SEERsr CONFIDENTIAL! A VLE REPORT MISSION NO. 37 FLOWN 19FEB (945 copy no.103 PEC ULU Lt rae AMT VT Tt: Mofo) Y |SECRET HEADQUARTERS 2X1 BowseR xoWAND APO 234 TACTICAL MISSION REPORT Field Order te, 39 weenie Tergeti Musashino Plant of tho Hlakajina Arcraft Sneine Works ‘TORO, JAPAN 19 February 1045 Table of Contonte Tactical Warrative Report Exhibit: Photo - Targst Area Sxhibitr Target Chart Annex A ~ Operations Part I - Hevigstion Part IT ~ Bombing Part IIT - Flight Engineering Part IV - Radar Fart V = Gunnery Part VI - Air-Sea Rescuslo ke fo be io " SECRET + By Auth of the G, 6. Yar Benber canard + Taitinle BADuNATARS xa BOUBER comtanD #PO 234 pISOTt Report of Operations, 19 February 1965 Gonnanding General, Twentieth Air Pores, ‘ieshington 2%, 0,0, 1 on of Miss: a, Pisla Order Humber 30, Headquarters Zit Bonber Conmendy gated 12 February 1915, directed the 75rd and 515th Boubardnent, “ings te participate in a coordinated attack agsinst target on Bonsiay . Targets Specified: 1 (1) Prinary Targets tuseshino Pent of tte Makadtan e iverate gina Wage, a abe aarivect base ot es AES Folder 90,17, Target Hunber 357. (a) sseonanry Takats Totvor Tort elem ted (5) Hass Resort Tarcet: May intstriel oktre Flan of Cnerat ions a. Hensona fox Salaction of Targets (a) The weather forecast presented wae afro te 4/10 cloud coverage in the tarett aren ith » aval 2) An attack vas planned to coordine’e oan welt te ine the gee cetett eta ast ask Forse #ESROEINE STewatord purpose Arete 2S Th cee hat non, tend to Rod Oe igaers er ranieyaauaissyi9sa S3gRE2 g. Their better stounge characteristics for B-29 airerstt. 1b, Ths favl that although tne SoOepouna goneraleparpess benb may Ye’ 1os6 effective thon larger size benbs seniat the multi-story reinforced concrete units of the Tana plant (eekleing onocthira of tne target) the assumed lergor number of hits (eePine Goocpound sizo predicted a better chance of interruption of choration of hie factory. The mission mas connitted to an attack seer ere et aa a whole and Us SO0-pound benb ws considered as cpesctive up the larger sizes against the Musashino complex (compris- ng tho other twonthirds of the target area). 9. The foct that maximum tonnage per air~ raft could not be carried with tonbs smaller than the S0O-pound siz ‘AMI-ML7A1 SO0-pound incendiary clusters were acleoted as the most cffective incendiary bonb because of: ‘a, The Torget, including buildings and con- tentey was estinated to be 30 percent inflannsbl« 1b, The number of exvected hits would be such higher than with other Incendiary bonbs dus to the 110 benbs in each cient and the fect that the target was only 40 percent roof sonvered. g, Increased chance of igniting widely dis persed inflannsble a, The bonbe contsined delay-sxplosive heads: that delay fire fighting, thereby increasing the possibility for spread ing fire after benbing has consod. NOES: Due to relatively large fire divi= sions, iN-N47A2 bombs may have Boon desirable, but they wers not recate, sions ie inle tine, pending final approval of multiple suspension, die fo lstk of cultable stowage characteristics. pk to detonate by inertia are believed te factory roofs without being initiated, actonate below the floor level, result! full blant effect on hnildings and nation of the boab in Guy fuses with ¢ake as ly with 2 Berocd fect weuld produce excellent results, An axis of attack of 86 dogr: arift was expected. bocanee ually as well as on the radar scope, of attack wes designed so that only 2 snall turn would be necessary. Thugs oe rudus operate woul hy we ager target (the secondary) was lecatsd bat one ond « belf minutes Geyond the visual (primary) tarests SEOR L 200K nigh Explosive ~ approxinately 19% oof incondinries = approximately 25% 25-794 (optimum) ratio approxinately 30m (») Besbine Planning: 1. Since boubing a curacy tnereesss rapia~ a decrease in eltitide, 1t was hoped that the planned altitude ‘eas polieved to bo satisfactory since only 1 1/2 degree (B Kofu was selected as the initial point it 1s know by the trews on this approach and stands out vis~ “3, If radar had to bo enploysd, the axis * ample tine for his operation since (2) Novtgstion Planning: House Bassons or Shoice Beso to a9/oox - 145/158 ‘This point would utilize the Northern Marianas to fas a radar and visual eheck peint. 