God is not. This is
to postulatesome measureof limitednessupon which God, people, animals,
plants, etc. arejudged. But, as noted and as Malcolm also recognizedin his
discussions of eternity,omnipotenceand omniscience, God's propertiesare
not determinedby the same measureswe determinethe propertiesof other
beings/things.Otherwise,God becomes merely a contingentbeing, albeitthe
most independentand unlimitedone.
Because Malcolm thus ignores the very distinction he makes between
God's propertiesand the propertiesof otherbeings/thingsin his discussions
of the unlimitednessand independenceof God, he turns God's necessary
existence into one instanceof the existence of contingentbeing/thing,albeit
the most independentand unlimitedone. This is why Rush Rhees criticizes
Malcolm'sdefinitionof the necessaryexistence of God. Rhees states,

Malcolmin his discussionsuggeststhatyou can talk aboutthe necessary

existence of God, meaning that God's existence is unlimited,and that
his existence is not dependenton anythingelse. But then it is not clear
how 'existence' is being used at all. Malcolm emphasizesthatyou may
use the term 'existence' in a variety of ways. Cf. The discussions of
existence theorems in mathematics,for instance. But when he speaks
of the unlimitedexistence of God in contrastwith otherexistence - the
existence of materialthings - well what is God's existence then if it is
not the same 'existence' as that of materialthings? And does it make
any sense to speakof existence in thatuse as unlimited?
The existence of a plant is dependentupon soil and light, moisture
and air. This does not say anythingabout the kind of existence it has:
except thatit shows somethingof how we might answerthe questionof
whetherany plants exist undersuch and such circumstances- perhaps
on certainplanets.It does show somethingimportantof how we use the
word 'exists' or the expression 'does not exist.'
If we takethis sense of 'existence', then 'unlimitedexistence' seems
to be meaningless. And it is not clear on his account of thing what it
does amountto.14

Rhees' point here is similarto the one I made above. While acknowledging
thatMalcolmnotes the differentkinds of existence, Rhees criticizesMalcolm
for not explaining what that difference amounts to. Rather,Rhees states,
Malcolm is using existence in the same way for both plants and God. If so,
there is no distinctionbetween 'existence' and 'necessary existence,' since
necessary existence is simply the same kind of existence as a plant's exist-
ence, except thatnecessaryexistenceis not dependenton its surroundingsand
22 H. JONGKIM

lasts forever.This is why Rhees says that the notion, "unlimitedexistence,"

understoodthis way, is meaningless. While Malcolm explicitly notes that
God's existence is differentin kind from the existence of other things, his
employmentand explicationof the unlimitednessand independenceof God
show thathe is treatingGod's existence in the same manneras the existence
of otherthings/beings.
Yet, if God's independenceandunlimitednessareunderstoodto be bound
by the samemeasureas thatof contingentbeings/things,in what sense can we
speak of somethingexisting like plants, engines, dogs, or dishes, that is not
limitedin anyway?The possibilityof imaginingany given contingentbeing's
non-existencestems from our prior experiencesof and language about that
being. For instance,because our languageaboutdogs and our experiencesof
them include death,disappearance,sickness, old age, etc., we can imagine a
possible world where dogs do not exist. Only because their nonexistenceis
alreadypresentin ourexperiencesandin ourlanguage,we understandthatthe
conceptof dogs is contingent.But how can we speak of God's existence in a
similarmanner?Can we show a pictureof God like we can show a pictureof
a dog? CanI conversewith God like I do with my mentor?CanI point to God
like I can point to a plant?The obvious answersto these questionsare "No."
We cannotpointto God, we cannotshow picturesof God, we cannotconverse
with God like we do with otherbeings not becausewe arelimited,butbecause
whateverGod's existence maybe, it does not share the same grammarwith
plants,dogs, engines, etc.
While Malcolm explicitly states thatquestionslike the ones above cannot
be asked of God, his treatmentof the unlimitednessand independenceof
God in terms of some neutralmeasureinvites these very questions.15Thus,
there is an inherentcontradictionin Malcolm's position: on the one hand,
he claims the superiorityof necessaryexistence over contingentexistence by
appealingto some neutralmeasure of unlimitednessand independence;on
the otherhand, he claims that God's properties(such as omniscience, omni-
potence, and eternity)cannotbe assessed in termsof the measurethatwe use
in assessing the propertiesof contingentbeings/things.His demonstrationof
the superiorityof necessaryexistence over contingentexistence is contraryto
the very distinctionthat allows us to understandthe concept of God, i.e., the
distinctionin kindbetween God's existence and the existence of contingent
things/beings.
Let us now considerwhetherwe arebetteroff stayingwith the second way
as emphasizedby Hartshorne.The second way in which the notion of neces-
sary existence is used in the argumentis by centralizingthe very difference
in kindthatMalcolm recognizedbut ignored.Hartshorneattemptsto explic-
itly distinguishbetween differentkinds of existence by appealingto modal
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORMOF THE ONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 23

logic. According to Hartshorne,"all modalities reduce to three: Np, N~p

(~Np&~N~p)."16 By Np, he means what he calls the modality of neces-
sity, where "only the existence, but not the nonexistence,is conceivable."17
This, of course, accordingto Hartshorne,is God. By N~p, he means whathe
calls the modalityof impossibility,i.e., a being whose existence is logically
impossible (round-square).By (~Np&~N~p), he means what he calls the
modalityof contingency,i.e., a particularbeing, whose nonexistenceas well
as existence can be conceived (cheese, unicorn,island, etc.).
AlthoughHartshorneexplicitly claims that he is dealing with conceptual
existence in his distinctionof the modes of existence, implicit in his distinc-
tion is his assumptionthatthe talk of existence is bound to talk of objects.18
WhereasMalcolm at least acknowledgedtypes of existence thatare different
from objects (e.g., the existence of an infinite numberof prime numbers),19
Hartshornesimply limits types of existenceto objects.His claim thatall types
of existence can be reducedto his threemodes of existence shows this. For,
what, accordingto Hartshorne,possesses the modalityof contingency?Such
objects as cheese, human beings, unicorns,plants, etc. What, accordingto
Hartshorne,possesses the modalityof impossibility?Round-squares,hot ice,
etc. Not only are all of these concepts of objects, but our understandingof
the contingencyor impossibility of these things stems from our experience
and understandingof objects. For instance, I know that a humanbeing is a
contingentbeing and that a roundsquarecannot exist. I know that a human
being is contingentnot simply because I grasp abstractlysuch constituents
as space-timelimitationsin the concept of a humanbeing, but because my
understandingof such constituentsstem from my encounterswith death,my
regretof events in the past which cannot be changed, my having to choose
between staying and leaving, etc. It is not that my understandingof the
contingencyof humanbeings stems from my understandingof the concept
of contingency;but rather,my understandingof the contingency of human
beings stems from my understandingof and encounterswith humanbeings.
In otherwords,our experiencesof contingentobjectsprecedeour conceptual
graspof the modalityof contingency.
The same holds for the concepts that possess what Hartshornecalls
the modality of impossibility.For instance, I know that a round squareis
impossibilitybecause I understandwhat a circle is and what a squareis as
well as the constituentsof these concepts. I know that squarespossess four
rightinteriorangles andfour equal sides because I have encounteredsquares,
angles, and lengths. I know thata circle has circumferenceand lacks internal
anglesbecauseI have encounteredcircles, curvedlines, etc. The impossibility
of a roundsquarethen stems not simply fromthe concepts andtheirconstitu-
ents being contradictory.Rather,ourgraspof roundnessand squarenessbeing
24 H. JONGKIM

