Eastem Europe After Communism

Epiuraph in !he IntJodtxbon ICI 1%9 by C. F. pete<s Corporation. Used by pe<mis sion.
AlI riQ/lts resewed. No part ol lhis publication may be reproduced or tra ns mitted in a ny l orm or by a ny means, electJonic or
medlanical, induding photooopy, reco<ding, or a ny information storage a nd retrieva l system, without pe<mis sion in writing rrom
!he
Copyright 1C1 1995 by Westvie w J>ress, Inc.
in 1995 in !he Uoited states ol America by Westview J>ress, Inc., 5500 Central Aveoue, BouIde<, Colorado
B0301-2B77, a nd in !he United K.ingdom by Westvie w J>ress, 12 Hids Copse Road, CUmnor Hill, Oxford 0)(2 9JJ
libra ry ol Coogress Data
Beyond VlJ!)Oslavia : politics, eronomics, a nd rulture in a s hatte<ed oommunity I Sabrina petra Ra met a nd S. Ada movidl,
e'.
p. an.
IrdtJdes bibliographical a nd index.
ISBN 0-8133-7953-9
l . VlJ!)Oslavia - Eoonomic oonditions - 1945-1992. 2. VlJ!)Oslavia - Politics a nd !)Ovemmeot - 19BO-1992. 3. VlJ!)Oslavia - So<ia l
oonditions. I. Ra met, Sabrina P., 1949- 11 . S.
HC407.B39 1995
33B.9497- OC2 0
J>rinted a nd bound in !he Uoited states ol America
94-359B7
CO,
Eastem Europe After Communism
Epiuraph in !he IntJodtxbon ICI 1%9 by C. F. pete<s Corporation. Used by pe<mis sion.
AlI riQ/lts resewed. No part ol lhis publication may be reproduced or tra ns mitted in a ny l orm or by a ny means, electJonic or
medlanical, induding photooopy, reco<ding, or a ny information storage a nd retrieva l system, without pe<mis sion in writing rrom
!he
Copyright 1C1 1995 by Westvie w J>ress, Inc.
in 1995 in !he Uoited states ol America by Westview J>ress, Inc., 5500 Central Aveoue, BouIde<, Colorado
B0301-2B77, a nd in !he United K.ingdom by Westvie w J>ress, 12 Hids Copse Road, CUmnor Hill, Oxford 0)(2 9JJ
libra ry ol Coogress Data
Beyond VlJ!)Oslavia : politics, eronomics, a nd rulture in a s hatte<ed oommunity I Sabrina petra Ra met a nd S. Ada movidl,
e'.
p. an.
IrdtJdes bibliographical a nd index.
ISBN 0-8133-7953-9
l . VlJ!)Oslavia - Eoonomic oonditions - 1945-1992. 2. VlJ!)Oslavia - Politics a nd !)Ovemmeot - 19BO-1992. 3. VlJ!)Oslavia - So<ia l
oonditions. I. Ra met, Sabrina P., 1949- 11 . S.
HC407.B39 1995
33B.9497- OC2 0
J>rinted a nd bound in !he Uoited states ol America
94-359B7
CO,
Contents
Preface ix
Intmdtxboo: lhe Root. ol Discord and !he
Lao(1Uage of War,
Sabrina !'etra ItJmet l
PART ONE
Adumbfatioos ol !he Break""
l . lhe Avoidable CatastJophe, Dennison
Rusinow 13
2. lhe Dissolubon of VUQOs lav Historiography.
lvoBimac 39
3. lhe Armed Forces of VUQOslavia : Slid"'u Onto
War,
Marko 67
4. Media : lhe ExteosOon ol Politics byothe.-
Means,
Jasmina 83
PARTTWO
lhe Republics
5. lhe SertJian O>urdl and !he SertJian
Nation,
Sabrina !'etra ItJmet 101
6. Demoaacy and Nationalism in O-oatia :
lhe First fuee Vears, DijiJniJ 123
7. lhe Bosnian Cri.i. in 1992, Paul Shoup 155
8. SIovenia's Road t o Demoaacy, Sabrina !'etra
ItJmet 189
9. lhe Macedonian EniQma, Sabrina !'etra
R.Jmet 211
lD.Politics in MOflteoegO"O, Milan Andrejevid!
m
p.bko-. Book H I., l\.oy"O>d P<>l rta. [c"nomo, o.d Cu l.u,. ;n Oommun;ty. Oon";bu'o.s, s..oon. _ .
R. mg - .,m"" l.jub;!.w S. - .,m"" PI ... of Publa ' ;<>n, """Id_. =. Publa ' ;<>n v.,"" ' ''''5. P09. "umb,
PARTTNREE
Economics
11.Economic Translormation in Forme<
VlJ(1Oslavia, wilh
5f}e<ial Regard to Privatization, s .
Adamovich 253
12. Foreign Economic Relations, Oskar KovaC
'"
13.Erwironmeol:al lsslJes and Policies, with
5f}e<ial
Atteotion to Monteoegro, Svetla"..
and
301
PART FOUR
Foreign Relations
14.Relations wilh!he SUperpowe<s, Branko
331
15.VlJ(1Oslavia s Relations wilh E .... opean
states,
Zach<lry T. Irwin 349
PART FIVE
CUlture and So<iety
16.lhe New Demoaacy- With Womeo or
Without lhem?
RiKia 395
17."0nIy Cmoks Can Get Ahead" :
Post -VlJ!)Oslav c.inemal
lV/VOdeo in !he 1990s, Andrew Hotton 413
18.lhe Catholic a-.....dl in a Time ol Crisis,
Jure Kristo 431
PART 51)(
CondtJsion
lhe VlJ!)Oslav Crisis and !he West, Sabrina
!'etra R.Jmet 453
About the Editors 477
About the Contributors 479
About the Book 484
Index 485
Preface
lo< !his book was be(1Ull in earfy 1988. lhe ioitial invitations Wefe issued in AUQUst - Septembe.- 1989, and
Ofga nizatiooa l wor1< related to a n eveorua l oooIe.-eoce was be(1Ull in 1990. By e a rfy 1991, it was a pJ>a reot Ihat !he Jong-fea red
brea kup ol YU(1Oslavia ha d become irreve.-sible a nd was now immineot, a nd at Ihat point, we reassessed!he project a nd
redesiOJlled t, a ddinu !he sectXm eotitled "lhe Republics in ord...- t o goive individua l atteotion t o eadl ol !he six OOflStitueot
re publics ol what onee was VUQOslavia.
lhis book was desi!lfled as a joint YU(1Oslav-Americao ooope.-ative eote<prise, a nd care was takeo to invite some ol !he most
sdwla rs a nd eXJlerts worhou in !he field. Ola pte.-s Wefe oootJacted /rOIlI sd>ola rs worhou in !he US, Brita in,
Ge<ma ny. Sert>ia, o-oatia, SIoveoia, a nd Macedonia. ne ithe.- ol !he two sdmla rs Irom SIoveoia a nd ne ithe.- of!he
two sdmla rs Irom Macedonia came Ihrouuh. a nd onIy 00" ol !he two sd>ola rs Irom Genna ny offe.-ed a dla pte.- lo< !he
book. In a ddition, a lthougoh great ,,/fort was expeoded in attempting t o obta in a m a pte.- on the Se.-bian political oceoe Irom a
distinQuishe d Se.-bia n sdwla r, eveotua lly our e/forts in that oonne<bon proved unava iliou, as first one a nd theo a nothe.- Se.-bia n
sdwla r Ieft: us lhe resull: was that we we.-e OOflstJa ined, lo< the s a ke ol stnxhora l ba la nee, t o move the Se.-bia n
Orthodox Olordl dla pte.- Irom the soda l issues se<bon ol the book t o the "Republics" se<bon, eveo thouuh it onIy pa rtia lly
oove.-s the t erra in oove.-ed by othe.- dla pte.-s in this sectron. No< was it our oriQina l inteotion that the SIoveoia a nd Macedonia
dla pte.-s be by one ol us; this solubon was Io<ced on us by the withdra wa l ol the sdwla rs oontJacted lo< these
dla pte.-s. Vet, l o< a D the that this book has!1Ofle through- tJava ils that a re by no mea ns uniQUe, but a re, on the
oontJa ry, thorOUQhlv lamilia r to a ny who have pa rticipated in ool a bofative projects - we that this book ma kes a unique
oootribubon t o the existinu lite.-ature, both in t em!S ol the brea dth of its oove.-a!)e a nd in t em!S of the ra n!)e ol opinion o/fe.-ed
he.-ein.
aur ori!)inal inteotion was to hoId the oonfe.-eoce in Dubrovnik, with Novembe.- 1991 as the prospectWe date. But by JuIy 1991,
it s e emed ooeasin!)ly li kely that Dubrovnik would shortly oome urnie.- sie!)e a nd we decide d to OOflveoe our me etin!)
somewhe.-e outside the oountJy. Lat e.-
Publ;co-. ' nf ........ -., Book H I. , I!ooyond P<>lrt;cs. Econom;cs nd Cul.u,," ;n Oommun;ty. Oon";bu'o.s , s.b.;n. _ .
R. m" . .d;,,,,. l.jub;!.o s. . .d;.",. W_ tv;_ "'-s. Pi u . ol publ""" ;on, Bou ld _. =. publ""" ;on v .. " '''''5. P' 9. "umb.<,
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lntroduction
The Roots of Discord and the
Language of War
Sabrina petra Ramet
No more SefY" your brutal war -J<ds, join (}Uf dancel No more slavel)'. join our dancel Oh dance to our sun' Oh
dance to (}Uf sun' Cruel war priest ol proud walled city Feared da Jriou mado"ss, Led his brutal army out
to battl .. , SIew an dar.cers, bumed alW,,!he Mad Da rriou Girl, 50 .. dar.ced in flam"s untiI she was ashes.
- Alan Americao oompose.-,
in !he text to his "Lady ol liQht"
( 19'68)
5uch nonsense- wiJntint;J fi put Serbs, Ctwts, iJnd inm one stale each. The BiJlkans iJre the most mixed region in
Europe, ali peop/e should /eam fi liv" to{Jether instead ot makint;J this absurd atrnmpt fi crearn ethnically deansed starns.
- KOro GIi!1OfOV, Presideot ol Macedonia':
I
I used to beheve Ihat nationalism had bolh beoeficial and harmful iocamatioos. Afte.- more Ihan Ihree years ol
sava!l"'Y in fOffller VUQOslavia, I am no Ionu".- cefta", ol !he supposed beneficjal iocamatioos, and am mo<e Oodined to
believe Ihat it is to suppr"s" natiooahsm rathe.-Ihan to wate.- a plant Ihat may bear sum po;sonous Iruit.
FOf a "!1OOd it is nothiou to kin a membe.- ol Ihe "enemy nation"; oolhe COfltJary, it is a point ol duty, Ihe
ol whidl is eJqlected to be rewarded bolh in lhis Me and in a supposed
p.bko-. Book H I. , l!ooy"O>d P<>lrta. [conoma. cul'u,. ;n Oommun;ty. Oon" ;bu'<><s , 500on. _ .
R. m" - .d;,,,,. l.jub;!.o S. - .d;.",. PI ... ol publ""" ;on, ""uld _. = . publ""" ;on v.,"" ' 9-95. P' 9.
"umb, *.
he.-ea/te.- in whidllhe 5upfeme Deity himseW is seeo as lavoOou one's own nation.
lhe 10U/ldinQ ol Ihe Y"'JOslav state at Ihe end ol 1918 was accompanied by mudl lanIa re. boIh amonu South Slavs and in
Ihe West . about Ihe triumph ol Ihe principle ol national seW-dete.-mination. lhis lanlare notwilhstanding. Ihe Yu!)Oslav
state QlJiddy revealed intemal /ragility as a resull: ol fundameota l diffe.-eoces ove.- its strudlJre and appfOpr;ate orieotation
t oward national diffe.-eoces. lhe inte.-war k.ingdom lasted 23 years belore it unde.-Ihe impact ol Ihe
Nazi.fasast OCQjJ>ation. into an intemal dviI war betweeo Croatian SertJian Oletniks. and oommunist Partisans. Tito
a new Yu!)Oslavia onlhe ashes ol Ihe old. and Ihe seamd Yu!)Oslavia lasted 46 twice as Iong as Ihe
first onee again into inte.-ethnic war. Bolh Ihe inte.-war kiogdom and Ihe Tito regime began by
attempting to impose a ceotJalized regime. and came t o realize Ihat . in Ihe oontext ol multinational Yu!)Oslavia.
onIy a deceotJalized model had any hope ol suocess. 8ut deceotJalization also had its loes. who ar!)lled altematively Ihat
Ihe approadl was inefficieot. lJflflecessary. and eveo """"",dem. " ::
lhe OOflSeQIJeot pe.-eonial teosions betweeo advocates of and advocates ol (or eveo
oonfede.-ation). in Ihe inte.-war e.-a. Ihe Tito e.-a. or Ihe post -Tito period. produced an atmosphe.-e ol pe.-petual
msis. in whidl monumeotal eoe.-!lies we.-e rivetted on eve.-y issue and in whidl economic. developmeotal. strudlJral.
pe.-sonoel. and policy QlJestions we.-e inevitably tJanslated into ethnicInational QlJestions. lhe instability ol bolh Ihe
inte.-war and postwar political lormuIas lent Yu!)Oslav politics a pe.-eonial seose ol .... geocv. but simultaneously Jlfeveoted
Ihe regimes /rom setting priorities onlhe basis ol any!hing olhe.- Ihan ethnic and national grounds. In Ihe earty 1980s. lor
exa"",le. Se.-gej Krajghe.- ol SIovenia headed a oommission whidl prepared a report whidl made various recommeodations
lor economic stabilization. Among olhe.-lhings. his recommendations would have some oompromise wilh Ihe
Jlfa<Dce ol near -amfede.-al deceotJalization. itseW a ooncession t o Ihe "national QlJestion. " As a result. Ihe Krajghe.- report
was still bom.
AIongside lhis pe.-petual msis. Ihe.-e have beeo rea.orreot Jlfessures /rom Yu!)Oslavia's disoonteots. lhus. as Ljubo 8Gban
has noted. " ... Ihe Ustasa [wartime Croatian lasast) movemeot itse4 was a direct Jlfoduct ol Ihe Yu!)Oslav state and its
Gfeat SertJian hegemonist policies. " lhe oommunists wanted to avoid Ihe mistakes ol Ihe inte.-war k.ingdom. but ironically.
made Ihe same mistake of Jlfovokion!) reseotmeot. Afte.- 1971. important sectors ol Ihe Croatian public we.-e
alieoated. and a/te.- Ihe Albania n riots in Kosovo in 1981. Ihe SertJian public became bolh more diseodlanted with Ihe
lede.-alized state and more vulne.-able to manipulation.
Pubko-. ' nf ........ -., Book H I. , ",""ond P<>lrt;cs. Econom;cs nd Cu l.u,," ;n Oommun;ty. Oon";bu'o.s , s. b.;n. _ .
R. mg . .d;,,,,. l.jub;!.o s . . .d;.",. W_ tv;_ "'-s. Pi u . ol publ""" ;on, Bou ld _. = . publ""" ;on Y .. " '''''5. P' 9.
"umb.<, 2.
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(1Uaoe as well. Bullets can t e<minate resist ance onlhe battlefield, but resist ance- eveo', as in hist Ol)'s most one-sided
d as hes, 0flIy a s piritual resistance- oontinues all Ihe same, as looOJ as any ot Ihe vanQUis hed nation are alive and
remembeJ. 0nIy a s uocesslul imposition ol ones own "national saipt" holds out Ihe promise ol a still more
oomplete 0001)', in whidl eveo Ihe survWo<s know 0flIy Ihe histOl)' writteo by Ihe ooo<s. lhe war about laflOJUaoe is at Ihe
same time a war lo< Ihe miods ol ones own nation, a war to ranks around Ihe "national idea, " as defined and
reodered in Ihe national saipt beinO JlfOJ>OUllded. Nation as vilin o< as hero, as ;ustified by God o< late o< histOI)', as old
o< new, as united o< divided by un;ust Io<ces- nation is Ihe value at Ihe heart ol many sum struooles oVeJ laflOJUaoe.
Newsreports loaJs Iheir atteotioo in Ihe first place onlhe purely military level on whidl wars are waoed, and to a
somewhat lesseJ exteol:, onlhe diplomatic"f'Olibcal and economic levels (whidl indude s um matteJs as embarOJOes, iIIicit
trade, price manipulations, and so 10Ml. But Ihere are olher levels ol warfa re whidl are also oonoomitants ot Ihe process.
one mi!)ht eoumeJate a numbeJ ol additionallevels, indudiJlOJ rultural, sexual (re. lhis, see Rada m apteJl,
and reliOJious, I s hall loaJs here 0flIy onlhe !inOJUistic level.
In lhis process ol Ihe dissolubon ol VUOJOslavia, Ihe IinOJuistic struoole has beeo waoed at various levels. First,
Ihere is Ihe reoamino ol towns and viIIaoes. Tito!)rad, !hus, has to its historical name, PodOJOrica, and s undry
HunOJarian villaoes in Vojvodina have beeo OJiveo Se<bian names, eveo thouOJh no Serns have lived lheJe. lhe Edvard
Ka rdelj University ot Ljubljana is no looOJer called sum. And Ihe Serns and Cm ats alike have ooncocted Iheir own names lo<
lands Ihey have seized: e. o., Ihe sernian desiOJllation ol part ol Cm atia as Ihe "Krajina, " and Ihe Cm atian desiOJllation ol
Cm at -<>Ca.OJ>ied HerzeOJOvina as fus arOJUflleol: about Ihe names ol places has exteoded to Ihe provioce ot
Kosovo, whidl Serns lately cali Kosmet, as Ihey did Irom 1945 t o 196B (revivinOJ, !hus, a name repuOJllant to Ihe A1bania nsl,
and to Macedonia (whidl lhe Gfeeks are willinO t o ooncede, at most, is "Iormer Macedonia"l, and eveo t o Ihe name
"VUOJOslavia, " wilh Cm atian reseotmeot Ihat Ihe Serns and MonteoeOJrios have dmseo t o call 1heir truncated st ate by lhis
name.
Second, lheJe is a oonscious effort to find "apJlfopriate" names lo< Ihe eoemy. lhe Serns, lo< example, st arted callinOJ Ihe
Cm ats already in 19B9, two years Ihe outbfeak ot war, s UlJoestinOJ Ihat Tudjmans Jlfo!)ram is pure
lasasm. lhe Cm ats, offeoded by lhis usaoe, have replied by calliJlOJ Ihe Serns "Oletniks, " but in lhis case, Ihe
name carries no stinOJ, because many ol Ihe Serns are in lad: Jlfoudly caniJlOJ Oletniks. On olher 1r0000s, Ihe
Serns have takeo t o callinOJ Ihe Albanians "Shiptars" (eveo thouOJh in Albanians
have wanted to be called "AIbaoo") , and the Muslims "Islamie Tito is a spooal case here, in that
has insisted on callinu him "Broz" (Titos actual lamily name), at the same time lorOnu the media t o lollow his lead.
lhird, at least some cit:izens have it necessary, in times ot war, t o m anue their names, in order to ass ert their
patriotism or ;ust to prese<Ve their lives and property. Nede/j".. Dalmadja, a SfJ lit weeldv, presented evideoce in
January 1993 ot a wave ol Cm atian cit:izens, who had m anued their names since 1991. As the newspaper
explained, these p""l>le "lor reasons well lmown t o want t o nullity the awkward national sound ol their own
names through this actXm." .".
