Can Science Be an Art?

Epistemology as the Vehicle for a Trip from Science to Art and Back
Author(s): John Stewart
Source: Leonardo, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1989), pp. 255-261
Published by: The MIT Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1575240
Accessed: 12/05/2010 14:23

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=mitpress.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Leonardo.

http://www.jstor.org
Can Science Be an Art?
Epistemology as the Vehicle for a

Trip from Science to Art and Back

John Stewart

EPISTEMOLOGY cept; even if we suppose that ABSTRACT

causality exists, that A is really
For those people who are not professional philosophers, it the cause of B, that is quite in- Impervious totheintellectual
in-
can be difficult to understand what epistemology is all about. sufficient. Nevertheless, it is un- sightsofcriticalepistemology,
It seems so immediately obvious that the world around us deniable that human beings do mostof uscontinue mostofthe
consists of real objects (tables, chairs, houses, people, ani- an idea of The timeto imprison ourselvesintheillu-
possess causality. sionthatwecananddoperceive re-
mals, pavements and so on), which we perceive quite simply paradox is complete. 'asitis'.Theauthor
alitydirectly
as they are (in terms of colours, forms, sounds, touch, smell, The solution to this enigma suggeststhatoneofthefunctions
etc.), that short of following the computer scientist's dictum was proposed by Kant. Since it ofartmaybeto render ustrulycon-
sciousthatrealityis wonderfully
("Whymake things simple when you can make them com- is manifestly impossible to ex-
andmysteriously morerichand
plicated?") one wonders what more there is to be said. In plain the origin of concepts on complex thanweareledto believe
principle, of course, this attitude is in itself an epistemologi- the basis of primitive sensory onthebasisofanyfinitesetof per-
cal position, which I shall denote by the term 'common- impressions, these concepts ceptual modes.Finally,heexplores
sense realism'. must exist a priori, that is to say thepossibilitythatwaysofperceiv-
It is quite probable, I think, that were it not for the ad- as a precondition for the act of ingtheworld constructedbyscien-
tistsmayhavea placeinthereper-
vent of modern science we would all still be quite content observation itself. Since any at- toireof artforms.
with the blissful ignorance of common-sense realism. Cer- tempt to explain the origin of
tainly, the development of epistemology is historically re- concepts on the basis of experi-
lated to the birth and growth of Western science [1]. Locke ence leads straight to the para- I ?? _
in particular set out explicitly to put the work of such dox of induction, Kant suggests
"master-builders... as the incomparable Mr. Newton" on a that we should seek instead to explain experience on the
secure foundation [2]. His attitude to this task was modest basis of concepts. This amounts to turning common sense
in the extreme: he felt that it was "ambition enough to be upside-down, and Kant himself spoke of his work as a "Co-
employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a pernican revolution" in the domain of epistemology [4].
little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way Kant's epistemology involves a fundamental distinction
of knowledge" [3]. By one of the most exquisite ironies in between reality 'in itself' on one hand, and representations
intellectual history, it was from these modest beginnings of reality on the other. The relationship between a thing 'in
that the movement of the British Empiricists, continuing itself' and a representation of it is definitely not that of a
through Berkeley and Hume, stumbled upon a major prob- simple reflection as in a mirror, nor even of a systematic
lem, which quite upset the apple-cart. The problem is this: correspondence: a representation is constructed on the
where do ideas and concepts come from? Take Hume's ex- basis of conceptual categories that do not derive from the
ample: how is it possible to arrive at the notion that A is the objects of knowledge themselves. When we perceive a green
causeof B?The common-sense answer is that the idea derives table, for example, the 'green table' is a representation of
from observation and experience by a process of induction. reality, and it is a great mistake to believe that we perceive
But Hume produces a pitiless reductioad absurdumthat shows reality directly as it is. From a Kantian viewpoint, common-
that this is quite impossible. In the common-sense view, we sense realism is an immense illusion.
would have to suppose that the idea presents itself to us be- Since critical epistemology provides a devastating intel-
cause we observe that B is always preceded by A, and that lectual refutation of common-sense realism, one might sup-
each time A occurs, B follows. But, asks Hume, how many pose that no one could believe in it any more. But the fact
times would we have to observe such a conjunction in order of the matter is that common-sense realism is not only alive
to be logically justified in arriving at the idea of causality? and well, it is actually dominant: most of us believe in it most
Once? Twice? Ten times? A hundred, a thousand, a million of the time. How is this possible? We are not yet 'out of the
times? By dint of asking this question seriously, we are forced woods' of paradox.
to recognize that the idea of a necessaryconnection between The issues at stake can be clarified if we take a look at the
A and B can never be strictlyjustified. Worse, if we really had social process by which facts are constructed in a scientific
no preconceived ideas, it is far from clear that we would even
notice the association between A and B. In short, it seems
John Stewart (research scientist), Centre d'Etudes Transdisciplinaires, 44 rue de la
quite impossible to explain how the formless stream of im- Tour, 75016 Paris, France.
mediate sensory impressions could ever give rise to the con- Received 25June 1987.