contradictorystems fromour encounterswith objectsandwhatwe do as well

as how we assess objects. In otherwords, our experienceswith objects make
possible our conceptualgraspof modalityof impossibility.
Hartshorneclaims that that which possesses the modality of necessity
(God) is such that only its existence is conceivable but not the possibility
of its nonexistence.20Yet, the possibility of nonexistencehere cannotbe the
same kind of possibility that belongs to those that possess the modality of
contingency.Otherwise,it binds the concept of God to our talk aboutcontin-
gent objects,e.g., whereasdogs die, God cannotdie; whereasdogs arebound
to space-timelocation,God is not, etc. But if this were so, as we have seen in
the discussions of Malcolm above, then all sorts of unanswerablequestions
inevitably arise because the possibility of its nonexistence stems from our
experiencesof andtalkaboutcontingentobjects.So, whateveris meantby the
impossibilityof God's nonexistence,it cannotbe on par with the possibility
of nonexistencethat belongs to contingentbeings. But Hartshornedoes not
distinguishbetween the two. He simply claims that the concept of God does
not include the possibility of nonexistencewhereasall contingentbeings do.
Statedthis way, the possibility of (non)existenceis treatedin the same way
for God and contingentbeings.
Thus, in order to understandthe impossibility of nonexistence in the
concept of God, we would have to differentiateit from the possibility of
nonexistencethatbelongs to contingentbeings/things.And, Hartshorneis on
the righttrackwhen he appealsto theisticlanguage.Indeed,viewed withinthe
tradition,God possesses neitherwhatHartshornecalls the modalityof contin-
gency nor what he calls the modality of impossibility.Within the tradition,
God, as Hartshornestates,is understoodto exist necessarily.
But this is a trite point: If one worshipsthe theistic God, then of course
one accepts that God necessarily exists. In other words, implicit in the
proclamationthat God is "Creatorof all things, visible and invisible"is the
proclamationthat God exists. However,this is the languageof worship and
confession. Indeed,in looking at the concept of God as confessed within the
tradition,contrathe positivists, it does not have "the statusof round-squares
and other impossible things."The concept of God is not self-contradictory.
Withinthe tradition,God is confessed to be eternal,omnipotent,omnibene-
volent, omnipresent,omniscient,etc. But, as Malcolm realized but ignored,
God's omnipotencedoes not mean that God has more power than anyone
else, God's eternity does not mean that God has infinite durationwhereas
otherbeings do not, God's omnibenevolencedoes not mean thatGod is more
benevolentthanany otherbeing, and God's omnisciencedoes not mean that
God has more knowledge than any otherbeing. Otherwise,God's properties
areboundto the same measureas thatof contingentbeings/things.God would
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORMOF THE ONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 25

then be boundto the same comparativesused to comparecontingentbeings.

These comparativesare senseless in traditionallanguage about God: God is
confessed to be the creator,and as such it does not make sense to use the
measure we use to compare contingent beings/things in measuringGod's
properties.
The same, of course, is true of God's existence. It is not that God is
confessed to have the impossibility of nonexistencebecause the possibility
of nonexistence that belongs to contingent beings/things is excluded from
the concept of God. Rather, God is confessed to have the impossibility
of nonexistencebecause the talk of existence and nonexistence concerning
contingent beings do not make sense in regards to God. In other words,
God's existenceis understoodwithinthe traditionto be conceptuallydifferent
from existence of other beings/thingsjust as God's omnipotenceis under-
stood within the traditionto be conceptuallydifferentfrom power of other
beings/things.But Hartshornedoes not seem to see this. While he appeals
to the tradition,he fails to note the grammaticaldifferencein talking about
God's existence andaboutotherbeings/things.He simply takesexistence and
the possibility of existence in both grammarsto be the same. But this runs
contraryto the notionthathe startedwith, i.e., thatGod's existenceis different
in kind from contingentthings.
Thus, both of the ways in which necessary existence is employed in the
second form of the argumentmistreat the notion of necessary existence.
The first way, as exemplifiedby Malcolm, simply dismisses the differences
in kind of existences by employing comparativesbetween independenceof
God and dependenceof contingentbeings as well as between unlimitedness
of God and limitedness of contingentbeings. While explicitly stating that
very difference,the second way, as exemplifiedby Hartshorne,nevertheless
ignoresthe grammaticaldifferencein talkingaboutGod's existenceandabout
otherbeings/things.'Exist' in "Dogsexist,""Roundsquaresdo not exist,"and
"Godexists"turnsout to meanthe same in each case even thoughHartshorne
startedby emphasizingtheir differences.But, when this differencein kinds
of existence is takenseriously,all we can appealto is the theistic languageof
worshipand confession. As such, that which is proclaimedin worship (i.e.,
the existence of God) cannot itself be part of the formal proof to show that
God does indeed exist apartand away from the languageof worship.

