Wings at War Series, No.

CONFIDENTIAL

Airborne

Assault

Holland on
Ail Interim Report

Published

by Headquarters, Army Washington, D. C.

Air Forces

Office of Assistant

Chief of Air Staff, Intellicence

CUIVFIDf=Na1;
LESr6\k l Vie-.c tk',
l-.

1L

r
"School

FOREWORD
This is the fourth in a series of interim reports published by HcadArmy Air Forces. The original material was prepared by
luartcrs, the First Allied Airborne Army and the IX Troop
)istorical officers of by a committee of from this Hiead-
and officers arrier juartcrs who visited the theater after the operation, on the basis of
first-hand observation. This text has been fl-icial records and abridged
in order to provide for combat personnel in all theaters a
ttl(l edited ticcinct summary of the planning and execution of the airborne in, Holland. :ision
of Command,

The conscientious and able work of staff personnel in the theaters

fakes possible the publication of this series, the intent of which is to important campaigns and individual missions in all
over the more beaters of operations.
invited. They be addressed to:
Comments and criticisms are should General, Army Air Forces, Assistant Chief Commanding 'lhc Air
of
Intelligence, Washington 25, D. C.
taff,

111

CONTENTS

1'he Situation ....................... Narrative of the Operation ................

1'he laic Struggle of the First

PACE.

Division ..........
. ..

Airborne

Io

45

ILLUSTRATIONS I-t. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton ...........................

1)-Day Parad rop ,(1 .............. .
mist I)-Day Paradrop .....................................
1faj. Gen. Paul L. Williams .............
navigation Diagram, No. i .............
. 1, I)-Day and D+i Paradrop...........................
ritisli <<, I)-1-i[ Glider Release tst ..........................
Glider Release I)+I :d .................
Frontispiece

13
9

41 .. 45

i iIli I in I I'Iinlu

1 '\A

L. . ILA . 1.cNU 11. l; rcrcwn, A

(: unnanIing

(Wiwi

I irs \Ilicl .I, .

\irli ii .\r .

Airborne Assault
Holland
on
The Situation

double Sicgflanking The place to achieve the the result of Line and crossing the Rhine was at Arnhem, fricd the Neder Rijn on Once across the river here, Allied troops would be beyond ill I Tolland. defenses flank of the Siegfried in position to swing beand the right The 11,1tterrain liind them and oil into tile Fatherland. of northern beyond Arnhcm favorable for remaining (; crnnany offered a route logical armor.

his forces for ,1 stand. lie was careening

the enemy no tinge to rally Siegfried Linc where, if permitted, he could be cxIectc(1 to toward the his breath and establish a defensive position. catcli 'l'o the Allies the Siegfried Linc presented a formidable obstacle. 'I'O penetrate the heart of the German homeland it was necessary t( fixed defenses with its artfully constructed not only this system of pass, minefields, and fire-control points, but also that natural tank traps, harrier, the river Rhine. Wily not accomplisll both aims at once? Why not dO it now, while forces were still reeling? enemy

CONFUSED

disorganized, the Wchrmacht was retreating and Francc and the Lowlands. Ever since the St. Lo breakacross Allied pressure had been relentlessly applied, giving through

the most likely point of attack, the most feasible Nvas With paratroops was an airborne operation. iiiethod and glidcrto seize strategic bridges and landing fields, it 1ornc units was cstiinfantry forces that armored and tl1atc"(1 could push rapidly forward Just as Arnhem
"Hie ranks of olliccrs nic"ntionc"d herein. (if the events (lc"scrihcd in this 1)ooklc"t are thus they held at the tiro(

factor was to hit the ellellly take over control. The all-important and before he could gather his resistance.
at this most vulnerable point It is well for those inclined to criticize the timing of the operation to
Had the attack imperative need for immediate action. consider this boldly conceived plan proved completely successful, the results of this Not that the Holland have amply justified the risks involved. would be deemed a failure; it was possibly 8o per cent successful, assault can Allied front was advanced 48 miles in the northern sector since the difficult river crossing remained. and only one It was the consensus of both United States and British airborne IX i r(e)p Carrier Command (IX'I'CC) staff that of staffs and of the in the European theater to (late, this was the all airborne operations Not only did the
brilliantly most conceived, planned, and execute(l. forces it carried perform creditably, but losses air eomIx)nent and the far smaller than anticipated. The units carried out their as-
wcrc by weather and enemy signed Missions, according to plan as modified in such manner as to clear the way for Lt. Gen. Miles C. reaction, I)empscy's armor, in case it cattle through close to schedule. 'Tactical air preparation was thorough. carrier operations, heavily upon available radar and radio aids, were precise and definite, IX T CC in of lcr tors. utilizing to great advantage the experience of Due to air preparation and the high degree of saturation attained losses were not only lower than in the area, troop carrier and glider but were probably not one-(luarter so great as Would have expected, been incurred by night, when higher operational losses may be looked for. Tile airborne divisions (United States (82d and joist and British themselves as only airborne units with considerable have done. The 82d Division in a series of bitter experience could fights captured a number of vital bridges prior to the arrival of the Guards Armoured Division and tiled, assisted by the latter unit, eilin the desperate assault on the important Nijmegen bridge so gaged by that time, to the vital to the success of the ground operation and, Operations hard-pressed British Ist Airborne Division. relief of the Division, which repulsed with bazookas and the joist Airborne of However, artillery a charge of 31) tanks, were equally spectacular. lxx, klet inevitably discusses to s0111C extent the activities of while this the air forces in the Battle of I lolland, it is primarily the ground here. component which concerns us Ist) acquitted
2

't'roop

depending

Army Supply and Airborne Training

Perhaps the most persistent the First Allied Air-
which in its attempt to train for and carry borne Army (FAAA) encountered during August and September through airborne operations 1944 was
its troop carrier resources by the requirements for air on to the rapidly advancing armies. It was a constant transport of supplies The Army, needing supplies, turned to the facilities of
tug-of-war. drain the IX TCC as best suited to produce results. FAAA tried to keep i rimy
demands to a minimum and to suggest other means of satisfying air In an effort to secure alternate means of transporting
transport needs. freight, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. I3rereton, Commanding General of FAAA,
heavy bombers about to be returned to the
sought to get war-weary United States, and on 17 August asked Supreme Headquarters Allied
Forces (SHAEF) F xpe(litionary to make available 250 11-24's with This request was rejected because it August. their crews until 25
difficulty

diversion of combat aircraft. would entail Some progress toward combat training was made when, on 22 General Eighth Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, Commanding August, heavy bombers to help in hauling freight, Air Force, offered to allocate 13-17's and three I3-24's to IX TCC for tests on turned over three zinc be carried, time of loading and unloadof cargo to types and amounts field required. ing, fuel consumption, and size of further alleviated with FAAA's The situation was acquisition of Groups (RAF) for aid in the supply-carrying assignment, 3S and 46 by a directive from Headquarters United States Strategic Air "ul(1 Eighth Air Force to set aside bombers for this (USSTAF) Forces to flights a day, to be placed under command of purpose capable of loo One hundred sixty-seven 11-17 supply sorties VAAA when necessary. flown in the week ending 2 September and 364 sorties the were following week. impending, Ii the Holland Wit airborne operation the hauling It had been a period freight was stopped on 15 September. ()f frustrations and difficulties, when the hydra-headed needs of full of had had to be met hand. invading army with whatever was at an That the airborne troops, and the crews who flew them in, did so is all the more admirable in the face brilliantly of stupendous training difficulties.
I 1o 6,1 - 1: 0 (;, ',

Preparation
Having

for the Attach

from the Mediterranean theater after c0111pletiol; returned invasion of southern

France, IX Troop Carrier Command was of the immediately alerted for a possible airborne mission. Other
operationI be used if desired. Although on several occa. to developed to full staff studies and the sions some of these plans were actual marshaling of aircraft and troops was accomplished, the ground forces advanced so fast as to render the operations unnecessary, since in question had been overrun by friendly troops. the terrain had been planned

By directive of the Supreme Commander, dated 5 September 1944, FAAA was ordered to c(x)pcrate with 21st Army Group in a contelll' to l)lacC was northward plated advance. The troop carrier operation

tr(i)ps in Ix)sition to seize the vital bridges of the Maast airlx)rnc `Vaal, and Neder Rijn rivers to facilitate the advance of the Britisl Second Army along the axis Eindhoven-Grave-Nijmegen-Arnlmen (A prolx)sed troop carrier operation against Walcheren Island 11a( been studied and by FAAA as not feasible because also rejected o! concentrated flak (efenses, impossible glider landing zones, excessive big (Iikes, numerous canals, water, terrain difficulties. ) and other IX TCC, commanded by Maj. Gen. Paul L. Williams, and aug by 3S Group and 46 Group, was to transport parachute mncntcd an to
Britisl' glider tr(K)ps and equipment and to c(fcct aerial resupply American forces. lime advanced command post, establishe(1
and at I: astcote, England, was used by the air commanders concerned as
headquarters, from which point all activities were directed
combined final decisions as to route, air cover, and weather were made by General I; rcrcton through his G-3, Brig. Gen. Ralph F. Stcarley, Eastcote. Combined IIcadquarters at e(x)r(linatcd through All

After an initial study of the capabilities of IX TCC, with application in hand, a coordinating to the problem conference was called of all involved, with a view to forming the! air and airborne commanders tactical plan. At this meeting the over-all problem was studied and all commanders voiced their opinions. Selection of staging airfields was based on the then location of troop fields, distance from target areas, tactical composition of airs carrier
4

PlansIX

of

Troop

Carrier

Command

erne

for marshaling gliders, and location units, suitability of supplies

for emergency resupply missions to airborne troops. Airborne troop to coincide with the tactical air formation desired units were made up by the troop carrier forces. A few exceptions were made from the desired by IX TCC, when mainactual number of aircraft per serial desired number for the air serial would have meant poor
taining the tactical composition on the ground. Troop carrier routes. -Routing troop carrier aircraft was based of following factors: n the

for IX TCC and RAF units. patterns balloon areas in United Kingdom.
Inner artillery zone and 3. Enemy antiaircraft and searchlight batteries. 4. Traffic control 6. Choice of prominent, irregular coast line for making distance over hostile territory. Shortest 7.
tlortll, traveling over enemy territory from the coast to the

Shortest distance to target area with consideration given to i. features. prominent terrain

Avoidance of clog-leg turns over water. 5.

landfall.

It was decided to choose two routes to the target area: one to the
target area;

friendly territory from the coast t he other to the south, traveling over held by our own forces. This was
done and through a corridor to improve the flexibility in the execu-
t,r) provide greater security and By simultaneous use of both routes, trc()p joie of the whole plan. It forces were subjected to a minimum of ground fire and caused
carrier divert aircraft over a far greater area to cover both courses.
t he enemy to t'roof of the advisability of such a plan was seen on I) plus I when, impassable by weather, the with the southern route rendered northern Way was unaffected. Navigational and types of navigational aids were aids. -Location in the same manner as for night operations. Even though ticlcctc(l t leis was a daylight mission, the problem of navigation was to be made For security reasons is silliple as possible. each site was given a code
Hanle. Call signs were assigned to the site. Tests and analyses of
in an effort toward navigational sites were made perfect performance. At the wing assembly points were Eureka beacons, M/F beacons, Aids of this nature : ill(] searchlight cones. were used to great advan-
t: lgc as rendezvous points for group and serial formations, and as wing Departure points 'lcparturc Points. on the English coast, where

North Sca crossings, were equipped with Eurek

serials started their beacons, M/F beacons, flashing the assigned code letter
and occults Along the routes and approximately halfway between friendly an(' enemy coasts were stationed two marker boats. Each of
these cai icd a Eureka beacon and a green holophane light, scn(ling the
a r do letter. These boats, serving as definite fixes over th signed co Water, contributed greatly to the accuracy of arrival times over targe
Since Holland was enemy-held, landfall on the Dutch
coax areas. by dead reckoning, plus special radar equipment in lea' was made Prior

force's arrival at drop zones (DZ) to the main aircraft. an

landing zones (I. %), pathfinder teams established
Eureka beacon'
M/F beacons, panels, and colorcel smoke. These
navigational ai44 for identification individual I)%'s and Lis, as well as fe served of homing purlx, scs for serial leaders. From the boat markers pat Lc finder crews located the target arras by means of special rad. equipment. "ironing. -'l'iming lowing factors: of troop carrier aircraft based on the fd was

fa

To provide safe intervals between serials. 1. 2. To provide for the shortest possible column time length.
To allow sufficient time on ground for servicing aircraft an between missions. resting combat crews To gain best advantage from clement of surprise. 4.