25/008 = 153/008 Iwo Jina operations were to be avoided by 7S niles. to 21/158 - 140/538 Mishino-Shina was to be used as wing assenbly Joint and Bonber Cemand departure post, to 29/00 = 181/375 to sa/ere 137/378sag (3) Plight Engineering Planning: (o) ‘Tho flight plan cubattted provided fer fuot economy and aircraft porfemanse, ee (e) In order to utilis tho variations in offecten= gy of inividust aireratt and crews, Yonb load wee speoified a8 mazi= oy oe sepeoneistont with aaftey, ability of the individial crem, end Te a eheractartstios of the individual aircraft, {e) Acsinimun 1n0d of 6,000 pounds was speci tied for beth Vinge, with autherity to lesson this by 1000 pounds for new cave making their Pirat najor-strike mission, (4) Ender Plonnings (a) The planned landfall (36/47 - 157/378) was considered ax excelent for n todar Wied ran Tad seaet Goa coe acre to ddontity by Todars ms designated ao a visual ges Sule SirTion NT Tron of Tokye wos Acsignated 05 the secondary targets sad Tho urben ave) od by enter release mothods only if. eisual Beabing ef the prinary were not possible. (5) Redar Counter Vessures (a) Pave R.G.tt, Opsorvers were to perform the ase uid soaron for enay SrnacntasUite SoRtcis tei ee ea at ans guar signals wim: bleh 2eAee, aie sie Uo Teonting rene 5 Heeccenan wanls, on) @-s000 eds eee ‘communi eee tn Troquency range of 4-5 kes, was also to be perferned, (6) Air-See Rescue Planning (a) The Mavy vos furnished with the details Of OS spieston end reqdeated ty Tansich cyanate) fees ‘air-see rescue wiepoose, The following facilities were nase available: |. Five submarines wore directed te 2° 2% stations during the mioeion wid wath sotonael by StpeEDSEs Stctions were to bel 35/o7H - 140/528 34/288 ~ 139/462 150/S15AISsW19: SOR I 5. This comand ersigned 2 Soper-tuabo atr= pines (Bet0'a) to orbit Submarine perl tion S9/0eH = 140/808 faa De eee tour in oie aaa distress signals, drop emergency equipment, and dirsct the subarines” eerene Life rescue faoflitien mare required, 4, Details of Planning = 3 sno: (2) Enemy tir Omnosition: Although the Japanese At Fores had a capebility of opposing this mission with a fores of over {00 faghtors, It ws estinated that the mexinus opposition mould be scproxiaatsly 200, Thia eptinate ms based on a study of past opera Siine and an asauned operational strength of 70 percent of available sient Pt. If gdveree weather conditions were to oxist ct target tins, UE"ERiuha ata feing conditions bale formation altitude would probably Teduse air opposition to ainer srepertions,, (2) AnticAivornft Oposition: (a) Planning for the best acie of attack of this ‘target von the Pluk Auslyose standpoint wae tontinad. dun te mexinum, dulce liaits, to elight variations fron the upwind and dewmwind axis, ceertm@ winds ct 25,000 fect were expect-d to be 260 to 280 degrees at 105 plus imots, (») On tho upwind run, the B-29"s would be within range of soproxinately 210 heavy witiairoraft gunsy on hs dowmriad coroxinctely 70, This offeot of defenses to the east combined with eT ccoreased ‘ground speed placed tho cstimate of chance of dasag> om am upwind run appreximately 6,5 to 8 tines greater than that of = dems Sind ran, ‘Therefore, for minimum danage from lek, a plan eslling for or axis of avtack generally froa the west on a course of 60 to 190 Grgrees eruo and, on withdravl, o tirn norlnust te avotd the Tokve conventration was submittod. 