? 1989 ISAST
Pergamon Presspic.PrintedinGreatBritain.
0024-094X/89$3.00+0.00 LEONARDO, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 255-261,1989 255
 laboratory [5]. Lack of space pre-
cludes going into details here: the
crux of the matter is that whenever a
social consensus emerges according to
which a hypothesis is 'true', the hy-
pothesis (formulated on the basis of a
priori conceptual categories) under-
goes a metamorphosis and becomes a
'fact'. There are actually two stages in
this transformation. Firstly, the hy-
pothesis projects a twin image of itself
into the 'real world out there'; and this
twin, absolutely identical in every re-
spect with the terms of the hypothesis,
takes on an independent existence in
the form of a real object. Secondly, the
relationship between hypothesis and
object undergoes an inversion. Ini-
tially it was the hypothesis that gave
rise to the object; but, rapidly, more
and more reality is attached to the ob-
ject and less and less to the hypotheti-
cal statement about the object, until
the point is reached where the object
becomes the cause of the hypothesis.
In practice, the conjuring trick is per-
formed so neatly that the sleight of
hand is imperceptible and no one
really notices what has happened. In
other words, we arrive at... common-
sense realism.
It is important to realise that this de-
scription of howthe metamorphosis of
hypothesis into 'fact' occurs in no way
amounts to an epistemological justifi-
cation. The metamorphosis occurs
Fig. 1. John Stewart, Two silhouettesor a
white vase?, ink on paper, 5.5 x 4.9 in,
1987. This classic example of figure-
ground reversal provides a particularly
clear illustration of perceptual 'switch-
ing'. It is instructive to register mentally
the switching from one perceptual mode
to the other and to exercise conscious
control over the process. Although it is
possible to increase the frequency of
switching, it is rigorously impossible to be
in both modes at the same time.
256 Stewart,Can Science Be an Art?
when a social consensus emerges, and
this in turn is likely to happen when-
ever a hypothesis functions reliably as
though there were a perfect two-way
correspondence between representa-
tion and reality. The catch, of course,
lies in the 'as though'; the apparent
'correspondence' is always essentially
contingent, being dependent on the
strictly local context within which
various actors, complete with all their
fears, hopes, attitudes and motiva-
tions, put the hypothesis to practical
use. This contingent locality is re-
vealed by the observation that follow-
ing a shift in the context of use, often
but not necessarily accompanied by
new experiments and observations, a
'fact' can turn back into a 'hypothesis'
and even perish as an 'artefact'[6].
The history of science is quite littered
with examples of established 'facts'
that have been overturned by subse-
quent theories. (In twentieth-century
physics, examples include the belief
that the structure of physical space
corresponds exactly to that of three-
dimensional Euclidean geometry; the
belief that two events separated in
space either are or are not simultane-
ous, independent of any motion on
the part of the observer; and the belief
that any object possesses both an exact
position and an exact momentum; to
say nothing of the oscillation between
corpuscular and wave theories of the
nature of light. Chemistry, geology
and biology of course furnish their
own examples.) In other words, the
metamorphosis of hypothesis into
'fact' is reversible. But as Feyerabend
has pointed out [7], this means that
the metamorphosis cannot be deter-
mined by any valid set of methodologi-
cal rules, because in that case the
metamorphosis would neverbe revers-
ible in this way.We are forced back on
the conclusion that the belief in real-
ism (which is nothing other than the
psychological dimension of the trans-
formation of hypothesis into 'fact') is
indeed an illusion.
I come now to a key point in my
argument. We have just seen that
common-sense realism is essentially
an illusion. However, what we also
need to realise is that it is an illusion
from which there is no practical
escape. Whenever a representation or
mode of perception functions reliably,
it is humanly impossible to avoid fal-
ling into the trap of believing that we
do perceive reality directly as it is. I
cannot emphasize too strongly that
there are sound practical reasons for
this. Consider the extension of critical
epistemology to knowledge in general
and to our perceptions in daily life in
particular. As Gombrich has so aptly
remarked [8], in real-life situations we
act first and think afterwards. If we
were rash enough to try to keep a 'cor-
rect' critical attitude constantly in the
forefront of our consciousness, we
would be completely hamstrung. We
would constantly be assailed by doubts
about the wisdom of trying to go
through a doorway or to climb a stair-
case, or even of getting out of bed in
the morning. When it comes to prac-
tical action, there simply is no sensible
alternative to common-sense realism.
The result is that the would-be lessons
of critical epistemology, expressed as
they are in abstract, intellectual terms,
make virtually no impression on us.
And yet common-sense realism is an
illusion; and for reasons that I shall ex-
plain shortly I think it is a pity to im-
prison ourselves by believing in it un-
reservedly. The question is, of course,
whether anything can be done about
it.
ART
I shall state immediately the central
thesis of this section, to wit: art, by im-
plementing the main insights of criti-