II

Malcolm and Hartshornefurtherstate that because necessary existence is a

constituentof the concept of God, the very concept of God prohibitsques-
tioning God's existence. This is their attempt at answering the objection
26 H. JONGKIM

made famous by Kant and Caterus.In objecting to the argumentsof Kant

andCaterus,Malcolm notes thatboth Kantand Caterusclaim that" 'God is a
necessarybeing' (or 'God necessarilyexists') is equivalentto the conditional
"21Malcolm thinks
proposition 'If God exists then He necessarily exists.'
thatthe conditionalis faulty.He asks, "Forhow do they want the antecedent
clause, 'If God exists,' to be understood?Clearly they want it to imply that
it is possible that God does not exist."22Hartshorneputs the similar point
in the following manner:While acknowledgingthat "Whethersomethingis
consistentlyconceivable or not cannot depend upon what happensto exist"
and "Conceivabilityand its contradictorydepend not on alterablerelations
of ideas to facts, but only on inherentand fixed relationof ideas to ideas,"23
Hartshorne,immediatelypreceding these statements,states, "WereGod to
exist, yet his nonexistenceto be conceivable,he would either exist by sheer
chance or luck, or else owing to some cause. Eitherway, he would not be the
best conceivablebeing, andhence wouldnot be worthyof worshipas God. He
mustthenexist withoutconceivablealternative.If you say, 'yes, supposinghe
exists at all,' you unwittinglyimply the conceivabilityof the very alternative
you admitmust be excluded."24Thus, both Malcolm and Hartshornewant to
prohibitsuch conditionalsas "If God exists, then his existence is necessary"
and "Yes, supposing he exists at all, God necessarily exists" by claiming
that the antecedentsof these conditionalscontradictthe logic of necessary
existence in the consequents.
Both Malcolm and Hartshorneargue thus to reject the objection made
famous by Kant.25Kant, as Malcolm himself quotes, states, "To posit a
triangle, and yet to reject its three angles, is self-contradictory;but there
is no contradictionin rejecting the triangle together with its three angles.
The same holds true of the concept of an absolutelynecessarybeing. If its
existence is rejected,we reject the thing itself with all its predicates;and no
questionof contradictioncan then arise."26Here, Kantagrees with Malcolm
andHartshornethatto rejectone of the necessaryelementsof a concept(three
angles of a triangle) yet affirmthe concept (triangle)is self-contradictory.
Thus, in affirmingthe concept of God, one cannot reject the conceptual
necessaryexistence of God.
However,Kantalso statescorrectlythatone can rejectthe whole concept.
Kant is saying that while q is a necessary consequentwhen p is accepted,
when p is rejected,then it makes no sense to assert q as being a necessary
consequentof p, not that q is not a necessaryconsequentof p at the concep-
tual level. In other words, Kant acknowledgesthat necessary existence is a
necessaryconstituentof the concept of God, but he also notes thatthe whole
conceptof God is not necessary.For example,one of the necessaryelements
of the concept of cigaretteis that cigarettescontainnicotine. Thus, in under-
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORMOF THE ONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 27

standingthe concept of cigarette,one also understandsthatcigarettescontain

nicotine.But, it is possible to imagine a world where the concept of cigarette
does not exist. If it does not exist, thenit makesno sense to speakof cigarettes
containingnicotine.In the similarway, in understandingthe concept of God,
one also grasps that necessary existence is a constituentof the concept of
God. But, if one rejectsthatGod exists (i.e., the whole concept of God), then
it makes no sense to speak of God existing necessarily.There are then two
differentgrammarsconcerningexistence here: (3) the conceptualor logical
existenceinternalto a concept,and (4) the actualexistence. As such, a person
can affirm(3) yet doubt(4). Takenthis way, the conditional,"Godnecessarily
exists (3), if God exists (4)," contains no contradiction,pace Malcolm and
Hartshorne.
Yet, Hartshorneand Malcolm may object that there is a huge difference
between the necessity of God's existence in the concept of God and neces-
sity in other concepts, e.g., cigarette.In conceiving God as that than which
nothing greatercan be conceived, Malcolm and Hartshorneclaim, we are
conceiving of a concept where the very possibility of its nonexistence is
ruled out, whereasotherconcepts are such that it makes sense to doubttheir
instantiation,e.g. cigarette,island, triangle,etc.28
More than Malcolm, it is Hartshornewho attemptsto note the different
kinds of necessity by distinguishing "what is only trivially a priori or
necessary" from "what is strictly a priori and purely necessary."This is
Hartshorne'sattemptat distinguishingbetween necessity thatbelongs in the
concept of God and necessity in otherconcepts.He states,

That "bluecheese containsmicroorganisms"(if this is partof what we

mean by cheese) is only trivially a priori or necessary;for there might
have been no such thing as cheese, or even any idea of such a thing.
What is strictly a priori and purely necessary here is only some such
principleas thatthe consequencesof a definedtermmust be acceptedif
the termis accepted.This much more abstractproposition,or something
like it, is, I believe, in a genuine sense implied by any propositionand
any thoughtat all. I hold similarlythat the validity of the Argument,if
it be valid, can only mean thatthe existence of perfectionis nontrivially
necessary,an implicit or more or less hidden ingredientof any concept
or any belief whatever.It follows thatit must be highly abstract,highly
general;and this consequenceI accept and emphasize."29

According to Hartshorne,trivial necessity is found in such statementsas

"bluecheese containsmicroorganisms."This is so, he argues,since although
containingmicroorganismis constitutiveof being cheese, theremay not have
been such a thingas cheese or the idea of cheese. Thus, such statementsas "all
28 H. JONGKIM

bachelorsareunmarriedmen"and"aunicornis a four-leggedanimalwith one

long spiralhorn"are triviallya priorior necessary.This is so because while
being never-been-marriedmale and having four legs and a horn are logi-
cally constitutiveof being a bachelorand of being a unicornrespectively,the
conceptof andactualexistenceof eitherbachelorsor unicornsarecontingent:
they do not have to be the case.
In contrast,Hartshorneholds, that which is "strictlya priori and purely
necessary here is only some such principle as that the consequences of a
definedtermmustbe acceptedif the termis accepted."This definitionof pure
necessity is ambiguous.On the one hand, Hartshorneseems to say that (5)
purenecessity stems solely from the internalcoherencyof a concept without
assessing the propositionsthat imply that very concept (the logical neces-
sity of blue cheese containing microorganisms).Understoodthis way, all
concepts,cheese, bachelors,unicorns,or God, possess purenecessity insofar
as all of these concepts possess logically necessary constituents(containing
microorganisms,unmarriedadult male, having a horn, omnipotence, etc.)
This is implied by Hartshorne'sstatement, "Whatis strictly a priori and
purelynecessaryhere is only some such principleas thatthe consequencesof
a defined term must be accepted if the term is accepted. This much more
abstractproposition [the definition of what is strictly a priori and purely
necessary],or somethinglike it, is, I believe, in a genuine sense implied by
any propositionand any thought at all." Understoodthis way, Hartshorne's
pure necessity simply denotes what must logically be the case given any
concept. Thus, while the concept of cheese is contingent (trivially neces-
sary),given the concept of cheese, thatthe conceptof cheese includescheese
containingmicroorganismsis purelynecessary.
On the other hand, however, Hartshorneseems to mean by pure neces-
sity, (6) the necessity that belongs uniquely to God, where the concept of
God necessarily includes the existence of God in such a mannerthat even
the possibility of its non-existence in reality is precluded.This is implied
by the whole of Hartshorne'sargument,as well as Malcolm's argument,for
the necessary existence of God. The following statementfrom Hartshorne
makes this point even more forcefully: "I hold similarlythat the validity of
the Argument,if it be valid, can only mean that the existence of perfection
is nontriviallynecessary, an implicit or more or less hidden ingredientof
any concept or any belief whatever."30 If one understandsHartshorne'spure
necessity in this manner,then not only is he claiming that God must exist
in reality but also that divine existence is the ground of all concepts and
thoughtswhatsoever.Thus, if one understandsHartshorne'sclaim that the
existence of perfection(God) is purelynecessaryin the sense of (6), then he
 WHATDOESTHESECONDFORMOFTHEONTOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT
PROVE? 29

