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Both Heidigger and Sartre find that actual relations with other people diminish the individuals freedom.

Their analyses differ as Heidiggers conception of relations with others is one of care while Sartres is ultimately antagonistic; however, both of them view others as an impediment to individual freedom. In conclusion Heidigger asserts that death is that which gives a being its authenticity while Sartre finds that death finally removes the possibility of the individuals freedom by making the individual a mere object for the other. Heidigger defines his subject of analysis as being always we ourselves. The being of this being is always mine(Heidigger 41; Being and Time. 2010. State University of New York Press. Ed.Schmidt, Trans. Stambaugh). This being is Dasein, an entity which is not merely objectively present in the world but which is being-in-the-world. Being-in-the-world refers to the necessity of examining Dasein within the context of the whole phenomenon, against the background of the structures of being which [belong] to Dasein itself (Heidigger 35). Since Dasein cannot just be examined as something objectively present, itdefines itself in terms of a possibility which it is(43). In its average everydayness Dasein understands itself in terms of those beings and their being which it itself is not, but which it encounters within its world(59); however, these encounters, relations with other beings, are only possible because the other beings decide to reveal themselves in a world (58). At this point it appears clear that Daseins being is possibility but that its being-in-the-world creates the possibility of relations with other Dasein in the world. For Dasein, [things] at hand are encountered within the world( 81) and for these things to have relevance for Dasein they exist together with it, they create a reference which is marked by Daseins concern (186). Since Dasein is a possibility it is always ahead of itself; but, in the sense that Dasein is taking care, it is concerned by what it has relations to in the world. Heidigger notes that the project of ones potentiality-of-being is left to the disposal of the they(187), but that even this is a mark of Daseins possibility since by giving itself up to the they Dasein demonstrates concern for itself it flees the anxiety of projecting itself into death by falling prey to the world. Falling prey means being absorbed in being-with-one-another (169), thus returning to Heidiggers emphasis on relations with others, despite the fact that it is primarily a falling away from the the self rather than falling prey to another being. This phenomenon is enabled by the existence of others, but is grounded within Dasein itself as being-in-the-world. Falling prey is entanglement, a way of everyday living which provides understanding, reassurance, and tranquility by through an evasive covering over of death(245). Living in this everydayness is an inauthentic way of being, it distracts Dasein from the anxiety of its ownmost and non-relational possibility being-toward-death (249). Authentic being-toward-death is an acknowledgement of the certainty of death, anticipation of death which Dasein can [lay] claim on [...] as something individual(252). The foundation of freedom is anticipation (of

authentic being-toward-death) as it is divorced from relations with others and does not evade the impossibility of bypassing death [...] but frees itself for it. Becoming free for ones own death in anticipation liberates one from ones lostness in chance possibilities (253). Thus, despite the anxiety of death, it must be endured as possibility in our relation to it(250), otherwise Dasein lapses into the inauthentic they-world which being-toward-death frees itself from. Ultimately, freedom for Heidigger is freedom from the illusions of the they, factical, and certain of itself (255) and this freedom toward death comes about via authentic existence; that is, being-toward-death as Daseins ownmost possibility, free of relations to others. While Heidiggers analysis moves from relations with others to the possibility of freedom, Sartres analysis starts by defining freedom and then examining the ways in which this freedom is restricted by others. For Sartre, nothingness must be given at the heart of Being(Sartre 56), although nothingness is not a component of Being, but comes about from Being since nothingness itself cannot nihilate. Only that which is can nihilate itself, thus for nothingness to result, there must first be a Being. For Sartre, the individuals freedom to nihilate, to stand outside the world, precedes essence in man and makes it possible(60); the being of humans is the same as being-free (60). Freedom is marked by the human being putting his past out of play by secreting his own nothingness(64) but Sartre finds that human consciousness of this freedom causes anguish, the reflective apprehension of the self (66).