Bernhard Debatin

Metaphorical Iconoclasm
and the Reflective Power of Metaphor

This article was first published in

Metaphor and Rational Discourse, Edited by Bernhard Debatin, Timothy R.
Jackson, and Daniel Steuer,
Tübingen: Niemeyer 1997, 147-158

For private use only. Copying and distribution not permitted.

Nur zum privaten Gebrauch. Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung nicht erlaubt.

During the last decades the function of metaphor as a heuristic, if not

constitutive, means of cognition has become broadly acknowledged in
philosophy. As Nelson Goodman has pointed out, a metaphorical predication
creates novel symbolic distinctions and rearranges things within a symbolic
sphere in a new way.1 Connecting Goodman's findings with linguistics,
philosophy of science, and hermeneutics, one can argue that nearly every
symbolic system is based on indissoluble root metaphors and on fundamental
metaphorical distinctions.2 However, the rationality of these basic distinctions is
controversial, particularly with respect to academic language and thought:3 one
side of the dispute, represented for instance by Goodman, Hesse and Black,
sees metaphor both as a non-substitutable basis of language and as a rational
element with its own truth. The other side, represented by Davidson and Rorty,
regards metaphors as contingent results of prevailing historical symbol systems,
which implies they can neither be true nor have a meaning of their own.
Moreover, it remains controversial whether fundamental and background
metaphor is a priori pre-reflective and irreducible and therefore, as Derrida
argues, the basis of all metaphysics or whether it is possible to transcend
metaphor through critical-hermeneutic reflection, so that its validity claim can
actually be examined, which is the position held by Ricoeur.

Keeping this debate in mind, it should come as no surprise that metaphor in

academic language remains under the spell of iconoclastic thought. In this
paper, I will first analyse the epistemological function of this iconoclasm, which
stems from the rationalist ideal of a clear-cut and literal language. My thesis is
that the rationalistic difference 'metaphorical versus literal' is constituted by the
prohibition and dissociation of metaphor from rational discourse. In this process,
a split emerges between surface metaphor, which has been attacked by
philosophy and science, and deep-level metaphor, which has been repressed or
at least wilfully ignored. In the second half of my paper, I will explore to what
extent critical reflection upon metaphor is possible. In contrast to the
aforementioned rationalistic view, I take the position that metaphor, due to its
reflective structure, can function as rational anticipation. However, the rationality
of this anticipation is not simply given, but instead has to prove i tself in light of
critical reflection upon metaphor.4

1. The epistemological function of iconoclasm, or: the light of

truth

A glance at the history of the natural and human sciences shows that their
development has been bound up with a broad critique of colloquial language as
imprecise and figurative, and therefore unsuited to the new demands of clear
and distinct cognition. Metaphor and analogy became seen as an expression of
mistaken and magic thinking, as religious and scholastic atavism, and as
improper use of language. Thus Bacon criticised the mythic-mimetic principle of
similarity and the 'idols' arising from it as pure illusions of perception that only
fuddle the mind. As Foucault has shown, Bacon's criticism was taken up by
Cartesian rationalism and transformed into a general debasement of the
principle of similarity:
The similar, which was for a long time a fundamental category of knowledge at
once form and content of cognition found itself dissociated in an analysis
based on terms of identity and difference. [ ] Similarity is no longer the form of
knowledge, but instead the occasion of error, the danger to which one exposes
oneself when one does not examine the poorly-illuminated place of confusions.5
In order to restrain the discourse of similarity, rationalistic discourse employs
the principle of identity as well as processes of elimination, control and
discipline. Thus the endless proliferation of discourse based on countless
analogical and metaphorical links can be tamed and cut back. For this reason,
rationalistic discourse has been embedded in criticism of language from its very
beginning: the discovery of the 'naked truth' calls for the un-covering of things,
for stripping away their linguistic veil, so that the 'light of truth' can shine.
Precisely during the baroque age, when metaphorical and allusive language
reached its apogee, modern rationalism tried to eliminate the imprecision of
natural language by developing an unambiguous terminology of its own, with
literal, definite and proper meaning. For this reason, Thomas Hobbes declared
metaphor, together with ambiguity, deception and insult, to be 'abuses of
speech': In Leviathan he argued that metaphor necessarily misleads cognition
since it uses absurd conclusions. Therefore Hobbes demanded that language
be cleansed of persuasive and figurative elements. Only by using nothing but
unambiguous, literal language could knowledge be gained and communicated
properly:

To conclude, the light of human minds is perspicuous words, but by exact

definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace;
increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And, on the
contrary, metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words, are like ignes fatui
[will-o'-the-wisps, B.D.]; and reasoning upon them is wandering amongst
innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.6

Similarly, John Locke criticised in his Essay concerning human understanding

imprecise and ambiguous 'civil' language and proposed a proper and definite
philosophical language that "may serve to convey the precise notions of things,
and to express in general propositions certain and undoubted truths, which the
mind may rest upon and be satisfied with in its search after true knowledge".7

For this reason, science must use words as precisely and clearly as possible
and must avoid all kinds of linguistic abuse, such as expressions that are
unclear or without content; unstable or ambiguous meanings; confusion of
words and things; mispredications; and finally rhetorical and metaphorical
speech. Only then can scientific language offer strict definitions that correspond
to things and are based on constant meaning. Thus Locke not only denied the
possibility that rhetoric and metaphor can convey truth, he also blamed them for
being the actual causes of deception and untruthfulness: "It is evident how
much men love to deceive and be deceived, since rhetoric, that powerful
instrument of error and deceit, has its established professors, is publicly taught
and has always been held in great reputation."8

In a similar way, rhetoric and metaphor have been criticised by such

philosophers and scientists as Galileo, Montaigne, Descartes, Bayle, Harvey,
and Leibniz.9 However, despite their struggle against figurative language, none
of the aforementioned authors were able to avoid metaphorical expressions in
their own writing. That is why they often advocated restricting metaphor to
pedagogical and illustrative functions. Even in the middle of the last century,
John Stuart Mill was still trying to make plausible this division between
illustrative metaphor and ostensibly non-figurative argumentation. In his System
of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, Mill ascribed a pedagogical and
persuasive usefulness to metaphor in argumentation and at the same time
denied that metaphor could have any inherent cognitive and argumentative
power: "A metaphor, then, is not to be considered as an argument, but as an
assertion that an argument exists; that a parity subsists between the case from
which the metaphor is drawn and to which it is applied."10

The devaluation of metaphor thus became a point of philosophical consensus,

even though metaphor was at no time completely eliminated from academic
language. Indeed, the rationalistic critique of language first raised only a
programmatic objection against a general deep respect for metaphor and
rhetoric. This respect led Locke, for instance, to contradict his own denunciation
of rhetoric: "Eloquence, like the fair sex, has too prevailing beauties in it to
suffer itself ever to be spoken against."11 But what are concessions to the
charms of metaphor worth, if it (like women) is simultaneously banned from the
more highly esteemed realm of the rational?

Emphatic iconoclasm and the call for a literal, metaphor-free language remain
central claims of modern philosophy of language and linguistics: fixation on an
ideal of literal definiteness and clarity, and criticism of the ambiguity of figurative
language have not only become basic tenets of philosophy; they have also
been persistent motifs in the attempt to replace natural language by ideal
language and a semantics of literal meaning. In this way, the difference
between scientific and natural language is equated with the difference between
proper and improper language and with the difference between literal and
metaphorical speech.
From the perspective of metaphor theory, it has often been remarked that the
opponents of metaphor are completely unable to implement any kind of
metaphor-free language and that their arguments are therefore inconsistent.12 In
fact, the language of the opponents of metaphor is no less rich in metaphor than
is the language of its supporters. For instance, the philosophy of truth,
knowledge and cognition is based on an irreducible and metaphysical root
metaphor: the metaphor of light. As Derrida and Blumenberg have shown, this
metaphor cannot be transcended because it constitutes its object in the first
place:13 truth and cognition are unthinkable without the light metaphor. There
can be no metaphor-free realm within which the discourse of truth and cognition
could develop independently of this root metaphor. Such irreducible, 'absolute
metaphors', as Blumenberg calls them, cannot be translated into non-figurative
language; they are 'basic elements' [Grundbestände] of philosophical language
and therefore an 'inexhaustible catalytic sphere' for the formation of concepts.
This means that underneath the surface level of obvious pedagogical-illustrative
imagery there is always a deeper layer of fundamental metaphors, which control
even the logic of seemingly non-metaphorical discourse and therefore lie in the
blind spot of theoretical reflection.

