PAPER SERIES

FROM DOWN UNDER TO TOP CENTER

AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES,
AND THIS CENTURY’S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Iskander Rehman
Research Fellow, Transatlantic Academy
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 From Down Under to Top Center
Australia, the United States,
and this Century’s Special Relationship

Transatlantic Academy Paper Series

May 2011

Iskander Rehman*
Research Fellow, Transatlantic Academy

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
From Liminality to Centrality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Evolution of Australia’s Strategic Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Gauging Australia’s Role in an Enlarged Airsea Battle Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Conclusion: This Century’s Special Relationship? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25

*Iskander Rehman is currently a Ph.D. candidate at CERI, Institute of Political Sciences (Science Po) in Paris and a Research
Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy. He is also a Former Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses
in Delhi; he has contributed on strategic matters for BBC World, The Guardian, and the South Asian news channel ANI.
In 2008, he received a two year grant from the French Ministry of Defense, for which he has also served in an advisory
capacity.
Executive Summary
F
or most of its history, Australia has floated
on the edge of much of the western world’s
mental map, a continent-sized island lying at
the fringes of our traditional representations of the
Asia-Pacific rim. This can be attributed as much
to what Geoffrey Blainey famously phrased “the
tyranny of distance”1 as to the enduring legacy of
antiquated Cold War-era perceptions of Asia.
Today, however, as the world’s center of gravity
shifts from West to East, Australia’s position
has swiveled from “down under” to “top center”
in terms of geopolitical import. Situated at the
confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
Australia stretches from the cold seas circling the
Antarctic to the vast belt of archipelagoes that
speckle the waters of Southeast Asia.
A small Western nation with a vast continental
landmass, Australia has grappled with a defining
paradox since its early days: its cultural proximity
to the West and its geographical distance from it.
This has led some to posit that Australia is a
“torn nation,”2 a country that constantly teeters
on a cultural fault line in a quest for its identity
and place in the world. In reality, far from being
a source of existential malaise, Australia’s very
liminality,3 or location at the intersection of two
worlds, has become its greatest virtue at a time
when China’s rise and growing assertiveness have
given urgency to concerns over the future of Asian
stability.
Australia’s strategic culture has, since its beginnings,
wavered between a “continental ethos” that looked
inwards rather than out, and the realities imposed
by the exigencies of modern security crises, which
have led Canberra, time and time again, to adopt
a more amphibious mindset.4 From the Boer War
and Gallipoli to the Southwest Pacific campaigns of
World War II, from the jungles of Vietnam to the
mountains of Afghanistan, Australian troops have
been compelled to operate offshore, often at great
distances from their homeland. Closer to home, the
Australian Defence Forces (ADF) have traditionally
been active in playing a stabilizing role — whether
it be via its UN-sponsored intervention in East
Timor in 1999, large-scale relief work in the wake
of the 2004 tsunami, or sustained efforts to nurture
good governance and rule of law in places such as As the world’s
the Solomon islands or Fiji. center of gravity
shifts from West
As China pursues its economic and military ascent,
to East, Australia’s
there is a growing realization that Australia’s
traditional oscillation between continental defense
position has
and offshore presence can no longer provide an swiveled from
adequate conceptual framework for dealing with “down under”
the rapid evolutions unsettling the region. As a to “top center”
result , the nation’s seminal 2009 defense white in terms of
paper calls for the biggest military build-up since geopolitical
World War II,5 and Australia’s vibrant strategic import.
community is currently engaged in some of the
most intense, and fundamental, debates it has yet
had to undertake.
Meanwhile, Washington’s strategic cognoscenti are
crafting a revolutionary new doctrine, entitled the
AirSea Battle Concept,6 which calls, among other
things, for a seamless cooperation between the
U.S. Navy and Air Force in order to offset Beijing’s
growing anti-access prowess. Fears at the Pentagon
over the growing vulnerability of American forward
bases to Chinese missile barrages have rendered
Australia, with its strategic depth and logistical
wherewithal, an ever more alluring tactical location.
This geographical advantage is compounded by
the fact that Australia is staunchly committed to its
alliance with the United States, and does not share
the same degree of reservations over U.S.-basing as
other countries in the region such as Japan.
Canberra’s presence at the heart of the Asian arena
has also led it to seek to extend its strategic vision,
from its traditional Pacific focus to the Indian
Ocean, which has sometimes been termed “the
From Down Under to Top Center 1
 neglected ocean,”7 and which forms its vast western Australia alliance. During the Raj era, the Viceroy
maritime front. This strategic elevation of the would preside over the future of Asia from the
Indian Ocean Region has been accompanied by a small Indian hilltop town of Simla or the bustling
growing appreciation of the need to build stronger streets of Calcutta or Delhi, while far to the West,
ties with major rising powers such as India, and the intricacies of European and Mediterranean
more substantively, with Indonesia, which is rapidly geopolitics would be unraveled in the halls of
emerging as one of Australia’s pivotal partners Westminster. In a similar fashion, the United States
In the future, in the region. In the future, Australia may well will only remain a global power if its strategic
Australia may prove to be a bridge between the United States and vision is buttressed by a transpacific, as well as by a
well prove to be Indonesia as well as other Southeast Asian and transatlantic special relationship.
a bridge between Oceanic states, thus becoming a central link in a
the United States chain of inter-state cooperation.
and Indonesia, The combination of Australia’s prime geostrategic
as well as other location, its staunch commitment to the U.S.
Southeast Asian alliance, and its growing enmeshment in the
and Oceanic Asia-Pacific region have led some to venture that
states, thus the U.S.-Australia relationship may well turn out
becoming a to be this century’s “special relationship,” to the
central link in a point at which it may in fact displace the U.S.-UK
chain of inter- relationship in terms of scope and importance.
state cooperation.
It will be argued here that Australia will indeed
emerge as the United States’ strongest ally in
the Asia-Pacific region, and that this solidifying
strategic convergence between these English-
speaking nations will have an immensely positive
influence on regional developments and stability in
Asia. This special relationship is one that will both
be attuned to the realities of an Asia-Pacific century
and help define it. This will not necessarily happen
at the expense of the U.S.-UK relationship, but
rather will form the Asian wing of the Democratic
Anglosphere, which has formed the inner core of
the U.S. system of alliances since its inception.

This will, in time, lead to the emergence of a form

of division of labor, or geographical differentiation
interlocking both strategic relationships. The U.S.-
UK special relationship will still be highly invested
in issues pertaining to the more traditional Atlantic
and Mediterranean regions, while the area “East of
Suez” will be the focus of the strengthened U.S.-

