DISASTER PREPAREDNESS SOLUTIONS, INC.

PACIFIC ISLAND TSUNAMI RESILIENCE

PLANNING GUIDE

Tsunami Hazard Mitigation and Disaster Management

Jeanne Branch Johnston

and
Dr. Walter C. Dudley

March 2009
 Table of Contents

Chapter 1 ................................................................................................................................... 1-1

Acknowledgments ..................................................................................................................... 1-1
Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1-1
Purpose ....................................................................................................................................... 1-2
How to Use This Compendium ................................................................................................ 1-2
National Programs and Federal Partners ............................................................................... 1-3
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) ............................................... 1-3
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) .................................................... 1-4
TsunamiReady Program......................................................................................................... 1-6
Lincoln City, Oregon - Tsunami Preparedness Program ................................................. 1-6
United States Geological Survey (USGS) ............................................................................. 1-7
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) .............................................................. 1-7
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................... 1-9

Chapter 2 - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis .................. 2-1
Definitions ................................................................................................................................... 2-1
Modeling Tsunami Hazard Zones ........................................................................................... 2-2
NOAA’s Role in Hazard Assessment ...................................................................................... 2-2
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) Role in Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and
Sensitivity Analysis ................................................................................................................... 2-2
State of Alaska - Hazard, Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis ............................. 2-3
Hazard Assessment ................................................................................................................ 2-3
Risk Assessment .................................................................................................................... 2-4
Vulnerability Analysis ........................................................................................................... 2-4
State of California - Hazard, Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis ........................ 2-4
Hazard Assessment ................................................................................................................ 2-4
Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis ........................................................................ 2-5

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State of Hawaii - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis ......... 2-6
Hazard Assessment ................................................................................................................ 2-6
Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................... 2-6
State of Oregon - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis.......... 2-7
Hazard Assessment ................................................................................................................ 2-7
Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................... 2-8
Washington State - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis ...... 2-9
Hazard Assessment ................................................................................................................ 2-9
Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis ..................................................... 2-9
Tsunami Hazard – Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands ............................................... 2-10
Earthquakes and Tsunamis in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands .............................. 2-10
Pacific Disaster Center’s Natural Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas ................................ 2-11

Chapter 3 – Mitigation .............................................................................................................. 3-1

Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations ............................................. 3-1
Definitions ................................................................................................................................... 3-1
State of Alaska - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations ................ 3-2
State of California - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations .......... 3-3
State of Hawaii - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations ............... 3-4
Maui County .......................................................................................................................... 3-5
Hawaii County ....................................................................................................................... 3-5
Hilo, Hawaii .......................................................................................................................... 3-5
State of Oregon - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations ............... 3-5
Washington State - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations ........... 3-6
Washington State - The Growth Management Act ................................................................ 3-6
Best Available Science .......................................................................................................... 3-6
State Hazard Mitigation Plans ................................................................................................. 3-6
International ............................................................................................................................... 3-7
Guidelines for Construction ................................................................................................... 3-7
New Zealand - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations .................... 3-8

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 Lessons Learned – Building Construction and Tsunami Safety ............................................ 3-8
Siting of Critical Infrastructure (Long Range Plan) .............................................................. 3-8
Lessons for Minimizing Impacts to Coral Reef and Other Ecosystems from the 2004
Tsunami ...................................................................................................................................... 3-9

Chapter 4 – Evacuation Planning............................................................................................. 4-1

Definitions ................................................................................................................................... 4-1
State of Alaska - Evacuation Planning ..................................................................................... 4-1
Field Guide............................................................................................................................. 4-1
Evacuation Forms .................................................................................................................. 4-2
State of California Evacuation Planning ................................................................................. 4-2
Marin County Tsunami Evacuation Planning Map ............................................................... 4-2
Ventura County Operational Area Tsunami Evacuation Plan ............................................... 4-3
State of Hawaii - Evacuation Planning .................................................................................... 4-3
Evacuation Zone Maps .......................................................................................................... 4-3
Hawaii County – Evacuation Signs ....................................................................................... 4-3
Evacuation Zones ................................................................................................................... 4-4
State of Oregon - Evacuation Planning.................................................................................... 4-4
Tsunami Evacuation Maps for Selected Oregon Coastal Communities ................................ 4-4
Cannon Beach 2008 Brochure ............................................................................................... 4-4
Evacuation Routes and Procedures ....................................................................................... 4-4
Evacuation Signs .................................................................................................................... 4-5
Cannon Beach, Oregon Tsunami Hazard Research Project................................................... 4-5
Washington State - Evacuation Planning ................................................................................ 4-5
International ............................................................................................................................... 4-6
End-to-End Evacuation Drill - Thailand ................................................................................ 4-6
Komunitas Siaga Tsunami (KOGAMI) ................................................................................. 4-6

Chapter 5 – Preparation............................................................................................................ 5-1

Definitions ................................................................................................................................... 5-1
Professional Advisory Groups .................................................................................................. 5-1
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 State of Hawaii ....................................................................................................................... 5-2
State of Oregon ...................................................................................................................... 5-2
Lincoln County School District (LCSD) Earthquake and Tsunami
Safety Program................................................................................................................. 5-2
NOAA Pacific Services Center, Pacific Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO) ...................... 5-4
International Projects ................................................................................................................ 5-4
Tsunami Preparation and Response - Western Australia ....................................................... 5-4
Tsunami Formal Education Activities ..................................................................................... 5-5
State of Hawaii - School Curricula ........................................................................................ 5-5
Washington State - School Curricula..................................................................................... 5-5
Washington State Pilot Project .............................................................................................. 5-5
Tsunami Teacher .................................................................................................................... 5-6
Certificate Program in Tsunami Science and Preparedness .................................................. 5-6
Public Education ........................................................................................................................ 5-7
State of Alaska ....................................................................................................................... 5-7
State of Hawaii ....................................................................................................................... 5-7
State of Oregon ...................................................................................................................... 5-8
Washington State ................................................................................................................... 5-8
Puerto Rico............................................................................................................................. 5-8
Museums and Education Centers ............................................................................................. 5-8
Pacific Tsunami Museum – Hilo, Hawaii .............................................................................. 5-8
International Tsunami Museums ............................................................................................. 5-9
Kamphuan Memorial Tsunami Museum, Ranong Province, Thailand ................................. 5-9
Kerala Tsunami Museum, Alappad, Kerala, India ................................................................ 5-9
Personal and Family Evacuation Kits ...................................................................................... 5-9
Hawaii County All Hazards Information Card .................................................................... 5-10
Brochures and Pamphlets ....................................................................................................... 5-10
Business Guides ........................................................................................................................ 5-11
How to Prepare Your Business for the Next Tsunami......................................................... 5-11
State of Oregon - Hotel and Lodging ................................................................................... 5-11

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 Hotel and Lodging Questionnaire ........................................................................................ 5-12
Washington State Hotel and Motel Guide ........................................................................... 5-12
Media......................................................................................................................................... 5-12
Washington State - Media.................................................................................................... 5-12
Tsunami Mitigation Newsletter ........................................................................................... 5-12
Community Meetings............................................................................................................... 5-13
Hilo, Hawaii ......................................................................................................................... 5-13
Model Communities ................................................................................................................. 5-13
Cannon Beach, Oregon ........................................................................................................ 5-13
State of Oregon – Seaside Tsunami Outreach Project – 2005 ............................................. 5-14

Chapter 6 – Warnings – End-to-End ....................................................................................... 6-1

Definitions ................................................................................................................................... 6-1
Policy ........................................................................................................................................... 6-1
Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) Tsunami Policy Recommendations ....... 6-1
Lessons Learned – Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) ........................................ 6-2
The Tsunami Warning System ................................................................................................. 6-2
Tsunami Warning Center Reference Guide ........................................................................... 6-4
California – Errors Observed ................................................................................................... 6-4
Communication System Chain of Authority ........................................................................... 6-5
Innovative Communications Systems ...................................................................................... 6-5
Automated Tsunami Alert System ......................................................................................... 6-5
New Tsunami Watch (TWATCH) Program .......................................................................... 6-5
Chain of Authority for Warning .............................................................................................. 6-6
NOAA Tsunami Warning System ......................................................................................... 6-6
Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) ............................................. 6-6
Dissemination of Tsunami Messages..................................................................................... 6-6
Various Tsunami Messages ............................................................................................. 6-6
State of Alaska - Warning ......................................................................................................... 6-8
State of California - Warning ................................................................................................... 6-8

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State of Hawaii - Warning......................................................................................................... 6-8
Hilo, Hawaii – End-to-End Warning System ........................................................................ 6-8
Water Level Monitoring System for Remote Locations ........................................................ 6-9
State of Oregon - Warning ........................................................................................................ 6-9
City of Cannon Beach, Oregon – Unique Tsunami Warning .............................................. 6-10
Washington State - Warning................................................................................................... 6-10
Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands - Warning System............................................................... 6-11
Multi-Lingual Warning Announcement – Thailand ............................................................ 6-11
Communication with Media.................................................................................................... 6-11
Communication with Individuals ........................................................................................... 6-11
Special Needs - The Buddy System – State of Oregon and Thailand ................................. 6-12
International ............................................................................................................................. 6-12
Sri Lanka .............................................................................................................................. 6-12
Tonga ................................................................................................................................... 6-13

Chapter 7 – Response ................................................................................................................ 7-1

Definition .................................................................................................................................... 7-1
Training ...................................................................................................................................... 7-1
International Training ............................................................................................................... 7-1
Maldives Training Course in Seismology and Tsunami Warnings ....................................... 7-1
Suggestions for Response Training ....................................................................................... 7-2
Exercises...................................................................................................................................... 7-2
Tsunami Exercise Plan........................................................................................................... 7-3
Hilo, Hawaii – Exercises........................................................................................................ 7-3
FEMA – “Pacific Peril” Exercise .......................................................................................... 7-3
Post Exercise Evaluation ........................................................................................................... 7-4
Public Education Programs and Training............................................................................... 7-4
State of California - Local Response ........................................................................................ 7-5
State and Federal Response Plans ............................................................................................ 7-9
Scientific Response ................................................................................................................... 7-10

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Chapter 8 – Recovery ................................................................................................................ 8-1
Definition .................................................................................................................................... 8-1
State of Alaska ............................................................................................................................ 8-1
State of California ...................................................................................................................... 8-2
State of Hawaii ........................................................................................................................... 8-2
State of Oregon ........................................................................................................................... 8-2
Cannon Beach Post-Disaster Recovery Planning Forum Summary Report .......................... 8-3
Washington State ....................................................................................................................... 8-3
FEMA .......................................................................................................................................... 8-3
Errors Observed ........................................................................................................................ 8-4
International ............................................................................................................................... 8-5
Management of Resources - Indonesia .................................................................................. 8-5
Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) – American Red Cross ........................................ 8-6
Management of NGO’s .............................................................................................................. 8-6
Pre-Disaster Planning for Catastrophic Disasters Recovery ................................................. 8-8
Future Planning – Fatalities ...................................................................................................... 8-9

Chapter 9 – Indigenous Knowledge ......................................................................................... 9-1

Value of Indigenous Knowledge in Disaster Mitigation and Education ............................... 9-1
Benefits of Culture ..................................................................................................................... 9-2
Pacific Northwest Tribe............................................................................................................. 9-2
State of Hawaii – Indigenous Knowledge ................................................................................ 9-2
Indigenous Knowledge for Disaster Risk Reduction .............................................................. 9-4
Simeulue, Indonesia – December 2004 ................................................................................. 9-5
Surin Islands, Thailand – Moken Sea Nomads – December 2004 ........................................ 9-7
Western Province - Solomon Islands - April 2007 ................................................................ 9-9
New Zealand – Maori Environmental Knowledge ............................................................... 9-11
Video Oral Histories ................................................................................................................ 9-13

Chapter 10 – Case Studies ....................................................................................................... 10-1

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Case Study – Maldives – December 26, 2004 Tsunami ........................................................ 10-1
Case Study – Sri Lanka – December 26, 2004 Tsunami ....................................................... 10-7
Case Study – 10 Lessons Learned from the South Asia Tsunami of 26 December 2004 10-10
Case Study – Sri Lanka – Post Indian Ocean Tsunami ..................................................... 10-12
Case Study – New South Wales, Australia – April 2, 2005 Solomon Islands Tsunami ... 10-13

Chapter 11 – Recommendations for Future Work ............................................................... 11-1

Ideal “Future” Mitigation ....................................................................................................... 11-3
Suggested Supplementary Projects ........................................................................................ 11-4

Appendix A – Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report ....................................... A-1

Appendix B – Tsunami Warning and Education Act .............................................................B-1
Appendix C – Lodging Facility Preparedness Questionnaire .............................................. C-1
Appendix D – The Buddy System ............................................................................................ D-1
Appendix E – Lessons Learned from the 26 December 2004 Tsunami Disaster
in Thailand..........................................................................................................E-1
Appendix F – Tsunami Information Databases ...................................................................... F-1
Appendix G – References and Resources ............................................................................... G-1

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 Chapter 1

Acknowledgments
We wish to thank the following people for their contribution to the development
of this compendium, including Ervin Petty, Alaska Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management, James Goltz, California Governor’s Office of Emergency
Services, Kevin Richards, Hawaii State Civil Defense, George Priest and Rob Witter,
Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries, Althea Turner, Oregon
Emergency Management, Jay Wilson, Clackamas County Emergency Management,
David Nelson, Brynne Walker and Beverly O'Dea, Washington State Emergency
Management, Christian Kay, County of Hawaii Planning Department, Quince T. Mento,
Hawaii County Civil Defense Agency, Kylie Alexandra, EnVision Downtown Hilo 2025,
Genevieve Cain-Robison, Pacific Tsunami Museum, Sharon Mielbrecht, Pacific Disaster
Center, Nathan Wood, USGS, Chris Maier, NOAA TsunamiReady, Delores Clark,
NOAA, Laura Kong, Brian Yanagi, Linda Sjogren, International Tsunami Information
Center, Patti Sutch, Western States Seismic Policy Council, Ian N. Robertson,
Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Hawaii at Manoa,
Visvanathan Kandeepan, Eastern University, Sri Lanka. A special thanks to Russell
Jackson, Adam Stein and Sam Thomas, NOAA, for their guidance and to Faye
Chambers, Malia Bervar and Penny Tukimaka for their help and support.

Introduction
Island nations are exposed to a large number of natural hazards and many
characteristics of small island developing states (SIDS) make them particularly
vulnerable to the impacts of natural hazards. In spite of this acknowledged vulnerability,
there are few studies which focus on the impacts of natural hazards in these countries
(Meheux et al, 2007). The 22nd Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly
(1999) undertook a needs assessment of SIDS and these were highlighted as part of the
United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (2000). Included among the SIDS are
all of the U.S. territories, flag island entities, and affiliated states of the Pacific and the
U.S. territories in the Caribbean.
Earthquakes and tsunamis have been recognized as a critical risk to the
populations of the Pacific Islands with several events in recent time such as Papua New
Guinea (1998), Vanuatu (1999), and the Solomon Islands (2007). In this compendium we
have attempted to outline not only the seismic and hydraulic aspects of the tsunami risk,
but also cover assessment, monitoring, and management options for disaster mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery. Interorganizational coordination in response to
hazard events is necessary but very challenging because these extreme events require
actions among multiple actors across many jurisdictions under conditions of urgent stress,
heavy demand, and tight time constraints. The human loss experienced during 2004
Indian Ocean tsunami was largely due to an under-estimation of the vulnerability and
lack of societal priority to deal with the tsunami risk. This reaffirmed the need for an

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integrative approach, incorporating both scientific and societal dimensions, to deal with
risk and vulnerability to environmental hazards (Haque et al, 2006).
This compendium presents a collection of tsunami mitigation practices and
activities gathered from the five Pacific States of the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program (NTHMP), countries affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, and
other areas affected by tsunamis since 2004. This compendium also includes successful
strategies of indigenous people in dealing with the tsunami hazard and other tsunami
related information that could be useful in creating a culture of prevention for
stakeholders in communities with a tsunami hazard. Unlike continental nations, island
nations will be affected as a whole by catastrophic tsunamis, thus requiring island
specific practices and activities to save lives and reduce damage to property.

Purpose
The United States Flag Pacific Islands include the Commonwealth of the
Northern Marianas (CNMI), and the territories of Guam and American Samoa. This
tsunami compendium has been developed to gather relevant tsunami mitigation data that
can be used by the United States Flag Pacific Islands once the activities currently being
conducted to model potential tsunami inundation levels are completed.
Extensive research was carried out and a thorough literature review conducted to
compile this compendium. The examples were chosen based on the following criteria:
adaptability of data to island regions; success when exercised or applied in actual events;
and applicability specifically to the United States Flag Pacific Islands.
While the principles of many of the practices and activities may be applied in
different locations, political and cultural differences may require some adjustments. For
instance, evacuation planning will be geographically specific to high islands, such as
Hawaii or low islands, such as the Marshall Islands. This compendium aims to assist
emergency managers and other stakeholders as a guide and a valuable resource to begin
to prepare their communities in order to save lives and minimize property loss in the next
tsunami.

How to Use This Compendium

The materials presented in this compendium are a selection and synthesis of
several thousand pages of materials with potential relevance to island communities faced
with a tsunami hazard risk. In many cases an individual item was selected from a much
larger piece of work, in which case the entire work is either available on-line or listed
under “Resources”. On-line references are printed in blue. All links have been tested
and are operational as of this time. However, please be aware that not all websites or
their contents are maintained indefinitely and that in the future certain items may no
longer be available. The references section is used here to provide information on
sources for certain individual items presented in the text.
Exact quotations from documents are in italics. Brackets ( [ ] ) are used
periodically in quotes to help clarify meaning. The authors have selected certain
programs, policies, products, projects, and recommendations for recognition as “Best
Practices” based on broadly-based experience in tsunami hazard mitigation and disaster
management. These items are designated by a “[►]”. Throughout this compendium

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certain sections of text have been placed in a box or highlighted in bold type. The
authors felt that these sections are especially noteworthy. These designations do not
represent the official position of NOAA or any other agency or organization.

National Programs and Federal Partners

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
NOAA's Role in the U.S. Tsunami Program
NOAA plays a crucial part in the United States Tsunami Program. According to a
description on NOAA’s website: Four NOAA agencies contribute to the U.S. Tsunami
Program: National Weather Service, NOAA Research, NOAA Ocean Service and NOAA
Satellites and Information Service. NOAA represents the U.S. as a member of the
International Coordination Group for the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific,
administered by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO.
http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/grounders/tsunamis.html

The NOAA website entitled “The Big Picture: NOAA’s Role and Who Does
What?” states: NOAA has primary responsibility for providing tsunami warnings to the
nation and they play a leadership role in tsunami observations and research.

Hazard Assessment
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) monitors earthquakes with a
network of seismic detectors. The states also monitor seismic activity. This information is
critical to understanding when a tsunami wave is generated.
NOAA Research develops models that forecast tsunamis and create tsunami
inundation maps. NOAA Research provides forecast models to NOAA's Weather Service
forecasters and inundation models and maps to state and national planners and
emergency managers. This information is critical to issuing warnings to communities at
risk.
NOAA's National Weather Service promotes tsunami hazard preparedness
through TsunamiReady, [TsunamiReady is] an active collaboration among federal, state
and local emergency management agencies, the public, and the NWS tsunami warning
system.

Warning
NOAA monitors sea height through a network of buoys and tide gauges
[including] NOAA Research/Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory, NOAA National
Weather Service/National Data Buoy Center, and NOAA National Ocean Service.
NOAA Tsunami Warning Centers use observations of seismic activity and sea
height with forecast models and issue Watches and Warnings where appropriate.
http://www.tsunami.noaa.gov/noaa_what.html

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National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP)
NTHMP’s Role in U.S. Tsunami Program
The NTHMP role is to develop a coordinated national effort to assess tsunami
threat, prepare community response, issue timely and effective warnings, and mitigate
damage.
The primary goals of NTHMP are to: 1) raise awareness of the affected
population; 2) develop integrated tsunami maps and models that can be used to develop
improved warning guidance and evacuation maps; 3) improve tsunami warning systems;
4) incorporate tsunami planning into state and federal multi-hazard programs. Because
tsunami mitigation is applicable beyond tsunamis and is integral to the nation's overall
effort to reduce coastal losses and improve resilience, the mitigation capability takes a
multi-hazards physical, commercial and ecological approach that responds to socio-
economic and disaster management priorities. http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/index.html

History
“Developing Tsunami-Resilient Communities: The National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program” on the NTHMP website states:
The April 1992 California earthquake and tsunami brought into focus that the
west coast of the U.S. has a major subduction zone capable of producing destructive
tsunamis. The 1992 tsunami raised the question as to the preparedness level of west coast
residents for a local tsunami. In July 1994 the Senate Appropriations Committee directed
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the federal agency
responsible for issuing tsunami warnings, to formulate a plan for reducing the tsunami
risks to coastal residents. Within 10 months, NOAA hosted three workshops involving
over 50 scientists, emergency planners, and emergency operators from all levels of
governments and universities and produced 12 recommendations, which were submitted
to the Committee in March 1995. In October 1995 the Committee directed NOAA to form
and lead a Federal/State working group to (1) review the 12 recommendations submitted
in the 1995 NOAA Report, and (2) develop an action plan and budget.
In February 1996, NOAA formed the Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Federal/State
Working Group, composed of representatives from the States of Alaska, California,
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington, and three Federal agencies—NOAA, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the United States Geological Survey
(USGS). By April 1996 the Working Group produced and submitted a Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Implementation Plan that provided technical and budgetary guidance for the
implementation of five specific Program recommendations:
1. Produce Inundation Maps;
2. Improve Seismic Networks;
3. Deploy Tsunami Detection Buoys;
4. Develop Hazard Mitigation Programs;
5. Develop State/NOAA Coordination and Technical Support.
These recommendations have been carried out over a 5 year period under the
guidance of the Federal/State National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP)
Steering Group. The Steering Group met twice each year to report progress on the five
elements, to make funding decisions, and to make adjustments in the Program. Through
the use of a web site, e-mails, telephone conference calls, and numerous individual
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meetings and telephone calls, the Group functioned as a team in implementing the Plan
(Bernard, 2005).
The historical archive website for National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
(NTHMP) documents is located at: http://nthmp-history.pmel.noaa.gov/

NTHMP - Current Information

A description of the NTHMP Strategic Plan states: The National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program (NTHMP) is a partnership between Federal and State agency
representatives designed to reduce the impact of tsunamis on U.S. coastal communities.
Led by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) National
Weather Service (NWS), the NTHMP is the nation’s community-focused program to
improve tsunami mitigation and preparedness of at-risk areas within the United States
and its territories.
The NTHMP includes all 28 U.S. coastal States, Territories and Commonwealths,
(Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington, California, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland,
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Maine, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, U.S. Virgin Islands, Northern
Mariana Islands, Marshall Islands; and Federal partners, the United States Geological
Survey (USGS), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Science
Foundation (NSF) and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). This
strong and active partnership enables all levels of government to work toward the
common goal of saving the lives of all people at risk for a tsunami at our nation’s
coastlines, and reducing damage to property and the economy.
This program provides tsunami modeling for preparedness planning, mitigation
initiatives, and public education; provides warning guidance to local jurisdictions; and
facilitates installation of all-hazard alert systems in coastal areas.
http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/index.html

“Tsunami Risk Reduction for the United States: A Framework for Action”
This document was prepared by a joint working group of the Subcommittee on
Disaster Reduction and the United States Group on Earth Observations, both under the
leadership of the National Science and Technology Council. The principal Federal
agencies involved in the implementation of this plan are the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), and
the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Other agencies playing important roles are the Department of State, the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Guard Bureau, and
the National Science Foundation (NSF).
Recognizing the complexity and scope of the sustained efforts needed to ensure
tsunami risk reduction in the decades to come; additional actions are needed in hazard
assessment, warning, and response planning, and new or improved actions in public
awareness, mitigation, and research. All of these efforts require sustained coordination,
attention and support on the Federal, state and local level.
http://www.sdr.gov/Tsunami%20Risk%20Reduction%20for%20the%20US%20-
%20A%20Framework%20for%20Action%202005-12-22.pdf
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 For other documents relevant to the NTHMP, see Appendix A for the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report on “U.S. Tsunami Preparedness”
(June 2006) and Appendix B for the “Tsunami Warning and Education Act,
Public Law 100-424” (December 2006).

TsunamiReady Program
The “TsunamiReady Revised Plan” is described as follows: TsunamiReady
establishes minimum guidelines for a community to be awarded the TsunamiReady
recognition. Communities that accept the challenge and meet prescribed point totals set
by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) are designated as
TsunamiReady communities. Guidelines include the following areas Mitigation,
Preparedness, Response and Recovery which are used for community ratings for
TsunamiReady recognition. http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/Minutes/november08/index.html

Lincoln City, Oregon - Tsunami Preparedness Program

The “Lincoln City Tsunami Ready Report” states: Just off the western coastline of
the United States and Canada, runs an 800-mile earthquake fault called the Cascadia
Subduction Zone (CSZ). This region is where the Juan de Fuca plate moves under the
North American plate, creating the same seismic hazards as those that spawned the 2004
Andaman tsunami in the Indian Ocean. The potential for devastating earthquakes and
tsunamis is present along the miles of coast from California to British Columbia.
A tsunami is a series of ocean waves generated by earthquakes, landslides, or
volcanic activity. In the deep ocean, the tsunami wave may only be a few inches high and
causes little visible disturbance. When the wave reaches shallower water near shore, it
may increase in height to become a fast moving wall of turbulent water several meters
high. During the 2004 tsunami, wave heights reached 30 meters in some places. In Banda
Aceh, waves measured 10-12 meters.
Earthquakes, volcanic activity and tsunamis cannot be prevented. However,
individuals and governments can mitigate the impact of tsunamis through community
education and preparedness, timely warnings, and effective response. The City of Lincoln
City has begun this community education effort with the hiring of a Tsunami
Preparedness Coordinator. Althea Turner was brought on board to coordinate the efforts
of the many people involved in making sure that Lincoln City is ready in the event of a
tsunami. A one-year $45,000 grant was given by National Weather Service, in
collaboration with Oregon Emergency Management, Department of Geology and
Mineral Industries and City of Lincoln City.
The program included an emergency exercise program, neighborhood educator
program and tsunami hazard cards for lodging facilities. Community members were
encouraged to get involved and help to make Lincoln City ready in case of a tsunami
event. For further information, contact: Althea Turner, 541-996-1204, or email
altheat@lincolncity.org

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United States Geological Survey (USGS)
The USGS is an essential partner in tsunami detection. The website “About
Tsunami and Earthquake Research at USGS” states: As part of the National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program, the USGS has upgraded the seismograph network and
communication functions of the West Coast & Alaska Tsunami Warning Center and
Pacific Tsunami Warning Center. This effort is termed CREST -- Consolidated Reporting
of Earthquakes and Tsunamis.
Here [on the website listed below] you will find general information on how local
tsunamis are generated by earthquakes as well as animations, virtual reality models of
tsunamis and summaries of past research studies. The scope of tsunami research within
the USGS, however, is broader than the topics covered here. USGS researchers have also
provided critical research toward understanding how sediments are transported during
tsunami run-up and deciphering the geologic record of prehistoric tsunamis. The USGS
collaborates closely with the (NOAA) National Center for Tsunami Research.
http://walrus.wr. usgs.gov/tsunami/about.html

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant
According to FEMA: The Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) program provides
funds to states, territories, Indian tribal governments, communities, and universities for
hazard mitigation planning and the implementation of mitigation projects prior to a
disaster event.
FEMA's mitigation grants, including PDM, are provided to eligible Applicant
States/Tribes/Territories that, in turn, provide sub-grants to local governments. The
Applicant selects and prioritizes applications developed and submitted to them by local
jurisdictions to submit to FEMA for grant funds.
Funding these plans and projects reduces overall risks to the population and
structures, while also reducing reliance on funding from actual disaster declarations.
PDM grants are awarded on a competitive basis and without reference to state
allocations, quotas, or other formula-based allocation of funds. States, territories, Indian
tribal governments, communities, and universities must have a [current FEMA approved]
Hazard Mitigation Plan in order to qualify for FEMA’s PDM grant program. [For
Pacific State Hazard Mitigation Program links see Chapter 3 – Mitigation, p. 3-6/7.]
http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pdm/

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

A study by The National Institute of Building Science’s Multi-hazard Mitigation Council
found: Although risk from natural disasters cannot be eliminated completely, every $1
spent on mitigation can save as much as $4 in response and recovery. The National
Institute of Building Sciences (NIBS) is a non-profit, private organization dedicated to
bringing together government, professionals, the building products industry, construction
labor, and the end consumer to identify and resolve current and potential problems that
disrupt the ability to design and build safe and economical private, public, and
institutional structures throughout the United States. Initiated by the U. S. Congress,
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NIBS provides a resource of authoritative advice for both the private and public sector of
the economy regarding the use of building science and technology, to bolster and further
the quality, safety, and adaptability of buildings from conception to construction. NIBS
receive its funding from federal and state contracts and grants, and private funds in the
form of membership dues and sales of its publications. This blend of funding resources is
intended to prevent any one sector, discipline, or industry from holding an undue
influence over the information provided by the Institute.
http://www.nibs.org/MMC/mmchome.html

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Acronyms
ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Center
AEST Australian Eastern Standard Time
AFTN Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network
AFAP Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia and the Pacific
AHAB All-Hazard Alert Broadcasting Radio
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
Humanitarian Action
APCEDI Australian-Pacific Center for Emergency and Disaster Information
APNHIN Asia Pacific Natural Hazards Information Network
ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers
ATWC Alaska Tsunami Warning Center
AWIPS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
BRR Advisory and Oversight Boards
CALWS California Warning System
CCM Coastal Construction Manual
CERT Community Emergency Response Training
CISN California Integrated Seismic Network
CLETS California Law Enforcement Teletype System
CREST Consolidated Reporting of Earthquakes and Tsunamis
CREW Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup
CSSC California Seismic Safety Commission
CSWC California State Warning Center
CSZ Cascadia Subduction Zone
CTEC Community Tsunami Early-warning Center
CUSEC Central United States Earthquake Consortium
CWS Church World Service
DAGS Department of Accounting and General Services (Hawaii)
DART Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis
DFID Department for International Development
DMVA State of Alaska Department of Military and Veterans Affairs
DNR/DGGS Department of Natural Resources, Division of Geological and
Geophysical Surveys (Alaska)
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DOGAMI Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries
DRP Disaster Recovery Plan
DSA Development Services Administration (Maui County, Hawaii)
EAP Emergency Action Plan
EAS Emergency Alert System
EDIS Emergency Digital Information System
EERI Earthquake Engineering Research Institute
EMT Emergency Medical Technician
EMWIN Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
EOC Emergency Operations Center
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FESA Fire and Emergency Services Authority
FMAP Flood Mitigation Assistance Program
GAO United States Government Accountability Office
GIS Geographic Information Systems
GMA Growth Management Act (Washington State)
GNS Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences Limited (New Zealand)
GSMB Geological Survey and Mines Bureau (Sri Lanka)
GTS Global Telecommunication System
HCRC Hawaii County Resource Center
HCTA Hawaii County Tourism Authority
HMGP FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
IASC United Nations Inter Agency Standing Committee
ICG/PTWS Intergovernmental Coordination Group for the Pacific Tsunami Warning
System
IDP Internally Displaced People
IHP Individuals and Households Program
ILO International Labor Organization
INGO International Non-governmental Organization
IOC Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission
IOTWS Indian Ocean Tsunami Warning System

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ITIC International Tsunami Information Centre
JMA Japan Meteorological Agency
KOGAMI Komunitas Siaga Tsunami (Indonesia)
LCSD Lincoln County School District
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MEK Maori Environmental Knowledge
MIC Mass Casualty Incident
NAO National Audit Office (United Kingdom)
NEHRP National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program
NEIC National Earthquake Information Center
NFIP National Flood Insurance Program
NGO Non-governmental Organization
NIWA National Institute of Water and Atmospheric and Research Ltd. (New
Zealand)
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSW New South Wales
NWR NOAA Weather Radio
NWS National Weather Service
NWW NOAA Weather Wire
NTHMP National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
OEM Office of Emergency Management (California)
OEMA Oregon Emergency Management Association
OES California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services
OHSU Oregon Health and Science University
ORS Oregon Revised Statutes
OSE Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery
OSU Oregon State University
PDC Pacific Disaster Center
PDM Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program
PRTWMP Puerto Rico Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Program
PRVI Puerto Rico/Virgin Islands

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PSA Public Service Announcement
PSC Pacific Services Center
PTM Pacific Tsunami Museum
PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
PTWC Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
PTWS Pacific Tsunami Warning System
RANET Radio and Internet for the Communication of Hydro-Meteorological and
Climate Related Information
RCDR Regional Centers for Disaster Reduction
RSS Real Simple Syndication
SBA Small Business Administration
SCD State Civil Defense (Hawaii)
SECC State Emergency Communications Committee
SECC State Emergency Coordination Center (Alaska)
SES State Emergency Service
SIDS Small Island Developing States
SRO Surfzone Relief Operations
TTRC Tsunami Technical Review Committee
TWATCH Tsunami Watch
TWC Tsunami Warning Center
TWS Tsunami Warning Systems
UHH University of Hawaii at Hilo
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNTRS United Nations team for Tsunami Recovery Support
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USCG United States Coast Guard
USGS United States Geological Survey
UTC Coordinated Universal Time (formerly Greenwich Mean Time)

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WAC Washington Administrative Code
WCATWC West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center
WHO World Health Organization
WSSPC Western States Seismic Policy Council
XML Extensible Markup Language

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 Chapter 2

Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensibility Analysis

Definitions:
Hazard Assessment: The process of estimating, for defined areas, the probabilities of
the occurrence of potentially-damaging phenomena of given magnitudes within a
specified period of time. Hazard assessment involves analysis of formal and informal
historical records, and skilled interpretation of existing topographical, geological,
geomorphologic, hydrological and land-use maps, as well as analysis of social and
economic and political conditions.

Risk Assessment: Risk analysis is a process of determining the nature and scale of
losses and damage due to disaster which can be anticipated in particular areas during a
specified time period. Evaluation of risk is the social and political judgment of various
risks by the individuals and communities that face them. This involves trading off
perceived risks against potential benefits and also includes balancing scientific
judgments against other factors and beliefs.

Vulnerability Analysis: The process of estimating the vulnerability to potential disaster

hazards of specified elements at risk. For engineering purposes, vulnerability analysis
involves the analysis of theoretical and empirical data concerning the effects of
particular phenomena on particular types of structures. For more general socio-
economic purposes, it involves consideration of all significant elements in society,
including physical, social and economic considerations (both short- and long-term), and
the extent to which essential services and traditional and local coping mechanisms are
able to continue functioning. http://www.cwserp.org/training/CWSEMT/KCmodulea.php

Sensitivity: Sensitivity refers to the differential impacts to community assets, given

similar hazard conditions. The term is applied differently by different disciplines.
Engineers often use the term sensitivity to describe a structure’s fragility to varying
levels of external stressors (for example, a building constructed of wood and another
constructed of concrete behave differently given an impact load). Social scientists use the
term sensitivity to describe why certain demographic groups within a population (for
example, single-mother households or individuals over 65 years in age) often experience
greater losses or have greater difficulty in recovering from the same extreme event.
Economists use the term sensitivity to determine the potential impact of individual losses
to a regional economy or the impact of an event on the flow of materials and general
productivity of a market. (USGS publication, “Volcano-hydrologic Hazards”, Pierson,
2008)

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According to the “Tsunami Glossary, 2008” found on the UNESCO website:

Tsunami Hazard Assessment: Documentation of tsunami hazards for a coastal

community is needed to identify populations and assets at risk, and the level of that risk.
This assessment requires knowledge of probable tsunami sources (such as earthquakes,
landslides, and volcanic eruptions), their likelihood of occurrence, and the
characteristics of tsunamis from those sources at different places along the coast. For
those communities, data of earlier (historical and paleotsunamis) tsunamis may help
quantify these factors. For most communities, however, only very limited or no past data
exist. For these coasts, numerical models of tsunami inundation can provide estimates of
areas that will be flooded in the event of a local or distant tsunamigenic earthquake or a
local landslide.

Tsunami Risk: The probability of a particular coastline being struck by a tsunami

multiplied by the likely destructive effects of the tsunami and by the number of potential
victims. http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/files/tsunami_glossary_small.pdf

Modeling Tsunami Hazard Zones

According to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA)
Pacific Services Center (PCS): modeling is currently being undertaken which will identify
tsunami hazard zones for United States Flag Pacific Islands. Evacuation maps will be
developed once the zones have been identified. Emergency managers will then determine
evacuation routes and make evacuation plans for residents, visitors and employees.
Additionally, evaluation of critical infrastructure in the at-risk area should be undertaken
and included as a priority (personal communication, Russell Jackson 2008).

