Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
also optimistic that ASEAN and China will soon be able to agree on a more binding
code of conduct to replace the 2002 Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea.”
Q2. China seems successful in using overseas development assistance to win over
some countries in Southeast Asia. Can Vietnam maintain ASEAN solidarity on the
South China Sea issue? Will the major powers be drawn back to this issue?
ANSWER: Vietnam has a difficult task to maintain ASEAN solidarity. ASEAN has only
seven months under the chair of Indonesia to keep up momentum for talks with
China. After that Brunei (2012), Cambodia (2013), Myanmar (2014) and Laos (2015)
will chair ASEAN and these countries have no direct interest in the South China Sea.
The most important thing Vietnam can do is to keep unity first among the claimant
states – the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei – and lobby Indonesia to maintain its
leadership on this issue. Vietnam must also consult with the other members of
ASEAN and convince them to stand firm. Finally, Vietnam should lobby the major
powers to keep the pressure on China to refrain from unilateral action.
Vietnam should look beyond the Declaration on Conduct of Parties and a Code of
Conduct towards joint development and what arrangements would suit its national
interests.
Q3. Does the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) help or hinder
a solution to territorial disputes in the South China Sea? Does UNCLOS favour
Vietnam or China?
ANSWER: China’s 9 dash line u‐shaped map has no basis in UNCLOS. The dash marks
clearly intrude into Vietnam’s 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone and
continental shelf. International legal experts are unclear what it is that China is
claiming. Is the entire South China Sea China’s “territorial waters”? Or is China
claiming sovereignty over all the rocks in the South China Sea? China has passed
domestic legislation and claims that this gives it legal jurisdiction over the South
China Sea. The United States and other maritime powers disagree.
No state has yet tried to settle their territorial disputes under provisions in UNCLOS.
Q4. In bilateral talks between the Chinese Defence Minister and his Vietnamese
counterpart, the Chinese Defense Minister said that the People’s Liberation Army
Navy was not involved in the Binh Minh 02 incident on May 26th. What would be the
implications if Vietnamese naval ships that escorted the Binh Minh 02 responded to
the Chinese patrol boat that cut the cable? Would this be another 1964 Gulf of
Tonkin incident? What can and should Vietnam do if China continues to sabotage
Vietnamese state oil exploration vessels?
ANSWER: China has five separate state agencies that deal with maritime affairs in
addition to the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Some observers offer the view that
the China Maritime Surveillance ships may have acted independently. Nevertheless,
the central government has backed the actions of these ships as “normal”
operations. China’s use of non‐military ships poses difficulties for states such as
Vietnam which do not have equivalent civilian forces to counter China.
Vietnam should consult experts in international law to see if there are grounds for
compensation when damage occurs. Vietnam must be extremely careful to respond
3
in a proportionate manner. The Gulf of Tonkin incident involved U.S. warships
operating in waters that the United States argued were international but which
Vietnam argued were territorial waters. At that time communist states, like Vietnam,
claimed greater territorial waters than the international community. Vietnam
responded by sending out torpedo boats. They were ineffective. This is a lesson for
Vietnam.
Vietnam needs to improve its capacity for monitoring its EEZ. It also needs to
develop appropriate civilian maritime capabilities to enforce its sovereignty. This will
take some time.
Vietnam could also escort its state‐owned oil exploration ships. With better
communication and experience, Vietnam could also provide air support when
Chinese ships approach Vietnamese exploration vessels. But the “rules of
engagement” will have to be carefully worked out to prevent violence and Chinese
retaliation.
Q5. What is your assessment of how the Vietnamese media and Vietnamese
researchers have covered the Binh Minh 02 incident? What impact has Chinese
assertive moves had on Vietnamese public opinion? Have the authorities been able
to cross over their self‐imposed “barriers of sensitivity”? How can Vietnam influence
world opinion in order to level the playing field against a more powerful China?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s leadership is in a difficult position because the South China Sea
is best dealt with through diplomacy. Vietnamese leaders know that the Chinese
Embassy will make strong protests anytime they see any report in the Vietnamese
media that is critical of China. But if the Vietnamese government does not let the
media play a greater role in reporting on the South China Sea, this will allow rumours
and foreign reports to shape Vietnamese public opinion. There is a sign that more
reporting is being done on the South China Sea. VietNamNet Bridge ran an
interesting series on the May 26th incident in which the views of scholars and former
officials were printed. Major General Le Van Cuong offered some sharp comments
for example.
Vietnam needs to re‐think its information strategy and modernize it in order to get
Vietnam’s views before international opinion. Press conferences by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs are not enough. Each ministry concerned should have a webpage that
is accessible and contains current information. Visual material including videos need
to be distributed in a timely manner. Vietnam also needs to translate material into
foreign languages in a timely manner. PetroVietnam, for example, distributed a
Power Point briefing about the incident. This could have been more professionally
presented and it should have been translated into English and given wide circulation.
Vietnam has held two international workshops on the East Sea and invited many
foreign scholars to present papers along with colleagues from Vietnam. These papers
should have been posted on a website for access by the whole world. The
proceeding of the first workshop took a year to publish. The proceedings of the
second workshop have not yet appeared. Papers by Vietnamese scholars have not
been translated into foreign languages such as Chinese and English. Vietnam cannot
afford to come in second in “information warfare.”
4
After Vietnam first provided details of the March 26th incident contradictory
information appeared. It was said that this was not the first time China had
interfered with oil exploration ships. Then it was said this was the first incident. It is
unclear if this meant the first time a cable had been cut. The way this was handled
led some observers to speculate on why Vietnam chose to publicize this incident but
not the others. Vietnam must be more transparent and consistent in releasing
information.
6. Yesterday the BBC gave coverage to peaceful public protests against China in
Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. When asked about this, Vice Minister of National
Defence Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh said that the “Vietnamese people
should believe that the State will have solutions and enough responsibility to keep
both territorial sovereignty and friendship with China”. Can Vietnam’s government
authorities do both – defend territorial sovereignty and maintain friendly relations
with China?
ANSWER: Maintaining unity at home is vital for Vietnam’s strategy in dealing with
China. The Vietnamese government needs to explain its actions and policies to the
people. Obviously the government cannot release confidential material related to
diplomacy. But the government should outline its general foreign policy strategy and
put it before the public. Government officials should address students at their
universities and answer their questions. Vietnam has held internal conferences on
the South China Sea but little information has been released to a wider circle. These
are complex issues and if the government does not explain its policies to the public it
runs the risk that rumours and false information will flow into Vietnam.
At the same time, Vietnam must hold high‐level meetings with the Chinese
leadership and get agreement that both sides should refrain from instigating
incidents like the Binh Minh 02 affair. Vietnam could quietly step up its maritime
cooperation with major powers, like the Japanese Coast Guard and India, to signal to
China continued belligerence will only internationalize the South China Sea issue.