To Shoot or Not to Shoot: Posttotalitarianism in China and Eastern Europe

Author(s): Mark R. Thompson

Source: Comparative Politics, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Oct., 2001), pp. 63-83
Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New York
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 To Shoot or Not to Shoot

Posttotalitarianismin China and EasternEurope

Mark R. Thompson

Democratic revolutionarymovements in China, Czechoslovakia, and the German

Democratic Republic (GDR) started similarly, as nonviolent, mass-based protests
against hard-line regimes. Yet little more than a decade later the massacre at
TiananmenSquarein Chinaand the triumphantrevolutionsof easternEuropeappear
to have left little in common. The subsequent direction of these countries could
hardlyhave been more different.After orderingthe army to shoot peaceful protest-
ers, China's Communist rulers executed or imprisoned hundreds of democratic
activists, while forcing othersundergroundor into exile. In Czechoslovakiaand East
Germany the order to fire at unarmed demonstrators never came, and the
Communistregimes collapsed. Although neither country still exists, their territorial
remnants,including Slovakiaafterrecent elections, have democratized.'
The eastern Europeandemocratizationsare often seen as "one single snowball,"
as Adam Przeworskihas phrased it.2 Differences between negotiated transitionsin
Poland and Hungary and revolutionary situations in East Germany and
Czechoslovakiahave been minimized,and the possibility of bloody repressionin the
latter two countries at the time has been largely ignored. Democracy in eastern
Europeis viewed insteadas the inevitableresult of the political avalancheunleashed
by Gorbachev'sliberalizationpolicies in the Soviet bloc.3 Because Deng was not a
political liberalizer like Gorbachev, the suppression of the Chinese democracy
movement is seen as equally predeterminedin a nondemocraticdirection.Yet China
did not have the only hard-line Communist leadership. Czechoslovakia'sand East
Germany's leaders were equally unyielding, despite Gorbachev's hints that they
should undertakereform.
It is easy to forget the widespreadfear that the East Germanand Czechoslovakian
protesterswould suffer the same fate as Chinese student demonstrators.Such Angst
was deliberatelycultivatedby the GDR regime, which had nothing but praise for the
Chinese government'sdefeat of "counterrevolution."Opposition leaders and ordi-
nary demonstratorstook these threatsseriously.4On October9, 1989, the fateful day
in Leipzig, where tens of thousands were preparing to demonstrate peacefully
against the regime, Honeckerwelcomed Chinese Deputy PremierYao Yilin to East
Berlin and lauded the crushing of protests in Tiananmen Square. Another East
Germanpolitburomember warned two Protestantchurch officials that Beijing was
far away from Berlin "only geographically."In Leipzig itself, in additionto the regu-
lar police, the workers'militia, and the secret police (Stasi), twenty-eightcompanies

63
ComparativePolitics October2001

of mobile police with eighty conscriptseach were mobilized. This last group, minus
the purgedrecruitswho were consideredpolitically unreliable,was briefed by politi-
cal officers. "Comrades, from today on it's class war....Today it will be decided,
either them or us. So be class watchful. If sticks aren't good enough, use firearms.
[If childrenare in the crowd, then] too bad for them. We have pistols, and we don't
have them for nothing."5Extrablood plasma was allocated to Leipzig hospitals, and
this information was spread to demonstrators with generous allusions to the
TiananmenSquare massacre. Similarly,in Czechoslovakia several members of the
central committee in Milos Jakes'sregime "toyed with the idea of a 'Chinese solu-
tion'....[Using] armed force was seriously contemplated in the first week" of the
protests beginning November 17, 1989.6 Protesters were understandablyworried
about being shot, particularlyafter the brutaldispersionof the November 17 student
demonstration.
Why events in Berlin and Prague did not end as those in Beijing remains one of
the most importantpuzzles of the revolutionaryyear 1989. Yet surprisinglyfew have
tried to solve this puzzle. Culturaldifferencesare often consideredtoo great to make
such a comparisonfruitful. Conservativeleaders in Singapore,Malaysia, and China
propagateda culturallyrelativistposition that western democracyis inappropriatein
Asian countries.7ProminentU.S. scholarspoint similarlyto a clash of civilizations.8
Nevertheless, the successful democratizationof the formerGDR and the earliersuc-
cess of West Germandemocracyhave laid to rest argumentsabout red Prussians in
East Berlin and chancellordemocracyin Bonn, not to mention the inherentlyauthor-
itariancharacterof Germans.9Despite Taiwan'sdemocratization,similar stereotypes
about the intrinsic authoritarianismof Chinese culture have yet to be abandoned.'0
Such culturalistarguments,with their assumptionof a culturalessence and oriental-
ist perspective,will be consciously ignored.'i
Scholars who have considered why the Chinese shot and eastern Europeansdid
not have offered four key answers:party legitimacy, societal modernization,leader-
ship behavior,and opposition strategies.Although each explanationmakes an impor-
tant contribution,they all neglect the common regime type in China and eastern
Europein 1989 and variationsamong subtypes.These regimes were posttotalitarian,
but there was an importantdifferencebetween China'searly and East Germany'sand
Czechoslovakia'slaterand frozen forms.

Party Legitimacy

GeraldSegal and John Phippsask what motivatesCommunistarmies to defend their

parties against popularprotests.12They arguethat the militaryin countriesthat expe-
rienced an internalrevolutionarystruggleremainsloyal to the Communistparty
because the indigenous army fought its way to power in the first place. Such fighting helps

64
 Mark R. Thompson

enhance the sense of nationalism surroundingthe armed forces and the revolution. The armed
forces also fight if it is clear that external powers with controlling influence are very keen that
they do so...The East Europeans, perhaps because they were installed in power by the Soviet
Union, lost confidence in their right to rule [after Gorbachev'sreforms]. It was undoubtedlytrue
that the depth of the crisis of legitimacy in Eastern Europe was far deeper than in the Chinese
case. It should be clear...thata vital part of the decision-makingprocess concerned the attitudeof
the Soviet Union. In China there was no outside arbiter,but in EasternEuropethe opinion of the
Soviet Union was crucial....Itis inconceivablethatthe revolutionsin EasternEuropein 1989 could
have takenplace without Soviet approval,or at least benevolentneutrality.13