NOAA’s Role in Hazard Assessment

As described by NOAA: NOAA performs research and develops models that are
used to forecast tsunamis and create tsunami inundation and evacuation maps. Forecast
models are provided to NOAA's Weather Service [tsunami] forecasters and the
inundation models and maps are provided to state and national planners and emergency
managers. Models are critical to using data to issue warnings to communities at risk.
http://www.tsunami.noaa.gov/research_modeling.html

The United States Geological Survey (USGS) Role in Risk Assessment,

Vulnerability and Sensibility Analysis
As the 2004 Indian Ocean disaster demonstrated, tsunamis are significant threats
to the safety, economic well-being, and natural resources of coastal communities.
Although high-hazard areas have been identified for tsunamis in many United States
jurisdictions, far less is known about the potential impacts of tsunamis on individual
coastal communities. Understanding societal vulnerability to tsunamis is critical if public
and private-sector decision makers are to reduce risks and increase the resilience of
threatened coastal communities. USGS researchers and their partners are providing
geographic information on variations in community exposure and sensitivity to tsunami

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hazards that helps local officials make informed and realistic decisions on mitigation,
preparedness, outreach, and response and recovery strategies for increasing community
resilience to tsunamis. Vulnerability assessments using geographic-information-system
tools and publicly available data have been conducted in Hawaii, Washington, and
Oregon to document variations among communities in developed land, human
populations, economic assets, and critical facilities relative to tsunami-inundation zones.
(Personal communication from Dr. Nathan Wood)

State of Alaska - Hazard, Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis

Hazard Assessment – State of Alaska
According to the “2007 Alaska State All Hazard Mitigation Plan”, Alaska is
developing tsunami inundation maps for communities along the Gulf of Alaska as part of
the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. Detailed maps of historical tsunami
inundation flooding are essential for determining evacuation routes and long-term
planning for vulnerable coastal communities. In addition, these maps require
maintenance by upgrading as better data becomes available and coastal changes occur.
Inundation maps for Kodiak (Kodiak City, USCG station, and Women’s Bay), Homer,
and Seldovia are completed and available to the public through the Department of
Natural Resources, Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys (DNR/DGGS)
website http://www.dggs.dnr.state.ak.us/. The next communities in priority for mapping
are Seward followed by Sitka and Valdez. http://www.ak-prepared.com/plans/
mitigation/statehazmitplan07.htm

NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Research website lists Alaska State Partnership Efforts
relating to Tsunami Hazard Assessment including publications and data.
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/state/ak/index.html

The “2007 Alaska State All Hazard Mitigation Plan” contains a section entitled,
“Develop Tsunami Inundation Maps for All Threatened Communities”. This section
addresses mitigation measures with the following objective:
Expedite tsunami inundation map development for vulnerable coastal
communities. Communities must rely on historical or estimated information for land-use
and evacuation route planning because reliable inundation maps are not available.
Scientifically prepared tsunami inundation maps will provide more accurate information
allowing for more accurate community decisions. The goal is to develop tsunami
inundation map for tsunami-threatened communities statewide.
Three out of 78 of Alaska’s threatened communities have completed Tsunami
Inundation maps. This process is solely funded by the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program. There is extremely limited quality digitized bathymetric data
available to accomplish this task. No State funds are available for this program.
http://www.ak-prepared.com/plans/mitigation/statehazmitplan07.htm

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Risk Assessment – State of Alaska
Review of risk and vulnerability analysis taken from the “Western States Seismic
Policy Council (WSSPC) Annual Report 2007”, “Improve seismic hazard identification
and risk assessment methods and their use” is shown below:
The State is using VRiskMap® software to facilitate risk and vulnerability
analysis from earthquakes and other natural hazards. The software allows Mitigation
Staff to overlay hazard maps, delineate by degree of hazard, and run queries giving
population and infrastructure-associated information to determine potential impact and
estimated losses. Several of Alaska’s largest communities and boroughs have Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved and community- adopted Local All-
Hazard Mitigation Plans fulfilling the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 criteria. These
plans are essential for identifying the risks, vulnerabilities, and the economic impact to
the State’s population and infrastructure from natural hazards like the State’s extensive
earthquake hazard. These plans cover approximately 83% of the State’s population.
Several of the remaining communities are developing Local Hazard Mitigation Plans to
align their local hazard mitigation plans, hazard data, strategies, goals, and initiatives
with the State Plan. www.wsspc.org/Publications/news/EQ2007Winter.pdf

According to the “2007 State of Alaska All Hazard Mitigation Plan”, the portion
of Alaska bordering the North Pacific Ocean can be hit by tsunamis generated by above
and underwater landslides [subaerial and submarine], crustal plate movement, or
volcanic activity. The Aleutian Islands could receive a tsunami generated by remote
source earthquakes while areas of the Gulf of Alaska could experience a tsunami from
several possible sources. The Alaska coastline facing the Bering Sea has a very low
tsunami threat. However, evidence exists of a volcanically induced tsunami in Bristol Bay
about 3,500 years ago. http://www.ak- prepared.com/plans/mitigation/ state
hazmitplan07.htm

Vulnerability Analysis – State of Alaska

There are no plans at this time for a Vulnerability Analysis.

State of California - Hazard, Risk Assessment and Vulnerability

Analysis
Hazard Assessment – State of California

NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Research website lists California State partnership efforts
relating to Tsunami Hazard Assessment including publications and data.
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/state/ca/index.html

A report entitled, “The Tsunami Threat to California: Findings and

Recommendations on Tsunami Hazards and Risks”, published by the California Seismic
Safety Commission in 2005, states:

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 Tsunamis generated either locally or from events elsewhere in the Pacific Basin,
pose a significant threat to life and property in California. Losses from tsunamis can be
reduced in four ways:
1) Engineering standards creating more damage resistant buildings and port
structures;
2) Public education training Californians to recognize tsunami alerts and
providing instruction on what to do;
3) Warning systems alerting a population to a tsunami coming from a distant
source; and
4) Effective evacuation planning. The report recommends a series of actions to be
taken to improve mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery
including:
• Improvements in public education about tsunami issues,
including multi-lingual information.
• Working with other coastal states to obtain an external expert
review of the NOAA tsunami warning system criteria for
issuing and canceling warnings.
• Working with federal agencies to develop guidelines for
structures to resist both strong ground motion and tsunami
wave impact.
• Supporting and providing matching funds for tsunami mitigation
programs in coastal counties and in Office of Emergency
Services (OES), including improvements to the
communications and emergency response systems.
• Supporting and providing matching funds for development of
improved technologies and methodology to assess tsunami
risk.
http://www.seismic.ca.gov/pub/CSSC%2005-03%20Tsunami%20Findings.pdf

Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Analysis – State of California

The “State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 2007” includes an
assessment of state vulnerability and potential losses: which states that assessing
vulnerability and potential loss due to tsunami hazards is a field that is in its infancy.
http://hazardmitigation.oes.ca.gov/plan/state_multi-hazard_mitigation_plan_shmp

The “Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) Annual Report 2007”,
contains the State of California’s “Earthquake and Tsunami Program Report” which
states:
During 2006, the University of Southern California's Tsunami Research Center,
working with the OES Earthquake and Tsunami Program and the OES Geographic
Information Systems unit, completed tsunami inundation maps for all California counties.
These maps are of critical importance because they become the basis for planning
evacuation routes and hazard mitigation within identified tsunami inundation zones. The
California State Warning Center has developed and tested new tsunami warning
notification technologies that have greatly improved the state's ability to communicate
tsunami warning messages to local government responders. Tsunami warning exercises
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conducted during 2006 have demonstrated the effectiveness of these technologies and
increased confidence that a warning issued by the West Coast & Alaska Tsunami
Warning Center will be effectively communicated to local officials who are responsible
for activating local tsunami response plans and alerting California coastal residents that
a dangerous wave may have been formed. OES provides leadership in tsunami planning
at the national level by active participation in the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation
Program. During 2006, representatives of the Earthquake and Tsunami Program
provided valuable input to NOAA officials regarding warning message content, tsunami-
resistant construction in coastal areas and improving the effectiveness of tsunami
exercises. OES worked with NOAA’s National Weather Service to conduct a thorough
test of the warning system in March 2008 involving multiple states and warning messages
that activate the Emergency Alert System. OES also convenes and chairs the State
Tsunami Steering Committee that includes all Operational Areas in coastal California
and provides a forum for discussion of new technologies, policy changes in the national
program and funding opportunities for local planning and mitigation programs.
www.wsspc.org/Publications/news/EQ2007Winter.pdf

State of Hawaii - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and

Sensibility Analysis
Hazard Assessment – State of Hawaii
NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Research website lists Hawaii State Partnership Efforts
relating to Tsunami Hazard Assessment including publications, animations and data.
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/state/hi/index.html

Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensibility Analysis – State of Hawaii

According to the USGS publication Abstract for “Variations in Community
Exposure and Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards in the State of Hawaii”, Hawaii has
experienced numerous destructive tsunamis and the potential for future events threatens
the safety and economic well being of its coastal communities. Although tsunami-
evacuation zones have been delineated, what is in these areas and how communities have
chosen to develop within them has not been documented. A community-level vulnerability
assessment using geographic-information-system tools was conducted to describe
tsunami-prone landscapes on the Hawaiian coast and to document variations in land
cover, demographics, economic assets, and critical facilities among 65 communities.
Results indicate that the Hawaii tsunami-evacuation zone contains approximately
80,443 residents (seven percent of the total population), 67,113 employees (eleven
percent of the State labor force), and 50,174 average daily visitors to hotels (44 percent
of the State total). With regards to economic conditions, the tsunami-evacuation zone
contains 5,779 businesses that generate $10.1 billion in annual sales volume (both eleven
percent of State totals), and tax parcels with a combined total value of $36.1 billion (18
percent of the State total). Although occupancy values are not known for each facility, the
tsunami-evacuation zone also contains numerous dependent-population facilities (for
example, child-day-care facilities and schools), public venues (for example, religious
organizations and parks) and critical facilities (for example, fire stations). The

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residential population in tsunami-prone areas is racially diverse, with most residents
identifying themselves as White, Asian, or Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander,
either alone or in combination with one or more race. Fifty-three percent of the
households in the tsunami-evacuation zone are renter occupied. The employee population
in the tsunami-evacuation zone is largely in accommodation and food services, health
services, and retail-trade sectors.
Results indicate that community vulnerability, described here by exposure (the
amount of assets in tsunami-prone areas) and sensitivity (the relative percentage of
assets in tsunami-prone areas) varies considerably among 65 coastal communities in
Hawaii. Honolulu has the highest exposure, Punaluu has the highest sensitivity, and
Napili-Honokowai has the highest combination of exposure and sensitivity to tsunamis.
Results also indicate that the level of community-asset exposure to tsunamis is not
determined by the amount of a community’s land that is in tsunami-evacuation zones.
Community sensitivity, however, is related to the percentage of a community’s land that
is in the tsunami-prone areas. This report will further the dialogue on societal risk to
tsunami hazards in Hawaii and help identify future preparedness, mitigation, response,
and recovery planning needs within coastal communities and economic sectors of the
State of Hawaii. (Wood, 2008) http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5208/

Hilo, Hawaii
In 2008, a survey of 100 business owners and their staff was conducted in downtown
Hilo. The purpose of the survey was to gather information on the current level of
knowledge and preparedness so that future tsunami education could be tailored to the
needs of the community. The survey is available in the document “Tsunami Education: A
Blueprint for Coastal Communities” which will be available for download in 2009 from
http://www.tsunami.org/

State of Oregon - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and

Sensibility Analysis
Hazard Assessment – State of Oregon
NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Research website lists Oregon State Partnership Efforts
relating to Tsunami Hazard Assessment including publications, animations and data.
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/state/or/index.html

According to the “Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) Annual

Report 2007”:
The Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI) has
initiated a cooperative project with the community of Cannon Beach, Oregon, to map
paleotsunami deposits preserved in local estuaries to field test [ground truth] tsunami
run-up models for inundation maps to be used for the city. DOGAMI is working with
Oregon Health Science University (OHSU) to improve tsunami inundation modeling and
mapping using Cannon Beach as the state-of-the-art example for future methods.
http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/

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 Oregon Emergency Management (OEM) and DOGAMI have collaborated on
many public meetings, workshops and training sessions dealing with tsunami hazard
assessment, warning protocols and public education.
http://www.wsspc.org/Publications/news/EQ2007Winter.pdf

Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensibility Analysis – State of Oregon

According to the USGS publication Abstract for “Variations in City Exposure and
Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards in Oregon”, evidence of past events and modeling of
potential future events suggest that tsunamis are significant threats to Oregon coastal
communities. Although a potential tsunami-inundation zone from a Cascadia Subduction
Zone earthquake has been delineated, what is in this area and how communities have
chosen to develop within it have not been documented. A vulnerability assessment using
geographic-information-system tools was conducted to describe tsunami-prone
landscapes on the Oregon coast and to document city variations in developed land,
human populations, economic assets, and critical facilities relative to the tsunami-
inundation zone. Results indicate that the Oregon tsunami-inundation zone contains
approximately 22,201 residents (four percent of the total population in the seven coastal
counties), 14,857 employees (six percent of the total labor force), and 53,714 day-use
visitors on average every day to coastal Oregon State Parks within the tsunami-
inundation zone. The tsunami-inundation zone also contains 1,829 businesses that
generate approximately $1.9 billion in annual sales volume (seven and five percent of
study-area totals, respectively) and tax parcels with a combined total value of $8.2
billion (12 percent of the study-area total). Although occupancy values are not known for
each facility, the tsunami-inundation zone also contains numerous dependent-population
facilities (for example, adult-residential-care facilities, child-day-care facilities, and
schools), public venues (for example, religious organizations and libraries), and critical
facilities (for example, police stations). Racial diversity of residents in the tsunami-
inundation zone is low, with 96 percent identifying themselves as White, either alone or
in combination with one or more race. Twenty-two percent of the residents in the
tsunami-inundation zone are over 65 years in age, 36 percent of the residents live on
unincorporated county lands, and 37 percent of the households are renter occupied. The
employee population in the tsunami-inundation zone is largely in accommodation and
food services, retail trade, manufacturing, and arts and entertainment sectors.
Results indicate that vulnerability, described here by exposure (the amount of
assets in tsunami-prone areas) and sensitivity (the relative percentage of assets in
tsunami-prone areas) varies considerably among 26 incorporated cities in Oregon. City
exposure and sensitivity to tsunami hazards is highest in the northern portion of the
coast. The City of Seaside in Clatsop County has the highest exposure, the highest
sensitivity, and the highest combined relative exposure and sensitivity to tsunamis.
Results also indicate that the amount of city assets in tsunami-prone areas is weakly
related to the amount of a community's land in this zone; the percentage of a city's
assets, however, is strongly related to the percentage of its land that is in the tsunami-
prone areas. This report will further the dialogue on societal risk to tsunami hazards in
Oregon and help identify future preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery
planning needs within coastal cities and economic sectors of the state of Oregon. (Wood
2007) http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5283/
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According to DOGAMI, in April, 2008, USGS released new seismic hazard maps
showing that Oregonians will inevitably face a magnitude 9 Cascadia Subduction Zone
earthquake and accompanying tsunami. http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazmaps

Washington State - Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and

Sensibility Analysis
Hazard Assessment – Washington State
NOAA’s Center for Tsunami Research website lists Washington State Partnership Efforts
relating to Tsunami Hazard Assessment including publications, animations and data.
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/state/wa/index.html

According to Washington State Emergency Management Division, Washington’s

coastline faces a dual threat; tsunamis generated by distant sources such as earthquakes
in Alaska and Chile, and local tsunamis generated directly offshore during earthquakes
on the Cascadia Subduction Zone.
The Cascadia Subduction Zone has generated magnitude 8 or larger earthquakes
and tsunamis at least six times in the past 3,500 years. The most recent of these events
occurred the evening of January 26, 1700. During such an earthquake, much of the land
on Washington’s outer coast subsides, or falls, making coastal communities more
susceptible to flooding and damage from a tsunami.
Computer models indicate that a Cascadia-generated tsunami could reach nearly
30 feet in height and affect the entire Washington coast. The first wave would reach
coastal communities within 30 minutes after the earthquake, and communities along the
Strait of Juan de Fuca in 90 minutes. Tsunamis from great Cascadia earthquakes
probably account for several sand sheets on northwestern Whidbey Island and at
Discovery Bay in Puget Sound. The Cascadia Subduction Zone, in its earthquake and
tsunami potential, is similar to the Sunda Trench off the coast of Sumatra Island,
Indonesia.
Washington’s inland waters also are subject to tsunamis. An earthquake in A.D.
900-930 on the Seattle Fault caused uplift that triggered a tsunami in central Puget
Sound. A landslide into the Tacoma Narrows set off a tsunami a few days after the 1949
Olympia earthquake. http://www.emd.wa.gov/

Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensibility Analysis – Washington State

According to the USGS publication Abstract for “Variations in Community
Exposure and Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards on the Open-Ocean and Strait of Juan de
Fuca Coasts of Washington” : Evidence of past events and modeling of potential future
events suggest that tsunamis are significant threats to communities on the open-ocean
and Strait of Juan de Fuca coasts of Washington. Although potential tsunami-inundation
zones from a Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) earthquake have been delineated, the
amount and type of human development in tsunami-prone areas have not been
documented. A vulnerability assessment using geographic-information-system tools was

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conducted to document variations in developed land, human populations, economic
assets, and critical facilities relative to CSZ-related tsunami-inundation zones among
communities on the open-ocean and Strait of Juan de Fuca coasts of Washington
(including Clallam, Jefferson, Grays Harbor, and Pacific Counties). The tsunami-
inundation zone in these counties contains 42,972 residents (24 percent of the total study-
area population), 24,934 employees (33 percent of the total labor force), and 17,029
daily visitors to coastal Washington State Parks. The tsunami-inundation zone also
contains 2,908 businesses that generate $4.6 billion in annual sales volume (31 and 40
percent of study-area totals, respectively) and tax parcels with a combined total value of
$4.5 billion (25 percent of the study-area total). Although occupancy values are not
known for each site, the tsunami-inundation zone also contains numerous dependent-
population facilities (for example, schools and child-day-care centers), public venues (for
example, religious organizations), and critical facilities (for example, police stations and
public-work facilities). Racial diversity of residents in tsunami-prone areas is low—89
percent of residents are White and 8 percent are American Indian or Alaska Native.
Nineteen percent of the residents in the tsunami-inundation zone are over 65 years in
age, 30 percent of the residents live on unincorporated county lands, and 35 percent of
the households are renter occupied. Employees in the tsunami-inundation zone are
largely in businesses related to health care and social assistance, accommodation and
food services, and retail trade, reflecting businesses that cater to a growing retiree and
tourist population. Community vulnerability, described here by exposure (the amount of
assets in tsunami-prone areas) and sensitivity (the relative percentage of assets in
tsunami-prone areas) varies among 13 incorporated cities, 7 Indian reservations, and 4
counties. The City of Aberdeen has the highest relative community exposure to tsunamis,
whereas the City of Long Beach has the highest relative community sensitivity. Levels of
community exposure and sensitivity to tsunamis are found to be related to the amount and
percentage, respectively, of a community’s land that is in a tsunami-inundation zone.
This report will further the dialogue on societal risk to tsunami hazards in Washington
and help risk managers to determine where additional risk-reduction strategies may be
needed. (Wood 2008) http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2008/5004/

Tsunami Hazard – Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands

Earthquakes and Tsunamis in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
USGS publication, “Earthquakes and Tsunamis in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands”, states: In 1918, a magnitude 7.5 earthquake resulted in a tsunami that
killed at least 91 people in northwestern Puerto Rico. Eyewitness reports of an 1867
Virgin Islands tsunami give a maximum wave height of more than 7 meters (23 feet) in
Frederiksted, St. Croix, where a large naval vessel was left on top of a pier.
Many earthquakes and tsunamis have occurred in the northeastern Caribbean,
where the movements of the Earth's surface plates are rapid and complicated. Future
such events pose serious hazards to the 3.7 million people who live in Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. (USGS 2001) http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs141-00/fs141-00.pdf

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Pacific Disaster Center’s Natural Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas
The Pacific Disaster Center’s (PDC) “Natural Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas”
can be found on PDC’s website. The Atlas includes interactive map viewers depicting
numerous data layers, historical and current hazard occurrences (e.g., tsunamis, tsunami
run-ups throughout the Pacific and beyond), evacuation zones for Hawaii and much
more. See the “PDC Fact Sheet” for full description. http://www.pdc.org/atlas

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 Chapter 3

Mitigation

Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations

Definitions:
Ordinance: A statute or regulation, especially one enacted by a city government.
Regulation (as in Land Use): A principle, rule, or law designed to control or govern
conduct.

Code: Any set of standards set forth and enforced by a local government agency for the
protection of public safety, health, etc., as in the structural safety of buildings (building
code). http://dictionary.reference.com/

Land Use
According to “The Hidden Costs of Coastal Hazards: Implications for Risk Assessment
and Mitigation”:
On the Pacific coast, cities and counties divide planning and hazards
management responsibilities for areas under their jurisdiction, with policy guidance from
state coastal management programs. Local coastal plans in Washington, Oregon, and
California play an important role in hazard mitigation through land use controls, but the
strength and effectiveness of these strategies and the tools employed vary widely from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Further, none of these states has standardized building
setback construction rules (e.g., each jurisdiction uses its own methods and few are based
on good scientific information). All three states also permit seawalls and revetments in
some areas.
The potential for very large and destructive local earthquakes and tsunamis in the
Pacific Northwest is a relatively recent discovery that presents huge challenges for those
concerned about life, safety, lifelines, and infrastructure. Such events would require
funds beyond local resources yet still need local planning and response efforts.
Building codes are used as a mitigation mechanism to prevent structural failures
and zoning ordinances, to a lesser extent, are used to contain risk. Zoning ordinances
are utilized most frequently to control population density, land use, minimum building
and lot sizes. Zoning not only regulates the types of structures that can be built, but it
also controls safety considerations dealing with structural safety. (Heinz, 2000)

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State of Alaska - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use
Regulations
According to the State of Alaska website: The Division of Community and
Regional Affairs serves as the Governor's appointed state coordinating agency for the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the Flood Mitigation Assistance
Program (FMAP). The Mission of the Division's Floodplain Management Program is to
reduce public and private sector losses and damage from flooding and erosion by
providing coordination and technical assistance to National Flood Insurance Program
(NFIP) communities. All boroughs and cities that are flood prone or have a tsunami risk
are encouraged to join this program.
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is a program administered by the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) that allows property owners in
participating communities to purchase flood insurance as a protection against flood
losses. In exchange the state and local community must enact floodplain management
regulations that reduce the possibility of future flood damage. If a community adopts and
enforces a floodplain management ordinance to reduce future flood risk to new
construction in floodplains, the federal government will make flood insurance available
within the community as a financial protection against flood losses. This insurance is
designed to provide an insurance alternative to disaster assistance to reduce the
escalating costs of repairing damage to buildings and their contents caused by floods.
Alaska's vast coastal areas and inland water bodies make Alaskan communities
especially vulnerable to flooding and emphasize the need to protect homes and
businesses from the damaging effects of floods, flood-related erosion, and tsunamis. The
goals of the NFIP are to:
1. Protect people and property;
2. Make sure federal flood and disaster assistance is available;
3. Save tax dollars; avoid liability and law suits; and
4. Reduce future flood losses.
http://www.commerce.state.ak.us/dca/LOGON/plan/planning-flood.htm

The “2007 Alaska State All Hazard Mitigation Plan” states: building codes and
land use regulations are very limited in Alaska. However, the state encourages local
jurisdictions to develop and enforce these codes.
Land-use planning and zoning can help limit tsunami damage by minimizing,
reducing, or preventing inappropriate development types in tsunami risk areas.
Developing coastal construction criteria would reduce vulnerability. This can be done in
many ways including: encouraging building elevations, siting structures on the higher
part of the lots, and using lower floors of high rise structures as non occupied spaces.
Additionally, developing site planning regulations requiring streets and structures to be
perpendicular to potential wave impact has a side benefit of creating a path of least
resistance for the wave reducing debris impact. These measures are targeted to reduce
non-coastal dependent development. Water based facilities like ferry terminals and
shipping docks should be built to withstand tsunami wave forces.

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 The objective [of these codes] is to encourage using blocking structures such as
walls, berms, etc. to restrict, reduce, or redirect wave activity safely. While avoiding
tsunami risk areas is preferable, it is not always possible. Some areas have already been
developed and some facilities are dependent on being on the coastline. Using these
[blocking] structures could allow threatened facilities to survive. However, diversion
devices must be planned carefully and designed so as not to create other undesired
impacts such as sediment accumulation in harbors or adjacent coastline erosion.
http://www.ak-prepared.com/plans/mitigation/statehazmitplan07.htm

State of California - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use

Regulations
The State of California Seismic Safety Commission (CSSC) issued a document in
December 2005 entitled “The Tsunami Threat to California: Findings and
Recommendations on Tsunami Hazards and Risks”. The findings state, in part, that:
present building codes and guidelines do not adequately address the impacts of tsunamis
on structures. Currently available tsunami inundation maps are not appropriate for code
or guideline applications.
The document further states that U.S. Building Codes generally have not
addressed the subject of designing structures in tsunami zones. FEMA’s Coastal
Construction Manual (CCM)[(FEMA 55], developed to provide design and construction
guidance for structures built in coastal areas, addresses seismic loads for coastal
structures and provides information on tsunami and associated loads. However, the
authors of the Coastal Construction Manual concluded that tsunami loads are far too
great and that, in general, it is not feasible or practical to design “normal” structures to
withstand these loads. It was acknowledged that special design and construction details
would be possible for critical facilities. http://www.seismic.ca.gov/pub/CSSC%2005-
03%20Tsunami%20Findings.pdf

According to the “State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 2007”: the

planning team has identified the following issues related to the tsunami hazard for the
planning area:
1. Present building codes and guidelines do not adequately address the impacts of
tsunamis on structures; and
2. Current tsunami hazard mapping is not appropriate for code enforcement.
There has been no change since the 2005 findings of the CSSC.
http://hazardmitigation.oes.ca.gov/plan/state_multi-hazard_mitigation_plan_shmp

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State of Hawaii - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use
Regulations
The following information was recorded in an interview with Dr. Ian Robertson
(2008), Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Hawaii at
Manoa.
Honolulu City and County and Kauai County adopted the 2003 International
Building Code in June 2008. Hawaii and Maui counties are waiting for the State to adopt
the IBC 2006 Building Code (with amendments) as the Hawaii State Building Code.
The State Department of Accounting and General Services (DAGS) is expected to
adopt the IBC 2006 Building Code, along with a suite of other codes, as part of the
Hawaii State Building Code in 2009. This code will then apply to all new state buildings.
Each county is required by State law to adopt the State Building Code within 2 years,
with the allowance that they may add their own amendments, pursuant to “home rule”.
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) addresses tsunamis, under
“flood loads” in Section 1612.4 under “Riverine and Coastal” in ASCE 24-05. 2006.
Flood Resistant Design and Construction, ASCE 24-05. ISBN: 0784408181. 01-Jan-
2006. Included are design guidelines, building classifications and Base Flood Elevation
(BFE). The publication contains few equations; but, it does address building on piles and
residential construction with some design guidelines.
In the FEMA 55, Coastal Construction Manual (CCM), there are no references to
tsunami loads although it refers to “high velocity flow areas” and contains some design
information. http://www.atcouncil.org/pdfs/FEMAP646.pdf
Published in June 2008, “Guidelines for Design of Structures for Vertical
Evacuation from Tsunamis”, ATC 64 – FEMA P646, is the current “state of the art” for
tsunami building design. However, it is not intended for all buildings. The publication is
available at http://atcouncil.org/pdfs/FEMAP646.pdf and www.fema.org
This publication was funded equally by NOAA, which leads the National Tsunami
Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) and by FEMA, which is responsible for the
implementation portion of the National Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program
(NEHRP).
FEMA initiated the project in September 2004 with a contract to the Applied
Technology Council (ATC). The project was undertaken to address the need for guidance
on how to design a structure that would be capable of resisting the extreme forces of both
a major earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The following information is presented in
the publication:
General information on the tsunami hazard and its history; guidance on
determining the tsunami hazard, including the need for tsunami depth and velocity on a
site-specific basis; different options for vertical evacuation from tsunamis; determining
tsunami loads and structural design criteria necessary to address them; and, structural
design concepts and other considerations. The publication is the first of two documents
on this issue. The second document, currently under development, will present
information on how the use of this design guidance can be encouraged and adopted at
state and local levels.

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Maui County
Maui County Development Services Administration (DSA), a division of the
Department of Public Works, which administers Maui County's subdivision, building,
electrical, plumbing, grading, and other construction related ordinances provided the
following information:
The Planning Department is responsible for administering and enforcing the
county's flood [and tsunami] hazard ordinance found in Chapter 19.62 of the Maui
County Code. http://ordlink.com/codes/maui/_DATA/TITLE19/Chapter_19_62_
FLOOD_HAZARD_ARE.html

Hawaii County
The County of Hawaii adopted building code standards specifically for building
in coastal high hazard areas (i.e. tsunami inundation areas) in section 27-23 of Chapter 27
of Hawaii County Code. These standards were designed to reinforce new developments
in the tsunami inundation zone by requiring stronger materials, increased elevation
requirements, setback requirements, and engineering specifications that would help
mitigate the destructive forces of a tsunami event. http://www.hawaii-county.com/
countycode/chapter27.pdf

Hilo, Hawaii
Following the destructive 1960 Tsunami, the Hawaii Redevelopment Agency drafted an
Urban Renewal Plan for Coastal Hilo entitled “The Kaiko’o Project”. The general
purpose of the redevelopment plan was to designate lands within the project area for uses
that would minimize the danger and loss of life or damage to property in areas subject to
possible future tsunami events.
The plan called for the relocation of residents in the project zone to other areas of
the island, the acquisition of vacated lands and real estate, demolition of vacated
buildings and facilities. Additionally project lands were re-zoned to allow for subsequent
re-development based on a land use map devised in the plan. This map identified specific
areas based on topographic conditions as either “Elevated Lands” or “Open Lands”
with corresponding conditions to re-development and permitted land uses.
This is an example of government response to a catastrophic hazard and their
efforts to mitigate against the effects of future disasters in the same areas. More
information about “The Kaiko’o Project” can be requested through the County of Hawaii
Planning Department. http://www.hawaii-county.com/directory/dir_plan.htm

State of Oregon - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use

Regulations
Below are pertinent State of Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS):
ORS 455.446: Construction of certain facilities and structures in tsunami inundation
zone prohibited; establishment of zone; rules; exceptions.

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ORS 455.447: Regulation of certain structures vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis;
rules. http://landru.leg.state.or.us/ors/455.html
The website below discusses ORS 455.446 and 455.447, as well as the
publication, “Designing for Tsunamis”, which contains seven principles for planning and
designing for tsunami hazards. http://www.oregonvos.net/~rbayer/lincoln/ec-misc.htm

Washington State - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use

Regulations
The “Amendments to the Geological Hazard Areas Designations of the
Environmentally Critical Areas Regulations” (2007) states the following:
Tsunamis - Washington’s outer coast is vulnerable to tsunamis from distant sources
(such as earthquakes in Alaska, Japan, or Chile) and from the adjacent Cascadia
Subduction Zone (CSZ). Washington’s inland waters, such as those in the Puget Sound
region, are also subject to tsunamis, particularly those generated by local crustal
earthquakes or by surface and submarine landslides. http://clerk.ci.seattle.wa.us/
~public/fnote/115845.htm

Washington State - The Growth Management Act

“The Growth Management Act” was adopted because the Washington State
Legislature found that uncoordinated and unplanned growth posed a threat to the
environment, sustainable economic development, and the quality of life in Washington.
Known as the GMA, the Act (Chapter 36.70A RCW) was adopted by the Legislature in
1990. In 1991 the GMA was amended to create the Growth Management Hearings
Boards to hear and determine allegations of non-compliance with the GMA.
The GMA has been amended several times since, including 1996, when the
boards’ jurisdiction was expanded to include allegations of non-compliance with certain
provisions of the Shoreline Management Act (SMA, Chapter 90.58 RCW). In 1997, the
Legislature again modified some of the Act’s provisions, including the boards’ standard
of review. http://www.gmhb.wa.gov/gma/

Best Available Science

The GMA requires local jurisdictions to employ the “best available science” in
land-use decision-making; that is, critical areas regulations must be formulated in light
of documented research. In the absence of existing scientific data, counties must either
limit development or use adaptive management, regulating critical areas.
http://www.sanjuans.org/CriticalAreas.htm

State Hazard Mitigation Plans

State of Alaska:
2007 Alaska State All Hazard Mitigation Plan
http://www.ak-prepared.com/plans/mitigation/statehazmitplan07.htm

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State of California:
State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 2007
http://hazardmitigation.oes.ca.gov/plan/state_multi-hazard_mitigation_plan_shmp

State of Hawaii:
State of Hawaii Hazard Mitigation Plan 2007
http://www.mothernature-hawaii.com/hazmit_planning_toc2007.htm

State of Oregon:
State of Oregon Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan – Updated 2009
http://www.oregonshowcase.org/index.cfm?mode=stateplan

Washington State:
Washington State Hazard Mitigation Plan – Revised 2008
http://www.emd.wa.gov/plans/washington_state_hazard_mitigation_plan.shtml

International
Guidelines for Construction
The document cited below includes general provisions considering multi-hazard
perspective to be followed during construction of houses: “Guidelines for Reconstruction
of Houses Affected by Tsunami in Tamil Nadu, India; Revenue Administration, Disaster
Management & Mitigation Department, and Government of Tamil Nadu, 2005”.
http://www.un.org.in/untrs/reports/Tech_Guideline_Housing_by_Tamil_Nadu_28sept05
_final.pdf

Another excellent resource for guidelines on building and other tsunami related
topics is the United Nations Team for Tsunami Recovery Support (UNTRS) website. One
such report, sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme, is entitled
“Evolving Strategies for Long-Term Rehabilitation on Shelter & Habitat Development in
the Tsunami Affected Areas of Tamil Nadu, 2005”. http://www.un.org.in/CRZ/
shelter_rehabilitaion%20report_tsunami.pdf

The UNTRS is comprised of seven United Nations agencies: Food and

Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Labor
Organization (ILO), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and World
Health Organization (WHO).
To facilitate efforts in tsunami recovery and to support the government in its
efforts for rehabilitation, a joint office was set up in Chennai, Tamil Nadu. The
collaborative work has strengthened the capacity of the UN system in India to work
together. The implementation of the UN Recovery Framework provides further

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experience as to how this can proceed constructively and effectively, thereby contributing
to the process of the United Nations reform. The joint UN office helps facilitate
information sharing, ensure synergies in interventions in different sectors and also
encourages joint learning by an autonomous Tamil Nadu Resource Centre (TNTRC) in
Chennai. It was established in partnership with a range of renowned NGOs as well as the
Government of Tamil Nadu. The TNTRC is networked to five district resource centers
throughout Tamil Nadu as well. http://www.un.org.in/untrs/content_01.asp
?ref=aboutus#background

New Zealand - Local Ordinances, Building Codes and Land Use Regulations
The Community Resilience and Hazards Planning Department of Geological and
Nuclear Sciences (GNS) in New Zealand have produced guidelines for land-use planners
for active faults and landslides. The data relates to New Zealand, but some of the general
principles (e.g. in terms of applying risk information) are useful for planners in other
countries.
1. “Planning for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults”:
http://www.gns.cri.nz/services/hazardsplanning/downloads/planningforactivefault
s0704.pdf
2. “Guidelines for assessing planning policy and consent requirements for landslide
prone land”:
http://www.gns.cri.nz/services/hazardsplanning/downloads/landslideguidelines
.pdf

Lessons Learned – Building Construction and Tsunami Safety

The Asian Institute of Technology produced a report entitled, “Lessons Learned from the
26 December 2004 Tsunami Disaster in Thailand”, (see Appendix E). The report is
available in complete form at: http://www.cv.titech.ac.jp/~jsps/workshopG3/Proceedings
/PDF %20papers/02_Pennung .pdf

Siting of Critical Infrastructure (Long Range Plan)

A report prepared for University of Hawaii Sea Grant, entitled “Mitigating the Risk from
Coastal Hazards: Strategies & Concepts for Recovery from the December 26, 2004
Tsunami” presents strategies, concepts and options for the recovery and redevelopment
of areas damaged by the December 26, 2004 tsunami. Particular emphasis is placed on
the use of scientifically based hazard mitigation measures for siting and construction in
conjunction with flexible implementation strategies in the land use and construction
process. It is believed that the technically based standards will protect the public to a
greater degree from future flooding and wave events, while the flexible strategies will
ease and expedite implementation and overall recovery. From a technical standpoint,
methods for dividing the tsunami inundation zone into subzones are introduced. Within
the subzones, appropriate multi-hazard mitigation measures are presented. Recurrence

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interval considerations are discussed, as well as strategies to adjust the construction and
siting standards based on the interval. In chapters 3 to 5, concepts and strategies to
assist implementation of the technically based standards are presented to assist the short-
term and long-term recovery of tsunami stricken areas. (Hwang, 2005)
http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/SEAGRANT/communication/pdf/TsunamiRecovery
Report.pdf

Lessons for Minimizing Impacts to Coral Reef and Other Ecosystems from the 2004
Tsunami
In a paper presented for the American Fisheries Society Symposium entitled “Lessons for
Minimizing Impacts to Coral Reef and Other Ecosystems from the 2004 Tsunami”,
Meadows and Brosnan state that: The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami left a vast amount of
destruction in its wake on land and in the sea. About 60% of coral reefs in the affected
areas of Thailand were damaged, at least in the shallowest 10–20-m (33–66 ft) depth
zones. Many damaged reef, beach, and mangrove areas in Thailand and Sri Lanka were
high value tourist attractions or provided other important ecosystem goods and services.
We were part of a fortuitous partnership of people with experience in reef restoration,
coral reef science, marine debris removal, construction, professional scuba diving,
business, marketing, and environmental nongovernmental organizations. We helped
organize and fund multiple restoration and cleanup projects that restored damaged and
detached sea fans in Similan Islands Marine National Park, restored hard corals,
removed more than 453.59 metric tons of marine debris, and provided sustainable
management advice to local stakeholders and decision makers.
We later became involved in advising emergency management agencies on
disaster preparedness and response. We use our reef-dominated experiences as a case
study to suggest broader lessons learned for natural scientists to be involved in and for
emergency managers to consider for mitigating and planning for future natural
disaster impacts on fishery ecosystems. We also provide some coral-reef specific lessons
regarding reattachment of large sea fans, triaging and organizing large-scale volunteer
marine debris recovery, and other coral ecosystem restoration efforts. We argue that
“natural” disasters can cause significant damage to reefs and other ecosystems and
that much damage results from human sources that are not natural and can be mitigated
or prevented (such as siting and land-use decisions that lead to debris affecting reefs).
Thus, we disagree with those who say natural events like hurricanes or tsunamis “are not
appropriate for reef restoration” (Precht 2006; Symons et al. 2006).
Further, governments need to recognize the economic and inherent values of
ecosystem goods and services in natural disaster response legislation and policies (e.g.,
The Stafford Act in the United States) to improve outcomes for society. We also argue
that ecosystem advocates need to adopt the language of emergency management.
(Meadows, 2008)

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 Chapter 4

Evacuation Planning

Definitions:
The University of Kaiserslautern in Germany, which had project that focused on building
evacuation, defines evacuation planning as:

Evacuation Planning: In evacuation planning the aim is to minimize the time needed to
evacuate a building or [area and] to maximize the number of people which can be
evacuated in a given time horizon. Evacuation as an aspect of emergency planning can
be explained as the act of leaving a danger zone as quickly as possible in an orderly
fashion. http://www.24hor.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 25&
Itemid=47

According to the definition in the “Tsunami Glossary, 2008”, located on the UNESCO
website:

Evacuation Map: A drawing or representation that outlines danger zones and designates
limits beyond which people must be evacuated to avoid harm from tsunami waves.
Evacuation routes are sometimes designated to ensure the efficient movement of people
out of the evacuation zone to evacuation shelters. http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/files/
tsunami_glossary_small.pdf

State of Alaska - Evacuation Planning

The State of Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency Management
webpage displays tsunami evacuation planning information. This webpage displays
various documents which are useful for emergency managers charged with planning and
implementing evacuations. http://www.ak-prepared.com/community_ services/
evacuation_plans.htm

Relevant documents are highlighted below:

Field Guide
The detailed “Field Guide to Evacuation Planning and Implementation” is a tool
for emergency managers charged with assessing what segments of the public, if any, are
at risk during the emergency and how best to protect them. This encourages objective
evaluation and is intended to help reduce erroneous perceptions of risk.
With today’s instant communications, a disaster is usually common knowledge
throughout a wide area within minutes. Citizens living or working in or near the affected
area want accurate information on the disaster. Emergency telephone lines may become
overloaded and responders may become distracted with questions.