is claiming that the concept of God necessarily leads to postulatingGod's

actualexistence. This issue will be discussedlaterin section III of this paper.
If by pure necessity, Hartshornemeans (5), then I don't really see what
the second form of the ontologicalargumentis supposedto prove except that
the theistic concept of God is such that the existence of God is necessarily
constitutiveof that concept. More positively, it does answer the challenge
posed by the positivists,especially Findlay,who proclaimedthatthe concept
of God and God's existence are logically incoherent.31However, and this
is a big however, both the noting of and the acknowledgementof such
logical/conceptualcoherency do not preclude a person saying in her heart,
"thereis no God."After all, the rejectionof the actualexistence of anything,
be it something logically contingent as cheese, triangle,unicorn, bachelor,
etc., or somethinglogically necessary,be it God, Brahman,BuddhaNature,
etc., does not have to be based upon findingsome internalincoherencein the
concept.
Otherwise, if we were to take Malcolm's and Hartshorne'spoint here
at face value, if we were to accept that it is contradictoryto affirm the
necessaryexistence of God at the conceptuallevel yet questionGod's actual
existence, then we would have to assert many concepts, insofar as these
conceptspossess necessaryexistence as an internalcharacteristic,as existing
in fact or in reality. These would include the Hindu notion of Brahman,
the Confucian/Taoistnotions of Tao, and the Buddhist notion of Buddha-
Nature,among others.Yet, how many theists, let alone Christians,would be
comfortablein assertingthatbecause of the necessaryexistence of Brahman,
for instance, Brahman is the underlying reality of all that there is? A
theist, especially if she is a student of religions, can sensibly grasp and
state the conceptualnecessary existence of Brahman,but at the same time
deny its actual existence. For the affirmationof the necessary existence of
Brahmanstems from descriptiveanalysis of the concept, while the rejection,
or doubtingof it, stems from her own confessional stance.Thus to recognize
that a concept possesses necessaryexistence as one of its internalcharacter-
istics does not lead to assertingits actualexistence. Rather,to understandthat
Brahmanhas the necessary existence as an internalpropertyof the concept
of Brahmanis to understandthat and that alone. A studentof religion, then,
can say, "Hindushold thatBrahman'sexistence is necessary,and the concept
of necessaryexistence of Brahmanis internallycoherent.But, / do not think
that Brahmanexists." These statementsare logically coherent.In a similar
manner,a person can sensibly affirm the necessary existence of God yet
reject or question God's existence, as in "(Christianshold that) God neces-
sarily exists (descriptivegrammar)but it is possible that He does not exist
(confessionalgrammar)."Because Malcolm and Hartshorneconflatethe two
30 H. JONGKIM

grammars(one of descriptionand one of confession), they believe that the

statementthat they attributeto Kant and Caterus,namely, "Godnecessarily
exists, but it is possible thatHe does not,"is fallacious.Thus Kantwas right,
pace Malcolm and Hartshorne,in making the trianglecase analogous with
God case: Just as having three sides cannot be denied when the concept of
triangle is affirmedbut the whole (the existence of the triangle as well as
its properties)can be denied, God's necessary existence cannot be denied
insofaras one sees thatit is a constitutiveelement of the concept of God, but
the whole (God and God's properties)can be denied.
In other words, neither Malcolm nor Hartshorneare able to rescue the
ontologicalargumentfromKant'scriticismby limitingit to conceptualneces-
sary existence. Their failure stems from their not realizing that while the
existence of God is logically necessary for the theist conception of God,
the concept of God is itself contingent.32While necessaryexistence belongs
to the concept of God, the concept of God is not itself necessary.Among
otherthings, the concept of God is limited to and dependenton the practice
of a theistic religion. As such, a non-practitionerof a theistic religion can
graspthatnecessaryexistence is constitutiveof the conceptof a theistic God,
but she may state, "Yes, God necessarilyexists, if God does exist,"just as a
Christianstudentof Hinduismor Buddhismcan acknowledgethe necessary
existence of Brahmanor BuddhaNaturewithoutthe acknowledgementof the
actualexistence of Brahmanor BuddhaNature.

Ill

I have argued thus far that both Malcolm and Hartshorneconfound the
conceptual grasp of the necessary existence of God with the confessional
proclamationof the actualexistence of God. While Malcolm seems to sense
the differencebetween the two, Hartshorneassertsthat the conceptualgrasp
necessarily leads to God existence in fact or in reality. Let us first look at
Malcolm.
Malcolm seems to note the difference between conceptual grasp and
confessionalproclamationin the final paragraphof his essay. He states,
I can imagine an atheist going through the argument, becoming
convinced of its validity, acutely defending it against objections, yet
remainingan atheist. The only effect it could have on the fool of the
Psalm would be that he stopped saying in his heart "thereis no God,"
because he would now realize that this is somethinghe cannot mean-
ingfully say or think. It is hardly to be expected that a demonstrative
argumentshould,in addition,producein him a living faith.33
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORM OF THE ONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 31