cal epistemology in an immediately ef-
fective way, provides us with a valuable
antidote to the illusion of common-
sense realism.
It will be well to start this section
with an explanation of why I think the
illusion of common-sense realism is a
pity. It is not that I have a puritanical
objection to illusion or error as such.
It is rather that when we are under the
spell of the particular illusion of
common-sense realism, when we
believe that we perceive reality itself
directly as it is, this not only bars us
from actual access to alternate modes
of perception, it blinds us to the very
possibility that other modes of percep-
tion could exist. To make myself clear,
I will put forth a major metaphysical
postulate (which I cannot strictlyjus-
tify other than offering it as a value
judgement): I believe that 'reality' is
infinitely richer and more diverse than
any single representation (or set of
representations) that we human be-
ings are capable of constructing. If this
is so, then it is indeed an impoverish-
ment to imprison ourselves within the
limits of a single mode of perception;
and the pity is redoubled if we are not
even aware that we are imprisoned. ~?r*
ef-"
Xvv *
And yet this is exactly what happens
when we fall prey to the illusion of ' -
,- . ;..
.... X
common-sense realism. W:t.:......: 97~~~~~'"
How does art pierce the walls of this
prison? In a major philosophical text
[9], Heidegger says that a work of art
instigates an unceasing tension or
combat between 'The World' (which I
interpret as corresponding to a partic-
ular representation or modality of per-
ception) and 'The Earth' (which I take
as symbolising the receptacle of the
unlimited multitude of alternative
representations which are de facto an-
nihilated whenever we focus on any
single modality of perception). In
other words, the mysterious magic of
a work of art consists in the artist's feat
of bringing a particular representa-
tion to vivid life without falling into the
trap of reducing the totality of reality
itself to this single way of perceiving. It
is worth noting that Heidegger's analy-
sis is centered not so much on the
process of artistic creation as on what
happens when a work of art is actively
experienced. He speaks of the 'Guard-
ians' of a work of art, those in whom
the combat between World and Earth
takes place; without its Guardians, a
work of art is merely a dead, empty
shell.
The best way of communicating this
concept is probably to give some ex-
amples in which works of art induce us
to assimilate the epistemological dis-
tinction between representation and Fig. 2. M. C. Escher,Waterfal,lithograph,14.9x 11.8in, 1961. (01987 M. C. Escher,c/o
reality. My first example, didactic in its CordonArt,Baarn,The Netherlands.Reprintedbypermission.)In thisvisualequivalent
simplicity, is nevertheless a suitable of perpetualmotion,perceptualswitchingis sustainedby the internaldynamicof the
model. We can perceive the well- imagein interactionwithour owninterpretativeefforts.
known drawing in Fig. 1 either as a pair
of silhouettes facing each other or as
a white vase. Two things are worth though they were what we usually take our everyday perceptions are as illu-
noting here. Firstly, each of these two for reality are systematicallyfrustrated. sory as dreams. Other schools of art-
modalities of perception annihilates A variant on this theme is provided by the Impressionists, the Cubists, con-
the other: if we see the silhouettes, the Magritte's hyperrealist painting infuri- temporary art through action painting
vase disappears, and vice versa; it is atingly entitled This is not a pipe (Fig. and beyond-all contribute, each in
rigorously impossible to see both at 3). As long as we remain obsessed with its own way, to diversifying our reper-
the same time. (This offers a clue to the 'common-sense' question 'What is toire of possible modes of perception.
the tenacity of the illusion of common- it really?' the koan-like conundrum In my own experience, the effect of a
sense realism.) Secondly, engaging in persists; release comes only when and painting is not limited to the time I
the activity of making controlled pas- if we realise that we are dealing with spend actually looking at it. It is pos-
sages from one mode of perception to representations, which are not to be sible to assimilate something of the
the other involves a special quality of confused with reality itself. artist's vision, so that it becomes avail-
concentrated awareness. The point I With this as a clue, it is possible to able as an alternative to usual modes
want to make is this: actively experi- see the same theme running through of perception. Thus, for example, it
encing works of art leads us to develop the whole of Magritte's work, and sometimes happens to me, at table or
a capacity for concentrated awareness, indeed through the whole of the in the street, that I suddenly see the
which in turn can radically modify and Surrealist movement. The Surrealists faces of friends or strangers with the
enrich our experience of life. were-and are-concerned to blur deep lineal clarity of a Dfirer portrait
Consider the drawings of Escher the cut-and-dried distinction between (Fig. 4). When this sort of thing hap-
(Fig. 2). Their fascination derives dreams and reality, to show that the pens, art is effectivelyimplementing
from the fact that our best attempts to dream-world is as real as what we usu- what critical epistemology affirms in-
construe these representations as ally take for reality, and conversely that tellectually: I am reminded that the