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 By completing each element of the Plan, managers can make objective decisions,
such as whether to take direct action, restrict movement, shelter in place; or call for a
limited or full evacuation. http://www.ak-prepared.com/community_ services/acrobat_
docs/EVACUATION_PLAN.pdf

Evacuation Forms
This document features a series of forms that are helpful in creating and
executing evacuation planning. The forms include Emergency Evacuation Plan, Incident
Evacuation Plan, Pre-Evacuation Contact Datasheet, Evacuation Order Report, and
other pertinent documents for evacuation planning. http://www.ak-prepared.com/
community_services/acrobat_docs/Evacuation_Forms.pdf

State of California - Evacuation Planning

The “State of California Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan 2007” states: regions that
are below the projected run-up height are delineated, and evacuation plans are
essentially the only mitigation methods currently available. These have been implemented
along the Cascadia subduction zone throughout Washington and Oregon, but most
regions of coastal California have yet to adopt these preparations.
http://hazardmitigation.oes.ca.gov/plan/state_multi-hazard_mitigation_plan_shmp

According to California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, “Local Planning

Guidance on Tsunami Response: A Supplement to the Emergency Planning Guidance for
Local Governments”:
Local governments are responsible for developing evacuation plans for possible
implementation in response to a near or distant-source event. A distant-source tsunami
event may allow several hours to evacuate. A near-source tsunami may require
immediate self evacuation through areas damaged by the earthquake and at some risk of
aftershocks. Each jurisdiction should analyze how much time an evacuation would
require and build that into the decision-making procedure. While developing its plan,
each jurisdiction should decide how best to handle the occurrence of both earthquakes
and tsunamis. Evacuation plans should also take into account the special needs of
evacuees, including the medically fragile, mobility impaired, deaf, blind, and those who
speak no English or English as a second language. http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/education/
science/docs/california_tsunami_guidance.pdf

Marin County, California - Tsunami Evacuation Planning Map

The “Marin County Tsunami Evacuation Planning Map” is a one-page brochure
shows the Tsunami Evacuation Areas of Marin County, California.
http://www.marinsheriff.org/uploads/documents/Tsunami%20-%20County
%20Coastal%20all%20mappdf.pdf

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Ventura County, California - Operational Area Tsunami Evacuation Plan
The “Ventura County Operational Area Tsunami Evacuation Plan” was prepared
by Ventura County Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services with the assistance and input
of the cities of Ventura, Oxnard and Port Hueneme, as well as many other agencies and
jurisdictions in August of 2006.
The Ventura County Tsunami Evacuation Plan includes the following sections:
Background and Historical Information, Jurisdictions and Facilities Potentially Affected,
Warning and Communications Systems, Concept of Operations, Mass Transit Support for
Evacuations, Shelter and Assembly Areas, Evacuation Routes, and Evacuation
Maps/Handouts. http://www.vcsd.org/oes/tsunplandraft.pdf

State of Hawaii - Evacuation Planning

Evacuation Zone Maps

►NOAA Pacific Services Center, the Pacific Tsunami Museum and Hawaii State Civil
Defense show the Tsunami Evacuation Zone Mapping Tool prominently located on
their websites. This tool can be used by entering either an address or a location on any of
the major Hawaiian Islands to discover whether that location is in a tsunami evacuation
zone. This application, developed by NOAA Pacific Services Center, is available to any
interested party for hosting on their website. http://www.csc.noaa.gov/psc/project _pages/
tsunami.html, http://www.tsunami.org/ and http://www.scd.state.hi.us/

Evacuation zone maps for each of Hawaii’s four counties are available in the local
telephone books.
Hawaii County maps are available at http://www.co.hawaii.hi.us/cd/tsunami/maps.htm,
Maui County maps are available at http://www.co.maui.hi.us/index.asp?nid=261,
Department of Emergency Management for the City and County of Honolulu maps are
available at http://www.honolulu.gov/ocda/maps.htm, and Kauai County maps are
available at http://www.kauai.gov/Government/Departments/CivilDefenseAgency/
tabid/90/Default .aspx

Hawaii County - Evacuation Signs

During the summer of 2008, Hawaii County Civil Defense installed colorful signs at
numerous locations alerting the public when they are entering or leaving evacuation
zones. These also serve as a valuable educational tool for raising awareness of the
tsunami hazard. For more information contact Hawaii County Civil Defense at
808-935-0926.

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Evacuation Zones
According to the author of “Tsunami Mitigation in Hawaii” (Curtis, 2008),
tsunami evacuation zones were developed using the historical run-up and wave action
records gathered by tsunami researchers at the University of Hawai`i. [The researchers]
developed the initial, broad brush tsunami inundation maps for the Hawaiian Islands.
These maps were published by Civil Defense and used for evacuation after they were
placed in the phone books of each island. Updated, more detailed [evacuation] maps,
with smaller, more usable zones were [later] developed using all historical run-up and
inundation records. http://tsunamisociety.org/274Curtis.pdf

State of Oregon - Evacuation Planning

Tsunami Evacuation Maps for Selected Oregon Coastal Communities

Oregon Department of Geology and Mineral Industries (DOGAMI)
Evacuation zones on the maps were developed by DOGAMI in consultation with local
officials. It is intended to represent a worst-case scenario for a tsunami caused by an
undersea earthquake near the Oregon coast. Evacuation routes were developed by local
officials and reviewed by the Oregon Department of Emergency Management.
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsubrochures.htm

►Cannon Beach 2008 Brochure

According to the Oregon State Earthquake, Tsunami and Volcano Program Coordinator:
The Cannon Beach mapping project is a collaborative efforts between DOGAMI,
scientists, and local stakeholders. Using the latest mapping technology Light Detection
and Ranging (LIDAR), computer technology and computer modeling, DOGAMI is
producing new tsunami hazard maps that are much more accurate and useful. Previous
maps varied by locality in both visual presentation of the information and the actual
location of the inundation line, with sometimes very subjective results. This pilot project
enables the creation of highly accurate maps.
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/tsubrochures/CannonEvac.pdf

Evacuation Routes and Procedures

Tsunami routes and procedures for selected Oregon coastal communities as well
as evacuation information are available on the DOGAMI website.

For Both Distant and Local Tsunamis:

1. Evacuate on foot if at all possible because of potential traffic jams.
2. Stay away from potentially hazardous areas until you receive an ALL CLEAR
from local officials. Dangerous waves can persist for several hours, and
local officials must inspect all flooded or earthquake-damaged structures
before anyone can go back into them.

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 3. If you need help evacuating, tie something WHITE (sheet or towel) to the front
door knob. Make it large enough to be visible from the street. If the
emergency is a distant tsunami, then help may arrive. In the event of a
local earthquake and tsunami, it is unlikely that anyone will help you, so
make a plan and be prepared!
4. After evacuation, check with the local area commander if you can help with
special skills or need assistance with locating lost family.
Be prepared! Assemble emergency kits with a three-day [preferably a seven-
day] supply for each member of your family.
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsubrochures.htm

Evacuation Signs
In a paper entitled “Tsunami Sign Placement Guidelines” published by DOGAMI,
the author reports: the most visible way to educate the public is to post signs.
There are several tsunami signs available: tsunami hazard zone, tsunami
evacuation route, tsunami evacuation site, and entering/leaving tsunami hazard zone. All
these signs were created in Oregon. The tsunami hazard zone and evacuation route signs
have been adopted for use by the Pacific states of the National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program steering group (Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and
Washington). Other Pacific Rim countries have also either adopted or adapted the signs
for their use.
►This paper includes sections on tsunami sign placement guidelines, tsunami hazard
zones, tsunami evacuation routes, tsunami evacuation sites, entering and leaving
tsunami hazard zones and examples of proper placement of hazard zone sign and
evacuation route signs.
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/OFR0306Signs.pdf

Cannon Beach Tsunami Hazard Research Project

A draft of the “Cannon Beach Tsunami Hazard Research Project” is available on
the internet. The Cannon Beach tsunami hazard assessment began in 2005 with support
from the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) of NOAA. The project
is managed by DOGAMI. A final report summarizing findings is in preparation and will
be released as a DOGAMI Special Paper.
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/FIELDOFFICES/George/CannonBeach.htm

Washington State - Evacuation Planning

Washington State Emergency Management Division has produced tsunami
evacuation maps for various areas on the Washington State coastline. Individual maps are
all listed under the heading “Tsunami Evacuation Brochures and Maps”.
http://emd.wa.gov/hazards/haz_tsunami.shtml

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International

►End-to-End Evacuation Drill - Thailand

The USAID report, “Thailand Post-Tsunami Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Program”
states:
A successful evacuation drill was conducted on February 24, 2007,
simultaneously evacuating over 900 people in three villages (Villages 1, 2 and 7) to safe
areas in less than 20 minutes. During the drills, Thai disaster management officials
activated national and local warning signals to test the system’s ability to alert
communities of impending natural disaster. Emergency medical and rescue personnel,
local police and firemen participated in the drills. Many drills are conducted throughout
Thailand and this drill was unique in that we had an evaluation method in place
(questionnaire and video recording of the event); we had detailed village level
evacuation map for the community members to follow; there were seven community
committees on alert to assist with their respective duties, and; local and district
government as well as communities planned and prepared for the evacuation together.
After the drills, a discussion was held with each village volunteer group, DDPM,
and representatives of police and military to provide feedback. The Governor moderated
each of these sessions which were animated, open, and inclusive. Lessons learned and
recommended disaster management plan modifications were discussed. Dr. Walt Dudley,
University of Hawaii-Hilo, also led a debriefing discussion with district officials and
community volunteers to assess the effectiveness of the evacuation, village preparedness,
and next steps. Thai disaster management agencies plan to share lessons learned from
the drills across six tsunami-affected southern provinces. The workshops and drills are
part of the project’s efforts to enhance coastal community resilience by building
community preparedness, capacity and governmental coordination.
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM215.pdf

►Komunitas Siaga Tsunami (KOGAMI)

According to one of the founders of KOGAMI, Patra Rina Dewi (personal
communication, 2009): The December 26, 2004 tsunami caused deep pain not only for
Indonesia but for the whole world. The tsunami caused many victims and over 250
thousand people lost their lives. In Aceh the survivors struggled against deep trauma
from the big-deadly-wave which killed their families and destroyed their property.
While the people in Aceh were still struggling to have normal lives, they had to
face the March 26 Nias earthquake and 10 April Mentawai earthquake. Those tragedies
proved that lack of knowledge, lack of coordination among the agencies, and no disaster
preparedness was causing a lot of losses. There was also an effect on the post-disaster
reconstruction. It was time to change the paradigm of disaster management.
West Sumatra, especially Padang City which is located between two continental
plates; Indo Australia, and Eurasia had experienced tsunamis in 1797 and 1833 and had
to prepare whole elements including government and communities to anticipate disasters.
Getting prepared before a disaster creates a much better response after disaster.

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 At the beginning, the first personnel of KOGAMI were volunteers of Surfzone
Relief Operations (SRO), a non-profit organization from San Francisco. SRO ran a
mission to distribute aid to the victims of December 26 tsunami in Simeulue island.
Gradually, the number of volunteers became larger and larger because of personal
communication from friend to friend.
Vision of KOGAMI:
KOGAMI as world ambassador in developing disaster preparedness culture.
Mission of KOGAMI:
Build organization capacity in disaster management.
Develop integrated system in disaster management based on professionalism.
Endeavour network to optimize work performance.
Role of KOGAMI:
Facilitator for the community.
Catalyst for the government.
Mediator between government and community.
KOGAMI successfully run the first National Evacuation Drill on December 26, 2005
in Indonesia.

The following information is from “School Education Program”, a presentation

given at a UN/IOTWS Transition Workshop in Bangkok, Thailand in December 2007:
Project Achievements
The School Education Program was implemented successfully for 30 Elementary
Schools, 21 Junior High Schools, and 10 Senior High Schools. Each school developed its
own evacuation plan and hazard map in a participatory manner and KOGAMI had them
professionally formatted and blown up as a lasting tool. About 17,700 students and 900
school staffs – 18,675 people all told! – were trained in disaster preparedness and proper
evacuation.

Lessons Learned
Cooperation and endorsement from the local government was extremely important.
- A standard system of disaster preparedness, developed with the local conditions and the
participation of local stakeholders is critical to ensure that all children are safe
and local responders – the fire brigade, search and rescue, etc – know how all
schools will react in a disaster.
- A national education curriculum for disaster preparedness is necessary for
sustainability.
- Our strong, capable group of committed local volunteers was the backbone of this
project without whom we could not have reached so many schools.
- Providing large, colorful maps and a bound printed module as “leave behinds” was
truly valued by the schools although a more permanent structure or display box to
house the map would be appreciated.
www.iotws.org, http://kogami.multiply.com/ and http://kogami.or.id/ (under
construction)

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 Chapter 5

Preparation

Definitions:
Broad Definition
Church World Service (CWS), a global humanitarian organization founded in 1946,
relates the following definitions on their Emergency Response Program website:

Preparation: Measures that ensure the readiness and ability of a society to (a) forecast
and take precautionary measures in advance of an imminent threat (in cases where
advance warnings are possible), and (b) respond to and cope with the effects of a disaster
by organizing and delivering timely and effective rescue, relief and other appropriate
post-disaster assistance. Preparedness involves the development and regular testing of
warning systems (linked to forecasting systems) and plans for evacuation or other
measures to be taken during a disaster alert period to minimize potential loss of life and
physical damage; the education and training of officials and the population at risk; the
establishment of policies, standards, organizational arrangements and operational plans
to be applied following a disaster impact; the securing of resources (possibly including
the stockpiling of supplies and the earmarking of funds); and the training of intervention
teams. It must be supported by enabling legislation. [We would add to this definition Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and appropriate medical responses customized to the
appropriate hazards.] http://www.cwserp.org

Specific Definition
The International Tsunami Information Center (ITIC) “Tsunami Glossary, 2008”,
provides the following definition:

Tsunami Preparedness
Readiness of plans, methods, procedures and actions taken by government officials and
the general public for the purpose of minimizing potential risk and mitigating the effects
of future tsunamis. The appropriate preparedness for a warning of impending danger
from a tsunami requires knowledge of areas that could be flooded (tsunami inundation
maps) and knowledge of the warning system to know when to evacuate and when it is safe
to return. http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/files/tsunami_glossary_small.pdf

Professional Advisory Groups

Disaster preparedness networks are made up of the relations among organizations

considered to be strategic for disaster planning and response. (Gillespie, 1993)

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State of Hawaii - Professional Advisory Groups
According to the “State of Hawaii Hazard Mitigation Plan 2007”, the “State of
Hawaii Tsunami Technical Review Committee (TTRC) Strategic Plan” established in
2006 states:
The four primary issues of concern are:
• To quickly confirm potentially destructive tsunamis and reduce unnecessary
evacuations.
• Address local tsunami mitigation needs.
• Improve coordination and exchange of information to better utilize existing
resources.
• Sustain support from state and local levels for long-term hazard mitigation.

The TTRC is made up of four working groups; the Public Affairs Working Group,
the Scientific Advisory Working Group, the Warning Systems Working Group and the
Zoning Codes and Guidelines Working Group. The groups are governed by five goals set
out by the NTHMP:
Goal 1: Understand the risk.
Goal 2: Create tools to mitigate the risk.
Goal 3: Disseminate risk information.
Goal 4: Exchange information with others.
Goal 5: Institutionalize tsunami planning.

Members of the TTRC working groups were assembled from public and private
sectors of the community and included scientists, first responders, government officials,
business people and academics. http://www.scd.state.hi.us/HazMitPlan /chapter_6 _
appC.pdf

State of Oregon - Professional Advisory Groups

►Lincoln County School District (LCSD) Earthquake and Tsunami Safety

Program

Lincoln County received an Award in Excellence from WSSPC in 2007 for their
Earthquake and Tsunami Preparedness Program for outreach to business, government,
schools and the general public. Information from the WSSPC website states:
Lincoln County is located along the Central Oregon coast with the majority of its
population based near the shoreline and around estuaries. These communities are
vulnerable to many naturally occurring hazards. Floods, beach erosion, landslides, high
winds and winter storms occur annually with ongoing losses to public and private
property. But this area is also vulnerable to a less frequent but potentially catastrophic
Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake and tsunami that will someday recur just 50 miles
off the Oregon Coast. This anticipated Magnitude 9 earthquake will cause severe ground
shaking that will last for 4-5 minutes with estimated tsunami inundation to approximately
40 feet above existing tidal conditions. Since much of the developed areas along the coast
will be significantly impacted by these hazards, the Lincoln County School District
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(LCSD) has undertaken a comprehensive approach to earthquake and tsunami
preparedness, starting with students and extending their involvement with emergency
officials and the general public. http://www.wsspc.org/Awards/2007/Lincoln%20Co.pdf

Below is a list of activities undertaken to promote earthquake & tsunami

preparedness in Lincoln County, both in the community and in school:

Tsunami Safety Poster/Flyers were made in August 2005 for all Coastal cities in Lincoln
County: Yachats, Waldport/Seal Rock, Newport, Depoe Bay, Gleneden Beach, and
Lincoln City. English & Spanish versions have been distributed on multiple occasions
and through many different venues.

A Tsunami & Earthquake Safety DVD was made August 2005 by students in Newport &
Waldport Middle Schools. It includes information on how to make an emergency kit,
earthquake procedures, difference between distant & local tsunamis, NOAA Weather
Alert Radio, signage, etc. This DVD has been used in schools, at community meetings, in
fairs, at civic clubs, etc. Over 500 copies have been distributed at no charge.

Waldport City-Wide Tsunami Drill – October 2005. 18 agencies and two schools
participated in this exercise.

Lincoln City Tsunami Preparedness Fair – April 29, 2006. Over 29 agencies/businesses
participated in this fair held at the Tanger Outlet Center. Each agency contributed
financially to make this happen. Tanger Outlets donated the space; Mo’s Restaurants
donated Clam Chowder, Sprint paid for the booths, several local businesses paid for 15
emergency kits to raffle, etc. Over 450 members of the public came to the fair.

City-wide Tsunami Drill (Taft & Cutler City areas of Lincoln City) - May 2006. Over 59
agencies/businesses participated. 276+ citizens checked in at pre-designated high-
ground locations. Taft Elementary School evacuated to high ground. Taft High School
was activated by the American Red Cross as a Community Emergency Shelter.

NOAA Weather Alert Radios were purchased and programmed for all schools, both
public & private, and given to all teachers throughout Lincoln County.

Family Emergency Preparedness Training- Training was held at Newport, Waldport,

Toledo, Lincoln City Schools; Gleneden Beach Community Center; Home School; Red
Cross Family Safety Days; Newport Home Show; and demonstrations at all schools
during registration.

Upgraded Schools Designated as Community Emergency Shelters – The following

upgrades were made - Evacuation site signage; Emergency water storage; Generators
and blankets; Emergency food and portable toilets; Comprehensive first aid trauma kits;
Search and rescue kits and Shelter operations and management workshops.

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Toledo Mass Casualty Earthquake Training Exercise - February 2007.
Waldport High School/City of Waldport – Planning is ongoing for earthquake and
tsunami preparedness, mitigation, response and recovery.

Tsunami Watch/Warning Procedures were developed and added to the (LCSD)

Emergency Plan and the Mid Columbia Bus Company’s Plan.

Parent Wallet Cards (May 2006). These cards show where to get information in an
emergency and give parents a place to write their own emergency evacuation areas and
out-of-state and in-state emergency contacts.
http://www.wsspc.org/Awards/2007/Lincoln%20Co.pdf

NOAA Pacific Services Center (PSC), Pacific Risk Management Ohana

(PRiMO)

According to the NOAA Pacific Services website: PRiMO, the `ohana (family) of
risk management partners and stakeholders in the Pacific, strives to improve the
development and delivery of risk management-related information products and services
in the Pacific.
PRiMO is based on a mutual recognition of the benefits of collective action, and
acknowledges the need for local, national, and regional participation to achieve effective
hazard mitigation and dissemination of information. The PRiMO Navigators Council and
hui o hana (working groups) members include representatives from agencies, institutions,
and private and non-profit organizations.
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/psc/FHMPPI/

International Projects

In a paper entitled, “Tsunami planning and preparation in Western Australia:

Application of Scientific Modeling and Community Engagement” (The Australian
Journal of Emergency Management, November 2008), the authors revealed the approach
and outcomes for their tsunami preparation and response plan:

Tsunami Preparation and Response - Western Australia

In the preparation of the project plan, Fire and Emergency Services Authority
(FESA) community engagement included consultation with local government, remote
indigenous communities, Emergency Management Committees, industry, tourist bodies
and other community groups.
The approach used in this project was based principally on the input and
guidance of local communities; FESA’s experienced emergency service personnel, and
through the scientific research gained from collaborative agreements with GA and the
Bureau of Meteorology.

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The project outcomes are:
- The communities, industry, volunteer and career response groups, media, and local
government will know the threat, risks and action to take for tsunami in at risk
areas;
- Emergency Managers are aware of the science, risks and threats of tsunami;
- Emergency Managers will positively reflect their partnership responsibilities with the
community, industry, volunteer response groups, media, and local government for
the emergency management of a tsunami event;
- Effective local, district and state emergency management arrangements are established
and emergency management committees, the community, industry, volunteer and
career response groups, media, and local government have embraced the
preparedness requirements for tsunami; and
- Where there is a risk of tsunami inundation, local governments review land use
planning. Regional milestones were established to achieve staff and community
awareness, development of local and regional emergency plans and an exercise
and review phase was included to evaluate the response plans.
http://www.ema.gov.au/agd/EMA/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE
097801FF)~AJEM_Nov08_Hall_Stevens_Sexton.PDF/$file/AJEM_Nov08_Hall_Stevens
_Sexton.PDF

Tsunami Formal Education Activities

State of Hawaii - School Curricula

In 2007, the Pacific Tsunami Museum (PTM) was awarded a contract through
Hawaii State Civil Defense, funded by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program
(NTHMP), to develop a tsunami curriculum for Hawaii schools. “The Tsunami Safe
Curriculum” is under development and should be available for download sometime in
2009. (Personal communication from Genevieve Cain)

Washington State - School Curricula

The following is a link to a book used as a teaching tool about tsunamis for
younger children in grades kindergarten to grade six:
http://emd.wa.gov/publications/pubed/how_the_smarts _survived_tsunami_book.pdf

Washington State Pilot Project

NTHMP approved a Pilot Project to develop, test and refine a critical component
essential to the NTHMP Educational Project. The “Washington State Pilot Project” is a
curriculum for Community-specific Tsunami Public Education Workshops. The
Shoalwater Bay Tribe in Pacific County, WA, hosted a Community-specific Tsunami
Public Education Workshop, with participants that included officials and residents of
both the Tribe and the neighboring communities of Tokeland and North Cove, WA.
A report to the NTHMP on the Education Project can be accessed at:
http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/Minutes/november08/NTHMP_Education_Project_Plan.pdf

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Tsunami Teacher
The International Tsunami Information Centre (ITIC) website states: As a
contribution to the building of training to support the communication of tsunami risk to
the public, the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has developed the Tsunami
Teacher Information and Resource Toolkit. The Toolkit brings together a wealth of new
and existing information on tsunamis into a single, reliable, and verified global resource
that is widely accessible to people, groups and governments around the world. Tsunami
Teacher aims to build awareness and capacity to respond and mitigate the impact of
tsunamis through the sharing of knowledge, research, and best practices. Materials are
available that can be adapted to develop locally relevant responses. A feature of the
Toolkit is the ability to customize training modules for different audiences.
Training Modules target the Media, Educational Systems, and the Public and
Private Sectors, including governments, non-government organizations, businesses, and
community groups. Within the government sector, a large amount of training material
has been assembled on earthquake and tsunami science and research, tsunami events,
and the building of tsunami warning and mitigation systems. These topics include hazard
and risk assessment, operational warning and dissemination systems, tsunami emergency
response, alerting, and preparedness, environmental, engineering mitigation and policy,
and education and outreach. Resource materials are provided as examples and guidance
for decision-makers.
Tsunami Teacher is supported both as a dynamic, electronic, on-line resource
that will be continually reviewed, updated, and added to by experts, and as an off-line set
of DVDs which will run on PC and Macintosh platforms. The base language is English,
with translations presently planned into Bahasa Indonesia, Bangladesh Bangla, French,
Spanish, and Thai. http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/files/TT_doc.pdf

Certificate Program in Tsunami Science and Preparedness

According to the Prevention Web website, the University of Washington and
NOAA, offer a tsunami science and preparedness certificate program: The program
consists of three introductory level courses. Participants must successfully complete all
three in order to earn the certificate.
First course
Tsunami Hazard Assessment
Participants explore and apply the tools, techniques and associated technologies
required to assess tsunami hazards on a regional and local scale.
Participants will be able to:
- Describe the scientific principles that underlie hazard assessment tools and products,
their effective use and limitations.
- Identify specific tools, techniques, and products along with their relevant application in
various geographic areas.
- Refine hazard assessment capabilities through paleo-tsunami and post-tsunami field
surveys and their subsequent documentation.
Second course
Tsunami Warning Systems
Participants examine the components of a tsunami warning system, including the
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detection, forecasting, and monitoring of tsunamis as well as the warning
communications that occur during a tsunami event. Participants will be prepared to
explain the activities that take place in a tsunami warning system before, during, and
after a tsunami event, and will be able to:
- Describe the general operation of a tsunami warning center.
- Recognize the technology required for detecting and monitoring a tsunami.
- Interpret tsunami warning communications and assess the effectiveness of tsunami
warning responses.
- Explain to the public the meaning and elements of an effective tsunami warning.
- Access historical records and GIS databases to obtain relevant regional data.
Third course
Tsunami Resilient Communities
Participants review and discuss the fundamental concepts of emergency management and
the critical path required to create tsunami resilient communities. Participants will be
able to:
- Apply basic concepts and components of community tsunami resilience.
- Interpret and evaluate community-planning documents, such as hazard maps,
evacuation plans, and critical infrastructure.
- Comprehend multiple strategies and select or create optimal plans for tsunami
mitigation, response, and recovery. http://www.preventionweb.net/ english/ professional/
trainings-events/events/v.php?id=1282

Public Education

State of Alaska - Public Education

The following is a link to children’s disaster books (includes tsunami, earthquake,
volcano and wildfire): http://www.borough.kenai.ak.us/emergency/books/watkins.htm

The following is a link to Kenai Peninsula Borough Emergency Management

regarding Earthquake and Tsunami information:
http://www.borough.kenai.ak.us/emergency/prepared / earthquake.htm

State of Hawaii - Public Education

The Pacific Tsunami Museum (PTM) in downtown Hilo serves as the focal point
for tsunami education in the State of Hawaii. The museum is a memorial to all those that
have lost their lives to tsunamis and takes a pro-active role in tsunami awareness through
education of visitors and the community. The PTM contains numerous exhibits depicting
major tsunami events. PTM collected and archived tsunami survivor stories from Hawaii
and around the world. Information about tsunami education conducted at the PTM can be
found at http://www.tsunami.org/events.html#past

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State of Oregon - Public Education
“Oregon Geology Fact Sheet: Tsunami Hazards in Oregon” details how to prepare for a
tsunami. http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/publications/tsunami-factsheet_ onscreen
.pdf

Washington State - Public Education

For information on tsunami preparation and evacuation refer to “Tips and
Information about Tsunami”: http://emd.wa.gov/hazards/haz_tsunami.shtml.

The following is a link to the tsunami fact sheet for the public provided by
Washington State Emergency Management Division: http://emd.wa.gov/hazards/
documents/ERG-35Tsunamis.pdf

The following is a link to the tsunami trivia for younger children from
kindergarten to grade six: http://emd.wa.gov/hazards/documents/PE_Tsunami_Trivia.pdf

The following is a link to a booklet describing how to prepare for disaster for
children grades kindergarten to six: http://emd.wa.gov/publications/pubed/how _the_
smarts_survived_tsunami_book.pdf

Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, created a

poster entitled, “Tsunami Lessons Learned in 2005”. This poster can be found at:
http://www.co.snohomish.wa.us/documents/Agencies/Emergency_Management/Informat
ion/Tsunami_Poster.pdf

Puerto Rico - Public Education

Puerto Rico Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Program website features a gallery
that contains several animations and a tsunami documentary produced in Puerto Rico.
The documentary video includes the history, hazards, and protective measures
concerning tsunamis. The video has been distributed at many schools, and governmental
and private agencies. The video is available in English and Spanish.
http://redsismica.uprm.edu/english/

Museums and Education Centers

Pacific Tsunami Museum - Hilo, Hawaii
The Pacific Tsunami Museum (PTM) in Hilo, Hawaii was founded in 1993 to
document the history of tsunamis in the Pacific, to commemorate the lives lost in past
tsunamis and to act as a repository for the stories of the survivors. The museum soon
became an education center for residents and visitors. Since the 2004 Indian Ocean event,
the PTM, with its extensive archives, has also become a hub for tsunami researchers.

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International Tsunami Museums

As a lasting reminder of the terrible toll wrought by the 2004 Indian Ocean
Tsunami, numerous memorials and several tsunami museums have been created. The
PTM has served as a model and assisted in the creation of community tsunami museums
in Kamphuan Thailand and Alappad, Kerala, India.

Kamphuan Memorial Tsunami Museum, Ranong Province, Thailand

A tsunami museum was created to provide support in the area of tsunami
preparation, education, and mitigation for the tsunami impacted communities in Ranong
Province, Thailand. The scope of the work was to provide warning, evacuation and
mitigation guidance, to develop model “risk awareness” educational and training
products, and assist in helping institutionalize all-hazard disaster planning and
management. Work was conducted in close cooperation and consultation with the local
project team, local government, and communities.
Photographs, charts, and interactive computer displays explain how tsunamis are
created and how people can prepare for future tsunami alerts. “This small museum
serves as a living memorial. There can be no greater tribute to those lives lost than to
save lives in the future,” said Dr. Dudley, who has repeatedly visited the five Suksamran
District communities since the tsunami claimed 105 residents’ lives.
http://www.usaid.gov/rdma/articles/press_release_233.html

Kerala Tsunami Museum, Alappad, Kerala, India

On December 11, 2007, the Kerala Tsunami Museum in India was opened to the
public. The museum, the first of its kind in India, is located in the village of Alappad,
State of Kerala. The aim of the museum is to educate people about the risk of tsunamis
and to commemorate the lives of those who died in the December 26, 2004 tsunami.
Exhibits explain how to respond to warnings and how to recognize nature’s warning
signs. Additionally, videotaped tsunami survivor interviews in both English and
Malayalam, a language spoken in southern India, are featured on touch screen kiosks.

Personal and Family Evacuation Kits

When putting together your family evacuation kit, do not forget to include your
legal papers, identification, bank account numbers, insurance policies, deeds and family
photographs. If you have valuable financial information, family photos in digital form, or
other important documents on your computer, you should back these up onto CDs,
DVDs, or a portable hard drive to keep in your evacuation kit.

There are many types of evacuation kits available:

American Red Cross Disaster Supplies Kit:
http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/0,1082,0_3_,00.html

Instructions on how to put together your own emergency kit:

http://www.ready.gov/america/getakit/

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 Earthquake and Disaster Preparedness Kits from “Equipped to Survive”:
http://www.equipped.com/earthqk.htm

FEMA’s “Are You Ready?” Website features disaster kits and instructions:
http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/

Evacuation Kit – modified and updated from FEMA

Basic Disaster Supply Kit

- Water - 1 gal./person/day
- Food - 5 day supply of non-perishable, high-energy food items
- First Aid supplies - bandages, antiseptics, non-prescription drugs
- Clothing, bedding and sanitation supplies - complete change of clothes, soap, toilet
paper, etc.
- Medication - Prescription drugs, insulin, blood pressure medication, etc.
- Tools - flashlight, battery radio, batteries, can opener, needle & thread, whistle
- Important Family Documents - photo IDs, insurance policies, wills, etc. - all in a plastic
bag
- Special Needs - baby supplies, hearing aids, eye glasses, dentures, etc.

For more information go to: http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/supplykit.shtm

Hawaii County All Hazard Information Card

A small, convenient, easily-foldable, pocket preparation guide for natural hazards
has been prepared for Hawaii County. This pocket card was originally aimed at both
residents and visitors and has been expanded to include school children and new students
entering the local state university. The card describes the risk from each of the main
hazards encountered on Hawaii Island (tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanic hazards,
hurricanes & windstorms, storm surge, rainfall flooding, and high surf), explains “How
to avoid becoming a victim,” lists emergency telephone numbers and emergency radio
stations, describes a family disaster kit, and shows on a map the location of certain
hazards, including tsunami evacuation zones, and the locations of emergency medical
services including hospitals and fire stations with medics. The project is designed to
increase public awareness of all life-threatening natural hazards encountered on the
island, including tsunamis, and explain the appropriate responses and resources available.

Brochures and Pamphlets

Tsunami Awareness materials can be found at the International Tsunami

Information Centre website. Some of the documents can be downloaded from that
website. http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/categories.php?category_no=75

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Hilo, Hawaii
►During the summer of 2004, the Pacific Tsunami Museum (PTM), in collaboration
with the Hawaii County Tourism Authority (HCTA), developed a 12 page full color
brochure entitled, “Walking and Driving Tours of Historical Tsunami Sites”. The self-
guided tours stretch from Laupahoehoe Point to Keaukaha. Special outdoor signs are
posted at most of the sites.
Information can be found at http://www.tsunami.org/programs.html#walktour

The PTM’s “Walking and Driving Tours of Historical Tsunami Sites” brochure received
an “excellence award” from the Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) in
2007. The Award Category is for Non-Profit Agency Efforts.
http://www.wsspc.org/Awards/2007/PacTsuMus.pdf

The “Tsunami-Safe Quick Step Guide” was developed by the PTM. The guide
contains life-saving safety information at glance. The University of Hawaii at Hilo
(UHH) distributes this guide to all incoming students. The guide can be downloaded from
http://www.hcrc.info/disaster-preparedness/tsunami/downtown-hilo/tsunamisafe
%20quickstep%20guideprint%20copy.pdf/view

Business Guides

How to Prepare Your Business for the Next Tsunami

In 2008, the Pacific Tsunami Museum in collaboration with the County of Hawaii
Planning Department developed “How to Prepare Your Business for the Next Tsunami”.
This document is intended to serve business owners and employees working in tsunami
evacuation zones in the State of Hawaii. It contains information on the history of
tsunamis in Hilo, what to do to prepare, and how to recover from a destructive tsunami.
This document was distributed to all business owners in the downtown Hilo Tsunami
Evacuation Zone in December 2008. (Personal communication with Genevieve Cain)
This document can be downloaded from the PTM home page at www.tsunami.org

State of Oregon - Hotel and Lodging

DOGAMI released a tsunami preparedness guide for coastal lodging facilities:
“Tsunami Preparedness Guide for Oregon Lodging Facilities” was mailed free of charge
to all lodging facilities on the Oregon coast. The CD-ROM contains information about
tsunamis and their origins, information about the tsunami threat to the Oregon Coast,
disaster preparedness and tsunami brochures from the American Red Cross and others,
and evacuation graphics and education materials that lodging facilities can provide
guests. To illustrate the likely damage to Oregon coastal communities in the event of a
major earthquake and tsunami, the report also provides a fictional account of a Waldport
motel manager and her ordeal as a survivor of the devastation that occurs.
http://www.oregongeology.org/sub/news&events/archives/TsunamiGuide10.17.03.pdf

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Hotel and Lodging Questionnaire
An example of a “Lodging Facility Preparedness Questionnaire” is shown in
Appendix C. This questionnaire serves as an example of the possible responses that
might be given by a small to medium-sized lodging facility. All of the responses are
fabrications and they do not reflect a particular lodging facility.

Washington State Hotel and Motel Guide

Washington State has created a “Hotel and Motel Guide” which will be added to
their website in the near future. http://www.emd.wa.gov/

Media

Hilo, Hawaii
A series of Public Service Announcements (PSA) highlighting important tsunami safety
information was produced in Hilo as a project of the Pacific Tsunami Museum. The
content of the messages was pre-approved by local emergency management authorities.
The actual Public Service Announcements were filmed by volunteer media professionals
with a celebrity spokesperson narrating the announcements. The local cable affiliate runs
these messages statewide over numerous channels, which target different demographics
in order to reach the largest possible audience.

Washington State - Media

The Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division,
“Broadcasters Tsunami Emergency Guidebook” states:
This guidebook provides a concise overview of the notification process used to
send tsunami alerts to public information broadcasters, local jurisdictions and the public.
It includes a Tsunami Warning Flow Chart that shows how information is sent to
broadcasters, a contact list of tsunami experts who can provide credible tsunami
information during a tsunami event, and Washington coastal community maps of regions
most susceptible to tsunamis. Two DVDs accompany this guidebook (located in the
binder sleeve): “Tsunamis in Washington” and “U.S. National Tsunami Hazard
Mitigation Program Selected Interviews”.
http://www.emd.wa.gov/hazards/documents/BroadcastersTsuGuidebook.pdf

►Tsunami Mitigation Newsletter

“TsuInfo Alert” is a bi-monthly newsletter that links scientists, emergency
responders, and community planners to the latest tsunami research. This newsletter is
published by the Washington Department of Natural Resources, Division of Geology and
Earth Resources on behalf of the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program, a
state/federal partnership funded through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. It is made possible by a grant from the Federal Emergency Management
Agency via the Washington Military Department, Division of Emergency Management.
http://www.dnr.wa.gov/ResearchScience/Topics/GeologyPublicationsLibrary/Pages/tsuin
fo.aspx

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Community Meetings

Hilo, Hawaii
Small-group ‘Talk Story’ sessions represent an important component of the “Tsunami
Education, Preparation, and Recovery Project for Downtown Hilo”. The ‘Talk Story’
sessions generate awareness of the tsunami hazard and gauge current levels in
knowledge and preparedness. They provided informal and comfortable opportunities for
the public to voice their concerns or raise questions about the tsunami hazard.
The Pacific Tsunami Museum and the County of Hawaii Planning Department held
regular meetings with a collection of government agencies and community groups to
create the project objectives and establish the framework for the Tsunami Safe Disaster
Preparedness Fair. Held on April 19, 2008, the Tsunami Safe Disaster Preparedness
Fair provided accurate and concise information about tsunamis to the community. For
more information, please refer to the “Tsunami Education: A Blueprint for Coastal
Communities” which will be available for download in 2009 on http://www.tsunami.org/

Model Communities

Cannon Beach, Oregon

DOGAMI has been working with coastal communities on tsunami awareness and
preparedness for over a decade, making Oregon a national leader in tsunami education
and mitigation.
This new scenario-based inundation research mapping expresses the variability
of what could be expected from a tsunami impact on the Oregon coast in the event of a
Cascadia subduction zone earthquake or a distant tsunami-generating earthquake,
including a most likely case Cascadia event tsunami, a worst case Cascadia event
tsunami, and a worst case distance tsunami.
This new map is based on exhaustive, state of the art, computer modeling and on
the ground paleotsunami mapping field work aimed at identifying the extent of
prehistoric tsunami deposits and DOGAMI is working closely with Cannon Beach
officials in the release of this map. The draft map on this page is still being finalized and
has not been through technical review. The finished map will be released later in 2008. A
draft of the new Cannon Beach tsunami hazard map can be found at:
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/CannonBeachMap.htm

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State of Oregon - Seaside Tsunami Outreach Project - 2005
“How to Implement an Effective Tsunami Preparedness Outreach Program” by Darci
Connor in 2005 relates the City of Seaside’s Tsunami Awareness Program and Outreach
Assessment showing how to implement an effective tsunami preparedness outreach
program.
Seaside is considered Oregon’s most vulnerable community to a tsunami disaster
due to its summer crowds and low-lying geography. It has a residential population of
6,000; however, during the summer months, the population can increase to 40,000 from
the influx of tourists. Most of Seaside is located in the tsunami inundation zone. Two river
systems run through the city parallel to the ocean, forming barriers to high ground (See
Figure 1). The majority of Seaside’s population is located on the west side of the
Necanicum River. This presents a critical evacuation problem, because in a local tsunami
event people would have to cross one or more bridges and travel up to a mile within 30
minutes to get beyond the inundation zone.
The Seaside community must be educated and trained on tsunami emergency
procedures. People will need to respond quickly in order to reach high ground before the
tsunami hits the coast. Public education will minimize the loss of life.
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/pub%26data/summaries/overview-intro-OFR-O-05-
10.pdf

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 Chapter 6

Warnings – End to End

Definitions:
Warning: Something that serves to warn, give notice, or caution.
http://dictionary.reference.com/

Tsunami Warning: A PTWC PTWS message issued initially using only seismic
information to alert countries of the possibility of a tsunami and advise that a tsunami
investigation is underway. In the Pacific, tsunami Warning status will encompass regions
having less than three hours until the estimated time of tsunami arrival. Those areas
having three to six hours will be placed in a Watch status. Additional bulletins will be
issued hourly or sooner until either a Pacific-wide tsunami is confirmed or no further
tsunami threat exists. [See pages 6-5 to 6-7 for details.]
http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/files/tsunami_glossary_small.pdf

Policy
Western States Seismic Policy Council’s (WSSPC) mission is to develop seismic policies
and share information to promote programs intended to reduce earthquake-related
losses. WSSPC also develops tsunami policy recommendations.
http://www.wsspc.org/AboutWSSPC/index.html

Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) 2007 Tsunami Policy

Recommendations
Policy Recommendation 08-1
Improving Tsunami Public Education, Mitigation, and Warning Procedures for
Distant and Local Sources
WSSPC supports strong, immediate and positive action from federal and state
agencies to reduce the potential loss of life caused by tsunamis. Specifically, WSSPC
recommends robust, effective, and fully maintained implementation of the deep-sea
tsunami detection system by NOAA, and expanding the efforts by NOAA and the USGS
and WSSPC members to enhance public education programs about the potential for
local tsunami impacts and the need to evacuate threatened areas immediately after
strong or sustained ground shaking.
WSSPC recommends full and timely appropriation of specified funds to the
National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program (NTHMP) as described in the Tsunami
Warning and Education Act of 2006.