3, Exosution: a. Ds Tho firet group of the 73rd Ting wes ‘to take off at 1820002 and thet of the gisth Wing st {aks off was accomplished as follows: asreraft:aataissvi9a to ie ec, Qvor Targott (2) Primary Target: Cloud coverage at the tari (s) Secondary Tarests One hundred ninetoon airoraft ly targets AFOpping apprexinatoly 457,7 tons of bombee ponbed the scoon (s) inst Resort Traseta: Seven atreratt drops on Toyohashi ana Kunasakt, ela (0) anests of Qoortunity: Pive efroraft dropped ponbs on the following targets! Shizuoka; Mishto sroa; Mateakay and seme on Noes woight of bombs dropped on last Fesort and Opportintty Targets wae 83,2 tans. 4, Route Becks avigation to tho bess was without inct= gent, Tovigetore reported nximim ranges of Loran up to 1400 miles ood gbtained average readings up to 650 miles. (1) Airoraft Landed ot hone bases as fellowes ne Mupber of iret Londine Last Landing ord o8* 1911082, ae4zaz sath S1 gunz porererg ‘TOTAL 1s aon1062, yonsze2 (2) Tour aircraft feted ts return to base as follows (a) One ditched as a result of exhausted fuel supply. (b)_ One was 1¢ tore cither by ranming oF an avoidental cottisien, Ceilezeed end ite fuselage broke apart when the a ‘to turn back inte formation. (c) One, rammed or hit goed fipnters broke apart just back of tie wings with es afire, = polieved to have boon fijays SEORS2 decias at the initial polnt the type Doabing run that will be used, (3) Plight Sneimeoring: (Soe Annex Ay Part TT, tor details.) The 819th Wing Feturned to Beto using a constant let sor ceeeeldire fron the target, This resulted in a saving of an ever ser of approximately 150 gallons ef Tue} per aircraft, (4) Radar: (See Annex A, Fart IV, for detafls,) gx/amq.is aquipnont wosused for target aon navigation, wind dotor— anyavarss cay ligprosch for visual and radar vonbing, Saploysext of nate aie civineter ond SOR-695 IPP equipment vas normal, (6) gunngrvs (Seo amex Ay Fart Yy for details.) omy saepted firing techniques developed to’nost note attacks ware Newly wechiy weed on thie aisaion, Enemy aircraft wore net aggressive against tight formations, (6) AireSeq Roseue: (See Annex dy Part Vi, for do- tate.) One 8-29 ditched epprexiaately © 1/2 niles north of Aerihen eile.) Oige aren aenbors were picked up by air sca resous facilities, ge Wasther: (S00 Amex By Fart 4) tor artcite.) Oven tho targets pianos encountoroda haze efstus dock watch roasted slant te EIEGY coneldercbly, Forecast for winds was excellent but posi= ‘ions of fronts vere poorly foreeast. Conmuninotions: (1) Radar Counter Measures: (Soo Annex Or Part te for aetatis,) Throe ROM search aircraft, each with one ROK observers ter ietea thie mission, Seareh mas sade for ensay early waraoe radar cracted tntll the wainlond was reashods vere search Was ROiG 0% Fae ar und oneay fighter communications channels, 4 Sots of 28 cueny radar signals was intercepted. (2) Gemunientions (Radio): See amex 0, Fart Ty for dotails,) Slight interference was ‘received on all strike frequen~ tor deta tocign, ‘The poroentage’breakdom: af Seattle Bee Ose cee ate enc acoent oa sm eye Pee een saeey ter etrequerotoey and 4 percent oR 11 aegacyels freasensitfe for dotatle,) sneny alt oppee: 570 attacks, Wintcen B-20"s (14,28) of th (2isa) of th aftort wore Slates a‘Toreat 1370 (25/44) = 159/488) Suniéa River Bridge, Sunida River % Approxinately 2400 squar: of Peeight warchouse roo! was dootreyod, bute Cling Corts 6. taaae Megor Gonarade TS. cece aissv1930ea att eenL YY FOE, 1S SooghLON ‘aataissv19aq SEGRED ‘ANTE A orsauns0xa, Exhibit - Trask Charts Part I = Navigation Port II ~ Bonbing Port IIT - Flight Engineering Fort IV - Radar Port ¥ = Gumory Part VI - air-Sea Rescue Exhibit - Air-Sea Reseus Mapa g ‘CONFIDENTIAL 130" Mission No. 37 DATE 19 FEB. wine 734 GROUP. Be,CONFIDENTIAL a5" an MISSION No, 37. Date IDEER i985 | Wing _313 th. GROUP. t iota ta 7) ‘ r | Of ‘Matsumoto ~ eST Pi] 2a van gor AS SEQRED Saar x. wavroarron 1, ayigation to the wing asconbly point was as briste or thd a9ethand SOtth Groupes of the Tord ani SISth Wings respect ivelyy