Dowling 1

Antonio Dowling

Phil. 220

Dr. E Trizio

17 March, 2011

Some weeks ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as

true in my naivety. It all began with my first reading of René Descartes’s Meditations of First

Philosophy. Descartes and I sought a quest for truth.

In the beginning of the First Meditation, Descartes realizes that he has been accepting

many “truths” without questioning them for his entire life. Sometimes they may be false, but in

general, he accepts them as true. His aim through these meditations is to achieve certainty.

Doubt, to Descartes, was the key to finding truth. He starts his methodic doubt in the Meditations

by recognizing that the senses are our main source of knowledge, but also that they can deceive

us, and therefore must be doubted. In fact, any truth that is not indubitable should be regarded as

that which is completely untrue. Descartes, instead of going through individual objects and

doubting their truth, forms somewhat of a categorical or methodic system of doubt. To begin, all

knowledge obtained by the senses is doubted. But it seems impossible, Descartes reasons, that his

senses are lying about his being there, sitting by a fire, etc. Certainly he must have a body.

Unless, of course, he is dreaming.

The dream argument states that dream experiences are incredibly similar to experiences

in reality and that there is no definite system of distinguishing between the two worlds, so it is

possible that I could be dreaming, rendering all of my perceptions false. To this Descartes objects
by saying that the images in our dreams can only be variations on those in reality. “Nonetheless,

it must surely be admitted that the visions that come in dreams are like paintings, and must have

been fashioned in the likeness of things that are real” (Descartes, 18). This reasoning implies not

that the perceptions obtained by our perceiving organs are indubitably true, but that the basic

elements of objects (which can be perceived) are true. The first example given in the meditations

is that of colour. Beyond the creation of a beast that is half lion, half eagle, which is clearly based

on things in reality, in the creation of something genuinely “new,” at least the colours of the

object must be real. What is more: quantity, size, position in space, and endurance of time are all

things that can, for now, be deemed “real.” This is all to say that purely intellectual capacities are

not affected by the dream argument.

It would seem, as Descartes reasons, that math and geometry would be an indubitable

system, as it plays on the fundamental qualities of being (primarily quantity) and is, indeed,

purely intellectual. But in fact, an omnipotent God could be leading you to believe that systems

of mathematics do not work in the way you understand them to. The argument of the deceiving

God is as follows. If we believe that there is an all-powerful God that has created us, and that he

has it in his power to deceive us in the matters of mathematics, then it would follow that there is a

possibility that God is deceiving us about such things. The objection that follows states that God

is good, and would not deceive us. However unsatisfying this may be to readers at this point,

there is more to come about the existence of God later in the Meditations.

Given that God is only a source of good, we may assume that there is an evil genius who

is able to deceive us as we thought God would. Once again, all senses and concepts of
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mathematics are to be doubted. At this point, it would seem that all hope is lost. Aptly put, we are

now deep within the Cartesian “whirlpool of doubt.” What is it that we can be certain of?

We will now take the argument of the evil genius and realize its implications. If

something (the evil genius) is deceiving something else (me), would it not stand to reason that

both things exist? It is at this point the first certainty of the Meditations becomes clear. “I think, I

am,” Descartes says. As long as I am thinking, I am existing. What is important to remember,

here, is that this statement only proves Descartes’s own existence to himself– this is a proof only

applicable in the first person. Further, it is often misconceived that this is a proof of the human

existence, body and all. “I think, I am,” occurs in the Meditations before the disambiguation of

the term “I.” Functions that Descartes had previously attributed to the soul (nutrition, motion) are

“mere fabrications,” without a body, as well as sense perception is. Here we see a

groundbreaking shift from long standing Aristotelian philosophy. No longer are the functions of

the soul to be nutritive or perceptive, but its only function is to be thinking. “Thought; this alone

is inseparable from me” (Descartes 18). This notion can be easily explained by way of a simple

maxim: you can imagine the soul without a body, but you cannot imagine the body without a

soul. In this way, Cartesian dualism begins to become clear. Certainly it is a dramatic distinction

between the soul (res cogitans) and the body (res extensa).

In Meditation 3, Descartes aims to prove the existence of God. He starts, however, by

talking about ideas. There are three kinds of ideas: factious ideas, or those from any imaginary

thing; adventitious ideas, or those from perceptions; and innate ideas, or those that originate

within me. All of these ideas have a degree of reality– that is to say, a level of independence of

existence. For example, this paper is white, but only so long as the paper itself exists. “White”
cannot have an independent existence, and therefore has a lower degree of reality. Descartes

introduces the terms objective and formal reality. Formal reality is simply the reality that is true.