6-1
Policy Recommendations 07-1 & 07-2
Rapid Tsunami Identification and Evacuation Notification
Policy Recommendation 07-1
Promote the development of tsunami evacuation and re-entry notification systems,
supplemented with an education campaign, that insure all populated coastal areas in the
WSSPC coastal states, territories and provinces are guided by at least one type of system,
appropriate to local conditions.
Policy Recommendation 07-2
WSSPC recommends the implementation of modern technological systems that
rapidly identify the tsunami potential generated from a local earthquake and that
immediately alert locally responsible emergency operations personnel about coastal
areas likely to be affected by a tsunami. Information provided by these systems would
augment any area evacuation decisions based on ground shaking.
Regarding Warning Systems, the tsunami warning system has provided warnings
of potential tsunami danger in the Pacific basin by monitoring earthquake activity and
the passage of tsunami waves at tide gauges. However, neither seismometers nor coastal
tide gauges provide data that allow accurate prediction of the impact of a tsunami at a
particular coastal location. Monitoring earthquakes gives a good estimate of the
potential for tsunami generation, based on earthquake size and location, but gives no
direct information about the tsunami itself. Tide gauges in harbors provide direct
measurements of the tsunami, but the tsunami is significantly altered by local
bathymetry and harbor shapes, which severely limits their use in forecasting tsunami
impact at other locations. Partly because of these data limitations, 15 of 20 tsunami
warnings issued since 1946 were considered false alarms because the tsunami that
arrived was too weak to cause damage.
http://www.wsspc.org/PublicPolicy/PolicyRecs/index.html

►Lessons Learned
According to the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center (ADPC) website in a paper entitled,
“The Boy Who Cried, ‘Wolf!’ or Why a Community-based Alert System is a Good Idea”,
The end-to-end multi hazards early warning systems approach is the provision of
timely and effective information, through identified institutions, that allows individuals
exposed to a hazard to take action to avoid it, or to reduce their risk and prepare for
effective response. (ADPC, 2007) Entire paper available at: http://www.adpc.net/v2007/
IKM/ONLINE%20DOCUMENTS/Default-DOCUMENTS.asp

The Tsunami Warning System

According to the PTWC website: Official tsunami warning capability in the U.S.
began in 1949 as a response to the 1946 tsunami generated in the Aleutian Islands that
devastated Hilo. The U.S. federal government already had a sizable piece of property in
Ewa Beach to house the Honolulu Geomagnetic Observatory. The Tsunami Warning
Center was co-located with this facility, which is maintained by PTWC staff today.
The WCATWC was established in Palmer, Alaska in 1967 as a direct result of the
Prince William Sound Good Friday Earthquake that occurred on March 27, 1964. This

6-2
earthquake alerted State and Federal officials to the need for a facility to provide timely
and effective tsunami warnings and information for the coastal areas of Alaska. The
center’s operational scope has increased over the years to provide tsunami warnings to
Canadian provinces and all U.S. coastal states, except Hawaii, for tsunamis generated
anywhere in the world which could impact these locations.
In 1960, the Chilean earthquake and tsunami devastated Chile, killed 61 people in
Hawai`i and 169 people in Japan. The nations of the Pacific decided to coordinate
efforts to prevent such loss of life from ever occurring again in the Pacific Basin due to
destructive ocean-crossing tsunamis. Under the auspices of the United Nations, the
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) established the Intergovernmental
Coordination Group for the Pacific Tsunami Warning System (ICG/PTWS) in 1968. The
U.S. offered the Ewa Beach center as the operational headquarters for the Pacific
Tsunami Warning System, and the facility was renamed the Pacific Tsunami Warning
Center. http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/history.php

The Tsunami Warning System (TWS) for the Pacific includes the Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC), and the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning
Center (WCATWC):
Areas of Responsibility
NOAA's two Tsunami Warning Centers, the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center
(PTWC) and the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC) have
separate areas of responsibility, which are the geographical areas within which each
Center has the responsibility for the dissemination of messages and the provision of
interpretive information to emergency managers and other officials, news media, and the
public.
Pacific - International
As the primary operational headquarters for the Pacific Tsunami Warning
System, PTWC provides warnings for Pacific basin teletsunamis (tsunamis that can cause
damage far away from their source) to almost every country around the Pacific Rim and
to most of the Pacific island states. This function is carried out under the auspices of the
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for the Pacific Tsunami Warning
System. A few destructive teletsunamis are generated each century by great earthquakes
around the Pacific Rim. Such tsunamis can propagate across the entire Pacific in less
than 24 hours, and cause widespread destruction along shorelines located thousands of
miles from the source. With ever-increasing population and development along most
coastlines, there is a corresponding increase in risk.
Pacific - U.S. Interests
As a U.S. National Tsunami Warning Center, PTWC provides warnings for
teletsunamis to Hawai`i, Guam, American Samoa, Wake Island, Johnston Island, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Federated States of Micronesia, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and all other U.S. interests in the Pacific located
outside WC/ATWC's area of responsibility (Alaska, British Columbia, Washington,
Oregon, and California). PTWC serves as a backup to WC/ATWC.
http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/-responsibilities.php

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Tsunami Warning Center Reference Guide
The “Tsunami Warning Center Reference Guide” states: The Guide describes the
key operational components of a tsunami warning center and the relationship of each
component within an end-to-end tsunami warning system.
The purpose of this Guide is to serve as a reference for countries that are
establishing new or maintaining and enhancing existing tsunami warning centers as part
of an overall end-to-end tsunami warning system. This document describes a concept of
operations for a National Tsunami Warning Center (NTWC) or Regional Tsunami Watch
Provider (RTWP) and also provides outreach and education resources for these centers.
Additionally the Guide is designed to assist individuals, organizations, and governmental
entities who operate or interact with a tsunami warning system.
http://apps.develebridge.net/usiotws/b/TsunamiWarningCenter%20Guide.pdf

California – Errors Observed

According to the State of California Seismic Safety Commission, in a document entitled,
“The Tsunami Threat to California: Findings and Recommendations on Tsunami Hazards
and Risks”, there were errors observed during the June 14, 2005 tsunami:
th
June 14 Alert in California.
On June 14, 2005 a magnitude 7.2 earthquake occurred offshore of Northern
California, in the vicinity of the Cascadia Subduction Zone. Following procedures, the
NOAA Tsunami Warning Center issued a tsunami warning 6 minutes after the event for
the whole west coast from San Diego to British Columbia. The earthquake generated a
small tsunami, which was only detected on tidal gauges and on one of NOAA’s Deep
Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) buoys and caused no damage. The
warning was canceled 78 minutes after the event. This event intensified interest in the
tsunami threat to California and identified several gaps in tsunami preparedness and
response capability that could pose potentially serious problems. These include the
basis for NOAA issuing and canceling warnings, inadequate alert and warning systems
at the local, state and federal government levels, a general lack of knowledge of the
tsunami threat, needs for public information materials, and jurisdictions without
tsunami response plans and procedures.
The warning was issued by the Alaska center on the basis of internal procedures
that call for a warning to all areas within two hours travel time of an earthquake above
magnitude 7 off the coast. Many scientists expressed skepticism that the wide spatial
coverage of the warning was appropriate in that a tsunami still large enough to be
damaging hundreds of miles from the source seemed extremely improbable. The Hawaii
center issued a bulletin saying no warning was in effect, because the Hawaii center has
responsibility to warn the western Pacific. Some recipients of both messages
misinterpreted the Hawaii statement as a cancellation of the Alaskan warning. The
warning was canceled, again as specified in the procedures, when the predicted wave
recorded on a DART buoy was too small to be damaging. Eleven minutes after the
earthquake, seismological data had shown that the earthquake did not result from
vertical deformation of the sea floor and was located 30 km west of the Cascadia

6-4
subduction zone, greatly reducing the likelihood that a tsunami had been generated.
NOAA procedures do not use seismological information for canceling warnings.
The California State Warning Center (CSWC) received the warning. The tsunami
warning issued by NOAA contained language and format that was unclear or obscured
critical information. The CSWS disseminated the warning through the California
Warning System (CALWS), the California Law Enforcement Teletype System (CLETS)
and the Emergency Digital Information System (EDIS). Not all affected local
jurisdictions were aware of the warning from the CSWC. Many who did receive it had
difficulty interpreting its impact. The response by local counties varied significantly
from evacuations to no response. Some jurisdictions experienced difficulty in ramping
up staffing levels that were required for effective notification, activations of emergency
operation centers and situation assessment. http://www.seismic.ca.gov/pub /CSSC%
2005-03%20Tsunami%20Findings.pdf

Communication System Chain of Authority

►National disaster early warning systems must connect with local-level counterparts.
Only by networking with communities and other local initiatives that can set up denser
contact points will such early warning systems be truly end-to-end. http://www.adpc.net
/v2007/Programs/UDRM/PROMISE/INFORMATION%20RESOURCES/Safer%20Citie
s/Downloads/SaferCities18.pdf

Innovative Communications Systems

Automated Tsunami Alert System
According to the Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), the Automated Tsunami Alert
System provides emergency officials with critical travel-time notification for tsunamis
that are generated when a major earthquake occurs. In Hawaii, this system assists
emergency managers’ disaster evaluation by automatically delivering official Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) messages via pager and cell phone, posting messages
to PDC’s web site. PDC also generates models of tsunami travel time maps. This system
is being developed into a multi-hazard message trafficking system for all emergency
alerts or notifications. http://www.pdc.org/pdf/factsheets/Tsunami_Response.pdf

New Tsunami Watch (TWATCH) Program

In collaboration with the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) and the
Pacific Disaster Center (PDC), the new and improved tsunami travel time model called
Tsunami Watch (TWATCH) provides estimates of tsunami travel time to all points in the
Pacific Basin using a grid format. Whenever there is a significant earthquake with
potential tsunamigenic activity, the PTWC issues a tsunami message. A Tsunami Warning
message activates the TWATCH model, which generates tsunami travel time contours
from the earthquake epicenter to coastal locations. Model outputs include a series of
images showing the earthquake epicenter, a regional travel time map, a global travel

6-5
time map, and a Hawaii travel time map. These maps are updated every few minutes in
real time. The model also creates a table depicting travel time as a function of tide gauge
locations. Currently, TWATCH is restricted to use by emergency managers. For further
information, contact PDC at www.pdc.org

Chain of Authority for Warning

NOAA Tsunami Warning System

As mentioned earlier, NOAA provides tsunami warning guidance to the United
States and other countries in the Pacific from two warning centers, the West Coast and
Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WCATWC) in Palmer, Alaska and the Pacific Tsunami
Warning Center (PTWC) in Ewa Beach, Hawaii. http://www.tsunami.noaa.gov/
warnings_forecasts.html

Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART)

The Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunamis (DART) project is a
component of the NOAA Tsunami Warning System.
The DART buoys provide a method to record a tsunami soon after generation
and before being distorted by near coast influences. They are located in regions with a
history of generating destructive tsunamis. This ensures early tsunami detection and
data acquisition which is critical to real-time forecasts.
A DART system consists of a seafloor bottom pressure recording system (BPR)
capable of detecting tsunamis as small as one centimeter, and a moored surface buoy for
real-time communication. An acoustic link is used to transmit data from the BPR on the
seafloor to the surface buoy. The data are then relayed via satellite cell phone
technology link to ground stations, which transmit the data to NOAA's Tsunami Warning
System. http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/Dart/

Dissemination of Tsunami Messages

The official message paths include: the Global Telecommunication System (GTS),
Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunication Network (AFTN), Advanced Weather Interactive
Processing System (AWIPS), Emergency Managers Weather Information Network
(EMWIN), NOAA Weather Wire (NWW), NOAA Weather Radio, Radio and Internet for
the Communication of Hydro-Meteorological and Climate Related Information
(RANET), Email, Fax, and Telex. PTWC also maintains Real Simple Syndication (RSS)
feeds of its messages and is planning for other Extensible Markup Language (XML) feeds
in the future. http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/

Various Tsunami Messages

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) website describes the tsunami warning
messages and bulletins that are issued for the Pacific basin:

What is a Tsunami Warning?

A Tsunami WARNING is the highest level of tsunami alert. Warnings are issued
due to the imminent threat of a tsunami from a large undersea earthquake or following

6-6
confirmation that a potentially destructive tsunami is underway. They may initially be
based only on seismic information as a means of providing the earliest possible alert.
Warnings advise that appropriate actions be taken in response to the tsunami threat.
Such actions could include the evacuation of low-lying coastal areas and the movement
of boats and ships out of harbors to deep water. Warnings are updated at least hourly or
as conditions warrant continuing the warning, expanding the warning, restricting the
warning, or ending the warning.

What is the difference between a "Fixed Regional Warning" and an "Expanding

Regional Warning"?
These types of warnings are issued to the Pacific Ocean only. If PTWC issues a
Fixed Regional Warning, only the countries within 1000 km (621 miles) of the earthquake
epicenter are placed in a warning. All other countries are advised of the earthquake but
are not placed in a warning or watch. If PTWC issues an Expanding Regional Warning,
the countries within 3 hours of the predicted tsunami arrival time are placed in a
warning, and countries within 3-6 hours of the predicted tsunami arrival time are placed
in a watch. Every hour, PTWC will issue new bulletins to update the lists of countries
within a warning or watch.

What is a Tsunami Watch?

A Tsunami WATCH is the second highest level of tsunami alert. Watches are
issued by the TWCs based on seismic information without confirmation that a destructive
tsunami is underway. It is issued as a means of providing an advance alert to areas that
could be impacted by destructive tsunami waves. Watches are updated at least hourly to
continue them, expand their coverage, upgrade them to a Warning, or end the alert. A
Watch for a particular area may be included in the text of the message that disseminates
a Warning for another area.

What is a Tsunami Advisory?

A Tsunami ADVISORY is the third highest level of tsunami alert. Advisories are
issued to coastal populations within areas not currently in either warning or watch status
when a tsunami warning has been issued for another region of the same ocean. An
Advisory indicates that an area is either outside the current warning and watch regions
or that the tsunami poses no danger to that area. The Center(s) issuing the Advisory will
continue to monitor the event, issuing updates at least hourly. As conditions warrant, the
Advisory will either be continued, upgraded to a watch or warning, or ended.

What is a Tsunami Information Bulletin/Statement?

A text product issued to inform that an earthquake has occurred and to advise
regarding its potential to generate a tsunami. In most cases, a Tsunami Information
Bulletin indicates there is no threat of a destructive tsunami, and are used to prevent
unnecessary evacuations as the earthquake may have been felt in coastal areas. A
Tsunami Information Bulletin may, in appropriate situations, caution about the
possibility of a destructive local tsunami. A supplemental Tsunami Information Bulletin
may be issued if important additional information is received such as a sea level reading

6-7
showing a tsunami signal. A Tsunami Information Bulletin may also be upgraded to a
watch or warning if appropriate. http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/faq.php

State of Alaska - Warning

The State of Alaska Emergency Alert System with links to tsunami alert tests is
explained as follows: In Alaska, the Emergency Alert System (EAS) is overseen by the
State Emergency Communications Committee (SECC), whose members include local
broadcasters, the State of Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency
Management, the National Weather Service and the West Coast and Alaska Tsunami
Warning Center. The SECC is chaired by Alaska broadcasters and cable system
operators. http://www.ak-prepared.com/IMAWS/eas.htm
End-to-end tests utilizing Live Codes are conducted annually during Alaska’s
Tsunami Awareness week which is held the end of March. In the past, using Live Codes
has assisted in identifying problems in the EAS. For further information see the Alaska
EAS Plan: http://www.ak-prepared.com/IMAWS/easplanacrobat.htm

State of California - Warning

According to the “Western States Seismic Policy Council (WSSPC) Annual

Report 2007”: The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES) continues
to promote earthquake readiness by supporting the California Integrated Seismic
Network (CISN) and the new rapidly available earthquake information products derived
from CISN. The close cooperation between the engineering, scientific and emergency
management communities has produced a state-of-the-art earthquake notification system
called the CISN Display which provides emergency managers with earthquake
magnitudes, locations and mapped distribution of ground motion (ShakeMaps) in a
timeframe of a few seconds to a few minutes. www.wsspc.org/Publications /news/
EQ2007Winter.pdf

State of Hawaii - Warning

►Hilo, Hawaii - End to End Warning System

The Mass Emergency Notification System, “City Watch” was unveiled by Hawaii County
Civil Defense in October 2008. This system allows County agencies to notify the public in
the event of an emergency such as a tsunami. “City Watch” is an electronic notification
system that will notify individuals via phone or email to evacuate if necessary. The system
will supplement traditional means of communicating disaster information with the public.
Hawai’i County residents may register for “City Watch” notification messages by
mailing contact information to: County of Hawai'i Civil Defense Agency, 920 Ululani St.,
Hilo, HI 96720 or online at http://www.citywatchonline.com/
To register, send your name, street address (no post office boxes), city, zip code, home
phone, cell phone, cell phone carrier and email address. The service is free to all
residents.

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 According to NOAA’s website: The Hawai`i Regional Tsunami Warning Center,
PTWC provides a rapid warning for local tsunamis generated in Hawaiian waters. Two
significant local tsunamis have been generated in Hawai`i in historical times, one in
1868 and one in 1975. Both were caused by major earthquakes that displaced the sea
bottom along the southeast flank of the island of Hawai`i. Although these tsunamis
caused damage and casualties only on that island, a future local tsunami could have
adverse effects further up the island chain. Local tsunamis strike nearby shores almost
immediately after being generated by the earthquake. Consequently, the earliest warning
for a local tsunami is the strong shaking of the ground and persons near the shoreline
that feel strong shaking should evacuate immediately without waiting for an official
warning. http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/responsibilities.php

Water Level Monitoring System for Remote Locations

The purpose of the project to install satellite operated water level gauges is to
provide more timely warnings for locally generated tsunamis. At present there are no
tsunami monitoring devices on the Big Island between Kapoho and Punaluu, in spite of
the fact that this is Hawaii’s most seismically active coastal region. This is due to the
remote nature of the area. Monitoring inundation in these areas after an earthquake will
provide more accurate and timely warnings for more populated areas of the Big Island,
and for other islands if necessary.
The new systems will provide for immediate siren warnings to coastal campsites
in Hawaii Volcanoes National Park as tsunamis begin to inundate those areas. These
warnings will be generated at the campsites independent of any agency or human
actions. Inundation will immediately trigger a warning siren at the campsite where the
inundation is occurring. Systems located at Kaaha, Halape, Keauhou Landing, and Apua
Point campsites will include sirens. These sirens will function only for immediate
warnings as campsites are flooded; later additions of sirens turned on by Civil Defense.
The occurrence of inundation will also be transmitted via satellite to the Pacific
Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) so that more accurate and timely warnings can be
given for the rest of the Big Island and State, if necessary. The instruments are hidden in
realistic artificial rocks and can operate for more than one year without maintenance
with their own internal power sources. All systems have been built and tested. They will
be activated upon final approval from the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park.
No sirens exist now in the Park’s shoreline areas (email from Dr. Daniel Walker,
2008). [There is currently no signage explaining the tsunami hazard at coastal
campsites in the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park.]

State of Oregon – Warning

Oregon Emergency Management (OEM), with participation from DOGAMI, is

facilitating a uniform tsunami warning signal work team based on requirements of Senate
Bill 557 from the 2005 Oregon legislature.
Oregon Tsunami Warning Standards Workgroup conducted a survey on Uniform
Tsunami Warning Signals. The survey results for the Tsunami workgroup are located at:
http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/plans_train/Tsunami/sb557_survey_results_2007.pdf

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With coordination from OEM, DOGAMI is managing the contract for the City of
Seaside's Congressional supplement to reduce tsunami risk through a public warning
system and hiring an additional tsunami staff member. For recent update see:
http://www.cityofseaside.us/pdfforms/MAug1108.pdf

City of Cannon Beach, Oregon - Unique Tsunami Warning

The City of Cannon Beach, located on Oregon’s northern coast, has taken a proactive
approach to tsunami warning. To try to avoid misunderstandings or complacency related
to the testing of tsunami warnings, the city took a unique approach. Instead of using the
loud warning siren to test the tsunami warning system, the city broadcasts the sound of
cows mooing along with instructions about testing the system.
http://www.meted.ucar.edu/hazwarnsys/twcrg/Case%20Study_4.pdf

Washington State - Warning

Currently Washington has 39 All-Hazard Alert Broadcasting Radios (AHAB)
installed and functioning. Grays Harbor County currently has 14 warning sirens which
are located in Pacific Beach, Copalis Beach, Ocean City, Ocean Shores, Hoquiam,
Aberdeen, Westport and Grayland. Both state and federal assistance provided in 2008
should increase to 16 the number of sirens throughout the County. These additional
sirens will be placed in Moclips and Aberdeen. Additional funding is needed to provide
complete coverage to all inundation areas. http://www.co.grays-
harbor.wa.us/info/DEM/Docs/AHABs.pdf

NOAA Weather Radio (NWR) – “A Coastal Solution to Tsunami Alert and

Notification” is the title of a paper written for the Journal of Natural Hazards. The
Abstract states: the Washington State/Local Tsunami Work Group adopted the NOAA
Weather Radio All-Hazards Warning System to warn citizens quickly and effectively
of not only tsunami hazards, but also other natural or man-made hazards. In concert with
an array of deep ocean tsunami detectors, land-based seismic sensors, and warning
messages issued by the tsunami warning centers, NWR provides a means to expeditiously
get critical decision-making information to emergency managers, elected officials, and
first responders. To implement the NWR strategy effectively, a partnership was developed
to add a repeater to the NWR system to provide complete coverage to the coast of
Washington and to shipping lanes off the coast. The Work Group also recognized the
need to disseminate time critical hazard information on tsunamis to the public on
beaches and in high traffic areas, so it developed a new notification system, with the first
prototype installed on 2 July 2003 in Ocean Shores, Washington. A public education
program also was developed to improve the impacted communities understanding of the
tsunami hazard, the warning system, and actions they should take if a tsunami occurs.
http://www.springerlink.com/content/gl525g722pnw136q/

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Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands - Warning System
Development of the tsunami warning capabilities for the Puerto Rico/Virgin
Islands (PRVI) region began in 2000 according to a paper entitled, “Emergent Tsunami
Warning System for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands”, as part of the Puerto Rico
Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Program (PRTWMP). The document states: This
emergent warning system has five thrust areas: definition of the tsunami scenarios,
tsunami detection, tsunami protocol, communication, dissemination and education. The
detection capabilities of the system are based on the detection of potentially tsunamigenic
earthquakes by the Puerto Rico Seismic Network (PRSN) and the Pacific Tsunami
Warning Center (PTWC). A protocol to respond to a potential tsunami has been
developed. The messages would be broadcast through the Civil Emergency Alert System
of the San Juan Field Office of the U. S. National Weather Service in coordination with
the Puerto Rico Seismic Network and the Puerto Rico State Emergency Management
Agency. Educational initiatives have been taken so that the threatened population is
aware of the hazards and can respond effectively in case of a tsunami (Von Hillebrandt-
Andrade, 2005). http://poseidon.uprm.edu/prtwsystem.pdf

Multi-Lingual Warning Announcement – Thailand

Tsunami warning sirens in Thailand not only sound an audible distress tone, but
also give verbal evacuation instructions in Thai, English, German, Japanese, and
Mandarin Chinese. A recording of this multi-lingual siren will soon be available on the
Pacific Tsunami Museum website. www.tsunami.org

Communication with Media

Although communication with media regarding tsunami mitigation awareness
training has been accomplished in the past, there are no ongoing media training activities
currently underway or planned in the near future.

Communication with Individuals

►Lessons Learned
According to the “After Action Report West Coast Tsunami Warning June 14, 2005”:
The magnitude 7.2 (preliminary magnitude 7.4) earthquake and Tsunami Warning issued
for the West Coast of the United States on June 14, 2005, serves as a credible test of
readiness for emergency officials in interpreting and communicating critical information
and enacting emergency operations to protect the welfare of the residents and visitors
along the Oregon coast. This “After Action” Report from Oregon Emergency
Management examines the timelines of the events on June 14 and the critical components
of emergency operations involved in receiving and issuing tsunami warnings and
evacuations. The report puts forward ten findings with recommended actions to improve
or refine existing operations that will mitigate future losses during the next inevitable
Oregon tsunami. http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/plans_train/Tsunami/oem_tsunami
_warning_report_06_14_05.pdf

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Special Needs – The Buddy System – State of Oregon and Thailand

State of Oregon
Oregon Emergency Management (OEM) has facilitated and helped implement a
special neighborhood preparedness program known as “The Tsunami Buddy System.”
First envisioned by Mrs. Betty Johnson for her community of Yachats, Oregon,
the system has now spread to other areas of Oregon and been successfully implemented
in other states and countries.
It cannot be assumed that emergency personnel will be available to help everyone
who needs assistance during a tsunami emergency. This program is designed for the
community to take care of one another during a tsunami evacuation by:
1) Identifying persons in the community who need help getting out of the
evacuation zone to a safe area.
2) Assigning a responsible “Buddy” within a four block radius to help their
neighbor or family member who needs assistance to evacuate.
3) Issuing a window placard to those in need of assistance to identify their
residences or businesses if located in an evacuation zone.
(For further information on the Buddy System: See Appendix D)

Thailand
The simple use of logos and placards allows The Buddy System to be easily
adapted to any community and any language. This simple idea about neighbors helping
one another, which was generated in a small coastal community in Oregon, is now
having direct impacts in Southeast Asia. The Neighbor Helping Neighbor Evacuate
concept is now being implemented in the Ranong Province in Thailand.
Information on the Buddy System can be found at the website below:
http://www.meted.ucar.edu/hazwarnsys/twcrg/Case%20Study_1.pdf

International
Sri Lanka
The Community Early-warning Center (CTEC), illustrates how a community
initiative can create the final bridge that connects the national disaster management
agencies, in this case Sri Lanka’s Disaster Management Centre, Geological Survey and
Mines Bureau (GSMB) and Meteorological Department, with the very people who need
to prepare for a disaster.
According to the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center: Hikkaduwa in Sri Lanka
was one of the most devastated locations in the December 26, 2004 tsunami. A
Community Tsunami Early-warning Center (CTEC) was established in Peraliya, the
village that lost 2000 lives; many were aboard the train that was swept away by the
waves. CTEC started from one of the rehabilitation activities carried out by the
community which was backed by a group of volunteers from both Sri Lanka and abroad.
A mechanism was needed to obtain, analyze and disseminate information about tsunamis
and other natural disasters to the community. CTEC was born as a solution for the

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problem. A complete description of the development and structure of CTEC is located on
their website listed below. The story of CTEC in Peraliya is one that shows how a
community initiative can grow into a viable and sustainable intervention against the
threat of disaster. From a voluntary organization in one village, it has expanded to cover
three villages in Galle, and has helped assuage fears of tsunamis in other districts. It has
moved from supplying and monitoring tsunami alerts to include more hazards. In its
desire to educate people about tsunamis and disasters, CTEC has trained community
members in other aspects of community based disaster risk management, including
community-based hazard, vulnerability and risk assessment.
http://www.adpc.net/v2007/Programs/UDRM/PROMISE/INFORMATION%20RESOU
RCES/Safer%20Cities/Downloads/SaferCities18.pdf

►Lessons Learned:
Local champions bring results. Having a group of volunteers emerge from a
community can make an effort that starts small become successful. Volunteers can be
maintained at a lower cost and can have a bigger impact upon vulnerability and risk
levels than expensive infrastructure and telecommunication networks.
National disaster early warning systems must connect with local-level
counterparts. Only by networking with communities and other local initiatives that can
set up denser contact points will such early warning systems be truly end-to-end.
Multiple-hazard warning systems are more effective. For hazards of rare
occurrence like a tsunami, setting up a system for it alone will not sustain interest in
disaster preparedness, and tend to generate false warnings. Addressing other hazards
that occur with frequency and regularity are more effective at keeping people alert.
http://www.adpc.net/v2007/Programs/UDRM/PROMISE/INFORMATION%20RESOU
RCES/Safer%20Cities/Downloads/SaferCities18.pdf

Tonga
On May 3, 2006 at 1526 UTC (4:26 am local time in Tonga) a 7.9 magnitude
earthquake occurred in the Tonga segment of the Tonga-Kermadec subduction zone near
the Kingdom of Tonga. A small tsunami was generated. There were no fatalities;
however, there was no warning due to a power outage caused by the earthquake.
http://www.drgeorgepc.com/Tsunami2006Tonga.html

An article on the Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia and the Pacific
(AFAP) Asia-Pacific Disaster Alerts website, entitled, “Tonga Earthquake and Tsunami
Warning: Lessons Need to be Learned”, discusses media misinformation and the
breakdown of the warning system in Tonga, Niue and the Cook Islands, New Zealand,
Fiji, Samoa and American Samoa. http://www.afap.org/apcedi/2006/05/tonga-
earthquake-and-tsunami-warning.html

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Lessons Learned:
1. Warning dissemination failed due to power cut. Independent power supply system and
message dissemination means are required.
2. Unnecessary panic was generated based on the media reports in some countries.
Training courses are needed for media to correctly interpret information
messages.
http://www.ioc-tsunami.org/files/CARTWS_meeting_Venezuela/ Tsunamigenic
Earthquakes06.pdf

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 Chapter 7

Response

Definition:
Response: Aggregate of decisions and measures taken to (1) contain or mitigate the
effects of a disastrous event to prevent any further loss of life and/or property, (2) restore
order in its immediate aftermath, and (3) reestablish normality through reconstruction
and rehabilitation shortly thereafter. The first and immediate response is called
emergency response. http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/disaster-
response.html

“Expanding the knowledge base of preparedness contributes to our understanding of

response effectiveness.” (Gillespie, 1993)

Training

Hawaii County
Community Emergency Response Training (CERT) has been given in several Hawaii
County communities. The purpose of the training is to provide local communities with the
knowledge and skill needed to respond appropriately to a disaster in their community.
Training ranges from evacuation to first aid. CERT training in Hawaii County is
provided by the County of Hawaii Fire Department and facilitated by the Hawaii County
Resource Center. Information on the CERT program and training schedules can be found
at: http://www.hcrc.info/disaster-preparedness/cert/

International – Training
Maldives Training Course in Seismology and Tsunami Warnings
A five-day international training course in Seismology and Tsunami Warnings was held
in Male', Maldives in August of 2006.
The training course was structured to give an introduction to tsunami warning
center procedures and operations in the first 2 days, and then introduce the earthquake
seismology needed for these operations in the remaining 3 days. The first day gave an
overview of global seismicity, the generation and propagation of tsunami waves and an
overview of warning centers, their objectives and activities.
The material covered in the training provided the background in science and the
practices of warning centers required to allow the participants to confidently participate

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in the development of their national tsunami warning center. The course was extremely
successful, with all participants gaining knowledge and several commenting in increased
interest and enthusiasm for seismology.
http://apps.develebridge.net/usiotws/4/SeismicTraining_Maldives_Aug06.pdf

Suggestions for Response Training

The National Audit Office (NAO), “Review of the Experiences of United Kingdom
Nationals Affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami” published in 2006, includes “Proposals
from families and survivors regarding training”:
More training is required to help people in official positions who may be under
significant strain to relate sensitively to traumatized people. There may be implications
for recruitment. Some commented that there were few female officials present.
Training needs to be put in place to ensure that individuals are able to:
_ listen properly.
_ acknowledge that they don’t have information or facilities if that is the case.
_ find out information if requested and provide feedback.
_ appreciate the impact of trauma on people, that they may experience unpredictable
reactions such as anger and guilt.
_ avoid behaving in ways that will exacerbate the situation.
_ respond to the needs of the individual.
_ respond with humanity, avoiding elitism and rigid adherence to protocols.
_ keep the families’ experience in mind.
All staff coming into contact with families and individuals need to be briefed
properly. Many examples were given of thoughtless comments and the lack of
appreciation about what people had been through. These exchanges, which were often
brief, stayed vividly in people’s minds.
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0607/review_of_tsunami_experiences.aspx

Exercises

According to the International Tsunami Information Center website: “Exercise

Pacific Wave 08” took place from 0000 UTC to 2340 UTC on 29 October 2008.
Altogether, 34 Pacific countries confirmed their participation to the UNESCO IOC.
Additionally, 10 other countries also successfully received PTWC messages by FAX or
email.
The purpose of the exercise was to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of the
Pacific Tsunami Warning system (PTWS), its operational Tsunami Warning Centers, and
its member states in responding to a destructive tsunami. The exercise provided an
opportunity for Pacific countries to exercise their operational lines of communications,
review their tsunami warning and emergency response procedures, and to promote
emergency preparedness. Regular exercises are important for maintaining staff readiness
for the real event. This is especially true for tsunamis, which are infrequent but when they
occur, require rapid response. The pre-exercise planning and post-exercise evaluation
process is as helpful as the actual exercise, because it brings together all stakeholders to

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closely cooperate and coordinate their actions. Every Pacific country was encouraged to
participate.
The exercise objectives asked each country to develop, from the scenario, their
own specific objectives for the exercise. The following were the overarching objectives of
the exercise:
1. Validate the international Tsunami Warning Center’s dissemination process of
issuing Tsunami Watch and Warning Bulletins to Pacific countries.
2. Validate the process of countries receiving and confirming Tsunami Bulletins
through their designated focal points.
3. Validate dissemination of warning messages to relevant agencies within a
country.
4. Validate the organizational decision making process about public warnings
and evacuations.
5. Identify the methods that were used to notify and instruct the public.
6. Assess the elapsed time until the public was notified and instructed.
http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/categories.php?category_no=395

Tsunami Exercise Plan

The University of Washington, in their “Certificate Program in Tsunami Science
and Preparedness” course, provided a template document for planning. A “Tsunami
Resilient Community Planning Exercise for Cuddalore, India” was created. This
document details how to create an exercise and is available at: http://nctr.pmel.noaa
.gov/education/TsuSciPrep.html

Hilo, Hawaii - Exercises

According to the Pacific Tsunami Museum, schools located in the evacuation zones in
and around Hilo conduct annual tsunami evacuation drills. The schools sound an alarm
to begin the exercise and students and teachers evacuate to a safe pick-up location
outside of the Tsunami Evacuation Zone. Schools in the Keaukaha district complete ‘full’
drills every other year. During these drills, the students and teachers cross the runway at
Hilo International Airport to reach their designated pick-up location at the airport
terminals (personal communication, Genevieve Cain).

FEMA – “Pacific Peril” Exercise

FEMA held a three day, multi-state tsunami exercise in the Pacific Northwest in
May 2006. "Pacific Peril" consisted of a 'training day' presenting earthquake and
tsunami hazards and response plans, a full day Command Post Exercise (CPX) and a
final table top review.
During the three day exercise, officials simulated a catastrophic seismic event
which triggered a large tsunami that devastates Pacific coastal communities from British
Columbia to northern California. The exercise was designed to challenge participants
with a high consequence scenario in order to better assess the effectiveness of existing
response plans.
http://www.nationalcongress.org/nationalblueprint/showarticle.php?articleID=2848
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►Post-Exercise Evaluation
An excellent example of how to evaluate your drill with a post-exercise evaluation is
documented in the “Post-Exercise Report, Lincoln County School District, Tsunami Drill
Taft and Cutler City, Lincoln City, Oregon” located at:
http://www.oregongeology.org/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/TsuDrillLincolnCity2006.pdf

Public Education Programs and Training

The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, “Local Planning

Guidance on Tsunami Response: A Supplement to the Emergency Planning Guidance for
Local Governments” states:
A sustained public outreach program is needed to gain the long-term grassroots
support of coastal populations and to institutionalize tsunami preparedness and
mitigation. Such a program should encourage consistent information between local
government and the community at risk. Innovative approaches should be encouraged at
many different levels. Training is a crucial component for a successful tsunami
response program. Local jurisdictions may want to develop a comprehensive program,
based upon a training needs assessment. One of the most important means of
educating the public is through tsunami education in the public schools.
There are several areas that local jurisdictions may want to consider when
developing a “Tsunami Training and Awareness Program”:
· Existing employee orientation and training programs and staff briefings
· First Responder training and exercise programs
· Incorporating tsunami education into existing earthquake programs in the public
schools.
· “Tsunami Awareness Programs” for the public, including the special needs
populations.