falch flew 80 ailea wost of the Uriofed couras in order to arrive 4a Tho onontly area on tine, The tine spent in the wing assestly area Tanged fron Ste 36 minutes, with departure 6 minutos early, 2, Loran furnished adequate navigational ald during the flight to the assembly aren, 3, Tho cliub phase wna started at approximctoly 30/008 on 2 dus northerly heading, ‘Tho tine in the clinb to 25,000 fest averaged one hour and 15 minute, 4 frontal condition was encountered from 31/11 ‘to the landfall point, and navigators wore unable to make drift or position checks, 4, 11 groups of the 73rd Wing made landfall 15-20 miles mest of Homana Lake, 5, Squadron B of the SOSth Group of the 313th Wing made landfall as brisfed but Squadron .. of tis Uroup Droke out or the tront south Of Mogeya end falsely identified Nagoya Bay as Tokyo Bay, Tt besane Goorientated on Yount Fuji howevor, turned, and made its bonbing run dn an axis of attack of 77 degrees, The load navigator had no dead Tockoning procedure in the target area, a mistake in identification ‘tmnt indloated the nesd for increased radar scope study, Steps have ‘boon taken to provide this study, 6, Squadron B of the SO4th Group had a near collision course with chother group and was blown beyond the target while turning aay Jo a repult i¢ was necessary for this Squadron to boub on an axis of 20° degrnas rather than the briefed 69 degra 2, Kil units of tho 73rd Wing bosbed as briefed, 8, The average winds in the target area wore 980 degrees at 140 ists, 9, Navigation to the bas ported maxinun ranges of Loran up to 1400 ail Fondings up to B50 miles, They also wero able Loran and slential fixes with a groat degree of ascuracy. 10, The oyarage tiee to the taraet ‘to an Sotiaated time of 08:45 hours, yoo 14340 hours, aiaagiaissv1914 SECRET Licved that future results will show great improvenent as 2 result of tho adoption of this new policy, 4, Since only 12 percent of barbs dropped wore Identified, exact bombing roeults could not be determined, tL = sxarist agsor! re lo Cruise: a, Group assemblies wore made by both the 73rd and 313th Wings near their respootive bases, ‘thm initial cruise wos mado as planned for beth “ings. c, wing assexbly by th 73rd “ing was offectad at the des- ignated aogenbly point without incident, |, The 13th Wing made the initial eruise in individual group formation with ne attempt at wing anacehly 2, Giimb to Bombing sLtil ‘The average tins required to climb to bombing altitude was as predicted for both “ings. 3, E Je Cruise to ‘The average tine required ot uubing titade wes ohert, lees than ona hoor for both ‘ings. Return to Bast: The S1Sth Wing returned to base using @ con stant letdown protedure fron the target, This procedure resulted in & saving of an average of approxinately 150 gallons of fue} per air= craft for the S1Sth Ving as compared to the 75ra Ving, which used many ‘ypee ef returning procedures, 5, General: See Consolidated Statistical Sunmary for fuel con- ounption and weight data, a, 3/2018: (1) The primarySEORED Radar Squipuont Perfor a, SSR: (2) 145 4/0 wore res xr equipped, (2) 114 WC reported radar satisfactory for bombing, (3) 27 4/C roported radar unsetisi .ctory for bonbing. (4) sexinun average for landfall was 65 miles, b, AW/APN 4: avorage range of Leran fixes was 650 miles, One novigator Faperted reception at 1400 miles, 3. Malfunctions: a, AVPQI (1) 2s Swoop rotation stopped 15 minutes before Landing, (2) 14 keimath etsbitiention Inaccurate, (3) 51 Lost targets at altitade, (a) 1: Inverter out at take-off; used Loren inverter, 0 ‘may back, tronanitter current fluctuated excessively, rendering set Eneporatine, vn gat (5) 1s Transmitter kicked off at altitude, 4 53 & & (8) 1: Too much pressurization, (7) 14 Torgote only 10 to 30 miles: APC voltage and orys— tal current erratic, (8) 1: Targets fnded out, finally disappeared. (9) 2: Inverters out, be, stam.z aataissyio3q_— SECRET BART V = gomeny 1, This mission was notable fren tho gunnery etandpoint in that it tested acagures developed to noet nose attacks, Dus toe leg in the ‘oonputer caused by the oxcoasibely high closing rate of oneny fighters on the nose of the B-29, it was decided that future rang instead of prosont range was roquired for ths computer, 2, Jt was recomended thet all nese gunners fire upon on enemy atroraft when it filled 8/4 of tho reticule and spin the range lnoD Free anxinuc to mininday putting future rango inte the conputer and Sutrining rexinun range correction from tho range moter, Positive results Have bocn obtained using this method. 3, Te was noticed that short burets at oneny aircraft when they are at 1000 yards defenitly modo than change the plan of attack, 4, Te was cleo cteorved that the Japs aro still using o rainbow ef colors on thier fighters. 5. Pilots show cvidence of having lecrned the fact thet = tieht formation ia their best defense, Tho Japs disiixs 1% peoauss Uy Cannot fly through as they could through = Looss fermetion, 6, The Japs continue to use pacing aireraft for antiaireraft inforastion, Thess oneay airoraft are not significant fron a gunnery standpoints eines they sslden make ottacks, 7, Data ra g0-Ga1, ammunition Expended 69,208 ras G8 0 System operative 1008 S0,necl, machine guns operative 97.7% Gane loeded Cold ‘A, sunnary of Aitching incident ccouring en this Bission follows: si i a, 78rd Wing atroraft (call sign to vaso ct a position 9 1/2 niles north of Gnctoly io1i0e2, + surtnee veosel reac! S survivors at 1915452, 4fase et — 4 7 es [eae = a aolanet MISSION NO.3Z TE 19 Feb45 | DATE XX1 BOMCOM | sme an-sea ncacue KEY | Le sibmarine 44) | O7Surtbce veel FomcesMsac vay Far Pils SOOSREN Aysornny SoueE amiex ‘WBATHES Yesther Sumery BAMLULL - Croce Soetion Chart Exuibit - Prognostic Usp Exhibit - Synoptic Mep ‘Mission Wo. 57 1p Fetrucry 1945aatatssy930 @ 1, Buse on Take-Off: There wore 4/10 cunulus clouds with bas nt 1800 fect snd tops at €000 foct allowing normal take off, Visibility sas 12 niles, 2, Route Outgoing: There wero 4/10 cumulus clouds betreen 1200 nd 6000 foot to Aldegrees North, Visibility was 1b miles, From 21 Gtgrees North to 24 dograos North there were 6 to 9/10 cumulus with fasse at 1900 fect and tops 6000 to 9000 fect, Thore wore also 8 to 10/10 altocunulus with bases at 10,000 fect and top geattercd showers in this zono reduced visipilitie: elie. Pron 24 degrees Werth to 20 degrees W there were 3/10 cumulus Jooueeh 1900 and 6000 Feet and 6/10 altocanulus bases at 14,UWy Test. Starting at 29 dogreos Worth the formntion olisbed through 7/10 cumulus Sener 1600 and 8000 fect and layers of altocumulus between 10,000 tnd 20,000 fect, Sone plance revorted the altosumulus to bo solid, Foon 20,000 to 25,000 feat, there was a deck of eirrostratus which ‘ploped upward te £7,000 foot over the Enpiro, Climbing through his Sone, formations were forced to brenk up, but they reformed on top. 3, Target: Plenes flying in haze cirrus deok which reduced slant visibility considerably, §/10 altecuralus wore reported betwoan 12,000 [nd 14,000 feet, and 5/10 ctratocumulus with bases at 3000 fast end (aye at S000 fost were cbasrrnd, Thors were hexry persistent contraile Ge fiight levels, “Vande were roported st 270 degrees at 145 Inets nile forecast winds wore 270 degrees ot 135 knots, 4, Route Returning: Conditions wore similar to route outgoing. — 5, Bases on Return: There wore 4/10 cumulus based ot 1500: with topo et 6000 fect, E Ronarkei lthough the posit! att, Grons reported forecast winds to= = —S—as 7TMEZL-PapLAPRAL — Vig 3 Ga ae (et SSP a cf (7 Sy oe & ee nL” 2 UINLVIM GBAUISEO Leet WEHIVIM LSVIaNes ‘SHE! F4eRIg27 6/ » ®i —gommamros TIONS © Port I ~ Radar Counter Measures Part II - Communications (Radio)an issvioaa_ | | S50RaL sat coun vessines 2, Ganetahi Five ROM Socroh treraft, ecch with on ROM Observer, inlcd to pertietorte in thie eisston. Mly eece