And lourth, thefe has been a diWe t o Puritv the lanQUa!)e its e-lf, manifested, in Cmatia, dliefty in a pseudo-O"oatization ol
Cmatian, involvin!) the COM!) ol new words with indi!)eoous derivation and the revival ot armaic Cmatian-ooly words, and,
in Se-rbia, in the suppression ot the Labn alphabet (whidl had beeo widely promoted in Titos day) in lavor ol an exdusive
use ol the Cyrillic alphabet, whidl both and Cmats have assooated with Se-rbian rulture.
In addition to these lour bmad areas, thefe are also a numbef ol speOOC areas oloootJovefsy, sum as those surroundinu
the words " minority" and (as already meotioned briefty) "Vu!)Oslavia," and the nature ot the war itseK.
Let us take our first case, the word " minority." Websrnrs New Worlc! Dictionary oftheAmericiJn LiJnt;JUiJf)e delines " minority"
as "less than haK ol a t otal; a !)roup, party, or lactXm with a smallef numbef ol votes or adhefents than the majority." .":
lhe word has, thus, a purely mathematical relereoce, and acoo<din!)ly, 49 percent ol a population a minority,
while 51 pefcent ol a """ulation a majority. For reas ons havin!) to do with the nature ol Titoisms d aims
vis-a-vis the nationalities QUestion, 10 the Vu!)Oslavs never allowed, in the years lollowin!) World War Two, that there were
"nr "mioorities" in the oountJy, although urnief a strict defioition ol the word, thefe Wefe 0II1y mioorities, sinee eveo the
lar!)est !)rOup (the less than 40 percent ot the t otal. As lon!) as the state was at peace, however, this
QUestion as t o whethef the Macedonians, let us say, Wefe a " minority" within VU!)Oslavia, or a "" ation" within Vu!)Oslavia
(why not both?) seemed a QUibble, and most obse<Vers seemed content t o let the Vu!)Oslavs reject mathematical ooocept s
and d>oose more subjectWe ideolo!)ical ooocepts. With the dissolubon ol the state, howevef, has come the stranue
spectade ol within Croatia insisbn!) that, with 11.6 percent ol the """ulation ol that republic, they were " not a
minority, " wllile their co-ethnics in Bosnia insisted that with 32 pefcent ol the population ol they Wefe
also "not a minority" ot the population ot Bosnia. lhe drawn /rom this
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He.-ze(1Ovina. " In a typical e/fort to dlWe this point home, the politically rabid Belgorade da ily PoIitika ekspres reported
(Ialsely) in Ma rm 1992 that Ismet desaibed as a ministe< in the Bosnian (1Ovemmeot ol A1ija Izetbe(1Ov;,:, was
demanding that Islamie Shariat law be made the basis ol dvil law in 15 By oontJast , in Cm atian eyes
and media portrayals, the<e is ultimately no diffe<eoce between Se<tiias wa r aOJainst Cm atia itseK and Se<tiias wa r aOJainst
Bosnia. Both are seen as wa rs ol t emtorial expansion, st oked by infIaminOJ nationalist m alNinism and inte< hatreds.
IrOf1ica lly, it was Sloboda n himseK who wa med, in January 1990, aboul: the da JlOJe< ol "national and reliOJious
hatreds" whidl couId "sprioOJ /rom out ol the dar1mess ooncealinOJ them into ol day, the hatreds that led us into a
/ratricidal wa r in the past , a wa r whidl we well know was s udl that its COflSeQIJeoces will b .... den the COflsOOus ness even
ol the OJene<ations that are vet t o be bom." 16
III
It be years belore the luli COflSeQIJeoces ol the war are known. Most West ern news reports are based eithe< on
battlefield observation or on visits t o the respective capital city. 1000000ed are the various t owns and villaOJes whidl are not
""de< sieOJe, but whidl, typicalty, bear the brunt ol the b .... den ol war: the capital city is, as a rule, the last t o leel
shorta OJes. lhis is why West ern and othe< travele<s reports that shops in Belgorade and Zagoreb are fuli ol OJOOds
(Qualified, at hiOJh prices) miss the point, whidl is that the wa r is indeed destroy'onOJ the eoonomies ol these republics,
0JtJttin0J eotire oommunities and drivinOJ l>uOJe numbe<s ol people below the poverty line. KraOJlljevac, onee a thrWinOJ
industrial town, has been eoonomicalty ravaOJed by the war, and many!ocal Serns are without worl< and roam the streets
idly: random <rime in KraOJlljevac has soared sinee earty 1992, as a result. the Se<tiian eoonomy has st eadity
downwards, eodt.inoOJ an infIation rate ol 19,BlO pe<ceot in 1992. !."..AccOfOOOJ t o reoowned YU(1Oslav eoonomist Oskar
KovaC, up t o 90 pe<ceot ol eote<prises in the Fede<al Republic ol YU(1Oslavia (Sernia and Montenegoro) may (10 bar.krupt
belore the end ol 1993, with many mar1<ets Iost t o Se<tiian firms . .:."..Health se<Vices and medical prot e<bon
have likewise deteriorated in the FRY sinee the outbfeak ol the wa r, and Belgorade atJthorities leared widespread lood
shorta OJes by the end ol 1993, in the eveot that the international embar(1O was not lifted (or more e/fectively
Or<Ullveoted). '0 lhe<e are, ot oourse, always those who profit durinOJ times ot hards hip and scarcity, and COflsisteot with
this pattern some Belgorade firms have m alked up sizeable profits :':"But by Novembe< 1992, the<e we<e already
nearty 3 million ""employed in Se<tiia and the numbe< was risinOJ. n
lhe situation is, ol course, worse in o-oatia, whose labo.- lorce ol 1. 2 mil..", pe<sons must s ustain the burdeo ol fina rriou
the 270,000 unemployed (as of Decembe< 1992), 550,000 refu!)ees, and 667,000 p""sione<s. O-oatian
economy has beeo mar1<.in!) up an anoual bud!)et deficit ol $2.5 billion, and O-oatian authorities announced st e"f' tax
m eases to t ake effect in January 1993. 2J Industrial J)foductHm has lali"" in O-oatia- by 28.5 pe<ceot in 1991 alone and
by another 28.1 perceot in the first si>< months ol 1992 - while infIation, whidl roa red at 609.9 pe<ceot in 199{), slowed
t o 122.6 pe<ceot in 1991, and has a ept upwards a!)ain t o 384.3 pe<ceot in the first six monlhs ol 1992. Exports dedined
24.7 pe<ceot in 1991, and anothe< 19.3 pe<ceot in the first sev"" monlhs of 1992. ' 5 In the Serbian Krajina, whidl was
always the J>OOfest re!)ion in o-oatia, the<e have beeo reports ol the exhaustion ol lood and the emI!)I"ation ol
Iocals t o SIoveoia and inne< Serbia.
80snias economy is completed !)Utted, wilh eotire industrial sectors physically destroyed or da ma!)ed beyond simple repair.
Moreove<, mudl ol the transport infrastru<hore li nl<io!) 80snia with Cm atia and linkin!) parts ol 80snia has be"" destroyed,
dliefty by Se<tiian militias, iICOOfdin!) t o news reports. And eveo !hose republics not involved in the fi!lhtin!l, viz., SIoveoia
and Macedonia, have be"" affected by the war: the disruption of trade coJlOectrons, the restri<bons of the UN imposed
trade embar!)O on Se<tiia and Monteoe!l'o, and, in Macedonias case, the derivative Gfeel< bIod<ade have ag hit these
economies hardo
lhe resull: is a re!)ion seriously impacted by the war- whethe< in t emlS ol lives Iost, or in t emlS ol the destructHm ol the
economic infrastru<hore necessary lor !hose who s urvive to make their way. lhe old Yu!)Oslavia, whidl died a stormy death
as risin!) t ore it limb Irom limb, has not onIy beeo politically dismantled, !hus. It has also beeo psyd>olo!)ically
scan ed and economically retJo!l'essed, while alI the while, the new muses of war have elabo.-ated national saipts t o
lhis new pur!)atory (wilh its moments ol s hee< hel) as it we<e heaveo.
Notes
In inte<View with Profil (Vieooa), 3D Novembe< 1992, p. 57, trans. in Fll IS, Daily REpott (Eastem Europe), 1 Decembe<
1992, p. 60.
Z. Rados lav JUfJOSlavij a, nadje i po/i tika (BeI!I'ade : Nova Imji!)a, 1988).
:L. Ljubo Boban, "still More Balanee on Jaseoovac and the Manipulation ol History, " in East European PoIi tics and
Societies, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Sprin!l1992), p. 215 .
.1. See my arWe, "lhe Breakup olYu!)Oslavia" ,in GIobaI Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Sprin!l1991), p. 97.
:i... Bo!)da n Deoitdl, Umi ts and Possibili ties: The Ctisis otYuooslav Socialism and state Socialis t Systems
Unive<s ol Minnesota Pfess, 199{)); and V.
P. Ga!lOOfl .Ir . "Vu(1Oslavia- Prospects IOf stability" in Foreign Affairs Vol. 70. No. 3 (SUmme< 1991). Also Deooison
Rusioow. "To Be Of Notto Be? VlJ!1Oslavia as Hamlet: in UFSI Field staff REpotts. 1990-91 series. No. lB (.lune
1991).
IrdtJding eveo Ihe rod< oceoe: IOf disrussion ol !his lesse< !mown dimeosion. see Sabrina Ramet. Balkan
Babel: PoIitics. CUlture. and REligion in Yuoosfavia (BouIde<. Colo. : Westview Press. 1992). dlapte< 5 (" Rod< Musie") .
L. Cynthia Codd>um. "A Womeos Political Party IOf VU(1Oslavia : IntJodtxbon to Ihe SertJian Feminist Manifesto: in
FeministReview. No. 39 (Winte< 1991). p. 156.
Nedeljna Dalmacija. as QlJOted in Borba (Belgrade). 20 January 1993. p. 12. trans. in FllIS. Daily Repott (Eastem
Europe). 2 February 1993. p. 4B.
Websrnrs New World Dictionary ot the AmericiJn LiJnt;JUiJfJf'. 2nd eollege Ed. (develand. Ohio: William eonins and
World Co . 1976). p. 906 .
.lll. FOf disrussion. see Sabrirla Proa Ramet. Nationalism and Federalism in Yu",, s/avia. 1962-1991. 2nd ed.
(Bloomiogton. Ind. : Indiana Unive<sity Press. 1992).
11. ZOfan offe<s a somewhat diffe<eot appmam. ar!)lJing Ihat insolar as old VU(1Oslavia has ceased to exist. so
too have old Cmatia. SertJia. Bosni,.. Hen:e(1Ovioa. and Macedonia. leaviog only peoples with legitimate rights. but
not preexisting legitimate states. as is usually supposed. lhis ar!)lJffieot would. ol oourse. appeal to Ihe Gfeel<s.
See "Ju(1Oslawieo- ein unerw[)nsdl!:e< staat. " in Die Neue Gesellschaft. Frankfurter Hefte. Vol. 3B. No. 9
(Septembe< 1991). p. 775 .
.u.. lhe remairlde< ol !his paragraph draws Ireely Irom my essay. "Delegitimation and Relegitimation in VlJ!1Oslavia and
Afte<. " in GeOfge Andreopou!os (ed.). International Serutity in Eastem Europe. lorthooming Irom Gfeeowood Press.
U Tanjug (26 January 1993). in FllIS. Daily REpott (Eastem Europe). 27 January 1993. p. 44 .
.H. Tanjug (17 Octobe< 1992). in FllIS. Daily Repott (Eastem E .... ope). 20 Octobe< 1992. p. 37 .
.l.5.. PoIitika ekspres (Belgrade). 31 Mardl 1992. summarized in Tanjug (31 Mardl 1992). in FllIS. Daily REpott (Eastem
Europe). l Aprill992. p. 42.
lli PoIitika (Belgrade). 22 January 1990. p. 2.
lL. Borba (6 Novembe< 1992). p. 11.
PART ONE
Adumbrations of the
Breakup
Pubko_ Book H I., l\.oy"O>d ""1;'0, Ec"n<>m;cs. o.d c ul'u,. ;n Oommun>ty. Oon";bu'o.s , s..b.;n. _ .
R. mg - .,m"" liub;!.w S. - .,m",. W_ tv;-. Pl o<. of Publa ''''" , """Id_. =. Publa ' ;<>n V.,"" '''''5. P094'
"umb.<, *
1
The Avoidable Catastrophe
DeooisOfl RusIoow':
HistoriaJl" and social s<ieotists are adept at disroveOng why whateve.- happeos was always inevtable, as
!he various efforts to pmduce some altemative resull: had Jleve.- had any pwspect ol suce" ss whatsoeve.-. 50 it is wilh!he
violeot disorn:egration ol VU(1Oslavia in 1991. Sd>olars are already busy f ollowing lhe media in desaibing VU(1Osl avia as an
artificial" state (whateve.- Ihat meaJls) and an . -fated experimeot Ihat was doomed to shatte.- onee Tito'. dictat Ofship
was no Jon!)'" !he ... , t o hold it t O!)ethe.-. lhe de"" wwal, religoious, hist orical, and soOO-eamomic diffe.-eoces amon!) its
peoples and Iheir aR" !jedly aooeot Of eveo primo<dial hatJeds ol one anothe.- are why ts a eation was unoatural and ts
disOntegoration inevta ble.
fus is a lIawed ar(1Uffieot. lhe hiddeo premise ol !he purportedly partirular and lat al artificiality" ol !he VU(1Oslav
state is Ihat onIy homo!)eo""",s sioQle-<lation Jlation-states are "natura!" and sustainable or eveo legoitimate.
Leaviou aside as a QUibble the oounte.--ar!lOffieot that ali stat es are human (and contionueot) artifacts and !hus artifrial:
!his hist orically and th"..,,-etically debatable and mudl debated Pfemlse is lar ITom seK-evideot and at best a pot eotially
mis leading over -simplification of a oomplex set ol modem wwal and political pheoomena. ::"Seoondlv, the OOflteotion that
some or aU ol the South Slav peoples have always hated one anothe.- so mudl that onIy Royal and then Communist
dictatorships oouId temporarily SUJ>llfess their "'!le t o lar!lescale re<ipfocal violeoce is OOfltJadicted by the historical reoo<d.
Except lor devastatin!) in inte.--<:Offi/lllJrlal dviI war wilhin a wide.- triurle war Wortd War II, whidl
OC<UTed in exceptional cirwmstances and with extemal (Axis) provocation, most of them have lived in relative peace-
althou!)h not necessarily in harmony- Ior most ol the ceott.ines that two or more ol them have oohabited in many
oountJysides and t owns. With oooperation
Publ;co-. ' nf ........ _, Book H I. , I!ooyond ""H. ;cs. Econom;cs. o nd Cu l.u,," ;n o Oommun;ty. Oon";bu'o.s , _ o
Ro m" . ,m",. l.jub;!.o s. . ,m",. W_ tv; ... PI ... ol publ"" ;on, Bou ld _. = . publ"" ;on V. ,"" 19-95 . P09.
"umb.<, *.
as oommon as oonllct, m e< -a>mmunal violeoce has beeo as s poradic and us ually as '" olhe< multi-a1ltural states
and regions Ihat are normalIy regarded as also oonllict -f}rone but funda meotally oommunities. AIthough easily
subject t o seotimeotal, romantic exagge<ation, Ihe "anecdotal evideoce" ol me< .failh and m e< -eIhoic mama ges,
and lrieodsmps and ot s hared least -days and house..-aisiog is too impressive '" QUa ntity and '" spatial and t ""'l>Ofal
distribution to be dismissed as marg;nal or irrelevant.
As will be ar!)Ued below, Yu!)Oslavias seoond dism egration actually became "",evitable" shortly it O<XUTed, and
primarily because Ihe caW ations and/or ",,,,,brude ol post -Tito politicians /rom seve<al regions and nations, s""eOmposed
on a decade ol JllOUIlbng eoonomic, poiibcal, and sodal msis Ihat had Ihe regime and system but not yet
Ihe state, tJa nslomled endemie teosions and oonfIcts among its dive<se nationalities m o ooNe<bve existeotial lears lor
Iheir oommunal survival lhat progressively infected Ihem ag. What was ",evitable (and widely OOflside<ed a
Onhibibon) was Ihat Yu!)Oslavias deoonstructHm, OOfls ummated '" haste and by unilate<al actXms, would be
violeot ralhe< lhan Eveo Iheo, howeve<, Ihe ma!)Jlitude ol hatJeds released and Ihe iohuman bn.tality ol Ihe
violeoce are oompreheosible as Ihe results ot deli be<ate iocitemeot and exploitation, by Ihe same politicians, ol
hist orical or pe<sonal memories ol aooeot and receot wrongs and ste<eotypes Ihat a Bosnian sero, spealOng lor he< own
nation, calls "lhings [lhat ) slumbe<ed '" Ihe hearts ol many seros, but it t ook an ",dustry ol hate to reville Ihem. "
"The Improbable SUrvivor: stevan Pavlowitdls title ol a book about "Yu!)Oslavia and its problems" '" 1988, is an
apt desaiption ol Ihe oountJy Ihat his We and t ext assumed would somehow and improbably oontinue t o s urvive
'" some loml. Yu!)Oslavia was always a doubtful and problematic a eation: a multi..,ational anomaly '" Ihe age ol
and and a union ol dive<se pe<>ples, eodowed by s""arate histories wilh distinct rultures and
more or less di stinct lan!)Uages, aaJte diffe<eoces '" economic developmeot and me<ests, and ", seve<al cases already lully
developed, widely diffused, and esseotially oompetitive national OOflsOOus ness and "Ilational ideologie s. " They sOOfl
disoove<ed Ihat Ihey had l>ttle '" oommon exc""t "lhe Yu!)Oslav idea" and Ihe ol lan!)Uage, myths ol origin, and
aspirations to be /ree ot lor";!)Il domination on whidl it was based. s urvive it did, and des pite Ihe
m ewal ol its destructHm by Ihe Axis '" 194 1 and Ihe dviI wa r and attempt ed mutual genocide Ihat 10Nowed, /rom 1918
untiI 1991.