Questions to consider when evaluating existing employee training programs:

· What training already exists?
· What additional areas of training will be needed?
· How can these elements best be incorporated into current training programs?

Questions to consider regarding tsunami awareness programs:

· What training is needed to reach the various population types (e.g. elderly, business,
transient, tourist, etc.)?
· How can training be delivered to best reach the community?
· How can tsunami education be incorporated into existing earthquake or all hazard
mitigation programs?
· Does the awareness training for personnel and volunteers include a quick orientation?

Questions to consider regarding First Responder training programs:

· What First Responder training already exists that can be used by the local jurisdiction?

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· Where does the First Responder training fit with other training elements?
· Does the jurisdiction need to develop First Responder training?
· Does the jurisdiction need assistance in developing its training?

Questions to consider when looking at employee training:

· What training needs to be implemented for dispatch centers?
· What training is needed for fire and rescue?
· What training is needed for EMS? HazMat?
· What training is needed for law enforcement?

Exercises
Communities can benefit by developing and implementing an exercise program to
test the training received on the tsunami response plan. Important considerations are:
· How can development of a separate exercise program for tsunami improve the
communities’ ability to respond to a tsunami?
· Who should develop, conduct, and maintain the new tsunami response exercise
program?
· Does the jurisdiction have the resources to conduct such exercises?
· In what creative ways can funding be found for an exercise program?
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/education/science/docs/california_tsunami_guidance.pdf

State of California - Local Response

The California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, “Local Planning

Guidance on Tsunami Response: A Supplement to the Emergency Planning Guidance for
Local Governments” states:

Fire Department
This section addresses concerns that may surface during tsunami response
planning for branches normally associated with Operations. All Fire and Rescue
personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the areas listed below
are addressed.
Tsunami inundations are not a single wave event; several waves may inundate the
coast over several hours. The first wave may be followed by larger, more destructive
waves that go farther inland and carry debris.
· Are fire and rescue response personnel staged outside of the potential tsunami run up
area until an all clear is given?
· Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a tsunami scenario?
· Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a
potential tsunami threat?
· What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event?
(For example, refresher training on chemical agent identification.)
· What additional technical support teams will be required for a tsunami situation?

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· Which fire and rescue functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for
coordination purposes?
· Will the Fire and Rescue Branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the
consequences of a tsunami event?
· Will Fire and Rescue Branch require extensive logistical support for their operations?
· How will fire and rescue personnel deal with the potential that they may become
secondary tsunami casualties upon response to an event?
· How will fire and rescue personnel expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-
day emergency response? What will be required to do this?
· How will the environmental needs be addressed?
· Have fire and rescue personnel prepared for an incident?
· Are decontamination procedures in place for fire and rescue personnel?

Law Enforcement
All law enforcement personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to
ensure the areas listed below are addressed.
· Are law enforcement personnel staged outside of the potential tsunami run up area until
an all clear is given?
· Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a tsunami scenario?
· Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a
potential tsunami threat?
· What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event?
(For example, refresher training on evacuations.)
· What additional technical support teams will be required for a tsunami situation?
· Which law enforcement functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for
coordination purposes?
· Will the law enforcement branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the
consequences of a tsunami event?
· What additional logistical support will law enforcement require for operations?
· How will law enforcement expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-day
emergency response? What will be required to do this?
· Are law enforcement personnel prepared to perform/direct mass evacuations and
spontaneous evacuations?

Coroner
Generally, all of the standard mass fatality concerns would apply for coroner
operations during a tsunami response.
· Are coroner personnel staged outside of the potential inundation area?
· Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a tsunami scenario?
· Do existing procedures address and deal with decontamination in the presence of
hazardous materials?
One area to be addressed is decontamination of the deceased prior to leaving the
scene to prevent contamination of facilities. This requires setting up a specific
decontamination procedure prior to transportation to the incident morgue or central
morgue facility. It may also be necessary to establish a temporary morgue for any work
with contaminated deceased.
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· Are there provisions in place for securing of personal effects? They may be needed to
assist in identification or at least in the “believed to be” (BTB) identification.
They must be secured for release to the family if appropriate.
· Are there provisions for the recovery and identification of the deceased? This is usually
the highest priority of the family. It may, however, conflict with the other issues of
a tsunami response. Recovery of bodies may be delayed, for instance, due to
continued tsunami risks. Coroner staff should not enter the inundation zone until
the “all clear” is issued.
· Do procedures address the issues of identification of large numbers of tsunami
casualties, when there may be decontamination and dismemberment issues?
· Do procedures include the establishment of a Family Assistance Center?
Mass fatalities management usually includes such centers. The centers facilitate
information flow. Family members may need to be available for interviews,
identification notifications, and remains disposition.
· Do coroner personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a potential
tsunami threat?
· What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event?
· What additional technical support teams will be required for a tsunami situation?
· Which coroner functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for coordination
purposes?
· Will the Law Enforcement Branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the
consequences of a tsunami event?
· What additional logistical support will be required for coroner operations?
· How will operations be expanded beyond the normal day-to-day emergency response?
What will be required to do this?

Medical and Health Issues

All medical and health personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to
ensure the areas listed below are addressed.
· Are medical personnel staged outside of the potential tsunami run-up area until an all
clear is given.
· Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a tsunami scenario?
· Do first responder personnel need to receive any special instructions in the face of a
potential tsunami threat?
· What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event
(refresher training on chemical agent identification, biological hazards, or
decontamination procedures, for example)?
· What additional technical support teams will be required for a tsunami situation?
· Which medical or health functions need to be co-located with other disciplines for
coordination purposes? For example, there are instances in which medical and
hazardous material personnel may need to conduct joint activities.
· Will the medical and health branches need to request mutual aid to deal with the
consequences of a tsunami event? What will be the source of this aid?
· Will the medical and health branches need to establish significant logistical support for
operations?

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· How will medical and health personnel deal with the possibility that they may become
secondary tsunami victims upon response to an event?
· How will medical and health expand their operations beyond the normal day-to-day
emergency response? What will be required to do this?
· Should medical and health personnel establish contacts in the private sector prior to an
incident for quicker access to supplies and personnel?
· Are decontamination procedures in place for medical personnel?
· If the event is a Mass Casualty Incident (MCI), how will medical personnel address the
need for the possible massive amounts of mutual aid required?

Mental Health Issues

“Medical” also includes mental health support, which will focus on support to
victims of a tsunami and support to response personnel, including Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) staff. Mental health planners should consider the same sort of questions
that other elements of the medical and health community address.
In addition, plans should incorporate the following areas:

Staff Background and Training

· Does your mental health staff have the requisite training in disasters, tsunamis,
and dealing with trauma?
Care & Shelter
· Do they have an understanding of governmental response roles?
· Are they able to function as part of a multi-disciplinary team?
Crisis Management
· Public information: What role should mental health practitioners play as part of
public information? What effect does public information have upon the
mental health of the victims and responders?
· Support services: How can the mental health community provide crisis
counseling, screening, diagnosis, and treatment for those in need of such
services?
· Stress Management: How can mental health personnel support stress
management programs within the EOC and other locations?
· Follow-up: What mental health follow-up programs need to be developed as a
result of a threat or event?
· Integration and support: How do mental health activities integrate with and
support other medical/health activities?
· Resources: What mental health resources are available within the community?
Will additional mental health resources be required?
- How can non-medical support personnel, such as religious staff or social
services personnel, be integrated into the process?
· Psychological aspects: How can mental health professionals address the
psychological aspects of response activities such as: body recovery,
identification, family notification, and transportation of the injured?
All care and shelter personnel should review current plans and/or protocols to ensure the
areas listed below are addressed.

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 · Do existing procedures need to be modified to accommodate a tsunami
scenario?
· What special instructions do care and shelter personnel need to receive
regarding a potential tsunami threat?
· What time-critical refresher training needs to occur in anticipation of an event
(for example, refresher training on facility security procedures or event
(for example, refresher training on facility security procedures or mental
health concerns during a tsunami event)?
· What level of facility security will be required for care and shelter operations
during a tsunami situation?
· At what levels of the emergency response organization should there be care and
shelter representation? Field level incident command post?
· Will the care and shelter branch need to request mutual aid to deal with the
consequences of a tsunami event? If so, what will be the source of this
aid?
· Will the care and shelter branch need to establish significant logistical support
for its operations? How will this connect to other logistical support, such
as medical?
· How will care and shelter personnel handle mass evacuations and spontaneous
evacuations? How will local law enforcement and fire personnel address
this situation?

Logistics - Support Requirements

As part of the planning process for the tsunami response, local government will
probably [need to] identify support requirements (supplies, services, equipment, facilities,
etc.). Resources databases will also need to be identified, developed, and maintained.
Logistics planners will probably want to [need to] identify critical support operations,
such as computer operations, that must remain intact and functional during an event.
The following questions should be considered when identifying support requirements:
· What assets do local jurisdictions have to deal with the tsunami threat?
· What do they think they might need to overcome shortfalls?
· Do local jurisdictions know how to access/request resources from other
sources?
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/education/science/docs/california_tsunami_guidance.pdf

State and Federal Response Plans

We have conducted a search for response plans and have been unable to locate
any up-to-date documents. Currently, the plans may not be available because a current
plan may contain confidential and proprietary information. In addition, the plans may
include tactical and strategic details that may compromise national security.

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Scientific Response

State of Hawaii - Tsunami Observers Program

According to the Pacific Tsunami Museum website: In June 2006, the PTM was
awarded a contract to manage the Tsunami Observer Program. This program has been
set up to record all important data associated with a tsunami event including [video]
footage of the waves inundating the coastline and wave run-up heights in a post tsunami
field survey.
The program consists of volunteer tsunami observers, located on Kauai, Lanai,
Maui, Oahu and Hawaii. When a tsunami WATCH is issued, all tsunami observers will
be alerted by a phone tree system. They will then set up recording equipment at safe
locations to monitor the waves as they come ashore. Following a large tsunami event,
tsunami observers will be deployed into the field to carry out a comprehensive post-
tsunami field survey which will record an array of data including runups, building
damages as well as information from eyewitnesses.
http://www.tsunami.org/programs.html

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 Chapter 8

Recovery

Definition
Recovery: restoration or return to any former and better state or condition.
http://dictionary.reference.com/

State of Alaska – Recovery

The State of Alaska, “Emergency Response Plan”, establishes a comprehensive,

State, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management across a spectrum of
activities.
Responsibility for emergency planning and disaster response lies first with
individuals and heads of households. This is consistent with Alaska's Constitutional
policy of maximum self-government. When individuals and families cannot respond
effectively, local chief executives, as designated in local emergency plans, will take
charge of local actions to protect lives, property and resources, and prevent terrorist
attacks. Local governments will attempt to relieve the suffering of those affected by the
event. If local capabilities are exceeded, the local chief executive may ask for State
assistance and/or a gubernatorial declaration. The Governor, in turn, has the option of
asking for Federal aid when it appears that the combined resources of local and State
agencies will be inadequate.
Government Relationships
Local emergency managers [with adequate training] know how to best apply
disaster relief resources within their communities. State workers will, in most cases, work
alongside and assist local emergency management. Otherwise, the State responders
coordinate their activities with local managers to render State assistance in the most
helpful manner.
The State, when asked to assist, does not intend to direct and control local
response operations unless asked to do so. Even regulatory and oversight responsibilities
are expected to be fulfilled in an atmosphere of mutual cooperation. Similarly, Federal
assistance is intended to support State and local efforts, not to be a substitute for them.
The National Response Plan makes this point very clear as a matter of operational
policy.
The State expects that boroughs will take an active role in all phases of
Emergency Management and Homeland Security. Furthermore, where boroughs exist,
the State expects them to work directly with the communities within the boroughs. For
example, the State expects each borough to assemble damage assessment information
from the communities within the borough and then provide the consolidated information
to the State Emergency Coordination Center (SECC). The State intends to have direct

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contact with individual communities only if they are in the unorganized borough.
http://www.ak-prepared.com/plans/acrobat_docs/alaska_emergency_response_plan.pdf

State of California – Recovery

According to the State of California, “Agency Disaster Recovery Plan”: Each

state agency (including each state data center) must maintain a Disaster Recovery Plan
(DRP) identifying the computer applications that are critical to agency operations, the
information assets that are necessary for those applications, and the agency's plans for
resuming operations following an unplanned disruption of those applications.
Each agency that employs the services of a state data center must develop an
understanding of the existing service level agreement for recovery services, and its
recovery plan must document the data center services that will be required during
recovery.
Each agency must keep its DRP up-to-date and provide annual documentation for
those updates to the Office. The annual requirements are:
If the agency employs the services of a state data center, it must also provide the
data center with either a full copy or a subset of its plan, containing enough information
for the data center to recover the agency's systems and/or data.
It is important to adapt the detailed content of each plan section to suit the needs
of the individual agency, with the understanding that DRPs are based upon available
information so they can be adjusted to changing circumstances.
http://sam.dgs.ca.gov/TOC/5300/5355.2.htm

State of Hawaii – Recovery

Hawaii State Civil Defense (SCD) features a “Disaster Recovery” Section on their
website. This section includes information on Individual Assistance, Public Assistance,
Insurance Claims and Community Efforts in Disaster Recovery:
Once the disaster itself is over and the recovery and rebuilding processes begin,
many disaster victims can feel like they are alone in their effort to rebuild. It is important
that the victim realize that there are always agencies and organizations they can turn to
for assistance in dealing with the aftermath of a disaster.
http://www.scd.state.hi.us/recovery.html

State of Oregon – Recovery

The Oregon Emergency Management Association (OEMA), with funding from

Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW), and working with the Oregon Natural
Hazards Workgroup and USGS, held a planning forum with Cannon Beach for post-
disaster recovery from a Cascadia event. As a result of the planning forum, the “Cannon
Beach Post-Disaster Recovery Planning Forum Summary Report” was created. The
purpose of this report was to describe the process used to conduct a community post-
disaster recovery planning forum aimed at addressing a catastrophic disaster event.

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Cannon Beach Post-Disaster Recovery Planning Forum Summary Report

The events of the 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami as well as Hurricane Katrina
in 2005 have proven that most communities are ill-prepared to undertake the long-term
post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts necessary to bring a community back
to normal following a catastrophic event. The importance of this issue to coastal
communities in the Pacific Northwest is heightened due to its location along the
Cascadia Subduction Zone where the Juan de Fuca plate meets the North American
plate. Earthquakes generated along this 800 mile fault have far more widespread effects
than other types of quakes in the region and have the potential to result in catastrophic
impacts on coastal communities due to the generation of local tsunamis.
http://www.oregonshowcase.org/downloads/pdf/projects/Cannon_Beach_Summary_Rep
ort_07.17.06.pdf

Washington State – Recovery

Washington Military Department, Emergency Management Division, features

resources to help prepare a business continuity plan, or “Emergency Action Plan (EAP)”
for disaster recovery:
Can your business bounce back from the impacts of an earthquake, flood, or
severe weather storm? Does your business continuity plan include redundancy strategies
to ensure your business can continue operation in the case of a power outage or phone
interruption?
According to the Institute for Business and Home Safety an estimated 25% of
businesses do not reopen following a major disaster. Building a continuity plan and
taking proactive steps toward preparedness will reduce this risk, protect stakeholder's
interests, and ensure continuation of services.
http://www.emd.wa.gov/preparedness/business/prep_business_plan.shtml

FEMA – Recovery

FEMA publication 54, “Help After a Disaster, Applicant’s Guide to the

Individuals & Households Program, Overview of the Individuals and Households
Program (IHP)”, states:
When disasters take place, the Individuals and Households Program (IHP)
provides money and services to people in the disaster area when losses are not covered
by insurance and property has been damaged or destroyed.
This program guide provides information that will help you understand IHP and
explains how to apply. You must meet specific eligibility conditions to qualify for help.
IHP is designed to help you with critical expenses that cannot be covered in other ways.

Limitations:
IHP will not cover all of your losses from damage to your property (home,
personal property, household goods) that resulted from the disaster.

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IHP is not intended to restore your damaged property to its condition before the disaster.
In some cases, IHP may only provide enough money, up to the program limits, for you to
return an item to service.
IHP does not cover business-related losses that resulted from the disaster.
By law, IHP cannot provide money to you for losses that are covered by your insurance.
While some money is available through IHP, most disaster aid from the Federal
government is in the form of loans from the Small Business Administration (SBA) that
must be repaid. Applicants to IHP may be required to seek help from SBA first, before
being considered for certain types of IHP help. You do not have to submit an SBA loan
application to be considered for FEMA rental assistance.

Types of Assistance:
The following list shows the types of assistance that are available through IHP and what
each provides.
- Temporary Housing (a place to live for a limited period of time): Money is available to
rent a different place to live, or a government provided housing unit when rental
properties are not available.
- Repair: Money is available to homeowners to repair damage from the disaster that is
not covered by insurance. The goal is to make the damaged home safe, sanitary,
and functional.
- Replacement: Money is available to homeowners to replace their home destroyed in the
disaster that is not covered by insurance. The goal is to help the homeowner with
the cost of replacing their destroyed home.
- Permanent/Semi Permanent Housing Construction: Direct assistance or money for the
construction of a home. This type of help occurs only in insular areas or remote
locations specified by FEMA, where no other type of housing assistance is
possible.
- Other Needs: Money is available for necessary expenses and serious needs caused by
the disaster. This includes medical, dental, funeral, personal property,
transportation, moving and storage, and other expenses that are authorized by
law. http://www.fema.gov/assistance/process/guide.shtm

Errors Observed
One of the authors (WD) made the following observations about the recovery
process while working in Ranong Province, Thailand during 2005-2007, and Banda
Aceh, Indonesia in 2008. In Thailand houses built by the government immediately
following the 2004 tsunami were constructed on posts demonstrating a nominal tsunami-
resilient design. However, as these homes were too small for most Thai families, they
had soon walled in the open space on the ground floor in order to have additional space,
thereby increasing hydraulic resistance and losing any tsunami resilience. There was also
a huge difference in the types of housing provided by different aid organizations. Some
were quite rudimentary while others were substantial and of quite high quality. This
difference in houses produced a sense of inequitable treatment resulting in hard feelings
in communities already suffering grief.

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 In Banda Aceh numerous houses were observed in an incomplete state. We were
told that aid agencies had begun construction but had failed to complete construction due
to lack of funds. These houses sit empty some with trees growing inside. It was also
observed that many houses built following the 2004 tsunami were constructed near sea
level with no tsunami resilient design features.

International
Management of Resources – Indonesia
The following information was gathered from “Aceh and Nias One Year after the
Tsunami: the Recovery Effort and Way Forward”:
Those involved in bringing Aceh and Nias back from devastation know just how
great the challenges are in rehabilitating and reconstructing the communities, the
infrastructure and the livelihoods for those in the affected areas. Yet just as the
challenges are great, so too is the spirit of those who have endured the trauma of the
events and those who have joined the endeavor to restore their lives. The world was
moved by the tragedy and moved with collective will to address it.
Key Challenges for All Partners
The Coordination Forums for Aceh and Nias in October and December brought
all the key stakeholders together for the first time to discuss priorities for the recovery.
This, and the ensuing discussions, can be summarized as eight key and collective
challenges.
1) We must cooperate in identifying problems, gaps and bottlenecks and finding ways of
solving them at the most local level. This entails joint mechanisms to ensure both
high quality and a rapid pace of reconstruction, as well as a willingness to shift
program responsibility from one agency to another if this will accelerate
progress. It also entails cooperation to ensure equity – between regions and
genders, between house owners and renters, and among all population groups.
2) We must coordinate effectively in policy-making and analysis, not just operations, to
ensure that systematic problems are cleared up by appropriate policy shifts and
guidelines, and that new policies are well informed by realities on the ground.
This has implications for policy advisory groups within Aceh and Nias and also
for ensuring that BRR’s boards (the Advisory and Oversight Boards) become
effective instruments.
3) We must be systematic in tackling the infrastructure logistics problems that hamper
recovery in the most challenged areas. This includes cooperation in ramping up
sea and road transportation to cut-off areas, in repairing the ports, roads, bridges
and drainage systems, and in restoring utilities and coastal protection.
4) We must cut through red-tape wherever it adds delay. All agencies should return as far
as possible to the sense of urgency that pervaded the first few months, when
people on the ground felt empowered to make the decisions on which lives
depended. Now, too many decisions are still bogged down because of
bureaucratic approval processes. Ensuring more direct lines of authority, clarity
on who has financial or policy authority, and actively creating speedy processes
for both on-budget and off-budget funds are all vital.

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5) We must work hard to revitalize the economy through restoring livelihoods and
employment. Reconstruction to date has concentrated on houses and
infrastructure; it now needs to enter a more holistic phase, otherwise we will
simply be creating places where people have shelter but not a decent life. This
calls for imaginative support for entrepreneurs to restart businesses, for long-
term livelihood promotion, and for fostering sustainable jobs – while retaining
emergency employment and welfare schemes as a vital stop-gap.
6) All of us, working in our various agencies, must constantly remind ourselves that the
path of recovery is not for us to determine, but for the people who suffered. The
communities must be firmly in the driving seat – which means scrupulously
adhering to principles of consultation, participation and transparency. It also
means helping communities put in place mechanisms to ensure their grievances
are heard. The starting point for this should be well-planned coordination forums
at village and sub-district level to bring together the supply side and the demand
side: the representatives of the communities and local officials plus the donors
and NGOs who are offering support.
7) We need to consider the needs of communities who were ravaged by conflict along
with the natural disasters to seek a virtuous circle by integrating rebuilding and
peace-building. Bringing the two together can help reunite communities, and
demonstrate the real possibilities of a peace dividend.
8) We need to strengthen intelligence gathering and information systems so that we have
a clearer idea of needs and progress, and greater confidence in the data and
analysis on which we base our programs. These are the key challenges, and all
stakeholders have a part to play in realizing them.
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2005.nsf/FilesByRWDocUNIDFileName/KHII-
6K54EE-brr-idn-15dec.pdf/$File/brr-idn-15dec.pdf

Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) – American Red Cross

“Tsunami Recovery Program”

According to the American Red Cross website: Thousands of homes have been
rebuilt, tens of thousands now have access to clean water, and millions have been
immunized against life-threatening diseases, four years after the Indian Ocean Tsunami.
Survivors from Southeast Asia to East Africa have resumed their daily lives and are
looking towards a hopeful future. The American Red Cross continues to help
communities improve health, provide protection against disease, ignite local business,
rebuild homes, and prepare survivors for potential disasters.
http://www.redcross.org/portal/site/en/menuitem.53fabf6cc033f17a2b1ecfbf43181aa0/?v
gnextoid=664fc71f2806b110VgnVCM10000089f0870aRCRD

Management of NGO’s

“NGO Impact Initiative: An Assessment by the International Humanitarian NGO

Community” is available on the Refugees International website. The document states in
part:

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 In April 2006, the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery, former U.S.
President Bill Clinton, presented the humanitarian community with a challenge – and an
opportunity. With the intention to improve Non-governmental Organization (NGO)
global relief and recovery, President Clinton launched a six-month intensive review by
U.S. and international NGOs of their activities in tsunami recovery in five critically
important areas: accountability to affected populations; coordination; enhancing local
capacity; human rights and disaster recovery; and NGO professionalism. Working
groups in each area led the respective reviews, which consisted of in-depth analysis and
consultations with partners in the field and at the headquarters level, in India, Indonesia,
Sri Lanka, Geneva, London, New York, and Washington DC. This report represents the
synthesis of the consultative process and the analysis and findings contained in the five
working group papers.
Informed by the experience of tsunami recovery, the analysis is most relevant to
natural disaster response, though much of the analysis and many of the recommendations
are also applicable to NGO response to man-made emergencies.
The Synthesis Report presents a summary of the analysis and recommendations
contained in the five thematic reports. It also outlines three broad and critical objectives
that have emerged from the five areas: building better partnerships for recovery; quality
assurance; and engaging with donors and the public in a call for informed and
responsible giving. Under each objective, there are specific recommendations for
ongoing and future work and a stated commitment to pursue implementation of these
recommendations. We urge all those involved in this initiative, and the broader
humanitarian and INGO community, to seriously consider the recommendations
contained in this report and commit to move them forward.
In the Conclusion, drawing on lessons learned during the massive tsunami
recovery effort, the review focused on several challenges, all of which were brought into
starker relief in the context of tsunami recovery but also represent systemic challenges
INGOs face in major disaster recovery.
While the working groups examined five different areas, several common themes
and conclusions came out of consultations and analysis. Broadly, these themes fall in
three categories: the need to build better partnerships for sustainable recovery; the need
to promote the highest standards of quality management and professionalism; and the
need for informed and responsible giving.
Building better partnerships for sustainable recovery covers a range of specific
issues and questions looked at as part of this initiative, from local capacity building and
accountability to human rights and coordination. A consistent theme throughout all of
the consultations was that INGOs should reorient their provision of humanitarian
assistance to make the strengthening of local capacity in recovery from an emergency a
priority equal to that of service delivery. The aim here is to empower affected
populations, recognizing their central and active role in their own recovery.
Doing this will require a shift on many levels: INGOs should engage with a
range of local institutions, including not only affected populations but also local NGOs
and local governments, where appropriate; increase their knowledge about the context in
which they operate, including local laws, policies, and norms; examine the disaster with
its broader context, looking both at preexisting patterns of vulnerability and
marginalization as well as how the disaster may have exacerbated those patterns; and
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work to improve coordination between international and local NGOs. All of these
changes imply the need to build better partnerships – with local NGOs, governments,
affected populations, and other organizations – in order to ensure recovery is sustainable
over time.
Many of these issues also impact the question of promoting quality management
and professional standards. Promotion of such standards will further enhance INGO
ability, both at headquarters and in the field, to advance policies and practices that will
improve management of and programming across the range of challenges identified by
this initiative. The research and consultations relating to all five working groups pointed
to the issues that arose because of the sheer number of INGOs active in tsunami
recovery. The high levels of funding donated for recovery allowed less experienced
organizations to enter the field. In all of the reviews, participants commented that
INGOs already present in the affected region before the disaster had better
relationships with local communities and organizations, knew more about local
context, and thus were better positioned to deliver more effective and sustainable aid. If
even a small minority of INGOs fails to meet their stated missions – or worse, do harm
to the local communities in which they work – these failures can affect the entire
INGO sector and erode public trust in the INGO community more broadly.
The third key theme that runs throughout the research, consultations, and
analysis in these studies is the fundamental role the media, donors, and the public play in
enabling INGOs to meet the objectives identified in this initiative. All the thematic
studies addressed in some form the effects of the intense focus from the media, donors,
and the public. While such focus was instrumental to the unprecedented generosity in
funding tsunami recovery, it also brought some challenges, such as pressures to act
quickly and to focus mainly on service delivery. This meant some equally important
aspects of humanitarian assistance, such as accountability to affected populations, the
need to prioritize coordination, strengthening local capacity, and basing recovery on a
human-rights approach, were sidelined. Unrealistic expectations of rapid results
characterized the public response to the tsunami relief effort, and both government and
private donors remain reluctant to fund critical long-term initiatives such as disaster
preparedness, training, and promotion of human rights. Both INGOs and donors have a
role to play in terms of enhancing the kind of informed and responsible giving that can
better ensure that critical aspects of recovery are not pushed aside in the pressure to act
quickly. http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/ngo-impact-
initiative-assessment-tsunami-response

Pre-Disaster Planning for Catastrophic Disasters Recovery

According to “Pre-Disaster Planning for Catastrophic Disasters Recovery”: The
events of the 2004 Sumatra earthquake and tsunami as well as Hurricane Katrina in
2005 prove that most communities struggle after a catastrophic disaster to develop the
long-term, post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts necessary to bring a
community back following a disaster. One of the biggest obstacles communities faced
following Hurricane Katrina was identifying when, where and how to rebuild areas that
were damaged. The region continues to struggle with this issue. Catastrophic events
require that communities and regions not only prepare for the disasters, but they must
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also understand their response capabilities and limitations; as well as establish
comprehensive risk reduction (e.g., mitigation) and long-term recovery and rebuilding
strategies. Communities facing catastrophic events must take a holistic and balanced
approach to all of the above identified activities not only to save lives, but to preserve
what they call community. Both Sumatra and Hurricane Katrina have highlighted the
need for long-term, post-disaster recovery planning for communities at risk to
catastrophic hazards.
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/cz/2007/Coastal_Zone_07_Proceedings/PDFs/Wednesday_Abst
racts/3131.LeDuc.pdf

Future Planning – Fatalities

Medical issues arise in most disasters. One of the critical issues that require prior
planning is the disposal of bodies in an event where there are many fatalities. The United
Nations (UN) World Health Organization (WHO) document entitled, “Immediate
Needs”, provides guidance:
Where there are many fatalities, the collection and disposal of bodies becomes an
urgent need. This is not usually due to any health-related risks, which are likely to be
negligible, but is important because of the possible social and political impact and
trauma. Emergency relief teams should primarily be concerned with the mental health of
the community and its need to carry out the cultural obligations and traditions to take
care of the dead, rather than potential disease transmission.

Physical health risks

The widespread belief that corpses pose a risk of communicable disease is wrong.
Especially if death resulted from trauma, bodies are quite unlikely to cause outbreaks of
diseases such as typhoid fever, cholera, or plague, though they may transmit
gastroenteritis or food poisoning syndrome to survivors if they contaminate streams,
wells, or other water sources.

Mental health risks

The psychological trauma of losing loved ones and witnessing death on a large
scale is the greatest cause for concern. It is therefore, important to collect corpses as
quickly as possible to minimize this distress. It is, however, not necessary to rush their
burial or cremation. This does not allow for the correct identification and record taking
of the details of the dead. Nor does it give the time for the bereaved to carry out the
ceremonial and cultural practices, which would normally occur after a death.

Cultural and religious practice

Relief workers should respect the wishes of the families and communities of the
dead to observe whatever cultural and religious events are usually practiced on death.
This is important in helping people deal with the psychological impact of such disasters.
It has been found that encouraging stricken communities to carry out traditional
ceremonies and grieving processes sets in motion the process of disaster recovery.

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Recovery of bodies
To minimize the distress caused by the sight of dead bodies and the odors
produced by their decomposition, it is important to collect and remove corpses to a
collection point as quickly as possible. Anyone in charge of a body recovery team
should be aware of the stress and trauma that team members might feel, and provide
support for this where possible.
The report also includes chapters on Delivering Safe Water, Providing Sanitary
Toilets in an Emergency, Solid Waste Management, and Hygiene Promotion.
http://www.un.org.in/untrs/reports/Immediate_Needs.pdf

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 Chapter 9

Indigenous Knowledge

Value of Indigenous Knowledge in Disaster Mitigation and Education

Based on long and close associations with the land and its resources, most
indigenous people have developed detailed knowledge of local natural hazards. This may
include oral histories and traditions that record past catastrophic hazard events, place
names that designate areas that are high risk, and environmental indicators that inform
about the safety and viability of activities linked to changes in the environment. This
environmental knowledge can provide a valuable source of expertise that can
contribute to contemporary natural hazard management and mitigation, and
become and a valuable resource for community education and involvement in
hazard preparedness.
Some of the contributions that indigenous knowledge can make to natural hazards
management, mitigation, and education include:
1) Raising community awareness;
2) Informing hazard planners about past catastrophic events;
3) Raising research questions;
4) Providing supporting evidence for broad scale models/predictions;
5) Assisting with the detection of subtle, but significant changes taking place in the
environment;
6) Providing insight on past vulnerability and resilience of the populations, including
ideas about how past natural hazards were managed and mitigated;
7) Providing locally-relevant educational materials for natural hazard education in local
communities and schools.
Despite the limitations and challenges involved in using “orally transmitted
records,” this is a valuable and neglected area of information about the past which
can help with hazard identification, management, and prevention. The contribution
of indigenous knowledge to hazards management does not end with documenting the
knowledge, but can also be the catalyst to more actively involve the local population in
greater participation in hazard management, mitigation planning, and preparedness.
Use of indigenous knowledge about natural hazards can produce a unique fusion
of physical, social and historical sciences applying the laws of physical and natural
science to test and confirm or reject human observations recorded in myths, legends,
chants, songs, and place names. The knowledge obtained can be used by applied
scientists, engineers, policy makers, and incorporated into warning and evacuation
systems and procedures thereby enabling Civil Defense and other first responders to save
lives and minimize suffering.

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Benefits of Culture

In an article entitled “The Benefits of Culture” written for Pacific Educator

(PREL 2008), author Dr. Dean Papadopoulos writes that “Culture is the social glue that
has given.....collective security.” He goes on to point out the importance of collective
wisdom in solving urgent problems and delivering the important message to every
member of the group that “You are protected, and should you feel scared, come to us for
assistance, and we will assist you in the resolution of your problems.” It is critically
important to recognize this long established role of culture in Pacific island communities
in order to effectively implement hazard mitigation and disaster management programs
throughout this region. http://www.prel.org/products/paced/spring08/14_culture.pdf

Pacific Northwest Tribe

Hoh Tribe Video - “Run to High Ground!”
A member of the Hoh Tribe shared the oral histories she learned from her father
and elders of the tribe and volunteered to be the native storyteller. Through her personal
efforts, Native American oral history, art, and culture were used to provide a tribal story
on DVD to teach the threat of earthquakes and tsunamis. In 2005, the DVD won the
Western States Seismic Policy Council’s award in “Overall Excellence in Mitigation and
Educational Outreach to Schools”. Please contact the Washington Military Department,
Emergency Management Division, at 1-800-562-6108, or 253-512-7000 for more
information.

State of Hawaii - Indigenous Knowledge

According to a document prepared on behalf of the Pacific Tsunami Museum and

the County of Hawai‘i Planning Department, “Tsunami Education: A Blueprint for
Coastal Communities”:
Hawaiian myths and legends speak of great sea floods and the “rising of the sea
to the hills.” These stories suggest that tsunamis have impacted Hawaiian coastal
communities in the past, just as they do in the present day. As there is evidence that
supports these historical accounts, there is a great deal to be learned through these
experiences passed down through generations of storytelling, dance and chants.
Recently, Roxane Kapuaimohalaikalani Stewart, a marine science teacher born
and raised in Hilo, has been conducting research into ancient Hawaiian myths and
legends that pertain to tsunamis and sharing her findings with the community on how
these may guide our tsunami educational programs today. All of the myths and legends
suggest tsunami events, however, interpretation of these stories vary and every attempt
has been made to cite original sources.
An account by Malo, 1898, tells the story of an ancient Hawaiian legend that
exists between Konikonia, a ruling chief, and Lalohana, a woman who lived in the sea
beyond the Wailuku River. It is said that Lalohana would steal the fish hooks and bait
from the fishing lines of the chiefs when they would fish. To stop this, Konikonia tricked

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and lured Lalohana ashore by making her believe that her husband was waiting ashore
for her. After four days on land, she warned him that her brothers were pao’o (fish) and
that her parents, Kahinali‘i and Hinaka‘ala‘alumoana would send her brothers in the
form of pao‘o (fish) to search for her on land. After ten days the ocean rose up and
overwhelmed the land from one end to another. Many people fled to the mountains and
climbed the trees.
http://www.co.hawaii.hi.us/planning/Tsunami%20Project-Prefinal%20Draft.pdf

Hawaii
A DVD entitled “No Ke Kaiakahinali’I” is in production at the Pacific Tsunami Museum.
This DVD features a chant that honors the deities associated with tsunamis, and shares
indigenous knowledge passed down through generations of hula chant and stories.

According to “Traditional Disaster Reduction in Pacific Island Communities”

(Campbell, 2006), a GNS Science Report:
The Pacific Island communities had a wide range of traditional measures that
enabled them to ameliorate the effects of natural disasters. This study identifies four
clusters of coping measures:
Most important among these was food security made possible particularly
through the production of surpluses. Not only were there many systems of food
preservation and storage, but communities also maintained a diversity of food plants in
addition to using wild or feral species. Fragmentation of garden land also enabled a
diversity of food production sites reducing the likelihood of complete loss of food
production following events such as tropical cyclones.
A second important element in traditional disaster reduction was intercommunity
and intra-community cooperation. Cooperation was encouraged by building ties through
feasting, ceremony and exchange of goods. This was also underpinned by the production
of surpluses but enabled a wide range of co-operative strategies to be called upon in
times of hardship.
The third category of traditional disaster response included features of buildings
in some parts of the Pacific region where hipped roofs, sennit bindings, deeply embedded
hardwood posts and well sealed walls and roofs helped reduce damage from tropical
cyclone force winds.
Finally, traditional knowledge systems underlay all of the features above and also
included strategies for predicting adverse weather events. Together these elements of
disaster reduction enabled communities to be sustained for millennia in Pacific Island
environments.
http://www.gns.cri.nz/services/hazardsplanning/downloads/SR2006-
038trad_mitigation_pacific.pdf

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Indigenous Knowledge for Disaster Risk Reduction

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR)

report, “Indigenous Knowledge for Disaster Risk Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons
Learned from Experiences in the Asia-Pacific Region” (2008), states:
This publication aims to build awareness of indigenous knowledge as an effective
tool for reducing risk from natural disasters. By improving the understanding of
indigenous knowledge and providing concrete examples of how it can be successfully
used.
Development research tells us that the success and the sustainability of
interventions at the community level depend, among a number of factors, on the
availability of relevant local culture, knowledge and indigenous practices that can
combine with new ideas to generate innovation. The importance of indigenous
knowledge contributes not only to the success of intervention, but more importantly to
its sustainability in the longer term.
Even before we came up with high technology based early warning systems, or
standard operating procedures for response, numerous local communities worldwide
have prepared, operated, acted, and responded to natural disasters using indigenous
methods passed on from one generation to the next. The Hyogo Framework for Action,
focuses on the importance of information management and exchange, and highlights the
use of “relevant traditional and indigenous knowledge and cultural heritage” to be
shared with and adapted to different target audiences.
We all need to understand, acknowledge and respect indigenous knowledge as a
valuable source of information and as a key contributor to reducing risk in many parts of
the world.

Success Stories
After the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, two success stories emerged, bringing new
interest to the concept of indigenous knowledge. The Simeulueans living off the coast of
Sumatra, Indonesia and the Moken, living in the Surin Islands off the coast of Thailand
and Myanmar both used knowledge passed on orally from their ancestors to survive the
devastating tsunami. While these two cases stole the limelight in recent years, there are
many less conspicuous examples of communities who have also used indigenous
knowledge to survive disastrous events and cope with difficult environmental conditions.
These communities’ use of indigenous knowledge to reduce risk, cope and survive recent
natural disasters provides many lessons for practitioners and policy makers on the value
of indigenous knowledge for disaster risk reduction.
Indigenous knowledge refers to the methods and practices developed by a group
of people from an advanced understanding of the local environment, which has formed
over numerous generations of habitation. This knowledge contains several other
important characteristics which distinguish it from other types of knowledge. These
include originating within the community, maintaining a non-formal means of
dissemination, collectively owned, developed over several generations and subject to
adaptation, and imbedded in a community’s way of life as a means of survival.