Segal and Phippsare concernedwith elite legitimacy.Different from the mass legiti-
macy emphasized by Max Weber in his analysis of the forms of domination, elite
legitimacy concerns the loyalty of the regime staff.'4 T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher
have arguedthat, "even where...[mass] legitimacy plays little or no part in the rela-
tionship between rulers and subjects, the mode of legitimation retains its signifi-
cance as the basis for the relationshipof authoritybetween rulersand the administra-
tive staff."'5 Maria Marcus has termed this internal legitimation of Communist
regimes despite the lack of mass support "legitimation from the top."'6 Following
this argument,Giuseppe Di Palma has suggested that while a self-proclaimed"'vir-
tuous regime' can live without popularsupport...itcan hardlylive when it no longer
believes in its own virtue.'"17
Daniel Friedheim,in his study of East German security elites, provides data in
supportof the contentionthatexternallydependentregimes lost internallegitimation
after Gorbachev'srise to power. His survey of members of "secret crisis teams"-
partyleaders, civilian state officials, and security agency officers reveals an abrupt
erosion of previously near universal support within the Socialist Unity Party of
Germany (SED) for the party's goals after the rejection of Gorbachev'sreformist
course.t8 Friedheimsuggests that a "unified, ossified leadership"in East Germany
using "pervasive repression"and facing "unorganizedopposition" long enjoyed a
faSade of stability. But when "hegemonic signals" from Moscow changed, many
SED officials lost belief in their party'slegitimacy,while the loyalty of their military
apparatusbecame doubtful.'9
Thoughlackingsuch systematicdata,JuanJ. Linz and AlfredStepanmake a similar
argumentaboutCzechoslovakia.Czechoslovakleaderswere nervousand confusedafter
Gorbachev'srise to power, particularlyas Gorbachevwas demandingthat the 1968
intervention,the raison d 'etre of Czechoslovakhard-liners,be denounced.Increasingly
doubtingtheir own right to rule, they quickly lost controlover and the loyalty of the
securityapparatuswhen demonstrationsand strikesbeganin mid November1989.20
With its indigenous legitimacy,by contrast,the Chinese CommunistParty(CCP)
was able to survive crisis in 1989 because it retainedthe belief in its own "virtue,"
and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) remained loyal and obeyed orders to
shoot.2' Unlike the Soviet satellites of East Germany and Czechoslovakia, the

65
ComparativePolitics October2001

geostrategicallyand ideologically independentChinese party elite kept its legitimacy

from the top. In a crisis situation,a self-confident partyretainedpowerthat grew out
of the barrelsof the PLA'sguns.
Yet Segal and Phipps's argument seems less persuasive now than in 1990.
Indigenousrevolutionarylegitimacy was not sufficient to save Gorbachev'srule in
the Soviet Union in 1991. His regime did not collapse in the face of a civilian revo-
lutionarychallenge, but ratherafter a failed coup from within its own ranks.22The
situation was thus different from both eastern Europe and China in 1989. But the
Communistparties in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia,and East Germanyall suf-
fered a severe decline in elite legitimacy. In the Soviet Union in August 1991 the
standing of the party had declined so far that a large part of the security apparatus
disobeyed Gorbachev,the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), and the
militaryhead. While externaldependencymay well make a Communistregime more
prone to collapse during crisis, the independenceand national pride a party derives
from its revolutionarypast is no guaranteeof military loyalty, as the experience of
the Soviet Union shows. It is necessary to understandbetter the general causes of
declining party legitimacy in Communist regimes, in indigenous and externally
dependentones alike.

Societal Modernization

Modernizationtheory claims that the more modern societies of eastern Europe had
strongercivil societies that demandeddemocracymore effectively than was possible
in backwardChina. Minxin Pei is the most influentialexponentof this position.23

The explicit propositionhere is that the likelihood and form of societal takeovermay be signifi-
cantly influenced by a country'ssocial mobilizationalprofile, which includes, primarily,level of
education, urbanization,and structureof the labor force. When a given country'ssocial mobiliza-
tion profile correspondsclosely to that of societies on the eve of the inaugurationof democratic
regimes (high rates of urbanizationand literacy),a democraticbreakthroughis more likely. When a
country'ssocial mobilization profile shows no significant deviation from that of societies during
the early stages of development,a democraticbreakthroughmay be less likely....24

Yet a particularregime type can create conditionsthat favorpolitical mobilization

or impose constraints that compel demobilization. Such regime influence can be
independentof the level of a society's modernization.Social mobilization must be
distinguishedfrom the abilty to mobilize politically. For example, it can be argued
that there is less independentpolitical activity in Singapore, which has one of the
world's highest per capita incomes, than in Malawi, which has one of the lowest.25
Although Mao's totalitarianregime confronted a relatively backwardsociety, other
totalitarianregimes, particularlyNazi Germany,were quite modern yet still banned

66
 Mark R. Thompson

independentpolitical mobilization.The level of socioeconomic modernizationunder

certainregime types tells little aboutpotentialpolitical mobilization.
Pei attemptsto circumventthis problemby arguingthatthe degree of societal mod-
ernizationbecomes relevantonly once an "initialopening"by a reformistleadershipis
undertaken.26 He uses this phraseto encompassboth the chiefly economicreformsthat
began in 1979 in Chinaand the primarilypoliticalreformslaunchedby Gorbachevin
1986 in the Soviet Union. But therewere importantdifferencesin the characterof the
civil societies of immediate post-Mao China and of the Soviet Union at the time
Gorbachevtook power. In fact, Deng's China was more like the Soviet Union after
Stalin'sdeaththanjust before glasnost more than thirtyyears later.The Soviet regime
underBrezhnev,like the Czechoslovakianand the East Germanregimesthrough1989,
was hard-line.But a parallelcultureof dissenthad nonethelessbeen firmly established.
Persecutionof oppositionistscontinued,but organizedopposition,unthinkablebefore
Stalin'sdeath,existed. In otherwords,the possibilityfor politicalmobilizationhadjust
begun in Chinain the late 1970s, while it had existed for over threedecades in eastern
Europeandthe SovietUnionwhen Gorbachevcame to power.
It is particularlyimportantto focus on urban areas, where popular protests in
China and eastern Europetook place in 1989. In China the relative size of the indus-
trial work force was small comparedto the peasantry;polls show that peasantswere
less democraticthan workers.27Mark Selden argues that one key to explaining the
suppressionof the TiananmenSquare movement was urban isolation. Despite four
decades of rapid industrialization,"China'scities remain isolated if dynamic islands
of powerand privilege within a predominantlyagrariannation."28Only about 20 per-
cent of China's population was urban, compared with nearly 80 percent of
Czechoslovakia'sand East Germany's.29Still, while surroundedby the countryside,
China's urban workers were numerous. According to Chinese national statistics,
therewere 105 million workersin 1988, 70 percentof the nonagriculturallaborforce
(there were only 2 million students).30Moreover, the global experience of recent
democraticrevolutionssuggests that even in overwhelminglyruralsocieties success-
ful popular uprisings can be city-based or even confined to the capital city (for
example, Manila in 1986, Kathmanduin 1990, and Dhaka in 1991).31 However,
although a successful urban-baseduprising was conceivable in China, it is essential
to consider variationsin Communistregimes to show how far Chinese society could
be mobilized, comparedto easternEuropein 1989.

Leadership Behavior

Chinese Communists' resort to violent repression is also explained by Deng

Xiaoping's decisive leadership, compared to the paralysis of East German and

67
ComparativePolitics October2001

Czechoslovakian leaders. A split in the Chinese politburo between reformers and

hard-linersexplains Communistparty vacillation between harsh condemnationand
conciliatory statementsfrom April throughmid May, by which time the number of
daily demonstratorson TiananmenSquarewas over 100,000.32Protesterswere able
to stop soldiers from enforcing martial law after it was declared on May 19. At this
point Deng stepped in to end the internaldisarray,rallied the old guard,and purged
reformistsin the partywhile insuringmilitaryobedience.