Malcolm's atheist is one who is able to see the internalcoherence of the

necessary existence of God yet remains an atheist. This is like the kind of
Christianstudentof religion who can see the sense of the necessaryexistence
of Brahmanyet, in the end, rejectthe existence of it. However,Malcolmgoes
on to state thathis proof would forbidthe fool from denying the existence of
God in his heartbecause that denial cannotbe made with meaning.Further,
Malcolmclaims thatthis proscriptionwould not raise in the fool some sortof
living faith.
My puzzlement here should be obvious: Is not saying in one's heart,
"Thereis no God,"a markof being an atheist,one who denies the existenceof
God?If so, if Malcolm'satheistis able to see the supposedinternalcoherence
of the argumentwhile remainingan atheist and, as such, can meaningfully
say and think that there is no God, then why does Malcolm think that the
fool cannotmeaningfullysay or thinkthatthereis no God?The only possible
sense of this distinctionthatI can make is thatMalcolm identifiesthe fool as
one who rejects not only the existence of God, but who does so because the
ontological argumentdoes not hold. In other words, Malcolm's fool claims
that the concept of God is internallyincoherent,whereas the atheist is one
who is able to see the internal coherence. While both of them reject the
existence of God, Malcolm believes that the atheist's rejection of God is
valid because thatatheistis not claiming thatthe concept of God is empty or
contradictory.The fool, accordingto Malcolm,however,is someone who has
made an attemptat a philosophicalrefutationof the argument,i.e. one who
rejectedthe validityof the argumentas being philosophicallyunsound.34
But Malcolm makes the fool into a philosopher.This need not be the
case. The fool may be using the same concept that is used in the language
of worship, in which case, whatever is meant, it is not the rejection of
the ontological argument.O.K. Bouwsma lays the same charge to Anselm
in his seminal essay, "Anselm's Argument."35Bouwsma's basic thesis is
that Anselm confounds the grammarof worship with that of philosophical
epistemology.The fool of the Psalmis not a philosophicalskepticor a logical
positivist.Rather,just as the wise person affirmsthe existence of God in her
worship,the fool's foolishness stems from his inability to participatein the
worship, therebyrejecting God's existence. Bouwsma gives an example of
such a fool, who can say in his heart,"thereis no God."A young Jewishman
is able to see that his elders find sense and meaningfulnessin their worship
of God, but he is no longer able to participate,not because he found some
logical flaw in the concept of God, but because God and worshipof God no
longer have meaningin his life. It is only because Malcolm,just as Anselm,
misidentifieswho the fool is thatMalcolmdistinguishesbetweenthe fool and
the atheist.The fool, like the atheist,does not reject the existence of God on
32 H.JONGKIM

the basis of philosophicalreasoning.Rather,regardlessof seeing whetherthe

concept makes sense for her, God, and as such the worshipof God as well,
has no place in her life.
More importantly,Malcolm's discussionsof the fool and the atheistshow
that Malcolm vacillates between asserting(1) that the Second Form of the
Argumentsimply shows that conceptualnecessary existence is constitutive
of the concept of God, i.e., the concept of God is not self contradictory,and
(2) not only that the concept of God is not contradictory,but also that the
argumentshows the actualexistence of God. (1) is supportedby Malcolm's
understandingof the atheist who is able to see the logical coherence in
affirmingGod's necessary existence in the concept of God while rejecting
the actual existence of God. (2) is supportedby Malcolm's rejectionof the
objectionsraised by Kant and Caterusas discussed in the section II of this
paper.As seen there, Malcolm wanted to prohibitsuch conditionalsas "If
God exists, he exists necessarily"and such conjunctivesas "Godnecessarily
exists but he may not exist."
Malcolm vacillates between these two because he is dissatisfied with
affirming,on the one hand, only (1) and, on the other, both (1) and (2).
If he were to simply affirm (1), then, his proof is simply that those who
worshipGod do not commit some logical fallacy. But of course, this would
be consistentwith those who say thatunicornsare animalswith one horn.In
bothcases, the actualexistence is not shown;rather,the only thingaffirmedis
the internalcoherencyof the concept. However,showing the internalcoher-
ency of the concept of God is not enough for Malcolm. This is seen by his
attemptto respond to Kant's criticism. However,if he affirmsboth (1) and
(2), he leaves no room for his atheist, someone who can see the sense of
the concept of God, yet reject God's actual existence. This contradictshow
some atheists actually are. Thus, throughouthis essay, Malcolm vacillates
between (1) and (2), attemptingto resolve the problems in affirmingonly
(1) by appealingto (2), and vice versa. Because he does so, his argumentis
inherentlycontradictory.
Let us turnback to Hartshorne.As stated at the beginning of the essay,
Hartshorne'sargumentpostulates a stronger thesis than Malcolm's does.
Unlike Malcolm, who vacillates between God's necessary existence as a
logical concept and as an actuality,Hartshorneclaims that his version of
the argumentactually shows the existence of God in reality,albeit what he
calls the 'bare existence.' This claim is due to his understandingof pure
necessity in the sense of (6) discussed in section II of this paper.According
to this definitionof purenecessity,Hartshorneasserts,since God's necessary
existenceis a consequenceof the conceptof God, God mustexist in fact or in
reality and is the ground of all being and truth.However, unlike Anselm,
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORM OF THE ONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 33

what the argumentshows, according to Hartshorne,is the bare existence

of God and not the concrete actual existence of God. (He also calls "bare
existence,""existence;"and "concreteactualexistence,""actuality.")"[Bare]
existence," according to Hartshorne,"is that the defined abstractnatureis
somehow concretely actualized;but how it is actualized,in what particular
state,with what particularcontentnot deduciblefrom the abstractdefinition,
constitutesthe actuality."36 Thus, he states, "Anselm,rightly contendingthat
existenceis deduciblefromthe definitionof God (assumingthatthe definition
is conceivable), overlooked the immeasurablegulf between bare existence
and actuality.Actualitycan neverbe deduced,not even in the divine case."37
Hartshorneclaims thattherearethreepartsto graspinga concept:essence,
bare existence, and actuality.Further,he states, "Eventhe step from essence
to existenceis, in the case of creatures,always a contingentone, a questionof
what the facts happento be."38But in the case of God, Hartshorneholds, the
step from his essence to existence is non-contingent:"His essence or nature
must be actualizedsomehow, in some concrete state or other.But how it is
actualized,the concretestate itself, cannotbe deduced,for, being richerthan
any abstraction,it cannotbe logically containedin any."39I find this thesis of
Hartshorneto be problematic.
The difference between God and other beings/things, according to
Hartshorne, is that whereas the bare existence of God is necessarily
constitutive of God, the bare existence of other things/beings, insofar as
they are contingent, is "a question of what the fact happens to be."40But
then, how do we determine the contingency of a thing/being? Consider
such concepts/things/beingsas cheese, bachelor,and unicorn.Accordingto
Hartshorne,we know that these possess contingency because it is possible
to imagine them not to be. But, Hartshornedoes not ask the prior ques-
tion of how we got knowledge of the essence of these things in the first
place. Includedin the essence of cheese is the notion that it is a fermented
dairy product.Included in the essence of bachelor is the notion that he is
an unmarriedman. Includedin the notion of unicorn is that it is similar to
horses except thatit possesses a horn. Ourknowledge of fermentation,dairy
products,marriages,males, horses, horns, etc., does not stem simply from
our graspingthese concepts. Our grasp of the concepts of cheese, bachelor,
and unicorn, too, does not simply come a priori. Rather,Hume was half-
right in statingthat our knowledge, be it a priorior a posteriori,stems from
our experiences.41The other half is that the basis of our knowledge is not
simply empiricalexperiencesas Hume asserts,but it also includes the whole
of languagegames andtheirrelations,as well as the very formof life in which
these language games are played. As Wittgensteinstates, we do not learn a
34 H. JONGKIM