2 Transatlantic Academy
1 From Liminality to Centrality
A Historic Vantage Point in Asia
For years, Australia has floated on the edge of much
of the Western world’s mental map, a continent-
sized island lying at the fringes of our traditional
representations of the Asia-Pacific rim. This can
be attributed in part to what Geoffrey Blainey
famously phrased the “tyranny of distance,” which
has made Australia the eternal frontier state.
In the 18th century, European explorers refused
for some time to believe that Australia was the
last great southern landmass in between Asia
and the Americas. Captain Cook and his rivals
vainly searched for what they called the “missing
continent,” which they believed was waiting to
be found and would add balance to the southern
hemisphere. Indeed, while nowadays such a
firm belief in geographic equilibrium may seem
somewhat whimsical, such was not the case at
the time. Europe’s great geographers and hardy
explorers deemed it illogical, impossible even,
that landmass in Asia should be so haphazardly
distributed.8 When, to their disappointment,
it was discovered that Australia was in fact
the last continent, our perception of Asia was
captured once more by the large landmasses,
great civilizations, and teeming cities north of
the equator. Australia became yet again the final
outpost, the great lonely land curving over the
known world’s edge. The Cold War, by focusing to
a great degree our attention on the global struggle
between the Western democracies and the Soviet
Union, sustained this traditional cartographic and
mental representation.
In reality, however, Australia has always been
central to Asian geography, not least during the
years of its founding. The notion that Australia was
viewed merely by Imperial Britain as the dumping
ground for the worst —or most unfortunate
— members of its society is a highly reductive
one. Historians point out that the decision to
colonize South Wales cannot be divorced from the
importance of trade rivalries in 18th century British
policy, and the emerging importance at the time
of global sea power. Australia, which had already
been mapped in part by the Dutch, started to be
viewed as a highly important asset for Great Britain
during the world’s first truly global struggle, the
Seven Years War, which raged from 1757 to 1763.
The southern Pacific landmass provided Whitehall For years,
with a naval base of operations from which it could Australia has
interdict the maritime communications of the floated on the
Dutch, French, and Spanish, as well as an entrepôt edge of much
for trade and goods pouring in from the East Indies of the Western
and China.9 At the time, Lord Sydney is known to world’s mental
have urged the directors of the East India Company
map, a continent-
to encourage the population of Australia in order to
sized island lying
“prevent the emigration of our European neighbors
in that quarter.”10
at the fringes of
our traditional
Australia’s centrality in Asia was also brought to representations
light during the two world wars, from which it of the Asia-
provided a vital staging point into Oceania and Pacific rim.
the Southern Pacific: in World War I, when a
large number of Australian troops led a series
of successful amphibious operations against the
Kaiser’s troops in places such as Papua New Guinea
and the Solomon Islands; and then, to a much
greater extent during World War II, when Australia
provided a vital arsenal and logistical support base
for the United States and took part in the great
campaign to roll back the Japanese in the Southwest
Pacific.
From Down Under to Top Center
A small western nation with a vast continental
landmass, Australia has grappled with a defining
paradox since its early days: its cultural proximity
to the West and its geographical distance from
it. This sense of isolation from the civilizational
cradle has forged the narrative of Australian
identity since the times of the early Federation,
when Sir Henry Parkes famously referred to the
“crimson thread of kinship” that tenuously bound
From Down Under to Top Center 3
 Figure 1: Australia’s geographic position.
In reality, far from
being a source
of existential
malaise,
Australia’s very
liminality, or
location at the
intersection of two
worlds, is what
has become its
greatest virtue at
a time when the
world’s attention
shifts to Asia.
the nation to Great Britain.11 This duality —of
Western identity and Asian geography — has also
heavily marked the country’s strategic culture since
its inception, and has led some in the past, such
as Samuel Huntington, to posit that Australia is a
“torn nation,” a country that constantly teeters on
a cultural faultline in a vain quest for its identity
and place in the world. Political scientists, when
referring to the young nation, have attempted
to define it by the concept of “liminality,” which
depicts it as a country that has an in between
or liminal location, “suspended between two
different worlds in which there is access to both,
but in which permanence in either appears to be
elusive.”12
In reality, far from being a source of existential
malaise, Australia’s very liminality, or location at
the intersection of two worlds, is what has become
its greatest virtue at a time when the world’s
4 Transatlantic Academy
attention shifts to Asia, where China’s
seemingly unchecked influence has
triggered widespread concerns over
regional and even global stability.
The rapidly morphing geopolitical
landscape has led the United States to
shift its attention from West to East,
and has given birth to a feeling in
Washington that the United States is
still “underweighted” in Asia, while
“overweighted”13 in regions such as
the Middle East. This can be imputed
not only to an underestimation of
the tectonic shifts in relative power
and influence in Asia, but also to the
bloody upheaval brought about by
Sept. 11, 2001, which led to American
involvement in two mass counter-
insurgency campaigns in the Middle
East. As Kurt Campbell, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs recently stated, “We (the
United States) have been on a little bit
of a Middle East detour over the course of the last
ten years (…) And our future will be dominated
utterly and fundamentally by developments in the
Asia and Pacific Region.”14 Washington’s renewed
focus on Asia is thus underpinned, to a certain
degree, by a sense of urgency, as well as by a desire
to make up for lost time. Official documents call
for a “more widely distributed and adaptive U.S.
presence in Asia,”15 and for a two ocean strategy
that revolves around the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
rather than around the more traditional Pacific/
Atlantic oceanic arena.16 U.S. Defense Secretary
Robert Gates has been explicit in stating that the
United States’ “overriding obligation” to allies
and partners was to “reaffirm America’s security
commitments in the region.”17 This re-emphasis
of America’s military footprint in Asia has
been accompanied on the ground by a gradual
repositioning of naval and air assets to the Western
Pacific Theater of Operations (WPTO) and by the
build-up of existing U.S. bases in places such as
Guam. The Obama Administration’s determination
to revamp the American presence in Asia has
also been expressed via a bevy of diplomatic and
institutional initiatives, whether it be through the
holding of the first U.S.-ASEAN summit, America’s
joining of the East Asia Summit, or through Hillary
Clinton’s open support of a multilateral resolution
to the South China Sea disputes during last year’s
Asian defense ministers meeting in Hanoi.
All this means that, today, as the world’s center of
gravity shifts from West to East, Australia’s position
in Asia has swiveled it from “down under” to “top
center” in terms of geopolitical import. Situated at
the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
and stretching from the cold seas circling the
Antarctic to the vast belt of archipelagoes that
speckle the waters of Southeast Asia, Australia
will be drawn into the eye of the storm in coming
decades. And through its rarefied geography, it will
not only acquire a new centrality, but also pride of
place in the Western system of alliances that has,
since the end of the Cold War, undergirded global
stability.
Wading into the Forgotten Ocean
Canberra’s presence at the heart of the Asian
arena has also led it to extend its strategic vision.
Traditionally, Australian policy and decision-
makers have been beholden to a heavily Pacific-
centric world view. This was due to the fact that
most of the population’s economic and population
centers are clustered along the eastern seaboard,
and Australia’s greatest ally, the United States lies
on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, which is
sometimes colloquially referred to in Australian
strategic circles as the “ANZUS Lake.” Over the
past few years, however, Canberra has elevated the
importance of the Indian Ocean, which laps against
its western coastline, and which has sometimes
been referred to as its “forgotten ocean” or “ocean
of neglect.”18 Australian analysts point to the fact
that the Indian Ocean, which forms the world’s
third largest body of water, has reemerged as a
major hub of maritime trade, with more than half
of the world’s container traffic, and 70 percent of
the world’s total traffic in petroleum products,
passing from its entry point, the Strait of Hormuz, Australia will be
to its congested exit, the Straits of Malacca. drawn into the eye
of the storm in
The Australian author John Birmingham elegantly
coming decades.
frames this strategic rotation westwards, writing
in the Australian Monthly: “The forgotten ocean’s
time is coming. The next century will only partly
belong to the Pacific. Just as Europe’s rise made
the Atlantic a setting for 500 years of maritime
and naval contention, shifting power centers will
draw new fleets of merchantmen and warships
into play across the 68.6 million square kilometers
of the Indian Ocean. Geographically dominating
the south-east quarter of those open seas, rich
in mineral and energy resources, and long allied
globally and regionally with the declining power of
the United States, Australia is about to undergo the
wrenching experience of having its world literally
turned around.”19
And indeed, although Canberra has historically
neglected its vast western maritime front, Australia
is, paradoxically, the largest Indian Ocean state in
terms of the extent of its offshore maritime claims.
Furthermore, Western Australia, which was long
dismissed as something of a backwater, is booming
economically, due to the recent mushrooming of
offshore oil and gas developments off the west and
northwestern coastlines. Approximately one third
of Australia’s exports now come from Western
Australia and this portion is only set to grow, as it
is estimated that approximately 90 percent of the
nation’s natural gas reserves lie to the West.20 Trade
with the region has been growing at a breakneck
pace, and India is fast becoming one of Australia’s
From Down Under to Top Center 5

Australian defense
analysts are
concerned over
the lack of bases
between Perth
and Darwin and
fret over how greatest export markets with a growth of 40 percent
ripe the region is over the past five years.21
for great power
On a more strategic level, Australian defense
rivalry, most
notably between analysts are concerned over the lack of bases
between Perth and Darwin (which are more than
India and China.
3,000 km apart), which may be needed in the
future to protect increasingly critical economic
infrastructure, and fret over how ripe the region is
for great power rivalry, most notably between India
and China. During much of the Cold War, Australia
was wary of India’s maritime intentions, in large
part due to Delhi’s proximity to the Soviet Union.
This thinking, interestingly, to a certain degree still
permeates Australian strategic discourse to this day,
and although the language of “Indian hegemony”
has been jettisoned, there are still concerns in some
quarters that drawing too close to India could
alienate smaller South Asian nations such as Sri
Lanka or Pakistan, or, more importantly, China.
maritime security in the region.22 This was followed
up in 2009 by the signature of a Joint Declaration
on Security Cooperation, which will work to
strengthen cooperation in a wide range of security
and related areas including counter-terrorism,
defense, disarmament and non-proliferation, and
maritime security. Nevertheless, there is a certain
degree of caution in Canberra to not give Beijing
reason to feel that a strategy of containment is
being put in motion. In 2007, when Australia,
Japan, India, and the United States engaged in
massive joint naval exercises, China issued a
diplomatic demarche demanding whether a form
of Asian NATO was being put into place.23 Since
then, Australia has been careful not to send out
that impression, focusing on multilateral maritime
exercises that emphasize counter-terror or anti-
piracy missions, rather than more conventional
operations. It remains to be seen, however, whether
this Australian attention to China’s perceived
sensitivities will continue in light of the latter’s
growing assertiveness in the region.