“Real” reality, so to speak. Objective reality, conversely, is the degree of reality of what is

represented by an idea. So in the case of the white paper, the paper may exist as many other

colours, and thus has more objective reality than the colour white. Here we see a distinction

between two classes of existence: properties and substances. Properties, naturally have a less

objective reality than substances, but can God fit into the role of “substance”? Here Descartes

introduces a three-point argument for the existence of God.

1) If something causes something else, its degree of objective reality must be equal to or greater

than that of the thing caused.

2) The cause of an idea must have as much formal as there is objective reality contained in the

idea.

3) I think I have an idea of an infinite substance (e.x. God). But surely this is false! Given that I

am a finite substance, I do not have enough formal reality to cause the objective reality of the

idea of an infinite substance.

Therefore, Descartes reasons, there must be an infinite substance which is the cause of the idea

of an infinite substance, and that infinite substance is God. In this way the existence of God is

proven in the Mediations.

God is an innate idea, present within us, and it would be impossible to exist without him.

In our hierarchy of reality (properties-->finite substances-->infinite substances), we see that the

cause of our existence must come from another finite substance or directly from God, as those

are the only two categories holding enough objective reality to have such ideas. A regress is
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created here, which must always end in God. This is somewhat a variation on the dual-causality

notion of the Ancient and Medieval eras. It is also in this section of the Meditations that we see a

more substantial argument for why God is not deceiving us. God is the possessor of all

perfections, and all fraud and deception lie in some sort of defect (Descartes 35). What is more,

in order to even conceive of our own imperfection, we must first realize perfection, and that

perfection is God. So, in thinking of myself, I think first of God.

The role of God in Descartes’s Meditaitons is one that allows us to enlarge our scope of

certainty. After becoming certain about my own existence, I realized that I was created by God.

God is the creator, God is perfect, and God will not deceive me. In Meditation VI we come to

realize that if God will not deceive us, then there is no reason to doubt that this reality is reality.

Now that Descartes has proven the existence of himself and that of God, only the existence of

every other being in the universe is left to prove. These beings have two kinds of properties:

primary and secondary. Similar to the wheel of primary and secondary colours, secondary

properties cannot exist without primary ones. Let us define these properties. Primary properties

have an independent state of reality; these properties may be shape, size, quantity, position, etc.

Secondary properties, conversely, have a dependent state of reality; these may include colours,

smells, sounds, tastes. It is true that primary properties exist in the external world, while

secondary properties do not. For instance, if a tree falls in a forrest, it does not make a sound. The

air may be disturbed in such a way that sound would be audible if someone where there to hear it,

but the entire notion of sound (a secondary property) exists only in the mind. Descartes, with the

help of God, has just proven the existence of the external world. This accomplishment of the

Meditations leads to the existence of my body, which does exist. What makes it different from
any other body is that I gather sensory perception from it. Here again we see a way in which to

make Cartesian dualism more clear. “I am not in my body like a sailor in a ship” (Descartes 38).

By this, Descartes means that there is a real unity between the body and the soul, unlike between

that of a sailor and his ship. When my toe is stubbed against a hard surface, I am in pain. It would

seem ridiculous to say that my body is in pain. Though there is a substantial difference between

the body and soul, that is, a difference in ontological being, there is an equal causal relationship

between the two. Mind functions cause body functions, and the other way around. This is the

nature of Cartesian dualism.

We will now compare Platonic and Cartesian dualism, in conjunction with bringing to

light the dualistic account of human nature outlined by Descartes. A fundamental difference

between these two types of dualism is found at the very base of the purpose of the soul. Drawing

from conclusions given in the Phaedo, the Platonic soul is one that holds the body in contempt.

In fact, would seem that the best thing that could happen to the soul would be for it to separate

from the body at death. While both Plato and Descartes believe that the soul is separable from

the body, Cartesian dualism implies something else. If the soul and body can be separate, why is

it that they are connected at all? For Plato, the body is an instrument of the soul. The soul desires

a life for itself, whether good or bad, and uses the body to gain experiences in the line of what it

wants. One might wrongly assume the same about the Cartesian soul/mind. Certainly the body

cannot will for there to be a soul inside of it, but the soul can will to be inside of a body, in order

to have perception, and thus, in order to think and imagine. Descartes even says that it is the soul

that holds desire. But unfortunately, this only comes after embodiment, and therefore cannot

explain embodiment itself. It is only God, in his perfect unity, that can create a unity between the
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soul and the body. Coincidentally, it is by comparing these two types of dualism that we see even

more clearly the role of God in Cartesian dualism.

It would seem that the quest for truth is finished. Descartes and I have doubted all that

was to be doubted, and subsequently reproved the existence of ourselves individually, and then

proved the existence of God in the first place. With the existence of God came a much large

scope of certainty, and now, finally, we have left the whirlpool, sopping wet as we may be.