single axiom, rathera host of them and theirrelationsto the axiom as well as
to each other.
Thus, in learningthe essence of cheese, bachelor,or unicorn,one learns
theircontingencyas well as theiractuality.It is the concreteform of life, and
being raised and taughtto function within that form of life, which informs
us of the contingency of a concept/thing/beingas well as its actuality.In
otherwords, the two steps that Hartshorneclaims are necessaryin assessing
a concept's actual existence, a step in showing essence to existence and a
furtherstep in showing existence to actuality,are not only gratuitousbut
fallacious.Thereis but one step:In learninga concept,in learningto use that
concept,we have alreadylearnedthe answersto the questionsof the concept's
contingencyand actuality.I did not gain the knowledgeof the contingencyof
cheese andits actualityby firstbeing taughtthe essence of cheese, thennoting
its contingency,and finally assessing whetherit actuallyexists. Rather,these
questionswere answeredfor me in tastingcheese, in cuttingcheese, in buying
cheese, etc. I didn'tlearnthatunicornsdo not actuallyexist andarecontingent
by first learningthe definition(essence) of unicorns.Rather,my knowledge
of what unicornslook like stem from my priorknowledge of what a horn is,
what a horse is, etc., and my knowledge of nonexistence of unicorns stem
from my knowledgeof fables and make-believe.
The sameholds for the conceptof God. Necessaryexistencein the concept
of God did not arisesimply a priori.Thatwe conceive God to be a certainway
stems from the worshipof God, the practiceof theistic religions themselves.
Throughoutboth essays, Hartshorneclaims that we conceive of God (or
God's bareexistence) as being "worshipfullysupreme,""creatorof all things,
visible andinvisible,""unsurpassable by another,""perfectionin knowledge,"
"necessary,""immutable,""independent,""withoutparts,""complete once
and for all," "perfectfreedom and goodness,""the sole individualdefinable
a priori,"etc. Indeed, correctly or incorrectly,these are some of the ways
theology has definedthe essence of God. But these theologicaldefinitionsof
God did not arise from sheerreflection;rather,they stem from how believers
worshippedGod, confessed God as the Most High, the being to whom the
highest glory belongs, etc. But if these characteristicsof God are confessed
in the worship of God, then bare existence and necessary existence are not
deduced from these characteristics.Rather, God's bare existence and his
actualexistence are confessed alongside and in connectionwith God's other
characteristicsin the worshipof God.
Because Hartshornethoughtwrongly that the necessaryexistence of God
is a result of logical deduction, he held that understandingit leads to the
affirmationof the bareexistence of God, thatAnselm "hadrefuted 'atheism,'
in the sense in which this consists in admittingthe logical possibility of the
 WHATDOESTHESECONDFORMOFTHEONTOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT
PROVE? 35

divine existence while yet denying its reality."42Yet, if the necessary exist-
ence of God is thatwhich is alreadyconfessed alongsideothercharacteristics
of God in the worshipof God, in what sense is Hartshorne'ssecond form of
the ontological argumentan argument?What does it prove? At best, it can
only show that in the worship of God, God's existence is confessed along-
side confessions of other characteristicsof God without contradiction.But
it cannot prohibit"the fool of the Psalm"from saying, "in his heart, 'there
is no God,' because he would now realize that this is somethinghe cannot
meaningfullysay or think,"as Malcolm states.43Nor is it "Anselm'sglorious
discovery"that "God'sbare existenceis indeed entirelynecessary,as well as
unsurpassable,immutable,independent,"as Hartshorneasserts.44Thereis no
discoveryhere;rather,the necessaryexistence of God is simply a confession
of a believer.
What then remains of the second form of the ontological argument?
Simply that those who worship God affirm that God exists. And, how do
they hold this? In theirprayers,worship,and devotionto God. To believe in
God is to assert that God exists. But this is trite, and a truism. Implicit in
the proclamationthat God is "Creatorof all things, visible and invisible"is
the proclamationthat God exists. This, of course, is the sense of (1), namely
thatnecessaryexistence is constitutiveof the concept of God. However,just
as a Christianstudentof Hinduismcan understandthe necessary existence
of Brahmanyet deny its reality, so can an atheist or a fool see that God's
(necessary)existence is logically consistent with other articles of faith, yet
deny God's reality.

Acknowledgement
I am indebtedto the membersof ClaremontWittgensteinSociety,particularly
PatrickHorn,for theirvariouscontributionsto this paper.Of course,all errors
are my own.

Notes
1. Norman Malcolm, "Anselm'sOntological Arguments,"in The Many Faced Argument,
edit, by John Hick and ArthurC. McGill (New York:Macmillan, 1967), pp. 301-320.
CharlesHartshorne,"WhatDid Anselm Discover?"and"TheIrreduciblyModalStructure
of the Argument"in the same collection, pp. 321-333 and 334-340. Both Hartshorneand
Malcolm acknowledgedthat Anselm may not have distinguishedthe first form of the
argumentfrom this second form.
2. The claim that necessary existence is a propertyof God is not a novel developmentby
these two thinkers.As they recognized, this notion is found as early as in Descartes'
36 H. JONGKIM

discussionof the ontological argument(Hartshorne,"WhatDid Anselm Discover?"322).

Malcolm actuallycites the passage from Descartes:
I do not see to what class of reality you wish to assign existence, nor do I see why it
may not be said to be a propertyas well as omnipotence,taking the word propertyas
equivalentto any attributeor anythingwhich can be predicatedof a thing, as in the
presentcase it shouldbe by all meansregarded.Nay, necessaryexistence in the case of
God is also a truepropertyin the strictestsense of the word, because it belongs to Him
and forms part of His essence alone. (Haldaneand Ross, The Philosophical Worksof
Descartes, 2 vols. (Cambridge,1931), II, p. 228 and quotedby Malcolm,p. 310.)