Stewart,Can Science Be an Art? 257


e net'ftA
. twe
Fig. 3. Rene Magritte,TheBetrayalofImages,oil on canvas,21.5 x 28.5 in, 1928-1929.
(?1987, ADAGP,Paris,France.Reprintedby permission.)"Thisis not a pipe?- Well
whaton earthis it then?"Howmanyreadersget the pointunaided?The presentauthor,
for one, had to haveit explainedto him.The perceptualswitchinvolvedhere is at the
level of epistemologicalthought.
blase complacency with which I ha-
bitually observe the world is infinitely
narrow and meagre compared to the
unbounded richness of reality.
So far I have spoken only of the
graphic arts, but the 'epistemological
perspective' applies equally to all
forms of art. The art form that is most
directly and obviously related to the
waywe habitually perceive the world is
probably literature, and in particular
the novel. In all the great novels (from
Thackeray and Eliot, through Dos-
toevsky, Tolstoy, Flaubert, Stendhal
and Melville, to Lessing and Fowles)
we are presented with an open invita-
tion to perceive those around us (in-
cluding ourselves) in a new way. To be
more precise, it seems to me that these
novels organise, with deliberate but
tender irony, a back-and-forth 'switch-
ing' between two distinct modes of
perception (analogous to the 'switch-
ing' between vase and silhouettes in
my basic metaphor). On the one
hand, we can identify with the closed,
self-centered consciousness that the
characters have of themselves; on the
other, we can take a step back and par-
take of the lucid external vision that
the author brings to bear, which by
contrast reveals the narrow vanity of
our usual way of perceiving things.
It is with theatre that the vital ten-
sion of a mode of perception that must
be both convincingly established and
at the same time revealed as illusion
reaches its paroxysm. The basic ex-
istential problem of the actor, who
258 Stewart,Can Science Be an Art?
pz . that when we return from a musical
must both enter into and 'live' the part
he is playing and yet at the same time
keep control so as not to 'lose' himself
in the role, provides another meta-
phor for the essence of what I am try-
ing to say. It is therefore not surprising
that the greatest of playwrights pro-
vides me with a quotation that expres-
ses perfectly my fundamental meta-
physical article of faith:
There are more thingsin heaven
and earth,Horatio,
Thanare dreamtof in your
philosophy....
(Hamlet,Act I, Scene 5)
And the relationship between art
and daily life that derives from my
'epistemological perspective' is stated
quite straightforwardly in another
quotation from the same author:
All the world'sa stage
And all the men andwomenmerely
players....
(As YouLikeIt, Act II, Scene 7)
In my own experience, this consti-
tutes an alternative mode of percep-
tion that offers fascinating possibilities
for 'switching'. It is more or less as
though I said to myself, in a real-life sit-
uation, "These people are not really X,
Y and Z; they are actors impersonating
X, Yand Z".The results of this switch
are frequently hilarious: people gener-
ally caricature themselves with such
merciless precision! The fact that we
do this quite unconsciously of course
only adds spice when we do manage to
see the joke.
Music is the art form that offers the
most serious resistance to my 'epis-
temological' interpretation. I find it
difficult to determine whether this is
because or in spite of the fact that in
our culture music is a particularly ab-
stract, intellectual form of art (it is the
one most commonly appreciated and
practised by scientists). Music, and in-
strumental music in particular, has of
course an exceptional capacity to
transport us into a 'world' of its own.
The trouble (from my 'epistemologi-
cal' point of view) is that this other
world bears no recognizable relation-
ship to anything in our ordinaryworld.
The result of this 'schizophrenia' is
'trip' our habitual modes of percep-
tion are not necessarily enriched. Is it
a total coincidence thatjazz musicians
are notorious users of psychoactive
drugs that present similar problems?
Be that as it may, in my own case the
way in to an epistemological perspec-
tive on music has come through opera
and song. Indeed, my epistemological
musings have contributed to a quan-
tumjump in my appreciation of opera.
Hitherto, opera had left me somewhat
less than indifferent: squalling prima
donnas on the radio definitely did not
appeal to me, and on the rare occa-
sions when I actually went to the
opera, the idea of people actually sing-
ing at each other seemed patently ab-
surd. It was here that the 'epistemo-
logical' attitude came to my aid by