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 The relationship between indigenous knowledge and natural disasters has
developed more interest in recent years. The new discussions around indigenous
knowledge highlight its potential to improve disaster risk reduction policies through
integration into disaster education and early warning systems. Throughout disaster risk
reduction literature, four primary arguments have been made for the value of
indigenous knowledge.
First, various specific indigenous practices and strategies embedded in the
knowledge, which prove valuable against natural disasters, can be transferred and
adapted to other communities in similar situations.
Second, an incorporation of indigenous knowledge in existing practices and
policies encourages the participation of the affected community and empowers its
members to take the leading role in all disaster risk reduction activities.
Third, the information contained in indigenous knowledge can help improve
project implementation by providing valuable information about the local context.
Finally, the non-formal means by which indigenous knowledge is disseminated
provides a successful model for other education on disaster risk reduction.
Many of these communities have been given little attention by other disaster
planning mechanisms and have employed their knowledge as a way to help themselves in
difficult times. Much of the knowledge embedded in these communities has been
dismissed by outsiders as inferior and often ignored as belonging to “backward” and
“less-educated” people. Yet many of these communities have developed successful
lessons and strategies for managing recurring disasters and surviving extreme events
which even high tech instruments are unable to help. All of these communities share a
common ability to depend on themselves during disasters and a similar understanding
of local threats and how to reduce these risks. There are many lessons to be learned
from these communities.
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-publications/19-Indigenous_Knowledge-
DRR/Indigenous_Knowledge-DRR.pdf

Simeulue, Indonesia - December 2004

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’s report,
“Legend, Ritual and Architecture on the Ring of Fire” (Meyers and Watson, 2008):
Indigenous practices have proven to reduce the impacts of natural disasters in
three islands in Sumatra, Indonesia, namely Simeulue, Nias and Siberut. Though
culturally different, all three islands have within the last five years experienced
earthquakes and tsunamis and have brought to light indigenous practices previously
unremarked by the international community concerned with disaster risk reduction.
These practices include traditional communication, human-settlement planning and
building methods and associated rituals.

Event
Within the last five years, Simeulue, Nias and Siberut have borne the brunt of
several earthquakes and tsunamis. The December 2004 tsunami affected both Simeulue
and Nias. Nias Island was strongly affected by the 26 December 2004 earthquake and by
the following tsunami that killed 140 islanders and rendered hundreds homeless.

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 Simeulue, however, only suffered a small number of casualties compared to other
areas. The official report issued by the district government declared only seven casualties
out of a total population of over 78,000, nearly 95% of who live in coastal areas. When
the earthquake occurred on 26 December 2004, the inhabitants of Simeulue knew that
they had to evacuate to higher ground, as there was the possibility of a tsunami. This
reaction to the earthquake minimized the potential devastating impact of the tsunami.
Besides the indigenous knowledge, the hilly topography of the island was also another
important factor that contributed to a small number of casualties. The hills are located
only a few hundred meters from the villages and the shoreline.

Simeulue
Part of the Province of Aceh, Simeulue is an island district which consists of 1
large island, i.e. Simeulue Island, and approximately 40 small islands. The islands cover
a total area of 205,148.63 ha and are located approximately 155 km from the mainland
Sumatra.
The low death toll on Simeulue Island can be attributed to the community’s
indigenous knowledge. According to local people, this knowledge can be traced back to
an “ancestral experience” in 1907, when an earthquake generated a tsunami and
killed a large number of the island’s dwellers. Stories from the disastrous 1907 event
were translated into stories, testimonial monuments and reminisce, which were then
transferred to younger generations in an unstructured and ad-hoc pattern. The
Simeulue community uses the word “smong” to describe this event, which has the same
meaning as tsunami. The existence of a local name to depict a tsunami event shows that
the local community possesses a certain level of knowledge in regard to the
phenomenon. Though it is unclear whether the word “smong” existed before the tsunami
event of 1907, many people on Simeulue believe strongly that it did and that it is derived
from ni semongan or splashing (of water) in one of the three local languages. The current
interpretation of “smong” by the local islanders is that it consists of a linear series of
natural events that start with strong earthquakes, a receding sea and then followed by
giant waves and flooding. The story telling was not aimed at preparing new generations
for future similar events, but instead gave a description of a historical event. The event
was so deeply traumatic that it was translated into a series of individual stories, which
were transferred at both the family and community level. Each story covered the event in
its own way and often referred to the suffering or death of family members.

Lessons Learned - Simeulue

It is important to highlight some key characteristics of the traditional story telling
in Simeulue that saved so many lives in 2004.
Firstly, the stories are concerned with local information.
Secondly, the story-telling takes place in the home from one family member to
another. These two factors together serve as an effective communication method to
inform a community about the risk of disaster in their locality. Modern communication
methods are less focused on information pertaining to the local area and disseminate
information in a much broader manner. With the introduction of modern communication
channels, such as radio, television and telephone comes a broadening of horizons and a

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wider scope of information. Lessons are taken from the world beyond instead of from the
past or the specific local context.
In this instance, new means to inform communities about the threats of disaster in
their localities must be found. These means must carry relevant information and must
also replicate the effectiveness of the oral story-telling tradition in dissemination and
immediate relevance to local communities. In Simeulue, a bedtime story about an event
in local history saved hundreds of lives. Modern development programs, which seek to
prepare communities through brochures and focus-group discussions, may yet have
something to learn from indigenous story telling traditions and practices. Also it is
important to remember the part played by the topography of the island of Simeulue.
Villagers, armed with their advanced knowledge of the threat of a tsunami, where able
to access hills to where they escaped to safety. This indicates the importance of the role
of human settlement planning in disaster risk mitigation. Had there been no access to
safe areas, knowledge of the legend in 1907 would not have saved so many. This is a key
lesson for future disaster risk reduction efforts – a holistic approach needs to be taken
towards protecting communities from disasters. Furthermore, risk reduction strategies
must be integrated in all aspects of the community’s existence.
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-publications/19-Indigenous_Knowledge-
DRR/Indigenous_Knowledge-DRR.pdf

Surin Islands, Thailand - Moken Sea Nomads - December 2004

We call this big wave “laboon”. It is the cleansing wave that came to wash the dirty
shore. It is the god of waves, a furious one that consumes and destroys. I had never seen
such wave, only heard it from the ancient ones. They talked about the ‘seven roller
waves’ that visits us once in every two generations.
Salama Klatalay, Moken elder.

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’s report, “Saved
by an Old Legend and a Keen Observation: The Case of Moken Sea Nomads in
Thailand” (Arunotai, 2008) states:
The Moken, the “sea nomads” or “sea gypsies” of the Andaman Sea, are a
former marine nomadic group generally known in Thailand as Chao Lay (sea people).
During the dry north-east monsoon season when the sea is calm the Moken lived in
traditional boats called kabang, traveling to islands in the Mergui Archipelago in the
Andaman Sea to make a living. The social structure consists of kin groups of about two to
ten families traveling together. In the southwest monsoon season the sea is rough and
unpredictable, so the Moken adapt to this by living in temporary huts in protected bays
and making their livelihood close to their villages.
The large Moken communities in Thailand can be found in the islands of Lao,
Sinhai, Phayam, and Chang in Ranong Province, the Surin Islands in Phang-nga
Province, and in Rawai Beach in Phuket Province. The Moken from the Surin Islands
remain relatively traditional compared to the other groups. Even though they have
started living in the same place for a longer period, they still use forest materials for

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their huts and occasionally move their village to another site. Nowadays there are about
2,000 Moken in the Mergui Archipelago in Myanmar and about 800 Moken in Thailand.

Event
On the morning of Sunday December 26, 2004, the Moken of the Surin Islands
observed a sudden change in the sea level. This occurred without any change of weather
and it was considered a very unusual phenomenon. For several Moken elderly, it
signaled the coming of “seven rollers”, a legend that has passed down for generations.
The whole community ran up to the hill behind the village very quickly, and all
survived the tsunami disaster, though the entire village was swept away along with a
few boats.
At the same time, over 20 Moken had been working at the National Park. Those
who took tourists out for snorkeling noticed a change in the current and decided to
steer the boats away from the shore. Due to their sharp instinct and outstanding boat
maneuvering skill, they saved the lives of many tourists. Again, it was the Moken who
took the National Park staff and tourists up their foraging trails to seek a safe place to
spend the night while waiting for a bigger boat to take them all to shore.
After their two villages were swept away by the tsunami, the Moken of the Surin
Islands came to shore to take refuge in the local temple. Within two weeks, they missed
the islands and the sea, and felt confident enough to move back to the Surin Islands.
Since they are a group that accumulates few material possessions, they did not dwell on
the past, but continue with their daily lives as in pre-tsunami days.

Lessons Learned - Surin Islands

The major lesson learned here is that traditional Moken knowledge previously
regarded as “common” or even “outdated” enabled the Moken (and others) to survive
the tsunami disaster. It is unfortunate that these forms of knowledge are now limited
only to the adults and the elderly. They are gradually forgotten and rarely passed on to
the young generations. As for the legend and folktales, some of the tales are merely short
versions of longer tales, and oral literature no longer has much meaning for them. The
traditional indigenous knowledge of the Moken is not recognized as knowledge or
science; thus the direction of change is towards the kind of development defined and
induced by outsiders who see them as backward and poor.
There are several implications for applying these lessons to relevant policy and
practices.
1. To value and promote indigenous knowledge through the development of relevant
local curriculum and community participation in education management. Children
should have a chance to learn from the elderly in the community, to absorb and
practice “keen observation” and the “precautionary principle”, and to learn and
cherish intimate knowledge of marine and forest environment. Formal education places
an emphasis on “explicit” knowledge, but such “tacit” knowledge and skills have proved
to be crucial to the Moken’s physical and cultural survival.
2. To “internalize” early warning signs and disaster preparedness plans like evacuation,
escape routes, and getting to emergency shelter. For the Moken, the coming of laboon is
actually imprinted in their cognitive system although it was previously half-myth and
half-reality. Not only were they able to recognize warning signs, they were also familiar
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with the forest trails which they used as their escape routes and staying/surviving in the
wild was not a problem for them either. For other communities, apart from having
educational materials on natural disaster for communities and schools, there needs to
be regular practices and drills for different kinds of possible disaster or occurrence in
the area.
3. To learn important survival knowledge and skills like swimming, climbing, first-aid,
etc. One should keep physically fit in order to be prepared. The Moken community is
small, so they know one another well and know who needs special help. For other
communities, there should be a mapping of the elderly, people with disabilities, and
others who need special help so that they can be taken care of during the emergencies.
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-publications/19-Indigenous_Knowledge-
DRR/Indigenous_Knowledge-DRR.pdf

Western Province, Solomon Islands – April 2007

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction’s report,
“Indigenous Knowledge Saved Lives during 2007 Solomon Islands Tsunami” (McAdoo,
Baumwoll and Moore, 2008, states:
On 2 April 2007, an earthquake with a magnitude of 8.1 and its subsequent
tsunami hit the Solomon Islands, killing 52 people. That number would have likely been
considerably higher was it not for the appropriate reaction of the indigenous coastal
populations. Immigrant populations died at disproportionate rates in comparably
damaged areas because they did not recognize the signs of the impending tsunami. Both
the indigenous and immigrant populations had little time to respond because their
villages were very close to the earthquake’s epicenter. While buoy-based early warning
systems are necessary to mitigate the effects of trans-oceanic tsunamis that hit coastlines
hours after an earthquake, they are limited in the near field regions close to the
epicenter, especially those with developing infrastructure. Tsunami mitigation plans that
seek to educate local populations must be cognizant of not only the physical
environment of the region, but also economically and culturally diverse populations
and their knowledge of the local environment.
Between 1955 and the early 1960s, the ethnic demographics of the Western
Province changed when a group of ethnic Gilbertese emigrated from their native Kiribati,
a country of remote, low-lying coral atolls located in the southwest Pacific Ocean, far
from any active earthquake sources. The Gilbertese are traditionally atoll-dwellers that
rely heavily on ocean resources, thus the majority of their settlements are located
adjacent to the lagoons. Since the Gilbertese moved to the region there had not been any
tsunamigenic earthquakes.

Event
On 2 April 2007 at 7:39AM local time, a magnitude 8.1 earthquake hit the
Solomon Islands’ Western Province. The earthquake caused strong shaking (hard
enough that most people had problems remaining standing) which lasted over 1 minute,
damaging structures and shearing off coral reef colonies, while at the same time warning
the populace of the potential for a tsunami. Structures in the region were significantly
damaged, and injuries resulted from falling building materials and burning water from
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cook stoves. The earthquake also triggered over 1,000 landslides on the steep volcanic
island of Ranongga- one occurred at the village on Mondo, killing 2 people. Strong
shaking and coseismic uplift also damaged the delicate coral reef in the lagoons, which
will have lasting effects on the recovery of the fisheries on which both the indigenous
Melanesian and immigrant Gilbertese populations rely.
Almost immediately after the shaking stopped, according to eyewitnesses, water
rushed out of the shallow coral lagoon, leaving the seafloor exposed. The tsunami came
back in between 3 and 10 minutes after the shaking ceased. Anecdotal evidence,
supported by geologic observations, describes two or three subsequent waves that came
in as relatively low power, rapidly-rising tides rather than fast-moving turbulent bores.
Low density coral colonies with large surface areas that the earthquake sheared off at
their bases landed near their original growth positions, and would have been moved in
the presence of a strong current. The tsunami picked up vehicles and houses, floating
them inland and dropping them with very little damage—more powerful bores tend to roll
vehicles and dismantle structures. The tsunami was responsible for 50 of the 52 deaths
caused by this disaster.

Indigenous Knowledge
The geologic survey found that a tsunami that came ashore at the same height in
similar physical surroundings in areas with different demographics produced inconsistent
mortality patterns which could not be explained by the physical hazards alone. Gilbertese
immigrants died at disproportionate rates compared to the indigenous Melanesians.
While the immigrant villages tend to have higher populations, their response to the
earthquake, which was to investigate the emptied lagoon, demonstrated a lack of
understanding of how tsunamis behave. Each of the villages had a good coral reef/lagoon
buffer, and one of the affected immigrant villages (New Manra) even had an additional
stand of mangroves that the indigenous communities lacked. This evidence suggests that
the primary factor contributing to increased mortality [of the immigrant population] was
[not having] a proper response based on generations accustomed to living on an active
island arc adjacent to a subduction zone.
The immigrant community of Titiana is only 3 km east of Pailongge on the south
coast of Ghizo Island that took the brunt of the tsunami. The broad lagoon (100-400 m
wide) lies behind a steep coral reef front, like Pailongge, and reflected some of the wave
energy back to sea. According to survivors, however, when the shaking stopped and the
ocean receded from the lagoon, curious children from the village went down to explore
the exposed seafloor. In the Gilbertese villages of New Manra, Titiana and Nusa
Mbaruku, 67.7% of those that died were children. In Titiana alone, 8 of the 13 people
that died were children who were not strong enough to swim against the incoming waves.
The immigrant villages recorded more deaths in Ghizo Island.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many adults here were overwhelmed by the
tsunami as they went to rescue their children.
On the other hand, there were no deaths in the indigenous Solomon Island
village of Pailongge (population 76) on Ghizo’s south coast. The sea withdrew almost
immediately after the earthquake shaking ceased, according to eyewitnesses. The
geologic evidence suggests that the steep reef front and broad lagoon (100-500 m wide)
slowed the incoming tsunami; however the wave was still quite large when it came
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ashore, flowing overland around 3 m deep. After the shaking stopped, village elders
noticed that the lagoon had emptied, helped direct everyone inland, and heads of
households made sure that children were accounted for and evacuated.

Lessons Learned - Solomon Islands

Of the 52 people that died during the Solomon Islands earthquake and tsunami,
31 (59.6%) were immigrant Gilbertese from Titiana, New Manra and Nusa Mbaruku
that did not react properly because they had no memory in their culture of such an
event. Kiribati is a coral atoll nation, situated far from any regular earthquake sources.
Because there have been no major, tsunamigenic earthquakes in the 50 years since their
emigration, they simply lacked the indigenous knowledge of their adopted environment
that could have helped save their lives. Gilbertese children were particularly vulnerable
because not only were they too weak to swim against the relatively slow-moving yet
deep tsunami, but they lacked the indigenous knowledge that would have kept them
from exploring the emptied lagoons.
The indigenous Solomon Islanders, on the other hand, in large part responded
in a way that reduced their overall mortality. Indigenous knowledge of the Solomon
Islands, where active volcanoes and earthquakes are more common, mitigated the effects
of this tsunami. In indigenous villages on hard-hit Ghizo Island, the effects of the tsunami
were mitigated by the combination of 1) a healthy coral reef with a steep barrier front
and wide, shallow lagoon that reflected and attenuated some of the tsunami’s energy, 2)
accessible and effective escape routes and high ground provided by the existing
topography, and 3) an indigenous knowledge of what to do during a strong earthquake
followed by an emptying lagoon.
Immigrant Gilbertese villages with both the same physiography and who were hit
by a tsunami of equal intensity, lacked indigenous knowledge which led them to suffer
more casualties. Many people died at the indigenous village on Tapurai, which lacked an
effective coral reef barrier due to its natural morphology that evolved on the lee side of
Simbo Island.
Indigenous knowledge is an effective tsunami mitigation tool when the right
combination of education and physiography come together. Locations with broad coastal
plains would have a hard time evacuating the coast, especially if population densities are
high as is the case with Banda Aceh, Indonesia during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.
Nonetheless, a barrier reef, wide lagoon and stand of mangroves were not enough to
protect the residents of New Manra since they had no knowledge of tsunamis in this
region.
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-publications/19-Indigenous_Knowledge-
DRR/Indigenous_Knowledge-DRR.pdf

New Zealand – Maori Environmental Knowledge

A report entitled, “Maori Environment Knowledge in Natural Hazards

Management and Mitigation” (King and Goff, 2006) that appeared in Institute of
Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS) states:

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 Information and knowledge about waves, storm surge and tsunamis are
widespread through the oral records and traditions of the Maori across New Zealand.
In New Zealand, we’re exposed to a range of natural hazards. Why should the relatively
short record since European settlement be all that we know about these things?
Obviously it isn’t: we have geology, geophysics, and other branches of Western science
to look further back in time. But we also have Māori environmental knowledge (MEK), or
Mātauranga taiao. It’s a cumulative body of knowledge that is part of a wider
understanding of the natural and spiritual world, or Mātauranga Māori. This form of
knowledge is regarded as both ‘traditional’ and contemporary, representing the
experiences of generations of Māori in New Zealand.
We have reviewed a wide range of written records (which are based on oral
recordings and traditions) to compile details of past natural hazards as remembered
through a variety of forms: pakiwaitara (stories), mōteatea (laments), pepeha
(quotations), whakataukī / whakatauākī (proverbs), and waiata (songs). They tell about
catastrophic events, such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, and areas of high
hazard risk, such as flood-prone rivers; and they forewarn hazardous environmental
conditions, such as storms and drought.
Storms, floods, and taniwha in oral tradition
Many stories tell of the impacts from great waves caused by storms, inundation
caused by incantations, and land or marine phenomena – known as taniwha – causing
death, destruction, and peril for people living near water. It’s likely these stories were
told to explain the causes of natural hazards, to record loss of life, and to serve as
warnings about the nature of particular places.
In a story from the northern South Island, a taniwha living in a cave at Cape
Campbell attacked people travelling along the coast between Cape Campbell and the
Wairau River. (A similar story places a taniwha at Wairau River mouth.) The taniwha
would approach the land with such force that the sea would rise up in front of it and
sweep people off the land and into the lagoon behind. Eventually, it was killed by a great
warrior who made the coast safe for subsequent travellers.
In another story, a group of Ngāti Tara from Taranaki were fishing off the coast
of Wai-iti on the north Taranaki coast when they were caught in a large storm that drove
them south to Rangitoto (D’Urville Island) in Tasman Bay. Eventually settling with their
families at Moawhitu (Greville Harbour), they lived there until the community was wiped
out by a wave. It is said the wave swept into the harbour, drowning almost everyone and
“tumbling their bodies into the sand dunes”. According to the oral tradition, this disaster
would have occurred around the 16th century. While there’s been no tsunami-related
research at this site, early work in the area hints that there may be some geological
evidence of such a tsunami-like event.
Given the diversity of natural hazards faced by various Māori communities in the
past and today, we can gain important insights from their experiences. MEK’s
contribution to natural hazards science and management can include:
- raising community awareness about the hazard histories of local areas and the range of
events that are possible;
- providing important baseline information against which to compare environmental
change;
- helping to set research questions about local hazards and environmental processes;
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- reconstructing time-lines of past hazards to help estimate the return periods of
specific hazards events;
- informing discussions about natural hazards preparedness, response, and recovery.
While there may be other valuable contributions that MEK can make to hazard
management in New Zealand, it’s important to recognize that incorporating MEK into
the process of hazard management does not end with documenting that knowledge.
Rather, the process should actually involve Māori people, their knowledge, and expertise.
By letting Māori share responsibility for hazard preparedness, response, and recovery,
we can apply all the knowledge that Māori possess – not just traditional knowledge – to
local hazards management and mitigation. Civil defense and local authorities tasked with
hazards management should actively facilitate this knowledge sharing to ensure that
MEK is incorporated into the decision making process; without it, New Zealanders are at
greater risk than they need be. http://www.niwa.cri.nz/pubs/wa/ma/16-2/hazards

Video Oral Histories

The life-saving power of indigenous knowledge, stories, and legends was well
demonstrated during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami when stories handed down from
generation to generation saved lives in the Simeulue Islands off Indonesia (Meyers and
Watson, 2008) and in the Surin Islands off Thailand (Arunotai, 2008). The value of these
stories was once again proven during the 2007 local tsunami in the Solomon Islands
when the indigenous population suffered many fewer deaths than immigrant Gilbertese
who had no traditional stories as part of their cultural memory (McAdoo et al., 2008).
Traditional story telling is in many ways becoming a lost art as these forms of
knowledge become increasingly limited to adults and the elderly, gradually forgotten, and
rarely passed on to the young generations (Arunotai, 2008). Meyers and Watson (2008)
note that modern communication methods are less focused on information pertaining to
the local area and disseminate information in a much broader manner. Lessons are taken
from the world beyond instead of from the past or the specific local context. They go on
to add that new means to inform communities about the threats of disaster in their
localities must be found. These means must carry relevant information and must also
replicate the effectiveness of the oral story-telling tradition in dissemination and
immediate relevance to local communities.
The technology of modern media will ultimately infiltrate every corner of the
planet hastening the loss of traditional storytelling, but modern technology can also be
wisely used to help capture and communicate the life saving messages of disaster
preparedness. The Pacific Tsunami Museum has been capturing the stories of survivors
of tsunamis on high quality video for use in hazard education and as a valuable source of
both physical and social science information about hazards and the human response to
these events. Thus far they have collected first-hand survivor accounts of tsunamis in
1923, 1946, 1952, 1957, 1960, 1964, 1975, 1998, and 2004. Though not replacing
traditional storytelling, capturing these powerful stories of survival on video also presents
this information in a form that is relevant to the younger generations. Furthermore, the
video recording of these stories permanently archives an important part of community
cultural memory.

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 Chapter 10
Case Studies
This section contains case studies and lessons learned after the December 26,
2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the April 2, 2005 Solomon Islands tsunami events which
we feel are especially instructive for tsunami hazard mitigation and disaster management.

Case Study - Maldives – December 26, 2004 Tsunami

The “Government of Maldives and United Nations Post-Tsunami Lessons

Learned and Best Practices Workshop - Report on Main Findings” states:
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was the first ever major natural disaster to strike
the Maldives and it had a unique and devastating effect. For a country, which has never
experienced an event such as this, the response by the government and the people of the
Maldives was extraordinary. It was also noted that the level of support provided, since
the tsunami until now, by the international community was immensely valuable and
sincerely appreciated.
To understand the complexity of the disaster in the Maldives, one must know that
the Maldives is a chain of 1200 islands spreading over a distance of 900 kilometres
across the Indian Ocean. The islands form 26 clusters called atolls, which for the
purposes of administration are grouped into 20. Each atoll is a ring of breakwater coral
reefs, studded with islands and pierced by a few narrow ocean channels. The tiny, low-
lying islands have an average elevation of just a few feet above sea level. The highest
elevation among all these islands is not more than three and a half meters and the vast
majority of islands do not rise more than two one and a half meters above sea level. It
remains to be understood why some islands were severely affected and others had only
limited impact. The specific location and configuration of some islands holds only part of
the answer. In the Maldives, the wave or waves flowed up and across the islands from the
east and continued onward across sea to the west. In human memory, there has never
been in this region a disastrous natural event of this magnitude.

Disaster Preparedness Issues

Structures for the disaster management
There was no system for early warning at any level. No national or local level
institutional structure for disaster management was in place. There were no personnel
trained to deal with a disaster of this magnitude. Training and rehearsals had been
conducted for disasters of a smaller scale such as airplane crashes and oil spills, but not
for a disaster of this magnitude. At the time the tsunami struck, there were no emergency
operations centers and no persons designated as information focal points.

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Communication systems
The existing inter-island communication facilities and systems, which under
normal conditions functioned well, were vulnerable and on most affected islands were
knocked out for some time. There were no back-up communication systems. Similarly,
there were no response plans, no evacuation plans at any level.

Transportation
For most of the population, even at the best of times, transportation is a time
consuming exercise. Rescue operations were, for the most part conducted using the slow
local vessels.

Emergency Shelters and Supplies

There were no emergency shelters and no storage places for emergency
equipment. No emergency supplies were pre-positioned in any location.

Fresh water
Some islands had fresh water wells. Most collect rain for drinking water. There
were no provisions for emergency water supplies.

Public Education
There was no public education or formal school curricula other than of a general
nature relating to disasters. As a consequence, public awareness of what a tsunami
represents and what to do when a tsunami approaches the coasts was almost nil.
Similarly, there were only a handful of trained responders. Few men and even fewer
women knew how to swim.

Disaster Preparedness Lessons Learned

Perhaps, it goes without saying that lessons learned in disaster preparedness
portray an opposite picture to the one presented above. It is also important to note that,
because of the nation is comprised of individual islands; to some extent what is done at
the central level must be replicated at the local level.
1. Need for a regional and national tsunami warning system.
There is a need for a regional and national tsunami warning system. The know-
how exists to develop such a system. The political will and commitment of resources are
what is necessary to establish such a system. Coupled with the need for national early
warning systems, is a need to dispatch warnings out to the individual islands. Options,
including a system that links a warning system to mosques at the island/atoll level, or to
the mobile phones at national level, were discussed.
2. Need for a national institution or national operations center.
A national institutional framework or mechanism for disaster management which
links individual islands and atolls to a national institution or national Operations Center
is needed. The establishment of such a center must be augmented with a comprehensive
disaster management capacity building effort. Just as an institutional framework must
extend from the national level throughout the islands, human capacities at all levels must
be developed.

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3. Need for supportive legal, policy and fiscal environment.
An essential part of an institutional framework is a supportive legal and policy
environment for emergency management. Policies that establish standard operational
priorities and procedures, emergency transport regulations, immigration and customs
regulations for emergencies; and procedures for managing financial and in-kind aid
contributions are among those that were identified.
4. Disaster management planning is essential.
Disaster management planning is essential to create a readiness to respond. A
range of planning needs was identified. A comprehensive national disaster management
plan linking the national to the local level must be developed.

Disaster management plan components

Components which should be included in this plan are:
- Clearly defined roles and responsibilities at all levels are essential.
- Logistics and transport plan, which includes provisions for both central storage
facilities in Malé and, at a minimum, regional storage facilities of emergency
supplies. Minimal storage facilities should be developed on most islands.
- Hazard maps for each atoll.
- Capability and vulnerability assessments.
- Island level emergency evacuation plans.
- Emergency medical plans.
- An emergency communication plan, which includes required facilities and human
systems.
- An information management plan and system with designated focal points at each level.
- A broadcast media plan to assure accurate disaster information dissemination.
- Contingency plans.

5. Emergency shelters.
Presently, islands do not have emergency shelters. There are models in other low
lying countries that could serve as examples of what might be constructed here.
Emergency shelters should be equipped with basic survival supplies including water, life
preservers, food and first aid equipment and supplies.
6. Education and trainings.
A nationwide campaign offering swimming lessons and basic first aid training to
the population should be encouraged. Since public awareness of common disasters and
how to respond is very limited, school curricula needs to be revised and teachers
trained to cover natural disasters and emergencies. Island level adult education courses
could also be conducted to raise awareness among men and women in the community.
Disaster education is also needed by personnel in relevant professions including line
ministry personnel, medical staff, media people, atoll and island administrative
personnel, Island Development and Women’s Development Committees.

Disaster Response Issues

Disaster response is directly linked to preparedness. Therefore, many of the
issues identified during discussions of disaster preparedness are linked to disaster

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response. Notwithstanding the above, there are a number of issues specific to disaster
response:

Management
• There were not enough vessels with sufficient heavy load capacity, which can land
equipment and supplies on islands.
• Island Task Forces were created, but there are no standard Terms of Reference for
these task forces.
• There was not a clearly designated authority as responsible for psychosocial [mental
health] support.
• Island Task Forces were created, but there are no standard Terms of Reference for
these task forces.
• The absence of coordinated assessment and unclear targeting of communities has led to
a lack of clarity about what kinds of relief assistance were needed by whom and what was
not.
• There is no existing mechanism to assure liaison with aircraft operators.

Demand and Supplies

• A variety of brands of desalination plants were delivered from different sources. The
long-term maintenance is a problem for government.

Donors
• The “thematic approach” (provision of specific kinds of assistance) applied by some
donors led to a mismatch between demand and supply in some sectors.
• In the first days after the tsunami, a large number of donor representatives arrived and
there was no system in place to manage them. Linked to this was the fact that, early on,
there was very limited coordination between line ministries, the National Disaster
Management Committee and international donors.
• In some cases, conflicting information was collected by donor and government
agencies.
• There was no coordination among individual donor and international agency personnel
visiting islands during assessment procedures. The same kinds of questions were
repeatedly asked. Some of these personnel made commitments to local communities that
have, thus far, not led to a lot of recognizable actions.
• Transport costs have escalated significantly with the demand for delivery of goods and
personnel. This has been caused, in part, by international agencies working
independently from government through local NGOs.

Civil Society Community Involvement

• In most circumstances, disaster and damage assessments were conducted without the
involvement of affected communities. In addition, the needs of specific elements of the
community, e.g. pregnant women, the disabled and elderly were not always addressed.
• Aid distribution has largely been handled by island authorities and/or National Security
Service personnel without the involvement of host or affected communities.
• Two-way information sharing and communication between affected communities and
responsible authorities was not always effective. In particular, information on decisions
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was and is not effectively communicated to IDPs. The absence of updates creates fear,
serves as a fertile ground for rumors and may create resistance against authorities
• Local NGOs are not represented in the national disaster management structure.

Gender
• Emergency management is almost exclusively managed by men.
• Supplemental food supplies for lactating mothers were not included in relief supplies.
• There is a clear lack of participation by women in island level decision making process.

Disaster Response Lessons Learned

Recovery efforts should focus on protecting the environment. Attention must be
given to assuring that waste and rubble are properly managed.

Demand and Supplies

• Disaster response efforts must be managed to assure a match between demand and
supply of relief items.
• A general list needs to be compiled of the kinds of supplies that are needed and those
that are not needed in an emergency.
• The country is in need of number of vessels capable of carrying heavy loads and
landing them in the islands.
• There must be a mechanism for assuring the continuity of the “cold chain”
[refrigeration] for certain medical supplies.
• A general list needs to be compiled of the kinds of supplies that are needed and those
that are not needed in an emergency.
• Disaster management policies should be established to assure a greater level of
standardization in the acquisition of specialized equipment such as desalination plants.
The need for spare parts (filters, for example) and the responsibility for long-term
maintenance of this equipment will surely place a burden on the island administrations.

Management
• External military assistance needs to be appropriate, timely, cost effective and
coordinated.
• Regional warehouses established during the response to the tsunami need to be
permanent.
• An emergency transport policy regulating pricing and designating delivery points is
needed.
• Aid contributions must be properly documented.
• Two-way information sharing and communication between affected communities and
responsible authorities must be improved.
• At the moment, there is not a clearly designated body responsible for monitoring
response and recovery efforts.
• Disaster management planning efforts should include a formal arrangement between
the government and aircraft operators.
• An emergency transport policy must be established to assure that in the case of
emergencies such as these, transport prices are controlled.

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• Disaster and damage assessments must be better coordinated and communities more
clearly targeted.

Donors
• Country, atoll and island profiles are needed for outside agencies to assure a better
understanding of context.
• Donors need to improve the balance between accountability and efficiency.
• Any conditions which donors wish to apply to the aid packages they provide must be
clarified before aid is provided.
• UN emergency procurement must be well coordinated.
• A formalized system needs to be put in place to manage the influx of donor
representatives who arrive to provide assistance to the country. Linked to this is the need
for greater coordination between line ministries, the National Disaster Management
Committee and international donors.
• Coordination among individual donors and international agency personnel visiting
islands during assessment procedures must be improved.
• At the moment, there is not clearly designated body responsible for monitoring response
and recovery efforts.
• Disaster management planning efforts should include a formal arrangement between
the government and aircraft operators.
• An emergency transport policy must be established to assure that in the case of
emergencies such as these, transport prices are controlled.
• Disaster and damage assessments must be better coordinated and communities more
clearly targeted.
• Disaster management policies should be established to assure a greater level of
standardization in the acquisition of specialized equipment such as desalination plants.
The need for spare parts (filters, for example) and the responsibility for long-term
maintenance of this equipment will surely place a burden on the island administrations.
• Personnel from international agencies must be aware that each island is unique.
Differences may not be readily observable, but they do exist and aid personnel need to be
sensitive to these differences.

Civil Society /Community Involvement

• Disaster and damage assessments should be conducted with the involvement of affected
communities. In addition, the needs of specific elements of the community, e.g. pregnant
women, the disabled and elderly must be addressed.
• Efforts must be made to assure that affected populations are involved in decision-
making and kept informed of developments.
• Standard formats are required for reporting, including standard and mutually
understood terminology.
• Standardized terms of reference need to be developed for Island Task Forces.
• While island administrative authorities have done an outstanding job of addressing the
needs of affected populations, efforts must be made to assure greater involvement of IDPs
in decisions related to the recovery process.
• Local NGOs must be represented in the national disaster management structure.

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• Two-way information sharing and communication between affected communities and
responsible authorities must be improved.
• Personnel from international agencies must be aware that each island is unique.
Differences may not be readily observable, but they do exist and aid personnel need to be
sensitive to these differences.
• Disaster and damage assessments must be better coordinated and communities more
clearly targeted.
• A long-term mechanism should be developed to assure follow-up between communities
and decision makers in the implementation of recovery plans.

Gender Issues
• Supplemental food supplies for lactating mothers must be included in deliveries of relief
supplies.
• Efforts must be made to assure that emergency management operations actively involve
women, especially at the island level.
• The participation of women in island level decision making must be improved. This is
particularly important for women among the IDP population.
• Policies for assuring protection of children, women and disabled need to be developed
and included in disaster management operations.
• There must be a clearly designated authority responsible for psycho-social support.

Suggested Next Steps

The lessons learned presented here are not formal recommendations. It is fair to
state that they represent an overall perception and general consensus among the
workshop participants. Had there been more time, there surely would have been more
formalized and detailed recommendations; however, what is important is action. Below
are some of the steps that might be taken at the country level:
1. Initial review by the UN Country Team and the Cabinet Ministers Committee.
2. A joint review of these lessons learned by the Cabinet Ministers Committee responsible
for the on-going management of response and recovery effort and the UN Country Team,
donor and NGO representatives. Priority actions could be identified and specific task
groups assigned to develop plans to address these priorities.
3. Lessons learned related to atoll level and island level response and recovery efforts
could be directed to these levels for planning and implementation (UNOCHA 2005).
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EVOD-6DZCSZ

Case Studies - Sri Lanka – December 26, 2004 Tsunami

This paper, “Approaches to Equity in Post-Tsunami Assistance - Sri Lanka: A

Case Study”, commissioned by the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Tsunami
Recovery, is one of a range of studies designed to contribute to lesson learning within the
humanitarian reform agenda:

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 It [the case study] is a review of how equity has been handled in the post-tsunami
context, using the Sri Lankan experience as a case study. Through qualitative and
quantitative evidence, it identifies:
• Patterns of inequity by comparing the assistance provided to tsunami and conflict
affected communities;
• Disparities in the assistance provided within the tsunami Internally Displaced Person
(IDP) group itself.
The findings indicate that despite the stated intentions of the Government of Sri
Lanka, development partners and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to
support the needs of both Internally Displaced People (IDP) groups and promote an
equitable post-tsunami response, significant disparities have prevailed. Most conflict
IDPs have received quantitatively and qualitatively less support and more slowly than the
support received by tsunami IDPs. While important practical and conflict related
constraints have played a role in limiting the outcomes for conflict IDPs, these
constraints have not been impenetrable. A critical obstacle to equity has been the
direction of policy priorities. Support for conflict IDPs has focused mostly on helping
them cope with constraints rather than on re-establishing the potential for independent
and assertive living.
Tsunami recovery has been shaped by a commitment to restore full independence
as quickly as possible to survivors, as well as building back better prospects and
opportunities where possible. The reasons this policy imperative has been so much
stronger in the post-tsunami rather than post-conflict context are at least partially related
to the unfinished, man-made nature of the conflict as opposed to the exogenous origins,
immediacy and breadth of impact of the tsunami. These differences have impacted on
political and bureaucratic incentives to deliver. The media coverage and the vast funds
available with fewer conventional policy conditions have additionally strengthened both
the political impetus and feasibility of enhanced delivery in the post-tsunami context.
Within the tsunami IDP group, affected communities in the east and, particularly,
the north have experienced a slower pace of progress than those in the south and west of
the country. This pattern is, again, partially related to practical constraints, many arising
from the more difficult conflict context constraining delivery in the north and east, while
stronger infrastructure and private sector support has favored faster delivery in the
south. However while the contextual and practical constraints have promoted a context
for inequity, they did not predetermine that it would prevail. What have been more
dynamic in driving the disparities are institutional constraints such as the role of politics
and the lack of subsidiary in the national context, and incentives and pressures that have
adversely affected the quality of NGO engagement. These factors undermined broader
aspects of best practice such as effective coordination and consultation with beneficiaries
and in so doing undermined the prospects for equity. They also contributed to intra-
district disparities identified particularly in the south, west and east of the country, by
undermining systems to deliver assistance more equitably. Additional pressures wrought
by the media, massive funding flows, and a profusion of actors with overly narrow
beneficiary targets exacerbated these weaknesses. This resulted in problematic national
coordination systems, allowing competition for beneficiaries among implementing
agencies. This in turn reduced the consistency and depth of the positive efforts by
government and implementing agencies to drive better practice and promote equity.
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 The institutional constraints elaborated in the study are far from unique to Sri
Lanka or the tsunami context. Most government systems will struggle with undue
political influences and imperfect disaster response frameworks; most recovery efforts
have experienced implementing agencies compartmentalizing responsibility for
delivery in a way that undermines wider best practice; and most development partners
could be much more flexible in financing disaster response efforts.
Acknowledging the most sensitive and often least transparent factors constraining
better practice and finding practical ways to challenge their influence is imperative in
mitigating the risks to equity.

