CASE 1: GUTIERREZ v. CA (1976) –BALDEO
CASE 2: GENSON v. ADARLE, ET AL. (1987)
FACTS: 1. Arbatin was the successful bidder in a public
auction of junk and other unserviceable government property
in the Highway District Engineer’s Office of Roxas City.
2. Arbatin then employed Adarle to help him haul the junk. On
a non-working day, when Adarle and Buensalido, the driver of
the payloader, were at the site continuing to gather the junk, a
bucket from the payloader fell and injured Adarle to the point
of paralyzing his lower extremities.
3. Adarle instituted an action against Arbatin, Buensalido,
Marcelino (Civil Engineer), and Genson (Highway District
Engineer).
4. RTC ruled in favor of Adarle. IAC modified the previous
ruling, absolving Marcelino from liability, and averring that the
liability of Genson is based on fault, by allowing Arbatin and
his men to work on the premises on a non-working day, in
contravention of his office’s policy.
5. Petitioner Genson then appealed the decision to the SC,
stating that the facts upon which the IAC declared that his
liability is based on fault by allowing the men to work on a non-
working holiday is without basis. Furthermore, he contends
that by filing a suit against him, Adarle is then filing a suit
against the Republic, which violates the non-suability of the
State.
ISSUE: WON Genson should be held liable, personally or
officially
HELD: NO.
RATIO: With regard to the non-suability contention, Adarle
filed a suit against Genson personally, in his capacity as the
Highway District Engineer, and not the State or his office.
As for the main issue, there was no evidence to prove
Genson’s presence when the accident occurred, nor was there
any basis for the lower courts to hold that Genson was at fault
by authorizing Arbatin and his men to work on a non-working
day. It might even be proven that working on a Saturday for
the specific purpose of hauling junk would be the time when
the most work can be done, as it has less traffic. The Master-
Servant doctrine in tort law cannot apply either, since despite
the fact that Buensalido, Genson’s employee, was
“moonlighting” on a non-working holiday, Buensalido’s
arrangement with Arbatin was purely private in nature, and
had nothing to do with his being employed under Genson.
Thus, absent the showing of malice,bad faith or
gross negligence on the part of Genson, he cannot be held
liable for the acts committed by Buensalido and Arbatin.
CASE 3: MARTIN v. CA (1992) –SALTERAS
CASE 4: CUISON v. NORTON & HARRISON CO. (1980) –
BALDEO
CASE 5: DE LEON BROKERAGE v. CA
FACTS: 1. The awards were for injuries said respondent
suffered as a result of the collision between the passenger
jeepney in which she was riding, and petitioner's cargo truck
recklessly driven by its employee, Luna.
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2. Luna was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of
homicide with physical injuries thru reckless imprudence.
Respondent had reserved her right to file a separate civil
action.
3. After a judgment of conviction had been rendered,
respondent filed in CFI Manila, an action for recovery of
damages against Luna and petitioner. CFI and CA held Luna
and petitioner solidarily liable to respondent.
4. Seeking reversal of such affirmance by the CA, De Leon
Brokerage claims that: (1) the allegations in respondent's
complaint were so ambiguous that it was not clear whether
she was suing for damages resulting from a quasi-delict or for
civil liability arising from crime, but since the averments therein
are more characteristic of an action of the latter nature, the
same, as against petitioner, is premature for failure to allege
the insolvency of its employee; (2) Exh. B (judgment of
conviction in the criminal case) is not admissible as evidence
of a quasi-delict; (3) the employee, Luna, was not in the
discharge of his dutiesat the time of the accident; and (4) it
cannot be held solidarily liable with Luna for damages.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is solidarily liable with employee to
respondent
HELD: YES
RATIO: The court of origin and the appellate court correctly
considered respondent's complaint to be based on a
quasidelict. Since averment had been made of the employer-
employee relationship and of the damages caused by the
employee on occasion of his function, there is a clear
statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The complaint does not, and did not have to allege that
petitioner did not exercise due deligence in choosing and
supervising Luna, because this is a matter of defense.
Respondent clearly did not base her suit on the criminal
conviction. It was mentioned merely to support her claim that
Luna had been recklessly negligent in driving the truck. Being
evidentiary, the allegation could have beeb dusregarded. She
waited for the results of the criminal action because she
wanted to be sure which driver and respective employer she
could rightly sue, since both Luna and the driver of the
passenger jeepney were prosecuted.
Plainly, the reservation made in the criminal action does not
preclude a subsequent action based on a quasi-delict. It
cannot be inferred therefrom that respondent had chosento file
the very civil action she had reserved. The only conclusionthat
can reasonably be drawn is that she did not want the question
of damages threshed out in the criminal action, but preferred
to have this issue decided in a separate civil action.
Considering that the judgment of conviction had been admitted
without objection, its competency can no longer be questioned