Substantial progress has been made in terms

of defense cooperation between the two Asian
democracies with the signing of a defense pact
in 2006, which called for greater cooperation
in maritime security, military research and
development, and military joint training. In
2007, both sides also agreed to share intelligence
information related to terrorist activity and

6 Transatlantic Academy
2
The Evolution of Australia’s
Strategic Culture

Sinking Paradigms: Continental Defense versus The surprising thing, however, is that Australian
Offshore Presence strategic thinking in times of peace has largely
Australian strategic culture is both fascinating and been at odds with the realities imposed by the
riddled with complexity, a labyrinth of intersecting exigencies of modern security crises, which have
and interrelated paradoxes. led Canberra, time and time again, to adopt a
more amphibious mindset. From the Boer War
An array of seeming contradictions has thus to the Southwest Pacific campaigns of World War
permeated its formulation over the years: II, from the jungles of Vietnam to the mountains Australian
• Australia’s Asian geography and Western of Afghanistan, Australian troops have been strategic culture
identity; compelled to operate offshore, often at great is both fascinating
distances from their homeland. Closer to home, and riddled
• Its continental landmass and island status; the ADF has traditionally been active in playing a with complexity,
stabilizing role, whether it be via its UN-sponsored a labyrinth of
• Its periodic quest for greater self-reliance along intervention in East Timor in 1999, large-scale
with a traditional great power dependency; and intersecting
relief work in the wake of the 2004 tsunami, or
and interrelated
sustained efforts to nurture good governance and
• Its strategic theorizing and wartime practice. paradoxes.
rule of law in places such as the Solomon islands or
Australian strategic thought has been heavily Fiji.
marked in peacetime by what could best be
described as a “continental reflex,” which has led it
to look inwards rather than out, and to look to the
defense of Fortress Australia rather than outwards
to the great blue. This has led some to say that
“Australians are a coastal people with a continental
outlook, an island nation with an inward focus,”24
and that in Australian strategic culture, the sea
has consistently been viewed as a defensive moat
and not as a maritime maneuver space, a “sea-air
gap” that separates the continental landmass from
the South-East Asian band of archipelagos. This
bastion mentality became increasingly apparent in
the wake of the Vietnam War and the United States’
enunciation of the so called “Guam doctrine” in
1969. For at least two decades, Australian defense
planning focused on continental defense, and on
the need to deny an enemy’s approach of the “sea-
Figure 3: Major battles or campaigns in the Pacific in
air gap” through a narrowly defined strategy of sea World War II.
denial, or as some disgruntled military officials
have phrased, by hiding behind “a blue-water
This disconnect between strategic theorizing
Maginot line.”25
and wartime practice has led some to say that
there is a profound “dissonance”26 at the heart of

From Down Under to Top Center 7

 Australian strategic thinking. This inner debate
notwithstanding, Australian strategic culture can be
defined by two overarching factors:
A tradition of “dependency on imperial
benevolence,” i.e. on a great and powerful friend
overseas.27 The more powerful ally was Great
It should be Britain until the second half of the 20th century
stated that the — the trauma of the fall of Singapore in 1942
constituting no doubt the watershed moment —
debate that has
and the United States since the early 1950s and the
raged between
signature of the ANZUS treaty.
continentalists
or minimalists
And secondly, by a predisposition to use force to
and those protect and further its interests overseas, to bring
advocating a more the fight to the enemy rather than let it spill over
vigorous forward onto Australian shores.
presence has
This strategic behavior has arguably proven to be
had a profound extremely effective. Indeed, barring the Japanese air
impact on defense raids on Darwin during World War II, Australia has
procurement and never been directly under attack.
has frequently
straitjacketed It should be stated that the debate that has raged
between continentalists or minimalists and those
Australian force
advocating a more vigorous forward presence has
structure and
had a profound impact on defense procurement
capabilities.
and has frequently straitjacketed Australian
force structure and capabilities. Nevertheless, the
paradigm squabble has had little bearing in terms
of Australia’s actual strategic behavior in times of
crisis.
The Australian 2009 white paper, Defending
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030,28
is a turning point in the sense that it may well be
the first fully fleshed-out effort to realign force
planning with reality. This new hard-headedness is
driven by a sense of urgency due to China’s rise in
Australia’s strategic discourse.
8 Transatlantic Academy
The Rise of China
in Australia’s Strategic Discourse
When the People’s Republic of China first came
into being, Australia’s official defense papers (which
were then called Strategic Appreciation papers)
largely viewed China in terms of the communist
threat and the risk of Maoism spreading to
Southeast Asia through the “large groups of ethnic
Chinese that honeycomb the region.”29 The threat
was perceived as being more ideological than
conventional, and more cause for potential regional
instability than as an existential threat. In 1953, the
Strategic Basis of Australian Defense Policy, referred
to China for the first time as the enemy in the wake
of the Korean War, during which Australian troops
suffered more than 1,500 casualties, 339 of them
fatal, many cut down storming heavily fortified
Chinese positions. Nevertheless, then and for many
years, China’s military capabilities were viewed
as being primed first and foremost for defense,
and were not seen as embodying a direct threat to
Australian security.
Interestingly, and maybe by virtue of its geographic
proximity, Australian strategists have frequently
been remarkably prescient when it comes to
evaluating China’s intentions and capabilities. In
October 1964, for example, the Strategic Basis
paper predicted that China’s first nuclear test was
to be “expected any time soon,” which did happen
only a few months later. And already in the early
1970s, Australian planners were forecasting that
China would become the greatest Asian economy
and that India would in time emerge as a useful
counterweight to China in the region and “provide
some counterbalance to the power and prestige in
Asia of communist China.”
The 1976 review’s concluding note on China
encapsulates what was to be Australia’s approach for
the next 20 years by stating that China “is of little
direct defense, as opposed to political, significance
to Australia at the present time,” though “in the
longer term there are
bound to be uncertainties
about a China that has
developed the political
and economic strength to
pursue significant policy
beyond its neighboring
regions, and capability The latest white
to project supporting paper comes
military force… China at a time of
could in time establish unparalleled
a primary status in the concern in Asia,
region that would be a and in Australia,
substantial political and
over the risks
strategic consequence for
surrounding
Australia.”30
China’s rise.
After the Cold War,
more concern started
transparency and provocative military signaling,
to be expressed due to
from the 2008 Anti Satellite test to the truculence
the increased uncertainty of a multipolar world
Chinese vessels have displayed in the South and
and in 1993 to China’s “potential to emerge as a
East China Seas.31 Australian newspapers have
strategic rival to the United States in Asia.” In the
drawn attention to the unprecedented number of
course of that same decade, Australia’s defense
cyber attacks being conducted on the Australian
community displayed once again a remarkable
government apparatus, with even former Prime
degree of foresight by predicting that China’s
Minister Kevin Rudd’s personal email having
economic growth would lead it to engage in a
been reportedly cracked by a hacker originating
massive overhaul of its naval forces. In 2000, the
in China. As Australia draws closer to Japan,
government of Prime Minister John Howard
signing a landmark defense declaration on security
anxiously noted “a small but significant possibility
cooperation in 2007, it has been increasingly
of …confrontation between major powers in Asia,
alarmed by the deteriorating relationship between
and even outright conflict,” and that Australia, by
Beijing and its close ally. The Rio Tinto affair32 in
virtue of its alliance with the United States, may
2009, which had large resonance in the Australian
well find itself being sucked into the turmoil.
media, cast a further pallor on Canberra’s
The latest white paper, published more than nine perception of its large neighbor to the “near north.”
years later, comes at a time of unparalleled concern
in Asia, and in Australia, over the risks surrounding Edging Towards a Maritime Strategy
China’s rise. These concerns are multiple, and Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper must thus
range from China’s perceived growing influence in be viewed in this light, as well as in the context
Oceania, which Australia has traditionally viewed of a fear in certain quarters that the United States
as its Southern Pacific backyard, to unease over will no longer be able to maintain the same level
the People Liberation Army’s’s lack of military

From Down Under to Top Center 9

 of military presence or freedom of action in the is almost impossible that a war can be decided by
WPTO as it used to. For Australians, this echoes naval action alone.”33
the concerns they felt at the beginning of the 20th
century, when their main security guarantor, Great This implies a high degree of interoperability,
Britain, started to scale down its naval presence in flexibility, and capacity for joint service action.
Asia in order to offset the expansion of the Imperial The Australian white paper reflects this synergistic
German Navy in Europe. approach. The most significant additions are in
While naval terms of maritime warfare capabilities, with, for
power seeks first The white paper thus calls for Australia’s biggest example the planned addition of three Aegis class
military build-up since World War II. Force 2030 destroyers, a fleet of 12 conventionally powered
and foremost to
is expected to be considerably more proficient submarines, 8 ANZAC frigates optimized for anti-
rule the waves,
than the current ADF, particularly in all aspects of submarine warfare, and 20 offshore vessels. But
maritime power
maritime warfare. the white paper also focuses heavily on the ADF’s
calls for action future amphibious component, which will involve
from the sea in Whereas in the past, Australian strategic thought the introduction of two large amphibious landing
order to influence had tended to view the Navy, Air Force, and Army vessels, and the need for the Australian army to be
happenings as acting separately rather than symbiotically, able to engage both in amphibious operations and
on land. the latest white paper goes well beyond the land warfare. While it is stated that “the main role
continentalist versus offshore debate and places the of the ADF should continue to be able to engage in
first foundations for a genuine maritime strategy. conventional combat against other armed forces,”34
It is important to distinguish maritime and naval the white paper also places much emphasis
power. While naval power seeks first and foremost on high-end asymmetric warfare, through the
to rule the waves, maritime power calls for action channeling of significant resources towards cyber
from the sea in order to influence happenings on warfare and the establishment of a Cyber Security
land. Operations Center, and the revolutionary decision
This distinction was
clearly theorized by the
great maritime thinker Sir
Julian Corbett, who wrote:
“By maritime strategy we
mean the principles which
govern a war in which the
sea is a substantial factor.
Naval strategy is but that
part of it which determines
the movements of the fleet
when maritime strategy has
determined what part the fleet
must play in relation to the
action of the land forces; for Figure 5: New Canberra Class of Australian Amphibious Assault Ship: the
it scarcely needs saying that it largest ship ever built for the Australian Navy, the first of which will be
commissioned in 2014. Source of image: Australian MOD