eempiste the uission, z a 2, Results of Seorehs a, 4 total of 29 enemy radar signals was intercepted, b, the following signals with Gun-Laying characteristies yore intercepted: (2) 193/4/1100 Intercepted at 1.7, (2) 97/4/1000 Intersepted at LP. (3) %8-79/5-6/1500-3000 Intaroopted in Tokyo area, (a) 2u2/v/ 1200 Intercspted in Tokyo “res ©, CM signals were lorged at 278 mey 8 mo, 36,7 mey and 189 ee, il were unnodulated, 4, The complete list of radar signals intercepted 4s os roLtows: (2) Target Area (Tokyo): 79/27/1000 Tracking 95/15/—- Tracking 108/10/600 Tracking 167/8-20/1000 Tracking 1108-489/7/800 Tracking 197/15/1100 Tracking (2) Other Radar signals intercepted were as follows: 74,5/11/1000 Sweep Reto @ RPL 79/31/800 Sweeping 93/39,8/500 Tracking 95-97/29/500 Tracking 100/20-22/250-350 Swoop Fate 1/2 RPK 302,5/17/500 Swoop Rate 1 RAL 104/14/250 Tracking 310/2/250 Tracking 115/9/-- 125/10/7508 EL >, Fightere: The enmy fighters attack 8 attacking the Loed group were at correct altitude and apparently wore given sufficient advense mere fing of the attack, Sautoments 4 Tho oquipmont onployed functioned saticfaetersly except for one AN/APA-6 PAF ucter which stopped indicating innediately aver teke-off, Tho equipment has besn vench checked end is back in epera~ tion, Sonclusions: .. The 78 me redar signals intercepted prosun-bly orignat fron Vork TA Medel IIT typo onony equipment, : eh b, The 58 me and 36,7 me OT signeis intercepted are poset Japanese OF Doppler Effect Reders, base e, Considerable dnta 1s being compiled on the Japanes® Gun Laying Rodis, ‘The results tus far indie-to thot £t operstse in tro frequenoy bands, ie,,,75 ond 200 me, Although lobe evitshing of the Giginis vos New reperten on tnis aisfion, previous eave anaiettes tae © uch is the evse in nerrly cll of the Ike elonels ineorsapted, oI GATIONS 2, Strike Reports: Airoraft radfo operstors tronsnitted & strike reports (Bombs Any); all were received by the ground station, 2, Fox Tronsaissions: Wecther encoded in UCOPAC and Tine Ticks wore ttonsaitted simultancously on nll strake frequencies on the tal hour cna hour respeetively, Wo requests for weather or tins ticks wore made by airoreft in Plight. agiissyi9ia__ | Slight interference was received on all strike 3, Frequencies: final hours of this mission, frequencies, changing to moderate in the serset opsretars ravort ground station’ the tirget, Adreraft signils fron over In e percentage bronkdows of traffic per frequency, ST ‘Snognoyele frequencies; 22 percont on ths 6 negncyele fand 47 percent on the 11 mogroyle frequencies,s oR . 6, Enemy transmissions: The following incidents of interference nd janming wore noted during this mission: ee a, 3145 koe (1) Insetoctive OY tronmissious fren an ntnewn stxttan on return leg of niceion (Ground Station) _ (2) Unidentified 8/T, ineffective, at 04542 (Aertel), B. SOCS wows (2) fatontionl OF jumtag ab 0500) sige eteeetteal ness (Ground Station), me (2) Jop OW tronsateston at 23072, tneftective (aerial), e, 11080 xes: (1) Feoxy Jap OF during the Pinal hours of the alsston = A+ is queotionalbe whether if was intentional or net, Effectiveness wae moderate (Ground Station), « (2) Tory otrong stendy tone at 08502 (aorta), (3). At 03002 honvy enemy O7 traffic, Sffectivencss og slight, (Aerial) (4) Untaentitiea R/T al 03365 was ineffaetive, (5) Unidontétiea Ov over the target and near the Boninsy ranging from offective to ineffective, aIssvI9H0 Ts 20 vay FOR SOOERLOM A 4, SHO uss: Yeptistnle, 2, 7310 kos: Negligible, £, aso kes: Hegliefble, 7, Bistrosni Two anorgency messnges indicating possible aitch= ing vero ont by siréraft, One svcured a baddy and renched the base. safely, he second airoratt aitaned, Tes geettion onl Ssoti2g 08 Felayod by a "Buddy® airoreft was recoived by the ground Five of the ditshed crewmen were rescued. Pour urgent, earings TeLe Feceived by the ground obtcined, Hecvy interference prevented ob