Deng Xiaoping now took decisive action. Having shrewdly retainedthe position of Chair of the
PartyMilitaryAffairs Commission, he was able to call an emergencymeeting of the regional mili-
tary commanders in the central city of Wuhan, far from the madding crowd in Beijing. Zhao
Ziyang [the chief CCP reformer]was sacked as Party General Secretaryon 24 May....WithZhao
out of the way and the infuriatedhard-lineleadershipfully in charge, the military crackdowngot
under way on the night of 3-4 June. The death toll could never be ascertained,but the best esti-
mates are arounda thousand.33

However straightforwardthe argumentabout Deng's decisiveness may appear in

the Chinese context (it is implicitly strengthenedby his popular image as a wily
operator) it encounters difficulties when viewed comparatively.Deng's leadership
was important.Had he not so successfully rallied the party and troops, the crack-
down might not have occurred or at least not so soon, and it might not have been
successful. But no such unifying leadership qualities were necessary in East
Germanyand Czechoslovakia.Honeckerand Jakes enjoyed united parties, yet lead-
ership in these eastern European countries was politically paralyzed by the mass
protests that broke out in 1989. While the infuriatedhard-line leadership in China
moved decisively to suppressthe TiananmenSquaredemonstrations,a surely equally
disconcerted East German and Czechoslovak leadership engaged in what Steven
Saxonbergdescribes as procrastination,bolstering continuingpolicies that were not
working, and then shifting responsibility.34 Leadership qualities alone can not
explain why eastern Europeanleaders fiddled while Deng orderedhis troops to fire.
Comparisonwith easternEuropesuggests that even a leader of Deng's caliber might
not have been able to save the day for the hard-linersunder more difficult circum-
stances. It is necessary to specify the conditionsunderwhich decisions are made.

Opposition Strategies

It has often been claimed that the Chinese student movement made a number of
errorsthat contributedto its defeat. In eastern Europe,by contrast,the opposition is
said to have skilfully guided the revolutiondown a peaceful path that ended in demo-
cratictransition.TangTsou arguesthat an increasinglyradicalizedstudentleadership

68
 MarkR. Thompson

in China missed the chance to accept a tacit compromise offered by the reformist
general secretary of the Comlnunist party, Zhao Ziyang.35Zhao clearly distanced
himself in a speech before the students from the hard party line, which was
expressed in an April 26 People s Daily editorialcondemningthe studentdemonstra-
tions. But studentleaders continuedto escalate the demonstrationsinstead of evacu-
ating TiananmenSquareas Zhao had requested. Student leaders who showed signs
of moderationwere removedby more radicalstudents."It was the radicalstudentsas
a group who determinednot only the fate of the studentmovemenltbut also the fate
of reformers like Zhao....'"36Tsou analyses the impact of the crucial hunger strike
begun on May 13 as follows:

That expressive act gravethe studentmovementa focal point that broughtabout an unprecedented
outpouringof sympathyfrom the citizens of Beijing, young and old, rich and poor, highly educat-
ed and semli-literate.It pushed the studelntmovementto a new height. In terms of tactics it was a
great success, but in terms of strategy it was a serious mistake, for it meant that, instead of de-
escalating the conflict with the governmentafter Zhao had taken serious political risks to offer
what must be considered to have been significant concessions, the studentsescalated it to a new
level... [The studentmovementbecalme]arrogant...asit marcheddeterminedlytowardfailure.37

As with Deng's leadership, however true these criticisms of student leaders'

behaviorring in the Chinese context (and many ex-student leaders have added their
own mee cutlpa), they do not hold up well comparatively. In both East Germany and
Czechoslovakiaorganizedopposition was small, and its nonviolentstrategywas sim-
ilar to that of the studentsin China. In his fine analysis of the students'nonviolence,
TimothyBrook arguesthat these protestslong drew a "magic circle" aroundthe pro-
testers that made a militarycrackdowndifficult in China.38It should not be forgotten
that the first attemptto clear TiananmenSquarewas stopped by demonstratorswho
blocked tanks and persuadedindividualsoldiers and commandersto withdraw.The
students'strategyinitially seemed effective. A very similarstrategyin fact succeeded
in eastern Europe.
Tsou assumes that Zhao's discussions with studentleaders show the possibility of
a compromisewith the Chinese regime. According to anotherview, the conservative
old guard was merely looking for the easiest way to end the protests.39This view
would explain why they tolerated Zhao's attempt to get the students to clear
TiananmenSquarepeacefully but purgedhim after he failed. The leadership'sprag-
matic attitudeshould not be mistakenfor a genuine commitmentto negotiationwith
the opposition.The old guardnever waveredfrom its hard-linestance.
It can thus be argued that the chief weakness of the Chinese students' strategy
was not that it was too radical but that it was too moderate. The Chinese student
leaders made only vague demands for democracyand called for reformedsocialism
that did not directlychallenge the regime.40This strategywas differentfrom the anti-
communism espoused by most eastern European dissidents, including the Civic

69
ComparativePolitics October2001

Forum in Czechoslovakia,which called for liberal democracy and a market econo-

my.41 Rasma Karklins and Roger Petersen suggest that the student protesters
"acceptedthe regime's right to rule and focused on the need to fight corruptionand
introduce some political reforms."42Andrew Nathan has argued that the students
acted as "remonstratorsratherthan opponents."43 Although a large numberof work-
ers neverthelessjoined the protests,Karklinsand Petersensuggest that a more liberal
democraticopposition would have made more efforts to mobilize them. The size of
the Tiananmenprotestsmight have reacheda "tippingpoint"that would have caused
the regime to collapse.44Instead, the numbers of demonstratorsdwindled continu-
ously afterthe declarationof martiallaw. Why were the Chinese studentsrevisionists
and not easternEuropean-styledissidents?

Comparing the Explanations

The strengths and weaknesses of each explanation have already been commented
upon. Comparingthem along structuraland actor-centereddimensions reveals a fur-
ther problem.As structuralor macro-level explanations,party legitimacy and soci-
etal modernizationare too far from the events of 1989. They attempta causal expla-
nation through the elucidation of party and societal strength, respectively. But by
focusing on temporallydistantprocesses (the revolutionaryor nonrevolutionaryori-
gins of the party'srise to power) or phenomenaonly indirectlyrelatedto the political
activity (social mobilization),they are unable to complete the causal chain to leader-
ship behavioror opposition strategies,respectively,duringthe 1989 crisis. This miss-
ing link is also evident on the actor or micro level. Explanationsbased on leadership
behavior and opposition strategies are too near to their subject. They analyze how
hard-linersbehaved and oppositionists strategized but do not explain why certain
behaviorsor strategiessucceeded or failed (see Table 1).
RichardSnyderand James Mahoneyargue that this missing variablebetween the
macro and micro level is to be found in regime institutions,that is, regime types.45It
will be demonstratedbelow that the posttotalitarianregime type can strengthenthe
explanationsindividuallyand help link structuralto actor-basedones. AnthonyGiddens
remindsus thatstructuresboth constrainandenableaction.46By differentiatingbetween
subtypesof posttotalitarianism, the constrainingand enablingimpactparty legitimacy
has on leadershipdecisivenesscan be more easily grasped.Similarly,the way civil soci-
ety's ability to mobilize affects the opposition can be more accuratelyassessed. But
despitethis emphasison structures,a significantdegreeof freedomremainsat the actor
end of the causalchain.Decisive leadershipbecomes more or less likely,not inevitable
or impossible. The chances of opposition success are improvedor hamperedby the
degreeof social mobilization,not predeterminedby them, as theirown choice of strate-
gy remainsa significantpartof the overallexplanation.