10 Transatlantic Academy
to arm all Australian MAJOR ACQUISITION PLANS
vessels with long-range
Conventionally Fleet will be doubled to over 12 vessels.
land-attack cruise
Powered Submarines
missiles (presumably
the Tomahawk). This F-35 Joint Strike Announced purchase of up to a 100 over the next
decision to morph the Fighters decade.
Australian fleet into F/A-18F Purchase of 24, 12 of which may be reconverted for
an “arsenal fleet” as electronic attack. Australia’s surge in
well as one capable Long-Range Land Major decision to equip naval platforms with long-range naval capabilities
of conducting more Attack Cruise cruise missiles. should therefore
traditional naval Missiles not be viewed
operations is a highly Surface Naval 3 AEGIS class destroyers, 8 ANZAC frigates with anti- through a bluntly
pragmatic one, as with Platforms submarine warfare capabilities, and 20 offshore combat navalistic prism,
the highly debated vessels, some of which will be outfitted for mine warfare. but rather as a
withdrawal from service Naval Helicopters 24, yet to be selected. pragmatic attempt
of the long-range
Amphibious 2 Canberra Class LHDS, 6 heavy landing craft, and a to emerge as a
F-111s from the AAF,
Capabilities sealift ship. well-rounded hard-
Australia’s long-range
strike capabilities will Australian Army Will not be expanded beyond eight battalions, but hitting amphibious
be gravely weakened. will receive Abrams tanks, artillery, and new troop-lift power in the
Equipping vessels with capabilities. Asia-Pacific.
long-range missiles
The scale and ambition of the reforms and
enables a resource-
acquisitions outlined in the white paper have cast
limited Australia to cut back on costs and to skirt
doubts over the Australian government’s ability to
the tactical headaches associated with deploying
fund and manage such an unprecedented overhaul
long-range fighter bombers in increasingly
of its defense apparatus. The white paper calls for
contested environments.35
a 3 percent increase in real growth of the defense
Australia’s surge in naval capabilities should budget until 2018, and then of 2.2 percent until
therefore not be viewed through a bluntly navalistic 2030 in order to finance the 20-year plan. These
prism, but rather as a pragmatic attempt to emerge costs are to be covered in large part through a
as a well-rounded, hard-hitting amphibious substantial program of reform, efficiencies, and
power in the Asia-Pacific, which can engage savings within the Defence Department, which is
simultaneously in: expected to generate close over US$25 billion in
savings over the next few years.
• maritime interdiction and power projection,
The question is whether the Australian government
• conventional assaults and high-end asymmetric will be able to honor its commitments. Past
warfare, and experience in this regard gives cause for a certain
degree of circumspection. The 1987 white paper,
• anti-submarine and anti-ship warfare, along
for example, called for an allocation of 2.6 to
with sea-based long-range land strikes.
2.9 percent of GDP to undergird its proposed
reforms. Figures show that the defense budget

From Down Under to Top Center 11

 actually declined to less than 2 percent in the
following years. This meant that many of the
proposed reforms never actually took place, and
instead of expanding to 16 or 17 ships, as hoped,
the Australian surface fleet remained at 12.36
An analysis of the 2010-2011 defense budget,
however, reveals that, for the time being at least, the
The goal behind government is intent on honoring its commitments,
Australia’s as the defense budget records a 6 percent increase
defense posture in nominal terms.37 Whether this encouraging
is not to provoke trend will persist over time is an open question
China towards and hinges largely upon the speed of Australia’s
conflict,however, economic recovery and the nature of its evolving
threat perceptions.
but rather to have
the wherewithal to Chinese reactions to the white paper were largely
deter any form of contained, if frosty, in public, but reportedly
Chinese military apoplectic behind closed doors.38 The goal behind
adventurism in Australia’s defense posture is not to provoke China
the event that towards conflict, however, but rather to have
it becomes the wherewithal to deter any form of Chinese
aggressively military adventurism in the event that it becomes
expansionist. aggressively expansionist, or in the spirited
language of Ross Babbage, one of Australia’s more
brilliant defense experts and one of the co-authors
of the white paper, to “rip off China’s arm”39 if it
ventures down too far south. This presupposes
however an unlikely and dire situation in which
Australia would be isolated from any form of
significant American assistance in the event of a
major security crisis involving China. In reality
Australia, the United States, and other regional
allies such as Japan and Taiwan would most
likely act in concert, under the architecture of a
revolutionary new doctrine currently being crafted
at the Pentagon in response to China’s anti-access
challenge and growing naval clout entitled the
“AirSea Battle Concept.”

12 Transatlantic Academy
3 Gauging Australia’s Role in
an Enlarged Airsea Battle Framework
Tectonic Shifts in Asia’s Tactical Environment
Despite the fact that the U.S. Navy, with its 11
nuclear-propelled carrier groups, still far outstrips
in terms of sheer power projection any of its rivals,
several observers in the U.S. strategic community
have been drawing attention to the gradual
“withering”40 of the U.S. combat fleet, which today
numbers about 280 ships in comparison to the peak
of 597 reached during the presidency of Ronald
Reagan. Both surface and subsurface platforms
have been affected, with the U.S. submarine fleet
having declined from 102 boats in 1991 to merely
53 today. This number is projected to dwindle even
further, to approximately 41 in 2028.
While the U.S. fleet is expected to stay at a relatively
stable level over the next few decades, oscillating
between 280 and 313 vessels, many question the
wisdom of choosing stagnation over expansion at
a time when the Chinese navy, which is already
said to comprise at least 260 ships, including more
than 75 principal combatants and 60 submarines, is
engaged in a process of unremitting expansion. Its
submarine fleet, in particular, is cause for concern.
Currently composed of 6 nuclear submarines and
54 diesel-electric submarines half of which are
the highly-effective Kilo, Song, or Yuan class, the
People’s Liberation Army Navy submarine flotilla,
if it sustains its current rhythm of induction, is
projected to vaunt 70 such vessels in the next 10
to 15 years. In all likelihood, one or two medium-
sized STOBAR (“short takeoff but arrested recovery
system”) carriers will also be launched in the course
of the next decade, as well as a new class of more
advanced destroyers.
This disquiet over the widening “quantity gap”
between the Chinese and U.S. navies in the Asia-
Pacific region has been exacerbated by the fact
the America’s traditional technological edge may
falter in the face of China’s “Assassin’s Mace” or
“Shashoujian” strategy.41 This exotic-sounding
term has its roots in ancient Chinese folklore,
which recounts how a hero wielding such a
weapon managed to overcome a far more powerful
adversary. Since then, in Chinese military strategy
it has come to mean the capacity to rapidly and
decisively seize the initiative and turn the tide to
one’s advantage when confronting a conventionally
superior foe. This is embodied in the People’s This disquiet over
Liberation Army’s intense focus on anti-access and the widening
area denial (A2/AD), via the mass acquisition of “quantity gap”
submarines, and, more recently, by the induction of between the
the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF- Chinese and U.S
21 D. China has long sought to counter U.S. carrier navies in the Asia-
dominance in the Taiwan Strait by fielding such a
Pacific region has
carrier killer missile, and its development gained
been exacerbated
fresh impetus after the 1995-1996 Taiwan missile
by the fact
crisis,42 when the deployment of two U.S. Carrier
Battle Groups to the region nurtured intense that America’s
feelings of helplessness and frustration among traditional
Chinese military officials. technological edge
may falter in the
The Assassin’s Mace thus combines China’s growing face of China’s
prowess in the field of A2/AD with its tactical “Assassin’s Mace”
approach to “waging a local war under conditions
or “Shashoujian”
of informatization,” which consists of a pre-emptive
strategy.
“blinding” assault against U.S. information systems
via Anti-Satellite Warfare (ASAT) and wide scale
cyber attacks.
China’s blinding strategy has long been studied and
taken into account by American military strategists,
but it is above all its strides in the field of A2/AD
that have radically transformed the nature of the
tactical environment. The sudden annihilation
of lightly defended American forward bases in
Okinawa and Guam under a barrage of China’s
increasingly large number of conventionally armed
ballistic missiles is now an abiding concern, as
is that of U.S. carrier groups becoming wasting
assets, as their growing vulnerability to Chinese
aircraft and submarines armed with high speed
sea-skimming ASCMs (anti-ship cruise missiles) or
to the DF-21 D risks rendering them operationally
From Down Under to Top Center 13
 irrelevant. This irrelevance would be
further accentuated by the fact that
the carriers carry short-range strike
aircraft, which would be compelled to
operate well within Beijing’s anti-ship
ballistic missile strike range.43