Now, my thesis is that the above-mentioned inconsistency actually strengthens

the position of the opponents of metaphor: it is precisely their continual pointing
to the pedagogical-illustrative surface metaphors and their conspicuous display
of fighting for a metaphor-free language that constitute and stabilise the
difference between the literal and the figurative in academic language. As
attention is directed only to the surface imagery from which purportedly literal
academic language dissociates itself, the deep metaphysical layer of metaphors
in academic language becomes eclipsed, and the always already metaphorical
realm of cognition becomes re-interpreted as a purely literal sphere. To stabilise
the distinction between literal, proper academic language and figurative,
improper everyday language, the difference 'literal versus metaphorical' must be
constructed again and again within academic discourse.

To this end, the obvious surface imagery is separated from language that is
based on hidden, fundament al metaphors and projected into the margins of
academic discourse. Precisely this strategy of dissociating and excluding
surface metaphors constitutes the basic distinction by which rationalistic
discourse gains its ostensible literal essentiality in the first place. The visible
level of surface metaphors thus functions as a protective layer that obscures the
underlying deeper level of fundamental metaphors. That is why the struggle
against metaphor is actually less about banishing all metaphor from academic
discourse, than about controlling and disciplining surface metaphor, taming its
suggestive power, and cutting back its proliferation. Only with this disciplinary
procedure can metaphor be used as a criterion of difference between natural
and academic language. As Derrida points out, all theoretical discourse on
metaphor can be interpreted as a disciplinary process which, ever since
Aristotle, has continuously classified and limited metaphor.14 Metaphorological
discourse has ritually repeated, confirmed, and inscribed the difference between
literal and figurative language onto the discursive praxis of human, natural, and
social sciences. Through this process, a dichotomous scheme of parallel
polarities emerged and has remained effective until today:

academic
literal proper rational philosophy masculine
language
natural
metaphor improper irrational rhetoric / poetics feminine
language

The common association of literal language, scientific rationality and masculinity

thus is complemented by a dichotomous association of figurative language, life-
worldly irrationality and femininity. This distinction enables opponents of
metaphor to use metaphorical language even in their attacks on metaphor, as
long as they use it to illustrate the dangers of metaphor. In John Locke's attack
on figurative language, which I described previously, de Man observes the
following:

Nothing could be more eloquent than this denunciation of eloquence. It is clear

that rhetoric is something one can decorously indulge in as long as one knows
where it belongs to. Like a woman, which it resembles [...], it is a fine thing, as
long as it is kept in its proper place.15

2. The reflective function of metaphor, or: the metaphorical mirror

The paradoxical strategy of unfulfillable iconoclasm can be read as an attempt

to cope with the epistemological crisis into which thought came when, with the
beginning of the modern era, the analogical ontology of similarity went into
decline. Indeed, even Nietzsche remained trapped within this paradox and was
unable to resolve it satisfactorily. Though he recognised the inevitability of
metaphor, he also at the same time derived its untruthfulness from its
inevitability.16 According to Nietzsche, any assertion that is taken to be true is
necessarily rooted in conventional metaphors that are only contingently valid.
For this reason, no rational criteria and no truth can exist for metaphors.
Metaphor hereby becomes myth. However, if truth depends on the contingency
of established sets of metaphors, then the truth or the untruth of metaphor can
only be asserted in the mode of performative contradiction. As de Man points
out, Nietzsche's criticism of rhetoric, which intends to escape "from the pitfalls of
rhetoric by becoming aware of the rhetoricity of language", remains at the same
time an "endless reflection [...], unable ever to escape from the rhetorical deceit
it denounces".17 Nietzsche thus has no other choice than to take an aesthetic
and ironical position.

A resolution of the paradox first emerges with the ascertainment of the reflective
function of metaphor, namely with its redefinition from a disruptive factor that
threatens the order of literal discourse as a semantic anomaly or as a
categorical mistake, to a reflective factor that permits the order of language to
be reflected and recategorised. Only in this reflective function can metaphor
become what Christian Strub calls the "linguistic kernel of a post-analogical
ontology of modernity", in which the contingency of ontological distinctions and
categories becomes known and can be reflected by means of metaphor.18 The
difference between literal and metaphorical speech then remains a pragmatic
one, which can be determined only from concrete contexts. Metaphor
introduces a meta-linguistic level in opposition to the ostensibly literal level of
linguistic reference to objects, which reflects this literal level in a specific way.
By transgressing the boundaries of the literal and thus reflectively thematising
them, metaphor can be said to have a reflective structure.19