From this study, two key priorities stand out:

• Increasing and enhancing collaborative approaches to recovery:
With host governments, development partners and implementing agencies accepting
mutual accountability for the entire recovery effort, notwithstanding how individual
responsibilities may be apportioned between actors.
• Improving transparency to enhance accountability systems:
Through increased availability of information about the contribution of individual actors
within the overall collaborative framework at all stages of recovery. The intention is to
reduce the space for poor practice to go unchecked by increasing the right kind of
pressure and support for all actors to work together for joint delivery.
Key recommendations include:
• The wider use of standing disaster response compacts setting out the roles,
responsibilities and working standards between different levels of government and
specific humanitarian actors in the event of a disaster;
• Transparent, depoliticized and more selective recruitment of national disaster response
personnel, combined with enhanced training to ensure implementing agency staff have
strategic capability as well as operational skills;
• Steps to ensure that implementing agencies will be more accountable for engagement in
the development of multi-agency coordination mechanisms, and in meeting common
standards to drive best practice;
• Steps to promote stronger accountability for national authorities through limiting the
opportunities for politics to unduly influence recovery processes;
• Requiring development partners to make funding policy support to governments as high
a priority as funding for operational delivery;
• Encouraging the UN Inter Agency standing committee (IASC) to explore options for
promoting joint accountability with a broader range of humanitarian actors under its
current reform agenda;
• Encouraging the IASC to include the consideration of equity issues within the
development of evolving cluster guidance;
• Encouraging the use of spot-checks to ensure that coordination systems are robust, and
support subsidiary and equitable delivery;
• Encouraging UNDP and OCHA to work with development partners and media
institutions to enhance the capacity of the media to report constructively;
• Encouraging NGOs to explore legal avenues to develop funding campaigns that legally
and transparently provide for maximum flexibility in the use of funds, to enable more
effective use of resources in a rapidly changing environment.
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 Overall, the paper recommends that the IASC and the Active Learning Network
for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) develop stronger
web resources to enable governments and development partners to learn about progress
and obtain advice and information on all of these critical issues.
The recommendations reflect and build on existing themes in the humanitarian
reform agenda, but in their specificity are designed to strengthen implementation efforts.
The pressure is on: future survivors and an ever growing global support base are waiting
to see how well we will meet our commitments in the future.
http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/06B7033C-446F-407F-BF58-
7D4A71425BFF/0/ApproachestoEquity.pdf

Case Study - 10 Lessons Learned from the South Asia Tsunami of 26

December 2004
The United Nations, Inter-agency Secretariat of the International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction (ISDR), “10 lessons learned from the South Asia tsunami of 26
December 2004”, states:
1. We are all vulnerable to natural disasters.
The tsunami affected a total of 50 countries, of which 11 were directly affected.
An additional 39 developed countries were indirectly affected by losing nationals who
were present in the region, either tourists or expatriates. While disasters often tend to be
localized, affecting a specific region or community (e.g. Bam earthquake), we must
remember that disasters do not recognize borders and can affect entire regions (e.g. 2003
hurricane season in the Caribbean).
2. Coastal zones and small islands are often densely populated areas that increase
people’s risk and vulnerability.
Nearly 3 billion people or almost half the world population lives in coastal zones
which in many cases are prone to hazards including tropical cyclones, floods, storms and
tsunamis. Often coastal populations are dependent on the sea for their livelihoods (e.g.
fishing villages) and do not have the choice to live elsewhere. Small island countries such
as the Nicobar and Andaman islands are barely a few metres above sea level, which
means that evacuation to higher land is almost impossible. Governments and local
authorities need to take human habitats into consideration in long-term development
planning, ensuring that risks are minimized.
3. Public awareness and education are essential to protecting people and property.
In Thailand more than 1,800 people were saved because a tribal chief recognized
that there was something wrong and decided to evacuate his people up to the hills. A 10-
year-old girl from England saved 100 tourists on a beach in Phuket after alerting her
mother of the imminent tidal wave and prompting a speedy evacuation to safety. She
recognized the signs after learning about tsunamis in her geography class. Knowing what
to do and when to do it is the key to save. In Japan, Hawaii and Cuba children know from
the early age what to do if tropical storms, cyclones or earthquakes strike.
4. Early warning saves lives.
In Kenya, thousands of people were immediately evacuated in Mombasa because
they were alerted to the wave making its way across the Indian Ocean. While the

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appropriate technology to detect seismic activity already exists, a failure in
communication meant that the relevant authorities and local communities were caught
unaware by the tsunami
5. Countries need to work together at the regional and international levels ahead of
time, instead of waiting until disaster strikes to respond.
There is a need for countries in the Indian Ocean to develop a regional early
warning system focuses on tsunamis. The tsunami highlighted that other regions at risk
have no regional early warning in place, such as the Caribbean and countries along the
Mediterranean coastline and need to have one as quickly as possible.
6. Reducing risk depends on communication and information exchange between the
scientific community and politicians.
The disaster showed that in the absence of an open dialogue, valuable
information and research from technical sectors is redundant. We need to strengthen the
link between scientific institutions and national and local authorities that need to react to
avoid human, economic and social losses from disasters.
7. Develop and enforce building codes in areas where earthquakes and tsunamis are
common.
The damage to buildings has been huge. It could have been reduced if building
codes and retrofitting measures had been taken. Past tsunamis taught us that people are
safer in high ground. After the Bangladeshi flood in the 70s, government decided to build
all the key buildings with two or more stories. In the Maldives, a lot of people who
escaped went up to the top floor. Cement is a resistant building material that could be
used more frequently specially for strategic buildings. Clearly, the further away you are
from the sea the safer you are - new legislations may need to be considered for the
construction of hotels and tourist sites in coastal zones.
8. Humanitarian aid needs to invest more in prevention and go beyond food, medicine
and immediate needs.
Donor funds need to think about the longer-term and include prevention in aid
packages. If we are able to collect 3 billion dollars in two weeks we should be able to
spend 10 per cent of it in prevention. We are trapped in a reactive rather than proactive
development trajectory. Reconstruction should take place keeping in mind disaster risks.
We can no longer afford to rebuild buildings which will collapse again in the face of a
similar disaster.
9. International, regional and national organizations should work better together and
be better coordinated.
Coordination is an essential element of disaster prevention, mitigation,
preparedness and response the entire UN system, governments and non-governmental
organizations. Efforts need to be made to promote complementarily and avoid
duplication. Governments need to demonstrate their political will and commitment to
disaster risk reduction through concrete measures, e.g. reserve national budget line for
disaster reduction, strategic donor funds to support and build capacity for disaster risk
management.
10. The media have a social responsibility to promote prevention.
Journalists need to be sensitized and maintain an ongoing focus on prevention
aspects of disasters. We must remind ourselves of the disasters happening on an almost
daily basis around the world, e.g. locusts in Western Africa, drought. Not to be
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overlooked is the media’s role is essential in early warning systems; this disaster could
be a trigger for the media to play a more active role in improving lines of regional and
global communication thanks to new media technologies. http://www.tsunami-
evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/0B9E9E7B-5D39-4DD7-B15D-D4E826E43156/0/ISDR
_Ten_Lessons_from_Tsunami_20050107.pdf

Case Study - Sri Lanka – Post Indian Ocean Tsunami

One of the best examples of a website established to increase awareness is the
Community Tsunami Early-Warning Centre (CTEC) website. CTEC details the
background, goals and objectives as follows:
Following the December 26, 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, Hikkaduwa was
one of the most devastated regions in Sri Lanka. An unsuspecting Peraliya was quickly
thrown into the world media spotlight as it was also the site of the world’s largest ever
train disaster when the Queen of the Seas Colombo-Galle Express train was derailed
there in the waves of December 26, 2004. It is estimated that some 2,500 people died in
the village while only 8 walls of 490 houses remained standing.
The need for an early-warning system for the region was recognized as early as
January 2005 by volunteers who were working on the recovery operation in Peraliya.
Several false tsunami warnings had adverse psychological affects in the population. It is
also obvious that if a proper warning system were already in place, many lives would
have been saved in the tsunami.
Our aim is to not only help protect the villages but also to create a culture of
preparation in case of a future disaster.

CTEC’s Objectives:
1) To create a Community Disaster Warning Center.
2) To establish a public address system in the community and extend along the coast.
3) To formulate a Disaster Action Plan.
4) To educate and train the community on the Disaster Action Plan.
5) To rediscover and disseminate traditional and local knowledge on tsunami warning
signs.
6) To obtain community participation in working towards disaster preparedness.
7) To conduct courses for the children and the youth on Information Technology.
8) To broadcast educational, health and religious messages to the community.
9) To expand the warning system around Sri Lanka, funds permitting.
10) To integrate fully with the international system.
11) To install a volunteer system in every village along the coast called Community
Points.
http://www.communitytsunamiwarning.com/index.htm

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Case Study - New South Wales, Australia - April 2, 2005 Solomon
Islands Tsunami

At 6:40 am AEST on Monday the 2nd of April 2007, a magnitude 8.1 earthquake
located 10 kilometres below the seafloor in the Solomon Islands occurred. As a
consequence of the earthquake a tsunami was generated. In the areas closest to the point
of tsunami generation severe damage was experienced by the waves reported to have
been several metres high. Some 52 reported deaths occurred in the Solomon Islands, with
some 5,500 people displaced.
Tsunami Bulletins were issued by the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center, which
warned of potential impacts on the Australian coast. As a consequence tsunami warnings
were issued by the Bureau of Meteorology for the East Coast, including NSW.
The first public warnings were issued at 8:20 am AEST and indicated that the
NSW coast could be affected by 10:15 AEST. The public were encouraged to take the
following safety actions:

• People at the beach should leave the beach, and any areas exposed to surf and move to
higher ground;
• People in boats in shallow water should immediately return to land, secure vessels and
move to higher ground;
• Boats and ships at sea should move to deep water and not return to harbor until advised
that it is safe to do so;
• If you see the sea go out like a very low tide then immediately go to high ground; and
• People should keep listening to the local media for updated information and advice and
follow instructions and advice from emergency services.
As a consequence of warnings beaches were closed and swimmers were
evacuated; some Sydney ferry services were suspended; some vessels moved offshore
from ports and a small number of schools were evacuated. Throughout the morning of
the 2nd, most media agencies streamed continuous coverage of the situation. At 1:30 pm
AEST the warning for NSW was officially cancelled by the Bureau of Meteorology.
Actions undertaken by emergency services included enhancing operational
readiness, disseminating warnings to people in or on water, closure of beaches in
consultation with local government councils, monitoring and reconnaissance and
management of the media.
A small tsunami was measured along the NSW coast as small changes in tides
over short periods of time. Some strong currents were observed at Coffs Harbour. Tidal
anomalies measured at Tweed Heads matched well with the predicted NSW arrival time
of 10:15 AEST. Fortunately, no significant damage or injuries were reported.
Some key observations and lessons learned from the event included:
• It was clear at subsequent debriefs that having a well exercised plan was a big
advantage and a worthwhile investment. The partnerships which were built between the
NSW State Emergency Service (SES) and other emergency services during the planning
process ensured that coordination of operations was effective;

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• Not all key stakeholders at the local level were aware of the NSW Tsunami Emergency
Sub Plan, reinforcing the fact that there is an ongoing need to market emergency plans to
ensure awareness of them;
• Post event debriefs and reviews regarding warning effectiveness managed by the SES
indicated that the large majority of residents became aware of the tsunami warnings
through the media. Since, the event occurred during morning hours when people were
travelling to or attending work; it was relatively easy to reach people through this
communication method. If the event had occurred outside of waking hours other
warning methods would have been required to supplement the media. However, due to
the much lower number of people who would have been within the potential area of
concern during this event, the warning task would have been much smaller in scale.
There was some confusion in advice messages regarding what was meant by deep and
shallow water. Messages will now refer to geographical descriptions, such as open
ocean, harbours and estuaries, rather than depths.
• A lack of consequence information made operational decision making difficult,
reinforcing the need for detailed risk assessment work to be undertaken.
• Modern communication means that information is very quickly exchanged across State
borders. The need for consistent messages across state borders is vital to ensure that
warnings do not create confusion and the public can appropriately responded.
• It is the experience of the NSW SES and evident through post event reviews that the
majority of the community does not recognize tsunami as a hazard to the NSW coast and
hence believed that the event would not have any serious consequences. This experience
illustrates the need for community education programs to be delivered which raise
awareness regarding the tsunami hazard and appropriate actions to undertake in
response to tsunami warnings.
• It is vital that the media and other emergency services are aware of the structure of the
total tsunami warning system and that Bureau of Meteorology Tsunami Warnings are the
official warning products for Australia, and all broadcast information should be
consistent with the information contained within them. An education campaign has
been undertaken by the NSW SES in conjunction with Emergency Management Australia,
Geoscience Australia, NSW Department of Environment and Climate Change and the
Bureau of Meteorology to enhance the knowledge of the total tsunami warning system
amongst the media and emergency services. http://www.emergency.nsw.gov.au /media
/325.pdf

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 Chapter 11

Recommendations for Future Work

The full extent of the tsunami risk in the Pacific is poorly understood due to the very
short time period covered by historical records. An expert meeting recently held in
Nuku’alofa, Kingdom of Tonga (Nov. 2007) on “Paleo-earthquake and Tsunami History
of Active Plate Margins within the Pacific Islands Region”, concluded that very little is
known about tsunami risks within the Pacific Islands Region. As yet very few
paleoseismic and paleotsunami studies have been carried out to better determine overall
tsunami risk in the region. This leaves us handicapped in providing information that can
be used to evaluate community risk and build alert systems. Furthermore, an accurate
assessment of the true costs of tsunami events, incorporating economic, social, cultural,
political and environmental impacts, is needed for effective disaster reduction planning.
Inadequate understanding of the true costs result in inappropriate allocation of resources
for disaster management and missed opportunities for mitigation (Meheux et al, 2007).
Studies are needed not only of risk and vulnerability, but of traditional coping
strategies. Duffield (1993) pointed out that as much as 90% of emergency assistance or
“relief” is supplied through people’s own coping strategies, with just 10% coming from
external sources of aid. Techniques, plans, and procedures for hazard mitigation and
disaster management must be altered and adapted to fit the host culture. Traditional
cultural mores must play a central role in designing effective tsunami hazard mitigation
and disaster management strategies, plans, and practices. Furthermore, studies should be
carried out to evaluate and adjust to changing impacts and environments, including
climate, social, political and economic.
The unique nature of small island nations calls for integrated, multi-faceted studies
of natural hazards, which should be small-scale, particularly at the community level.
This should not be restricted to the conventional disaster impact assessors (usually civil
servants), but involve experts with experience in other communities with similar settings,
and include recent experience on the islands of Thailand, Indonesia, and the Maldives,
which were heavily impacted by the 2004 tsunami.
The following recommendations are made for the planning and implementation of
a successful tsunami hazard mitigation and disaster management program for U.S. Flag
and Affiliated Pacific Islands:

A. Review of current land use policies for U.S. Pacific Flag Islands related to natural
hazards.
B. Evaluation of previous, current and planned risk analysis, including geological
investigations of paleotsunamis and numerical modeling to determine risk and
measure vulnerability.

C. Carry out sensitivity analysis and develop a GIS database to be used for future policy
development and scenario planning purposes.

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D. Hazard mitigation and disaster management plans for each jurisdiction and locality.
1. Create an end-to-end communication system with built-in redundancy;
(a) Government agency operations communication system;
(b) Community-based appropriate technology communication system.
2. Create tsunami formal education components for local schools.
3. Create public education components for dissemination throughout
communities.

E. Create response and recovery plans and procedures.

1. Response Plans – These plans should be modeled on successful programs
such as those listed in Chapter 7:
· Hawaii County CERT training.
· NAO “Review of the Experiences of United Kingdom Nationals
Affected by the Indian Ocean Tsunami”.
· University of Washington “Tsunami Exercise Plan”.
· Hilo, Hawaii tsunami evacuation drills for schools.
· State of Oregon “Post-Exercise Evaluation”.
· State of California “Local Planning Guidance on Tsunami
Response”.
These plans should be customized to fit the culture, needs and capabilities
of the local communities.
2. Recovery Plans – These plans should be based on successful programs such as
those listed in Chapter 8:
· Cannon Beach Post-Disaster Recovery Planning Forum Summary
Report.
· Indonesia – “Aceh and Nias One Year after the Tsunami: Recovery
Effort and Way Forward”.
· “NGO Impact Initiative: An Assessment by the International
Humanitarian NGO Community”.
· “Pre-Disaster Planning for Catastrophic Disaster Recovery”.
· Guidance from the World Health Organization (WHO) “Immediate
Needs”.
These plans should be community-based, culturally sensitive and
specifically suited to the local area. The plans should contain an education
component. All documents should be dynamic with periodic review.

F. Create model prototype end-to-end tsunami hazard mitigation and disaster

management programs combining all of the above elements for selected test case
jurisdictions representing geographic and cultural end members to be used as
templates for broader implementation.

G. Create model training programs for:

1. “Train the Trainer” - Emergency management personnel and first responders
need to have more in-depth understanding of the nature of the tsunami
hazard, the impacts, and management of potential tsunami disasters than

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 do other members of the community. However, the nature of their duties
precludes the possibility of leaving their posts for extended periods of time
or as a group for the necessary training. The most effective alternative is
to have an individual in each unit (Civil Defense, Police, Fire, EMT, etc.)
become their unit trainer on the tsunami hazard. The unit trainer
understands the demands of the unit and can adapt training to best fit the
schedule and needs of the unit. They can offer continuing education,
passing along updates and changes in protocols, to their units. Training
these unit “trainers” is the most efficient, practical and cost-effective way
to provide specialized training about the tsunami hazard without
interfering with the necessary on-going operations of each unit. Training
for these unit trainers can include special seminars and short-courses, such
as those offered by the International Tsunami Training Institute at the
University of Washington in Seattle, or potentially a combination of on-
line courses and a hands-on capstone field course, as is being developed at
the University of Hawaii at Hilo.

2. Community-based field exercises.

H. Design and implement program evaluation instruments for prototypes.

I. Fully analyze strengths and weaknesses of prototype programs and modify

appropriately.

J. Implement full scale tsunami hazard mitigation programs throughout the entire region.

Ideal “Future” Mitigation

In order to create positive change during the brief window when both
government “will” and outside resources may be available, we suggest the following
post-event plans:

1. Re-siting infrastructure and habitation - Following the destructive 1960 Tsunami in

Hilo, Hawaii, the Hawaii Redevelopment Agency drafted an Urban Renewal Plan entitled
“The Kaiko’o Project". The plan called for the relocation of residents in the project zone,
located in downtown Hilo, to other areas of the island. Vacated lands and real estate were
acquired; vacated buildings and facilities were demolished and the area turned into a
grassy buffer of parkland.

2. Replacing unsustainable activities such as (over) fishing with more sustainable

activities such as estuary and pond-based aquaculture as carried out in Ranong Province,
Thailand following the 2004 tsunami. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACM215.pdf

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3. Create a “Day After” legislative package to be presented to the appropriate government
body immediately following the next catastrophic tsunami. This package would include
mitigation regulations, building code changes and public education components; in effect,
all the desired components of an ideal tsunami hazard mitigation and disaster
management program not yet realized.

Suggested Supplementary Projects:

1. Show how social science, in general, and the disciplines of sociology and psychology
should be used in the design of the hazard education products and disaster recovery plans
and procedures.
2. Evaluate all existing strategies, protocols, plans and procedures to deal with the visitor
industry and resorts, and recommend additional necessary strategies.
3. Create a compendium or report on tsunami signage around the world and tsunami
education facilities including museums, brochures, and memorials. Show examples and
discuss tactics.
4. Addressed reef resonance in models of tsunami inundation for island nations. Tropical
islands need special consideration with respect to the effect of coral reefs on tsunami
wave impact. A recent study of resonant periods of fringing reefs (Ahrouch, 2008)
indicated that the mean resonant period of the 53 reefs studied is 518 seconds, which
though toward the lower end, is still within the range of tsunami wave periods.
Furthermore, six of the 53 fringing reefs studied have periods exceeding 1000 seconds
(16.66 minutes).

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 Appendix A

Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report

U.S. Tsunami Preparedness - Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help

Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain

June 2006

Results In Brief:
The coastal areas of the five states bordering the Pacific Ocean and U.S.
territories in the Caribbean face the greatest tsunami hazard, but reliable and
comprehensive assessments of the potential impacts on people and infrastructure have
not been completed for many of these areas. According to NOAA, the general areas most
threatened by both distant and local tsunamis are Hawaii and the west coast states of
California, Oregon, and Washington, whereas Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands are threatened primarily by local tsunamis. Historically, the east coast and the
Gulf coast tsunami hazards are relatively low.
The at-risk communities we visited have taken actions to mitigate tsunami impacts
through planning, warning system improvements, public education, and infrastructure
protection; however, the level of implementation among these locations varies
considerably. Each of the six states we visited have FEMA-approved, all-hazard
mitigation plans that identify tsunami hazards; and most have taken the additional step of
identifying actions to mitigate those hazards, such as relocating critical facilities out of
inundation zones. However, only 4 of the 12 communities we visited have developed
FEMA-approved plans that include tsunami mitigation projects. Further, while all of the
states and communities we visited have developed some mechanisms for warning people
about a tsunami threat, communications problems may hamper some communities’
ability to receive and disseminate warnings in a timely manner. For example, during the
west coast tsunami warning in June 2005, many 911 dispatch centers and telephone lines
were overloaded, in some cases, preventing local emergency managers from quickly
disseminating the warning to other local officials and preventing telephone-based
warning systems from reaching residents. Moreover, while state and local officials
recognize the need to educate the public, key efforts identified by tsunami preparedness
experts—such as distributing evacuation maps and developing school curricula—have
not been consistently implemented across the states and communities we visited. For
example, only two of the six at-risk states we visited have developed and implemented
tsunami preparedness curricula in schools.

A-1
 In addition, few states and localities have implemented long-term mitigation
efforts such as land-use restrictions and building design codes to prevent loss of life and
reduce economic damage. Overall, state and local emergency managers attributed the
variability in tsunami preparedness efforts to a variety of factors, including their focus on
other higher priority natural hazards and a lack of funding. Furthermore, only a few
communities in coastal areas have chosen to participate in NOAA’s voluntary
TsunamiReady program, which is designed to help them take the initial steps in tsunami
mitigation. NOAA officials believe that TsunamiReady participation is limited because of
community perceptions of a low tsunami threat and perceived high cost versus benefit.
We are recommending that NOAA evaluate the TsunamiReady program to determine how
to increase participation by high-risk communities.
Efforts are under way to significantly expand federal tsunami detection and
related activities as well as the NTHMP; however, the future direction of these efforts is
uncertain because NOAA has not established long-range strategic plans to guide them.
Strategic plans are important because they help agencies set specific program goals and
objectives, define performance measures for assessing program effectiveness, ensure
coordination of existing activities and establish risk-based priorities. Prior to the Indian
Ocean tsunami in December 2004, NOAA’s various tsunami-related activities, such as
warning center operations, the TsunamiReady program, and tsunami-related research,
were not managed as a formal, integrated program. NOAA combined the activities in
2005 into a single program and is currently strengthening and expanding certain
elements of the program. However, NOAA has not yet adopted a comprehensive, risk-
based strategic plan to guide its expanded tsunami program into the future. NOAA
officials told us they expect to finalize such a plan during 2006. In addition, the plan that
NOAA is using to guide the NTHMP activities has not been updated since 1996, and the
program’s performance has not been formally assessed since 2001. As a result, some
issues raised in the 2001 assessment, such as lack of performance measures, remain
concerns of state NTHMP members today. Representatives of the five original high-
hazard NTHMP states are also concerned that the program’s funding decisions and
strategic direction may become less risk-based as states that face relatively low hazards
join the program. Without an updated, risk-based strategic plan for the expanded
NTHMP, NOAA will have difficulty ensuring that the most threatened states get the
resources they need to continue and complete key mitigation activities. We are
recommending that NOAA evaluate the NTHMP to determine what has worked well and
what high-priority activities remain to be completed and develop comprehensive risk-
based strategic plans for the Tsunami Program and NTHMP.

“U.S. Tsunami Preparedness - Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help

Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain” prepared by
the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) as a Report for
Congressional Committees and Senator Dianne Feinstein in June 2006, go to
http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/GAO_report_d06519.pdf to read the entire report.

A-2
 Appendix B

PUBLIC LAW 109–424—DEC. 20, 2006

TSUNAMI WARNING AND EDUCATION ACT

120 STAT. 2902 PUBLIC LAW 109–424—DEC. 20, 2006

Public Law 109–424

109th Congress

An Act
Dec. 20, 2006
[H.R. 1674]

To authorize and strengthen the tsunami detection, forecast, warning, and mitigation
program of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to be carried
out by the National Weather Service, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Tsunami
Warning and
Education Act
33 USC 3201
note.

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Tsunami Warning and Education
Act’’.

33 USC 3201.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) The term ‘‘Administration’’ means the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration.
(2) The term ‘‘Administrator’’ means the Administrator of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

33 USC 3202.

SEC. 3. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this Act are—
(1) to improve tsunami detection, forecasting, warnings,
notification, outreach, and mitigation to protect life and property
in the United States;
(2) to enhance and modernize the existing Pacific Tsunami
Warning System to increase coverage, reduce false alarms,
and increase the accuracy of forecasts and warnings, and to
expand detection and warning systems to include other vulnerable

B-1
 States and United States territories, including the Atlantic
Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico areas;
(3) to improve mapping, modeling, research, and assessment
efforts to improve tsunami detection, forecasting,
warnings, notification, outreach, mitigation, response, and
recovery;
(4) to improve and increase education and outreach activities
and ensure that those receiving tsunami warnings and
the at-risk public know what to do when a tsunami is
approaching;
(5) to provide technical and other assistance to speed international
efforts to establish regional tsunami warning systems
in vulnerable areas worldwide, including the Indian Ocean;
and
(6) to improve Federal, State, and international coordination
for detection, warnings, and outreach for tsunami and
other coastal impacts.

(See: http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/education/science/docs/bern3043/bern3043_
appendixE.pdf
Or for complete version: http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/B?r110:@FIELD
(FLD003+d)+@FIELD (DDATE+20070104)

B-2
 Appendix C

Lodging Facility Preparedness Questionnaire

This questionnaire has been filled out with answers as an example of the
response of a typical small to medium sized lodging facility. The fictitious facility is the
Oceanside Motel in Waldport. All answers are fabrications and do not reflect the
situation of any particular coastal lodging facility.

The following questions will guide you through the issues that you will need to
address to make a preparation plan for your facility. Answering these questions will
essentially produce a preparation plan for the time that a major earthquake/tsunami will
strike the Oregon Coast. Some of the questions will not apply to your facility, and as you
go along, you probably will think of other issues that are not addressed in this
questionnaire.

General Questions:

Is my facility within the inundation zone for a local tsunami (30-50’ above mean sea
level)? Yes No

Is my facility within the inundation zone for a tsunami generated by a distant earthquake
(15-20’ above mean sea level, the present base of the sea cliffs is generally around 10-14’
above mean sea level)? Yes No

How long does it take to walk from my facility to an area outside of the tsunami
inundation zone? It takes 10 minutes for a fit person, 20 minutes for a person with
disabilities

Where is the community-designated assembly area that is closest to my facility?

Waldport Elementary School

What is the most direct walking evacuation route to the nearest community designated
assembly area?
Go up 5th Street to Hayes Drive; take a right on Hayes, follow Hayes to Marble Lane, the
school is at the end of Marble Lane

Does this route cross any bridges that might be knocked out in an earthquake? Yes No

C-1
What is an alternative evacuation route, if the most direct route is blocked, or otherwise
unusable?
Walk over two blocks to 3rd Street, then go up 3rd Street to Hayes Drive or Gilbert
Blvd., if Hayes is blocked then continue up 3rd Street to Van Buren, and turn right. You
will need to back track from Van Buren to Hayes, when you get to the area of the school.

If there is no community-designated assembly area near my facility, where is the nearest

safe-area where my staff and guests will be told to rendezvous?

Does my facility have a NOAA weather radio? Yes No

Where is it located and how will it be monitored for announcements? It is in the office
behind the front desk. Anyone in that office can hear it, as well as the receptionist at the
front desk.

If my facility does not have a NOAA weather radio, does it have a battery-powered
radio? Yes No Where is it located?

How will my staff contact me or other managers in case we are away from the facility
during the tsunami evacuation? I will expect my staff to call me on my cell phone, as they
usually do for questions or for emergencies.

Does my facility have a disaster kit? Yes No

What does the kit contain (see Red Cross and business brochures)? It contains a couple of
flashlights, extra batteries, some Powerbars, matches and fire starting materials, a gallon
of bleach, a couple of cases of bottled water, disposable cameras.

Where is it located? It’s in the storage unit where we keep extra supplies on 4th Street

Is it easily accessible if my facility is within the inundation zone? Yes No

Will it be accessible after a major local earthquake? Yes No

What agency is responsible for emergency management in the local area of my facility?
The Lincoln County Emergency Services Department and the Central Oregon Coast Fire
and Rescue District

What is the contact information for that agency?

Central Oregon Coast Fire and Rescue District Lincoln County Emergency Services
P.O. Box 505 Courthouse Room 103
225 West Olive Street
Waldport, OR 97394 Newport, OR 97365
Office Phone: (541) 563-3121 Office Phone: (541) 265-4199
Office Fax: (541) 563-3190 Office Fax: (541) 265-4197

C-2
Evacuation Questions:

Who is in charge of making decisions about an evacuation from my facility? I am in

charge—in case I am absent or on vacation, the receptionist has the authority to make
evacuation decisions.

Is the same person/position in charge at night? Yes No

Are there official warning sirens in the area of my facility? Yes No

If warning sirens exist, what is the signal for a local tsunami?

Is the siren signal different for a distant tsunami?

What is the siren signal for the “all clear”?

If warning sirens do not exist, how will I know that a local tsunami may be coming?
After reading the tsunami literature I will know that a local tsunami is coming if we
experience a strong earthquake.

What other kind of community notification system for a distant tsunami exists for my
facility? I don’t think that we have a community notification system, so I am relying on
announcements from the NOAA weather radio to alert us to the danger of a distant
tsunami.

How do I plan to deal with our responsibility to notify guests that a local tsunami
(minutes before the tsunami arrives) may be on its way and that they need to evacuate? I
will have someone make an announcement using the bullhorn. They will go to the
stairways and halls, as well as the RV Park.

How will my notification plan differ for a distant tsunami (hours before the tsunami
arrives)? The telephone switchboard will be the best way to notify guests for a distant
tsunami. We have a message prepared that we can hook into the automatic wake-up
system.

How will the notification plan for a local tsunami work if:
The electricity is out? The bullhorn is battery-operated

The phone system is out? The plan does not use the phone system for notification of a
local tsunami.

It is daytime and most guests are away from the facility? It will still work, although we
may not get much response.

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It is nighttime and most guests are asleep? I am assuming that the earthquake will wake
everyone up, but in case it doesn’t I will ask the person with the bullhorn to knock on
doors.

How do I expect my staff to handle the evacuation of elderly, disabled, or physically

handicapped guests? Evacuation of the elderly and otherwise disabled people will begin
immediately after the earthquake. We will try to get other guests to assist people who
really need help. For those who are completely immobile, we will use their wheelchairs
and/or the wheelchair that we keep in the front desk office closet. If there are too many
we will use the cart on the riding lawnmower, or perhaps the laundry supply cart.

How do I expect my staff to deal with non-English speaking guests during an evacuation?
It depends on what language they speak. If it is Spanish, we will rely on Maria, who is
our Spanish-speaking maid. I speak a little French and Italian, and Rachel speaks some
German. John knows a little Japanese from his service in the military.

Staff Evacuation Responsibility Questions:

Do my staff members know how to protect themselves during a major earthquake

followed by a tsunami? Yes No

How do I plan to communicate information about earthquake and tsunami personal

preparedness to my employees? We hold a “drop, cover, and hold” drill every six
months—one which is announced and one which is unannounced.

Is my staff trained in the way that I want them to react to a tsunami evacuation in terms
of my facility and guests? Yes No

How often does that training occur, and what form does it take? We will go over the
evacuation plan once a year. I will make sure that all new employees are briefed on
evacuation procedures and the evacuation plan when they are first hired.

Do I expect all my staff members to stay at the facility until all of the guests are
evacuated? Yes No

If all of my staff members are not expected to stay, then who is expected to stay? I expect
the front desk staff to stay until the evacuation announcement has been made. I expect
other staff to help with the evacuation of the elderly and physically disabled. If any guest
resists evacuation, then we will warn them of the dangers, but I do not expect any of my
staff members to stay behind to take care of reluctant guests.

How does this expectation change for a local vs. distant tsunami? For a distant tsunami I
expect all of the staff members to stay and help with the evacuation. They will be allowed
to call their families to warn them about the dangers and to make arrangements to meet
them after the evacuation is over. If any guest resists evacuation, then I do not expect any
of my staff to stay behind to take care of them.
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When will I allow my staff members to seek out their family members and determine
their safety? For a local tsunami I expect them to look for their families after they have
reached the evacuation assembly area with the guests that they are helping. For a distant
tsunami, see the answer to the previous question.

What tasks do I want my staff to perform during an evacuation?

First priority? The first priority of the staff is to make sure that the guests are notified that
a tsunami is expected to hit the motel and Waldport.

Second priority? heir second priority is to help with the evacuation. The receptionist on
duty needs to take a copy of the registered guests as well as the receipts and money in the
cash drawer.

Which of my employees are trained in CPR and first aid? John and I have training in both
CPR and first aid. Rachel has CPR training, and took the first aid class 10 years ago.

Does my staff know the locations of the main turn-off valves and switches for the gas,
electricity, and water services? Yes No

Who will be responsible for turning off the gas, electricity and water? John will be
responsible for turning off the utilities. If John isn’t around, then any of the rest of the
staff can be assigned to do it. Locations of all of the valves and switches are shown on a
motel map attached to this plan.

Where have I posted, for my staff, the contact information for the local emergency
management agency? A list of emergency contacts is posted in the staff break room. In
addition a list is kept on each maid cart and in the handyman’s shop. The front desk has a
more extensive list over the switchboard.

Guest Preparedness Questions:

What information will I provide to my guests about general personal tsunami

preparedness and evacuation? Every room has a laminated copy of the evacuation
brochure for Waldport in the same drawer as the phone book. In addition, we have a
table-topper on the top of the TV that gives the basics for tsunami preparedness.

What information will I provide to my guests about a tsunami evacuation from my

facility? When they check in we will provide them with the map of the motel that also
has the route to the assembly area shown on a small map.

What form will this information take? See above

How will I provide information to non-English speaking guests? I have no plans to

provide information to non-English speaking guests, because we don’t get that many of
them.
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Business Preparedness Questions:

Do my staff members have a procedure for taking the guest registration information to
the assembly area during an evacuation? Yes No

If yes, what is the procedure and who is responsible? At the ends of their shifts the
receptionists and night clerks will print out a list of all registered guests.

Do my staff members have a secure way to take the money receipts and guest credit card
information along to the assembly area during an evacuation? Yes No
If yes, what is the procedure and who is responsible? The receptionist or night clerk will
be responsible to emptying the cash drawer into our usual bank deposit bag. They will
take it with them when they evacuate. If I am at the facility at the time of the evacuation I
will be responsible for this task.

What is my insurance coverage? All of our insurance is with Mutual of Enumclaw. Our
policy is through Bob Jones, phone number 541/368-4295. We have liability insurance as
well as full coverage on the contents and structures. We have flood insurance which
covers tsunamis, and another policy that is earthquake insurance.

Where is information kept about my insurance coverage? Aside from this information,
the policy is kept in the second drawer down in the gray filing cabinet next to my desk in
the office. The folder is marked “Insurance Policies”.

Do I have a way to record the damage to the facility for documentation in later insurance
claims? Yes No

What is it and where is it located? We have a video camera and it is kept in the bottom
drawer of the gray filing cabinet next to my desk in the office. If that does not work, there
are several disposable cameras in the disaster supply kit.

Do I have a list of my principal suppliers? Yes No

Which suppliers are within the inundation zone? Mary’s Janitorial Supplies, Staples, and
Home Depot

What alternative suppliers are available? Clean ‘R Us is in Newport, Jones Hardware and
Lumber, and Smith Stationery is in Waldport

Do I have a back-up plan for my business files and records? Yes No

Are those backup files and records presently kept within the inundation zone? Yes No

C-6
What are alternative storage sites? We could put the back-up disks for the computer in
the storage unit on 4th St. I have copies of my files on my laptop, and also on my home
computer.

What pieces of machinery and computer equipment are essential to the smooth operation
of my business? Laundry machines, RV dump station, front desk computers and my
computers

What is my back-up plan for the repair or replacement of any damaged equipment?
No plan at this time. I can bring my home computer in to work, if it is not damaged.

Post-Disaster Questions:

How do I find out if the “all clear” has been given and the danger of more tsunamis is
past? The fire station will give a signal with the fire whistle. If that isn’t working then the
police will come to the assembly area and make announcements on a bullhorn.

What will I expect my staff and guests to do during aftershocks? For all large magnitude
aftershocks we will follow the same evacuation procedures as the first earthquake. For
smaller magnitude quakes we will take cover during the quake and then check on the
guests after each quake.

How will I get an assessment of the structural damage to my facility? The city
engineering staff will assess all of the public buildings before anyone is allowed to go
back into them.

What is the procedure to account for all registered guests after an evacuation? We will
check people off at the assembly area against the registered guest list.

What actions will my staff take regarding guests who are not accounted for? If they are
still missing after 48 hours we will report them to the authorities and try to call the phone
number that they gave on their registration. We will also go into their rooms to look for
possible emergency contacts in their belongings.

How will I keep guests and staff from re-entering an unsafe structure to retrieve their
belongings? We will put big Keep Out-Danger signs on all the doors. I or another staff
member will also warn all of the guests at the assembly area not to re-enter the building
until after the city inspection is complete. We will not go in to rescue any guests if they
insist on entering the building and then have problems.

What alternative lodging arrangements might be available for my guests if my facility is

no longer safe? No plans are made at this time.

How will I tell my guests about alternative arrangements, and who will pay for those
arrangements? Unknown

C-7
How will I handle refunds for guests who cut their stay short? Their credit cards will be
credited, or they will receive a check refund within a month.

How will I get in touch with employees to come in and help with the disaster relief? I will
call people’s cell phones.

Do I expect my staff to help with search and rescue efforts within my facility? Yes No

Where are extrication tools stored? In John’s workshop and in the 4th Street storage unit

Do I plan to stockpile supplies for use during the period immediately following the
disaster? Yes No

What are those supplies and where will they be stored? Other than the disaster kit we
don’t plan to store any extra supplies besides the extra that we usually have on hand.