Responding to The Substance of

this changing the AirSea Battle Concept
environment, the Responding to this changing
United States environment, the United States is
is radically radically rethinking its doctrine and
rethinking its force posture in the WPTO. The result
doctrine and is a strategy entitled “AirSea Battle:
force posture A Point of Departure Operational
Concept,” first released by the
in the WPTO.
Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments in May 2010.44 The
concept, which is currently being
red-teamed and integrated by the U.S.
Navy and Air Force, is an attempt to
reconcile two hard truths: the relative Figure 6: Conventional anti-access capabilities. The PLA’s
conventional forces are currently capable of striking targets well
stagnation of the U.S. naval force level
beyond China’s immediate periphery. Not includes are ranges
in Asia, and the great strides China for naval surface- and sub-surface-based weapons, whose
has made in the field of anti-access employement at distances from China would be determined by
and area denial. Using the LandAir doctrine and the scenario in which they are employed.
Battle Concept implemented by the
AirSea Battle is comprised of two interactive stages,
U.S. military in the early 1980s as a
the first focusing on repelling a preemptive Chinese
template, the AirSea Battle Concept calls for a
strike and regaining the operational initiative, the
seamless cooperation between the U.S. Navy and
second on creating options to resolve a prolonged
Air Force in order to offset China’s prowess in anti-
conventional combat on favorable terms. Thus,
access capabilities.
according to the executive summary, “U.S. and
While wartime operations and scenarios are allied military forces can withstand initial large-
meticulously outlined, the avowed goal of the scale Chinese conventional attacks, mitigate their
newly forged strategy is not to assert crushing U.S. effects, reduce the effectiveness of China’s A2/AD
dominance over the Asian maritime theater, but system by rapidly blinding it, regain the strategic
to ensure that American presence in the region and operational initiative, and thereby set the stage
remains a powerful deterrent to any form of for sustained follow-on operations.”45
Chinese expansionism or military adventurism.
The core of AirSea Battle is what is termed the
“scouting campaign,” or “blinding campaign,”

14 Transatlantic Academy
during which both sides would conduct lightning
strikes on each other’s command and control and
communication networks in order to deny their
adversary vital tactical information. This blinding
campaign would involve fourth and fifth dimension
warfare, by unfolding in both the space and cyber
domains, with offensive cyber attacks on space and
ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
systems, kinetic and non-kinetic ASAT (anti-
satellite warfare) through ballistic missile strikes
or the use of newly developed directed-energy
weapons.
Joint air and naval action are presented as a way
of neutralizing China’s A2/AD threat to the U.S.
navy’s carrier fleets, with air force counter-space
operations targeting China’s space-based maritime
surveillance systems, and U.S. Navy Aegis-equipped
destroyers contributing to the defense of vulnerable
forward air force bases. Air force planes would
be called on to neutralize PLA missile boats with
inadequate air defense, while navy short-range
strike aircraft would find themselves imparted a
hunter-killer role in the elimination of Chinese
Airborne Warning and Control AWACs and
AEW&C aircraft. One of the most pivotal stages
in the conceptualized conflict revolves around
the destruction of the PLA submarine fleet in
the first island chain. The AirSea battle concept
recommends a form of maritime quarantine of
China’s littoral, with anti-submarine barriers along
the Ryuku islands and the Luzon Strait cordoning
off potential escape routes for the PLA submarine
fleets, and mobile mines and armed unmanned
underwater vehicles UUVs being sent into the
danger zone via the U.S. submarine fleet. These
efforts would be supplemented by offensive mine
laying operations conducted by air force stealth
bombers.
These are a few of the measures and tactical
recommendations outlined in the extremely
detailed document, which point to a profound
shift in the United States’ tactical perception of the
WPTO.
What Role for Australia in AirSea Battle?
The AirSea Battle Concept states that “Australia
would provide strategic depth and capable forces
for peripheral campaigns, perhaps involving sea
control and support operations in the eastern What kind of
Indian Ocean, Oceania and the South China Sea.”46 concrete role
could one expect
Various areas of potential cooperation are laid out: Australia to play
in the event
• Partner with the United States and Japan in
developing the next-generation anti-ship/anti- of a conflict
surface cruise missile; with China?
• Support its fielding a fifth-generation fighter
force to support combined air superiority and
anti-submarine warfare ASW operations;
• Join the U.S. space surveillance system and
build an S-Band radar to improve southern
hemisphere Space Situational Awareness; and
• Establish an offshore node for the U.S. Joint
Space Operations Center to create a Combined
Space Operations Center, thereby improving
operational integration and enhancing C2
survivability.47
These are broad brush stokes, that lay out valid
and interesting ideas for an Australian involvement
in a regionalized AirSea Battle framework. If one
were to take a step further however, by looking
at Australia’s future force structure and strategy
as outlined in the latest Defense White Paper, as
well as at some of the force structure amendments
suggested by a preeminent analyst in a recent
monograph, what kind of concrete role could one
expect Australia to play in the event of a conflict
with China?
The paper written by Ross Babbage of the Kokoda
Foundation, entitled, “Australia’s Strategic Edge
From Down Under to Top Center 15
 in 2030,”48 is one of the few recently published
Australian strategic documents to rival the Defense
White Paper in terms of sheer impact.
In this monograph, Ross Babbage calls for a
revamped defense strategy that builds on the 2009
Defense White Paper, but goes for a step further. He
Australia’s claims that Australia must be both more self-reliant
greatest asset is in the event of the United States not being able
to come to its assistance, and also more capable
its strategic depth,
of operating more synergistically with the United
due to its distance
States, most notably through the medium of Air Sea
from China’s short
Battle.
and intermediate
range missiles, Australia, he says, needs to “make the most of
and its vast Australia’s limited strategic resources to leverage
continental the country’s close allied partnership with the
landmass. United States and generate an integrated suite of
highly asymmetric capabilities.”49 He calls for the
replacement of the planned fleet of conventional
submarines with a flotilla of nuclear Virginia
class submarines, for the reconfiguration of the
Australian Army for long range special forces
operations, and for the establishment of a potent
joint U.S.-Australian cyber capability, among
other things. He also states that Australia needs
to be involved in the development of joint long
range strike options, whether it be fifth generation
strategic bombers, conventional global strike,
or high endurance long range drones, as well as
provide the facilities from which these strikes could
be launched. Both “Australia’s Strategic Edge” and
the Defense White Paper recognize that if Australia
is to survive in a high-intensity conflict involving
China, it needs to be able to:
• Leverage asymmetric abilities in order, in a way,
to “do a China on China” and
• Act as force multiplier by operating
synergistically with its allies in the region such
as the United States and Japan.
16 Transatlantic Academy
Applying these two core principles and the two
force structure variants outlined in both the
Defense White Paper and the Kokoda Foundation
monograph, what are the different options open to
Australia in an AirSea Battle contingency?
There are three different possibilities, all of which
should, ideally, be pursued simultaneously:
• Supportive rearguard actions
• Disruptive peripheral campaigns
• Offensive amphibious strikes
Supportive Rearguard Actions
Australia’s greatest asset is its strategic depth, due
to its distance from China’s short and intermediate
range missiles, and its vast continental landmass.
In the future, as American forward bases in Japan,
Korea, and Japan become increasingly vulnerable
to Chinese missile barrages, the Southern Pacific
Continent, with its solid infrastructure and local
technical expertise, could provide the United
States with the possibility to station hardened
and dispersed bases. By ensuring that joint space,
cyberspace, and radar monitoring facilities are
stationed in Australia rather than closer to Chinese
shores, the allies considerably enhance the chances
of their C2 abilities surviving the “blinding
campaign” outlined in the AirSea Battle Concept.
There has already been some speculation in U.S.
and Australian policy circles, as well as in the
Australian press, of the possibility of establishing
a full U.S. base in Darwin, a joint amphibious
strike force in Townsville, or an enlarged joint
naval facility in Western Australia.50 For the time
being though, it seems as though the preference in
Australia may continue to slant towards joint basing
on the model of what already exists at Exmouth and
Pine Gap.
During World War II, Australia served as a major
logistical hub and arsenal for Allied Forces fighting
the Japanese in the Southwest Pacific. This function
could easily be reprised in the event of another
regional conflict. Australian dockyards already
have the required facilities to repair damaged
American aircraft carriers, and deep sea ports
can shelter American and Japanese submarines.
Australia’s AEGIS-equipped Air Warfare Destroyers
could also undoubtedly play a vital role, helping to
shield vulnerable Japanese airfields from incoming
missile attack, for example. Chinese naval analysts
have been particularly concerned over Australia’s
planned induction of AEGIS class ships, suggesting
that Japan, Australia, and the United States could
form a future tripartite Ballistic Missile Defense
alliance, operating under some form of division of
labor, with Japan and the United States providing
forward defense against incoming land-based
missiles, and Australia monitoring the waters of
the Pacific for Chinese submarine launches. As
James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara point out in
their excellent study of Chinese maritime strategy,51
Chinese writers may in fact be overestimating
Allied capacities in terms of ballistic missile defense
when they claim that the three partners could in
the future “erect a protective shield reaching 50,000
meters above the earth’s atmosphere along the
entire first island chain.”52 This may be true, but
Chinese forecasting of a division of labor in terms
of missile defense can serve as useful advice to
integrate into Australia’s AirSea Battle planning.
The country’s ANZAC class frigates, with their
potent anti-submarine warfare capabilities,
could also be called upon, along with the future
submarine force, to help cordon off the second
island chain and protect Guam against marauding
Chinese submarines during the subsurface
quarantine phase of AirSea Battle. Analysts have
also pointed out that the sprawling atolls and
islets of Oceania, which Australia has traditionally
considered to be its strategic backyard, “straddle
the geopolitically significant maritime routes
between the United States, Australia, New
Zealand, East Asia, and Guam.”53 Australia, by
deploying submarines, UUVs and mobile mines
in the area, could ensure that it becomes a highly
contested environment in the event that a Chinese
amphibious force felt tempted to replicate the
American island-hopping strategy of World War II.
Australia’s
Australia’s strategic depth could also play to its strategic depth
disadvantage, however, if its distance from the
could also play to
Chinese mainland prevents it from providing any
its disadvantage,
significant support to allied operations in terms of
however, if its
long range strike. The 2009 White Paper attempts
to compensate for the phasing out of Australia’s distance from
long-range airstrike capability by emphasizing the Chinese
that its vessels will be equipped with long-range mainland prevents
land-attack cruise missiles. While it is a good it from providing
decision to provide Australia’s fleet with such a any significant
capability, it seems unwise to cut back on long- support to allied
range airstrike while simultaneously announcing operations in
the prohibitively costly acquisition of up to 100 terms of long-
short-range F-35 Joint Strike Fighters over the range strike.
course of the next decade. Carlo Kopp, one of
Australia’s leading airpower strategists, has drawn
attention to the fact that in addition to its high
cost, the Joint Strike Fighter can only attain a
combat radius of 600 nautical miles at best, and
requires force multipliers such as air tankers,
something which the Australian Air Force currently
is short of, in order to be effective. Kopp argues
convincingly for the reintroduction of the F-111,
albeit in a more evolved form, stating that “as the
F-111 has the endurance and combat radius to
perform many roles with little or no aerial refueling
support, important operational economies could
be realized in comparison with smaller multi-role
aircraft which cannot function effectively without
continuous tanker support.” An evolved F-111,54
would also be “more precisely tuned in capability to
the Australian Defence Force’s unique geographic
and strategic needs”55 than shorter range fighters,
which are “optimized for European, Middle Eastern
From Down Under to Top Center 17
 or other less demanding short-range strategic
environments.”56 In reality, Australia need only
have two or three forward deployed JSF squadrons.
The rest of its inventory should be composed of
the evolved F-111s suggested by Kopp, and of the
new class of long-range stealth drones, which will
be inducted into the U.S. Navy from 2018 onwards.
Australia and the Likewise, Ross Babbage’s proposal that Australia
United States focus on the co-development of a stealth long-range
may be presented bomber aircraft with the United States should be
with a situation heeded at a time when strike range will count as
much, if not more, as strike density.
in which they
have no choice Disruptive Peripheral Campaigns
but to divide their In the early days of the 20th century, Imperial
areas of operation Germany’s frantic naval build-up gave birth to
when confronted much anxiety in Paris and London. As the first
with a growing storm clouds scudded across the old continent and
Chinese navy. rumors of war grew ever louder, both allied nations
decided to split responsibility for naval operations
for the duration of the pending conflict. The Royal
Navy was to take on the German High Seas fleet in
the North Sea and the Atlantic, while the French
were to focus their attention on the Mediterranean.
In a similar fashion, Australia and the United States
may be presented with a situation in which they
have no choice but to divide their areas of operation
when confronted with a growing Chinese navy.
In this case, it would seem logical that American
forces would be primarily deployed in the heart of
the Western Pacific Theater of Operations, while
Australia, at the rearguard, could simultaneously
conduct disruptive peripheral actions from its
vast western seaboard into the Indian Ocean.
By stationing some of its short-range joint strike
fighters on enlarged airfields on the Coco Islands,
the Australian Air Force could conduct lightning
strikes on Chinese vessels attempting to exit or
enter the Malacca Straits. Australia’s small but
potent submarine fleet could also be called upon
to conduct a campaign similar to the German U
Boat campaigns undertaken during both World
18 Transatlantic Academy
Wars, with wolf packs of two to three Australian
submarines harassing Chinese energy shipments
or task forces on their way back from deployments
in the Gulf of Aden or stationings in Gwadar.
Such campaigns would require long transits and
periods of operation. Babbage’s suggestion that
Australia seek to acquire Virginia class SSNs
rather than build conventionally powered attack
submarines should therefore be seriously taken into
consideration.
Offensive Amphibious Actions
The 2009 White Paper lays out the framework
for a significantly more potent amphibious force,
with the planned acquisition of two large LHDs
(Landing Helicopter Docks), half a dozen smaller
landing crafts, a replacement replenishment ship,
and a medium-sized sealift ship. This has been
framed as a return to an Australian amphibious
culture “present in earlier Australian military
eras.”57 Amphibious forces, an Australian analyst
at the Land Warfare Center notes, provide much
flexibility in terms of signaling and shaping enemy
perceptions, by “mixing the speed-persistence
and relatively inoffensive presence of a warship
in international waters with the directness and
decisiveness of land forces.”58 Thus an Australian
amphibious task force could deploy itself 13
nautical miles from a Chinese refueling station
or node in its “string of pearls”59 in an attempt to
apply pressure and compel Beijing to deescalate.
Amphibious task forces could also be used to
“sanitize” the Southern Pacific, island hopping
from atoll to atoll, or destroy Chinese intelligence
gathering facilities in Southeast Asia or Oceania,
such as the one Beijing recently strove to erect in
East Timor.60
With vast archipelagoes stretching from its near-
north to the swathes of atolls in Oceania circling
its north-eastern rim, it is natural for Australia to
rediscover its honored tradition of amphibious
warfare. An abiding concern, however, is the
vulnerability of these same amphibious task forces frigates and maybe a screen of submarines,
to anti-ship missiles, mines, or wake-homing which could lead to a costly dilution of Australia’s
torpedoes. This means that any amphibious force warfighting potential elsewhere.
will need to be provided with an escort of ANZAC