Yu!)Oslavia was not Ihe a eation ol Woodrow Fourteeo pom s and Ihe peace process ol 1919-20, although Ihese
la<ilitat ed and OOfls ummated its aeation, or solely Ihe re-<Teation ol Tito and his Communist
-14-
National Libe.-ation struggle, although Ihese we.-e esseotial to ts restoration. It was a eated On 1918 and re-<l"eated On
1943-45 by patriotic Sot.dl Slavs who Ihat some lorm ol union- although Ihey might disagree about Ihe
lorm- was prefe.-able to s""arate nation-states Ihat would be sma., weak, vulne.-able to reoewed loreign domOnation, still
multi..,ational (except SIoveoia) and oondemned by Ihe ethnic map and oompeting Odeologies to a plethora ol
minorities and a pla!)Ue of reciprocal irredeotisms.
fus is Ihe esseoce ol "lhe Yugoslav idea," twice bom and triumphant ove.- oompeting national ideas and
pmgrams and now, along wilh Ihe YU!)I>slav state, twice dead and buried. :"Its streogth is its recognition ol Ihe
of dra wiog Ihe borde.-s of true (nationally homogeoeous) nation-states whe.-e nations are so scatte.-ed and
iote.--<ningled, and Ihe Onevitability ol irredeotist oonflicts and minority pmblems wilhin and among s UPJ>Osedly national
states imposed on sum an ethnic patmwork It recognized Ihe importance ol Ihese pmblems lor Ihe Serbs,
Croats, and or Croato-Se<tiian-speakin!) Slavic Musli ms (since 1968 officially a s""arate nation), whose
diasJ>Ofas ouI:side Iheir historical matrix-states (lor Jlfeseot J>UIl>Oses OOflside.-ed to be Ihe late lede.-ations republics ol
Se<tiia, Croatia, and OOflstituted 25.6 pe.-ceot, 20 pe.-ceot, and 19 pe.-ceot ol Iheir respective total
numbe.-s On Ihe ceos us ol 1991, takeo ;ust before "ethoic deansiog" began to mange Iheir distritiubon . ."..It is no
ooincideoce Ihat Ihe priocipal advocates ol Ihe YU!)I>slav idea we.-e Croats, seros, and Muslims Imm !hose parts of Croatia
and oohabited by two or an Ihree of Ihese p""l>les. Its primary wealmess was its advocates lail .... e to
recognize Ihe existeoce, or else fuIIy to oompfeheod Ihe implications, ol oompetiborl Imm Ihe eariie.- or late.- ol
lun.ffedged national OOflsOOusness and national ideologies among Croats, Serbs, SIoveoes, some MonteoegOns, and
eveotually also Macedonians and Muslims.
In ts late.- evolution- wheo "1IIyrianism" had become "Yu!)I>slavism" alte.-Ihe demise ol Ihe Odea ol IlIyrians as Ihe oommon
ancestors ol ag Sot.dl Slavs- advocates ol Ihe Yugoslav idea sought to oope wilh lhis Jlfoolem On one ol two ways. lhe
first, whidl has beeo called "iotegral YU!)I>slavism" or "Yu!)I>slavist unitarism, " -"-was by deoy;"g lhe s""arate nationhood ol
Serbs, Croats, and SIoveoes ali ke, or seelOng to supe.-sede t , by eilhe.- J>Osoog lhe existeoce of a single "Yugoslav nation"
(subdivided ioto and pemaps olhe.- historically.formed "trities" or "names") or by a eating one (late.-
called lhe seoond, lound On an phases ol Ihe "Ttoist answe.-" to Ihe national QUestion exc""t ts drift
toward iotegral YU!)I>slavism, circa 1953--62, 10 was by reco!)fliring s""arate nationhoods and seelOng OOflstitutional and
olhe.- lormulae lor a multi. national state ol related peoples with s hared iote.-ests and aspirations.
-15-
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ood YlJ(1Oslav state is Ihat J)(}fle ol Ihe majo< national oommunities, howeve.- mudl eadl oonside.-ed itself disadvantaged O<
exploited, le'" Ihat Ihe existeoce of its members as a national rommunity was actually eodange.-ed, eilher in its "own"
Republic (lo< Ihe six South Slavic "st ate nations") o< AtJtonomous Province (lo< Ihe J)(}fl-Slavic Albanians ol Kosovo) o< as a
numerically sigoificant minority in anolher Republic (e.g., Ihe sems ol Cmatia).
lhis had not beeo Ihe case in sem-oominated inte.--war YlJ(1Oslavia, whe.-e most J)(}fl-Sems came t o leellhreateoed as
national oommunities by Se<tiianization in Ihe !)lJise ol prodamations and policies desigoed to meld Ihem into a single
"YlJ(1Oslav nation." (The exception was Ihe SIoveoes, who we.-e pmtected by dist anee, oompactness, Iheir own
laJl!)l.lage, and Ihe deals Iheir leaders strud< wilh Belgrade, and who still perceived Deutschtum and italianita as Ihe primary
Ihreats t o Iheir temtory and rultural oommunity bolh wilhin and outside YlJ(1Oslavia.) No sudl existeotial lear was aedible
in Titos lede.-al ylJ(1Oslavia . .:."..He.-e eadl SolJlh Slav nation, and alte.- 1 %B eveo Ihe OI>Pfessed Albanian
"nationaMty" in Kosovo, eojoyed (o< in Ihe MlJslim case shared) Ihe PfotectXm and Pfomotion ol its a.oItural and national
ideotity provided by a de juro o< de facto republic and a national..communist political elite ol its own. lheir diasporas,
officially part ol Iheir respectWe state-<lations and not minorities ("nationalities") , possessed a measure oloorrespondin!j
prot ectXm unde.-Ihe YlJ(1Oslav whidl at least united aM sems (as Ihe largest and most seositive diaspora nation)
in a single lede.-al state. To lhis extent, Titos strategy ol oontaioiog divisive Ihrough a oombination ol
temtorial-<lational atJtonomy and a balanee ol powe.- and gr;evanees among lhe oonteode.-s (espe<ialy betweeo sems and
J)(}fl-Sems) may have provided a mo<e viable sok.ition to Ihe national question Ihan is geoe.-ally recognized today, wheo its
instabiMty and "transient" nature is manifest. it may have done mo<e t o prese.ve bolh
peace and unity Ihan his ability t o blow Ihe whislle wheo he thought it was not worhn!), as he did to t Ol>ple
and "li be.-al" leade.-ships in Cmatia and elsewhe.-e in 1971-72. lhe Pfoblem alte.- 19BO was not only Ihe lad< ol sudl a
Quasi-amfederal Ihe legacy ol Titos strategy in its fina l phase, was no Ionger worlOn!) in
pra<bce. It was also ioaeasingly dlalleoged in prir.ciple by Ihe most nume.-ous nation, Ihe sems, who we.-e ooming to
regard it as a plot , based oolhe priociple Ihat "a weak Se<tiia is astrong YlJ(1Oslavia, " t o keep Ihem divided and powerless
in a state Ihey believed Ihey had done Ihe most t o aeate and
Kosovo Pfovided Ihe time.ruse, and Slobodan MiIosevic provided Ihe detooato<s, lo< a dlain ... eactHm ol explosioos in whidl
first sems and Iheo Albanians, SIoveoes, Cmats, and olhe.-s came t o believe, olteo t o Ihe point
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nation suffered by Serbia under Tito's rule and call"'u lor remedy Ihrougoh a unified and stronu Sert> oommunity and state.
"
By Mardl 19B9, wheo he became Presideot ol Serbia's state presideocy ""de< a new ooostitution also marhnu Ihe ellectWe
eod ollhe autonomy ollhe two provinces, oouId boast Ihat SertJia- if not vet ag Ihe Sert>s- had beeo
reunited. In oonsonance wilh hist orie Sert> prelereoce, as Ihe largest nation with Ihe largest diaspora, lor a ceotJalized
("unitarist ") Vugoslavia in whidllhey assume Ihey will play Ihe leading role and can bette< protect Ihat diaspora, he had
also laundled a fuMe< campaign lor a streogtheoed lede<al ceote<, bolh !)I>vemmeotal and in Ihe League ol Communist s.
"
In Ihe process, and in Ihe reactXms ol J)(}fl-Sert>s t o a strategy Ihey pe<ceived as an attempt t o reimpose bolh Sert> and
Communist hegemony Ihroughout VU!)I>slavia, Ihe Kosovo poIson spread to Ihe rest of Ihe country.
SIoveoes we<e Ihe first to exp<ess widespread ooncem Ihat strategy, and Ihe passioos Ihat we<e
being laJlfled and exploited in its se<Vice, oouId presage Ihreat s not onIy t o Iheir autonomy but t o Iheir Ionge< -te<m survival
as a sman nation in a sero- and VU!)I>slavia. SIoveoe cags lor a Ioose oon/ede<ation ol "sove<eign"
states or outright secession inside as wen as outside Ihe Republic's Communist establishmeot. By 19B9 ooollict
betweeo SIoveoia and SertJia, escalating Imm mutual acaJs ations and Ihreats to boyootts, teIDJ>Ofarily tool< ove< Imm
Sert>-O"oat issues as Ihe ceote<piece of Ihe national QUestion.
As exteoded his daim to be Ihe lmight-errant ol serodom to Ihe diaspora seros of Cmatia and Bosnia-
Heue!)l>vlna, and as Cmatia's Sert>s responded (in rural regions whe<e Ihey we<e a majority) with demonstrations deay;ng
"wltural geoocide" by Ihe Cmatian regime and caning lor autonomy, Ihe Cmats ol Cmatia and Ihe pluraMty
and Cm at minority in we<e ooeas.ingly prone t o similar lears. 50 we<e nationally ooosOOus
Macedonians, recallin!) Iheir defioition as "South Sert>s" and SertJianization policies in Ihe first VU!)I>slavia, and !hose
Monteoegrins who believed Ihat Ihey are a Monteoegrin natron ralhe< Ihan Ihe best and fie<cest Sert>s.
A viOous Orde ol reOp<ocal lears, fuel ed by deObe<ate incitemeot ol memories Ihat had slumbe<ed in Ihe hearts, was on its
way t o becoming a viOous spiral ol seW.fulfilling prophooes. Its first aaJte and violeot vortex, as
desaibed was in parts ol Cmatia wilh!ocal sero majorities or large minorities. He<e actXms and reactXms based on
lears lor Sert> national and Cmatian t emtorial integrity or survival would leed on one anolhe< - with Ihe first aggravated by
espooally awlul!ocal ollhe (Cmatian lasast ) regime's attempt to exte<minate Cmatia's seros dt.inog
Ihe Second World War and Ihe second by Ihe region's
strategie Jocation astride <nrial oommunications between OOfltineotal and Dalmatian O-oatia- untiI both were ooeasOnulY
valid.
Defied by first one and then most ol the republics. the writ ol lederal authorities. high/y limited in oonteot Ihroughout the
1980s. had meanwhile ceased t o run in almost all matte<s. lhe way Se<tiias new oonstitution was adopt ed in Ma rdl1989.
parts ol the SIovenian one prodarned that Sept embe<. and leg;slation t o """lemeot both ol these W>lated the lede<al
OOflStitution wilh implN"oity. ' 5 Emotional express"""s ol hypertmj}hied national seotirneots mounI:ed almost eVe<yWhe<e. In
these Oram!st ances irrecor.cilable oornfOfltation between a joint SIovene.Q"oatian pr(}j}Osal lor a Ioose
oonfede<ationthat Se<tiias rule<s lound t otally U/lacceptable and a Se<tiian ..... spired prDposal lor a "modem lede<ation"
(more centJalized than ylJ!)I>slavias sinee the 1950s). whidl SIovenes and o-oat s rejected out ol hand. seemed to J)fesage
a bfeak...-p and violence to preveot or OOfls ummate it.
1990 began wilh the evaporation of the Lea!)l.le of Communist s ol YlJ!)I>slavia. and wilh it Sloboda n putative
strategy t o restore a more centJalized lederation. ' 6
lhe partys demise came da wn on 24 January 1990. wilh a dra matic adjoumment sine diem ol its 14th and last
Coogoress. It had been OOflvened si>< monIhs ahead ol sdledule at the request (a contiongency aulhorized by the party
st atute) ol the Vojvodina Lea!)l.le ol Communist s. naw a sat ellite ol Se<tiian Party. lhis slJggests that
believed that the time was riQht lor his bid lor a revitalized and re-<:entJalized oommunist party. whidl he oouId oootrol. and
Ihrough whidl othe<. recalcitrarit Republican leade<ships oouId be t amed as Tito had t amed them.
II so. he had miscalrulat ed- and not onIy becalJse of measing resist ance t o his hegemonie intentions in most
ol the country. In the between the s ummons t o ConQress and its oonveoing a revolutionary wave s wept aaoss the
rest ol east em E .... Oj}e. t"",,1iog Communist regimes and promisiog demoaatic e.JectXms and mar1<et eoonomies eVe<yWhere
except in Albania. In YlJ!)I>slavia. untiI but na longe< the proud ol "li be<ahzation" and "mar1<etization"
""de< Communist rule. these eveots reinforced a trend toward acceptance ol e.JectXms and their own
oonve<s""" into So<ialist or So<ial-demoaatic parties that was already well ""de<Way among SIovenian and O-oatian
Communist s and gatheriog st eam in Macedonia and In Decembe< in these
republics. whidl had already desffibed as lorming "an """riocipled anti-Se<ti ooalition." won majorities that
exceeded some ol their own expectations 27 in the regional party OOflgresses that had J)feceded and ooeasOnulY
intIuenced lede<al COfl<JI"esses sinee 1969.
-22-
lhe SIoveoe arrived oommitted to walk out the Coogress lailed t o ilCCept a still ""'se.- (oonfede.-al) "Lea!)Ue ol
Lea!)Ues, " eodofsement ol mulbparty ele<bons, and a strong st and in lavOf ol "human rights" throughout the oountJy
(read: Kosovo), al! ol whidl oohort ol Imm Se<bia, the lormally separate parties in Vojvodina and
Kosovo, and Monteoegro were bound t o """"se. At the end ol lour days ol aaimonious debat es, the SIoveoes did
walk out. Afte.- a dramatic oonfrontation at the podium betweeo and Cmatian party PTesident Ivica Raean- Se<ti
against Cmat again, without the SIoveoes as buffe.- and loiI- a rump session eveotually agreed with Racan's insist eoce
that the Congress oouId not oontinue without one ol the Lea!)Ue ol Communists' OOflStituent regiooal parties.
lhe Communist Party Of Lea!)Ue of Communists ol VlJ!)Oslavia, aeatOf and slJstainer of the second VlJ!)Oslav st ate, had
self-disintegrated. Little was t o sUJ>port the oontinuance ol that st ate except the residue ol "the VlJ!)Oslav idea"
and its rationale, a motley ol lederal Ofgans with diminishing atJthority, and the AImy with its 70 percent Se<ti and
Monteoegrin office.- OOJllS. And the oonfrontation betweeo and Racan ma r1<ed the return to cente.--stage in the
VlJ!)Oslav drama ol rivalry and oonfIict betweeo VlJ!)Oslavia's two largest nations, with large diasJ>Ofas in one anothe.-'s
homelands and inte.-mingled in to magnify the risks.
lhe sole and momentary exception to the rule ol diminishing lede.-al atJthority was the PTesideot ol the Federai Exea.tive
CounciI (Iede.-al !)Ovemment), Ante whose demonstJation ol leade.-ship in laund-.ing the most and
hopeful economic reforms ol the post_ Tito e.-a was elevating his and popuIarity at the moment of the VlJ!)Oslav
party's Congress and demise. pemaps also in a momentary reflelrive seardl IOf a substitute pan-VlJ!)Oslav symbol, public
opioion pol s that spring ideotified him as the oountJy's most popular politrian, eveo in Se<bia. In.lune I to people
in Belgrade and 2agreb disrussin!l, more in hope than in lear Of with any evideoce that it mi!)hl: happeo, the possibility ol
an AImy-s""ported, time.,limited "Roman dictatOfship" (their te.-m, although more recent Tt.rlcish precedents also oome t o
mind) t o pe.-mit t o and impose a new OOflStittJbon, and to aeate demoaatic oountry-wide parties, ove.- the
heads of Republican-<lational Party leade.-ships. But dithe.-ed, and the window of opportunity IOf some k.ind ol
soltJbon" disappeared, it eve.- exist ed, befOfe he anoounced the lormation ol his own pan-VlJ!)Oslav
"Party ol Reform FOfces" in late summe.-, and t(}{} late.
What was left ol the VlJ!)Oslav idea was meanwhile sufferiog the oonseQIJeoces ol its oo-<>jltation by the Communist Party,
""de.- the now ooeasiogly dubious slogan ol South Slav "brotheffiood and unity, " into the
-23-
disaedited wheo not passKmately despised COfl>US of Titoist -Communist ideology and propaganda. II Communists had
pfOmoted it, acaJfding to the "'gic ol the new times, it must have beeo a bad and probably idea.
By the eod ol 1990 aU six republics had held geouinely oompetitive muIti"f}arty electHms: in SIoveoia and
Cmatia in in Macedonia and in Novembe<, and in and Monteoegro in Decembe<. ' " As
a reflectHm ol voter the res u"=s and ma ndates they bestowed we<e sometimes mo<e ambiguous (even
disoounting the net ellects ol some Iraud and mo<e presslXe as unmeaslXable) than the pariiameotary majorities and
govemmeots they produced. In Cmatia and the electo.al arilhmetic ol single.."embe< OOflstituerries tJa nslormed
me<e electo.al pluralities into de<isive one"f}arty pariiameotary majorities, in lurthe< infIated by an AJbania n boyoott
of the electHms. In SIoveoia the pariiameotary majority and govemmeot represeoted a ooalitiofl of seven antiaHnmlrist
but othe.wise hete<ogeoeous parties, called Demos, none ol wl1idl received as many votes as the
party o. its lorme< youlh o.ganization. And in Macedonia the lormation of a non"f}arty "govemmeot of e""erts" lollowed
Ihree monIhs ol Iruitless attempts to assemble a wor1<.ing majority in pariiameot. Mo.eoVe<, the public stances ol the
wirloin!) parties o. ooalitiofls teoded to ambiguity on the vital QUestion ol the future s hape of VU!)Oslavia and its
a"=ematives.
Four of the six electHms produced non-<:ommunist majorities and govemmeots, these induded oo-<>j}ted o. lorme<
Communists, induding lhree heads ol state: Presideots Kuea n ol SIoveoia (Presideot ol the SIoveoe party Irom 19B6
to 19B9), Franjo Tudjma n of Cmatia out of the party and antiaHnmunist lo. 20 years), and Kiro Gligorov ol
Macedonia. lhe exception was A1ija who became Presideot ol seveo.."embe<
state Presideocy; in prison a decade eariie< lo. activities and an "Islamie Dedaration" that the regime then and his
<>i>poneots in the 1990s OOflside<ed "Islamie he was now head ol his Republics mo<e militant MusIi m party.
Al ol the new govemmeots, induding the Communist ones in (where the ruIing party had renamed itseK the
Party ol in 1990) and Monteoegro, can lairty be desaibed as nationalist in orieotation and policy- except in
trinational where preceotages of the electo.ate votiog lo. Serb, and Cmat parties were
almost proJ><Hti<>nate to the national oomposibon ol the population. lhe<e the new oollective state presideocy and
govemmeot were lo. the momeot precariously mublational and pledged to the civic peace and terTitorial integrity
ol their Vugoslavia"'.."iniature- an impossible prospect the greate< VU!)Oslavia we<e to disintegrate.