70
 MarkR. Thompson

Table 1 ExplanatoryStrengthsand Weaknesses

[ Party Legitimacy Societal Modernization

| Strength:
l Distinguishes"home-growfi
g legitimacyin Chinafromexternal
| dependencym EasternEurope.
Weakness:
.
0
Cannotexplaingeneralloss of
elite supportovertime even by
a "home-grown" party,e.g.
Gorbachev'sSoviet Union.
Strength:
Contrastshighlevels of
socialmobilizationin Eastern
Europewithlowerlevel in China.
.Weaknes.:|
Cannot eplain political
mobilizabitltytough social
mobilizationalone.

Leadership Behavior - Opposition Strategies

l Satrngth: Strength:.
ContrastsdecisiveChinesewith of
Contrasts'revisionism"
paralyzedEastEuropean ChinesestudentswithEastern
X&. leaderhip. "dissidence".
Europeman

We
eaaess: Wakness\
Cannotexplainwhy. Cannotexplainwhy.

Totalitarianism and Posttotalitarianism

According to a central premise of totalitariantheory, totalitarianregimes' coercive

capacities are so great that political change from within is virtually impossible. In
their classic analysis on totalitarianism,Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski
wrote that to be a dissenterin a totalitariandictatorship"is an intolerableoffense to
the grandeur of the totalitarian enterprise and [the dissenter] must be liquidated
because, according to the ideology, [the dissenter] has no place in the world the
totalitarianis bent upon building."47No regime has been fully totalitarian,and oppo-
sition has never been fully crushed.Nonetheless, totalitarianregimes such as Stalin's
Soviet Union and Mao's Chinahave gone furtherthan any other regime type in sup-
pressingtheir opponents.
Only under posttotalitarianCommunismis organized dissent thinkable and the
question whether or not it will be suppressedworth posing. The end of the worst
humanrightsabuses in the Soviet bloc (arbitraryexecutionsand the Gulag) made the
consequences of dissent more calculable and less catastrophic.HannahArendt was
one of the first observersto recognize this change in the Soviet Union after Stalin.
Arendt showed that dissent was conceivableafter Stalinism, even if it was still dan-

71
ComparativePolitics October2001

gerous.48The writings of Vaclav Havel offer the most eloquent analysis of the possi-
bility of oppositionunderposttotalitarianCommunistregimes (a term Havel used).49
Havel dissected the dangersof dissent but also showed the limits of terror.Demotion
at work, the loss of holidays, and discrimination(particularlyin higher education)
against one's childrenare not sanctionsthat can be lightly dismissed, but they are far
short of concentrationcamps and executions. Obedienceto the regime was no longer
commandedthroughideological belief but ratherthroughthe small advantagesto be
gained by getting along with the powers that be. Havel's famous descriptionof the
greengrocerwho puts up a Communistposter in his shop capturesthis outer confor-
mity without innerconviction.50The official ideology is no longer believed by either
the regime or society but is used as a general justification, as an "all-embracing
excuse" to keep up pretenses,to '"livewithin a lie" to such an extent that it becomes
"a world of appearancestrying to pass for reality."
Juan J. Linz has developed the most systematic concept of posttotalitarianism
and, in collaborationwith Alfred Stepan, recently elaboratedit as a distinct regime
type.51They define posttotalitarianismalong four dimensions:leadership,pluralism,
ideology, and mobilization. The chief feature of posttotalitarianismis its collective
leadership;it is both the most obvious difference with totalitarianismand the chief
reason why this new regime type came into existence. Totalitarianleadership,justi-
fied by an elaborateideological mission and unconstrainedby law, is usually charis-
matic. But it is dangerousfor those of whom the rulergrows suspicious, particularly
for high ranking cadre. Fearing a "permanentpurge,"post-Stalinists in the Soviet
Union and eastern Europe as well as the CCP after Mao established a bureaucratic
form of collective leadership,with sharp limits on the powers of the top leader and
corresponding safety guarantees for his subordinates.52 While totalitarianism
attemptedto abolish all plural elements in society, posttotalitarianismis character-
ized by limited political pluralism. Posttotalitarianism,as Havel showed, is highly
ideological only on the surface.While the official ideological canon still exists, actu-
al belief in it declines. Regime mobilization of society, too, is only a shadow of its
former totalitarianself. It becomes ritualized and unenthusiastic.Party leaders and
the masses go through the motions at marches, rallies, and meetings without the
strong commitments of old. The attempt to politicize the private sphere is aban-
doned. The HungarianleaderJanos Kadar'sslogan in the 1960s-"those who are not
against us are with us" sums up the official acceptance of such political passivity.
Havel shows how the average person again his greengrocer-might one day
choose to give up "living within a lie" in order to "live within the truth"instead.53
When the circumstancesprove favorable(as they did after Gorbachev'srise to power
in the Soviet Union), mass rebellion may breakout against the regime, and there will
be little resistancefrom powerholderswho lack "anyauthenticconviction."54
An explanatoryproblemremains,however.If totalitarianismseemed "too strong"
(such regimes will always shoot), posttotalitarianismappears"too weak" (they will

72
 lMarkR. Thonmpson

never fire at demonstrators).If Havel is right about the ideological hollowness of

these regimes, then they should collapse once society finally rises up in protest.
Since the regime did not collapse in China, it is necessary to distinguish between
regime subtypes.

Subtypes of Posttotalitarianism

Linz and Stepan delineate the subtypes of early and frozen posttotalitarianism.The
Soviet Union after Stalin and China after Mao are examples of early while
Czechoslovakia and East Germany are cases of frozen posttotalitarianism.55The
third subtype, mature posttotalitarianism,is relevant in understandinglate reform
Communism in Hungary and Gorbachev'sSoviet Union. Unlike reformist, mature
posttotalitarianregimes that recognized or even negotiated with organized opposi-
tion, both early and frozen posttotalitarianregimes considered suppressingpopular
protest violently. The question was whether these hard-lineregimes would collapse
before they shot.
Early posttotalitarianismis classified according to its timing. Its closeness to
totalitarianismis its crucial characteristic.Civil society was flattenedby the totalitar-
ian period. Many totalitariancontrols remained,althoughthey were used more spar-
ingly. Some dissent was unofficially tolerated,especially when it contributedto de-
Stalinization or de-Maoization. Yet there were limits to such tolerance. Although
there was no major organized protest in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev,the
crushing of the 1956 reform governmentin Hungary showed the leadership'swill-
ingness to use force againstcounterrevolutionaries.
Frozen posttotalitarianismis defined by its political temperature.56 The political
climate grew colder after heated experimentationwas abandoned.Past reforms, pri-
marily economic but also flirtationswith political liberalization,had long been dis-
carded and party reformers had been purged. This freezing was most obvious in
Czechoslovakiaafter the Soviet invasion that turnedthe Prague spring into the long
winter known as normalization.It was also apparentin East Germanywhere promar-
ket cadre had been silenced, and the leading architectof the new economic policy of
the 1960s, ErichApel, committed suicide.57Khrushchev'spopularity,which derived
largely from his post-Stalinist reforms, was replaced by the deep freeze of the
Brezhnevera.