To put parachute troops in enough ahead of gliders to sccutr, 5. LZ's. glider

6. To have a special number of gliders in as early as possible aft&. in order to provide troops with early artillax, parachutists support.

To have parachute scrips spaced 4 minutes head to head arric . )1 head to hea(1. glider serials 7 minutes Timing schedules used clock time and were based on EI-hour, I I-hour was changed because of weather or operational rcasollt< case A quick calculation then could be made to obtain times over turnip t'1 initial point (II'), and drop and release times. points,
altitudes.

regard to avoiding smalb, were chosen with -Altitudes , for drops an t fire, heavy antiaircraft fire, minimum safe altitude arms frog in with those returning releases, and clearance of aircraft coming the target area:

Altitude:
DL'S
...................................
LZ's ....................................
Out .................................... Back ...................................
Speeds flown. -

feetMMSL 500 500 feet AISL 1,500 feet MSL

3,000 feet NISI,

Parachute aircraft 140 m. p. h. IAS ............................ Pathfinder aircraft 151)m. P. h. IAS ............................ Aircraft towing gliders 120 M. p. 11.LAS ..................
. ..... Parachute aircraft from IP to I)Z 12o in. p. h. IAS ............... All aircraft returning 150 in. p. h. IAS .........................
Corrected speeds were given 2 hours prior to each mission, after final

had been received. Finds and altimeter settings

Rope drop. -Glider tugs were instructed to drop ropes in prcdedrop zones common to all aircraft on return after release. , ri1ined dropped its rope immediately Icll tug after clearing the LZ, thus :, kilitating rope recovery. Pay loads.-The following maximum pay loads were established for

1eoperation:
Parachute aircraft ............................
I lorsa gliders ................................
(Waco) gliders CG-4A .......................
'j'ug
aircraft .................................
5,850 Ills6, goo Ills.
3,750 nil. Ills.

aircraft were to fly in 9-plane vee of vices -Parachute t serials up to 45 aircraft, in trail, with 4-minute intervals head to The formation for between serial lead aircraft. "'ail glider columns is pairs of pairs, echeloned to the right, serials I'll to 4S aircraft
, in trail, with 7-minute intervals between lead
Wing gliders serial These intervals and formation tcraft. patterns provided for sullictlt maneuverability of columns and gave excellent concentration to lratroops and gliders on the ground in the target area. Iii determining the formations to be used, every effort was made to `cp the column time length at a illinitlnum to insure the greatest from fighter escort and permit the 11Cfit shortest time over enemy Since the operation was to take rritory. by daylight, it place was intervals, beyond lssible to tighten the formation the nlltlllllutll t; lblished for night missions, to 4 minutes head to head between lead aircraft in paratroop formations rial and to 7 minutes head to Besides 'Zd between glider formations. shortening the intervals, formations.
7

the planners established three parallel streams to the target region

LZ's A left-hand to DL'S from and in the Arnlielr strcanl went IP for vicinity British Ist Airborn(I with and equipment paratroops

the

IP to DZ': in the center stream were the aircraft LZ's in the neighborhood Nijmegen and with paratroops an of Division; troops of the United tatcs 82d Airborne and th
glider take aircraft to DL's and LZ's in the Eind
right-hand stream was to Division;

the fly from to

lioven area with paratroops and glider troops of the

United State
Each of the outside lanes
was I% Haile' Airborne Division. Ioist from the center stream. A fourth channel was provided for aircraf P and 46 Groups, which were to take the center stream at , )o(
of ( fcct grcatcr altitude.
ct grcatcr

Emergency landing fields. -Arrangcnunts made for

timer were in operation in East gcncy landing strips by notifying airdromes all France and it, I3cf Anglia, as well as landing strips in northwestern East Anglian airdromes IX TCC contrc gium. specifically under
: rc v crc at Chipping Evasive action.

-In

Burclianl. Ungar and Borcliani. Ungar insure c)rdcr

tration on the groun(l for and gli(iers, combat crews wer to take no, evasive action between the IP and the Dl's and LZ's. F, rilrrrc to release or drop. was the responsibility of wing -III, -It group commanclcrs to cnforcc the policy that no paratroops or gli(ler be rcturnctl to staging airfiehls, that all paratroops must I)' were to drc, ppcd and all gliders released in the target region.
for troop carrier forces
and airbornc troo}i Air cover. cover -Air by the United States Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, any was provided

to paratroops

the

lllaXlnlunl

Ix)ssll-)Ie cc)ncen

by RAF's Air Defense of Great Britain

Force
specific

Second Tactical Ai (ADGB),

Bomber and
Command.

TAP), Coastal (2d

assignments were:

Coillnland,

Tim

Eighth

flak from IFS V' of and neutralization I)%'s and LZ's, and resupply to airborne troops On I) plus 1. for airborne troops aftc Ninth Air Force and :!d TAF-Air cover I drop. Air Force-Escort

from landfall to IP's. flak neutralization AUGB-Escort and Coastal Command-Diversionary missions. bombing Bomber Command-Diversionary missions and installations. enemy

TAF-Photo 2d 8

reconnaissance of target areas.

Allied agencies, air, procedure. -All artillery control informed of the detailed flight plait of the ground, and sea, were Orders were issued to all Allied troops in the troop carrier columns. fire on any aircraft until vicinities of the routes and targets not to further notice.

Antiaircraft

Narrative

Intention

ofthe
and

Operation

Plan

un(ICrtakell

TI

II: airborne intentions the

operation

was planned and

Supreme Commander of the

for the

to iinplenlent drive itito

I Ic had given first priority (; rrmany. to the advance The First Allied Group of Armies across the Rhine. in cooperation was to act bridgehead was scarred Group the Northern with lower Rhine. across the

the Northern of Airborne Arilly Armies of until

'hie supply situation rcyuircd that operations be held to a nlinitllutl,

Seventh American Armies while
fronts of the First1'hird, and or the Nortlicrn Group of Armics, aided by the FAAA, struck northward the As has been lxinted out, the intention was to place airborne troop, in a posit ion to seize vital bridges across the three principal Dutch

in the line of advance of the British Second Army from its

rivers bridgehead across the Escaut Canal. 'l'hc Guards Armoured Divi.
British XXX Corps and was sion was to spearhead the attack of the b passed northward through a corridor established by the airborne to landings. his forces across the At the time, the enemy was withdrawing holding both its banks, was bringing troop Scheldt estuary while still Canal to positions in the line farther cast, the Escaut around north of his positions in the Dutch ports to prevent im and was maintaining however, his forces had Allied supply situation.
proverncnt of the badly depleted and broken up in the battle of the Normand)'
been in the in the retreat across the Seine, so that enemy troops pocket and line of the British Second Army's advance
were not thought to Con-
formidable stitute a
The A.
I ()

military
force

force.

was commanded British Airborne by U. Gen. with Frederick General Troops,

task airborne M. Browning, (; 0C

Once the aircommanding the air phase of the operation. borne troops were on the ground, General Browning came under the the XXX Corps, part of General I)empsey's British command of Second Army. The principal missions of the several units of the task force follow: United States ioist Airborne Division to capture bridges and the the route between Eindhoven and Grave; the United States roads along 82d Airborne Division to seize the bridges over the Maas at Grave Waal at Nijmegen; the the British ist Airborne Division, and over the Polish Parachute Brigade, to capture the bridges at together with Arnhem. In each case the surrounding area was to be held until the Guards Armoured Division could effect a junction, upon the accolllof which the airborne troops were to protect the sides of plishnlent The British 52d Light Division (Air-portable) was to the corridor.

Ilrereton

the Arnhem vicinity as soon as an air strip could be prepared cone into by the airborne engineers. It is axiomatic that surprise is an essential element in the success of To make the enemy believe that the Allied an, airborne attack. too acute to enable an advance by the Northern situation was supply Group of Armies, the cavalry patrols of the XXX Corps were withdrawn as much as 10 miles in some instances. At the same time the First and Third Armies made attacks into Germany and American Moselle in order to mislead the enemy as to Allied intenacross the Meanwhile troops and supplies were being concentrated in the tions. large bridgehead which the British Second Army held on the north Albert Canal ready for the thrust to the north. bank of the

RAF -Starts
1)_d, y to 1) phis i. -The first Now in cooperation was struck by the
a onlbcr Command the night of 16-17 September. The four
RAF Leeuwarden, Steenwijk-Havclte, I Iopsten, and Salsbergen,
at airfields fighters were in a position from which to attack the transports bohlbed by 200 Lancastcrs were and 2.3 Mosquitoes, which gliders, 89o tons. The same command dropped sohle bombed a flak position Lancastcrs and 5 Mosquitoes, Moerdijk with 54 dropping 294 tons. at Lancastcrs were lost. Results in instances were relxirtcd to Two 5 -111 force of 6 1B-17's next morning be good. A small the bombed the Eindhoven airfields with good results.
li 11 llli:
i i 11

and

45

.--.

English bases favorable. Overland fog at the weather was by 09(X) and the stratus at 8cx) feet by 1030. Over the North cleared Sea the weather was fine, and, though there was 5/IO to 8/io cloud Continent, the bases were above 2,500 feet and visibility was over the to 6 miles. 4 In the hour and one-half from 1025 to 1155 Sunday morning, 17 September, the greatest troop carrier fleet ill history took off. ApElements of
divisions became airborne. proximately olle-half of 3 British ist Airborne Division and corps headquarters, with their
the lifted from the Newbury region by 145 United States equipment, were I)-(ay British and 4 American gliders towed by 358 parachute aircraft and 354 . British tugs. The tr(x)ps of the American joist Airborne Divisions,
from the same area, were transported ill 124 United States coming .
United States gliders towed by American
parachute aircraft and 7o From the vicinity of Granthalll came elements of the Unitc, l
tugs. States Std Airlx, rnc Division in 4Mo United States parachute aircraft American gliders towed by United States tugs. The tot, and 51) il
i force, including the pathfinder aircraft that led the way
to each drop
landing zone being
used that day, was made 111) f 1,544 iirp1aneti and o The streams of aircraft converged toward East and 47S gliders. Anglia and passed over the North Sea. At the coast 2 trains were formed. The planes carrying the British ist Division and the Unite(] States 82d Division followed a route over the Dutch island of Schouwell to the W at Boxtcl, where a turn to the left brought them to their drop landing zones. The planes of the foist Division followed zones and a friendly territory from Ostend to the 11)at Ghccl, southern route over where tile}' also turned left to their objectives. Air c(xlperation was of four kinds: fighters provided escort and withdrawal cover; fighters provided an umbrella landing zones; fighters undertook antiflak and tackcd flak positions. the drop cover over bombers atpatrol;

Since the northern route lay over enemy territory from the coast to the southern course did so only after the initial the objectives, whereas
northern route. most of the antiflak operations were A force of 821 B-17's of the Eighth Air Force dropped 3,139 tons on fair, and 50 poor results. They 117 flak positions with 43 good, 24 by In daylight wcrc escorted 153 P-51's. 85 Lancasters and
a mission

Ixlint,

along

the

Mosquitoes 15
12

dc-
RAF Bomber Command bombed 3 coastal of the

I' J

fense batteries in the Walcheren area, Escort was provided by 5.3 Spitfires. results.
A force of 550 Eighth escort fires, about Ninth Air

dropping

533 "'I's

with

goo(l

Force P-47's, P-38's, and P--5 I's performed SpitTetllpests, AI)C; IB contribute(1 371 patrols. and antiflak in the ratio of Mosquitoes route, allocated and on the northern The Go per cent to escort and 4o per cent to antiflak patrols. Force gave umbrella cover over the (trop and landing zones Air as air cooperation

fighters. with 1G4) What may he regarded

troops with the airborne itself, was given by 84

rather than with the operation on the ground, TAF, I; ostons, and Mitehclls Mosquitoes, which attacked bar_
of 2d Three aircraft Ede. Nijmegen, Cleve, Arnhem, and were
racks at lost on these missions.
The thorough flak positions was very successful.
Not coverage of land batteries knocked but several flak Ships and barges only were out, islands were smashed. No British troop carrier the Netherlands off aircraft or gliders were lost, but 35 American troop carrier aircraft and destroyed. i"; American gliders were

Luftwaffe
reaction to this hesitant. great airborne operation was (In a later section of this booklet the over-all enemy air reaction is ) Approximately Focke Wulf 19o's, which engaged (Iiscussed. iS one group of Eighth Air Force fighters near Wesel, were the only enemy Of these, 7 were shot down for the loss aircraft encountered. of I United States fighter. Most of the other losses of the cooperating air forces were to flak. Losses for the Air Defense of Great Britain, (lay: Ninth Air Force, 1; Eighth Air Force lighters, 17; Eighth Air Force o; I oml)crs, 2. The 2 great trains of transports and gliders bearing the airborne forces reached their drop and landing zones on schedule. In all, 335
British aircraft with 323 gliders, 1,044 American aircraft, and 1o8
United States gliders got through to their objectives. The drops were be excellent, the planes flying low and in close formation rcportc(1 to into the prescribed zones. Gliders to put their paratroops exactly landings well, arlcl the fields were rapidly also were seen to make their for the following aircraft. cleared '! 'hose
elements