-24-
Whe.-eve.-Ihese ne w (1Ovemmeots or individualleade.-s eojoyed astronu pariiameotary majority a nd a weak or divided
oppos iborl, Ihey t eoded t o dis play a uthorita ria n instincts. One example was Iheir attempts s uocesslul) t o
s ubstitute Iheir own lor Communist ove.- mass media, espeOal/y t elevision. A maliOous obse.-ve.- might desaibe
Ihe-ir as a n attempt t o s ubstitute "lhe dictatorship ol Ihe proletariat, " whidl was Ihat ol its Communist
"va ngua rd," wilh "lhe dictatorship ot Ihe nation, " meaniog as its tutors. Whe.-e Ihe lorme.- was intole.-aJlt ot
olhe.- d asses, Ihe latte.- teods t o be intole.-ant or at least inseositive t owa rd olhe.- nations a nd national minorities within its
jurisdi<bon: Se.-bs in Cm atia, Muslims a nd Cm ats as we-ll as Albania ns in Se.-bia, "SouIheme.-s" (Juznjaa) ol ag kiods in
SIoveoia, a nd olhe.-s.
In Ihe JnOflIhs alte.- Ihe-ir electHms, Ihe (1Ovemmeots ol SIoveoia, Cm atia, a nd Se.-bia watdled Ihe-ir popuIa rity siipping in
public opinion pol s, prima rily (lhey a nd press oommeota ries assumed) because Ihey we.-e seeo t o be doing little a bout Ihe
stil deteriorating eoonomy bul: also in reactXm t o Iheir poIibcal alAhorita ria n in Se.-bia a nd Cm atia a nd
high-handed a nd blundering in SIoveoia. Tri..,ational (1Ovemmeot in passed Ihrough stalemat e t o
effective dis integration a nd domination by its Mus hm part. 30 In Ma rdll 991 hold on Se.-bia was seriously
dlalleoged wheo Ihe a rmy was called in t o dispe.-se a peaceful demonstration by Ihe oombined oppos iborl in Belgrade,
res ulting in two dealhs a nd sparhn!) a live-day oca.opation ot Ihe city ceote.- by pfOtesting studeots a nd olhe.-s.
made ooncessions a nd seemed to be in serious political trouble.
In eadl case Ihe (1Ovemmeot ooncemed 10Ulld some way t o reforus J>OI>UIa r attentiorl on its nations respective national
tra umas a nd national eoemies, to reite.-ate lhat "OnIy Unity Saves Ihe Se.-bs" (or Cm at s or SIoveoes, although it is a Se.-b
sloga n ot great a ntiQuity), a nd !hus t o reooup popula rity a nd diss enbng voices. In doing so Ihey igoored (a nd in Ihe
process also gradually eli minated) Ihe possibility Ihat dedining popula rity might also reflect ala rm ove.- poliOes on Ihe
national front a nd in inte.-..-epublican relations Ihat seemed t o be leading towa rd a bfeak_ UJ' , lor whidl none ol Ihem as
vet had a dear ma ndate or evideoce ol majority s upport (eveo in SIoveoia, a nd astronu probability ol eosuing
violeoce, whidl almost no one vet wa nted.
In a double oonfrontation, wilh one a nolhe.- a nd wilh Iheir own learful a nd volatile OOflstitueocies (a nd oppos iborl parties,
some more radically nationahst Ihan Ihey), Ihe politrians in dla rge ol Se.-bia, Cm atia, SIoveoia, a nd Ihe Mus hm,
Se.-b a nd Cm at parties in we.-e pairlting some a nd some by mis ma nagemeot,
into come.-s fumis hed wilh poliOes a nd promises Ihat Ihey oouId not realize without ris lOng a <iviI wa r or a ba ndon without
Iheir own politi
-25-
cal demise. lhese we<e national salvation lo< SIoveoes and Cm at s Ihrou!)h secess""" and lo< seros Ihrou!)h unity in a
s"'ule (eithe< VlJ(1Oslav o< Gfeate< SertJian) st at e. But Ihe<e we<e also seve<al occas"",s wheo Ihese politicians miQht have
escaped oomeOng, some had possessed Ihe wOlI and olhe<s Ihe skiII, in ways Ihat would eilhe< prese<Ve some lorm ol
Ioose ass ooation o< provWe a medlanism lo< a gradual, peaceful, and COflseoslJal divo<ce. lhe right oombination ol wOlI and
skil was always lad<.ing.
W>th pariiameots and (1Ovemmeots Ihat oouId da"" t o eojoy Ihe mandat e and legitimacy bestowed by demoaatic ele<bon
in place by Ihe eod ol 1990 (except in Macedonia, whe<e Ihe new (1Ovemmeot was /malty inst alled only in Ma rm1991),
lormal ne(1Otiations about Ihe ftJture ol Iheir OOmmOfl st at e, postponed untiI all muld da"" lhis mandat e, began again.
lheir ceote<piece was a series ol meetings ol top republican and lede<alleade<s, Ihe first on 26-27 Decembe< 1990, and
Ihe last on 6.lune 1991, whidl became !mown as "VU-slJmmits" C"VU" lo< VlJ(1Oslavia). J2 lhe SIoveoes and/o< Ihe Cm at s
boyootted o< walked out ol some ol Ihem. lhe rest and a para"eI series ol meetings betweeo republica n leade<s
produced just eoou!)h appareot progress t o waJTant ""timistic evallJations by participants and most of Ihe media, whidl
we<e QUiddy betrayed by oontradictOfY inte<pretations bad< in republica n capitals.
lhe initial basis lo< Ihese ne(1Otiations was provided by "A Confede<ate Model Among lhe South Slav Slat es" first t abled by
Ihe stat e presideocies ol Cm atia and SIovenia on 4 Octooe< 1990, along wilh adralt "Treaty ol Ihe VlJ(1Oslav
Confede<ation" by Ihe Cm atian Presideocv, and " A eoncept lo< Ihe COflstittJtional System of VlJ(1Oslavia on a Fede<al Basis:
whidl reflected SertJian prefe<eoce lo< a lede<ation wilh eohanced central powe<s. JJ lhe diffe<eoces seemed
uobridgeable, but some (espeOalty Bosnian and Macedonian) participants stubbomly oootioued to trv, and Ihe rest at least
preteoded to. lhe final attempt t o build a bridge- a oompromise prOj}Osal lhat tilted toward Ihe Cm at o-SIovenian
"Confede<at e Model" but retained some central monetary, fi scal, and olhe< maao-economic oornmls- was preseoted by
Presideots of and GligOfOV ol Macedonia at a VU-s ummit ol Ihe six replJblica n presideots on
6.lune 199 1, whe<e it was unanimously accepted as a basis lo< furthe< disaJss"", at Iheir next meeting. H Uke its
predecesso<s, lhis last agreemeot o< preteoce ol agreemeot was Quiddy by eveots, lhis time in Ihe lorm ol
doof -slaJl>lllir>g secess"",s and 0viI war. lhe meeting ol 6 .lune was t o be Ihe last VU-s ummit.
Whelhe< and lo< whom Ihese ne(1Otiations and olhe< efforts to defuse an ooeasingly e""losive situation we<e sinee<e o<
gestures deemed necessary lo< a variety ol reasons- t o win time to arm; t o shift o< sIlare Ihe blame lo< """"pular o<
undesira ble outoomes; t o pe<s lJade, eolarge, and mobilize ones own COflStitueocv o< t o reduce and demobilize Ihe olhe<
sides;
-26-
O< lo< all ol Ihese and olhe.- reasons- are debatable QUestions. lhey are also important as part of a biuge.- QUestion, also
hotly debated onlhe basis of selective and inadequate evideoce: we.-e some already so set onlhe palh to
unilate.-al secession o< to maintaining lhe preseot o< a more ceotJalized union by Io<ce Ihat Ihe die was already cast? In
any case, olhe.- developments we.-e meanwhile malOng a break-<iJ> more ralhe.-Ihan less lhese induded: 35
On 23 Decembe.- 1990, 89 pe.-cent ol Ihe 94 pe.-ceot ol Ihe SIoveoe electo<ate who went to Ihe polis voted, in a
refe.-eodum o<ganized by Ihe Demos !)Ovemmeot, lo< "an independent and sove.-eign SIovenia" Ihat Ihe !)Ovemmeot
promised to delive.- at Ihe eod ol six monlhs, as a lully independent state, Ihe olhe.- me republics had not by Iheo
agreed to a IDose COflfede.-ation in a "Lea!)Ue of 5ove.-eign states. " Legal and olhe.- preparations lo< separation, already
unde.-way, we.-e accele.-ated and s uggested Ihat Ihe deadline was seOous.
On 15 Mardl 1991, Ihe Serbian regime preapitated a six-day ooostitutional msis in Ihe .."embe.- oollective J>resideocy
ol Yu!)Oslavia Ihat meOts additional atteotion because it set Ihe stage lo< its effe<bve destructHm two monlhs late.-. It
began wheo Borislav Serbias membe.- ol Ihe J>resideocy and its J>resident -to< -a-year (to 15 May), resigned alte.- his
proposal lhat Ihe J>resideocy unleash Ihe army against internal unrest was voted down, 5-3, wilh Kosovos membe.-, R.lza
Sapundxija, unexpectedly voting wilh Ihe majority. lhe membe.-s Irom Vojvodina and Monteoegro also resigned, and
dedared Ihat "Seroia will not reoognize a single de<ision by Ihe Fede.-al J>resideocy. " lhe Serbian pariiament
"relieved" Sapundxija as Kosovos membe.- and elected Sejdo in his place, Ihe.-eby exe.-osiog powe.-s vested by
Ihe Fede.-al ConstittJtion in Ihe pariiament ol Kosovo Ihat Ihe Seroian pariiament had (also unoonstittJtionally) dissolved Ihe
previous summe.-. Amid growing furo< in Yu!)Oslavia and abroad, and no o< a negative reactHm by Ihe army,
resignation was lormally rejected by Ihe Serbian Assembly on 20 Mardl. 8ad< to square one, except Ihat Monteoegro,
Vojvodina, and Kosovo would be rep<eseoted by Iheir pres idents untiIlheir new membe.-s of Ihe Fede.-al J>resideocy we.-e
bolh elected and oonfirmed by Ihe Fede.-al Assembly, whidl was delayed by Ihe irre!)lJlarity untiI16 May.
On 16 Mardl, Ihe seoond day ol Ihe J>resideocy msis, a new ve.-sion ol reite.-ated dedarations ol alJl:ooomy by a Serbian
National CounciI, purport;ng to speak lo< Ihe sero majority in a region in Cmatia Ihey called "Krajina" (see below), became
a dedaration ol separation Irom Cmatia. It was lollowed two weel<s late.- by a dedaration ol union wilh Serbia.
On 25 Mardl J>residents and Tudjma n met at Karadjordjevo, a hunting Iodge in Vojvodina onee lavo<ed by Tito, lo<
private talks Ihat reportedly induded disrussion, onlhe basis ol a map o< maps, ol a parti
-27-
tion ol betweeo Seroia and O-oatia. lhe<e had already beeo olhe< indications Ihat
recogniring lhe bankruptcy ol his ptJtative eariie< stJategy lor a more ceotJalized VU!)Oslavia and unwillin!) to
accept a IDose< one. had shifted to Gfeat e< Se<tiia as a less desirabie but more leas ible lor sero unity and his own
ambitions. Reve<siog an eariie< position. he was now prepared t o accept Ihe rigIlt t o "national sef-determination"
(induding secession) lor SIoveoes and o-oats as national oommunities. but not lor republics as t emtorial eotities and only
s eros in O-oatia and Bosnia we<e iICOOfded Ihe same rigIlt. He and olhe< Se<tiian leade<s we<e also iSsulng repeated
wamiogs Ihat Se<tiia would demand m anges in iote< ... epublican boundaries. whidllhey t e<med administJative. artiitJary.
and "Titoist." VlJ(1Oslavia eithe< dis integrated or became a OOflfede<ation.
fus approadl to Ihe preOoice on Ihe polibcal front was replicated. and becoming violeot.
in Ihe oountJyside. Most seOous oooIrontations and eos uing violeoce in lhis period OC<UTed in Ihe lorme< Habsb .... g Military
Frontie< (Voj na Kujina) in O-oatia (begir.r-.iog in AlJ!)l.Ist 1990) and Iheo in ceotJal and eastem Slavonia (in Ma rm and
May 1991 lhese regions. in whidl o-oat s and seros have oohabited lor ceoturies. 36 would also be Ihe first
battle-zones in Ihe War ol O-oatian Secession lat e< in 1991. and Ihe first proof- with Bosnia Ihe second and
Kosovo Iogicaly Ihe third- Ihat VlJ(1Oslavia oould not and would not disiotegrate in peace.
O-oatian Krajina is a mountainous. J>OOf. and iohabited temtory rur1ing around Ihe bofde< with Bosnia.
s eros (or "V1ahs") settled he<e. with Habsb .... g eooo .... agemeot. as free warrior "f}easants pledged to drop Iheir
and seize lheir !)lJl"ls t o Turbsh inrursioos (lhe eoemy m anges. but Ihe tJadition pe<sists). and are a majority or a
large minority in most Iocalities. lhey are a majority of Ihe sparse J>Oj>ulation in six (oounties) in Ihe karstic and
iohospitable Knin region. whe<e 89.55 1 s eros we<e 77 pe<ceot ol 117.000 iohabitants in Ihe 1991 ceoSlJs. and in six
in neartiy 8anija and Kordun. whe<e 73. 481 seros acoounted lor 65 pe<ceot ol Ihe 1991 population. Memories ol geooOde
by Ihe lascist dt.inog World War Two and neve< -again dete<mination are parfu.olarfy stJong in 8anija and Kordun.
whe<e some ol Ihe worst wartime atJoOOes OC<UTed; Sero-O"oat oompetibon lor Ihe Knin regions scarce arabie land and
jobs made it a breeding ground lor ioteose seotimeots sinee at least Ihe earfy 20th ceotury. In Slavonia. whidl
is lar more le<tiIe and J>Oj>ulated. 83.558 s eros oonstittJted sizeable minorities (more Ihan 25 pe<ceot) in six
(laur in ceotJal Slavonia and two on Ihe Se<tiian bofde< in eastem Slavonia). but outnumbe<ed o-oats onIy in ceotJal
Slavonian pakrac; an additional 116.902 s eros we<e less Ihan 25 pe<ceot of Ihe population in olhe< Slavonian opdne.
Furthemmre. ag ol
-28-
Ihe sems ol Ihe 18 O-oatian opdne where Ihey were a majority or large minority accounI:ed lor 0flIy 42 percent (or wilh Ihe
rest ol Slavonia 62 pe<ceot) ol O-oatia's 581,000 sems. J] lhe rest, iodudiog large numbe<s in Zagreb and othe< urba n
centers, were in effect igoored- "oonsigned by Se<bia to was Ihe ironie oomment ol one ol Ihem in a JuIy 1992
oofwe<sation- in Ihe political and Iheo battlefield campaign lor Ihe lN1ion ol ag sems in one Gfeate< Se<bian or rump
Vu!)Oslav state. In !his seose Krajina was a oontrived test.
From Ihe Knin district in and alte< AlJ!)lJst 1990, wheo O-oatia's new paramilitary "spooal" police and armed seros first
oonfroflted one anolher in Ihe oontext ol a Iocally organized "plebiscite" on atJtonomy lor Ihe region Ihat O-oatian
atJthorities vainly attempted to J)feveot, to Pakrac and P]itv;ce (Uka) in earfy and late Mardl respectively, and to 8omvo
SeIo (eastem Slavonia) on 2 May 1991, Ihe fuse lit by in Kosovo spar1<ed a series of ooeasingly violent
detonations. lhe first seOous numbe< ol casualties and latalities we<e inrurred at 8omvo SeIo and in lesse< incideots on
Ihe same and lollowing days in Dalmatia and Krajina. Some date Ihe beginning ol dviI war, and Ihereby Ihe end ol Ihe
endgame ove< Ihe and lashion ol Ihe disintegration ol VlJ!)Oslavia, to 8orovo SeIo; lor othe<s Ihe point ol no
return was Plitvice. Ja
In Ihe political areoa Ihe eodgame began on 15 May Ihe day Stipe ol O-oatia was in line to become President ol
Vu!)Oslavia's Presideocy but did not. In what s hould have beeo a purely lormal ele<bon by his pee<s (""de< a sdledule lor
rotation amon!) Ihe lederal units laid down wheo Ihe Presideocy was aeated), received 0flIy lour votes, one
short ol Ihe reQuired majority. and Ihe presideots ol Vojvodina and Kosovo (standing in, li ke Presideot Momir
ol Monteoegro, lor new members not vet confirmed to replace !hose who resigned or were "relieved" in Mardl) voted "no."
abstained because, he explained, Ihe Fede<al Assembly had insulted Monteoegro's eQllality by not vet approviog
its new member ol Ihe Presideocy. In a new vote on lhe lollowing day, alter Ihe Fede<al Assembly hastily confirmed Ihe
Ihree new membe<s in what was assumed to be a quic! pro quo afTangemeot lor ele<bon, all lhree joined in
voting against him. lhese maneuvers J)feOpitated anolher COflstitt.itiorlal msis, /rOIlI whidllhe lederal Presideocy,
pariiameot, and !)Ovemmeot in effect neve< eme<ged alive. J9
On Ihe lollowing SUnday and unde< Ihe influence ol Ihese events, Cmatia's vote<s went to Ihe polis in a rele<eodum wilh
two QlIestions and a lore!)Ofle condusiorl. WiIh a tumout ol 84 pe<ceot, whidl suggested Ihat most O-oatian seros stayed
away, more Ihan 90 pe<cent voted "no" to Ihe first QlIestion: "AIe you in lavor Ihat Ihe Republic ol O-oatia remains in
Vu!)Oslavia as a united lede<al state ... ?" Approxirnately Ihe same majority, 94 pe<ceot, voted "yes" to Ihe second: "AIe
you in lavor Ihat Ihe Re
-29-
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responsObility IOf Ihe break-<.op and eosumu violeoce, whidl was brief and hmited IOf Ihem but not IOf olhe.-s.
Total indepeodeoce IOf SIoveoia was Ihe proceduraIly bul: fixed OJOa l ol many SIoveoe intellectuals and bolh
Communist and "alternative" (non..communistl politicians by Ihe s umme.- ol 1989, as noted previouslv, and some ol Ihese
had beeo oontemplatinu it eveo The steps to ad>ieve!his OJOa l and Iheir timinOJ, as Ihese unloIded in Ihe
months befOfe 25.lune 1991, dose/y resembled Ihe mOfe cautious ol two strateOJi es Ihat we.-e beioOJ debated by
some ol Ihese same people, in Of dose t o Ihe new Demos OJOvemmeot, in Ihe summe.- ol 1990. They are lhe.-efOfe
responsible, wilh help /rom IOf havinOJ ad>ieved what Ihey wanted. 8u1: SIoveoias OJeo!)raphic Iocation and
homoOJeoeous J>OI>ulation (90 pe.-ceot SIoveoe and almost no SIoveoes in olhe.- republicsl made it a spe<ial case. Eve.-yone,
by 1990 indudinOJ (whose subseQUeot behaviof s UlJOJested Ihat he was tJionOJ to drive Ihe SIoveoes
out, not keep Ihem inl, admowledOJed Ihat VUOJOslavia muld in priociple survive SIoveoias departure alooe. The
oo ... IOf Ihe violeot bfeak-<iO ol Ihe rest ol VUOJOslavia ol Ihese people, and ol Ihe Demos ooalition and public
opinion Ihey manoeuve.-ed and led to secession in.lune 1991, derives larOJe/y /rom Iheir ethooceotric seW-preoca.opation
and !)rowinOJ indiffereoce t o Ihe late ol Iheir lellow South Slavs, indudinOJ Iheir Cmat partne.-s in "COflI"ede.-al model"
proposais, whom Ihey abandoned in Iheir calrulated ",s h IOf Ihe exil:. Their timinOJ wor1<ed IOf Ihem, bul: it pus hed Ihe
Cm at s fuMer and last er Ihan was wise: Tudjma ns dedaration Ihat Cm atia would secede "lhe day alter SIoveoia, " wheo
Ihe OJOOd reasons he OJave IOf not doinOJ so Ihe day befOfe would not have OJOfle away, reco!)r1ized Ihe poss ib/y
lateful da maOJe Ihat Ihe defe<bon ol Cm atias mief ally would infIict on Cm atias neOJOtiatinu stre<lOJ\h' Cm atia linOJered;
bul: it may aiso have beeo t arOJeted aaoss Ihe western borde.-, in a final ellort t o dete.-Ihe SIoveoes /rom IOfcioOJ Ihe
Cm ats to abandon hope IOf a solubon less risky Ihan secession at !his time and in Ihese ara.mst ances .....