on appeal. It established the fact of Luna's negligence, giving
rise to the presumption that petitioner had been negligent in
the selection and supervisionof its employees. And petitioner
failed to prove that it had exercised such requisite care and
deligence as would relieve it from responsibility. Since both
Luna and petitioner are responsible for the quasi-delict, their
liablity is solidary, although the latter can recover from the
former whatever sums it pays to respondent.
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CASE 6: VALENZUELA v. CA (1996) –SALTERAS
CASE 7: DULAY v. CA –BALDEO
CASE 8: UMALI v. BACANI (1976)
FACTS: 1. On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the
Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan. During the storm, the
banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala
Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric
wire.
2. The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left
hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the ground.
3. The following morning, barrio captain saw Cipriano
Baldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but the
latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he
was going to look for the lineman to fix it.
4. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8 months
old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on
the opposite side of the road, went to the place where the
broken line wire was and got in contact with it.
5. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was
only after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
ISSUE: WON Electric Company may be held liable
HELD: YES
RATIO: Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the
plaintiff (parents of the victim in this case) was only
contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury
being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care. First, by
the very evidence of the defendant, there were big and tall
banana plants at the place of the incident which were higher
than the electric posts supporting the electric line, yet the
employees whi, with ordinary foresight, could have seen that
even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be
endangered by banana plants being blown down, did not even
take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of
danger. Second, even after the employees of Alcala Electric
were already aware of the possible damage the storn could
have caused they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines, thus becoming a possible threat to
life and property, they did not cut off from the plant the flow of
electricity along the lines, an act they could have easily done
pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been cut.
Lastly, employee baldomero was negligent on the morning of
the incident because even if he was already made aware of
the live cut wire, he did not have the foresight to realize that
the same posed a danger to life and property, and that he
should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent
anybody from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero
left the premises because what was foremost in his mind was
the repair of the line, obviously foregetting that it left
unattended to it could endanger life and property.
Even if the child was allowed to leave the house unattended
due to their negligence, he would not have died that morning
where it not for the cut live wire he accidentally touched. Art.
2179 of the CC provides that the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of care, the
plaintiff may recover damages, but the court shall mitigate the
damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. The
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negligence of the employee is presumed to be the negligence
of the employer.
CASE 9: BLTB AND PON v. IAC, HEIRS OF PAZ, NERI, DE
ROSALES (1988) –SALTERAS
CASE 10: ORTALIZ v. ECHARRI (1957) –BALDEO
CASE 11: BAHIA v. LITONJUA (1915)
FACTS: 1. Fausta Litonjua purchased an automobile and later
turned it over to International garage, which isowned and
managed by his son Ramon Ramirez.
2. As part of the daily operations of his business, Ramirez
rented the automobile donated by his mother to Mariano
Leynes.
3. Ramirez also supplied Leynes a chauffeur and a machinist
for the purpose of conveying to and from Balayan and Tuy.
4. While in Balayan, the automobile refused to obey the
direction of the driver in turning a corner due to adefect in the
steering gear. As a consequence, it rammed into the wall of a
house against which thedaughter of plaintiff Bahia was leaning
at the time.
5. The automobile crushed the child to death. Bahia then filed
an action against the Fausta (donor of auto), and Leynes,
under who was directing and controlling the operation of the
automobile at the time of the accident. Ramirez was not made
a party.
6. TC found Leynes liable but dismissed complait against
Fausta
ISSUE: Are Leynes and Fausta liable
HELD: NO
RATIO: Even if the mother purchased the automobile, she
turned it over to the garage of her son for use therein. The
establishment belonged to the son, Ramirez, and he had the
full management and control of it and received all the
profitstherefrom. It appears that Fausta was not aware of the
contract with Leynes. While she may have been in onesense
the owner of the machine, that fact does not, under the other
facts of the case, make her responsible for the results of the
accident.
The judgment against Leynes must be reversed and the
complaint against him must be dismissed. While is may be
said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was