What the Subtypes Add to the Explanations

Party Legitimacy The subtypesof posttotalitarianismexplain why the indigenous

revolutionarylegitimacy of the CCP survived in early posttotalitarianChina but not

73
ComparativePolitics October2001

in frozen and matureperiods of the CPSU underand after Brezhnev.Deng and oth-
ers in the Chinese old guard who launched posttotalitarianismafter Mao's death
were still part of the revolutionarygeneration.By contrast,Brezhnev,who froze the
Soviet Union's posttotalitarianpolitics, was a fourth generation leader, following
Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev.58As in China, the hierarchy of the Soviet bloc
Communist parties became increasingly old, but revolutionaryglory did not com-
pensate for age. The "gang of elders" in China?as they were disrespectfullytermed
by younger party members, had fought and defeated the forces of imperialismand
reaction in 1949. These revolutionarycredentialsinsuredthe old guard'sdominance
during the Tiananmencrisis. Gorbachev,by contrast, faced a "double defection" in
1990-91 of reformersand conservativesalike.59Lacking a comparablerevolutionary
network to rally the party at a time of crisis, the CPSU fragmented into warring
camps, culminatingin the August 1991 coup attemptwhose supportersincluded the
minister of defense and the head of the KGB. In China such betrayalwas unthink-
able, as "the CCP and PLA hierarchies,especially at the higher echelons of leader-
ship, remained inextricably intertwined."60 Although both had indigenous
Communistregimes, erosion of party legitimacy in China under early posttotalitari-
anism had only begun, while in the Soviet Union it was well advanced.
Lackingindigenouslegitimacy as dependentsof the Soviet Union, easternEurope
suffered the most extreme ideological decay. Havel described this situation in
Czechoslovakia,where the growing cynicism and hypocrisy of both the population
and the regime severely weakened ideology. But the self-justification of these hard-
line European regimes eroded further when they rejected Gorbachev's reformist
course. The loss of the remainingorientationprovidedby the ideological motherland
was devastatingto partymembers'belief in their own legitimacy.Althoughthere was
no clash between conservativesand reformersas in China and Gorbachev'sUSSR,
unity did not bring strengthto hard-line Communistparties in Czechoslovakiaand
East Germany.
An additional source of party legitimacy in early posttotalitarianism was the
haulting of the worst excesses of totalitarianism for high ranking cadre (Stalin's
purges and the Cultural Revolution). Rehabilitated cadre (including, of course,
Deng) were particularlyenthusiasticaboutthe new order.The party'scollective secu-
rity was assuredby the end of totalitarianpurges. Such security-basedelite legitima-
cy graduallydeclined as party membersbegan to take their safety for grantedunder
later forms of posttotalitarianism.Instead,collective Communistleadershipbecame
increasinglybureaucratized,giving the regime a technocraticveneer that was some-
times mistakenfor a reformiststance.61
Early posttotalitarianregimes also enjoy elite performance legitimacy through
rapid economic growth that follows the abolition of the most irrationalaspects of
totalitarianplanning and campaigning. Both Khrushchevand Deng focused on the
economy, which had suffered under the excessive, ideologically driven policies of

74
 MarkR. Thompson

totalitarianism.Early posttotalitarianrulers in China enjoyed the fruits of easy eco-

nomic reforms that could be undertakenmerely by lifting rigid controls on farmers
and no longer exploiting them to subsidize the cities.62 Economic growth reached
miraclelevels from 1979 to 1989.63Althoughthe partyleadershipsplit over economic
reforms in the mid 1980s conservatives merely wanted a more efficient planned
economy,while reformersarguedin favorof furthergrowthof the privatesector-all
factions were committedto repairingthe damage caused by the CulturalRevolution.
This agreementstrengthenedparty morale, even as inflation and growing inequality
contributedto populardiscontent,particularlyin urbanareas.64Yet, as Paul Krugman
pointed out in a prescientarticle writtenjust before the recentAsian financial crisis,
high growthrateswere also once registeredin the Soviet bloc as well, only for it later
to be discoveredthat they rested on shaky,low productivityfoundations.65Long-term
economic decline in easternEuropesappedregime self-confidence.

Societal Modernization Upon Deng's ascent to power, Chinese society was

socioeconomicallybackwardand politically demobilized.Much of Mao's state-driven
industrializationstrategyhad failed, society was atomized,and public discourse was
monopolized.66All social groups had been profoundlytransformed(though workers
more than peasants).67After years of intense ideological campaignsand state terror,
an autonomouscivil society had to be built almost from scratch.The DemocracyWall
movement of 1978-79 was the first major organized opposition in China since the
1950s.68 Contacts with the outside world through travel, business, educational
exchanges, and a more liberal (though still censored) media were just beginning,
althoughthis initial opening shocked intellectualsand studentsby revealing China's
backwardnessand lack of societal autonomy.69In addition, many of the old mecha-
nisms of social controlremainedintact;posttotalitarianleaders still enjoyedmuch of
the powerof the old totalitarianstate apparatus,even if they used it morejudiciously.
Crucially,after the declarationof martiallaw on May 19, 1989, many workerswere
locked up in their enterprisesduringthe protests,while others fearedthe loss of their
jobs, which were linkedto social benefits includinghousing.70
In frozen posttotalitarianregimes in eastern Europe, by contrast, society was
more socioeconomically modernized, and the ability to mobilize politically had
increased.ThroughRadio Free Europe in Czechoslovakiaand West Germantelevi-
sion in East Germany,as well as contacts with foreignersand limited travelopportu-
nities, substantial information about the outside world was available. Most
Czechoslovakiansand East Germans, like Havel's greengrocer,were not politically
active, but they saw very clearly that they were "living within a lie." Despite the
increased repression that often followed the abandonmentof early posttotalitarian
reform efforts, a numberof autonomoussocial groups had become established.The
thirty-five-yeartime span since Stalinism gave social groups time to organize sup-
port, develop traditions and rituals, and find niches in which they were relatively