As IOf Ihe Cm ats, Iheir most lateful and !)reatest to eost.inoOJ Ihat 0viI war would lollow Iheir dedaration
ol indepeodeoce !)rew out of Ihe inseos itivity (at least l ol Tudjman and his OJOvemmeot and party t oward Cm atias seros
and Iheir historically justified lears of becominOJ seoond-dass cit:izeos, Of WOfse, in a Cm atian nation-st ate dominated by
Cm atia n politicians unwillinOJ Of ooosideOnOJ it politicaly ine""edieot t o disso<iat e Ihemselves /rom Ihe lasast satellite
"Indepeodeot state ol Cm atia" and its OJeoocidal poliOes t oward seros and olhe.- non-O"oats in Ihat state. Mojmir Kriza n,
who is olhe.-wise sympalhetic t o Cm atia n positions and dilemmas, deS<ribes!his "series of ooncerninOJ Ihe seros in
Cm atia" as lollows:
-31-
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was dismembe.-ed by Ihe secessKm ol O-oatia and delay io issuiou an iotemationally dealh
certificate and Ihe timinu and way io whidl its heirs we.-e and we.-e not recognized would tragicaly protong and aggravate
its ooeasioQly ooleot and brutal post_ mortem agony.
When dviI war became Ihe ioevitable deoouemeot ol break-<iJ> is easie.- to answe.-. It was when mofe Ihan homogeneous
and expendable SIoveoia lollowed Ihe palh to muIti..,ational o-oatia, with a large and armed Se.-ti
minority to accept Iiving io a unita rist and intole.-ant O-oatia and enjofon!llhe support of Se.-ti irTegulars, Ihe
Se.-tiian regime, and Ihe Se.-ti-oominated YUQOslav army. Tom apart by Se.-tiian and O-oatian irredeotis ms
oompetitive and OOOj}e.-ative) and MusIim J)fetensions (whethe.- defensive..-eactive Of premeditated), Bosnia- Hen:egoWla
oouId not kmg remaio immune. The.-ewith we return to Ihe oonIIict and dilemma between Ihe basic rationale ol "lhe
YUQOslav idea" and its competitOfS: Se.-tis, o-oats, Slav;c Muslims, and olhe.-s oondemned by Iheir dispe.-sal and
extensive areas of oo-habitation to live togethe.-, and oondemned by oompeting national rull:ures, ooosciousness, and
ideologies to find it extraOfdinarily diffirult.
Notes
Portioos ol lhis dlapte.- have been adapted /rom DeonisOfl RUSInoW, "To Be Or Not To Be? Yugoslavia As Hamlet: io
Field staff REpotts, 1990-91/No. I B (.lune 1991).
Important COfltributOfS to Ihe debate iodude E.e Kedourie ed. and roo., Nationalism in Asia and (New YOfk
Meridian, 1970), Emest Gell ne.-, Nations and Nationalism (Ilhaca : Univ. Press, 19B3), Benedict Ande.-SOfl,
ItniJfJined Communities (London: Ve.-so, 19B3), and Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism s;nce 1780 (Cambndge :
Unive.-sity Press, 2nd ed., 1992).
Simultaneously a oomplex multi"f}arty !)Ueffilla war agaiost ocaJpie.-s and two k.iods ol dviI war: iote.--
oommunal and ove.-Ihe oountrys futore political and sodal Ofde.-.
.1. Gofdana Knezev;c, assodate editOf of Ihe Sarajevo Os!obodjenje, as quoted by John F. Bums, "Hate Was .!ust an
Embe.-, But Oh, 50 Easy to Fan," ioNew york Times (17 January 1993), p. E-4.
stevan K. The Improbable Sllrvivor- YuoosJavia and its prob/ems: 1918-1988 (Columbus : Ohio state
Unive.-sity Press, 1988).
Data based on lhe 1991 ceosus. he.-e and a re /rOIlI ROIa Petmv;,:. "The Nabonal Composibon ol YU(1Os lavia 's
Populabon." in Yuf}OSlav SUrvey. Vol. 33 (1992). No. l . pp. 3-24.
The second by Banac. in The National Question a nd "Post ..communis.m as Post -Yu(1Oslavis m: The YU(1Os lav
ol 19B9-1990: in Ivo Banac (ed. ). Eastem Europe in R2vo/ution (Ilhaca : Comell Unive.-sity Press.
1992). PP 16B- I B7 .
.lll. Pa ul Shoup. Communism and the Yuf}OSlav National Question (New York Columbia Unive.-sity Press. l %B). lor Ihe
wartime to 1%7 period. a nd Deooisonl. Ruslnow. "lJnfinished Business: The YU(1Oslav ' Nabona l Quesbon': in
AmericiJn Universi ties Field staff Repotts. 19B1/No. 35 (Au!1Ust 19B1).
11. E.g . Deooison I. Ruslnow. "Afte.- Tito ... " in American Universi ties Field staff Repotts. 19BO/No. 34 (JuIy 19BO) .
.u.. I reco<ded!his SIoveoe lita ny a nd its Cm atia n a nd Serbian a na lo!1Ues <lt.inog 19B9-9O visits t o Ihe three republics.
U Except Ihe Mus Ii m nabon. wllidl "s ha red" tri..,abona l BoSJlia- He.-ze(1OvIoa wilh Ihat Republic's Serbs a nd
Cm ats a nd was not lully recognized as a separate nabon untiIl %B .
.l1. studies in Eo glis h ol Ihe pw cess a nd oooseQuences indude steveo L. Burg. Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist
YUf}OSIavia (Princeton. N.J. : Princeton Unive.-sity Press. 19B3); Sabrina P. Ra met. Nationalism and Federalism in
Yuf}OSlavia. 1962-1991. 2nd ed. (Bloomin!)ton. India na : India na Unive.-s ity Press. 1992); April Carte.-. Democratic
R2form in YUfJOS/avia- The ChatIfJitIfJ RDIe ot the Party (London: Frances Pinte.-. 19B2); a nd contributions by WoKga ng
HOpkeo. Deooison Ruslnow. a nd olhe.-s in Pedro Ra met (ed. ). Yuf}OSlavia in the 1980s (BouIde.- : Westview Press.
19B5) .
.l5.. The onIy notable excepbon. late a nd during Ihe endga me ol YU(1Os lavia 's diss olution. was Ihe Ma r1mvic (1Ovemmeot's
initia lly successlul "shod< Ihe.-apy" reforms ol 1990. wllidl seve.-al republican (1Ovemmeots sabotaged.
For a s umma ry ol Ihese measures a nd accomplishmeots. see Robin Remington. "The Fede.-al Dilemma in
YU!)Os lavia. " in CUrrent Histoty (Decembe.- 1990). pp. 4071.
lli IndudiO!) Ihe sources cited in Note 14. For "apocalypse a.olture" see Pedro Ra met. "Apoca lypse CUlture a nd Sodal
OlaO!)e in YU!)Oslavia. " in Ra met (ed. ). YUfJOS/avia in the 1980s [not e 14) . pp. 3-21. For one view of a key iss ue in
Ilistorical revis ioois m. Robert Haydeo. "Recounting lhe Dead: The Redisrove.-y a nd Redefinition ol Wartime Massaaes
in Late a nd Post ..communist YU(1Os lavia : in Rubie Wat s on (ed. ). Memory and Opposition Under state Socialism (Santa
Fe: Sdmol ol America n Resea rdl. 1993). My own periodic "snapshots" ol Ihe process a re in UFSI R2potts. 1982/Nos.
39 & 40 Decembe.- 1982 1983/No. 3 ApriI 1983). a nd 1986/No. 21 (Novembe.- 1986).
.l2.. Alel<sa Djilas, The ContestOO Country [note 6), p. 187.
Zll. Numemus studies and oommeotaries in non-Vu(1Oslav lan!)Ua ges on !he bad<grOU/ld and dynamics ol !he Kosovo
problem in !he eartv 1980s indude Jem Reute<, Die JlJbaner in Juooslowien (Munidl : R. OIdeobourg Vertag, 1982);
Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism [note 14), pp. 187-201; Sami Repishti, "lhe Evolubon ol Kosova s AtJtonomy Within
!he VU(1Oslav Coostitubonal Framewor1<," Paul ShouJ>, "lhe Govemmeot and Constitutional status ol Kosova, " and
o\he< oontributo<s t o AJshi Pipa and Sami Rep;shti (eds. ), studies on Kosova (llouIde<, Colo. : East European
Monographs, 1984). Deooison I. RUSInoW, "lhe Othe< Albania : Kosovo 1979: in Atnetkan Universities Field staff
REpotts, 1980/Nos. 5..f> (January 1980) is a firs!hand report on !he situation 18 months befo<e!he 1981 explosion.
:.u. sero unhappiness with A1banian and irredeotism" in Kosovo,!he exodus ol !he provinces remaioiou
Slavs, and SertJias division and redU<bon t o "inne< SertJia" Ihrougoh de lacto republican st atus lo< Kosovo and
Vojvodina was voiced in !he CeotJal Committee ol !he SertJian party as eartv as 1%8 (by historian Jovan
and write< Dobrica who we<e mtrized and dropped /rom !he oommittee). Howeve<, popular reactXms eveo to
developmeots alte< 1981 we<e notably mUl:ed and olteo despairiou (" Kosovo is Iost l") untiI ga lvanized by in
1987.
:.22.. "Memorandum SANU: published in tem<! (2agroo), Vol. 33, no. 1-2 (1989), pp. 128-163. lhe seoond part,
eotitled "lhe Situation ol SertJia and !he sero Nation" (pp. 147-53), oontains !he catalog ol gr;evances and remedies
!hat became!he "8ible " ol SertJian in !he l ollowing years.
II DeS<riptions and aibcal eva luations of methods and role indude Sabrina P. Ramet, "SertJias Slobodan
A Profile: in Orbis, Vol. 35, No.l (Winte< 1991), pp. 93-105; Sabrina P. Ramet, Sodal CUrrent5 in Eastem
Europe: the Sources and MeanifIfJ ofthe Great Transformation (Durham, N.C. : Doke Unive<sity Press, 1991), dl. 7;
8anac, "Post ..communism as Post -VUQOslavism" (see Note 8); and Mojmir Krizan, in JuQoslawieo: in
Osteuropa, Vol. 42, No. 2 (February 1992), pp. 121-140. Cribcal sero indude Dfag;sa O/ako obeffina
brzina (2agroo: Globus, 1988); and Slavoljub Kako se dooodio vocIja (Belgrade: Visnjic, 1992).
1!. Krizan, in Ju(1Oslawieo: pp. 123-127, preseots a useful (but iooomplete and somewhat prejudiced)
dlronology of !hese developmeots /rom 1986 t o Octobe< 1991. RUSInoW, "To Be Or Not To Be?: pp. 5-11,
summarizes and inte<prets!he same to eartv lune 1991.
:.2..5.. Robert Haydeo, "A ConIede<al Model lo< VU(1Oslavia ?: pape< preseoted at !he aronua l meetinu ol !he American
Assooation lo< !he Advancemeot ol Slavic studies in Washington, D.C., 22 Octobe< 1990; Robert Haydeo,
"Constitutional Nationalism " in Slavic Review, Vol. 51 No. 4 inter 1992 ; and Robert Hayden "lhe Be ol !he
:.u. Inte<View with Bra nko Ca rat a n (lheo a le a de.- ol Ihe "reform" wing ol Ihe o-oab a n pa rty), Zagreb, 17 May 1991.
ZlL. FOf mOfe detailed summa ries a nd a na lyses, see steveo L. Burg, "Nationa lism a nd Demoaatization in Yu!)Oslavia ," in
The Washington Quarterlr, vol. 14, no. 4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 5-19; RUSInoW, "To Be OJ Not To Be: pp. 6-9; a nd
reports by Mila n Arldrejevidl in Ra dio Free Europe, REport on Easrnm Europe, vol. l, nos. B (23 Februa ry
1990), pp. 31-33; lB (4 May 1990), pp. 33-39; 20 (17 May 1990), pp. 22-26; 4B (3D Novembe.- 1990), pp. 25-32; 49
(7 Decembe.- 1990), pp. 20-27; a nd vol. 2, no. 3 (lB Ja nua ry 1992), pp. 26-32.
Z.2. As desaibed by Ja smina in !his volume.
:Hl. As desaibed by Pa ul Shoup in !his volume.
;u. Arl public opinion pol takeo by Ljublja na Unive.-sitys Resea rdllnstitute ol Ihe Farulty of SocioIo!IY,
Political saeoce, a nd in e a rfy 1990, whidl may have giveo Ihe leade.-ship pa use lo< thou!lht, showed a
majority of SIoveoes sbn in lavo< ol belonging to a Ioos e.- a nd prefe.-a bly "oonfede.-al" Yu!)Oslavia , oould be
adlieved.
;u. lhe first round indude d Ihe oo"ective B-<nembe.- Pre sideocv of YlJ!)Oslavia , Ihe pre s ideots ol Ihe republics, a nd
olhe.-s . lhe second, beginoing in Ma rdl, wa s lo< presideots ol Ihe republics but not Ihe Presideocv, whose le gitimacy
wa s being dla "eoge d by pa ra "eI developmeots. Communique s a nd pre ss relea s e s Irom Ihe first round a nd pa ra "eI
meetings ol republican le a de.-s a re a ssembled in "Doa.meots on Ihe Futore Re!)UIation ol Relations in
Yu!)Oslavia ," in Yuoos!av5urvey, Vol. 32 (1991), No. l, pp. 3-26.
;u. AlI in EogIish tra nslation in REview ot International Affairs, Nos. 973 (20 Octooe.- 1990) a nd 974 (5 Novembe.-
1990). SUbseQUeot issues ol !his QUa si. olOOa l Belgra de periodical have usefully published olhe.- (induding UN, =,
a nd EC) "Doa.meots on Yu!)Oslavia " a s ins erts .
;H. Texts a nd oommeota ries in majo< Yu!)Oslav newspa pe.-s in Ihe wee k befo<e a nd days alte.- Ihe meeting.
:!5.. Ba sed on YlJ!)Oslav press acoounts at Ihe time a nd on inte<Views in Belgra de a nd Zagreb in May 1991.
FOf historical ove<Views, Irom Ihe oontempo<a ry pe.-spective ol a poMtica11y mode.-ate o-oab a n s ero, see Dfa!)O
Stpska i hrvatska povijest i "nova historija" (Zagreb: stva most , 1991), a nd Srbi u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb:
Vjesnik "posebno izda nje, " 1991); a lso Bosna i razuma, a ool e<bon ol a rWes, extracts, a nd
ma ps a s booldet by IGC Boroa , Ma rdll992.
O-oatian and YU(1I>slav army units in January 1991, whidl was defused wheo Tudjman, Ihe Fede.-al Presideocv, and
Ihe army agreed to a oompromise soltJtion to Ihe issue Ihat had provoked it; but olhe.-s lonowed.
:!2.. lhey al li n!le.-ed on, powe<1esslv, untiIlhe rump Presideocv (lhe Ihree Sert>ian and MOflteoe!)rin membe.-s) deposed
Ihe (1I>vemmeot and Fede.-al in Octobe.- 1991 and itseK became irrelevant .
.1ll. lhe preseot write.-, who was in Belgrade on May 15 and in on May 19.
!l. David Binde.-, "Bake.- Wei!lhin!l a Break WiIh Belgrade, " in Ihe New York Times (21 April 1992), p. A3 .
.1.2.. Both Carole Ro!)eI, "SIoveoias Indepeodeoce: A Reve.-sal ol Histo<y, " in ProbIems ot Communism, Vol. 40, No. 4 (JuIy-
AU!)llst 1991), pp. 31-40, and Krizan, pp. 134-137, """,hasae Ihe seminal importa nce of what RO!lel
ca"s Ihe "landmar1< issue, " subtitled "Contributions to a SIoveoe National Program, " ol Ihe Ljubljana inte"ectual
joumal Nova R2vija, No. 57 (Mardl19B7), and Ihe role ol SIoveoe las<ination wilh Ihe ooncept ol "dvij sooety" in Ihe
IDmlation ol SIoveoe s"flaratism. See also Tomaz Masmak and LYflrle Jones, "Behind Ihe ethnic rivalry, " in Ihe Times
lJterary Sllpp/ement, 19 JuIy 1991, p. 6 .
.1:L. As desaibed to Ihe author by one ol Ihe strate!)ists, on a not -to< -attribubon basis, in Ljubljana in AU!)llst 1991 .
.1.1. AIl Inte<pfetation sU!I!lested by lellow-watdle.-s of Ihe broadcast (11 May 1991) ol !his olhe<Wise a.inous statemeot .
.1.5.. Krizan, p. 13B .
.12. Izetbe(1l>vics and olhe.- Bosnian Mus li ms share ol responsibility lo< Ihe catastrophe, desaibed by Paul Shoup in !his
volume, became appareot and relevant to Ihe lar!)e.- prltJre onIy in 1992 .
.'!l.. lhe SIoveoes who we.-e (see above) inf\ueotial but wilh one o< two exceptions not membe.-s ol Ihe (1I>vemmeot.
-37-
Publico_n ' nfornu_, Book H I. , I!ooy"nd ""H. ;cs. Ec"n<>m;cs. Cu l.u,," ;n Oommun;ty. Oon";bu'o.s , _ o
Ro m" . .d;,,,,. l.jub;!o S. . .d;.",. W_ tv;.., ""-ss. Pl oc. ol publ"'''"n, ""uld _. =. publ"'''"n V.,"" 19-95. P09.
"umb, 37.