Veghel and Eindhoven very quickly consolidated their posibCIWCen had been set up in St. tion. By nightfall the divisional headquarters

of

the

IOist

Division

which

dropped

and

landed

14

Oedenrode, and Veghel to the north and Zoil to the south hat! been Another force was pushing by small detachments. occupied southBest. The bridge over the Willlelmina Canal south toward westward 'Lon was found destroyed but a crossing was soon made on an inlof bridge, and by last light this force had reached Bokt. provised The Guards Armoured Division was pushing up from the south Jumping off at 1400, by nightfall they
against stiff resistance. 6 miles below Eindhoven. The next morning
Valkenswaard, held Aalst, which was by-passed to the was encountered at resistance Junction was made with elements of the 101st Division at west. By in the village at Nieuw Acht, northwest 4 Lindhovcn. 1100 had occupied Eindhoven and the Guards Armoured noon the 1oIst The latter entered the city during in the southern outskirts. were the evening. fell to the elements of the Division with which Initial success also headquarters landed. Browning's corps By the first evening General Maas at Grave and over the Maas-Waal Canal at bridges over the the had been taken intact, while the high ground southeast of Heumen Nijmegen was occupied, as well as that south and southwest of Grocsforce had pushed into the city of Nijmegen and approached beck. One bridge over the Waal, taking 100 prisoners.
end of the road south the just south of Nijillegeil. The
Corps headquarters was established

82d

Maas-Waal Canal at Hatert was found bridge over the Malden had been blown up by the enemy. that at

damaged

and

Enemy

Strikes

Back

German forces in the Reichswald to the east soon made their The known and the following morning a severe counterattack Presence from this direction. A call for air power to launched dcalaid in was threat was sent out, and a force of 97 Spitfires and Musiiig with this TAF was dispatched to the area. tangs of 2d increasing German Meanwhile, under pressure on Nijmegen from had approached the troops which the south end of the bridge the cast, Waal were forced by afternoon to retire to the center of the across the September During the (lay of i8 many more prisoners were city. by night being i, ooo. the total taken, dropped British ist Airborne Division, The and landed west of resistance stern into ran almost immediately. The ist Para-
Arnhem,

Z3 to%

S^ 15

Brigade succeeded in reaching the north end of the road bridge

chute over the Neder Rijn, but was unable to wrest it from German forces at

the
South

end.

lift went in on D plus i. It 1) plus i to D phis 2. second air -The had been planned to use both northern and southern routes again, but it tt"aSdecided to send the planes in by the northern route only because Belgium toward rain and thick cloud were spreading northward across The take-off was between 1000 and 1100 under the area of operations. 8/10 cloud with bases between 2,000 and 3,000 feet, but concli_ 5/10 to improved as the North Sea was crossed, and over the target areas lions the weather was clear.
both
aircraft troops, was and airborne The headquarters the Polish to that sent out on I)-day. similar of Brigade and resupply for the British Division carried in 126 were ist United States and 35 British parachute Troops of the ist Di_ aircraft. The in Vision Went in 2(y) British gliders towed by British tugs. The American forces were transported had gone in gliders, since all parachute units in on I)-day. The 82d and foist Divisions American 904 employed Of the total force
of 1,356 planes and 1,203 gliders,
tugs and giidcrs. 1,3(Ii of the former and 1,152 of the latter reached the drop and landing
Zones. Two British tugs and 2 British gliders were lost, along with 20 American Later in the day 252 American aircraft and i9 gliders. Eighth Air Force Ii-24"s were dispatched to drop supplies to the airtroops; 246 of them 782 tons with good to excellent They were protected by 183 P-47's, P-38's, and P-51's of the results. Eighth Air Force. Thirteen bombers were lost to flak. by Air Defense hic escort for the troop borne dropped force dispatched,

carriers was provided of (; real Britain and the Eighth Air Force. `These forces also dispatched Tempests,
knock out flak Spitfires,
fighters to strafe and positions, 277 Mustatigs, Mosquitoes former and 415 I )-47's and P-51's and the

of
in

the

iattcr

Air Force fighters Losses in escorting fighters to some (p Mcsscrschmitts. encountered Eighth Air Force, 28; ADGB, 6. all c:luscs were:
mulch

e1111>loyeol these stronger than on the preceding

being

operations.

Enemy

of

reaction

was,

day; Eighth

I)iv-ision, elements of that organization and of the Guards Arnloure(l Zon was The bridge at I)iv-ision were pushing northward. rapidly reSeptember the
By o8.30 on the morning of 19 to carry tanks. paircd

As the I) plus i reinforcements

in the area of the were arriving

101st

Guards reached Grave, where

j(,

junction

the 82d was made. By

with

the advance armoured i8oo By 1415 the XXX Canal.

Browning his headquarters at

elements were crossing

Corps commander

shelle(l. land in Zone "0" to the west of Nijmegen gliders junction with the Guards, the 504th Infantry the
The

rroops Nijmegen. south of of the Division were still in the center of town. There was continued presfrom the vicinity of the Reichswald, and Groesbeck being sure Because a message back requesting that the of this was sent

had

the joined

Maas-Waal

General

Sid

was

1) plus Before on Parachute Regiment

bridge over the Maas-Waal Canal Nccrbosch.

had captured the south of
deteriorated Division be-
the British ist Airborne of situation I) plus i and 1) plus The ist Parachute the air missions of tween Brigade held a position near the north end of the road bridge, but beisolated and was subject to severe attack. Later the came completely Air Landing Brigade was almost cut off near the river bank south of ist The rest of the division was engaged in heavy fighting Verbrink. west Arnhem. of

Weather
I) plus 2 to D plus 3. -Poor

Interferes
weather of zy September cut down the
H-hour until 2500. The aircraft which in reaching their objectives and many

effort and postponed airborne had great difficulty took off The meteorologists back. recommended the northern route, turned but it was not used because it was feared that a third mission in sucinto disastrous flak. Supplies for this course would run cession on Division Airborne in British aircraft British were dispatched ist the Polish Brigade in British troops of the gliders towed by British and Of 6o aircraft taking off to resupply the `i2(i Division, only ;6 planes. destinations. Reinforcements their were sent to the joist
reached in 385 aircraft Only 213 of each arrived.
Division and 385 gliders. 'T'wenty-five planes and 97 gliders were listed as lost or missing, with abortive. the remainder

Spitfires of ADGB Escort consisted of 127 and lit Mustangs of the Air Force. Severe flak was encountered between the 11' Eighth and drop and landing zones. The enemy also put up strong fighter the Eighth Air Force fighters formations. met more than j25 Me zcx)'s FW z)o's. Their claims were 23 destroyed, z probably destroyed, and Nine P-5z's were lost. damaged. and 4 The late afternoon of 19 September and all day 20 September saw

17

fighting for the town of Nijmegen and the crucial bridge

over severe The plan of attack was for the 504th Parachute Infantry Waal. the Regiment to make an assault crossing of the river and attack the
bridge while the Guards Armoured Division attacked
north end of the Other units of the 82d Division were to aid in the drive This plan was carried out with Nijmegen to the bridge. through in the face of murderous German fire from great skill and courage an fort on the north bank of the river. By nightfall the bridge had old been taken. Why the enemy did not destroy it when his position it frontally. became hopeless is not known. Farther south, the enemy infiltrated from the west and was with difficulty across the narrow corridor back to Schijndel. pressed Fighting was eery stiff at Best, which the airborne troops had not sucin capturing. The British 43d Infantry Division was nlovitig ceeded behind the Guards Armoured Division. up By morning of 20 September the situation of the British ist Airborne
Division was serious. Most of the in the D plus 2 lift had supplies fallen into hands. The men of the ist Parachute Brigade, Who enemy had stubbornly dominated the the bridge for 3 days, north end of finally lost control it at noon of 20 September. The main body of the city was also under extreme enemy pressure from both
vest of east and west. About 25 Luftwaffe planes strafed the British troops
The divisional commander reported that he was forming a close perimeter defense around the village of Hartestein. After bitter fighting the ist Air Landing Brigade carved its way back defensive zone. The ferry at Heveadorp was still under the
to this division's control, and the main road bridge was reported intact. The
Polish Parachute Brigade commander requested that the troops of the be dropped on 20 September just to the south of the river near the Heveadorp ferry. terminus of the impossible the transport 1) plus I to D plus 4. Weather made C )f Polish parachutists to a drop zone on 20 September as planned, and flown. There was low stratus cloud over
only resupply missions were in the Channel there was morning haze be-
England in the morning; bases 2,000 to 3,000 to Io/I0 cloud in the afternoon, with Coining 7/10 feet, Visibility I to 2 Miles. On the afternoon over the target areas there in haze. The south6/Io to 8/Io cloud with visibilities i to 2 miles was British and 350 American aircraft took In all, 163 crn route was used.
IS

during

the day.

It

Official

Magi" I'1i11tn
(; arricr

(; cn. Paul

L. Williams,

Commanding
Command.

Gcr: cril,

Ninth

'I'r(x)l)

19

losses of 331 respectively reached their objectives with off, and 162 and Flak in the Arnhem region, where tlic 14 and o respectively. intense and accurate. Most of the British were resupplying, was very Division reached the enermly. dropped to the ist Airborne supplies ADGB, of which 3 were lost, and 679 of Escort was by 248 fighters of failed to return. No enemy aircraft were Eighth Air Force, 5 of which The Ninth Air Force had 43 P-47's on uneventful Patrol encountered. battle area in the late afternoon. over the

Division Guards Armoured September the On the morning of 21 Division British 43d Infantry were making a de" and elements of the lian(licap resistance and under the of termined effort against stern By Division. Airborne beleaguered heavy rains to reach the ist eve. `
forward had pressed several miles toward the Necler
units ning the forces in Arnhem from the Vaal and had brought Rijn the enemy fire. The Germans were continuing stiff counterattacks under artillery the Nijmegen on from area Reichswald.

Reinforcement
The

Impossible

Division can only he British ist Airborne situation of the It had been impossible to reinforce it
termed extremely critical. Polish Brigade. Division Headquarters had no news of thet
with the Parachute Brigade, and heavy casualties were being suffered by
Ist body. Rations were one for three men. The enemy suc. the main Heveadorp ferry from September in wrenching control of CCCdedon 21 the British troops. September the weather played 1) Plies 4 to 1) plies 5.-Again on 21 Low stratus persisted over eastern England until the enemy's game. made possible the attelnpte(l! aftcrn(x)n, when slight half the Polish Parachute Brigade and the most translx, rt of about No glider tows were tried because of the, urgently needed supplies. Again the southern course was taken. One 11rIn miserable weather. American British aircraft carrying supplies and 177 air-
tired nineteen Of
and supplies took off under escort. craft carrying paratroops British and 128 United States planes Completed their misthese, 114 latter were lost before tile}' but :9 of the former and 4 of the sions, So and 10o enemy fighters Between friendly territory. could return to by some of tile` These were engaged in wait for Allied aircraft. were Mosquitoes of ADGI3 escorting the! Spitfires, Mustangs, and j320

improvement

Halifaxes, and by some Of tile 95 I"-47'-s and I)-51's

Stirlings and C-47's. Twenty of the enemy were shot down and 4 the guarding Four P-47's were lost. damaged. were for the ist Airborne Division was a little brighter The outlook on September because air resupply had been of 22 the morning because about goo men of the Polish Brigade and accomplished Neder Rijn, where they had dug in along the just south of the were bank of the river and were standing off assaults from the cast and south The previous day's rains had made the going for tanks inisouth. highways; accordingly, the 43d Infantry Division off the main possihle Guards Armoured Division, held up at Elst. The through the passed Arnhem had gathered a strong fighting force German commander at from the miscellaneous elements at his disposal. f 15,000 to 20,000 men 0, the main British force was mercilessly shelling and mortaring This by attacking from all sides, was slowly compressing the body and, Division defense zone. German loud-speakers of the ist perimeter demanding surrender of the British forces, which into action, went fought doggedly on.
far in the rear, the Germans were keeping their pressure Meanwhile, heavy fighting Best. the corridor; continued at western side of on the Regiment launched Infantry Parachute an attack toward The 5o6th Division Headquarters the Joist Infantry of was moved Wintelre. The British iith Armoured to Uden. Oedenrode and north from st. Infantry 3d Helmond. toward 5 to D plus 6. -Bad D plus Divisions were moving up the right flank of the corridor

weather went to worse; on 22 September Until 1400 there was cloud less than were possible. at air operations no English bases, with much the feet over the same conditions preooo I, battle region all day. There were patches over the of stratus vailing Sea at 300 to 6oo feet. Despite these conditions, North the to over during the day at Oosterbeek. f,-W 1go's were seen September the advance of the Guards of 22 On the afternoon Division being
along the main roads toward Arnhem ArinoUred was Elst, but elements of the 43d Division had by-passed this
held up at had made contact to the west and the Polish Brigade with resistance A ferry service was put into IDriel at 2016. Oosteroperation at near September, and a few Polish troops crossed heck the night of 22-23 day this ferry The following was reported destroyed by with supplies.
21