helping me to relax: to staywith my ini-
tial impression as long as I was in that
mode of perception, but to remain
open to the possibility that an alterna-
tive mode might supervene. And thus
it was that the magic moment so well
known to opera-lovers finally came to
me: the moment when the marvellous
emotional intensity that lies dormant
and unsuspected beneath the surface
of the most banal or absurd of situa-
tions suddenly breaks forth in full
splendour.
I would like to conclude this sec-
tion, therefore, by claiming that it
does seem feasible to perceive art as a
way of putting flesh and blood onto
the dry bones of the intellectual
insights of critical epistemology. Of
course, this is a somewhat unusual way
of thinking about art; the mainstream
of philosophical thought has been pri-
marily concerned with the basis of aes-
thetic values, as exemplified by Kant in
the Critique of Judgement [10]. How-
ever, the 'multiple worlds' view of art
that I have advocated here is not
unprecedented: it is in line with
Dewey's Art as Experience [11 ], and has
been explicitly developed by Eco [12].
And even more to the point, I have a
precise reason for proposing this 'epis-
temological perspective': to equip my-
self with a tool for coming to grips with
the subject of the next section, that is,
can science itself become an art form,
and if so what would it be like?
SCIENCE
The links between science, art and the
'multiple worlds' view are many and
varied; I cannot here do more than
briefly cite a few of the more impor-
tant cases. Popper [13] has made the
fundamental point that scientific
knowledge is not a 'reflection' of real-
ity, but is based on hypotheses that
(provisionally) escape falsification.
Gregory [14] has drawn a formal
seven-point analogy between this 'hy-
pothetical' structure of scientific
knowledge and that of human knowl-
edge in general; and Gombrich [15]
has demonstrated the relevance of the
Popper-Gregory approach to an un-
derstanding of perception in the
visual arts.
Kuhn [16] has pointed out that sci-
entific progress is not just a question
of the continuous accretion of ever
more precise and detailed knowledge.
Finally, the theory and practice of
science as it is actually performed in
the laboratory epitomize the 'multiple
worlds' view. The very concept of mod-
elling (both descriptive and norma-
tive) recognizes the metamorphosis of
one world into another: the method of
multiple working hypotheses-in use
for almost a hundred years-cham-
pions the creativity of holding several
simultaneous explanations; the tech-
nique of brainstorming and the simi-
lar approach of lateral thinking both
give the fullest support to the divorce
between an idea and its 'real' counter-
part by suspending evaluation of ve-
racity.
However, although these numer-
ous links are definitely suggestive of
possibilities, they are not in themselves
sufficient to show that science, as it
currently exists, really attains the sta-
tus of an art form. Heidegger, for ex-
ample, clearly had strong reservations
on this score, perhaps best summed
up in his famous phrase "science does
not think" [20]. Thus, whereas he con-
sidered that there is a close relation-
ship between poetry (taken as the
epitome of artistic expression) and
thought (i.e. philosophical thought),
he manifestly felt that science belongs
to a different register altogether. I
I 3 If-.
would now like to examine more
closely what is at issue here.
In terms of my 'epistemological per-
spective', as I have schematically sum-
marized it, art is effective just in so far
as it succeeds in maintaining a vital
tension between two complementary
requirements: Firstly, a work of art
must create a fresh mode of percep-
tion, a 'World' as Heidegger would
say, that is incommensurable with our
usual way of perceiving things. More-
over, this new World must be convinc-
ing enough to detach us from our
complacent common-sense realism,
which leads us to believe that our ha-
bitual perceptions correspond to all
that there is. But secondly, a work of
art must also manage to communicate
this new World in such a way as to in-
crease our awareness that not only our
habitual modes of perception, but all
particular modes of perception, in-
cluding the new World itself, are
merely representations of reality, and
that we will impoverish ourselves if we
fall into the illusion of taking them
singly or collectively as the totality of
reality itself.
Now it seems to me that in the case
of science, in particular as it is com-
municated to the general public, these
two requirements tend to work against
fr1
(r