In addition, metaphor also has a self-reflective structure, since it proposes a

new insight in the mode of the 'as-if'. What Hesse calls 'metaphorical
redescription' can be understood as a rational anticipation of new phenomena,
an anticipation that contains in itself the reflected negation of the old order and
at the same time proposes a new order.20 If, however, metaphorical
redescription is actually to be a rational anticipation and not just an arbitrary
myth, then its rationality may not be evaluated only in respect of its internal
aptness to the symbolic system in which it is used, for this might be mere myth
or ideology. Instead, metaphor must be evaluated in terms of the
epistemological paradox of the metaphorical 'as-if' predication, which
simultaneously expresses both an identity between two entities and their
difference. Metaphorical predication always entails the 'insuperable paradox'
(Ricoeur) that is built into the notion of metaphorical truth: "The paradox
consists in the fact that there is no other way to do justice to the notion of
metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' within
the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is'."21

The usage of a metaphor with validity claims thus implies both the possibility
and the necessity of metaphor reflection. Here, the difference 'literal versus
metaphorical' is less decisive than the difference 'mythical versus metaphorical'
insofar as myth results from taking a metaphor too literally and thus reifying
language. Metaphor becomes myth when it is considered to be the one and
only invariable truth, instead of a possible, fallible truth. That is, metaphor
becomes myth when it is anchored so deeply in conviction that it can no longer
be called into question.22

Thus reflection upon metaphor does not entail converting metaphorical speech
into literal speech. Instead it requires a determination of the difference between
myth and metaphor; this means distinguishing the 'as-if' status of metaphor from
the unquestionable certainty of myth even where metaphor is unavoidable and
irreducible, as in the case of absolute metaphor. Only metaphor reflection that is
both self-referential and context-referential and that reflects the broader sense
of a metaphorical expression can prove the truth of metaphor and thus rationally
legitimise its use.23 In the same way that every actual consensus about truth
remains open to revision without losing its unconditional validity claim, the
metaphorical redescription has the status of an 'as-if' predication and
nevertheless can assert a truth claim: As Berggren points out, metaphor is a
"counterfactual statement" that possesses a "possible or counterfactual truth".24
The rationality of the metaphorical redescription has to be measured by its
adequacy. Adequacy can be determined by comparing the new metaphorical
description with previous descriptions of the object and by interrogating it for
new perspectives and insights. However, this reflective process of catching up
with the metaphor's implications is possible only retrospectively and within
argumentative discourse concerning the reflection of both metaphorical
anticipation and metaphorical myth. Thus metaphor must prove itself in the
language-game of truth.25

The idea of assessing the rationality and truth of metaphor through critical
reflection upon metaphor, however, is itself based on the fundamental optical
metaphors of light, mirror and observation. The metaphorical roots of reflection
thus deserve closer consideration. One could say that the light of truth cannot
be recognised directly but needs to be refracted and mirrored from different
angles.26 This indirect recognition is necessary not because the light of truth is
too bright (as Plato believed) but because the mirror allows selection and
comparison. Reflecting a metaphor from different angles means creating new
views on this metaphor, and thus introducing both new distinctions into
interpretation and more distance from the metaphor. Although the blind spot of
observation, as such, remains insuperable, it is possible to overcome the blind
spot of a particular observation by changing the position and the basic
distinction of the observer.

Changing position and distance does not imply a reduction of the evocative and
imaginative power of metaphor. In other words: metaphor reflection is not meant
to be a procedure of metaphor control and surveillance but instead an operation
that broadens understanding by opening up new perspectives and points of
comparison. This requires that reason act not as a Foucaultian observer in the
centre of a cognitive panopticon27 but rather as a Socratic traveller who
constantly changes position and perspective by wandering through the network
of metaphorical associations and connections and by creating new relationships
or abolishing old ones.28 Metaphor reflection is in itself a metaphorical process
of transference and interference.