AUSTRALIA’S AIRSEA BATTLE ROLE

Supportive Rearguard
Strategic
Strategic Depth
Foundations
Air Warfare Destroyers
shield Allied Forward
Bases
ANZAC frigates provide
vital assistance during the
ASW campaigns
Tactical Options Long-range cruise missiles
can strike at over-the-
horizon radar systems and
hardened structures Breaking of China’s “String beachhead before risking
Logistical hub, arsenal, of Pearls” and support
and repair center for allied bases in the Indian Ocean
forces region
More long-range strike
capabilities. Strike range as
important, if not more, as
strike density
A smaller fleet of Joint
Strike Fighters in favor
Force
of several squadrons of
Requirements
evolved F-111s
Long-range unmanned
aerial vehicles UAVs and
co-development of a new-
generation long-range
stealth bomber
Amphibious
Peripheral Campaigns
Strikes
Geographical division
of labor under an ASB Archipelagic warfare
framework
Disruptive “U-boat”
Island hopping/WWII
campaigns launched from
Pacific Campaign
the western seaboard
Amphibious strikes
Airstrikes from the Coco
against Chinese bases
Islands
intelligence facilities in
Strait interdiction Southeast Asia and the
Strikes at Chinese task Southern Pacific
forces returning from thePreliminary cruise missile
Indian Ocean strikes to soften up the
an amphibious landing
Enlarged airfields on the Reconfiguration of
Coco Islands. Stationing Australian Army for
of two squadrons of Joint Special Ops Campaigns/
Strike Fighters Amphibious Strikes
Large naval base between Offset growing
Perth and Darwin vulnerability with escort
Nuclear rather than of ANZAC frigates and air
conventional submarines support
in order to prosecute Establishment of a joint
lengthy submarine American/Australian
campaigns Amphibious Warfare
Mobile mines and UUVs Strike Corps and Training
for strait interdiction Facility

From Down Under to Top Center 19

 4 Conclusion:
This Century’s Special Relationship?

A
s the world’s axis pivots from West to
East, Australia has swiveled from down
under to top center. Nestled in between
the two great oceans of our time, bound by strong
cultural, political, and military ties to the Western
hemisphere, Canberra is coming to terms, at last,
with its Asian geography. Shedding antiquated
Canberra’s paradigms, Australia has emerged as a maritime
new special nation in the making, an important actor at the
heart of the Asia-Pacific Century rather than an
relationship with
isolated hinterland clinging onto its edge. The vast
Washington is
continent’s western shore booms with the echoes
one that will both
of the forgotten ocean, and Australia, by tearing its
be attuned to
gaze away from its traditional Pacific horizon, has
the realities of
reacquainted itself with its Asian centrality.
an Asia-Pacific
century and It is this same centrality, when combined with its
help define it. strategic depth and growing concerns over China’s
rise, that ensures its emergence as the United States’
strongest ally in the Asia-Pacific region. Its efforts
to develop a 21st century force structure emphasize
both the virtues of self-reliance and the need for
greater synergy with United States and allied forces
operating under the mantle of an enlarged AirSea
battle framework. Canberra’s warfighting prowess
and operational flexibility will guarantee both its
survivability in the face of strategic uncertainty, and
its continued value as a major U.S. ally.
This solidifying strategic convergence between both
English-speaking nations will have an immensely
positive influence on regional developments and
global stability. Australia’s deep enmeshment in
Asia, and increasingly close ties with countries such
as Indonesia,61 may well prove to be its greatest
asset. At the intersection of two worlds, Australia
will also be their bridge, linking the West with an
Asian hemisphere slowly pulling away from the
Middle Kingdom’s orbit.
it. This will not necessarily happen at the expense
of the U.S.-UK relationship, but rather will form the
Asian wing of the Democratic Anglosphere, which
has formed the inner core of the U.S. system of
alliances since its inception.
This will in time lead to the emergence of a form
of division of labor, or geographical differentiation
between both strategic relationships. The U.S.-UK
special relationship will still be highly invested in
issues pertaining to the more traditional Atlantic
and Mediterranean regions, while the area “East of
Suez” will be the focus of the strengthened U.S.-
Australia alliance. The recent decision to let Great
Britain and France spearhead the intervention
in Libya may be the first glimpse into this new
division of labor which will, by virtue of necessity,
come to characterize Western action in a multipolar
world.
At the time of the Raj, the British Viceroy would
preside over the future of Asia from the small
Indian hilltop town of Simla and the bustling
streets of Delhi or Calcutta, while far to the West,
the intricacies of European and Mediterranean
geopolitics would be unraveled in the gilded halls
of Westminster.
In a similar fashion, the United States will only
remain a global power if its strategic vision
is buttressed by a transpacific, as well as by a
transatlantic special relationship.