Such periods of 'normal science' are Fig. 4. Albrecht >...

-, ^ e^
punctuated by 'scientific revolutions', Diirer, The
in which whole conceptual paradigms Motherofthe 1^.= eft i7 * 1 ?r-
\, W
" 0 w.^T
shift in such a way that the world Artist,charcoal g?% ;s
-> 9 ,*
visions of successive epochs may be drawing, 16.6 x
11.9 in, 1514. ; ~5]
*~~ a s; r*--

largely incommensurable. In a related The vision of an

vein, Holton [17] has described the artist can affect
range of different 'themata' that may us beyond the
underlie scientific thought, and Po- time we actually
lanyi [18] speaks of the 'heuristic pas- spend looking at
sion' with which scientists adopt par- the image. This
ticular paradigms or themata. He also portrait of Bar-
bara Diirer (nee
extends these concepts to the arts, re- Holper), drawn 2
calling E. M. Forster's distinction be- months before
tween 'flat' and 'round' characters in her death at the
a novel: we say that a character is age of 63, is one
round if it can 'convincingly surprise' of the master-
the reader. pieces of Euro-
pean art. The
Bohr, author of the complementar- present author
ity principle in quantum mechanics, feels that its emo-
has proposed an extension of switch- tional intensity is
ing between perceptual modes to an 'engraved in his .".. i
*.
''
soul', so that,
understanding of human knowledge ! . . rI .

in general [19]. having experi-

enced it, he finds :'V
Science, tragedy and comedy have the world is no
been associated since their common longer the same
origins in classical Greece; their con- place.
tinuing links have been extensively ex-
plored.