75
ComparativePolitics October2001

protected.71In response, the size of the secret police and its network of informers
reachedgrotesqueproportions.They kept dissident social groups underconstantsur-
veillance but could not crush them, nor could they later stop these social groups
from leading a revolt againstthe regime.72
In the GDR the loosely organizedcitizens' movementmade up largely of intellec-
tuals and artists found supportin the Protestantchurch and received some backing
from West Germany,particularlyin the Green Party.73Since the 1953 worker-led
rebellion, the regime had bent over backwardsto woo the working class by easing
workplace constraints.74Nevertheless, the Stasi chief, Erich Mielke, reported that
the Leipzig demonstrationsin October 1989 enjoyed strong labor support and that
workersincreasinglycriticizedthe regime at theirworkplace.75
Despite the severe repressionthat accompaniednormalizationin Czechoslovakia
after 1968, a youth counterculturedeveloped alongside groups of dissident intellec-
tuals, conservativeCatholic critics, and purgedreform Communists.Charter77 cre-
ated a loose opposition alliance out of these groups that used the Helsinki human
rights process to strengthenits internationalcontacts and raise the costs of domestic
regime repression.76Such pressure from abroad helped limit open crackdowns on
the opposition. In the fall of 1989 protests were led by studentswho enjoyed strong
workersupport.77

Leadership Behavior Early posttotalitarianismhelps explain both why Deng

faced a more divided politburothan his hard-linecounterpartsin easternEuropeand
why he still saved the regime in China while East EuropeanCommunismcollapsed.
In China after Mao young reformersbroughtin to reform a moribundeconomy sat
uneasily beside old orthodox Communists who merely wanted to return to pre-
CulturalRevolutioneconomic planning. Such a divided leadershipis typical of early
posttotalitarianism,as the split between Khrushchevwith his reformistallies and his
conservativeopponents indicates.In frozen posttotalitarianismin easternEuropethe
failure of earlierreformefforts led to the purge of reformers,creatinga united polit-
buro by default. Though not facing internaldivisions, frozen posttotalitarianleader-
ship was hollowed out in Havel's sense. Neither rulersnor ruled believed in the offi-
cial ideology. In China, by contrast,the orthodox old guard and the military hierar-
chy could be rallied because they came from the same interpenetratedgenerational
cohort in which ideology still played an importantrule, they valued political stability
and personal safety, and they acknowledged improved economic conditions since
Mao's deatheven if they opposed further"capitalist"reforms.Deng could invoke the
still fresh fears of disordercaused by the CulturalRevolutionwhile underplayinghis
own divergent,economic reformistaims.

Opposition Strategies The subtypes of posttotalitarianismhelp explain why the

Chinese student protesterswere revisionists while eastern Europeanoppositionists

76
 MarkR. Thompson

were more likely to be dissidents.The closer the opposition is to the totalitarianpast,

the more likely it will cling to socialism, ratherthan turn to anticommunism.The
Prague Spring was revisionist in its aims, the culminationof two decades in which
critical eastern Europeanintellectuals had tried to rescue socialism from Stalinism
by giving it a "humanface." But the frozen regime that followed the defeat of this
attempt to reform socialism in Czechoslovakia destroyed any hope of a third way
between capitalistdemocracyand Communistsocialism and turnedrevisionists into
dissidents. Due to the ideological strengthof antifascism in East Germany,the citi-
zens' movement there remainedrevisionist. But opposition leaders had limited con-
trol over popularprotestsin which workerswere well representedand calls for unifi-
cation soon emerged. Christian Joppke argues that in the German context these
protests amountedto anticommunistdissidence.78In China, in contrast,many influ-
ential opposition leaderswere formerRed Guardsdisillusionedwith their experience
duringthe CulturalRevolutionbut still influenced by many of its ideas. It is reveal-
ing that duringthe TiananmenSquareprotests, beside the symbol of the goddess of
democracy, representations of Mao expressed discontent with the impact of the
CommunistParty'seconomic policies.79
As revisionists, the Chinese student opposition did not actively try to form a
Solidarity-like coalition of workers and students, the CCP's greatest nightmare.80
Studentdemonstratorsinsteadtook an elitist stance of calling for the returnto social-
ist ideals and were reluctantto rally workersagainst the self-proclaimedparty of the
proletariat.As a percentageof the work force, urbanlaborwas smaller in China than
in easternEurope.Moreover,the ability to mobilize workerswas more constrainedby
early posttotalitarianChinathan by the frozen regimes of easternEurope.Yet the stu-
dents did not even maximize the possibilities available to them. Had they built an
alliance with the workersin the early weeks of the protests,labororganizationsmight
have been createdthat could have betterresistedthe crackdownon labor groups after
the declarationof martiallaw in mid May. Because of studentrevisionism, even the
limitedopportunitiesfor workermobilizationwere not utilized.

Conclusion: Linking the Explanations

In early posttotalitarian Chinathe CCP still enjoyedconsiderableinternalparty legiti-

macy throughthe revolutionarycredentialsand ideologicalconvictionof the old guard,
the increasedpersonalsafety of its members,and the country'srapideconomic growth
since 1979. The CCP faced a socioeconomicallybackwardsociety whose totalitarian
legacy and still existingstatecontrols(particularlyin the workplace)fromthe totalitari-
an periodlimitedthe abilityto mobilize it politically.These constraintson society made
it more difficult for the student-ledoppositionto reacha tippingpoint in which a mas-
sive student-worker alliancewould have doomedthe regime.But althoughthey demon-

77
ComparativePolitics October2001

stratedpeacefiully,the studentactivistsdid not do all they could to recruitworkers,in

largepartbecauseof theirrevisionism.They demandedthe reformof socialism,not the
abolitionof Communism.Strongparty legitimacymade it possible for Deng to unite
the dividedpartyleadershipby purgingthe reformersand to act decisivelyto crushthe
protests.The regimepulledtogetherduringcrisis.It shot.
In East Germany's and Czechoslovakia's frozen posttotalitarianismthe loss of
Soviet support fiurtherweakened party legitimacy that had already been eroded by
ideological decay and economic decline. Society, though seemingly passive, was
actually both highly modernized socioeconomically and capable of being mobilized
politically. When Gorbachev'sdoctrineand the democratictransitionsin Poland and
Hungaryprovided the political opportunity,small opposition groups demandedthe
end of Communismand were quickly able to win social support,including crucially
that of workers, until a tipping point was reached and overwhelmed the regime.
Lacking legitimacy and doubtful of the loyalty of their own security apparatuses,
hard-lineparty leadershipsin East Germanyand Czechoslovakiabecame paralyzed
as peaceful revolutionsbroke out, and these regimes collapsed (see Figure 1).
The crushingof the TiananmenSquaredemonstrationsin 1989 is the most recent
of a failed series of democratic revolutions under Communism: 1953 in
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, 1956 in Hungary and Poland, 1968 in
Czechoslovakia,and 1970, 1976, and 1980-1981 in Poland.After all these revolu-
tions lost, democracy was finally regained in 1989 in eastern Europe. Whether
China's future will be so rosy is uncertain.But by repressing protest, the Chinese
regime has become increasingly frozen and thus vulnerable to regime collapse
should anothercrisis occur.