Even though friendly forces were near, the plight of the the enemy. better. Subjected to attack by tanks Division was no Airborne ist had come up during the afternoon of the 22d, by self-propelled which by mortars, the unit stubbornly maintained its perimeter guns, and defense. Some help was being given by friendly artillery, which w. -IS A report from the German positions from across the river. shelling Dutch resistance movement speaks of a group of Welsh, together with few Poles, being surrounded and wiped out at Oosterbeek on 23 a September. 82d Division was buttressing its position by clear.
the ink; out the enemy from the bend of the Waal to the east toward
Farther
clown the corridor, the enemy made a sharp attack
Erlckom. from the east with 30 tanks and 2 battalions of infantry on the after-
For the second time since the junction of the Guards of the 22d. At Nijmegen The the supply corridor was cut. Germans reached the main road between Uden and Veghel and Were The Gu: to maintain their position until the next morning. able irds
Armoured started southwest from their position near Nijmegen
when with the attack was launched, and the next morning they succeeded in forcing the enemy to withdraw, thus clearing the supply channel ag, iln. 1) Phis r to 1) p1115 largest airborne program since D plus 7.-The i The weather, wlllch I) plus 6,23 September. was carried through on had been Wretched for 4 days, improved in the morning over England in the aftcrn(x)n over the Continent. The opportunity was Seizcd
and to send trcx, ps and supplies to the hard-pressed ist Airborne Division
lifts to the 82d and Joist Divisions. One
and the remaining glider hundred twenty-three British Stirlings and Dakotas transported the
be parachuted to theist Division. None of these aircraft was
supplies to but 12 were lost in the battle area. The drop itself
was not alx, rtive, a by the and supplies were recovered success; most of the ammunition Forty-one American aircraft dropped the Polish parachutists enemy. While this
Drop Zone "K" on the south bank of the Neder Rijn. at drop was rclx, rted to be successful, 7 of the aircraft were lost. -rlac
for the 82d and 101st Divisions took 490 American tugs :and missions but only 1 Thirty-eight of these missions were abortive, air-' gliders. lost. The landing of the 325th Glider Infantry. craft and i glider were 82(1 Division was highly successful. Regiment at Grave to reinforce the forces was furnished by 123 fighters Escort for these large .airborne Armoured the 82d Division,

22

the Eighth Air Force. The Luftwaffe

reacted and 586 of than on any previous day; Eighth Air Force planes net more strongly fighters, of which 8 were claimed destroyed, some 135 enemy 2 probdestroyed, and 6 damaged. The ADGB
cncountcred no enemy ably but lost 2 Spitfires to flak. Total losses of the Eighth Air planes, P-47's and
11 P-51's. Force were 11 ADGB of

Corridor Made Firm

the road axis by the enemy showed the cutting of Allied policy, begun about that time and continued in the of wisdom days, of widening Units the corridor from the
bottom. the succeeding Corps were fed in behind Corps and
began VIII the XXX of the The lotst Division the shoulders on either side. out came
pushing Corps on 24 September, the VIII of and was
under
the command farther Veghcl.
up to protect the sides of the corridor above moved Sepwas started on the evening counterattack Another enemy of 23 Erp on the cast toward from the direction Veghcl, but was of tember By the next noon Erp was repo, ted cleared of the enemy.
repulsed. The 22 September

Royal Netherlands Brigade came into the Allied At this time the battle and was assigned to hold the line near Grave. Farther order of 82d had succeeded in pushing its front line eastward to include up, the bend of the Waal, but the enemy still held
positions close to
all the the southeast. On the morning of the 24th, the 82d glad
Nijmegen on being the first airborne unit to c nter a town distinction of, on
the the village
of Beck.
German soil, In the crucial areas north and south of the Neder Rijn \vest of Allied forces were waging a desperate struggle to link up. Arnhem, Polish troops, Who had parachuted Approximately 36o on 21 and 2
September, crossed the river the night of the 23d, but were able to
take with them only such ammunition and supplies as they could carry backs. Ferrying by daylight Was impossible, their since German on had the crossing under fire. To the south of the Polish Briartillery firm link with troops d there was a of the I, otl, brigade, 4_;
gade had pressed around Flst Iivision, which to the
west and approached
banks of the river. the On the far shore of the river the battered elements the ist Airof borne Division still remaining holding were grimly 'heir out.
2.

had been further 1crimcter

strong supporting artillery hope that succor was near. September weather stringently
D plus 7 to D phis 8.-Again on 24 Rain and low cloud prevailed over Britain in
limited air operations. Only the nlost battle area in the afternoon. tlhe morning and over the of 46 Group essential missions were carried out. (RAF) based in Belgium took off to drop supplies west of Arnhetl,. Two did not drop their cargoes and the two which did saw no ground drop zone. All four were
damaged by flak. Seventeen signals in the Fifteen
the 82d Division. resupplied
dropped their bundles, and two landed on the strip which had been
Grave. Thirty-six Spitfires furnished uneventful i. rcparcd west of I )akotas Belgium Division,
the ist Airborne to aid also endeavored into the Arnhem region at intervals. A sending offensive patrols Typhoons equipped with rockets performed special group of 22 a indicated they were close c(x)pcration mission, and ground reports rover.
Second TAF based in Four Dakotas

but they were heartened by compressed,

fire from the southern bank and by
the

infantry. effective against enemy mortars and During the night of 24-25 September small elements of the 130th Brigade crossed the Neder Rijn in boats and, together with about 40 Polish tr(i)ps already on the far side, joined in the defense of the During the (lay the
held by the ist Airborne Division. perimeter Air Force strafed the troops. A decision was reached
on the (; ennan the Neder Rijn was morning of the 25th that the position north of in the face of such formidable supply and reinforcement
untenable difficulties. Plans were made to withdraw the troops of the ist Air-
borne Division that night under the protection of the newly arrived fresh forces. Below the Neder Rijn the situation was improving as Elst had finally beet, Nijmegen bridge. more tr(x, ps got across the late in the afternoon of 24 September and the corridor had been taken considcrabiy widened to the west. By morning of the 25th the 82(1 had consolidated its positions in lend of the Vaal to the cast and was pushing back the enemy the
southeast of

Ni

megen.

from the south was attacked for the third time in I he supply road This time the thrust, which Was late afternoon of 24 September. the _4

from the west. Not only was the in some strength, came road cut but the enemy Veghel and St. Oedenrode, l, etwecil managed to mainThere was his position astride the road for 36 hours. no trat l'ic tain highway on 25 September. all on the it

the weather on 25 September was D plus 8 to D plus 9.-Although favorable than on the preceding day, there were more generally bases i, ooo to 2,000 feet over the Channel with cloud anal the showers American planes were dispatched on reThirty-four 1-Polland area. Division. There were no aircraft aborto the 101st supply missions lost. Escort, 6o Spitfires of AllGB, losses suffered no and none tive
made no claims.
,ind TAF came to the aid of the troops near Arnhem. In 2 missions 2d Typhoons strafed enemy guns and troops around the defense $evcn Mitchells and 21 Bostons bombed guns and morwhile 53 perimeter, A good concentration was achieved and a blockhouse was tars. Escort was flown by 96 Spitfires and Mustangs of
knocked out. These formations were attacked by 12 F\V i9o's, part of a
AI)GI;. in the neighborhood. Apparently loo enemy aircraft force of about in the enemy formations were bombers attacking other aircraft the bridge, since some 40 were reported by the ground Nijmegen the The bridge, although hit by i have dropped on that target. forces to From the ensuing combats bctwccl, tile l, c,l, lb, remained passable. forces, 2 Mitchells, I Boston, and 2 fighters were lost, (Il)posing air the enemy were 16 aircraft destroyed, i probably claims against and damaged. destroyed, and i9

British Withdrawn
the battered men of the ist Airborne of The planned withdrawal during the night of 24-25 September. was accomplished Division troops groped their way through enemy lines across Roughly 2,000 fire, to the bank, where fields, under constant river most of
tuddy in assault boats and barges and on rafts. Some swans them crossed Upon reaching the southern bank they yards of swift water. the 150 in a drizzling before reaching the several miles rain had to walk as-
loaded
in where they were vehicles and carried back to area, se>lhly Behind them, near Arnhem, they left 1,200 wounded, Nij111egen.

25

for whose care arrangements had been made with the Germans'
The withdrawal tragic for these men, who
had fought
sol
bravely against crushing odds for 8 long days. Right
up to the endl it had seemed that relief could be accomplished, but sufficient forces I be brought up in time to cross the river by assault. Tlie not could German tactic of continuous pressure on the supply in the VCRIICII had been successful. The interdiction of this vital road for' vicinity hours beginning on the afternoon of 24 September had been
tlie' 3(,

was

that the alternatives were to withdraw the

istl Airborne Division or
leave it to a fate of gradual and inevitable eX)
doubtful distinction of continuPride, prestige, and the termination. ing a hopeless fight were not permitted to outweigh the saving Ofd I those gallant amen.

dreisive factor.

After

yoteR,

yht

aHd

left

hand

strc"aMS

each

The lout was still on. round into action on the afternoon of 25 September, attacking Iivision went The brittle was the road south of Vegliel. hard to reopen waged
the next morning, the night to a successful conclusion when
through back. However, again thrown was the road remained enemy the German artillery range and the gantlet still had to be run. within the 82d Division a successful push to the northwest In the sector of September in which had been made on 20 the town of Oss had been
Now the 82d was advancing in the opposite direction into captured. beyond Beek. Germany One

had been lost, but

the battle

the afternoon of 26 September two important British D plus 9.-On flown to the air strip west of Grave. The weather, nonunits were in the morning over Holland, by afternoon. The cleared operational
2

Light Antiaircraft Battery and the

Airborne Forward Delivery ist Airfield Group were carried in by 209 C-47's. There
were no abortive }Manes and no losses. The assignments of the transported units were
handle air freight at the Grave strip and to protect it against enemy
to Escort was furnished by 182 fighters of ADGB and 100
aircraft. fighters of the Eighth Air Force. The former encountered no enemy
losses, but those from the Eighth engaged aircraft and suffered no 50 Me icxj s and FW i)n's in combat, claiming 32-1-8 for a loss of 2 United States planes.
During the day 2d TAF had some 25o Typhoons, Mustangs,
111(l Spitfires in the Arnhem area on armed reconnaissance and in direct They encountered cooperation. Mustang lost. with
i The final phase of the operation September. Not all the remainder before, nor had the covering night 62 enemy aircraft, claiming 5_2_7,

during
the night of 2627
occurred Division
had returned the of the ist This Was troops been withdrawn.

darkness and was complete successfully accomplished under cover of I by morning of the 27th. It was decided to bring the ist
Airborne Division back to Brussels, whence it would be flown to England. The
Polish Brigade was to continue as a fighting unit under the 2d Ar11ly
and was withdrawn to the Ravenstein region.
-Anus ended an engagement rich in heroism but fraught
with
frustration.

