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Roman Military History

The Roman Empire, at its greatest extent in the second century A.D., included two and a

half million square miles (Steele 2001, 36) and ruled some eighty million people. It stretched

from present day Scotland to Sudan, from the Persian Gulf to the Rock of Gibraltar. This massive

achievement was won through expansion by the sword. Seemingly invincible legions carried the

golden eagle through territory after territory in order to create and control the Empire. For a

millennium, the descendants of Aeneas steamrolled the rest of the known world and lost few

battles as they went. However, the Roman army was successful not on account of unresourceful

enemies or a willingly subservient population, but rather as a result of its ability to learn and grow

over the centuries of the early Republic and Empire.

According to tradition, when Rome was founded in 753 B.C. on the banks of the Tiber its

military was far different than the imperial legionnaires so commonly recognized. Rome’s first

distinguishable army was a heavily-Etruscan-influenced force of peasant tribes numbering around

three thousand men known as a legio or levy (Keppie 1998, 15). However, the city would not

have an organized and well equipped military until the middle of the sixth century B.C. The

sixth king of Rome, Servius Tullius, established a system in which the citizens were separated

into political and military classes. He conducted the first census and created five distinct classes

of citizens based on their property and wealth (Webster 1985, 3). Each class supplied a certain

number of centuries (groups of one hundred men) armed to a specified degree. The wealthiest

citizens, called equites (or knights) formed eighteen centuries of horsemen, while the four less

affluent classes made up one hundred and seventy centuries of infantry (Keppie 1998, 17).

Tullius’ institution was effective in the sense that he was able to field a large army by conscription

in a very short amount of time and at a low cost to the state, since soldiers had to supply and

maintain their own military equipment for use on the battlefield. Finally, since only citizens who
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had property and wealth were allowed to serve in this first Roman army, the chances of defection

or evasion were very small as each soldier had something tangible to fight for.

As impressive as the earliest army organization was, it was based on a flawed ‘hoplite’

formation. The hoplite was the standard ancient Greek soldier- it had been used for centuries

before to a great degree by the city states and Alexander the Great. They were very successful in

conflicts with enemies who drew soldiers up into formations for attack, but the “old” rules of

engagement were changing. Rome, after separating in 509 B.C. from the dying Etruscan

kingdom and fighting a century long war with the surrounding small city states, was left as a

powerful force in central Italy. However, this mastery of the land left Rome to fend for itself in

the region and the needed army reform would not come until after disaster.

Gallic tribes had been pushing further south into Italy for two centuries and the effect of

their rampage was startling. Early on the Etruscans had acted as a buffer zone against the

barbarians, but were eventually overrun. In 390 B.C. the Gauls had pushed all the way down into

the territory of Rome and destroyed a Roman phalanx army on the banks of the Allia River

(Goldsworthy 2000, 36). The barbarians sacked the city and were only expelled after a large

ransom of gold was paid and a gutsy military counterattack by the dictator-general Marcus Furius

Camillius drove them out (Keppie 1998, 18). This event did not leave a lasting mark on the city

itself (the barbarians were driven out and Rome was not sacked again until the German invasions

of the late fifth century); though the argument can be made that the Gauls weakened the Etruscans

to a point where the Romans were able to break away from their control. However, it did prove

the military needed new reform.

The shellshock of the Gallic sacking of Rome brought the realization that the phalanx

formation was an outdated relic of the classical Greek age. The ability of the Celts to fight

flexibly on the battlefield and move freely made a great impression on the legions. A new
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formation was adopted by the Roman army known as

manipuli (literally handfuls). These

subsections of the legion were organized

into small rectangles of three heavy lines

known as the triplex acies: the hastati (or

spearmen), the principles, and triarii, which were

situated behind a small screen line of skirmishers or leves

(Keppie 1998, 20).

Maniple formation was exceptional because of the possibilities it offered its commanders.

These rectangles were capable of independent action from the rest of the army but retained

synchronization within the legion. Each maniple was separately commanded by an officer (later

known as a centurion) who could take broad orders from the general yet carry out quick action

in response to new battlefield developments. Also, the maniple formation proved its flexibility.

Conversely, once a phalanx was committed to battle, it was almost completely impossible for the

pikemen to react. Due to their long pikes, hoplites could not turn to face an attack from a new

direction while maniples could shift on account of their “checkerboard formation”. Windrow tells

us:

They fought in solid ranks, but could open gaps in the ranks when
ordered to replace one another in battle when they became tired… if
the enemy broke through the front ranks, the [fresh] second rank soon
dealt with them (25).