NOTES

An earlierversion was presentedat the APSA annualmeeting, Atlanta,September2-5, 1999. I would like
to thank Daniel V. Friedheim, Peter Gelius, Rasma Karklins, Siegfried Klaschka, Oskar Kurer,Juan J.
Lopez, Ann L. Philipps, Steven Saxonberg,Achim Siegel, StephenWhite, and four anonymousreviewers
for their helpful comments.
1. In contrast,in China secessionist movements in Tibet and to a lesser extent in northwesternChina
have been brutallyrepressedas partof the general illiberalityof post-I1989Communistrule.
2. Adam Przeworski,Democracyand the Market:Political and Economic Reformsin Eastern Europe
and LatinAmerica (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1991), p. 3.
3. Jacques Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe
(Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1997), arguesagainst such a simplistic view.
4. Elizabeth Pond, Beyond the Wall: Germany s Road to Unification (Washington, D.C.: The
BrookingsInstitution,1993), pp. 111-12.
5. Ibid.
6. BernardWheatonand Zdenek Kavan,The VelvetRevolution:Czechoslovakia1988-1991 (Boulder:
Westview,1992), pp. 61, 72.

78
X

'
4I ',iSiSS, "Early":High mobilizationconstraints
o S
J }-Xi obstructrevisionistopposition reaching"tippingpoinmt"f'
Qcs z "IFrozen" Low mobilization
constraints
t| ~ ;< ^~~ease by dissidents
"bandwagoning"
cO .

'o S

EI I, ,)
|^I
I'"~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)

*
c *a

; *3 e
o . -

c) '- 1

+-*~'~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

g--*_
> IISSSK^
coll
legitimacy(if regime"home-grown"),
9 "Early":Revolutionary
.2 security,andeconomicgrowthmakedecisiveleadership
possi
-
ffFrozenk:Post-revolutionary generationand/orlossof s
leadership
i:;?SiS^^
3 r; - i-f aftereconomicdeclineandideological
..
decaymakeparalysis
...
lik
._ ,,,....ii....
t
._*
ComparativePolitics October2001

7. MarkR. Thompson,'The Survivalof 'Asian Values'as Zivilisationskritik"Theoryand Society, 29

(2000).
8. For an appropriatelysarcasticanalysis see Jacob Heilbrunn,"The Clash of Samuel Huntingtons$'
TheAmericanProspect, 39 (July-August 1998), 22-28.
9. RandallCollins, "German-Bashingand the Theory of Democratic Modernization,"Zeitschrift fiir
Soziologie, 24 (1995), 3-21.
10. Stephen Manning, "Social and Cultural Prerequisites of Democratization: Generalizing from
China,"in EdwardFriedman,ed., The Politics of Demlocratization:GeneralizingEast Asian Experiences
(Boulder:WestviewPress, 1994), pp. 232-48.
11. Not all culturalist arguments are so essentialist. See Lucian W. Pye, "Tiananmenand Chinese
Political Culture:The Escalationof Confrontationfrom Moralizingto Revenge,"Asian Sturvey, 30 (April
1990), 331-47.
12. John Segal and John Phipps, "Why CommunistArmies Defend Their Parties,"Asian Survey, 30
(October 1990), 959-76.
13. Ibid.,pp. 960-61,972-73.
14. A point Weber also analyzed. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive
Sociology, vol. 1 (Berkeley: Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1978), pp. 212-13.
15. T. H. Rigby and Ferenc Feher, "Ilntroduction," in T. H. Rigby and Ferene Feher, eds., Political
Legitimationin C'omnmunist States (London:Macmillan, 1982), p. 15.
16. Maria Marcus, "Overt and Covert Modes of Legitimationin East EuropeanSocieties," in Rigby
and Feher, eds., pp. 82-93, cited in Giuseppe Di Palma, "Legitimationfrom the Top to Civil Society:
Politico-CulturalChange in EasternEurope*"WorldPolitics, 43 (1991), 55.
17. Di Palma,p. 56.
18. Daniel V. Friedheim,"DemocraticTransitionthrough Regime Collapse: East Germany in 1989"
(Ph.D. diss., Yale University,1997), pp. 53-65.
19. Ibid.,Table37, p. 421, and ch. 8.
20. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problemsof Democratic Transitionand Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-CommunistEurope (Baltimore:The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1996), pp. 322-28.
21. Andrew Scobell, "Whythe People'sArmy Firedon the People,"in Roger V. Des Forges,Luo Ning,
and Wu Yen-bo, eds., Chinese Democracy and the Crisis of 1989: Chinese and American Reflections
(Albany: State UniversityPress of New York, 1993). pp. 191-221.
22. Stephen White, After Gorbachev (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 23-27,
RichardSakwa, "The Revolutionof 1991 in Russia: Interpretationsof the Moscow Coup," Coexistence,
29 (December 1992), 335-75; John B. Dunlop, The Rise and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Princeton:
PrincetonUniversityPress, 1993), ch. 5. For his own (controversial)account, see Mikhail Gorbachev,The
AugustCoup (London:HarperCollins,1991).
23. Minxin Pei, From Reform to Revolution: The Demise of Communismin China and the Soviet
Union (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994), chs. 1, 2. Also see Xiaoxing Han,
"DemocraticTransitionin China: A ComparativeExaminationof a Deified Idea,"in Des Forges, Ning,
and Wu, eds., pp. 224-28.
24. Pei, p. 58 (emphasis in the original).
25. In 1997-98 FreedomHouse gave Malawia ratingof "free:"while Singaporewas considered"part-
ly free,"although the former had a real GDP per capita (PPP) of only $695, while the latter had one of
$20,987. AdrianKaratnycky,ed., Freedomin the World1997-1998: TheAnnual Surveyof Political Rights
and Civil Liberties(New Brunswick:Transaction,1998).
26. Pei, p. 52.
27. Ibid.,p. 57.