Canberra’s new special relationship with

Washington is one that will both be attuned to the
realities of an Asia-Pacific century and help define

20 Transatlantic Academy
5 Endnotes

1 
See: Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance- Michael Evans, “The Tyranny of Dissonance:
12 

How Distance Shaped Australia’s History, Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War,
Macmillan 2nd Edition, London, 1975, 232pp. 1901-2005,” Australian Land Warfare Studies
2 
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and Centre, 2005, p. 29. Available online at www.
the Remaking of World Order, Simon and Schuster, defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/SP/
New York, 1996, p. 158. SP_306.pdf
3 
Richard A Higgot and Kim Richard Nossul, “The National Security Adviser Tom Donilon, quoted
13 

International Politics of Liminality: Relocating by Ryan Lizza in “The Consequentialist: How the
Australia in the Asia-Pacific,” Australian Journal of Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,” The
Political Sciences, n.2, Vol.32, 1997, pp. 169-185 New Yorker, May 2nd 2011 Edition
4 
Michael Evans, “The Tyranny of Dissonance: Quoted by Ryan Lizza in “The Consequentialist:
14 

Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War, 1901- How the Arab Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign
2005,” Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre, Policy,” The New Yorker, May 2nd 2011 Edition.
2005. Available online at www.defence.gov.au/ Quadriennal Defense Review Report, U.S.
15 

army/LWSC/Publications/SP/SP_306.pdf Department of Defense, February 2010, p. 82.

5 
Commonwealth of Australia, “Defending Retrievable at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030” qdr percent20as percent20of percent2029jan10
(Canberra: May 2009), retrievable at www.defence. percent201600.pdf
gov.au/whitepaper/. See: A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
16 

6 
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Seapower, U.S. Department of Defense, October
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary 2007, p. 9. Retrievable at http://www.navy.mil/
Assessments, officially released on 18 May, maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf
2010, retrievable at http://www.csbaonline. Remarks at the first plenary session of the 2010
17 

org/4Publications/PubLibrary/ Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore, Saturday 5th June

7 
Sam Bateman and Antony Bergin, “Our western 2010.
front: Australia and the Indian Ocean,” Australian See Sam Bateman and Antony Bergin, “Our
18 

Strategic Policy Institute, March 2010, available western front: Australia and the Indian Ocean,”
online at www.aspi.org.au/publications/publica- Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 2010,
tion_details.aspx?...248 p. 33 p. 33. Retrievable at www.aspi.org.au/publica-
8 
See Geoffrey Blainey’s fascinating account of this tions/publication_details.aspx?...248
rarely recounted obsessive quest for the “missing John Birmingham, “Looking West: Australia and
19 

continent” in Sea of Dangers: Captain Cook and his the Indian Ocean.” The Monthly, August 2009,
European Rivals, Viking, Melbourne, 2008, 420pp. available online at http://www.themonthly.com.
9 
See Jeffrey Gray, A Military History of Australia, au/monthly-essays-john-birmingham-looking-
Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 45 west-australia-and-indian-ocean-1852?page=0
percent2C1
10 
Ibid.
11 
See Bernard Ringrose Wise, The Making of the
Australian Commonwealth 1899-1900, A Stage in
the Growth of the Empire, Longmans, Green and
Co. London, 1913, p. 51.

From Down Under to Top Center 21

20 
Sam Bateman and Antony Bergin, “Our western
front: Australia and the Indian Ocean,” Austra-
lian Strategic Policy Institute, March 2010, p. 41,
retrievable at www.aspi.org.au/publications/publi-
cation_details.aspx?...248
21 
Ibid.
See Rory Medcalf, “Australia and India: How to
22 
Advance.” Lowy Institute for International Policy,
May 2010, available online at www.lowyinstitute.
org/Publication.asp?pid=1293
See Iskander Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at
23 
Bay: India’s Counter-Containment of China in
Asia.” in Asian Security Journal, Vol.5, Issue 2,
May-June 2009.
Frank Boeze, “Maritime Australia: Integrating the
24 
Sea into our National History,” Maritime Studies,
May-June 1995, pp. 9-16.
Former Chief of the Australian Army Lt. Gen
25 
Frank Hickling, quoted by Michael Evans in
“The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic
Culture and Way of War, 1901-2005,” Australian
Land Warfare Studies Centre, 2005, p. 29. Avail-
able online at www.defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/
Publications/SP/SP_306.pdf
Michael Evans, “The Tyranny of Dissonance:
26 
Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War,
1901-2005,” Australian Land Warfare Studies
Centre, 2005, p. 29. Available online at www.
defence.gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/SP/
SP_306.pdf
See Alan Bloomfield and Kim Richard Nossal,
27 
“Towards an Explicative Understanding of Stra-
tegic Culture: The Cases of Australia and Canada.”
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.28, n°2, August
2007, pp. 286-307.
Commonwealth of Australia, “Defending
28 
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force
2030 ” (Canberra: May 2009), retrievable at www.
defence.gov.au/whitepaper/.
22 Transatlantic Academy
See Richard Smith’s brilliant short analysis in
29 
“The Long Rise of China in Australian Defense
Strategy.” Lowy Institute for International Policy,
April 2009, available online at www.lowyinstitute.
org/Publication.asp?pid=1023
30 
Ibid.
31 
Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman, “Australia’s
2009 Defense White Paper: A Maritime Focus
for Uncertain Times,” Naval War College Review,
Winter 2010, Vol.63, n.1, pp. 61-76.
In 2009, Stern Hu, a China-based Australian
32 
executive of Rio Tinto, one of the worlds largest
mining companies was arrested for having alleg-
edly “stolen state secrets.” His detention, which
occurred at a time of rising anxiety in Australia
over its growing economic dependence on a
resource-starved China and under the backdrop
of large-scale corruption and shadowy business
deals, severely frayed diplomatic ties between
Beijing and Canberra.
Julian S Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime
33 
Strategy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
1988,
p. 15.
Commonwealth of Australia, “Defending
34 
Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030”
(Canberra: May 2009), p. 22, retrievable at www.
defence.gov.au/whitepaper/.
It will be argued later, however, that this may
35 
prove to be only a stop-gap measure in a secu-
rity arena where heightened long-range strike
capabilities will become the norm and absolute
prerequisite.
Cameron Stuart, “Military Ambitions,” The
36 
Australian, 2 May 2009 edition.
Trevor J. Thomas, “2010-2011 Australian Defence
37 
Budget Analysis,” Australian Defence Business
Review, ADBR & ASRC: Defence & National
Security Budget Briefing Vol.29, No.03, retriev-
able at http://www.adbr.com.au/download/2010/
ADBR_2010-11_Defence_Budget_Analysis.pdf
 John Arnaut & Brendan Nicholson, “Defense
38 
plan ruffles the Chinese,” The Age, 2 May 2009.
39 
See Grame Doebell, “Rip off a Chinese Arm,”
7 February 2011, retrievable at http://www.
lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/02/07/Rip-off-a-
Chinese-arm.aspx
40 
Seth Cropsey, “The U.S. Navy in Distress,” Stra-
tegic Analysis, Vol.34, n°1, January 2010, p. 35-45.
41 
See: Alastair Iain Johnston, “Toward Contextual-
izing the Concept of a Shashoujian (Assassin’s
Mace),” retrievable at http://www.people.fas.
harvard.edu/~johnston/shashoujian.pdf
See: Andrew S.Erickson and David D.Yang,
42 
“Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese
Analysts Consider the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile,”
Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009, Vol.62,
n°4, pp. 53-86.
See: Andrew F.Krepinevich Jr , “The Pentagon’s
43 
Wasting Assets: The Eroding Foundations of
American Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August
2009, and James Kraska, “How the U.S. lost the
Naval War of 2015,” Orbis, Winter 2009.
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
44 
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, officially released on 18 May
2010, retrievable at http://www.csbaonline.
org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
45 
Ibid
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
46 
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, officially released on 18 May 2010,
p. 51, retrievable at http://www.csbaonline.
org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
47 
Ibid, p. 93
Ross Babbage, “Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030,”
48 
Kokoda Foundation, Paper n.15, February 2011,
available online at www.kokodafoundation.org/
Resources/Documents/KP15StrategicEdge.pdf
49 
Ibid, Executive Summary.
Greg Sheridan, “Best Place for a Larger U.S.
50 
Base,” The Australian, August 19th 2010 edition.
51 
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star
Over the Pacific, China’s Rise and the Challenge
to U.S. Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, 2010, p. 115
See LI Jie, “Why are AEGIS Ships Gathering in
52 
the Asia-Pacific?,” Modern Navy, November 2007,
p. 26; Ren Dexin, “AEGIS ships encircle China,”
Naval and Merchant Ships, September 2007, p. 12
Captain Sea Sovereign Thomas, “Engaging
53 
Oceania,” Naval War College Review, Winter 2010,
Vol.63, n.1, pp. 97-106.
The Evolved F-111 would have undergone
54 
significant upgrades, most notably through the
provision of a phased array AESA radar, super-
sonic cruise propulsion, and a radar cross section
reduction.
See: Car lo Kopp and Peter A Goon, Strategic
55 
Needs and Force Structure Analysis: The Thinking
Behind the F-22 A and Evolved F-111 Force Mix
Option, Air Power Australia Discussion Paper
(Issue V), 10 February 2008, retrievable at http://
www.ausairpower.net/Evolved-F-111-DP-V.5-S.
pdf
56 
Ibid.
Alberto Palazzo, Antony Trentini, Lt. Col Jona-
57 
than Hawkins, and Captain Malcolm Brailey,
“Projecting Force: The Australian Army and
Maritime Strategy,” Australian Land Warfare
Studies Centre, 2010. Available online at www.
army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/sp317.pdf
58 
Ibid, p. 32.
59 
For more on China’s String of Pearls, see:
Iskander Rehman, “China’s String of Pearls
and India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage.”
IDSA Strategic Comments, June 2010, retriev-
able at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
ChinasStringofPearlsandIndiasEnduringTactica-
lAdvantage_irehman_080610
From Down Under to Top Center 23
 Philip Dorling, “Timor Rejected Chinese Spy
60 