Finally, this loose rectangle allowed for overlap and overrunning action. Maniples could

be deployed to engulf units and then turn to use a “pincer movement” on nearby engaged

troops. Once encircled, enemies could be easily cut down. This was put to good use in

Greece at the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. against the Macedonians. Philip V,

king of Macedon, had arranged phalanxes of hoplite pikemen against the Roman
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legionnaires. The pikes rushed down a hill at the Romans on both the left and right

flanks in order to try and batter the maniples back with a row of spears. The battle

became a stalemate on the left flank, but poorly deployed hoplites on the right were

surprised by a Roman counter-offensive whereby the maniples split to avoid rows of

spears and closed in with the short gladius (Hammond 1988, 108). Macedonians,

unable to turn or expand to counter the Romans, were systematically boxed in, cut apart,

and fled. Victorious right wing infantry were then able to swerve around and attack the

left wing from behind, pressing the remaining Macedonians between a Roman “hammer

and anvil” strike (Hammond 1988, 109). Effectively, this victory allowed Rome to

conquer Greece and showed the effectiveness of the manipuli.

Along with a change in organization of troops came an adaptation of equipment.

When the phalanx was scrapped as the Roman method of war, so were all of its standard

arms. In the century between the Gallic invasions and the Punic Wars great strides were

made in changing the army’s gear. The hoplon shield, small and circular, was replaced

with the scutum, which was longer and more able to protect the body in close quarter

combat (Keppie 1998, 19). The pike too, was also retired. Shorter thrusting spears

known as the hasta were given to front line maniple troops (hence the name hastati)

as well as the triarii. Eventually these too would be replaced by a set of pilum, two

javelins with soft iron heads which would, when they struck, impale and bend, rendering

a shield awkward to carry and the javelin unable to be thrown back (Williams 2003, 21).

Finally, legionnaires were equipped with short swords since maniples were now a close

combat fighting group. Designed to hack and slash, the modified Spanish blades known

as the gladius (and later its longer cousin the spatha) were issued and became very

popular with the Roman soldier (Goldsworthy 2000, 44). Auxiliary troops did favor
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weapons from their own countries, but mostly the army was equipped in very much the

same fashion from the middle of the Republic to the late Empire.

With this new and improved army, Rome began expanding. Starting in 340 B.C.

Rome fought a series of three wars with the Samnites, a neighboring tribe. Minus the

loss of a whole army at the Battle of Caudine Forks- a Roman scouting error where a

legion was caught surrounded in a deep valley- (Grant 2005, 36), the wars were a large

success for the Eternal City. This conflict was interesting because the Samnites were

conquered by an army not better but smarter. During the conflict, the Roman army built a

system of farming colonies (connected back to Rome by roads built by the legionnaires)

which separated the different tribes of the Samnites from one another (Webster 1985, 8).

This had a multifarious effect- the colonies made enemy movement of troops and

communications more difficult and less stealthy, the agrarian colonies provided food for

the rapidly expanding Roman state, and sometimes the colonies actually converted

enemies into friends. This divide-and-conquer strategy worked; after half a century,

Rome had made most of northern and central Italy submit to their power.

Rome’s next military adventure would prove, of all things, the determination of

her army. Still expanding, Rome came into contact with the Greek trading posts set up in

the south. Although they were usually welcomed as a defense against barbarians, one

city named Tarentum, nervous of Roman expansion, called back to Greece, where an

army of nearly 25,000 was sent by King Pyrrhus to check the Italians (Keppie 1998, 23).

The resulting war was bloody for the Romans- they lost 15,000 men alone in the battle of

Heraclea (Grant 2005, 37). However, it revealed the audacity of the Romans. Refusing

to admit defeat and sue for peace, the Romans forced Pyrrhus, who was also dearly cost

by the war (the essence of “Pyrrhic victory”), to sail back to Greece. A conflict which
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should have been easily won was lost because of the Romans almost kamikaze ability to

drag it into attrition.

Now a major player in the Mediterranean area, Rome clashed with powerful

Carthage, and continued to develop in order to deal with this new overseas threat.

Expanding into Sicily, Rome went to war with Carthage in 264 B.C. and fought three

campaigns on and off which spanned more than a century (Goldsworthy 2000, 56).