**** *

In spite of the difficulties at Arnhern the airborne operations Itad but also with much lower loss
proceeded not only according to plan Moreover, they did much to disprove
the view that than expected. daylight airborne operations over enemy territory heavily defended by The great dividends in accuracy flak are excessively hazardous. ()f dropping and landing and in quick assembly of troops, which are to be had by daylight, were enjoyed to the full. Three Contributing factors were largely responsible for success: Strong cooperating air forces were available and were skillfully
t. knock out flak positions in advance, to beat down employed to flak (luring the airborne operations themselves, and to profrom hostile aircraft. tect the troop carriers Excellent 2. so organized the movement of troop staff by the cooperating air forces, :llld carriers, their protection work

28

drop and landing zones of troops as to achieve maximum the Large forces were placed at tactically important surprise. loss of time. points either simultaneously or with a minimum
Thorough 3. produced Weapons training and troop carrier personnel perfect accuracy in the drops and landings. almost retrieved and units rapidly formed up were quickly their initial of missions. both airborne of

for the accomplishment

D plus 2 to D plus 8 weather seriously hampered resupply

From attempts, yet on the whole they, too, were acand reinforcement It is true that higher loss rates were suffered on curately effected. days, but this had to be-and in the vas- xpected these succeeding face of increasing enemy resistance. decision to carry out a bold daylight operation was one which
The rereton alone could make. His experience as Commanding General Ninth Air Force, had convinced him that it could be done. General, testifies to his sound judgment. The success of the airborne operations

Glider Phase of the Operation

the number of personnel carried, the tonnage of supconsidering landed, and the amount of equipment transported to the battle plies This success was largely attributthe glider phase was a success. :area, FAAA and IX TCC. the careful planning of .il)le to landing, glider pilots reported upon to the nearest Innine(liately As soon as circumstances United States command post. permitted, under orders of the command were evacuated post taa Ileadthey Division Airborne Airborne or Headquarters foist quarters Kingdom. for further air evacuation to the United Division

82d

invasion of Normandy, IX TCC had been Ever since the marshaling fields under its control, at the various anticipating a commitgliders forces. On D minus 1, gliders available amounted of airborne ment They carried 9,566 troops into combat, of a total of 3o,4Mt. to 2,474. latter figure compares with 17,262 in the Normandy assault This and in the invasion of southern France. The gliders which did 7,019 not
stopped by enemy fire or by mechanical
their objectives were reach Transportation, one of the main concerns difriculty. of airborne delivered by gliders in the form of 705 14-ton trucks, was also troops, and, 45 trailers for the '-toil The bulk of
trucks. 13 1ilotorcycles,
2()

landed on D plus i, D plus 2, and D plus 3. The respect these were 11Iicle( able total of 2,476,594 pounds of equipment and supplies was Had weather and the tactical situatio by gliders during the operation. figure would have been much higher. Darin, permitted, this dispatched at the rate of about 2a mir the operation, gliders were tc D plus 6, a tears Reclaniatio, r of Gliders on the Far Shore. -After IX TCC Service Wing (Provi of officers and enlisted men of
the in the landing
zones, sional) was sent to make a survey of gliders will Followine a view to recovering and salvaging as many as possible. it was decided to construct a temporary landing strip f0
the survey, the purpose.

The terrain was such that the engineering Problems ill! filling ditches, making drains, removing volved were mainly soft installing steel matting.
The IX TCC Corps of Engiriceng earth, and the IX Engineer Command to use the 876t1;
section arranged with Engineer Aviation Airborne Battalion Sonia
to build the strip. heavy equipment of the Royal Engineers was used for earth moving

TAF to obtain 150 tong made with were Arrangements located at a depot near Bayeux. Despite dif-of square-nlesll track, )ortin fieulties in trans 1 T the mesh track, involving trucking and air freight, the landing strip was finished in i week. On 20 October
then 2d

tlic' first gliders were lifted from the strip by aircraft of the 61st Trool, I
Group. This date marked the start of glider recovery from' operations.

Carrier

the Ilollan(1

Pathfinder Activity
Both airborne and air commanders felt that pathfinders should be in the operation, but because the landings were to be made byt tiscd t daylight it was determined that a minimum number of personnel be coinjilittcd, with only enough time to set the equiht11ent
would into operation prior to the arrival of the main serials.
Final decision
was that two teams, each consisting of one officer and nine elliisrell
DZ, -o minutes before
the arrival be Collllllitte(l to each Then, would Except for one enlisted man, all these Officers of the main serials. in a combat pathfinder operation in Nor. had participated and men had volunteered for a second mission. nnandly and briefing very smooth. Pre-
Past experience made preparations and drawn rations, ainnlunition, smoke, panels, and other essentials had a"

hccn stored in the group's area for several weeks. Pilot-jumpmaster

held as soon as DZ's
were assigned; pinpoints were conferences were by jumpmasters and pilot-navigator teams; in conjunction selected field and regimental 24 hours before take-oil tinge,
(, to the base from the time first orders and all personnel were restricted Each the return of the aircraft from the mission. received until were fficer and noncommissioned officer was issued a 1/25,000 neap of
t, I)Z area, and all personnel carried copies of the i/ioo, ooo Ill. ), ) of
the No maps were marked. After 6 months of zone. the operational teams working together, the utmost confidence and co-
sir-airborne . had been achieved. The final pathfinder briefing for air ordination held at 0830,17 September following paratroops was 1944, crews and with maps, Enlisted rders. studied briefed men were all personnel proceeded to their assigned aircraft. which
2. -The assignment of these two teams drop upon and mark DZ "A" for the main effort, preceding Was to At 1040 they took followed first group by 20 minutes. off and a
the Over the Channel P-47 picked east to the coast. a course generally flight and escorted it to the coast of France. No other escort up the At a point where the British spearhead went deepest into Was seen. i and rnemy Orange territory smoke our was aircraft observed bore north and marking the and the two h. Very heavy fire'was to 18o m. p. antiaircraft speeded rc-
ships in the vicinity Patie, Belgium, of the plane carryand at 1232, ecived hit badly in the left engine and wing tank, fell flaming ing team 2, dive. Four 'chutes were seen to leave the door before into a steel) in a sheet of flame. plane crashed, exploding the The other aircraft action, continued until through very heavy flak belts, taking
110 evasive the railroad continued front line, feet. at 1,500 Mission of teams

jumpmasters

divisional

running generally east-west into was seen; at this point the pilot followed \legliel a course parallel to
the plane over the DZ, and jumped the pathfinder the tracks, slowed desired. The time the exact spot was 1244 plus 50 second:. team on No immediate enemy resistance was encountered at the 1)Z, allowing the team time to put all navigational lids, into operation in a 'cry . Because of excellent drop time. dispersion speed, short was slight, The Eureka unnecessary. assembly rendering was set up and in ill 1 minute, wilde the panel "Y' (operation and the panel letter "A" Willie more than 21 minutes. difficulty took no some was experiJI

enced
mintItes.

with

the CRN-4

antenna,

functioning this set was

within

late and dropped The first serial, due at 1304, arrived 3 minutes late, dropped \Teghel. The second and third serials, also 3 minutes 0: The Eureka and the CRN-4 were lef half of the DZ. the western No stray last serial arrived. in operation 12 minutes after the air craft were seen. Its mission complete(]-no glider ing been schedule(] for DZ "A"-the landings

drops has or resupply

team made
its pathfinder Veghel, where it established a road block in the main square wit] to buildings with three more, and two then, cleaned out a street of sc11 four to take a bridge. Friendly troops were the remaining n1e1 After the initial drive, team i was used at within 3o minutes. van local security group, prison guards, and combat patrol. ous times as
drop and 'if! SSlol!! Of teams 3 and 4. two teams were to Thar] -These , I )Z's "B" and "C" for the train effort and for subsequent glider land ings and resupply drops. The teams took off from Chalgrove airt field at 1040. Upon reaching the coast the aircraft circled twiCC t(I by teams 1 kill flew timme, then the same course taken aryl .r heavy flak as soon as they reached the enetll, I also encountered lines, and the fire Although to the drop. Continued all the way n, Sillc(t to 18o m. p. h. evasive action was taken, the planes speeded I)Z's "C" were actually one large series of fields, the te11m and dropped by side at 1255, pinpointed exactly on the prescrihc(,
side locations. I Iere
again, assembly was unnecessary since the pilots 11,1( to assure a good
jump. slowed their aircraft almost to a stall

The slight enemy resistance was overcome and did

not slow the tea111s. The Eureka was in operation inside i minute, and the panels I The main serials all arrived 3 riiin (, RN -4 within 4 minutes. and
the DZ's were adjacent titer 1325. an(? dire( serials were it was difficult to distinguish clue to arrive at each, drop was exceptionally
however, good, all trocll the :among them; Since Pathfincle,
loss of time. the without and assembling DZ's to guide glider landings and resulp1)11 personnel remained on the hitting DZ's late, at r 31c, 1 322, and l

for 6 days, when they were relieved. aircraft bulk and path finders. of navigationa1 Resupply, for -The weight it impossible for them to Carr}
ids nccdc"d the pathfinders made
iii enough

batteries to provide smoke and

by

continuous

operation of all`

32

.,
. .

Accordingly for subsequent landings of gliders. a resupj)1)' aids flown on D plus i with the necessary additional equil} mission was This resupply, consisting of a complete CRN-4, extra batteriek ment. for both Eureka and CRN-4, and a supply of smoke, landed app-)roxi from the Eureka on which the pilot was homing. mately 20 yards

Air Evacuation
There fields was no during the operation. direct air evacuation Casualties, of casualties both British adva; tlcc( American. and chain to Brussels, air t(I from

the normal ground evacuation were routed through had an airdrome including IX TCC where party, control at1 directed by FAAA duty. IX TCC evacuation section, on was the RAF

Up to in air evacuation from Brussels. cooperate with 1(' day were flown in accordance planes a operating with standing pre} Membury, Ramsbury ce"dures. Casualties and were evacuated to ex, for loads which landed at Blake British; rcpt these were were entirely hill Farm. during incidents There were the no unusual aili t evacuation.

Air-Sea Rescue Services

very cooperative and effective air-seal Two corridors were established frond rescue service was maintained. I) clay to 1) plus despite the fact that short notice was giver and for changes facilities wllicl; of time and route, this service provided in the rescue of many of our personnel. resulted "R" motor lautncltes. Naval control. equipment consisted of -Naval high-speed launches, and motor torpedo boats. It had been the ccm before narrow air corridors were adopted for air-sea mon practice launches to carry out short patrols near their home bases, %() rescue zt, This had proved efficient
be on immediate call for any emergency. t. ' in the case of bombers returning from missions over the Contit1cttt.
they were not flying a predetermined course and were returili1tl; when before the airborne attack the suggestion IIowever, sporadically. to the naval authorities that, with ? air corridors cstabwas made launches be placed at irregular intervals along lished, :iir-sea rescue idea was concurred in, and in the northern cor" This these routes. From I)-day to I) plus 9a

34 .

-idlor alone 17 launches were so placed, with io in the much shorter 't, uthern lane. The wisdom of this move was well demonstrated when the entire `rcw of a C-47 was forced to ditch on the return from Holland, and before the aircraft had submerged. Because crews
'\-ac picked up even been briefed that air-sea rescue launches would be spaced along
gad rjic corridors, they were able to ditch at points where rescue could
quickly be effected. On D plus 2, when weather over the sea was
"-rry bad and fog reduced visibility to about i mile, the plan again Gliders were breaking tows in large numbers, yet one ! 'rove(1 itself. ihotor launch, stationed some 40 miles from the English coast, was five gliders. Ah1eto pick up the entire crews of launches of air-sea rescue service spent 1,243 hours f Iigh_sheed at sea. in air-sea rescue included Spitfires and dir Control. -Aircraft used \Valrt. ADGB, Hudsons and Warwicks of Coastal Command, ises of Because of their long range and the USAAF. vjjtl Thunderbolts of Warwicks and Hudsons were very usefully employed
`! arability, the iii flying alongside serials on their route out. They were thus able to
the exact position of aircraft ditching, and to go to
jIlf, t and report 1lic crews' assistance when there were no rescue launches in the On the way hack, with aircraft more spread out, this plan 'iciility. it was at this stage that the Thunderbolts sas less effective; and Spitlarger area in less time, proved 1! of great value.
able to cover a res, During the operation, 205 men were rescued from ditched aircraft
'rl(1 gliders.
The sir-sea following rescue
Sorties

figures service:

give a summary

of the patrols
1;

carried

by out

by Spitfires

I, ong-range Command

Sorties

and Walruses of AIx; by Warwicks sorties and ...............

USAAI' of ................

.................
Iludsons of
Coa. tal

14s3

by Tbundcrbolts Total air

.........................
S;

sorties

_5i

Air German

Force Reaction to the Airborne

Landings

the GAF failed to meet the Just as challenge of the Normandy it mach a miserable showing i; so against the Netherlands air-
'vasion,

borne assault. Strained shortages, and aircraft t distant points, harried by coi11I111
bring planes from inconveniently in other sectors, the Luftwaffe the furioi
could not mount Inents The folios,
defensive effort called for by so ominous a
development. covering feeble this relatively the air.
ing review, September,
the period 17-23 forces to smash the attempt gives an accotirlt fror the FAAA of

by

fuel

forced

The state of the weather was certainly a greater handicap

to th Allies than to the enemy. While it prevented the GAF from I)tlttin,
it also kept the Allies from bringing to l)c. up a maximum effort, l the full weight of their air superiority, as well as grievously haml)erin; the resupply and reinforcement.
Although the GAF was quick first on the identify to
landing

the main ari This

was proh, drop areas, its reaction clay was slow. lbl, due to the fact that the German forces based nearest to fighter t1,, landing had already been committed to operations elsewhere
points had to be pressed into service from localities
soy that other units . far away Darmstadt. With the sudden extension of the l), ittl" as in Holland, Germans the landings area the appraised certainly as This led to employment very serious threat. on tactical tasks of unit had previously been engaged in the strategic defense of Ger
which against Germany. central many heavy-bomber raids, and involved their

fron
transfer forces were identified Elements it of these new The extent by 21 September. Holland tactical over operations t(1 forces was platlne, of the western tactical which this reinforcement have been about 30o aircraft, and represents a reversal of ppcars to former GAF cooperation the with policy of sacrificing tactical al daylight bOllll)inl, in favor of defense of the homeland against army I lowvever, despite this strong Holland over entailed reinforcement numerical in no way commensurate with was One reason for this in home defense. in fighters, t1u the

scale of effort evident sacrifice

fairly large force, the need to maintain a in the Nancy-Metz Allied to meet pressure cation during of appreciable the period fighter activity review.