Who will know about the stored items and how to access them?

What agencies will be available to help me with my post-disaster problems? FEMA in

Portland, Small Business Administration in Salem

What are the contact numbers of those agencies?

FEMA 503/123-4567
SBA 541/987-6543

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 Appendix D

The Buddy System

The City of Yachats, Oregon is located on the central Oregon coast and is home to
just over 600 full-time residents. Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the City
conducted several tsunami evacuation drills. In June 2006, an actual tsunami warning was
issued following an earthquake off the California Coast. A local resident, who
participated in both the drill and the warning, realized that many residents in the City
were elderly or disabled and were not able to evacuate on their own. Determined to do
something to help these special needs populations, the resident created a “Neighbor
Helping Neighbor” Program.

The program’s creator used word of mouth to get the program’s message out to
residents. The program includes a volunteer registry of those who require additional
assistance and gives those individuals a placard to place in a front window of their home.
Residents are educated to look for these placards in the event of an evacuation order so
that they can provide assistance to those who need it. Once a resident who needs
assistance has been helped, the placard is removed from the window.

On the following page is a form that can be useful in creating a Buddy System program.

D-1
 Tsunami Evacuation “Buddy System”

Please fill out this form if you need a “Buddy” or if you can be a “Buddy.”

Need a “Buddy” ____ Or Can be a “Buddy”_____

Name:

Address:

Phone:

If you need a “Buddy” and have a neighbor or family member that can be a “Buddy” and be
responsible for getting you to the safety area during an evacuation please list their information
below.

Name:

Address:

Phone:

This will help us organize our community and see that everyone reaches safety during an
emergency. We will deliver a window placard to your home when we receive the form and
have confirmed a “Buddy” for you.

Please fill out this form and give it to your community tsunami mitigation representative.

D-2
 Appendix E

Lessons Learned from the 26 December 2004 Tsunami Disaster in

Thailand

Among several beaches in Phuket Island, the impact of tsunami was reported to
be highest in Kamala and Patong Beaches. The maximum height of tsunami waves above
the tide level at that time was about 4 to 5 meters, while the inundation depth was about 2
meters. The first sign of tsunami attack was the withdrawal of the sea. Many people were
surprised and went to see the exposed seabed. Many of them were killed or seriously
injured as the sea withdrawal was shortly followed by a high tsunami wave. At Kamala
Beach, three tsunami waves struck the shore at 9.54, 10.14 and 10.57 am, respectively,
and the 2nd and 3rd waves were higher than the 1st wave.
After the water had receded, a great amount of debris which was floating during
the tsunami flooding finally deposited on ground and water marks could be observed on
building walls. The damage seemed disproportionately severe compared with what would
be expected from a normal flooding of similar height. The high hydrodynamic pressure
due to high-velocity water and the collision of floating debris appeared to be the main
causes of the severe damage.
The wave heights vary considerably from site to site, and the maximum height
occurred at Khao Lak in Phang-Nga Province. This area has many luxurious hotels and
was quite popular for foreign tourists, especially those from Europe. Water marks in the
form of stripped roof tiles on the 2-story building indicates that the flow depth in Khao
Lak area was as high as 7 to 8 meters. The flow velocity in this area was estimated to be
about 6 to 8 m/s, and hence a very high hydrodynamic pressure of about 20 to 30 kN/m2 was
exerted on buildings and obstacles by tsunami waves. Due to these extremely high flow
depth and pressure, Khao Lak was the hardest-hit area with the largest death toll. Most
of the resorts surveyed sustained heavy to complete damage.
A reinforced concrete building facing Kuk-kak Beach in Khao Lak was completely
destroyed by tsunami impact, while another concrete building in Khao Lak Princess
Resort (Ban Bang Sak) was overturned. These are only a few examples of many
completely damaged buildings in this area. One damage pattern commonly found in
reinforced concrete frame buildings is the breaking of frame-infill masonry walls. These
walls are generally 100 mm thick. They are much weaker than reinforced concrete frame
members, and they could not withstand high hydrodynamic pressure or impact of major
floating debris carried by the strong current. Breaking of infill masonry walls,
particularly in the first story, can be found in many sites where the flow depth was about
2 m or higher. The flow height did not reach the 2nd story of a 2-story building, but it
was able to demolish all infill masonry walls at the 1st story.
We observed that in general reinforced concrete frames in which infill walls had
been completely ripped away were still in good condition—no damage or major cracks

E-1
found in reinforced concrete columns, beams, and beam-column joints. The breaking of
infill walls seemed to help saving the reinforced concrete frame structures by reducing
the lateral pressure load on the structures. Therefore, to improve the safety of reinforced
concrete frame buildings in the tsunami affected areas, infill masonry walls in the 1st
story (and the 2nd story in some areas) might be replaced by weaker (and lighter) panels
that could be easily ripped away by the water. These observation and design
improvement concept are well in line with those made by several investigators of past
tsunami disasters.
Another type of frequently observed damage to buildings in tsunami affected
areas is the severe scouring of supporting sand underneath building spread footings,
leading to foundation failure. This severe scouring was caused by highly turbulent and
strong tsunami induced currents. We have also found severe scouring of roads and wall
foundations in many sites, particularly in beach front areas.
Another type of failure associated with shallow spread footings. Several buildings
at Ton Sai Bay were floated and displaced from their original positions. As spread
footings were commonly used for low-rise buildings in Phuket and several southern
provinces of Thailand, this issue was widely discussed among design engineers in several
forums. Many engineers suggested that the use of spread footings for buildings in
tsunami hazard areas should be forbidden, and that pile foundations should be used
instead to improve the resistant to scouring, undercutting, and flotation effects.
One important feature of tsunami flooding we have learned from this survey is
that strong current tsunami waves carried with them a great amount of debris including
cars and boats. We found pieces of wood, furniture parts, refrigerators, trees, metal
(zinc) roof sheets, sand and mud in the debris. High-density debris in tsunami waves is
certainly one of the key factors that are responsible for a large number of tsunami
victims.
Many cars were rolled, pushed around, hit by floating debris, or thrown against
buildings and obstacles. Many fishing boats were pushed from the shore toward the land
and crashed into buildings. One patrol boat was transported into as far as 1.2 km in land
at Ban Bang Neing in Khao Lak area. The largest object that was displaced by tsunami
waves is a battleship of Royal Thai Navy. The ship was tossed on to the shore in front of a
naval base at Tab-lamu pier in Phang-Nga.
While the southern and central parts of Phang-Nga have several resort hotels, the
northern part is still a rural area with fishery and agricultural villages. In a populated
fishery village named Ban Nam Khem, more than a thousand of residents were killed, and
most reinforced concrete residential buildings and masonry structures for shrimp
farming suffered heavy damage. The survey team also visited one fisherman village
named Ban Pak Jok in Phra-thong Island—a small island located just off the northern
coast of Phang-Nga. In this village, all wooden fisherman houses and small light-frame
concrete buildings were completely wiped out. All survivors were evacuated from the
island and resettled in the northern coast of Phang-Nga. We saw evidence in this village
and in many other sites (such as Phakarang Cape) that wooden houses, compared with
normal reinforced concrete frame buildings, are much more vulnerable to tsunami
impact. At sites where reinforced concrete buildings were lightly or moderately damaged,
wooden houses would be severely damaged or completely destroyed.

E-2
The finding suggests that wood construction should be as much as possible avoided in
tsunami hazard areas.
In Ban Pak Jok village, only one structure was left intact: a reinforced concrete
water tank tower. It reminded us of a tsunami tower in Japan, in which people can easily
evacuate from low-lying ground to its high-level platform during the tsunami flooding.
Since the whole area of Phra-thong Island is very flat and surrounded by sea, it would be
very difficult to find a safe (high-level) ground for the evacuation in the next tsunami
event. Hence, reinforced concrete tsunami towers seem to be a practical solution in this
case.
Prior to this event, a tsunami disaster of this scale was considered by the Thai
public to be impossible. This general belief was simply based on the fact that such
disaster has never happened before in the history of Thailand. They also believed that
the risks from other natural disasters (such as earthquakes) were also very low and
limited to a small scale. Most decision makers in the government paid not so much
attention to planning and preparation to mitigate the risks or supporting more
scientific researches to understand the risks. The emphasis was only placed on
emergency response measures.
After the event, the attitude of the general public and government officials
towards natural disasters has changed significantly. They are now much more
interested to learn about these natural disasters and their potential impacts. They are
also more ready invest their money on making and ensuring a safe environment. It
seems that the Thai public has also learned a very important lesson from this tsunami
disaster. http://www.cv.titech.ac.jp/~jsps/workshopG3/Proceedings/PDF%20papers/02_
Pennung.pdf

E-3
 Appendix F

Tsunami Information Databases

National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC)

Extensive tsunami data can b e found at the National Geophysical Data Center
(NGDC) website. Since December 26, 2004, there have been several major tsunamis
(Indian Ocean, December 26, 2004; Kuril Islands, November 15, 2006; Kuril Islands,
January 13, 2007; Solomon Islands, April 1, 2007; and Peru, August 15, 2007). Data on
the event, runups, photos, calculated travel time maps and interactive maps can be found
at http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsu.shtml

Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

The Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) of United Nations

Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) was established in 1960
and has successfully coordinated the Pacific Tsunami Warning System (PTWS) for the
Pacific Ocean since 1968. After the Sumatra tsunami on December 26, 2004, the IOC
received the mandate to help all UNESCO Member States of the Indian Ocean rim to
establish their own Tsunami Early Warning System (IOTWS).

Tsunami Warning Systems (TWS’s), owned and operated by Member States,

collect, distribute and interpret continuously all available seismic and sea level data for
the existence and propagation of a tsunami. They issue timely and clear warnings for
their area of operation and exchange these data and information with other national and
international centers. Complementary and sustained activities in tsunami hazard risk
assessment, tsunami warning training, emergency response, and preparedness are part of
the comprehensive tsunami mitigation programs that extend the TWS’s as end-to-end
systems. http://www.ioc-tsunami.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1

F-1
 Appendix G

References and Resources

[Note: Citations follow the Modern Language Association of America (MLA)

style. Most bibliographic references to printed works contain only one date, the
date of publication. A citation of an electronic work, however, normally requires
two and sometimes more dates to be identified fully. Since electronic texts can be
readily altered, an online source must be considered unique each time it is
accessed. Typically, then, a citation for an online text contains the date assigned
to the document in the source as well as the date of access—that is the date on
which you viewed it. For a work with a prior or simultaneous print existence, it
may be necessary, then, to give three dates --- the date of the print publication, if
provided; the date of the electronic publication; and the date of access—for the
document may have been different at each stage (Gibaldi 5.9.1).

MLA Reference:

Gibaldi, Joseph. MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers. 6th ed. New
York: The Modern Language Association of America, 2003. March 9, 2009
www.mla.org]

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G-1
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G-4
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“IOC Tsunami Information.” UNESCO/IOC. 2008. February 6, 2009

http://www.ioc-tsunami.org/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1

ITIC - International Tsunami Information Centre. February 6, 2009

http://ioc3.unesco. org/itic/

Jackson, R. 2008. Personal communication to Jeanne Johnston.

G-6
“Kamphuan Memorial Tsunami Museum Opens in Ranong Province.” United
States Agency for International Development – USAID/ASIA. 2007.
February 6, 2009 http://www.usaid.gov/rdma/articles/press_release_233.html

Kerr, J., S. Nathan, R. Van Dissen, P. Webb, D. Brunsdon, A. King, A. “Planning

for Development of Land on or Close to Active Faults.” Ministry for the
Environment, New Zealand. 2003. February 6, 2009 http://www.gns.cri.nz/
services/hazardsplanning/ downloads/planningforactivefaults0704.pdf

King, D.N.T., J. Goff, A. Skipper. “Facing Natural Hazards with Maori

Environmental Knowledge.” National Institute of Water & Atmospheric Research
Ltd. New Zealand. 2006. February 6, 2009 http://www.niwa.cri.nz/ pubs/ wa/ma/
16-2/hazards

Le Duc, A. “Disaster Planning for Catastrophic Disasters Recovery.” Disaster

Planning for Catastrophic Disasters Recovery. February 6, 2009
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/cz/2007/Coastal_Zone_07_Proceedings/PDFs/Wednesd
ay_Abstracts/3131.LeDuc.pdf

“Lessons Learned from the Tsunami.” Tsunami Evaluation Coalition. February 6,

2009 http://www.tsunami-evaluation.org/Other+Evaluations+and+Reviews/
Lessons+ Learned.htm

“Local Governance in Tsunami Recovery: Lessons Learned and Emerging

Principles.” United Nations Developmental Program. 2006. February 6, 2009
http://www.un.org.in/untrs/reports/Local_Gov_Tsunami_ Recovery_200601.pdf

“Local Planning Guidance on Tsunami Response: A Supplement to the

Emergency Planning Guidance for Local Governments.” State of California
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. 2nd ed. 2007. February 6, 2009
http://www.oes.ca.gov/ Operational/OESHome.nsf

“Maldives Training Course in Seismology and Tsunami Warnings.” Maldives

Training Course in Seismology and Tsunami Warnings. 2006. February 6, 2009
http://apps.develebridge.net/usiotws/4/SeismicTraining_Maldives_Aug06.pdf

“Marin County Tsunami Evacuation Planning Map.” Marin County Office of

Emergency Services. February 6, 2009 http://www.marinsheriff.org/
uploads/documents/ Tsunami %20-
%20County%20Coastal%20all%20mappdf.pdf

McAdoo, B., J. Baumwoll and A. Moore. “Indigenous Knowledge Saved Lives

during 2007 Solomon Islands Tsunami.” United Nations International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction. 2008. February 6, 2009 http://www.unisdr.org/ eng/about_
isdr/isdr-publications/19-Indigenous_Knowledge-DRR/Indigenous_Knowledge-
DRR.pdf

G-7
Meadows, D., and D. Brosnan. “Lessons for Minimizing Impacts to Coral Reef
and Other Ecosystems from the 2004 Tsunami.” American Fisheries Society
Symposium. 2008.

Méheux, K., D. Dominey-Howes, and K. Lloyd. "Natural Hazard Impacts in

Small Island Developing States: A Review of Current Knowledge and Future
Research Needs". Natural Hazards. vol. 40. 2007: 429-446.

Meyers, K. and Watson, P. “Legend, Ritual and Architecture on the Ring of Fire.”
Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 2008. February 6, 2009
http://www.unisdr.org/eng/about_isdr/isdr-publications/19-Indigenous_
Knowledge-DRR/Indigenous_Knowledge-DRR.pdf

Murphy, Ken. “After Action Report West Coast Tsunami Warning June 14,
2005.” Oregon.gov. 2005. Oregon Emergency Management. February 3, 2009
http://www.oregon.gov/OMD/OEM/plans_train/Tsunami/oem_tsunami_warning_
report_06_14_05.pdf.

“National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC).” Tsunami Database. 2008.

February 6, 2009 http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazard/tsu.shtml

“National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program.” National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). 2008. March 7, 2009
http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/index.html

“Natural Hazards and Vulnerabilities Atlas.” 2008. Pacific Disaster Center.

February 10, 2009 http://www.pdc.org/atlas/html/atlas-init.jsp

“Natural Hazard Mitigation Saves: An Independent Study to Assess the Future

Savings from Mitigation Activities.” Multi-hazard Mitigation Council. 2005.
Washington, D.C. http://www.floods.org/PDF/MMC_Volume1_Findings
ConclusionsRecommendations.pdf

“New South Wales Tsunami Emergency Management State Plan.” Sub Plan of
the NSW State Disaster Plan (State Displan). 2005. February 6, 2009
http://www.emergency.nsw. gov.au/media/325.pdf

“NGO Impact Initiative: An Assessment by the International Humanitarian NGO

Community.” Refugees International. 2006. February 6, 2009
http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/ngo-impact-initiative-
assessment-tsunami-response

“NOAA and Tsunamis.” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA). 2007. March 7, 2009 http://www.publicaffairs.noaa.gov/
grounders/tsunamis.html

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“On the Shores of Paradise.” Coastal Geology Group. 2008. February 6, 2009
http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/coasts/publications/shores/4Quakes_and_tsunami_
FLETCHER-final.pdf

“Oregon Geology Fact Sheet: Tsunami Hazards in Oregon.” Oregon Department

of Geology and Mineral Industries. 2008. February 6, 2009
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/publications/tsunami-factsheet_onscreen.pdf

Ossewaarde, R., A. Nijhof, L. Heyse. “Dynamics of NGO Legitimacy: How

Organizing Betrays Core Missions of NGOs.” University of Groningen. 2008.
The Netherlands. February 6, 2009 http://www3.interscience.wiley .com/
journal/117899977/abstract

“Pacific Risk Management Ohana (PRiMO).” National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS). February 6, 2009
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/psc/FHMPPI/

“Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC).” National Oceanic and Atmospheric

Administration (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS). February 6, 2009
http://www.prh.noaa.gov/ptwc/

Papadopoulos, Dean. “The Benefits of Culture.” Pacific Educator. 2008.

Honolulu. February 6, 2009 http://www.prel.org/products/paced/ spring08 /
14_culture.pdf

“Partnerships in Preparedness: A Compendium of Exemplary Practices in

Emergency Management.” United States Federal Emergency Management
Agency. 1995. Washington, D.C. February 16, 2009
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/ managers/exp_v2.pdf

Perez, F. Y. L. “Survival Tactics of Indigenous People.” Waves of Devastation.

2005. February 6, 2009 http://academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/LEEPERFY/

Pierson, T., K. Scott, and N. Wood, N., et al. Volcano-hydrologic Hazards.

Cambridge: University Press, 2008.

“Pre-Hazard Mitigation Grant Program.” Federal Emergency Management

Agency (FEMA). March 7, 2009 http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/pdm/

Redwood-Campbell, L. J., and L.Riddez. “Tsunami Medical Care: Health

Problems Encountered in the International Committee of the Red Cross Hospital
in Banda Aceh, Indonesia.” Prehospital and Disaster Medicine, January –
February 2006. 2005. February 6, 2009 http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu

Rice, Allison, and Kelly Haynes, et al. Post-Tsunami Reconstruction and

Tourism: A Second Disaster? London: Stapleton House, 2005.

G-9
Rieff, D. “Tsunamis, Accountability and the Humanitarian Circus.” Humanitarian
Exchange Magazine. 2005. February 6, 2009 http://www.odihpn.org/ report.
asp?id=2711

Robertson, Ian N. 2008. Personal communication to Jeanne Johnston.

Sarkar, A. K., R. Panda, M. Sahoo, and R. Samuel. “Evolving Strategies for

Long-Term Rehabilitation on Shelter and Habitat Development in the Tsunami
Affected Areas of Tamil Nadu.” United Nations Development Programme. 2005.
February 6, 2009 http://www.un.org.in/untrs/reports/shelter_ rehabilitation_
report_tsunami.pdf

Saunders, W., and P. Glassey. “Guidelines for Assessing Policy Planning and
Consent Requirements for Landslide-prone Land.” GNS Science. 2007.
Miscellaneous Series 7. February 6, 2009 http://www.gns.cri.nz/services/
hazardsplanning/downloads/ landslideguidelines.pdf

“South Pacific Tsunami.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs. 2007. OCHA Situation Report No. 3. February 6, 2009
http://www.reliefweb.int/ rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=TS-2007-
000042-SLB&rc=5

“State of Alaska Emergency Alert System.” State of Alaska, Division of

Homeland Security and Emergency Management. 2008. February 6, 2009
http://www.ak-prepared.com/IMAWS/eas.htm

Stevens, R., G. Hall, J. Sexton. “Tsunami Planning and Preparation in Western

Australia: Application of Scientific Modeling and Community Engagement.” The
Australian Journal of Emergency Management. 2008. Vol. 23, No. 4, November
2008. February 6, 2009 http://www.ema.gov.au/ agd/EMA/ rwpattach.nsf/VAP/
(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~AJEM_Nov08_Hall_Stevens_Sex
ton.PDF/$file/AJEM_Nov08_Hall_Stevens_Sexton.PDF

“Thailand Post-Tsunami Sustainable Coastal Livelihoods Program.” United States

Agency for International Development. 2007. February 6, 2009
http://pdf.usaid.gov /pdf_docs/PDACM215.pdf

“The Boy Who Cried, ‘Wolf!’ or Why a Community-based Alert System is a

Good Idea.” Case Studies on Mitigating Disasters in Asia and the Pacific. Asian
Disaster Preparedness Center. 2007. February 6, 2009 http://www.adpc.net/
v2007/ IKM/ONLINE% 20DOCUMENTS/Default-DOCUMENTS.asp

G-10
“The Tsunami Threat to California: Findings and Recommendations on Tsunami
Hazards and Risks.” State of California Seismic Safety Commission. 2005.
February 6, 2009 http://www.seismic.ca.gov/pub/ CSSC%2005-03%20
Tsunami%20Findings.pdf

“Tips and Information about Tsunami.” Washington Military Department,

Emergency Management Division. February 6, 2009
http://emd.wa.gov/hazards/haz_tsunami.shtml

“Tsunami Drill - Taft and Cutler City, Lincoln City, Oregon: Post-Exercise
Report Lincoln County School District.” Oregon Department of Geology and
Mineral Industries. 2006. February 6, 2009 http://www.oregongeology.org/sub/
earthquakes/ Coastal/ TsuDrillLincolnCity2006.pdf

“Tsunami Education, Preparation, and Recovery Project for Downtown Hilo.”

Hawaii County Resource Center. February 6, 2009 http://www.hcrc.info/disaster-
preparedness/tsunami/downtown-hilo/

“Tsunami Evacuation Brochures and Map.” Washington Military Department,

Emergency Management Division. February 6, 2009 http://emd.wa.gov/ hazards/
haz_tsunami.shtml

“Tsunami Evacuation Maps for Selected Oregon Coastal Communities.” Oregon

Department of Geology and Mineral Industries. February 6, 2009
http://www.oregongeology.com/sub/earthquakes/Coastal/Tsubrochures.htm

“Tsunami Gallery.” Puerto Rico Tsunami Warning and Mitigation Program. 2008.
February 6, 2009 http://poseidon.uprm.edu/gallery.html

“Tsunami Glossary, 2008.” Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission.

UNESCO. 2008. Paris. February 6, 2009
http://ioc3.unesco.org/itic/files/tsunami_glossary_small.pdf

“Tsunami Observer Program.” Pacific Tsunami Museum. February 6, 2009

http://www.tsunami.org/programs.html

“Tsunami Resilient Community Planning Exercise for Cuddalore, India.”

Certificate Program in Tsunami Science and Preparedness. University of
Washington, Seattle. February 6, 2009
http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/education/TsuSciPrep.html

“Tsunami: the Great Waves.” United States Department of Commerce, National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service. 2008.
Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission. February 6, 2009
http://www.weather.gov/os/ brochures/ tsunami/htm

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“Tsunami Warning Center Reference Guide.” United States Indian Ocean
Tsunami Warning System Program (US/IOTWS). 2007. March 5, 2009
http://apps.develebridge.net/usiotws/b/TsunamiWarningCenter%20Guide.pdf

Turner, Althea. “The City of Lincoln City’s Tsunami Preparedness Program Final
Report.” 2008. Contact: altheat@lincolncity.org

“United States National Seismic Hazard Maps.” United States Geological Service
(USGS). 2008. February 6, 2009 http://earthquake.usgs.gov/hazmaps

“U.S. Tsunami Preparedness - Federal and State Partners Collaborate to Help

Communities Reduce Potential Impacts, but Significant Challenges Remain.”
United States Government Accountability Office. 2006. February 6, 2009
http://nthmp.tsunami.gov/GAO_report_d06519.pdf

Vang, K. “Tonga Earthquake and Tsunami Warning: Lessons Need to be

Learned.” Australian Foundation for the Peoples of Asia and the Pacific (AFAP)
Asia-Pacific Disaster Alerts. 2006. February 6, 2009 http://www.afap.org

“Ventura County Operational Area Tsunami Evacuation Plan.” Ventura County

Sheriff’s Office of Emergency Services. February 6, 2009
http://www.vcsd.org/oes/ tsunplandraft.pdf

Von Hillebrandt-Andrade, C. G. and V. Moreno. “Emergent Tsunami Warning

System for Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.” Puerto Rico Seismic Network.
2005. University of Puerto Rico. February 6, 2009 http://poseidon.uprm.edu/
prtwsystem.pdf

Walker, Daniel. Personal communication to Jeanne Johnston.

Warnitchai, Pennung, “The 26 December 2004 Tsunami Disaster in Thailand:

Experience and Lessons Learned.” Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand. 2005.
February 6, 2009 http://www.cv.titech.ac.jp/~jsps/workshopG3/Proceedings/PDF
%20papers/02_ Pennung.pdf

Waugh, Jr., W. L. and R. J. Hy. Handbook Of Emergency Management: Programs

and Policies Dealing With Major Hazards And Disasters. Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, 1990.

“West Coast and Alaska Tsunami Warning Center (WC/ATWC).” National

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Weather Service
(NWS). February 6, 2009 http://wcatwc.arh.noaa.gov/

“Western States Seismic Policy Council Annual Report 2007.” WSSPC

Earthquake Quarterly. 2007. February 6, 2009 www.wsspc.org/
Publications/news/ EQ2007Winter.pdf

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“What is a Tsunami?” Clatsop County Oregon. 2008. February 6, 2009
http://www.co. clatsop.or.us/default.asp?pageid=391&deptid=5

Wood, Nathan. 2008. Personal communication to Jeanne Johnston.

Wood, Nathan. “Variations in City Exposure and Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards

in Oregon.” U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2007-5283.
2007. February 6, 2009 http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5283/

Wood, N., A. Church, T. Frazier, and B. Yarnal. “Variations in Community

Exposure and Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards in the State of Hawaii.” U.S.
Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2007-5208. 2008. Version 1.1.
Rev. February 6, 2009 http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2007/5208/

Wood, Nathan, and Christopher Soulard. “Variations in Community Exposure and

Sensitivity to Tsunami Hazards on the Open-ocean and Strait of Juan de Fuca
Coasts of Washington.” U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report
2008-5004, 34 p. 2008. February 6, 2009 http://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2008/5004/

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Resources

Hazard, Risk Assessment, Vulnerability and Sensitivity Analysis

Asia Pacific Natural Hazards Information Network (APNHIN). 2008. Pacific
Disaster Center. February 15, 2009. http://www.pdc.org/mde/explorer.jsp
This website is designed to directly support disaster and resource managers,
planners, governments, and nongovernmental organizations with
applications and information services designed to search for, evaluate, and
access high-quality geospatial data for natural hazard applications within the
Asia Pacific region.

Bernard, E.N. “Draft - Developing Tsunami-Resilient Communities – Concept for

a Regional Tsunami Warning System for the Indian Ocean”. 2005. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). February 15, 2009.
http://apps.develebridge.net/usiotws/1/IOTWS%20ConceptualDesign.pdf
This document recommends that a global network of Regional Centers for
Disaster Reduction (RCDR) be created to reduce the influence of all natural
disasters, including tsunamis, on global society.

Bernknopf, R.L., S.J.M. Rabinovici, N.J. Wood and L.B. Dinitz. “The Influence
of Hazard Models on GIS-based Regional Risk Assessments and Mitigation
Policies”. Vol. 6:369–387. International Journal of Risk Assessment and
Management. 2006.
The focus of this paper is a discussion of the development of mitigation
policies and the influence of GIS-based hazard models.

Chapman, Robert E., and Douglas S. Thomas. “A Guide to Printed and Electronic
Resources for Developing a Cost-Effective Risk Mitigation Plan for New and
Existing Constructed Facilities” (NISTIR 7390). National Institute of Standards
and Technology. 2007. February 15, 2009.
http://homelandsecurity.tamu.edu/framework/keyreports/critical-infrastructure-
risk-assessment/a-guide-to-printed-and-electronic-resources-for-developing-a-
cost-effective-risk-mitigation-plan-for-new-and-existing-constructed-facilities-
nistir-7390.html/
This document includes many resources such as the FEMA guides to risk
assessment and mitigation.

Courteau, Roland. “Evaluating and Preventing the Tsunami Risk for France’s
Metropolitan and Overseas Coasts”. National Assembly Report, No. 488, Senate
Report, No. 117. Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and
Technology Choices. Paris. 2008. February 15, 2009.
http://www.senat.fr/opecst/english_report_tsunami/english_report_tsunami0.html
The report deals with evaluating and preventing the risk posed by tsunamis
to all French coasts, both in metropolitan France and overseas.

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Koshimura, Shunichi, Toshitaka Katada, Harold E. Mofjeld, and Yoshiaki
Kawata. “A Method for Estimating Casualties Due to the Tsunami Inundation
Flow”. Journal of Natural Hazards. 2006. February 15, 2009.
http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele= afficheN&cpsidt=18273015
This study developed a method for estimating the number of casualties that
may occur while people tried to evacuate from an inundation zone when a
tsunami has inundated the area. The method is based on a simple model of
hydrodynamic forces as they affect the human body.

Prasad, R., E. Cunningham, and G. Bagchi. “Tsunami Hazard Assessment at

Nuclear Power Plant Sites in the United States of America”. U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. 2008. February 15, 2009. http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/nuregs/contract/cr6966/
This document includes information on tsunami hazard assessments of the
nuclear power plant sites in tsunami zones in the United States.

Weigel, R. “Tsunami Information Source”. Water Resources Center Archives.

University of California at Berkeley. February 15, 2009. http://www.lib.
berkeley.edu/WRCA/
This internet site includes tsunami information on tsunami generation
(sources, impulsive mechanisms), propagation, and effects of nearshore
bathymetry, and wave run-up on shore as well as physical (hydraulic)
modeling and numerical modeling.

Yalciner, A. C., E. Pelinovsky, E. Okal, C.E. Synolakis. (Eds.) “Submarine

Landslides and Tsunamis.” The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2003.
February 15, 2009 http://www.seismic.ca.gov/pdf.files/ McCarthy%20 Anderson
%20Tsunami%20paper.pdf
This document discusses tsunami generation mechanisms.

Mitigation
Cascadia Region Earthquake Workgroup (CREW) 2008. February 15, 2009.
http://www.crew.org/papers/papers.html#justintime
This site features a collection of papers and publications gathered by a
coalition of private and public representatives who work together to share
information promoting mitigation.

Fletcher, C., E. Grossman and B. Richmond. “Atlas of Natural Hazards in the

Hawaiian Coastal Zone.” U.S. Geological Survey Geologic Investigations Series
I-2761. 2000. February 16, 2009 http://pubs.usgs.gov/imap/i2761/
The information in this document will improve the ability of Hawaiian
citizens and visitors to safely enjoy the coast and provide a strong data set for
planners and managers to guide the future of coastal resources.

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“Guidelines for Design of Structures for Vertical Evacuation from Tsunami.”
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). ATC 64 – FEMA P646
prepared by Applied Technology Council. Redwood City. 2008.
February 15, 2009. http://www.atcouncil.org/pdfs/FEMAP646.pdf
The focus of this document is on structures intended to provide protection
during a short-term high-risk tsunami event.

Hwang, Dennis. “Hawaii Coastal Hazard Mitigation Guidebook.” University of

Hawaii Sea Grant College Program. 2005.February 16, 2009
http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/SEAGRANT/communication/HCHMG/hchmg.htm
This guidebook serves as a resource to reduce the risk to coastal development
by planning for natural hazards such as erosion, flooding, tsunamis and
hurricanes.

Sanguantrakool, T. Remote Sensing Technology for Tsunami Disasters Along the

Andaman Sea, Thailand. Presentation at 3rd International Workshop on Remote
Sensing for Post-Disaster Response. 2005. February 16, 2009
http://ares.tu.chiba-u.jp/workshop/Chiba-RS2005/Paper%20supapis.pdf
This document illustrates information gathering and application of geo-
informatics technology that was used in mitigation and recovery. The
potential of satellite data and GIS technology, in addition to assessing and
monitoring tsunami disaster, also offers an excellent opportunity for creating
a long term database on risk assessment and relief management.

Evacuation Planning
“The Planning Process: Organized Preparation for Regional Disaster Planning.”
Central United States Earthquake Consortium (CUSEC).1999. February 16, 2009
http://cusec.org/publications/pamphlets/planningprocess.pdf
This pamphlet is a thorough written plan developed with participation of
government officials, volunteer agencies, and the private sector is necessary
to achieve the coordination needed to cope with the effects of a great
earthquake.

Warnings – End to End

“Grays Harbor County Tsunami Warning Plan.” Grays Harbor County. 2006.
February 16, 2009 http://www.co.grays-harbor.wa.us/info/DEM/Docs/
Plans/Tsunami/ TsunamiWarningPlan.pdf
The plan provides for warning and safe evacuation from coastal danger
areas and the Chehalis River estuary in order to protect life and property
which are likely to be affected by a distant tsunami.

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“Progress Report 2007.” United Nations Team for Tsunami Recovery (UNTRS).
2007. February 16, 2009 http://www.un.org.in/untrs/reports/Progress_ report_
may_11.pdf
This site includes examples of community radio integrated into coastal
villages for improved disaster warning and public awareness.

Preparation
“Asian Institute of Technology, Proceedings - Scientific Forum on the Tsunami,
Its Impact and Recovery.” Asian Institute of Technology. 2005.
February 16, 2009 http://tsunami.ait.ac.th/Documents/Final %20Proceedings
%20of%20Scientific%20Forum%20on%20Tsunami%2030mar07.pdf
Through this scientific forum, technical knowledge was strengthened so that
authorities as well as vulnerable people could increase their capacity to
prevent, manage and recover from the impact of a large-scale tsunami
disaster.

Creighton, James L. The Public Participation Handbook: Making Better Decisions

Through Citizen Involvement. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 2005.
February 16, 2009. http://www.diesel-ebooks.com/cgi-bin/item/0787979635/The-
Public-Participation-Handbook-Making-Better-Decisions-Through-Citizen-
Involvement-eBook.html
This handbook makes a case for the involvement of public citizens in the
planning process.

“A Primer on Disaster Preparedness, Management and Response: Paper-based

Materials.” COOL: Disaster Preparedness and Response. Stanford University.
2008. February 16, 2009. http://cool-palimpsest.stanford.edu/bytopic/disasters/
This site contains a collection of links related to disaster preparedness and
response.

Dudley, Walter C. and Min Lee. Tsunami! 2nd ed. Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1998.
The second edition of this book expands the scope to include tsunamis from
around the world. Included also is a simplified summary of recent tsunami
research findings.

“Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning.” Federal Emergency

Management Agency (FEMA). Washington, D.C. 1996. February 16, 2009
http://www.fema.gov/plan/gaheop.shtm
This guide clarifies the preparedness, response, and short-term recovery
planning elements that warrant inclusion in state and local Emergency
Operating Procedures.

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Granger, Ken, “An Information Infrastructure for Disaster Management in Pacific
Island Countries.” Australian Geological Survey Organization (AGSO). 1999.
February 16, 2009 http://www.crid.or.cr/digitalizacion/pdf/eng/doc13818/
doc13818.pdf
This report is the outcome of a study into the information needs of disaster
managers in Pacific Island Countries and the nature of the information
infrastructure needed to ensure the delivery of that information.

Johnston, Jeanne B. Personal Accounts from Survivors of the Hilo Tsunamis of

1946 and 1960: Toward a Disaster Communication Model. MA thesis. University
of Hawaii at Manoa, Honolulu, 2003. Proquest Digital Dissertations. Proquest.
2003. February 16, 2009 http://www.proquest.com/en-US/products/dissertations/
individuals.shtml
This research indicates that effective tsunami mitigation can be accomplished
through continual tsunami awareness education for the public, governmental
agencies and the media.

“How Resilient is Your Coastal Community? A Guide for Evaluating Coastal

Community Resilience to Tsunamis and Other Hazards.” U.S. Indian Ocean
Tsunami Warning System Program. 2007. February 16, 2009 http://apps.
develebridge.net/ usiotws/13/CoastalCommunityResilience%20Guide.pdf
This document provides a framework to integrate the goals of community
development, coastal management, and disaster management.

Response
“Local Planning Guidance on Tsunami Response: A Supplement to the
Emergency Planning Guidance for Local Governments.” State of California
Governor’s Office of Emergency Services. 2nd Ed. 2007. February 16, 2009
http://www.oes.ca.gov/Operational/OESHome.nsf/
This planning guidance is intended to assist local governments in the initial
development of a tsunami response plan and the procedures necessary to
deal with a tsunami’s impact on their communities.

Recovery
Rice, A. and K. Haynes. “Post-Tsunami Reconstruction and Tourism: A Second
Disaster?” Tourism Concern: Fighting Exploitation in Tourism. London:
Stapleton House. 2005. February 16, 2009 http://www.tsunami-
evaluation.org/NR/rdonlyres/C9D911D2-A3AA-41AF-90CF-
DF9DD296DD8F/0/tourism_concern_post_tsunami_reconstruction _oct_05.pdf
This report looks at the countries where the post-tsunami reconstruction
plans involved the tourism industry.

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Rieff, D. “Tsunamis, Accountability and the Humanitarian Circus.” Humanitarian
Exchange Magazine. 2005. February 6, 2009 http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp
This document is a frank discussion of accountability and the NGO response
to the Indian Ocean tsunami.

Siripong, A., S. Yumuang, and N. Swangpho. “The Assessment of Damage from

Indian Ocean Tsunami on the Coastal Morphology of the Andaman Seacoast of
Thailand by Remote Sensing.” Marine Science Department, Faculty of Science,
Chulalongkorn University. and Geoinformatics for Thailand, Chulalongkorn
University, Bangkok. 2005. February 16, 2009 http://www.aars-acrs.org/
acrs/proceeding/ ACRS2005/ Papers/SST2-1.pdf
The Indian Ocean tsunami caused damage in the six provinces of the
Andaman seacoast of Thailand. This report assesses the degree of damage
with remote sensing of high and low resolution data.

“Reports.” United Nations Team for Tsunami Recovery Support (UNTRS). 2006.
February 16, 2009 http://www.un.org.in/untrs/reports/default.asp?ref=reports
This website was designed and maintained by the United Nations team for
Tsunami Recovery Support (UNTRS) and provides a myriad of documents
that cover a wide array of topics on tsunami recovery support.

Case Studies
Koottatep, T., “Field Observations on Water and Sanitation at Tsunami-Affected
Villages, Kampuan Sub-district, Ranong Province.” Asian Institute of
Technology. 2005. February 16, 2009 http://www.crc.uri.edu/download/Field_
Observations_ Ranong.pdf
This report describes the first field observations on water supply and
sanitation in tsunami-affected villages in Ranong Province with an emphasis
on post-tsunami water and sanitation issues.

Research Papers
School of Ocean and Earth Science and Technology (SOEST). University of
Hawaii at Manoa. February 16, 2009 http://www.googlesyndicatedsearch.com/
u/soest? hl=en&lr= &ie=ISO-8859-1&q=tsunami
This site contains over 400 tsunami-related papers and publications are
available for research including out-of-print tsunami reports.

G-19