Stewart,Can Science Be an Art? 259

 each other, so that in the end neither
of them is fully realized. To start with
the second count, contemporary
Western society is so thoroughly im-
bued with scientific technologies that
manifestly work, that the general pub-
lic understandably identifies 'scien-
tific' with 'true', as in the common
phrase: 'it is scientifically proven
that . . .'. Indeed it may not be too
much to say that with the general de-
cline in institutional religious belief,
science has taken the place of the
Church as the major social reference
point for 'truth'. Of course working
scientists, who have daily experience
of the fluctuating status of scientific
hypotheses, know that this image of
science as revealing a single, fixed
truth is a travesty. This probably
explains their instinctive reticence
towards most attempts at popularizing
science. But the straightforwardappli-
cation of this corrective-insisting
that the current hypothesis is only a hy-
pothesis, that there are numerous un-
tidy details which do not fit in, and so
on-effectively militates against the
first requirement, which is that a dis-
tinctive scientific 'vision of the world'
be convincingly communicated.
It may therefore be worth exploring
an alternative strategy for fulfilling the
second requirement. In terms of my
'epistemological perspective', I have
suggested that a basic technique for
achieving this second requirement
consists of purposely providing at least
two alternate modes of perception be-
tween which switching can occur. If we
apply this to science, in the hope of
raising it to the status of an art form, I
see two major possibilities.
The first possibility is to set up an
'external' equilibrium between a sci-
entific vision on one hand and an
everyday way of perceiving things on
the other. The potential here is surely
tremendous. As Bachelard [21] has
noted, scientific thought is character-
ised by an 'epistemological breach'-
in plain language, the basic notions of
science are an outright affront to com-
mon sense. In this, I think he is right;
just consider a few examples.
Inertial motion.According to physi-
cists, any object, if simply left to itself,
will continue moving indefinitely in a
straight line. As Koyre [22] has
pointed out, this is a strikingly non-
empirical notion: no one in her right
mind has ever seen or heard of such a
thing.
Primaryand secondaryqualities.Ac-
cording to physicists and neurophysi-
260 Stewart, Can Science Be an Art?
ologists, sounds, colours, smells, and
so on-the most direct of our sensory
impressions-do not really exist as
such. They are merely the illusory re-
sult of a rather clumsy conjuring trick
that nature plays on us. The only
things that really exist are particles
(atoms) and electric charges (elec-
trons) in various states of motion, and
these things themselves are com-
pletely colourless, soundless and taste-
less. Even Thomas, who doubted what
he saw, believed when he touched; but
that most tangible (sic) of realities falls
equally under the aegis of this aston-
ishing doctrine.
If this is not enough, consider a
third example: genes.According to ge-
neticists, these microscopic entities,
which live as parasites in every one of
the cells of which our bodies are made,
are transmitted unchanged from gen-
eration to generation. Not only are
these genes impervious to the vicissi-
tudes of our life experiences, but they
actually have the effrontery to pro-
gramme all our actions with the sole
aim of ensuring their own reproduc-
tion, thus reducing our most cher-
ished hopes and fears to the status of
superficial epiphenomena [23].
I am not trying to ridicule science.
On the contrary, I am trying to convey
the strength as well as the essential
weirdness of scientific perceptions of
the world. Science as art would then
involve establishing a switching rela-
tionship between such visions on the
one hand and familiar everydaymodes
of perception on the other. In this
case, there would be no need to water
down the sharpness of scientific vision;
on the contrary, everything could be
done to exacerbate the shock, to bring
out the fascination of this terrifying
wayof perceiving things, which has the
power to impress itself on our minds
as being at least as 'real' as our ordi-
nary modes of perception.
I can imagine a number of variants
on this theme of setting up an exter-
nal equilibrium between scientific and
everyday modes of perception. One,
of particular relevance to our present
condition, would be to arrange a con-
frontation between an 'expert' and a
'layperson'. The point is not to make
the expert an object of derision, but
simply to redress the usual imbalance,
which leads us so often to submit pas-
sively to 'expert opinion'. We are look-
ing for that critical point where we can
see things both from the expert's
point of view and from the layperson's,
so that we end up really wondering
who is right. In a similar vein, the de-
ployment of a scientific attitude in an
everyday situation has distinct comic
possibilities. Le Lionnais [24] has
pointed out that, from the scientific
point of view, it is little short of in-
credible that if one lifts up a pencil
and lets it go it drops back to the table
and stops there, or that when one
picks up a cup, it does not slip between
one's fingers like greased lightning.
So we could imagine a play or a film in
which an absent-minded professor
takes his science seriously, and starts
asking why (and if) we really can pick
up pencils and cups and put them on
the table. Here again, it is not (simply)
a question of poking fun at science; we
are looking for the balance-point that
makes us wonder who is right. A final
variant is to deploy the technique of
the theatrical switch that I referred to
previously. Readers who have the
opportunity of attending a scientific
meeting should try saying to them-
selves, "That speaker is not really a
scientist, she is an actor caricaturing a
scientist." In my own experience, the
result can be devastatingly funny-
and in no way precludes switching
back and listening with renewed ap-
preciation to what the speaker (thinks
she) is saying.
The second major possibility for or-
ganising switching consists of setting
up an 'internal' equilibrium between
several rival scientific theories in such
a way that the spectator is unable to de-
cide definitively in favour of any of
them. The history of science (and, as
working scientists know well, contem-
porary science) abounds with exam-
ples of controversies that remained
open over a significant length of time.
These could serve as starting points. If
we choose the appropriate historical
viewpoint, it should not be difficult to
set up the required equilibrium. A
model of what I have in mind is pro-
vided by Latour, who illustrates the re-
versible metamorphosis between hy-
pothesis and 'fact' by recounting the
nightmare of a sociologist haunted by
successive theories of dinosaurs [25].
Another amusing example, this time
of role reversal, has actually been pub-
lished in a scientific journal in the
form of a "One-ActPlay"[26]. It might
also be instructive to rehabilitate a
frankly obsolete theory, the simpler
the better-we could bring in an un-
shakable believer in the flat earth, for
example, or a lost, lonesome time-
traveller, unable to convince his hosts
(sympathetically concerned for his