Barth, earlierthan these two, also recognized the differencebetween Proslogion II and
III. KarlBarth,"ProslogionIII:The Special Existence of God,"in Hick andMcGill. For a
thoroughhistoricaltreatmentof the argumentand discussions on it, see McGill's "Recent
Discussions of Anselm's Argument"in the same collection.
3. D.Z. Phillipsalso notes a similarpoint. D.Z. Phillips, "SublimeExistence,"in Wittgenstein
and Religion, GreatBritain:Macmillan, 1993, p. 17.
4. By logical or conceptualexistence of God, I mean the concept of God's existence in the
concept of God, whereasby God's actualexistence, I mean God's existence in fact or in
'
reality.Similarcriticismis notedby JohnHicks in "ACritiqueof the 'SecondArgument,'
in The Many Faced Argument(edit, by John Hick and ArthurC. McGill (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1967), pp. 341-356) and by Jerome Shaffer in "Existence,
Predicationand the OntologicalArgument"(in Hick andMcGill, 242-243.)
5. Malcolm articulatesit in the following manner:
If God, a being a greaterthanwhich cannotbe conceived,does not exist then He cannot
come into existence. For if He did He would either have been caused to come into
existence or have happened to come into existence, and in either case He would be
a limited being, which by our conception of Him He is not. Since He cannot come
into existence, if he does not exist His existence is impossible. If He does exist He
cannot have come into existence (for the reasons given), nor can He cease to exist,
for nothing could cause Him to cease to exist nor could it just happenthat He ceased
to exist. So if God exists His existence is necessary. Thus God's existence is either
impossible or necessary.It can be the formeronly if the concept of such a being is self-
contradictoryor in some way logically absurd.Assuming that this is not so, it follows
thatHe necessarilyexists. (Malcolm, 309)

Hartshornestates,
To exist necessarilyis betterthan to exist contingently;hence the greatestconceivable
being can exist only necessarily.Moreover,whatevercould be necessary is necessary
("reductionprinciple"of modal logic); hence to say thatGod does not exist necessarily
is to say that he could not do so, and since he also could not exist contingently,it is
to say that he could not exist at all. ... The only logically admissible way to reject
theismis to rejectthe very idea of God as eithercontradictoryor empty of significance.
(Hartshorne,322)

6. Malcolm, 314-315.
7. Hartshorne,324
8. Malcolm states,
 WHATDOES THE SECONDFORMOF THE ONTOLOGICALARGUMENTPROVE? 37

Thereis nothing we should wish to describe,seriously and literally,as 'testing' God's

knowledge and powers. That God is omniscient and omnipotenthas not been deter-
mined by the applicationof criteria:ratherthese are requirementsof our conceptionof
Him. They are internalpropertiesof the concept, althoughthey are also rightly said to
be propertiesof God. (Malcolm, 309-310)

9. Malcolm, 305.
10. Malcolm states,

Necessary existence is a property of God in the same sense that necessary omni-
potence and necessary omniscience are His properties. . . . The a priori proposition
'God necessarily exists' entails the proposition 'God exists,' if and only if the latter
also is understoodas an a prioriproposition:in which case, the two propositionsare
equivalent.In this sense, Anselm's proof is a proof of God's existence. (Malcolm,310)

11. Malcolm, 306-307.

12. Malcolm, 307.
13. Malcolm, 307.
14. Rush Rhees, On Religion and Philosophy,edit by D.Z. Phillips (Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress, 1997), p. 17. Rhees furtherreflectsupon Malcolm's usage of necessary
existence, and states that "If you speak of God as a necessary being, I do not think this
has point or sense except in contrast with the existence of the world - which is then
supposedto be 'contingentexistence.' 'God is a necessarybeing' is a way of speakingof
God as creator.There are difficultiesin talkingaboutthe contingencyof the world which
are almost as great as talking about the necessary existence of God. In ordinaryuse the
contrastbetween contingent and necessary refers to events - to what can be predicted
and what is accidental,for instance."(18) The difficultyof talking aboutthe contingency
of the world is that while it makes sense of talking about other things being contingent,
and hence dependent,it does not make sense to talk about the world in the same way.
For example, one can talk aboutwhen the child was born and the time before, or when a
countrywas started,etc., but what would it mean to talk about the time when the world
was not? Rhees makes an importantpoint thatcan be easily missed here:he statesthatto
speak of the necessarybeing of God is to speak of God as creator.And, to speak of God
as a creatoris to speak in the language of worship.The importanceof this point will be
discussed furtherbelow in connectionwith what it means to state, "thereis no God."As
always, Rhees speaks succinctly and clearly where I botch and tend to be verbose.
15. These are similarto the very questionsthatMalcolm claims cannotbe asked aboutGod's
existence. He correctlynoted that"Itis absurdto make God the subjectof such questions"
as " 'How long has he existed?', 'Will he still exist next week?', 'He was in existence
yesterdaybut how abouttoday?', and so on."(Malcolm, 305) However,given his explic-
ation of unlimitednessand independenceof God, these questionsnow can be asked and
inevitablyarise.
16. Hartshorne,340.
17. Hartshorne,326.
18. Elsewhere,Hartshornedenies that God shares object language with other beings/things
(for example, see his PhilosophersSpeakof God, among otherwritings).However,in his
two papersthat discuss this second form of ontological argument,HartshornetreatsGod
on par with objects.
19. Malcolm, 312.
38 H.JONGKIM

20. Yet, in what sense is Hartshorneusing this possibility of nonexistence? Given that
Hartshornedoes not note the differencesin kinds of existence as Malcolm does and given
that his other two modes of existences deal with objects, it is justified to assume that
Hartshornetakes the existence in this thirdtype of modalityin the same sense as his other
two modalitiesof existence: objects.
21. Malcolm, 316.
22. Ibid.
23. Hartshorne,327.
24. Hartshorne,326.
25. Malcolm furtherstatesof Kantand Caterus,
On the one hand, they agree that the proposition'God necessarilyexists' is an a priori
truth;Kant implies that it is 'absolutelynecessary,'and Caterussays that God's exist-
ence is implied by His very name. On the other hand, they think that it is correctto
analyze this propositionin such a way that it will entail the proposition'It is possible
that God does not exist.' But so far from its being the case that the proposition'God
necessarily exists' entails the proposition 'It is possible that God does not exist,' it is
ratherthe case that they are incompatiblewith one another!Can anythingbe clearer
than the conjunction 'God necessarily exists but it is possible that He does not exist'
is self-contradictory?Is it not just as plainly self contradictoryas the conjunction"A
squarenecessarilyhas four sides butit is possible for a squarenot to have four sides'? In
short,this familiarcriticismof the ontological argumentis self-contradictory,because
it accepts both of two incompatiblepropositions.(Malcolm,317)