Ivo Banac
2
The Dissolution of Yugoslav
Historiography
I
In May 1979, one year beton, Tito'. dealh, !he oolhe histOl)' ol YlJ!1Oslav unification gathe.-ed at one ol !hos"
Ihat Communist <humed up wilh typical grace. lhey gathe.-ed at lJok, a
s leE1lY O-oatian t own oolhe Dar.ube, downstJeam /rom Vukovar, wilhin s igN: ol !he Fraooscan <hurdl in whidl st. John ol
Capistrano was laid to fest in 1456. BUl:, unlik .. !he swallows Ihat ma r1< !he return ol spriou t o !he CaMomia miSSKm named
alte.-Ihe same wamor_ saint,!he historia,," at ma r1<ed!he point. ol aopoi lo< !he hoes ol historiographic oombat. To be
sure,!he lour days at Hok gave ample space to !he usual <iron"s ot faktorJrafska isto/iofJrafij a,!he tiresome and
uoimagoinative unfoldi" !ls oolhe agreeable mir.utiae ol YUQOslav unity. StiI,!his ooogress was unlik .. a U Pfevious OJatherious
ol ts bod. For behind!he lacade ol stod< phiases about "bour,,"";s histoOography, " "IOb e.-al Ode<>lo!IY, " and
strategoic aims and inte.-est s of biu finaooa l capital," one muld hear eotirely new t ones and intefl}retations that
went t o the celebfato<y inteotions ol the meetinu. Instead ol the sole-mn rite on the sixtieth annive.-sary ol
YlJ(1Oslavia, the proceedings we.-e marred by seve.-al speake.-s, not ably MomOlo a Belgrade hist orian and speOalist
in SIoveoian histo<y, who t ool< on seve.-al saaed C<lws.
In a report that one participant dlaracte.-ized as "shod< the.-apy, " asseJted: first that the.-e existed a one-sided
ide-ology and policy ol treatiog the YlJ(1Oslav ....-.ification and the ideas that dlarted its course as the "YlJ!)Oslav idea [we.-e]
an aooent and ""ilinear aspiration, aeated
befo<e the lormation ol nations, as a process that was OOOfdinated in ts motives and inte.-ests, and on the
nse"; seamd, that the olOOal historiography ove.-stated the rnporta nce ol the supposed unitary tJeods, s um as the
nineteeoth-<:eottMy IlIyrian movemeot in o-oatia; third, that the.-e have beeo lew systematic analyses ot the "Serb national
question, as a historical, state-juridical, and national inte.-est ol the Serb people"; lourth, that the.-e existed (and
still exist ) real national inte.-ests ol eadl speOfic national oommunity in VU(1Oslavia (now lorme.- VU(1Oslavia) that
may not always be recor.cilable, preduding at the same time the possitiility ol reducing Sertiian inte.-ests t o me.-e "national
inte.-ests ol the Se.-tiian bourgeoisie"; fifth, that historiography i!)nOfed the religious question- " a lacto< ol [theJ first o<de.-
in our area, induding in the struggle lo< the ol VU(1Oslavia," whidl was infIamed by the three "Ieading
d>urdles [sicJ, Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamie, " by the anti-Vu(1Oslav Vatican; sixth, that, due t o "political and
peda(1Ogica l motives, " historiography "remained about the Iratricidal attad<s among the VU(1Oslav pe<>ples
in the oourse ol the First World War"; and last, in geoe.-al, that the "reasons lo< mutual distrust and am<>n<J the
participants in the unification ot VU(1Oslavia ... we.-e oomplex and de"" and oould not be solved in an ollhand ma""e.-, with
various dedarations, resolubons, and similar pol6ca1 and juridical acts." .:
In 1979, VU(1Oslav historiography, 0<, more ts dominant institubonal part, was still bound by the ide<>logy ol the
Titoist party-state. Heoce, seeo pape.- mar1<ed the be!)inrliog ol e.-osioo ot the Titoist
inte.-pretation ol South Slav history. It is a a.inosity ol the VU(1Oslav Communist regime that t to oodify ts think.ing on
a series ot historical questions that had beeo oontJove.-sial since the beginoing ot the VU(1Oslav state (1918). Neve-rtheless,
the pragmatic OOflSeoSUS ol Communist historical inte.-pretation was summed UJ> in Ttos report to the Fifth Congress ol the
Communist Party ol VU(1Oslavia (CPY] in 1948. Tito as sumed that the unification was good: "The unification ol the
South Slavs was needed and had to be This was the idea ol the most progressive people in the lands that
we.-e caned South Slavic." 8U1: he also recognized that the new state was burdeoed with inevitable oonfIicts Irom the Vel)'
beginoing, because ol Gfeat Se.-tiian hegemony unde.- the monardly ol the Karadjordjevices and "bourgeois powe.-." He
singled out Monteoegro and O-oatia as the two South Slav lands in whidl the unification was resisted by the J>OI>UIace and
the.-ealte.- imposed by the Se.-tiian and Eoteote (mainIy Freom) tJoops. He also rnplicated the J)(}fl-Serbian bourgeoisie in
the suocess ot the Gfeat Sertiian PfOject, because t leared the "revolubonary movement ol the mass es" more than Sertiian
hegemony. ::
As lo< the nature ol the inte.-war regime, Tto desa'itied t as the "dictato<ship ol the ruli ng VU(1Oslav bourgeoisie, headed by
thelOng: whidl
-40-
pul: on a demoaatic mask untiI1929, when "Kinu AJeksandar was to throw olf that mask, trampie the COflStitutiOfl
and ... opeoly proda"" a monard>o.fasast dictato<sh"'. " the assassination of AJeksandar in 1934, the suocessive
regimes, notably those ol Prime Mi",stefs Milan and Dfag;sa (1935-41), did not mitigate the severity
ol the dictato<ship was not the demoaatization ol the oountry, but its lasasization undef the influence ol and
Ge<man lasasm") . lhe agreemeot ol 1939, whidl sought to "s""'e" the Cmatian QUestion, was "in one
sense, a division ol poWef between the Se<tiian and Cmatian bourgeois ie. " Tito was harsh with Vladko MaCek,
the leadef ol the Cmat Peasant Party (HSS), lo< his antioommunism and leoieocy with the Cmat pro.fasast As lo<
the ApfiI war of 1941, when VlJ!)I>slavia was attad<ed and QlJiddy OCQ)J>ied by the Axis poWefS, Tito held that "as is wen
known, the VlJ!)I>slav army capitulated, owiog to the treadle.-y and oowardice ol the genefals, altef twelve days ol weak
resistance. " !)I>es wilhout safong that his vefsion ol warome histOl)' was devoid of any sympathy lo< Dfafa
the leadef ol the Se<tiian Oletniks, who, according to Tito, represeoted "the last remoant ol armed poWef ol
the old, rotten, bourgeois o<def, [whidl) in no case wanted to struggle against the OCQjJ>iefs but, at a. oosts, wanted to
sale!)lJard the old bourgeois sodal o<def ""def the OCQjJ>ation. " lo< the Communists, "wilhout the leadiog role ol the
CPV [Communist Party ol VlJ!)I>slavia), we would today have no new VlJ!)I>slavia ... No< would one be able to imagine the
realization ol brotheffiood and ""ity of our peoples. " ::.
II
Sinee 1948, vefsion ol VlJ!)I>s lavias tweotieth-<:eotury histOl)' was maintained in institutiOflal historiography wilhout
regard to Communist party membefship. lhe VlJ!)I>slav historical represeoted by a genefation ol historians
bom befo<e 1918, sudl as Vaso Dfa!)l>slav and JOfjo in Se<tiia; Vaso 8ogdanov, Fefdo
and Jaroslav Sidak in Cmatia; 80!)l> GfatenalJef and Fran Zwittef in SIoveoia; and Anto and 8ra",slav Djurdjev in
was preoca)J>ied, with exceptions, with the pre-1918 period. AIthough they occasiooally disagreed,
their disagreemeots Wefe not subvefsive ol the Titoist historical Iote<pretation, whidl was furthef se<Viced by a somewhat
youngef ol historians spe<ialirin!) in the histOl)' ol the CPV (PefO Jovan PefO Mo<aCa,
and Vlado 80th altef accounting to< disparities in age and intefest, genefally oohefed in a series
of joint pwjects, beginoing with bib
-41-
Iiographic (lOides on hist orical publications lor the world ooogresses ol historians in 1955, 1965, and 1975), two
volumes ot the History ol the Peoples ot VUQOslavia (1953, 1959), and in various eocydopedia projects, notably the two
editions ol the Eocydopedia ol VlJ(1Oslavia (1955- 71, 1980-91).
From the end ol the 196Os, howeve<, t became ooeas ifluly dear that the unity ol VlJ(1Oslav historiography was depeodeot
lJI>Ofl the unity ol the re!1ime. lhe demise ol VlJ(1Oslavia in the 1990s canoot be tJaced t o a sioQle lactor, nor was t 0flIy an
aspect ol regoime rra!)meotation. Neve<theless, the intemal tJoubles inside the Ttoist - the eme<geoce, in the
196Os, ol a re/ormist bloc with a stJong base in the northwestem republics and the assooated COfTelation betweeo
systemie reform and administJative deceotJahzation (geouine lede<alis m) - had immediate repe<russioos in historiography.
lhe plJblication ol the third volume ol the Histoty ofthe Poop/es ofYUfJOSlavia, whidl was t o deal with the aibcal period ot
nineteeoth and ceotu"y national integration and st atebuilding, kept being postponed and neve< came t o pass.
lhere were growin!) polemies ove< CO<ltJoversial aspects ol tweotieth-<:eotu"y history. In 1963, Geoe<al VeIimir
brought out his monograph, Juoos!avija u aprilskom ram 1941 (VlJ(1Oslavia in the April War ol 194 1), in whidl he attributed
VlJ(1Oslavias swill: lan t o the tJeas on ol Cm atian leade<s, nota bly MaCek, who slJDj}Osedly "alte< 1930 ... sought the heli> ol
the Axis powe<s and worl<ed on- and planned destructHm ol VlJ(1Oslavia. In lact, [he and his assooates)
lor the most part <hose tJeason, whidl was in the April war. " -"-At the Eighth Coogress ol the Lea!)lJe ol
Communists ol VUQOslavia (LCV), held in Belgrade in Decembe< 1964, Tito himsef gave veot t o an aibcism ot
in historiography, " by deoourring "instanees ol indirect d aims that ave< some k.ind ot primacy ot
one national history ove< the others. " .":
Ttos atJthority ooncealed the deavages in what was stil! the single ceote< ol powe<. Eve< the mast e< ol political balanee,
Tto expected historians t o bestow, without lavor, the prope< meas",e ot Pfaise and ceos",e on eadl national oommunity.
But he himself st arted providing ooeas ingly difle<eot meas",es in historical soorekeeping. In 1966, Tito lorced the leadin!)
SerlJian Commtrist, Aleksandar out ol the LCV leade<shiD, sigoalling, amon!) othe< things, great e< leeway lor the
aibcs ol Seroias role in VlJ(1Oslav history- but 0flIy up t o a point. In short, Tto wanted to take with t s political
Ioms in SerlJia, a lew notdles Iowe< in geoe<al regard without stirriog up a great deal ot luss. 10 By January 1970, the
Cm atian Communist s took the struggle against one st ep lurthe<. In repudiating VlJ(1Oslav unitarism, a tendeocy
lavoring the amalgamation ot the s eros, Cm ats, SIoveoes, and othe< South Slavs into a s upranational VlJ(1Oslav nation,
Cm atian oommunist leade< Sawa
-42-
KuCar stated !hat no lorm of was attractive or without danuer lor VU(1Oslavia and ts iodividual peoples, wa minu
!hat unitarism is in lact only a lorm ol ol !he stronge.- nation in !he variant ol great state dlalNinism. ':':"lhe
pace of oornmJltation wilh ceotralism and unitarism, in ts Serbian version, was at issue. Heoce, !he newous and
incondtJsive nature ol historical polemics in !he earfy 1970s.
Opposition to ceotralism and unitarism came as an unexpected gift t o Cm atian historiography, whidl did not really
t ake luli advantage of!he Oj>J>Ortunity. '::"Indeed, historians in Cmatia were exposed to harsh cens .... e by
nonacademic Jlfactitione.-s sudl as Zvonimir who be.-ated!heir timidity and lad< ol patriotism. '::"BtJt whe.-e!he
historians were stin reluctant, o!her inteUectuals ventured lorth. lhe reading putilic was elated by !he poet Vlado Got ovacs
stingiog attad<s on Belgrade sd>olars Miroslav and Jorjo who invested oonside.-able ene.-gy in denYon!l or
ignoring!he Cm atian dlaracter ol Dubrovniks Jlfestigious literary and historical heritage. Plafong on texttJal
sd>olarshiJ>, Gotovac dlar!jed !hat a me.-dlants invoice is more important to in dete.-miniog!he national dlaracte.-
ol [Dubrovnik] !han!he citys whole spintual tradition. poslhumously putikshed defense ol !he unitarist dlaracte.-
ol Dubrovnik went beyond!he scope ol his !heme t o affirm!he traditional unitarist view !hat religion was !he laOIe- and
"..,.oneous- dividinu line between!he Orthodox and Catholic Cmats. In an all usion to !he newly Jlfodaimed policy ol
viewing Bosnian Muslims as a nation, he offered his opinion !hat we are endeavoOng t o Jlfodaim one ol (}Ul" religious
oommunities as a nation, whidl is a unique case in Jlfesent- day E .... ope. 15
lhe tense earfy 1970s can 0flIy be understood as a oonfIict over !he future ol VU(1Oslavia. lhe and unitarist bloc
held !hat!he distinctXms between!he nationalities we.-e being blurred and !hat VU(1Oslavia oould be homo!jeoUed on !he
traditions- real or invented- ol VlJ!)I>slavism. In Jlfa<Dce, !his meant!he extirpation ol
always inte.-preted as separatist and potentially lasastic, and !he Quiet absolt.ition ol history and political Jlfa<bce
Irom!he sin ol SlJJlfemacy. lhe remissiorl of!he slJJlfemaOst offense was permitted because Gfeat Serbian
he!jemony, willingly or unwillin!llv, regardless ol its historical record, became an awOliary t o VU(1Oslav national
amalgamation. Heoce, when QlIestioned his a'itics unfavorable view of insatiable Ordes ol Gfeat Serbian
monardly, he a edited!he latte.- wilh!he adoption ol VU(1Oslavism and linked his a'itics wilh!he anti. VU(1Oslav and
lasastic 16
lhe bloc Jlfoceeded Irom!he demonstrabie lact !hat amalgamation did not take place and oonduded !hat!his
was not a sethad< but a benefit ol VU(1Oslav unity. lhe stood by !he historically evolv
-43-
ing and s""arate natiooal Odeotities ol eadl of Ihe South Slavic natioos, starting with Ihe distinct sems, o-oats, and
SIovenes, but induding Ihe Macedonians and Monteneginns, whom Ihe Yu!)Oslav Commtrists had recognized as distinct
Yu!)Oslav natioos already in Ihe 1930s and tJeated acaJfdingly. lhis rost e.- ol "natioos " was oompleted in 1968
with Ihe addition ol Ihe 80snian Mus hms. In addition, a numbe.- ol J)()fl-Slavic "natiooalities, " nota bly Ihe Albanians ol
Kosovo and Ihe Hungarians of Vojvodina, we.-e recognized as oomponeots of Ihe mulbnatiooal Yu!)Oslav
state and Ihe.-e!"o<e eotitled to eve.-y protectXm ol ideotitv, language, and rulture, indtJding oontacts with Iheir oo-<latiooals
in st ates (Albania, Hungary) . lhe deceotJalist Iogic was Ihat Yu!)Oslavia would bette.- oohe.-e, O< would at least
be a less repressive place, ' lhe Ihreat ol assimilatioo to any OOflStitueot natioo, O< lo< Ihat matte.- to Ihe s""""sedly
slJllfanatiooal Yu!)Oslav oommunitv, oouId be removed. Heoce, when Gotovac attad<ed vanous unita rist s, he
did not to point out Ihat "!hose who see onIy an insignificant remnant ol histOf)' in eve.-y sign ol natiooal Kl eotitv, no
matte.- what sort of revolt.itionary Odeas Ihey have in Iheir heads, are reaty aiding oogmatist s and OOflsewatives, are really
giving a mance t o Iheir pfOgrams, t o Iheir t errorist voluntarism." Obviously, Ihe Odeology ol Yu!)Oslav itseK
became an instrumeot in Ihe oonteotion between Ihe ceotJalist;unita rist and distinctivist camps.
lhe oonteotion was SOOfl tested in historiography but at an lJrlseasooable hour. In Decembe.- 197 1, at Ihe
SessOon ol Ihe LCY CeotJal Committee, Tito Ihe political eQUihbrium by strik.ing at Ihe Lea!)l.le ol Commtrists ol
O-oatia. He acaJsed its leade.-s, Sawa Kuca r and Miko Tripalo, Jlfeviously his dosest ool abofato<s in Ihe struggle
against ceotJalism, of being 00 O-oatian and ol stJessiog Ihe sove.-eignty ol O-oatia at Ihe expense of
Yu!)Oslavias oo"ective sove.-eignty and state unity, ffiOfeoVe.-, t o Ihe detrimeot ol statehood, defined as a
"oommunity ol wor1<.ing p""I>le, " not as a natiooal state . .:."..lhis seemingly abrupt mange in oo .... se inau!)lJl"ated a nasty
campa;gr, against O-oatian atteoded by an est s, mass firings, and expulsiofls Irom Ihe party, deourriatioos,
and ceoso<ship. lhe brie!" synthesis ol Povijest hrvats/rofJ naroda (HistOf)' ol Ihe O-oatian People), by T'l>rnir MaCa n, whose
outside reviewe.- was Franjo Tudjma n, was withdrawn Irom Ihe mar1<et and destJoyed. In a s""arate developmeot,
Tudjma n was an ested and seoteoced to two years in prisoo 00 mar!)es ol belonging to a "oounterrevolt.itionary
group. " ' 0 It was in lhis oontext Ihat Vladimir Dedije.- (1914-90), Titos bOographe.-, sometime dissideot, and gadRy,
anoounced Ihe publicatioo of Is torija Juoos!avije (A Hist Of)' ol Yu!)Oslavia), st ating Ihat "lhe.-e we.-e some objectXms t o Ihe
lad: Ihat [lhe not be called Ihe Hist Of)' ol Ihe Peoples ol YlJ!)Oslavia." It is good Ihat Ihe
-44-

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Communist "libe.-als, " led by Marno Nikenc and Latinka Pe.-ov;,:, we.-e not the proponents of In lad:, they we.-e
the first Se.-bian leade.-s in the histOl)' ol YU(1I>slavia t o have retJeated Imm ceotJalist ambiboos. Neve.-theless, they also
unde.-st(}{}d the strug!)le against as the emancipation ol Se.-bia Imm the tutelage ol the lede.-al cente.-. lhis
""sibon won them some reprieve Imm Se.-bian but onIy heighteoed Titos In the wOfds of Latinka
Pe.-ov;,:, "whe.-eas the othe.- republics oouId always, with more Of less reason, point t o Se.-bia by attad<.inu in
Titos preseoce, aibcism ol ceotJalism Imm Se.-bia itself was unde.-st(}{}d as a dired: dlalleoue t o Tito. " ' 5 Afte.- Tito removed
the Cmat leade.-ship, the Se.-bs reluctance t o jump on the bandwa!)Ofl ol the campai!lfl was seeo as oovert
' 6 and Pe.-ov;,: resigned on 21 Octobe.- 1972. Attad<s on Se.-bian oouId theo lorus on
Dedije.- and
III
lhe "tum" 011971-72 rep<eseol:ed a retJeat Imm demoaatization but not Imm Titoist whidl was deleoded and
promoted by the ooeas ifluly repressive LCY. lhe ""lemies against Dedijer and we.-e therelOfe marned by
repressive whidl was predicated on "s weepiou up belOfe ones own threshold, " that is, on repudiatinu the
"nationalis m ol ones own nation. " FOf example, Se.-bian historian Branislav Gligorijev;,: QlJestioned Dedije.-s economic
analysis, whidl he saw as devoid of "an aca.orate prltJre about the loundations of the Se.-bian bourge-oisies hegemony. "
Djuro stanisavljev;,:, a Se.-bian sodal historian Imm Cmatia, QlJestioned Dedije.-s fi!)lXes on Se.-bian war Iosses in YU!)l>-
slavia and Ustasa Cm atia. ("ShouId the fi!)lXes rele.- t o the total numbe.- ol Se.-bs lOIIed dt.inoQ the war, theo the fi!)lXe ol
200,000 is only exagge.-ated. ShouId we believe the numbe.- ol 600,000 Se.-bs kiIIed in Cm atia alooe, and
theo t ake a Iook at the ceosuses of the last lorty years, we would have to QlJestion the motives ol those who make sum
d aims. ") And MomOlo mtrized Dedije.-IOf "Ieaving the impfession that animalistic attitudes existed in
SIovenian bourge-ois ""Iitical cirdes. " " But there was also a type ol Ma rxist anti-hegemonism amonu the aibcs of the
Histoty ot yuoosfavi.J, IOf example, wheo the Bosnian MusIim historian Avdo oomplained about the
acceol:ed iss ues ol d ass" in the bool< and theo pwceeded to note that!his t eodeocy was damagirlu t o the
histOl)' ol Bosnian Musli ms, "who are barely noticeable in this bool<. " ' "
AIthough swipes at Se.-bian biases we.-e pe.-mitted . ooudled in Ma rxist metoric, this accommodation was less li kely in
Cmatia.