%t 200 airerafe approximately There is no itldi sector. are. '

in the Aachen-Maastricht

under

interception by fighters were comparativel, Allied losses through In the main, CIlCnl September. were confined to i (lay, 21 small and in attempts to attack gliders and transfighters were used initially 3(,
.

but concentrated later upon the strafing of gliders and landed ports in an effort to prevent their successful deployment. troops

Night bomber operations were carried out on

D

only

2 nights,

the

plus (D plus i and 2), with 5o and too sorties 19th and The targets were along the Escaut Canal and at Eindrespectively. Weather was doubtless the deciding factor in limiting these hoven.

18th

efforts.

in strength only on the second night Night were out free-lance patrol over Holland, evidently anticipating on There is no dropping reinforcements and supplies by night. of the idence that they were employed on ground-strafing operations either V%, by night. by (lay or feature was the use of a small number of twin-engine
An unusual reconnaissance of the southern North Sea. Prefighters on night of this was to obtain early information the purpose of any sumably the air landings by a seaborne invasion of the to supplement Zlttrmpt fighters Netherlands islands.

Details
Single-engine

Enemy Daylight of

Air

Operations

fighters. -Not more than 50 fighters were put up on landings. Oil D plus i this
had increased 1)-day against the airborne but this effort was not exceeded until 23 September to too-125 sorties, 6), when an estimated 150-200 sorties were flown over Ilol(1) plus further reinforcements from central Germany lanUl. By this time the It is not thought that they were engaged
begun to participate. 113,1 before the 23d. Of the fighters initially available in the in strength two-thirds operated against the airborne landwest, approximately The Aachen sector
the Nancy-Metz front. remainder on ings and the have been temporarily deprived of air cooperation. At the
to ;appears the period about boo of a total of 800 fighters located in west-
end of for operations in Germany were available the region of the aircrli Serviceability is unlikely borne landings. to have exceeded (x) per figure of fighters the theoretical ready to operate against cent, and and transports would therefore be on the scale of (o-, troops airborne but it appears that at the peak effort not even one sortie per available It is possible that these was achieved. estimates are low, beaircraft GAF's custom of operating when the no Allied fighters are
cause of
37

about and consequently no sighting reports are received, and also 1,, in bad weather a number of abortive flights may have been mac' cause I In the absence of comprehensive have no evidence. of which we r; from Allied ground troops, exact assessment is difficult, 1n ports is no reason to believe that the estimates given here were apl, r( there In any case,
hampered by fuel difficulties, lack cial>ly exceeded. large numbers of trained pilots, and inadequate servicing
faeiliti
has
its operating bases, it is not surprising that the Luftwaffe at rc failed to live up to its hypothetical capabilities. pcatedly Altogether, the German fighter reaction was very close to the ioe forecast as the average to
be expected over a period 150 sorties of days following the actual landings.
Fighter-hoinbers. evidence of fir I to was only slight -There bomber and mortar aircraft operations during the period. Sots, fighter units could have been temporarily adapted to this purhos; thus accounting

for part of the single-engine fighter effort. A fa

is 6o-7o, giving a scale
rstimatc of the number of aircraft so used ;! day. There is no evidence of fighter-botill)c about sorties a _3o by jet-propelled Me 262'S. activities

RecoJ ninSs, ince. is estimated that 5-10 reconnaissance -It sortir be considered flown daily over Holland, WW ere can a norm. ', which The interest the Eindll()s. reaction. was along area of main ct, into the rear\v. Nijmegen-Arnhem ' route, with some penetration ir, i1ceringen bridgehead /ones, the and southward.

bombers. and by these types of aircraft by day. cpcrations

Twin-engine fighters

expected, there were

-As

ri

Details of Enemy
Night activity was generally Iic1(1 mainly

Night

Air

Operations
the weather
111 C;

for which small,

accountable. identified bombers. -Operations in-engine i on only were On the 18th ahol1t Bights out of ti e 7, namely, 18-i9 and 19-20. bombs were dropped in the Escaut Cana' flown and sorties were directed against the airborne landiti=; is Whether this was ti sector.
for the area of attack lay well to the west of the Il1ai'
! 'ot clear, bombers had been idle for the preceding
landing zones. As these it is reasonable to suppose that their sudden reappearance NN, ww, "eeks, The following landings. night about direct result of the ts; a

being Eindhoven. If further atbombers operated, the main target they were probably canceled due to the weather. tacks were planned, fighters. Twin-engine 18 September (D plus 1), 50-75 night -On fighters were out on free-lance patrol over Holland. Untwin-engine the dropping of reinforcements anti they were expecting (1uestionably This type of activity soon ceased, and there is by night. supplies fighters were again specifically detailed to show that night nothing landings. It is also to be noted that no against the evidence to guard by night, as had been (IOOC in of troops ground-strafing -,ppeared of . by German night fighters in Normandy. vincrgeilcy Fighter-bombers. -There were no accounts of night operations by by single-engine night Fighter-bombers, nor of ground-strafing night fighters. bombers. is at hand that
the Ju S7 Night ground-attack -Evidence bombers operated on a small scale (Io-2o
sorties) on (Stuka) night September, not in the landing areas but in the Aachetlis and 19 It is possible that a very small number c(x>peratcd Maastricht vicinity. bombers' attack on Eindhoven on the night of the twin-engine with have been active as nuisance raiders and they may also on the 18_19, ether occasions. the night of the 18th onward, from two to Reconnaissance. -From fighters were out on reconnaissance night over the four twin-engine North Sea and seaward approaches to the Netherland islands. southern likely task was to detect and report any signs of seaborne Their most in cooperation with the troops landed from the air. vperations Conclusion to the airborne landings proved once again the The GAF reaction inability to produce an effort at all commensurate with the enemy's his disposal. It seems clear that the many difaircraft at number of lack of fuel and trained crews, and of inadequate airfields,
f culties of for him, even when faced
Batt beets too much with one of the most he had had to counter. The cooperation by threats given serious to the enemy ground troops, tither in intercepting die Luftwaffe in dealing and gliders en route, or with troops already transports Its part in combating the Allied landed, was small. airborne land-
largely ineffective, ings was a minor one, was little and contributed to the outcome.

39

Statistics

he following l
the operation, inclusive: ,

tabulation gives a graphic picture of the statistics

covering the period September-26 17 Septemh

llroppvd b:/. A Claims ('atiualties

or lundvd
F. yui

Dispatched

sU<'(Y`titirlll

Lost

Troops

Vollicles

Artillery WeapUll\

I[H't .C"u ttUr (toil

1x

TCC

.; ti
ti

aid ( i1.:

! 16
-

) {(i 1 '(" -1.21 1.89I

3,880 1, f)3: ) 1,200

98

live )! )--(i! t(,

(11 --

1,:31O
--

2 AI)(:

AFV TA
It
rl: I

---:

627 3.9-1: 3 :3R5 R(i0

-1,71(i
1.1'("
-

12.9N91;

1,677
11,9
l: i

137 55 2 59 2 13 12 2: 38

454 30,481 294 87 2 13 12 4,395

1,001 926

4 63

3,5
1,

(4)
(4)

] oj,
(4) \(4)

13'.)

(4) (4)

(4) (4)

T,

(: 2..i! I{
(111Iy.

2,262

1391

1591 86213.1,876I,

927

.;

III, 1' 111'In1}1'd

Ir" InrIli, 1 F.
tnnntwt 1n, : 11f thr.

r1-IJ11111y ulw-ratii nlininnun.

1" Av wcn lu. t.

oil by

KAF.

211 1)iv.

r Ili 11 1"h flcun".

, In n11t inciu111.392 A/c clisllmtah141 to target

amlt oil 1)-11ay morn in};

mill

t,hc n401 1. lin"c

c Ifit III, Iv. viwlhnl".

alone cannot reflect the collateral costs of the operatic be considered in terms of several factors. For exa1l1I, ' which must involved would have h, while the airborne and troop carrier troops be used on any operation of similar size, the use of virtually to a for this operation dissipated a serious thre
FAAA the resources Germans had had to he continually on guar against which the

Figures

Thus one cost was the sacrifice of this menace to enemy plans.
Stand-by status and operational use of IX TCC aircraft for the landings, together with their planned predecessors, which airborne for marshaling and complete immobilization each case called of I TCC, further complicated a ticklish supply situation by cutting o, CATOR, Continent. whit
much of the available air supply to the handled over-all air supply through a priority control office, arrangr
by C-47's some 20,000 tons to the Continent during Septen to supply been contemplated, CATO her. Had the airborne operations not
Mot, ) and %tiranccr rcconnaissancc not includcd.

40

I
4

restriction& existing that, considering estimated inadequate loading facilities, scarcity of aviation gasoline, etc., airfields, have been of which 25,000 tons could tons could 15,ooo . have gone to Lt. Gens. Courtney H. Hodges and George S. Patton, Jr. General Bradley did not desire to resume the otTcnthe time, At
in

limitations

weather

delivered,

he had a 30,000-ton stockpile, which by sea, rail, and truck

sivc until
accruing

daily.
was at a rate of only i, ooo tons While about 250 heavy bombers were used for air supply, the
prin-
heavy bomber missions resulted from the diversion
of
cipal cost of Fighth Air Force fighters flying escort.
Lt. Gen. James H. Doo
little estimates this cost as the equivalent of 6 heavy-bomber
missions, have been of major size. Of the 17 missions flown of which 4 could during September, 2 were further reduced in size because of fighter diversion to the airborne landings. Operations of tactical air forces cannot }round be charged to the airborne assault any more than to other have been conducted in its stead. activity which might

Conclusions
in gaining or restoring units are most useful -Airborne mobility when armies are in contact. Mobile reserves should he sufficient to insure exploitation of initial airborne success.
Reserve infantry divisions
should he available, and utilized, to rc divisions in combat pl. ice airborne be physically clfectcd.
can Employment as rapidly as their replacement Strategic.

of airborne units should hence all well conceived airborne

of their capabilities; exploitation involve an acceptance of a calculated risk in
view of operations will far-reaching results.
possible l icre adequate protection from enemy interceptors
can Tactical. -W he insured, and where adequate air preparation can he provided to hostile flak, daylight airborne operations will super combat
silence losses substantially lower
than the normal operational losses sustained
by daylight
Further, accuracy of placing airborne troops at night. is vastly superior. in regions vital to the enemy (e. g., Against a well-organized army Korea, japan), plans for airborne operations Manchuria, Germany, 42

be based
on a maximwll

should require that all troops and equipment essential to the success
be landed on the initial day. This is especially im-
of the mission certain climatic conditions, but the rapid concentration portant under hostile flak which must be anticipated will in any case render later of increasingly costly. air operations Doctrine requiring early relief of airborne units is sound where is well organized. Air dropping of supplies cannot be the enemy under conditions of uncertain weather and enemy flak However, it may be possible to make a deep air-
concentrations. borne penetration of vital enemy territory, without expectation of iill-
mediate relief, provided: relied upon

A period of favorable weather can be anticipated. z. We possess virtually complete air superiority. 2.
The entire air effort can be expended to further 3. Landing fields are seized. 4. the operation:

Sufficient infantry and light artillery are air-landed at once to 5. defend landing fields out of enemy medium artillery range.
in the absence of adequate sea, rail, and cisive ground operations, and lift must be employed to supply any needed tonnage.
road supply, air be susceptble to hand loading Normally, the cargo should and should
Trucks should include ammunition, rations, and petroleum products. than rations or fuel when other circumrather carry ammunition airplanes to take those cargoes better permit, permitting stances by air lift. safeguarded Decision as to employment of troop carrier aircraft as bct"ccn air Band, and airborne training transport, on the one and/or combat, on be that of the theater commander. Operation the other, must of air be. under the air commander. transport should Troop carrier strength, considering the use of troop carrier aircraft for intratheater air transport purposes, cannot be charged in its entheater airborne needs. However, at least tirety against one-half the is normally and permanently troop carrier cost chargeable to airborne 1leeds.
1-Iis will Leavy longer be necessarily true no wbrn fig liting ccluiPmirnt. ground air has thr eahahilitVV of air-lart1ling all eswntia)