Here, Malcolm believes that to state "God necessarily exists, but it is possible that God
does not exist" is as absurdas stating that "A square necessarily has four sides, but it
is possible for a squarenot to have four sides."He thus claims that both of these share
the same propositionalform: Np«(pv~p). Yet, these two statementsare not analogous.
The statementconcerningthe squareand its four sides is a nonsense because it affirms
the internalnecessity and definition of a square (Np), yet at the same time assert the
possibility of it not being the case (pv~p). Here, the both sides of the conjunctiveassert
the same sense of p, therebycontradicteach other.Howeverthe statement,"Godneces-
sarily exists, but it is possible that God does not exist," has two different senses of p,
two different grammars.The first part, "God necessarily exists," is the affirmationof
the internallogical necessity of the concept of God. But the second part, "It is possible
that God does not exist," is concernedwith the actual existence, or rather,employment
of confessional grammar.As such, one can state both statementswithout committing a
contradiction.
26. As quotedby Malcolm, 310-311.
27. See endnote27.
28. This distinctionbetween God and otherbeings is the very bases by which Anselm refutes
Gaunilo's infamous Perfect Island objection. Both Malcolm and Hartshorneexpand on
Anselm's somewhatfacetious reply that "I can confidently say that if anyone discovers
for me somethingexisting eitherin fact or at least in thought,otherthan 'thatthanwhich
a greatercannot be conceived,' and is able to apply the logic of my argumentto it, I
shall find that 'Lost Island' for him and shall give it to him as somethingwhich he will
neverlose again."(ReplyIII) However,my point here differs from thatof Gauniloin that
I am concernedhere with necessaryconstituentsof existing concepts (such as nicotine in
the concept of cigaretteor necessaryexistence in the concept of God) whereasGaunilo's
 WHATDOESTHESECONDFORMOFTHEONTOLOGICAL
ARGUMENT
PROVE? 39

Lost Island, as rejected by Anselm and echoed by Malcolm and Hartshorne,is intern-
ally incoherentdue to postulatingnecessary existence as being constituentof a concept
(Island)thatcannotpossess such existence as one of its constituents.In otherwords, (A)
that an island must be surroundedby water on all its sides is a necessary constituentof
the concept of island;but, (B) an island as being necessarilyexisting cannotenterinto the
concept of island because the concept of island alreadydenotes contingentexistence. My
example of the concept of cigarettedeals with (A), not (B).
29. Hartshorne,340.
30. Hartshorne,340.
31. J.N. Findlay, "Can God's Existence be Disproved?",in New Essays in Philosophical
Theology,ed. A.N. Flew and A. Macintyre(London:1955).
32. JeromeShaffernotes a similarpoint by distinguishingbetween intension and extension.
He states,

What lies at the heart of the puzzle about the Ontological Argumentis the fact that
our concepts have two quite different aspects, markedby the familiarphilosophical
distinctionof intension and extension. A world like "horse"has a particularmeaning
and is logically connectedwith other words like "animal";its correspondingconcept,
the conceptof a horse,has a particularcontentandis connectedwith otherconceptslike
the concept of an animal.It is this intensionalfeatureof words and theircorresponding
concepts which makes certainassertionslike 'A horse is an animal' tautological.But
words and concepts are also applicableto things. It turnsout to be the case that there
have existed, do now exist, andwill exist entities such thatit is trueof each of them that
it is a horse, this fact we may express by saying that the word 'horse' or the concept
of a horse has extension. In making assertionsabout the extension of a concept, there
are typical forms of expressionwhich we use; ". . . exist,"". . . are nonexistent,"'there
are . . .,' 'there are no ... ,' '. . . are plentiful,' '. . . are scarce,' '. . . are extinct,' '. . .
are mythological,' '. . . are found in Africa,' etc. that such expressions are typically
used in assertionsaboutthe extension (or lack thereof)of particularconceptsis what is
"
correctlybroughtout in the slogan, 'exists' is not a predicate."But the typical use is
not the only use. Since any statement,with suitabledefinition,can be trueby virtueof
the meaningsof the terms,sentenceswith existentialexpressionscan be used to express
tautologicalstatements.The very same sentencewhich is typicallyused to makea claim
aboutthe extensionof the conceptmay insteadbe used to make a claim aboutthe inten-
sion of the concept. We cannot tell by the form of the expression how the expression
is being used. 'Particularsexist,' when assertedtautologically,is used to make a claim
about the meaning of the word 'particulars'and thereforecannot be used to make a
claim about the extension of the term. Similarly,if someone uses the sentence, 'God
exists,' tautologically,he tells us only thatbeing an existentis a logical requirementfor
being God. If, on the other hand, someone asserts, "God exists," nontautologically,
then he claims that the term "God"has extension, applies to some existent. In the
case of the OntologicalArgumentthe only valid conclusion is an intensionalstatement
about the meaning of the concept of God. A fortiori the conclusion cannot be about
whetheranythingexists to which the concept applies. The primafacie plausibilityof
the Argumentcomes from the use of a sentenceintensionallywhen typical use of that
sentence is extensional.In this way it conceals the illicit move from an intensionalto
an extensionalstatement"(JeromeShaffer,"Existence,Predicationandthe Ontological
Argument,"in Hick and McGill, 242-243.)
40 H. JONGKIM

33. Norman Malcolm, "The Second Form of the Ontological Argument,"in Classical and
ContemporaryReadings in the Philosophy of Religion, edit. By John Hick (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall,Inc., 1970), 463.
34. This, of course, is Anselm's understandingof the fool. Proslogion IV.
35. O.K. Bouwsma, "Anselm'sArgument,"in WithoutProof or Evidence,ed. And introduced
by J.L. Craft: and R.E. Hustwit (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press,
1984).
36. Hartshorne,329.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Hartshorne,329-330.
40. Hartshorne,329.
41. David Hume, An EnquiryConcerningHuman Understanding,CharlesW. Hendel, edit.,
New York:Macmillan, 1957.
42. Hartshorne,327.
43. Malcolm, 320.
44. Hartshorne,331.