-46-
To be sure, Ihe estabkshmeot O-oatian historians stroogly mtrized and Dedije.-. Mirja na Gmss, in parfu.olar, made
short worl< ol double st andard. believes Ihat Ihe Kleology of Ihe Party ol Riuht had many elemeots
sOmijar to Ihe great nationalist movemeots ol Ihe ceotury; first ol all because ol [its in]lhe geopolitical
basis of nations." I wonde.- why !his bias shouId be aS<ribed DflIy to Ihe Kl eology Ihat sought t o galhe.-Ihe SouIh Slav
population, whidl it OOflside.-ed o-oatian, into a O-oatian state, and not t o Ihe Kleology Ihat sought t o galhe.-Ihe SouIh
Slav population, whidl it oonside.-ed Sert>ian, into a Sert>ian st ate?" For all lhat, Ihe Ireedom ol debate was ooeasingly
resIDcted as O-oatia s hpped into Ihe period ol "o-oatian whidl lasted untiI 1989. fus was Ihe aue ol unbridIed
sed:arianism without geouine beliel, administ e.-ed by an alhance ol dogmatist s and opportunist s. Stipe SUVar, O-oatias
doctrinal watd>dog, ioitiated periodic attad<s oolhe humanistic intelligeotsia. A typical example ol Ihese ooe-sided
Kleological oombats was Ihe assau"= in 1978 on 2vonimir uneveo b",graphy ol Ihe peasant aulhOf, Slavlm Kolar.
Mounted by Gora n a t aleoted poet in SUVars sew;ce, it induded an omioous warroiog Ihat exposes of unita rism in
sd>olarship we.-e subve.-sive ol Ihe YU!)l>slav sooalist syst em: "fus is a N about a struggle lor or against sooalism; and
eve.-ythiog else is but a smol<e saeeo and noise whose aim is to oonceal lhe basic oourse ol !his
oounterrevolutionary activity garbed in a lite.-ary, sd>olarty, and artistic robe, hke a monks habit. In orde.- t o dis gu;se !his,
acaJsations ol unita rism are being s howe.-ed down UJ>Ofl us. " 30
In lad:, Ihe debate about Ihe His toty ot Yuoos/<1vi.J was Ihe last major historical debate in Ihe oppressive atmosphe.-e ol late
Titois m. lhe purs uit ol politics Ihrough hist oriography wOUlld down by Ihe middle ol Ihe 1970s, at Ihe time ol Titos last
le!)islative effort. lhe OOflStitubon ol 1974 was meant to estabksh repressive lede.-alis m as a political petpewum mobile. Its
basK: leature was a syst em of unceasing rotation ol and repres eotation by Ihe republica n leade.-s, redefined t o indude, to
Ihe dlagrin ol ""mn make.-s, Ihe leade.-s ol Sert>ias two aut(}f)(}mDUS provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo.
Analogous ,,"'syst ems ""e.-ated in eve.-y area ol public inte.-est , induding hist oriography; Ihe OOflgresses ol hist orians kept
rotating Irom republic t o republic. while Ihe ardlited:s ol revolviog madlines always attempt to Iree Ihe motion
ol Iheir oonstru<Dons Irom Ihe influence ol eve.-y physical lorce, Titos petpewum mobile was meant t o highlight Ihe visible
hand ol Ihe party. lhat was Ihe systems strudural weakness, as became evideot wilh Titos dealh in 1980.
lhe Sert>ian leade.-shiJ>, howeve.- reliably Titoist alte.- 1972, grumbled against Ihe OOflStitubon as earty as JuIy 1977. It
seized oolhe passiog of Tito as a signal to begin Ihe unravelin!) ol Ihe e.-a. lhe ""portunitv lor la....-.dling Ihe
debate oolhe OOflstitutional orde.-, primarily ove.-
-47-
Ihe habilities ol Sert>ia's "parcelization" ioto Ihree lederal units, Pfesented itseW in Ihe sPnnu ol 1981 wilh Ihe
oommeocement ol demonstrations by AJbanian students in Kosovo. Ihe Sert>ian iotelligentsia and political elite
were on a campaign against Tito's OOflStitutiofl. lheir cans IOf Ihe diminution ol Kosovo's autooomy oouId be
by exaggerating Ihe A1banian meoace and by reopeoin!) evel)' historical underpioniog ol Tito's lhe
s parring at Ihe historians' OOflgress in llok was Ihe parent ol lhis ellort.
History's utiIity t o Vugoslav polibcs was not a debat able premis e in 1981. It is more diffirult, however, t o acoount IOf Ihe
s peed wilh whidllhe new political vaanm Pfompt ed an otJtpourlng ol revisiof"oist worl<s, almost in Sert>ia. Most
ol Ihese wor1<s, at least ioitially, dissected Ihe history ol Ihe system and its demiurge. lronically, it was Dedijer, Ihe
"Partisan MKflelet, " as he was caned in a poigoant obituary, who first lifted Ihe hand Ihat had writteo Tito's offi<ja l
against his erstwhile master. J2 Dedijer's NaW prilozi za bior!rafiju Josipa BIOza llta (Ne w Contribubons to Ihe
8iography ol los"" 8roz Tito), in 1981, demythologized Ihe late MatOf and portrayed him as a ledler and
sdlemer, diss embler and master ol a altiness, bon vivant and tyrant, dlarismatic leader and pacesetter in "excessive
retortion" (Dedijer's euphemism IOf Ihe exeaJtion ol "eoemies") . 33 lhough maintaining Ihe appearance ol amity IOf his
subject, Dedijer delighted in bfeabng evel)' taboo, from Tito's participation in Ihe units onlhe
Sert>ian front in 1914 t o Ihe negotiations betweeo his Partisan IOfces and Ihe Germans in 1943, from Ihe Comintem's policy
toward Vugoslavia to Ihe resJ>Oflsibility IOf Ihe redless eodangerment ol imprisoned Communist leaders in Cmatia (lhe
abortive Kerestinec escape ol 194 1). fus ungraceful book, a cabbage head on a makeshift body, luli ol unrelated
provocations, induding Dedijer's obsession wilh "revolutionary s uicides" and vituperative epithets directed against AIojzije
Cardinal stepinac, AJ<robishop ol Zagreb and Metropolitan ol Cmatia, Pfovoked a storm ol protest. It was also read
and set Ihe oourse IOf an eotire li ne ol K:onodastic volumes by Sert>ian authOfs. H
Aro admirer ol Dedijer has d arned Ihat NaW prilozi "defioitely mar1<1 ed) Ihe end ol illusions Ihat our history can be writteo
acoording to traditional IOfeign modeIs, in whidl eve<ything is subofdinated to dry doruments and oondusions ol political
lorums ... Dur true history ... IOf better Of WOfse, is still Ofal." 3 5 Smali wonder Ihat Dedijer's overstated
revisiooism legitimated and diminished geouine sd>olarship. 3 6 Nevertheless, Ihe bool< Ihat Gojko
Nikoli':, veteran Communist and dissideot, had totJted as Ihe "most seosational ol all lhat have appeared in our epodl and
on our soi!" opeoed Ihe doOf IOf Ihe preteosions ol more seOous Sert>ian sd>olars, who were also more
politically sophisticated Ihan Dedijer. J] Ihey were party Ioyalists,
-48-
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5

o

vOfable view ol !he Serbian Demoaatic Party ol Gml sU'Jgested a nonoommunist Serbian model ot
pluralism.
IV
lhe oPJ>Ositiooal !hemes in Serbian sd>olarshiD roused!he LCY watdldogs in !he o!he< r""ublics. But it was !he Cmatian
OOflse.vatives, stil on !)Uard against hete<odox thioI<ionu in!heir own bad<yard, who we<e alarmed by !he new
treods in Serbian pubhshing. stipe SUVar, Cmatias <hiel LCY ideologist, summoned 165 historians and party actMsts t o
Zagreb in Octooe< 19B3 IOf a two-day oonfe<eoce awkwardly Wed, "Historiography, Memoir and FeuiReton
Orodtxbon in !he Li!)tlt ot Ideatiooal Cootrove<sies. " Serbian historians did not wish t o ronle< legitimacy on a
meeting !hat was eJqlected to lash out at Belgrades ideologicallatitudinarianism. 70 invitees who did not atteod, 34
we<e ITom Belgrade and Novi Sad, induding sum notable historians as !';ima Dfagoslav Andrej
De<o MOfaca, Cedo POj}Ov, Branko and Momcilo SUVar set !he t one IOf!he OOflfe<eoce by st atinu !hat
!he time had rome IOf "us" t o stop beiou deleosive: "lhe Lea!)Ue ol Communists t oday, more !han eve< belOfe, must show
its ability and streoulh as !he ronective intenectualleade<ship ol !he worlOnu d as s, must Ofganize!he struggle ot ideas
ove< real issues and in !he riQht Folowiou lead, alarms we<e sounded by most participants.
Retrospectivelv,!he wamings ol Vojan Rus, who predicted "lhree Of four Lebanons" in Yugoslavia should!he proJ>Oneots ol
a system have!heir way, seem exagge<ated 0flIy in!heir dlain ol causality. lhe preveotive meas ures we<e
acoordinQly misplaced.
SUVar caubooed against!he "harmful OOflsequeoces ot aH sus prious iotriQues in historiography ... in !he s phe<e ol
multinatiooal relatioos. " He noted!he !hesis !hat!he "CPY was a t ool ol !he Comintem in weakeoiou and wred<.ing
[interwar] Yugoslavia, and !hat it eveo carried out an as siQned mission ol rutting up ... !he new Yugoslavia, eSDooal1y by
settinu bad< and break.inu up some ot our natioos. " 5 0 He aimed at natiooal protectronism in SertJian historiography.
As an object lesson in how t o deal wilh nonconlom>ist historians, his as sist ants SOOfl whipped up two controlled witdl
hunts in Zagreb. In January 19B4, Zagrebs Yugoslav Lericographical lnstitubon first volume ol Hrvatski
biorJrafski /eksikon (lhe Cmatian Biographical Lericoo]. lhe biographies ol 1,751 notabies writteo by 270 authors aided by
40 editorial as sistants, roveOou!he surnames ITom A to Bi, contained, acoordinu to Ines Sas kOf, exa mples ol "insufficieot
Ma rxist aibcal evaluatin ol !he contribuboos ol individual pe<sonalities to natiooal history. " 5 1 In Apnl 19B4, Goran
-5 1-
wrote a ooovulsive artide in whidl he cited seve.-al hundred derics in the lerioon's and projected ol subjects,
dlar!)inu that this "rea<bonary publication" revived an "eoom>oUs numbe.- ol t otally margoioal people whose sole historical
'merit' was a monk's habit O< some blado: garb, not t o meotion that the.-e are aim",als among them." 5 ' And, in.lune 1984,
the Odeological oommissOoo of 2agreb's Lea!)Ue ol Communist s ol Cm atia (LCC) City Committee o<ganized a disrussOoo of
the suspect publication. 53 lheo, in Decembe.- 1984, Cm atian hardiine.-s mourlted a campaign against a newly
s urvey ol the Cmatian fi lm industiy, I zmec!ju publike i drfDve: Povijest hrvatske kinemato{Jrafije 1896-1980 (Betweeo Public
and state: A HistOf)' of Cm atian Dnematography, 1896-1980) . "" lhe book was deoounced as an antioommunist
"pamphlet" in whidl "no seoteoce is accideotal and almost ag are t eodeotious." 55
lhe lessons in rep<ession we.-e not in Sert>ia. Unlike the Cm atian intellectuals, whose spints we.-e oowed,
Sert>ian integectuals, historians espooally, whethe.- Communist s O< nonoommunists, became ooeasingly mo<e da riog in
their publications. lhey we.-e not intimidat ed by the drones ol the hist orical est ablis hmeot and their ideological wamings at
the Eighth Coogress ol Hist orians ol Vu!)Oslavia (Arandjelovac, Octobe.- 1983) 56 O< by the an s ol !iuvar and
Unfortunatelv, they we.-e also ooeasiogly mo<e nationalistic. In 1983, Veli mir brought out a new and expanded
ve.-sOoo ol his book on the oo"apse of VU!)Oslavia in the April war ol 1941 in whidl he repeat ed his oId theses about
Cm atian betJayal and the.-eby provol<ed bitte.- reaiminations Irom Zagreb. 5 7 Desanka book on the Communist
nationality policy Irom 1919 t o 1935 was esseotially a rehabilitation ol (1888-1938), seaetary ol the CPY" s
CeotJal Party CounciI in 1919, a leading Serbian Communist , and leade.- ot the Right la<bon in the party disputes ol the
1920s, whose position on the nationality QUestion- not able lo< its opposition t o aniances with the mass movemeots ol
non-Serbian nationalities- was reevaluat ed as a d as sic Leoinist position. priocipal theme was the da nge.-
ol usin!) "national struggle as a tool ol d as s struggle, " the.-eby pe.-mitting "the dominance of national Odeology" in
Communist polibcs. lhis view that Serbian dis inte.-est in Cm atian o< national movemeots was good
oommunism. made this eveo mo<e explicit by deoouncing the Communist "tJeatmeot ol the Sert>ian people [in the
int...-war period) as exp/oitative" and by ar!)l.'iog that the Communists geoe.-ally overlooked the relevance ol the
"Serbian QUestion," that is, the integration ol the Serns with", a single st at e. 5"
Rehabilitation ol dethroned Sert>ian leade.-s of the interwar period was a furthe.- step in the revival of Sert>ian national
d aims. Some joumalists st arted promoting King assass",at ed in Ma rseilles in Octobe.- 1934 by
Cm atian and Macedonian t errorist s, as the "first
-52-
vi<bm ol lascism in E...-ope. " "" But t was historian Djo<dj e Dj. biography ol Nikola (1B45-1926) that
initiated the tJend in sdmlars hip. was the leader ol the Serbian Radical Party, prime minister ol Serbia and Y"(1Oslavia,
and <hel ard-oitect ol SertJian predominance in the unified Y"(1Oslav st at e. 60 In his worl<, avoided the uncribcal
attitudes ol pre-war Serbian historians who viewed efforts in the unification of Y"(1Oslavia as determination
to liberat e aU the seros, Cm ats, and SIoveoes Irom 100eiOJll rule. And he tool< aim at postwar Ma rxist historians who blamed
not onIy lo< Oj}posing the demoaatic aspirations ol the masses but (alter having Oj}ted lo< Serbian hegemony instead
ol YlJ!)Oslav oooperation) also lo< wred<.ing an olfers ol agreernent with the South Slav bourge-olsie of the lormer A"stJo-
Hungarian temtories. Instead, he insisted that was solving the "s ero national QlJestion," that is, the unification ol aU
seros within a single stat e, whidl, iICCOfdin!j to necessarily promoted the interest s of the other South Slavs. lhis
sort ol "Y"(1Oslavism," defined esseotialy as a Serbian Interest, lay at the heart ol the nationality displJtes ol the 19BOs
and was heoce an accompany;ng lacto< in the political displJtes.
lhe wave ol Serbian hist orical revisionism, atteoded as it was by the appearance ol reveali ng memoirs by vanous
Communist leaders 61 and publications on Masons and other a eato<s of "seaet histories," 6' muld not by t seW be a
de<isive threat t o the stability ol nationality relations as Iong as t was not an immediat e instrument ol political conteotion.
Al of that dlanged with the rise ol Sloboda n (b. 194 1) t o party leaders hip in Serbia, wheo the condusions of
polibcal historiography became lully Oj} erational in SertJias confroJltation with the autonomous provinces ol Kosovo and
Vojvodina and indeed with the "COflStittJtiofl deleoders" in the other r"""blles and in the lederal center. Among the
a.orlosities ol these intricate stru!1!)les was the lact that rose to power as an orthodox Titoist ready t o " se
"administJative meas...-es" against diss idents. lhis did not prevent the Serbian Acaderny ol SOeoces and Arts (SASA) ,
ooeasingly a nationalist and anticommunist bastion, Irom leoding its authority t o Sloboda n
In May 19B5, at the annual meeting ol SASA, members deOded to o<ganize a commissiofl that would be dlarged with
coordinating a dralt memorandum on the <UTent situation in Y"(1Oslavia. lhe commission induded two historians- Radovan
and Vas ilije Adralt of the doa.meot came into the possession of a Belgrade da ily in S""t ember 19B6.
AccOfding t o one version, orthodox Ttoist s in the lederal center, pemaps conoected with the COflsewative lederalists
otJtside Serbia, wanted an alfair that would embarrass the Serbian leadership and demonstJat e t s laxity t oward
nationalis m. "lhe Memorandum ol SASA" was the perlect lo< the diminis hin!) lust er ol Titoist communism. Its authOfs
ar!)lJed
-53-
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by the elements ol the COflStitutiofl, and, laOling that, by defininu Serbia's economic and natioflal
inte.-ests, presumably outside VUQOslavia. ""
The novelty ot the memorandum was its QUestiofling ol Vugoslavia as the optimal solubon lo< the seros. Usually, the
J)(}fl-sero natioflal movements hur1ed acaJsatiofls at VUQOslavia on account ol various Serbian advantages in the oommon
state. Now, the leading Serbian intellectual institution cast its own aspe.-sioos on Vugoslavia. The memorandum shod<ed
and oompfOmi sed the Communist leade.-ship ol SertJia. AIthough Slobodan left an impressioo that he "J>UIl>Ose/y
did not wish t o be dear" onthe QUestiofl ol the memorandum, he gained COflside.-a bly !rom its publicatiofl. Acoofding t o one
view, he was private/y already in lavo< ot the memorandum's theses. He opeo/y adopted them "two years lat e.- as his
programmatic orientation. As a resull:,!his dorument lat e.- gained lar great e.- si!)llificance than wheo it originaly appeared."