driving the auto was a servant of Leynes, in as much as the
profits derived from the trips of the auto belonged to him and
the auto was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this
fact is not conclusive in making himresponsible for the
negligence of the chauffeur or for the defects in the auto itself.
Under Article 1903 of the CC (now Article 2176), 2 things are
apparent:1.presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer whenever there is an injury caused by thenegligence
employee 2.presumption is juris tantum and may be rebutted.
In the instant case, the death of the child caused by a defect in
the steering gear immediately raised the presumption that
Leynes was negligence in selecting a defective automobile or
in his failure to maintain it in good condition after selection. As
to selection, SC found that defendant had exercised due
diligence when he obtained the machine from a reputable
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garage, which so far as appeared in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were
duly licensed, and apparently thoroughly competent. The
machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant
had no notice, either actual or constructive of the defective
condition of the steering gear. Sufficient time had not elapsed
to require an examination of the machine by thedefendant as a
part of his duty of inspection and supervision. While it does not
appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulations for
the guidance of the drivers and gave them proper instructions
designed for the protection of the public and the passengers,
the evidence shows that the death of the child was not caused
by a failure to promulgate rules andr egulations. It was caused
by a defect in the machine as to which the defendant has
shown himself free from responsibility
CASE 12: YAMADA v. MANILA RAILROAD & BACHRACH
GARAGE –SALTERAS
CASE 13: WALTER SMITH CO. v. CADWALLER GIBSON
LUMBER CO. (1930) –BALDEO
CASE 14: ONG v. METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT
(1958)
FACTS: 1. Dominador Ong, 14-year old son of plaintiffs, in
company with two of his brothers went to swim at the
defendant’s swimming pool.
2. After paying the admission fee they went to one of the small
pools where the water was shallow.
3. Later Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the
locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke.
4. Upon hearing this, his two brothers went to the bigger pool.
Later another boy in the swimming pool informed a lifeguard
employed by the defendant that somebody was swimming
underwater for quite a long time.
5. The lifeguard immediately jumped into the big swimming
pool and retrieved te apparently lifeless body of Dominador
Ong from the bottom. Artificial respiration and a resuscitator
were applied by employees of the defendant upon Dominador
for the purpose of reviving him. A doctor was summoned by
employees of the defendant to revive the boy but all to no
avail.
6. Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages,
funeral expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son,
Dominador Ong, in one of the swimming pools of the latter.
7. After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint for it found the
action of the plaintiffs-appellants untenable. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE: WON the death of the Ong can be attributed to the
negligence of defendant and/or its employees so as to entitle
plaintiff to recover damages
HELD: NO
RATIO: The spouses Ong who were claiming for damages
had the burden of proving that the damage iscaused by the
fault or negligence of MWD or one of its employees and were
not able to do so. The operator of swimming pools will not be
held liable for the drowning or death of a patron if said
operator had exercised due diligence in the selection of and
supervision over, its employees and that ithad observed the
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diligence required by law under the circumstances - in that it
had taken all necessaryprecautions to avoid danger to the
lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their
death.

In this case, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD had

taken all necessary precautions:1.Swimming pools are
equipped with ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen
resuscitator and first aid medicine kit 2. Bottom of pool is
painted w/ black colors to insure clear visibility 3.Rules and
regulations governing use of pools are on display at
conspicuous places.4. 6 trained and proficient lifeguards were
employed and are on duty two at a time. 5.A male nurse and
sanitary inspector were employed. 6.There is a clinic provided
with oxygen resuscitator 7.Security guards are always
available.

The employees of MWD also did everything possible to bring

the boy to life. Abaño gave him manual artificial respirator, the
nurse and sanitary inspector injected camphorated oil and
applied oxygen resuscitator, a doctor was sent for. All of these
show that MWD has done what is humanly possible under the
circumstances torestore life to Ong and for that reason it is
unfair to hold it liable for his death.

Lastly, the Doctrine of last clear chance can never apply where
the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the
injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at
hand after theperil is and should have been discovered.

CASE 15: METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP. v. CA (1993) –

SALTERAS

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