Although the Second Punic War is the more commonly remembered for the battles of

Hannibal and Scipio, the First Punic War is the most important of the trio. At the outset

of the conflict, Rome found itself without ships fighting the greatest naval power of the

day. The Romans had an enormous problem of playing catch-up and hastily built up a

baby fleet of 60 quinqueremes and triremes. But to beat the more advanced enemy

they relied on advances again. Grant says “To make up for their inexperience at sea, the

Romans depended on an innovation: the corvus, a boarding bridge… legionaries would

swarm across to capture the ship” (38). Surprisingly, the First Punic War was a smashing

success for the Romans, who overwhelmingly defeated the better trained Carthaginian

navy at battles like Mylae in 260 and Ecnomus in 256 B.C. At the end of the wars, Rome

had won control of Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and North Africa. Finally, Carthage’s

destruction in 146 B.C. left Rome supreme over the rest of the Mediterranean and began

the tradition of “Mare Nostrum”.

The last great learning experience for the Roman army came under the might of

Julius Caesar and his campaigns. Caesar arrived as head of the legions after decades of

civil war and several coups. Even though the army’s organization and equipment stayed

much the same, he reasserted discipline (Webster 1985, 23). But more important was

Caesar’s feats of great engineering. His sheer capacity for being able to build the Roman
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army to success is a monument to itself. In 55 B.C. he pushed the army to the limits of

possibility. German tribes had been extending over the traditional boundary of the Rhine

River into the province of Gaul, so in response Caesar, instead of just driving the

barbarians out, decided to take the fight to them. After clearing the western bank of the

Rhine, the army built a bridge 1300 ft in length and about 50 feet wide from local lumber,

spanning the river in ten days (Keppie 1998, 86). The bridge was most likely a pile

bridge, meaning wood poles were imbedded by a floating pile driver into the riverbed

onto which wooden trusses and planks were built on top to make a traversable surface

(Blacklock 2004, 22). This bridge allowed all forty thousand of Caesar’s troops to cross,

scare away the awestruck Germans, raid the countryside and then cross back over. The

expedition took eighteen days. At the end, Caesar had the great bridge torched to let the

Germans know Roman territory was not to be trifled with. Caesar would again prove his

brilliance in the siege of Alesia in 52 B.C. with the building of two sets of huge walls and

twenty three forts encircling the town (Grant 2005, 46). The virtual city surrounding the

city was able to repulse attacks from the town as well as Gallic relief sorties from outside.

Caesar’s siege crushed the rebel Vercingetorix and finally allowed him to exert complete

control over Gaul. This legacy of great building feats was perpetuated in the numerous

forts across the empire, and the walls, aqueducts and road systems still visible today.

The Roman army was able to control so much of the world not only because of

its training, its size, and its leaders, but because of its intelligence. Rome for centuries

reigned as the hub of arms technology advancements, able to beat its enemies more

effectively with smarter, faster, and lighter weapons. And the army’s ability to adapt and

change to fit the situation allowed it to overcome most any adversary. But

the greatness of the Roman Empire began to slip

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away once it stopped advancing. The destruction of three legions by the Germans at the

Battle of Teutoberg Forest in 9 A.D. was really a turning point starting a long decline for

the legion. Increased use of unreliable barbarian auxiliaries in the army and the total lack

of popular support for the military late in the Empire sounded the death knell of the once-

great, unstoppable machine. But the fact that the Empire, so extensive and plagued by

constant attack, was able to survive for so long is a testament to the phenomenal work of

the legionnaire.

Works Cited

Anderson, Mike. "The Maniple as a Tactical Unit in the Roman Army." Mike

Anderson's Ancient History Blog. Blogger.com, 14 Mar. 2009. Web. 09

May 2011. <http://www.mikeanderson.biz/2009/03/blog-post_14.html.

Blacklock, Dyan, and David Kennett. The Roman Army: the Legendary

Soldiers Who Created an Empire. New York: Walker &, 2004. Print.

Goldsworthy, Adrian Keith. Roman Warfare. Ed. John Keegan. London: Cassell,

2000. Print.

Grant, R. G. Battle: A Visual Journey Through 5,000 Years of Combat. New

York: DK Pub., 2005. Print.

Hammond, N.G.L. "The Campaign and Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC." Journal of

Hellenic Studies (1988): 108. Print.

Keppie, L. J. F. The Making of the Roman Army: from Republic to Empire.

Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1998. Print.

Steele, Christy. Rome. Austin: Raintree Steck-Vaughn, 2001. Print.

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Webster, Graham. The Roman Imperial Army of the First and Second

Centuries A.D. Third ed. Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1985. Print.

Williams, Brian. Ancient Roman War and Weapons. Chicago, IL: Heinemann

Library, 2003. Print.

Windrow, Martin. The Roman Legionary. Toronto, ON: Franklin Watts, 1984. Print.