Air Transport. -Wheel

tonnage is required for the conduct of de-

43

Commendations

of the enthusiasm which greeted the airborne phase of the advance into Holland which were beare the commendations intelligent leadership had stowed upon those whose aggressive and On 18 September
Gen. H. H. Arnold made the operation possible. following message to General Brereton:
sent the Eloquent

information of successof your conlto receive See decisive role for large-scale airoperation. I)orne future doctrine. operations military All command and staff in brilliant planning and execution of your echelons congratulated on " assault. "Highly gratified mand in its initial
The next (lay, 19 September, General Brereton received the following message of congratulation from Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower: " 7'hc initial major operation of the Allied Airborne Army has far to confirm the wisdom of the dealready proceeded sufficiently cision to organize all our airborne forces under single command. Individually divisions have previously exhibited unexcelled skill, your But the current operation marks the first
courage, and resolution. in warfare to utilize a number of airborne divisions
against attempt The perfection of your staff work
is demona single major ol)jective. by the complete coordination between
air, ground, and airstratcd lx)rne forces, and this coordination has resulted in maximum tactical W ca. I congratulate you and your deputy, General Browning, toBest wishes and gcthcr with all officers and ranks serving under you. luck for the future to every man of the Allied Airborne Army. " goxxl On i October General Eisenhower transmitted to General Brereton from Gen. George C. Marshall: message "Dear IlRi. RE: : My congratulations and thanks to you, your staff, TON for the courageous and determined manner
and your pilots and crews have carried out their duties in landing and supplying
in which they I am requesting
divisions of the airborne army in Holland. the General Eisenhower to transmit a message to the United States
forces which are now engaged in the salient. " ground units of the First Allied Airborne Army itself there was a strong Within the discharged had most meritoriously conviction that the air component General its obligations.
Maj. Gen. James M. Gavin, Commanding Division, who on 21 October was promoted to the
82d Airborne following the

44

in recognition of his gallantry and resourccftilof major general rank follows to \Iaj. Gcn. Paul L. during the operations, wrote as ness
Commanding General 1X Troop Carrier Conlnland
: Williams, bridge the Division captured the GRAVE "In summary, several landing, seized the key terrain bet'een GROESI; EEK (lours after during the night of 1)/I) plus i, captured to NIJMEGEN and Canal by daylight I) plus i, and capbridges over the MAAS-WAAL bridge on D plus 3. The Iivision big NIJMEGEN tured the could have accomplished any one of these missions, nor its complete not but for the splendid, whole-hearted the IX
cooperation of mission, The drops and landings were the best in
Troop Carrier Command. The courageous performance of the pilots history of this Division. the has been the subject of boundless favorable comwas magnificent and by all ground personnel. With all the sincerity at my command ment I would like to express to you my appreciation and that of every for the splendid Division performance of your of this soldier " command.

The Epic Struggle of the First

Airborne Division

World War II are forgotten, the TONG after many episodes of desperate stand of the British ist Airborne Division at Arnhem deep admiration. In the following is be recalled with pages will American air officer, Lt. Bruce E. the personal account of an given foredoomed perimeter defense with the Davis, who went through the Division. of the ist soldiers

With a few revisions,

Lieutenant of

but

without

Change

of

meaning,

the narrative

Davis is given here. Arnhem

Report on
18-25

Operation, September 1944

Lt. J. E. Bice and I were ordered to take part in Originally, the GCI controllers, but this was later
airborne operations as Aruheln the air cooperation and night fighters were to be all since canceled, Clarence Brown, 38 Group Operations, VII/C RA 4. who was
in GCI
teams, explained that the two our verbal orders were
charge of

45

but that we were no longer ordered that we could go in voluntarily,

fighters were used, and also in the hope
do so. In case American to day fighter control center, I decided to go of setting up an offensive Bice returned to our unit, the 3o6th Fighter CoilLieutenant along. trol Squadron, in France. I)-day we were ready to go, but our tug planes had not been On had to wait until ordered, and we day. W/C Brown following the instructions to meet him on the went ahead with another unit, with LZ cast of N'ijmegcn. We intended to set up on the hills to the east, just across the German border, in the western tip
of the Reicliswal(l. Brown, as I have since learned unofficially has been killed. W/C from
several sources,

On I) plus i, S/L Coxon, four RAF enlisted men, and I took off
from the RAF station at Harwell. As we crossed the western tip
the Netherlands islands, we encountered a heavy flurry of near
flak of bursts, but no flak hit
our glider. About 5 minutes short of our LL, the one about 5 miles northwest of Arnhem, our tow plane was in a terrific concentration of flak and tracer and caught fire.
caught \Ve cut l(x)sc and landed in a field in the Letters,
general vicinity of The the Rhine, about 7 miles southwest of Oosterbcek. south of glider pilots reported that our tow plane had crashed and sent a billow of smoke and flame several hundred feet into the air. destroyed our secret beacon by territory, we Stcn guts fire and joined the parties of two other gliders, who had been forced down in the same field. While the other parties, comby Lieutenant Farrell of the British ist Airborne Division, manded two motorcycles, two jeeps, two trailers, and a small anti-
unloaded I kept saying "Oranje" to Dutch civilians until a major tank gun, \Ve decided against setting fire to approached. of the underground for fear of guiding the Germans to our location. The our gliders Dutch officer then led its down bylanes, through woods, and behind dikes until we reached a small mechanical ferry northeast of Driel. Tbc Dutchman walked ahead and told the ferry captain to open the
for its and to be ready to move quickly, since we were under a gate We made a break across 200
large concentration of enemy guns. Fortunately, a Fortress was flying overhead, yards of open ground. German eyes and guns turned on it we crossed unseen.
and with all had
capThe Ii-17 was untouched. In I)riel, before crossing, we 46 Being in German

turgid six Germans, but because we were unable to take there with us had the local in jail and
throw their we civilians put the prisoners into the river. They were Poles, forced into the German
weapons had no fight in them. army, and Across the river the Dutch civilians had posted themselves at interdirected us to the main body of troops. \Ve got sections and now Arnhem and were held in the western part of past the railroad station by heavy machine-gun fire. Lieutenant Farrell and I knocked out up but we were still unable to go on. two machine guns with grenades, it was dark. By this time Farrell wanted to go to the ist Brigade and I was Since Lieutenant division headquarters, we separated and I joined Lieuten-
Beaded for S/L CoXOn took the enlisted men into a
Heaps, a Canadian. ant I had planned to spend the night in the building across the road. but Lieutenant I leaps decided to report back to headstation, railway him. We had ii men crowded on a liren I went with so quarters, carrier.

Rcacllcs Division
We diet
quite

Hcadquartcrs

Ujxnl reaching; followed our other three gliders down on had A glider pilot, who had told me earlier in the evening that the rest of our party I, Z, the fire upon landing, hit by heavy RS-nlm. and machine-gun been bad he had been killed. I reported this to l; rigadicr that all alld

bit of machine-gun and rifle fire during the trip. a division headquarters 'ye reported to Brigadier I lix.

thought doubtful him it looked fix and told

was concerned,

be salvaged. The next morning I jeep and a w see hat could got for the I, %, but I was caught by mortars and pinned down started out lost for half an hour. The jeep was badly hit and several about gallons of water and gasoline. I'hercforc I did not expose myself
by trying to start it, but crawled a few hundred down the ditch
yards I got back into the heavy woods. until
Later that morning I saw from the four enlisted men, they were. Within an hour cut off from us, and I had S/I, Coxon, -ho had become separated
he
gave me idea of w%-here and a rough I learned they were in danger of being Lieutenant Heaps drive me
down. I: x-

far as our having night fighters as but that I would try to to the LZ the next day and get

47

heavy sniper fire on certain parts of the road, I borrowed a pecting In a ioo-yard stretch we heard the machine
Sten and the started. five snipers. I returned the fire, more as a bluff than
anypistols of but I may have hit one who was covered by thick foliage thing else, in a tall tree. Eventually At least, he stopped firing.
found the men, placed them on
the jeep facing in
we directions, and started back. We fired upon. Upon
rcall were not turning I met Lieutenants Geddes and Johnson, who said they had two "vccps" but needed a VHF expert. So I moved the RAF radio
Private Eden, around behind the headquarters building, expert, and
he started to work I also moved the other three RAF
on the radio. to the back, since sniper fire had recommenced in front of
the
men building.
the mortars started, and from then on the place was fire. At about under continuous Eden, the enlisted mortar 1700, American radio plan, Lieutenant Johnson, I were standing by the and jeep, trying to make contact with Allied aircraft, when I mortar
barragc came over and a shell landed
about 25 yards from us. We (lived
under the jeep, but both Eden and the American soldier were
hit,
the American three times in the back, Eden
through the jugular vein.
I Ic kcd
at them and for a stretcher. I knew Eden was
called finished, for blood
was from his throat and mouth.
gushing I thought I had known what it to be an officer, but I did
not
was know it until then; for Eden, knew he was finished, but
could who not talk to me, gave me a look which told me that he conlplc. tcly
depended
ulx, n inc to take him. I patted hint on the back, care of him I would look after him he would be all right. He telling and believed Inc. Lieutenant Johnson was tending the other wounded I stayed with Edcn until he became nman, so unconscious, although I was utterly powerless to aid him. When I helped Lieutenant J01111the dcx:tor and the stretcher bearers came. We did not even son until later that several more shells had fallen near us. realiir until 'I'hc vccp had been hit, but two channels were still working, and finally got in touch with a Spitfire, but the pilot said he could not we he flew away. hear it,. bccausc of flak. At the end of about 20 minutes we were unable to reach any more aircraft, although during the next 2 days, day and night one of us was calling for "Boxwcxxi" "any Allied aircraft" and giving our calling and that
4s

That afternoon

After

both as ist Airborne Division call signs in our radar control and Late on the third day the knocked out station code. radio was by an 88-mm. altogether shell.
After that day, Tuesday; the jammed together and I (lays were all There was an HF set in cannot remember which day was which. the attic at headquarters, directed by a British lieutenant from the The attic was full of chair cushions, with which Headquarters section. the radio all around, since the walls and roof were too thin
we padded 88-mm. Even so, the radio was knocked out four Stol) to shrapnel.
always mechanic 88's and mortars, keep it going. Lieutenant Geddes and I hoped to hear managed to recognize us, so the voiceof someone we recognized and who message through without auair cooperation that we could get an luck, but we had no thentication; although we alternated regularly, the VHF set outside, taking turns one of us on this set and one on the

times by near bursts from

but

would

with the enlisted men there. knew that the walls and roof would never After a (lay or two, we 1111'set out to the back also, moved the so we stand the pounding, dugout was hit almost immediately, smashing The in a dugout. The snipers were everywhere, many of them directfor good. the set and by radio. The German artillery, both mortars ing artillery
fire 88's, was unbelievably accurate.