Offer,” The Age, 10 May 2011, retrievable at http://

www.theage.com.au/world/timor-rejected-
chinese-spy-offer-20110509-1efv1.html
For a good, concise overview of Australia’s
61 

exceedingly complex relationship with its Indone-

sian neighbor over the years, see: Dale Stephens,
Stefan Gruber “Cooperation, Friction and Safe-
guarding: Australia and Indonesia’s Security
Relationship,” Sydney Law School Legal Sudies
Research Paper No.10/84, August 2010, retriev-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1666661

24 Transatlantic Academy
6 Bibliography
Reference Books
Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance-How
Distance Shaped Australia’s History, Macmillan
2nd Edition, London, 1975.
Geoffrey Blainey, Sea of Dangers: Captain Cook and
his European Rivals, Viking, Melbourne, 2008.
Julian S Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime
Strategy, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1988.
Jeffrey Gray, A Military History of Australia,
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order, Simon and
Schuster, New York, 1996.
Bernard Ringrose Wise, The Making of the
Australian Commonwealth 1899-1900, A Stage in
the Growth of the Empire, Longmans, Green and
Co. London, 1913.
Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, Red Star
Over the Pacific, China’s Rise and the Challenge
to U.S. Maritime Strategy, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, 2010.
Academic Articles
Frank Boeze, “Maritime Australia: Integrating the
Sea into our National History,” Maritime Studies,
May-June 1995.
Seth Cropsey, “The U.S. Navy in Distress,” Strategic
Analysis, Vol.34, n°1, January 2010.
Ren Dexin, “AEGIS ships encircle China,” Naval
and Merchant Ships, September 2007.
Andrew S.Erickson and David D.Yang, “Using
the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts
Consider the Anti-ship Ballistic Missile,” Naval
War College Review, Vol.62, n°4, Autumn 2009.
Richard A Higgot and Kim Richard Nossul, “The
International Politics of Liminality: Relocating
Australia in the Asia-Pacific,” Australian Journal
of Political Sciences, n.2, Vol.32, 1997.
LI Jie, “Why are AEGIS Ships Gathering in the
Asia-Pacific?” Modern Navy, November 2007.
Andrew F. Krepinevich J. “The Pentagon’s Wasting
Assets: The Eroding Foundations of American
Power,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009.
James Kraska, “How the U.S. lost the Naval War of
2015,” Orbis, Winter 2009.
Jack McCaffrie and Chris Rahman, “Australia’s
2009 Defense White Paper: A Maritime Focus
for Uncertain Times,” Naval War College Review,
Vol.63, Winter 2010.
Iskander Rehman, “Keeping the Dragon at Bay:
India’s Counter-Containment of China in Asia.”
in Asian Security Journal, Vol.5, Issue 2, May-
June 2009.
Dale Stephens and Stefan Gruber “Cooperation,
Friction and Safeguarding: Australia and
Indonesia’s Security Relationship,” Sydney Law
School Legal Sudies Research Paper No.10/84,
August 2010, retrievable at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1666661
Captain Sea Sovereign Thomas, “Engaging
Oceania,” Naval War College Review, Vol.63, n.1,
Winter 2010.
Government Publications
Commonwealth of Australia, “Defending Australia
in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030”
(Canberra: May 2009), retrievable at www.
defence.gov.au/whitepaper/.
From Down Under to Top Center 25
Quadriennal Defense Review Report, U.S.
Department of Defense, February 2010.
Retrievable at http://www.defense.gov/qdr/
qdr percent20as percent20of percent2029jan10
percent201600.pdf
A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,
U.S. Department of Defense, October 2007.
Retrievable at http://www.navy.mil/maritime/
Maritimestrategy.pdf
Reports/Monographs
AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational
Concept, Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments, officially released on 18 May 2010,
p. 51, retrievable at http://www.csbaonline.
org/4Publications/PubLibrary/
Ross Babbage, “Australia’s Strategic Edge in 2030,”
Kokoda Foundation, Paper n.15, February 2011,
available online at www.kokodafoundation.org/
Resources/Documents/KP15StrategicEdge.pdf
Sam Bateman and Antony Bergin, “Our western
front: Australia and the Indian Ocean,”
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March
2010, p. 33. Retrievable at www.aspi.org.au/
publications/publication_details.aspx?...248
Michael Evans, “The Tyranny of Dissonance:
Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of War,
1901-2005,” Australian Land Warfare Studies
Centre, 2005. Available online at www.defence.
gov.au/army/LWSC/Publications/SP/SP_306.pdf
Alastair Iain Johnston, “Toward Contextualizing
the Concept of a Shashoujian (Assassin’s Mace),”
retrievable at http://www.people.fas.harvard.
edu/~johnston/shashoujian.pdf
26 Transatlantic Academy
Trevor J. Thomas, “2010-2011 Australian
Defence Budget Analysis,” Australian Defence
Business Review, ADBR & ASRC: Defence
& National Security Budget Briefing Vol.29,
No.03, retrievable at http://www.adbr.com.au/
download/2010/ADBR_2010-11_Defence_
Budget_Analysis.pdf
Car lo Kopp and Peter A Goon, Strategic Needs and
Force Structure Analysis: The Thinking Behind
the F-22 A and Evolved F-111 Force Mix Option,
Air Power Australia Discussion Paper (Issue
V), 10 February 2008, retrievable at http://www.
ausairpower.net/Evolved-F-111-DP-V.5-S.pdf
Rory Medcalf, “Australia and India: How to
Advance.” Lowy Institute for International
Policy, May 2010, available online at www.
lowyinstitute.org/Publication.asp?pid=1293
Alberto Palazzo, Antony Trentini, Lt. Col Jonathan
Hawkins, and Captain Malcolm Brailey,
“Projecting Force: The Australian Army and
Maritime Strategy,” Australian Land Warfare
Studies Centre, 2010. Available online at www.
army.gov.au/lwsc/docs/sp317.pdf
Iskander Rehman, “China’s String of Pearls and
India’s Enduring Tactical Advantage,” IDSA
Strategic Comments, June 2010, retriev-
able at http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
ChinasStringofPearlsandIndiasEnduringTactica-
lAdvantage_irehman_080610
Richard Smith, “The Long Rise of China in
Australian Defense Strategy,” Lowy Institute
for International Policy, April 2009, available
online at www.lowyinstitute.org/Publication.
asp?pid=1023
Press Articles
John Arnaut & Brendan Nicholson, “Defense plan
ruffles the Chinese,” The Age, 2 May 2009.

John Birmingham, “Looking West: Australia and

the Indian Ocean,” The Monthly, August 2009,
available online at http://www.themonthly.com.
au/monthly-essays-john-birmingham-looking-
west-australia-and-indian-ocean-1852?page=0
percent2C1

Grame Doebell, “Rip off a Chinese Arm,” 7

February 2011, retrievable at http://www.
lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/02/07/Rip-off-a-
Chinese-arm.aspx

Philip Dorling, “Timor Rejected Chinese Spy

Offer,” The Age, 10 May 2011, retrievable
at http://www.theage.com.au/world/timor-
rejected-chinese-spy-offer-20110509-1efv1.html

Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist: How the Arab

Spring Remade Obama’s Foreign Policy,” The
New Yorker, May 2nd 2011 Edition.

Greg Sheridan, “Best Place for a Larger U.S. Base,”

The Australian, August 19th 2010 edition.

Cameron Stuart, “Military Ambitions,” The

Australian, 2 May 2009 edition.

From Down Under to Top Center 27

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