In conclusion, I would like to propose a systematic method of metaphor

reflection, based on an extension of Shibles' 'metaphorical method',29 which I
call reflective metaphorisation. I understand reflective metaphorisation to
comprise all metaphor-critical processes, such as the creation of metaphors,
their expansion, variation, exhaustion, confrontation, and historicisation. All
these processes serve reflection upon a metaphorical or (ostensibly) literal
expression. By setting in motion processes of reflective metaphorisation, we
decontextualise the problematic expression, call it into question, and challenge
its self-evident truth, thus consciously shifting it into an 'as-if' perspective.
Through the systematic exhaustion of metaphorical potential and through the
decontextualisation of metaphors, we can open up new ways of seeing and new
connections, make visible new distinctions and differentiations, and investigate
the internal and external limits of validity for each metaphor. Even paradigmatic
background metaphors and absolute metaphors can be rendered accessible to
reflection through this operation of reflective metaphorisation.
Only with a reflected consciousness of the constructive 'as-if' character of each
metaphor can we avoid the mythification of metaphor and the development of
essentialistic conceptions. If we bear in mind this 'as-if' reservation, we can
avoid what Immanuel Kant would call 'dogmatic anthropomorphism'. We then
limit ourselves to a 'symbolic anthropomorphism', which, indeed, concerns only
language and not the object itself.30 Metaphor is necessarily anthropomorphic
and as such anticipates and impinges on the world; but as reflected
anthropomorphism, limited to the symbolic realm, metaphor does not resort to
the myth of reifying, essentialistic ontology. Metaphor can be a rational
anticipation (and thus capable of truth) only in the synthesis of anticipatory
evidence and rational reflection of meaning and validity. However, metaphor
possesses not only its specific reflective power but also (particularly in the
sciences) an immanent tendency to become mythified, due to its suggestive
power. As a result, metaphor reflection that dissolves epistemological obstacles
is not only a theoretical task for metaphorology and the philosophy of science. It
is also an ethical duty of academic praxis.31

Footnotes

1 See Goodman, Nelson (1968): Languages of art, Indianapolis:Bobbs-Merrill.

<back>

2 See e.g.Pepper, Stephen C. (1935): The root metaphor of metaphysics,

Journal of Philosophy 32, 365374.; Blumenberg, Hans (1960): Paradigmen zu
einer Metaphorologie, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 6.; Lakoff, George/Mark
Johnson (1980): Metaphors we live by, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
<back>

3 For the general discussion, see Ortony, Andrew (1979)(ed.): Metaphor and
thought, Cambridge: Cambridge UP. <back>

4 For a broader and more detailed discussion of the rationality of metaphor, see
also Debatin, Bernhard (1995): Die Rationalität der Metapher. Eine
sprachphilosophische und kommunikationstheoretische Untersuchung,
Berlin/New York: De Gruyter. <back>

5 Foucault, Michel (1966): Les mots et les choses, Paris: Gallimard, p. 68 and
65, my translation. <back>

6 Hobbes, Thomas ([1651]1960): Leviathan, or the matter, form and power of a

commonwealth ecclesiastical and civil, ed. M. Oakeshott, Oxford: Blackwell,
Part I, Chapter 4 and 5, here: 2930. <back>

7 Locke, John ([1686]1959): An essay concerning human understanding, ed. A.

C. Fraser, New York: Dover, Book III, 9/3. <back>

8 Ibidem, Book III, 10/34. <back>

9 See e.g. Nieraad, Jürgen (1977): "Bildgesegnet und Bildverflucht"
Forschungen zur sprachlichen Metaphorik, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft, Chapter 4.2.1 and Kurz, Gerhard/Theodor Pelster (1976):
Metapher. Theorie und Unterrichtsmodell, Düsseldorf: Schwann, pp. 31ff.
<back>

10 Mill, John Stuart ([1843]1974): A system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive,

ed. J. M. Robson, Toronto: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Book V, Chapter 5, § 7:
801. <back>

11 Locke, John ([1686]1959): An essay concerning human understanding, ed.

A. C. Fraser, New York: Dover, Book III, 10/34. <back>

12 See e.g. Moore, F.C.T (1982): On taking metaphor literally, in: David Miall
(ed.), Metaphor: problems and perspectives, Brighton: The Harvester Press, pp.
113, de Man, Paul (1978): The epistemology of metaphor, Critical Inquiry 5, 15-
30, Nieraad, Jürgen (1977): "Bildgesegnet und Bildverflucht" Forschungen zur
sprachlichen Metaphorik, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, pp.
88ff., and Ledanff, Susanne (1979): Die 'nackte Wahrheit' in metaphorischer
Beleuchtung, Sprache im technischen Zeitalter 68, 282289. <back>