On Night
'iilcc IIlcll all mir radios were out, on patrol Out at night; this

Patrol
to take my they were RA not was refused, since

I asked permission

training Pantry-trained. myself, I 1 went the next 2 nights. The first night, to go, and was allowed helped to put up a Huff Sten gull barrage patrol when the (; er-
cur infantry attacked on our northwestern The
attack perimeter. tan was repulsed, and we spent the rest of the night chasing out snipers lines, but the had infiltrated our who snipers were there in large numbers. The next night, three of us went after a machine-gun nest and found it from division headquarters. about 400 yards There were six 11C" sitting by it, doing nothing. \Ve threw two grenades and then welt back toward camp. On the way back I shot a sniper, who fell

I Living

had

infantry reserve

49

feet out of a tree, landing on

his head. I think that was one about -o I have ever seen. He
was either care-
of the most satisfying sights less or overconfident, for he had chosen a tree higher than the others
He foliage, making a beautiful target. and not very thick with

never even saw Inc. The next day I was hit in the foot by mortar shrapnel, and also hurt
hip. I was (living into a dugout when hit and landed on my
hip.
my At first I thought my left leg was broken, but
after sitting still a
I realized that it was just a painful bruise. There
was small
while, in my foot. Later that (lay I learned that my RAF personnel
shrapnel hit in that barrage, two of them killed instantly and the third, were
Corporal Austin, badly wounded in the back and head. He
was I taken to the hospital in Arnhem, which was in German hands. 1(x)ked for him in the first aid post at
division Headquarters, but he had
been taken away. Lieutenant Geddes was there on a stretcher, having been hit in the back during the same
barrage. and right arm The doctor said he would have no trouble he
get surgery should but, with the hospital in German hands, early surgery s(x)n, was
doubtful. I Ic was a brave little guy, and I certainly hope he will
be
all right.
After I was hit, I was very slow and could not make the trip around
the yard as often as I had before. After learning
my responsibilities
from Eden, I went around to all the foxholes at the back
and (lid I could for the enlisted men. I spread any good news that what in; there was constant news of reinforcements across the river.
came It began to sound as if one-half the British army were there, and I
I must have promised the men an armored division for breakthink fast four mornings in a row. It wasn't all wasted effort,
because while i was trying deeper. I was having them dig
themselves in to cheer them up

day after that, but I was so slow it would

I tried one trip (luring the have been suicidal to continue, so I told the meal I would come
had been
'T'hese were British soldiers whose officers around at night.
. I was moved into headquarters to After wrenching my leg again do was to man a Sten gun from one. from then on all I could stay, so been expecting an infantry attack on diviIlaving f the windows. (, headquarters, sion 5() had nine men manning we the window arches

killed and

11111ch of

ww"hose

equipment

had

been

(lcstroyed.

to prevent the enemy from throwing under the stone veranda, gre-
The attack never came, but into the operations room. nades we times that it had. thought a thousand The night before we left, some Netherlands Red Cross workers came

the offer of negotiating a short truce to evacuate the wounded with hospital at Arnhem. This was arranged and I
f both armies to the (, My leg was worse than I knew with them. ever and was evacuated be of any use in a moving battle. (\Ve expected
`I was too slow to I had lade many friends in the
the river. ) to move south, nearer I knew that in case of withdrawal division, and they would I(x)k after
down. The
odds were too themselves thus slow great. ,tie and Ilut I didn't do it I went in to evacuate, in effect to surrender. So know why. Somehow I felt I was letting never lnd shall probably down. Since I was the only Yank around headyuartcrs buddies y Johnson was ferrying Poles across the river) I was letting
(Lieutenant down.
So I climbed back through the window, made own army 1my if we had to retire southward it was agree that every man everybody This was probably the luckiest decision I for himself, and stayed. lever made. to have degenerated into a After residing this report, which seems I want to interject one using before telling blood-and-thunder novel, I am not trying to sound courageous, for courage was last night. of the heroism was the rule. God knows I badly and was commonplace deal of the time. scared
a good learned this from the Arnhem
operation: that men, Ix)rn and I freemen, have a great strength and will power which they
1bred as it. I saw men who were litungry, distrust until they need exhausted,
by all the rules hopclessly outnumbered, men who of warfare should
to have it
all over with, who were shelled
have gladly surrendered 1until helpless psychopathics; and through it they were all they laughed, (sang, died, and kept fighting because they Were told this
battle and (would shorten the war considerably. that I think could be paid to the ist Airborne The greatest tribute by a German prisoner, a Division was paid major, the old Prussian
in the last war who saw service and in this one. The type of officer, in a cage about 200 yards from division headquarters. l)risoners were that they were not getting enough f(x)(1. complaining were At that, they were getting more than we were, and they could slccl). , fliey

51

The major concluding

called with

together and like this: something tllenl

dressed

them

down

severely,

"'T'hese mcn have stood up under the most terrible artillery They have fought on without food bombard mcnt I have ever seen. days. Even though they are our enemies, I never for several or sleep braver men. When you complain you make inc feel ashamed of saw be quiet and follow their
I suggest that you being German. our " example. This speech was overheard by several reliable officers who undcrGerman, and they have sworn that it is true and not another stand of those rumors. But to get back to the last day.

Word of Evacuation
That
morning

we

S05 we counted and (), morning

I1CWs

had
133

our

usual mortar
exploding

Between 0720 barrage.

division

shells

near

headquarters.

Count that

'T'his was not all unusual

for

want of anything

number; better

just happened to we
to

do.

About 1500 we heard the

Then

that we were evacuating that night. we got the news in the infantry with machine guns, 1cx) Gernlans, that there were between us and the river. We thought they must w()(xls to the south,

know our plans.

Division artillery, south of the river, and on the 43d called before dark and once after
heavily 3 times they shelled the woods I
from dark. to 2200 was nerve-wracking. The waiting 1500 'e

I might have to swine, thought

make that difficult, SO I t(X)k

and my

knew combat

Illy

injured leg would

pants, canteen, and

off

I burned the confidestroyed them. I could spare, and everything blacken my document and used the ashes to dential) autlientif)cation had been bombed and face and hands. The edge of our perimeter Typhoons, and we hoped by Marauders, 111underbolts, and strafed A rocket-firing Typhoon hit it would 1(x)k as if were going to attack. had been giving us the most trouble mortar which the Ncbclwerfer "All rockets on target. " This gun was the six-barrel and reporte(l, became much lighter. it was hit the shelling type, and after leave division head'c divided into groups of io and were to in the party of Maj. Gen. R. intervals. I was quarters at 15-minute 52

E. Urquhart, leave at 2215 hours, with was to hours.

Commanding

General

the division, and our party

of first group departing the at 21.5

General Urquhart filled but at 2135 the shelling stopped. up to, were we all took a sip. The glider pilots'
chapwith whiskey and a cup
in and prayed and led us all in the Lord's Prayer.
lain came first two parties moved out. Colonel Preston asked rile how The foot would hold up. I told hint that as S(x)I1 as I my I tl1ougllt got foot. Moving outside, we forget I had a in slit trenches I'd sat excited the darkness. Our orders were not to return our eyes to to accustom by our party leader. I took one last l(x)k at
fire unless so ordered headquarters and the surrounding I have never grounds. division destruction, not even in Montebourg Valognes, vista of and such a tieell had been cleanly bombed and there for there everything were no At division headquarters, the grounds and surroundaround. woods Large trees had I)een cut up until they ing works were shredded. bare sticks. The smell of gunpowder was everyonly tall, were The big, four-story house was a shambles. Part of the r(xlf
where. in; there wasn't a window in the place, nor had there blown was for days; the walls were torn out in several places; and the been From the first we had been everywhere. to bury unable were (lead the (lead.
behind hedges until
we We walked along a road reached an open by an enemy machine gun. As Nve crawled, field commanded a very light went up, but apparently we were unobserved. We
bright into the woods again. As we stopped to rest and
on squatted
moved bellied me pitched forward on his face. I the man thought
(town, I hit the dirt too. Then I hint over he had seen something, so rolled lie was dead. He was the i4t11 man to be killed saw that within and feet of me, the others by mortar fire. few a
We got through to the river plain and crossed another bad
stretch The dead and dying were everywhere. We about 200 yards. of bank and lay down in the mud the river to wait for our turn reached barges, of which there were 5, holding 12 ill the men each. l; y this it was raining, which helped, since it reduced visibility. \Ve held
time the north bank
and the 43d Division 50o yards of (xx) about about

2100. The Germans usually did A mortar shelling started about thought again that they knew what we at night, and we not shell

53

yards of the south Urquhart General got

bank. had

The the

barges wounded

kept

crossing across

back

taken

forth. and first; then his

engine then the last straw-the darned alx)ard. party After wouldn't start, and the current was too swift to paddle across.

And

much struggling

and swearing,

finally the engine

started, and we got

across unmolested. We walked alx)ut 3%2 miles to a place where a rest point had peen There we were given hot tea, biscuits, rum, and cigarettes;
set up. drink very
little,
but somcthing had gone wrong-we Could eat and but we couldn't smoke enough to satisfy us. Our nerves were still
in
knots. We were moved another 2 miles in "ducks, " had more tea
biscuits, then were moved by truck to Nijmegen, where we had .Ind hot meal, dozens of cigarettes, and all the liquor we a marvelous drink. But we still had trouble getting
food and drink down. could WVcpulled off our muddy clothes and went to bed.
That night and the following night we had a few bombs, but nothing serious. In Nijmegen we found S/L Wheeler and F/I. Richards, They told nle that F/I.
had been killed on the U. who we though '1'isshon and the other j6 men had been missing since they landed.
Whccler and Richards had carried their secret beacon for several clays, Coxon arranged with W/C Barfor us to ride to Eindhoven in the wing commanders jeep. At
nard Iandhovcn, arrangements were made for us to ride: in a C-47 to
Brussels, and at Brussels I was booked on a C-47 to Croy(1on. I Callle Lieutenant Colonel Preston of the Ist Airborne Division, Guy With liyum, a IMC correspondent who had been with us at Arnhem, and S/L but it was a Luftwaffe the was active, The FW I/)'s and Me jog's were over every %cry peculiar activity. day except two, and their tactics were always the same. 'T'hey would back and forth at alx)ut 4,0(x) feet, drop to 2,000 feet, and then sweep if to strafe us. But I doubt that they fired more than 5o0 p cd of{ as It looked as if they were in all the passes they made at us. rounds if our fighters then be unarmed and afraid to use their ammunition if they were simply trying to boost German morale. came, and as What must have shaken enemy morale was the guts of our resupply Roo to goo feet, I)ay after day they would wade in at plane crews. several other people. All through the operation then had destroyed it. The next day, Wednesday,

S-4

55

The only day on which flak right through a terrible heavy was when P-47's flew escort, and most of the ack-ack was not did not open up for fear of being spotted and strafed. flak barrage.

Praises Resupply Airmen

Wednesday-I saw three not sure which-I am or hits and catch fire, and the pilots, instead of saving
planes receive dropped their cargoes, and crashed
themselves, calmly circled again, in flanges. I can find no words to express the admiration we have for Thinking I feel a great pride at just those resupply men. of them, being a member of the same Allied team. Now that the excitement battle has faded away, it seems impossible to believe that men could of have such devotion to their comrades, that they would endure such hell in an eliort to take care of us. A Polish captain, a liaison officer between division headquarters Landing Brigade, spoke and the 4th the truth When he said, "There isn't a man flying resupply who doesn't deserve the V. C. "
the siga miracle. kept their lines in will probably nal section radios and their telephone be known, but it was nothing I do less than miraculous. Wryer I. now that they sullered heavy casualties doing so. The Arnhem in communications were had was a series of constant crises, and if communications uprration been knocked for as much hours of the entire siege we out as 2 have been lost. should
Division's internal How

On Tuesday

'I'lic
medical corps, as usual, continued to go and get the wounded how Heavy the barrage. The Germans respected the lied no matter ('rosy flag every time an evacuation party went out, but of course there no Iced Cross flags during the barrages. The medics simply were went out after the wounded and took them in, shelling or no shelling. ma'I he infantry absorbed everything-mortars, tanks, SP guns, in the book, and kept coming up for more. chine guns, everything SS troops The (; c"rlnan artillery and armor were under command of But the German infantry, except for its backbone and were sturdy. SS troops, was scared of the Red Caps and would not attack withof fired upon help of armor or SP guns. Four of were once out the of hitting "There was no chance machine guns one-half mile away.
burst which
heard a Spandau Another time I it was just fright. its:

by

us

56

lasted almost 30 seconds, and fires a Spandau with as a roan who burst is simply scared or he would not freeze the much as a 5-second trigger that long. There was constant evidence that the attack had Jerry the scare of his life. The amazing thing about
the Britgiven ish infantry was that they carried on with the light-hearted
abandon Sunday school class on the first spring picnic. of a I would like to make a few suggestions based upon my own observation of the airborne operation:
There was apparently a lack of liaison between
the air cooperaz. \Vhether this was due to
the air cooperation itself. tion party and improper crystal frequencies, lack of aircraft, or some other cause I
know. This should be taken care of well in advance of all (10 not Lieutenant Geddes told me he received
his frequencies operation. before D-day. This should be definitely
settled in time to the night install the crystals and fuses and test the radios.

After our two radio Radio crews should be thoroughly trained. 3. hit, nobody knew the job. We borrowed a man from the men
were Airborne Division, but he also was hit.
British ist A layer of armor plating, easily removable for speedy mainte4. surround the radio set. nance, sliould be the solution to lot of radio trouble. A jump set might a 5. be weighed the mobility of the present veep.
Against this must

All officers and enlisted men should be completely combat2. before being sent out on such missions. trained

for
all operations is this: an air A point e(x)ecration party must beforehand where the ground forces know' intend to set up their
that the most favorable
site may be preselected. In the de fcnses, so ! Arnhem case, there was no place inside the perimeter outside the but With a larger 1,, of enemy guns, perimeter such a site might
-Inge been obtainable. I do not know
whether this have was prearranged s but I Mention it because the air cooperation party, with, we of the were not given this information had we gone in on party radar and, D-(lay ail set ill) as we planned, we would have been in enemy terin a few hours. ritory

U. S. GOVlRNMCNT

PRINTING

OFFICE:

194S

57