sanity) that atoms, electrons and so on
actually exist. Let me emphasize again
that the aim is to arrive at a point
where everyone reallywonders who is
right. Finally, the 'internal' and 'exter-
nal' approaches could also be com-
bined. Something along the lines of
the fable of the miller, his donkey and
his son could serve as an example: a
'fall guy' lets himself be convinced in
turn by each of a series of mutually
contradictory scientific theories. The
final moral-he would have done bet-
ter to trust his own common sense-
would be worthwhile only if everyone
was convinced at the time, along with
the anti-hero.
These are of course only a few sug-
gestions, designed principally to illus-
trate my point. My hope is that I have
communicated my conviction that, al-
though science is arguably not fully an
art form at present, it could perhaps
become one if we put our minds to it.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the reviewers of Leonardofor
their constructive criticisms, and for their permis-
sion to incorporate certain of their comments
into the revised version of this text. I also wish to
thank Cordon Art, Baarn, The Netherlands, for
permission to reproduce Escher's Waterfall;
ADAGP, Paris, France, for permission to repro-
duce Magritte's Cecin 'estpasunePipe;and Editions
Cercle d'Art, Paris, France, for permission to re-
produce the drawing La merede 'artistefrom their
book Direr, Dessins.
References
1. B. Russell, The Wisdomof the West (London:
Macdonald, 1959).
2. J. Locke, quoted in Russell [1] p. 215.
3. J. Locke, quoted in Russell [1] p. 215.
4. I. Kant, quoted in Russell [1] p. 238.
5. B. Latour and S. Woolgar, LaboratoryLife: The
SocialConstructionofScientificFacts(London: Sage,
1979).
6. Latour and Woolgar [5].
7. P. Feyerabend, Against Method(London: New
Left Books, 1975).
8. E. H. Gombrich, "Illusion and Art", in R. L.
Gregory and E. H. Gombrich, eds., Illusion in Na-
tureand Art (London: Duckworth, 1973).
9. M. Heidegger, "Der Ursprung des Kunst-
werkes", in Holzwege(Frankfurt/Main: Kloster-
mann, 1949).
10. I. Kant, CritiqueofJudgement(London: Mac-
millan, 1950).
11. J. Dewey, ArtAsExperience
(New York:Minton,
Balch, 1934).
12. U. Eco, OperaAperta
(Milan: Bompiani, 1962).
13. K. R. Popper, The Logic of ScientificDiscovery
(London: Hutchinson, 1959).
14. R. L. Gregory, 'The Confounded Eye", in
Gregory and Gombrich [8].
15. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1961).
16. T. S. Kuhn, TheStructureofScientificRevolutions
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
17. G. Holton, Thematic Origins of Scientific
Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1973).
18. M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge-Towards a
Post-CriticalPhilosophy(London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1958).
19. N. Bohr, Physique atomique et connaissance
humaine(Paris:Gauthier, 1961).
20. M. Heidegger, Unterwegszur Sprache(Pfullin-
gen: Nesker, 1959).
21. G. Bachelard, Epistmnologie,(Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1971).
22. A. Koyre, Etudesgalileennes(Paris: Hermann,
1966).
23. R. Dawkins, TheSelfishGene(Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1976).
24. F. Le Lionnais, "Science Is an Art", Leonardo
2, No. 1, 73-78 (1969).
25. B. Latour, "The Three Little Dinosaurs, or A
Sociologist's Nightmare", FundamentaScientiae1
(1980) pp. 79-85.
26. M. Mulkay, "The Scientist Talks Back:A One-
Act Play with a Moral, about Replication in
Science and Reflexivity in Sociology", SocialStud-
ies in Science14 (1984) pp. 265-282.
Stewart,Can Science Be an Art? 261