80
 MarkR. Thompson

28. MarkSelden, "The Social Origins and Limits of the DemocraticMovement,"in Des Forges,Ning,
and Wu, eds., p. 124.
29. Pei, Table2.2, p. 59.
30. The National Statistics Bureau, ed., Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1988 (Beijing: Chinese Statistics
Press, 1988), pp. 117-30, cited in ShaoguangWang,"Froma Pillar of Continuityto a Force for Change:
Chinese Workersin the Movement,"in Des Forges,Ning, and Wu, eds., p. 180.
31. MarkR. Thompson,"WhateverHappenedto DemocraticRevolutions?,"Democratization(2000).
32. Marc Blecher, China against the Tides. Restructuzring throughRevolution,Radicalismand Reform
(London:Pinter, 1997), p. 106. Elsewhere,however,Blecher'sargumentis more structuralist.
33. Ibid., pp. 107-8.
34. Steven Saxonberg,"Regime Behavior during Crisis: A Comparisonof East EuropeanRegimes in
1989," paper presented at the APSA annual meeting, Atlanta, September 2-5, 1999, p. 4. Also Steven
Saxonberg, The Fall: Czechoslovakia,East Germany,Hungaryn and Poland in a ComparativePerspective
(London:HarwoodAcademic, 2001).
35. Tang Tsou, "The TiananmenTragedy:The State-Society Relationship,Choices, and Mechanisms
in HistoricalPerspective,"in Jan Elster,ed., The RoundtableTalks(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,
1996), pp. 213-40.
36. Ibid., p. 222.
37. Ibid., pp. 223-24.
38. Timothy Brook, Quelling the People: The Military Suppression of the Beijing Opposition
Movement(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress, 1992), Introduction.
39. Scobell, pp. 194-95.
40. Selden, pp. 126-27.
41. Wheatonand Kavan,pp. 206-8.
42. Rasma Karklins and Roger Petersen, "Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern
Europe 1989,"TheJournal of Politics, 55 (August 1993), 610.
43. Andrew J. Nathan, "Chinese Democracy in 1989: Continuity and Change," Problems of
Communism(September-October1989), 17, cited in Karklinsand Petersen,p. 610.
44. Karklinsand Petersen,p. 610.
45. RichardSnyderand James Mahoney,"The Missing Variable:Institutionsand the Study of Regime
Change,"ComparativePolitics, 32 (October 1999), pp. 103-22.
46. Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory:Action, Structure and Contradiction in
Social Analysis (London:Macmillan, 1979), pp. 59-73.
47. Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy
(Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1956), p. 135.
48. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1976), pp.
xxxvi-xxxvii.
49. Vaclav Havel et al., The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern
Europe (London: Hutchinson, 1985). For background on the term "posttotalitarian" see Mark R.
Thompson, "NeitherTotalitariannor Authoritarian:Post-Totalitarianismin Eastern Europe,"in Achim
Siegel, ed., The TotalitarianParadigmafter the End of Communism:Towardsa TheoreticalReassessment
(Amsterdam:Rodopi, 1998), pp. 303-28.
50. Havel, pp. 27-28.
51. JuanJ. Linz, "TotalitarianandAuthoritarianRegimes,"in Fred I. Greensteinand Nelson W. Polsby,
eds., Handbookof Political Science, vol. 3 (Cambridge,Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), pp. 175-411; Linz
and Stepan,chs. 3, 4, 17.
52. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism(Cambridge,
Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1956).
53. Havel, pp. 39-40.

81
ComparativePolitics October2001

54. Ibid.
55. Foranotherapproachapplyinga modifiedversionof totalitariantheoryto China,see WeizhiXie, "The
SemihierarchicalTotalitarianNatureof Chinese Politics,' ComparativePolitics, 25 (April 1993), 313-30.
Chien-min Chao, "Some Thoughts on the Party-LegislatureRelations of Leninist Regimes: The Case of
China,"paperpresentedat the Conferenceon InstitutionalAnalysis of PoliticalTransitionsin Germanyand
China,Beijing,September13-14, 1999, uses the term"posttotalitarian authoritarian
regime."
56. Linz and Stepan drew the term frozen posttotalitarianism from Timothy Garton Ash,
"Czechoslovakiaunder the Ice," in The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe (New
York:RandomHouse, 1989), pp. 61-70.
57. HermannWeber, DDR: Grundri/Jder GeschiChte1945--1990 (Hanover:Fackeltrager,1991), pp.
119-121,260.
58. Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley: University of
CaliforniaPress, 1993), p. 12.
59. Philip G. Roeder,Red Sunset:.The Failureof olvietPolitics (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1993), pp. 239-45.
60. Scobell, p. 192. Such party-militaryinterpenetrationwent back as far as the 1920s, when key
membersof the old guard had held importantmilitary positions and "can be logically classified as 'mili-
tary men.'
61. PeterChristianLudz, The Changing Party Elite in fEastGermlany(Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press,
1972).
62. In later posttotalitarianism,as in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev,the state began to subsidize
farmers;farming collectives accustomed to state largess often initially viewed marketreforms hostilely.
See MarkSelden, "Post-CollectiveAgrarianAlternativesin Russia and China,"in BarrettL. McCormick
and Jonathan Unger, eds., China after Socialism: In the Footsteps of Eastern Europe or East Asia?
(Armonk:M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 7-28.
63. This miracle growth rate was canonized in World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic
Growthand Public Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), Box 1.3, p. 59. China enjoyed an
annualGNP growthof 9.4 percentfrom 1979 to 1989, with a surge of 11.34 percentfrom 1982 to 1988.
64. Selden, "Limitsof the DemocraticMovement,"pp. 114-20.
65. Paul Krugman, "The Myth of Asia's Miracle," Foreign Affairs (November-December 1994),
62-78.
66. Barrett L. McCormick, Su Shaozhi, and Xiao Xiaoming, "The 1989 Democracy Movement:A
Review of the Prospectsfor Civil Society in China,"PacificAffairs,65 (Summer 1992), 186-187.
67. Selden, "Post-CollectiveAgrarianAlternatives,"pp. 7-28.
68. A demonstrationagainst the Gang of Four in TiananmenSquareon April 5, 1976, though small,
could also date the beginningof the revivalof China'sdemocracymovement.
69. Selden, "Limitsof the DemocraticMovement,"p. 111.
70. Andrew Walder, "The Political Sociology of the Beijing Upheaval of 1989," Problems of
Comnmunismn (September-October1989), 30-40, cited in Karklinsand Petersen,p. 609.
71. This term was coined by the West GermandiplomatGunterGaus, WoDeutschlandliegt (Munich:
DeutscherTaschenbuchVerlag, 1986).
72. On the East German Stasi see David Childs and Richard Opplewell, The Stasi: East German
Intelligence and Security Service (New York: New York University Press, 1996); Walter SuB,
Staatssicherheitam Ende: Warumes den Mdchtigennicht gelang, 1989 eine Revolutionzu verhindern
(Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999). On the StB see Wheatonand Kavan,pp. 136-37.
73. For an encyclopedic look at the East German opposition, see EhrhartNeubert, Geschichte der
Oppositionin der DDR 1949-1989 (Bonn: Bundeszentralefur politische Bildung, 1997). Also see Hagen
Findeis, Detlef Pollack, and Manuel Schilling, Die Entzauberungdes Politischen: Wasist aus den poli-
tisch alternativen Grnppender DDR geworden? (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt,1994). The best

82
 MarkR. Thompson

English language studies are Christian Joppke, East German Dissidents and the Revolution of 1989.
Social Movementsin a Leninist Regime (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); and John Torpey,Intellectuals,
Socialism, and Dissent.: The East German Opposition and Its Legacy (Minneapolis: University of
MinnesotaPress, 1995).
74. Jeffrey Kopstein, The Politics of Economic Decline in East Germany, 1945-1989 (Chapel Hill:
Universityof North CarolinaPress, 1997).
75. Cited in SuB,pp. 339, 360-61.
76. Wheatonand Kavan,pp. 11-13. The standardwork on the establishmentof Charter77 is Gordon
H. Skilling, Charter77 and HumanRights in Czechoslovakia(London:GeorgeAlien and Unwin, 1981).
77. Ibid., pp. 606-7.
78. Joppke, ch. 5. Also see Mark R. Thompson, "A Hostile People but a Loyal Opposition:National
Identity and Anti-Fascism in the GDR," in Howard Williams, Colin Wight, and Norbert Kapfer, eds.,
Political Thoughtand GermanReunification(Basingstoke:Macmillan,2000), pp. 1-27.
79. Selden, "Limitsof the DemocraticMovement,"p. 127.
80. Ibid., p. 121.

83