13 See Derrida, Jaques (1972): La mythologie blanche, in: J. D.: Marges de la

philosophie, Paris: Gallimard, pp. 247342, Blumenberg, Hans (1957): Licht als
Metapher der Wahrheit. Im Vorfeld der Begriffsbildung, Studium Generale 10,
pp. 432447, Blumenberg, Hans (1960): Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie,
Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte Nr. 6, Blumenberg, Hans (1971): Beobachtungen
an Metaphern, Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte 15, pp. 160214. <back>

14 Derrida, Jaques (1972): La mythologie blanche, in: J. D.: Marges de la

philosophie, Paris: Gallimard, particularly pp. 265ff. <back>

15 De Man, Paul (1978): The epistemology of metaphor, Critical Inquiry 5, p.

15. <back>

16 Nietzsche, Friedrich ([1873]1985): Über Lüge und Wahrheit im

außermoralischen Sinn, in: Werke in vier Bänden, ed. by Gerhard Stenzel,
Salzburg: Bergland, vol. 4, 541554. <back>

17 De Man (1979): Allegories of Reading, New Haven/ London: Yale UP, pp.
110 and 115. <back>

18 Strub, Christian (1991): Kalkulierte Absurditäten. Versuch einer historisch

reflektierten sprachanalytischen Metaphorologie, Freiburg: Alber, pp. 471ff. my
translation. <back>

19 Köller, Wilhelm (1975): Semiotik und Metapher. Untersuchungen zur

grammatischen Struktur und kommunikativen Funktion von Metaphern,
Stuttgart: Metzler, pp. 46ff. and 72ff. <back>
20 See Hesse, Mary (1966): Models and analogies in science, Notre Dame:
Notre Dame UP, pp. 156184, Ricoeur, Paul (1975): La métaphor vive, Paris:
Editions du Seuil, pp. 250ff. and Kittay, Eva Feder (1987): Metaphor. Its
cognitive force and its linguistic structure, Oxford: Clarendon Press. <back>

21 Ricoeur, Paul (1975): La métaphor vive, Paris: Editions du Seuil, p. 321,

quoted from the English edition: Ricoeur, Paul (1978):The rule of metaphor,
transl. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello, London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 255. <back>

22 See Berggren (1963), Ricoeur (1975: 310ff.), Shibles (1974), Bühl (1984:
151ff.) Köller (1975: 224ff.) and Nieraad (1977: 26ff.). <back>

23 See Villwock (1983, esp. 297). <back>

24 Berggren, Douglas (1963): The use and abuse of metaphor, Review of

Metaphysics 16, pp. 240 and 253. <back>

25 Bühl, Walter L. (1984): Die Ordnung des Wissens, Berlin: Duncker und
Humblot, p. 158. As in the operational pragmatic notion of truth, the
determination of a metaphor's truth is retrospectively oriented, a process of
explaining it hermeneutically. We can say only in retrospect to what extent a
truth claim be it literal or metaphorical can be sustained in the long run. <back>

26 Here one could ask, too, what mirror is used and then, as philosophy has
traditionally done, un-cover the epistemological paradoxes: that language is
both the mirror and mirrored, that reason is both the mirror and the observer,
and that reason and language then enter into a paradoxical constellation.
Moreover, does not reflection lead to the paradox of doubling its object, thus not
only multiplying things but also creating an infinite regress of reflecting each
reflection yet again? I hold the 'view' that this paradoxical structure, as
epistemological constructivism has shown, is actually the condition of possibility
of reflection. <back>

27 See Foucault, Michel (1979): Discipline and Punish, New York: Vintage
Books. <back>

28 See Trabert, Lukas (1997): Metaphor, rational discourse, and the beginning
of philosophy in Plato's 'Theaetetus', in: Debatin, Bernhard/ Timothy R.
Jackson/Daniel Steuer: Metaphor and Rational Discourse. Tübingen, pp. 25-37.
<back>

29 See Shibles, Warren (1974): Die metaphorische Methode, Deutsche

Zeitschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 48, pp. 8f. <back>

30 Kant, Immanuel ([1783]1965): Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen

Metaphysik, ed. Karl Vorländer, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, § 57 / 15. <back>

31 Work and time constraints hinder a thorough reflection of metaphor in

practice; therefore, I would like to propose two normative practical principles for
dealing reflectively with metaphor. Firstly, alternative metaphors should be
systematically sought out and permitted to describe phenomena, which implies
that the current, conventional metaphors take on a hypothetical, 'as-if'
character. Secondly, in academic contexts metaphor should be methodically
monitored; this entails constantly asking whether a metaphorical description
aids cognition or impedes it. <back>

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