65 The historiography that rose in its shadow represented mo<e than a move t oward historical revisionism. It became an
ageocy ol aggressNe natioflal aggrandizemeot, in sewice ol political program- the ol a
strong and unified Serbia that would, onee again, be capable ot dominating Vugoslavia and, laOling that, go its own way
wilh alI the temtories in whidlthe seros lived, induding portioos ol Croatia and most ol
Seve.-al Serbian hist orians- membe.-s ol o< assooated wilh the Serbian Academy ol SOeoces and Arts- played a majo< role
in !his translormation. Academician Df. Vas ihje had a history ol oontJove.-sial publicatiofls belo<e the memorandum.
His ooKe<bon Stpsko-hrvatski odnosi i juoos/ovenska ideja (Sert>o-O"oat Relatiofls and the VUQOslav Idea), in 19B3,
portJayed the ideology ol South Slav reOp<ocity (Yugoslavism) among the Croats as esseotially a case ol that
promot ed Croatian SUj}femacy over the seros and SIoveoes. The Croatian Vugoslavists, iICOOfding to "accept ed
ooope.-ation wilh SertJia and wilh it and urnie.- its leade.-ship sought t o sollle the South Slavic and Eastem
Questiofl onIy wheo they lound themselves in a hopeless position and wheo an ot their plans lo< primacy amllfl!lthe South
Slavs, whidl [the Croats) would have had in a lede.-ally o<ganized [Ha bsburg) Monarmy, eoded in lailure." 66 Far mo<e
damaging was 19B6 arWe "Oo the Oogin ol the GeooOde ol s eros in the Independent state ol Croatia," in whidl
he used teo QUOtes (spaJ"olliog the period !rom 1700 t o 1902), accounts ol lour incideots, and obse<Vatiofls by
a Croatian politician t o d aim that the "geooOde against the s eros in Croatia is a speOfic pheoomeoon in our
[SertJian) ceoturies-cld oommonlife wilh the Croats. The protracted deve/opmeot ol the geoocidal idea in ceftain ceote.-s ol
Croatian sooety ... [whidl) did not necessarily have some naJmw- but rathe.- a
-55-
broad- base, t""k deep r""ts in the OOflsOOuSneSS ol many geoe.-ations. " 67 Kresocs artide became the sole academic
inspiration IOf the ooeasiogly less speOfic asse<tions about the "geoocidal nature" ol the Cmats, a therny that justified
the Serb insurgeocy in Cmatia in 1990-91.
lhe Se<tiian Acadernys most seOnus misstep the MemOfandum was the publication ol Veseiin Saveznid i
juoos/ovenska rama drama (lhe AIIies and the YU!)I>slav War [)fama), published in 1985, whidl was oondemned as a
"defeose ol the Oletnik moverneot. " 6" fus poorty researdled and writteo wor1< arOtJsed undeserved atteotion on account
ol its inteotionally provocative message, whidl lound sponsOfship in SASAs 8alkanological lnstitute. set 0lJI: to
prove that the "myth ol Se<tiian hegemOflY" oootributed to the AIIies misreading ol inte.-war YlJ!)I>slav developmeots,
preveoted prope.- appre<iation ol the dimeos"",s ol geoOOde infbcted on the Serbs by Cmatian and a eated a
need to ,""",se symmetrical rulpability IOf wartime camage on both Cmats and Serbs, the.-eby prejudging the dloice ol
Iocal dieots in lavOf ol antinationalist Commtrists instead ol eQualty antifascist but nationalist Oletniks. In
oondus""" unhke the othe.- nationalities that we.-e on one Of anothe.- embattled sOde, the Serbs we.-e dMded
betweeo the Commtrists and the Oletniks. Se<tiian nationalists (Oletniks) we.-e unable to oounte.- the myths ol Se<tiian
hegemOflY and seotimeot amon!) the Cmats. Indeed, the "Cmatian and MusIim extremism (Ustasism)"
suoceeded in translorming itseK into Commtrist "official policy, " the.-eby hoodwiokin!) the undiscipli ned and nationally
"tJnCOflstituted" Serbs. lhe resu'" was that the Serbs oouId dmose onIy betweeo the acceptance of the Partisans and
death. AIthough book was ternpofarily banned, Se<tiian polernicists his views against the aibcisms ol
the "Zagreb Orde, " 70 as did, more proless"",al historians like
lhe fina l product ol the SASA line was the monograph by acadernician MilDfad stvaranje Juoosfavije 1790-1918 (lhe
Cieation ol YU!)l>slavia, 1790-1918), whidl appeared in 1989, the year ol reintegration ol Kosovo and Vojvodina,
ol his militant speedl at GaLi Mestan at the 600th annive.-sary ol the Se<tiian defeat on the Field ol Kosovo, wheo he said
that the Serbs are "onee again in battles and befOfe battles. lhey are not armed battles, though that is not to be
exdtJded. " n In his sophisticated nanative, whidl stands head and shouIde.-s above the primitive efforts of
rettJmed to his thernes about the Catholic hand in the lailure ol YU!)l>slav integration. He was lar more explicit
in his speedl at the public lorum ol 8udva, Monteoegro, on 25 Octooe.- 1990, wheo he dlarged that "it is not the tragedy ol
YU!)I>slav e<>mmurlism that it historically to lift rulture 0lJI: ol the vaull: ol inferiority the.-eby preveoting
[rulture) Imm becoming the loundation ol a new assooation. lhe tragedy is that oommtrism acQuired lhis role. " ]J
-56-
Insisting oolhe w lpability of Ihe Catholic O>urdl, d aimed Ihat Ihe "whole past of VU(1Oslav unification depeoded
oolhe ability ol O>urdles t o rationahze Ihe division ol a sioule linQuistic cake. lhat is, duriou Ihe [nineteeoth and
tweotieth] ceorunes, Ihe VlJ!1Oslavs we<e united 0flIy t o Ihe exteot Ihat Ihe Catholic O>urdl lailed in maintaiflinu Cm atian
and SIoveoian separatism. " lhe South Slavs did not ose t o luli unitarism because "lhe O>urdles divided us. " Hence Ihe
future ol VU(1Oslavia oouId (10 eilhe< against Ihe influence ol religion Catholicism] and into and
dis solutioo. H By 1991, in Ihe wake ol Ihe oogapse ol oommunism Ihroughout Eastem Europe, Ihe dis soltJtion was at hand.
Following lhe legalization ol opposibon parties 19B9-90, and Ihe victOl)' of Ihe oppositioo in Ihe 1990 electXms in SIoveoia,
Cm atia, Macedonia, and Se<tiia and Ihe VU(1Oslav Peoples Amly became ooeasingly isolated and
detem>ined to accept no furthe< oonfede<alization, mum less indepeodence, ol Ihe oonstitueot republics. lhe dedarations
ol indepeodence by SIoveoia and Cm atia in.lune 1991 and Ihe war Ihat lollowed prompted an obituary lo< VlJ!1Oslavia in a
leading Se<tiian w wal weeldy: "Cioatia and SIoveoia are exiting rrom VU(1Oslavia wilh Ihe Communist dowry, leaviog
behind Ihem, in a garnage can, ag Ihe symbols, rituals, and party cards wilh whidllhey acQUired Ihe dowry. Mo<eove<, Ihey
are exiting rrom Ihat notorious party and ideological state with Ihat Ihey neve< would have woo oo lhe fi eld of
battle. " 75
lhe non-Sero reactHm to Ihe rise ol historiography in Se<tiia was inadeQIJate and late. Mo<eove<, as we have
already seeo in Cioatia, mum ol !his effort was mounI:ed by orthodox Titoist polemicists, not geouine historians. 0nIy in Ihe
late 19BOs did real sdwlars like Ljubo Boban, 76 Bogdan Krizman, and Dusan Bibe< start responding to Ihe avalandle ol
double standa rds and distortions. lhey we<e joined by demographe<s who t ook up Ihe exagge<ated d aims about Ihe war
Iosses ol 194 1-45,lhe stod< subject of historiography. ]] Most J)()fl-Se<tiian historians we<e o<
eQUivocating. GWeo Ihe tight oontJol ol party ceoso<ship in Cioatia, Kosovo, and almost eVe<yWhe<e
ouI:s ide Se<tiia prope< except in SIoveoia, popular historical worl<s we<e rare and writteo by amateurs. P"rolessiooal
historians weot about Iheir business, avoiding political histOl)' in lavo< ol nonoontJove<sial sodal studies. lhe lew Se<tiian
historians who raised Iheir voices against Ihe deluge we<e isolated in intellectual ghettos. 7"
"Today it is impossible to say, " ar!)l.led at Gazi Mest an, "what is historical truIh and what is legeod in Ihe battle ol
Kosovo. lhis is no longe< eveo importa nt. " VlJ!1Oslav historiography oouId not s urvWe Ihe notion Ihat Ihe distin<bon
betweeo historical truIh and popular legeods was not a matte< ol importance. It oouId not s urvWe Ihe notion Ihat Ihe<e
we<e diffe<eot trulhs, ne(1Otiated by prolessional historians. lhe ooe-sided
-57-
war ol historians is notable because le!)eods and ideolo!)ical distortioos we.-e olteo promul!)ated by the best historians, not
by amateurs. Yu!)Oslav histoOo!)raphy was neve.- arran!)ed. Now, it no Ion!)e.- exists. lhis means that the
histoOo!)raphies ol the s uocessor st ates be uneQUa l in harmony, QUa lity, and orieotation, accordiJl!) to the level ol
ideolo!)ization in eadl. lhe historical !)Uild have a diffiru"= t as k in removin!) not onIy the heota!)e of the Commuoist
dififJistne but also the oonseQUeoces ol the postoommunism dlas m. fus dlapte.- has s u!)!)ested that the dissolution ol
Yu!)Oslav histoOo!)raphy O<XUTed because of the COfltiouity ol partisan Ioya"=ies t o dlanQin!) ideolo!)ical banoe.-s. It canoot
ans we.- why so many dlaJl!)ed their Ma rxist alle!)iances (' s um they we.-e) so QUiddy (' they did sol t o intJoduce (or re/lect)
the new political reQUiremeots. lhe oooseQUeoces lor histoOo!)raphy, but also lor ordinary human lives, are vast.
v
In 1984, amid various historical polemics, Mexican write.- Roberto Salinas J>Oce tidded the lancy ol the YU!)Oslav public with
his novel theory about the Iocation ol Homeric sites. lroy, he d aimed, was realty at Gabela, a He.-ce!)OvIoan viIIa!)e on the
riQht bank ol the Ne.-etva RHe.-, downstram /rom Capljina. FJlJstrated d assicists, whose inability to antripate Salinas
theories became a source ol oooside.-able dispara!)emeot in the Jlfess, responded with a sardonic QUiz, whe.-eby the most
!)lIni ble respondeots we.-e Jlfodaimed lrojans, "You have a stomadl ol steel, a real lrojan stomadl, despite the 8ronze
A!)e. You can devour eve.-ythin!), nothin!) can make you ., nothin!) can survnse you. You are blessed because you have
believed but canoot see. Yours is the K.in!)dom ol lroy. " BO
At the time ol this writio!), the Ne.-etva valley is a !)reat cauldron ol war. Capljina and Gabela are amon!) the many t owns
and villa!)es that the YU!)Oslav P""l>les Amly has bombed in ApfiI and May 1992 in its war a!)ainst lhe
lrojan lancy has tumed into Hea.obas veilin!). 8ut it is 1101<, more so than the bombed slopes ol the He.-ce!)OvIoan Ida, that
has Jlfoduced the most !)raphic ima!)es ol the YU!)Oslav war. In Octobe.- 1991, more than twelve years alte.- the
memorable oon!)ress that initiated the war ol historians, the army lD,OOO Cm ats t o leave 1101<. Instead ol
perf!lffllio!) a solemn rite on the seveoty-third annive.-sary ol Yu!)Oslavia, the p""l>le ol ilok pad<ed their cars and carts with
eve.-ythin!) they couId carry and took off t oward the west. A phot o!)raph ol a !)randmothe.- bein!) seardled by
two stern army womeo is memorable . .".:.."No t e.-ms can be made with Fate. I have just now seeo Cassandra
dra!)!)ed away by lorce. " "'
-58-
Notes
fus dlapte.- was oriQina lly in The AmericiJn His toric.Jl R2view, Vol. 97. No. 4 (Octobe.- 1992). Copyri!)ht by lhe
America n Historica l Assooation. Reprioted by pem>is sion ol !he a ulhof a nd ol !he jouma l.
1. MomOlo "Nel}lolm pita nja istoriografiji o ju(1OsIoveoskom ujedinjeoju: in Nikola B. Popov;,: ("d. l, stviJriJnje
j uoosfovenske Institut za savremeou ist oriju, 1983), pp. 439-44 1, 446-448.
Jos"" Broz Tito, Polib&i in PeN /mnt;Jres Komunisti&e parnje Juoos!avije: i referati (Belgra d,, :
Kultura, 1948), pp. 24-26.
:L. Ibid., p. 29 .
.1. Ibid., pp. 50, 53.
:i.. Ibid., pp. 63-65.
2.. Ibid., p. 94.
L. Ibid., pp. 128- 129.
lL. Velimir Juoos!avijiJ u apri/skarn ram 1941 (Titograd: Gfafi&i zavod, 1%3, p. 664, note l . fus bool< provoke d
a st OJm of mtris.m in o-oatia, prompting political ooodemnations in !he pa rty press. Accofdi"!I t o one aibc, " One
uets!he impression Ihat [T...nc] pw ceeded fmm ao a priori assumption Ihat!he colaps" of myal Yu!)Oslavia and
its a rmy was not caused, first ol al , by t s re OJime, unteoable relations a monOJ ts nationa lities, oorruption a nd lad<
ol Pfepa redoess on the part ol stat e a nd milta ry leade.-ship, a nd the a OJ!)ression ol lasast powe.-s within a speOOC
international situation, but that the causes ol colaps e most be s ouOJht a monOJ the ooosequeoces ol this orde.- of
thinOJs, mainly in one ooosequeoce- the behavior ol individual peoples in the ApriI war, a bove ag in the O-oatia n
developmeots a nd in the behavior of the O-oatia n people as a whole. " - stjepa n "O politillOm i vojnim
UZfoOma .luOJoslavije, " in Putovi revo/udJe, Vol. 2 (1% 4), Nos. 3-4, pp. 498-499.
los ip 8roz Tito, "UIoOJ a Saveza komunist a u daljnjoj lz!)radoji drustveoih odnosa i a ktua lni Pfoolemi u
medjuna rodnum radni&om pokretu i bortJj za mir i s oOja liza m u svijetu, " in Osm; /mnt;Jres SIO (BeI!)rade: Kultura,
1% 4), p. 35.
U KuIundDc weot lor Ihe jugolar in st ating lhat Ihe misloJtune ol O-oatian historiography lay in its domination "by meo
who sewed Ihe preW>us regimes QUite and who, lor Iheir own pe.-sonal reasons, out ollheir goili:
oomplex, tJans ported Iheir own sins ooto Ihe whole nation, Ihe.-eby developing what we usualy rele.- t o as Ihe IJuilt
complex ollhis whole pe<>ple. " - Zvonimir hrvatske histo/iofJrafije: O fa/sifikatorima, birokratima,
f!efJatorima, i td . i td . .. hrvatske povijesti, 2nd ed. (Zagreb: at Ihe authors expeose, 1970), pp. 7-8.
AJguinglhat Ihe Ustasa oomplex- a seose ol !)UiII: lor Ihe anti-Se.-bian mmes ollhe seK-<mposed,
KuIundDc stated Ihat Ihe source ollhe problem rested with "us intellectuals who did not , and
systematicaly, always and at eve.-y OI>portunitv, place Ihe Ustasa symbol ol U with a bomb alongside Ihe Oletnik
symbol of skuli and bones, Ustasa dagge.-s and duhs alongside Oletnik a.orved knives and saws, [Ante] Pavelic
alongside and [Kosta] Peeanac ... .!ust as onIy a smaU, sman portion ol Se.Jt>s can be
by Ihe extJemely odious name ol Chemik, so, t oo, among lhe o-oats, Ihe.-e was onIy a handful of bloodthirsty
madmeo in whom Ihe beast was awakeoed and whom we can dlristeo with Ihe t effible name
TrOfJf'(iija hrvatske histo/iofJrafije, p. 6 .
.H. Vlado Gotovac, "Autsajde.-ski Iragmeoti : Svtak tJe: in Kritika, no. 8 (Septembe.-- Octobe.- 1969), p. 557 .
.l.5.. )ordo krufe .!ugoslavijom, " in I storijski Cilsopis, Vol. 18 (1971), p. 49.
lli Ibid., p. 50.
lL Gotovac, "Auts ajde.-skilragmeoti" [note 14], p. 559 .
.llL. Jos", 8roz Tito, Govoti dmIJa TIta (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1971), p. 8 .
.l2. The oonteots ollhis handy book we.-e hardly oontJove.-sial. In lad:, Ihe authors balanced position was evideot in all
seositive questions Ihat matte.-ed to Ihe authorities. The books olleose had more to do with Ihe !mown polibcal
ol author and reviewe.-Ihan with its biases. To be s ure, Ihe.-e was also Ihe sin ol omission. The whole
postwar sectXm ooosists ollhe lollowiog three seoteoces: "In a state community with Ihe othe.- nations and
nationalities ollhe SoOalist Fede.-aJ Republic of Yugoslavia, Ihe Croatian pe<>ple live and prospe.- in Ihe SoOalist
Republic of O-oatia. [This re-public] is a resull: ollhe joint strug!lle ol o-oats and Se.Jt>s, and ol an South Slav nations,
in Ihe National libe.-ation War [i.e., World War Two]. It is Ihe rea!izatron ollhe O-oatian pe<>ples right to li berty,
statehood, and indepeodeoce. " - Trvimir MaCa n, Povijest hrvatskog naroda (Zagreb: KIljiga, 1971), p. 228.
Zll. Tudjman was m arged, am<>nO} olhe.- lhings, with calliog lor a reexamination ollhe historical OraMllstances Ihat
oontributed t o Ihe neve.--eoding O-oatian struggle lor survival. On Tudjmans role in historical oontJove.-sies, see
Kruselj, "Franjo Tudjman- biografij a, " in Tomislav (ed. ), Franjo Tudjman (Zagreb: Globus, 1991), pp.
41-116.
:.u. "Istorija, " in PoIi tika (Belgrade), 3D Ma rm 1972, p. 13.
-60-
:.22.. Dedije.- did not lail to promote many QUestionable views, nota bly on !he s upposedly vast anti-Se<bianism of!he
SIoveoian Catholic press in 1914, "geooOde" against!he seros of and parts ol O-oatia" in
World War Orle, exploitation ol economicaly bad<ward regions of inte.-war VU!)l>slavia by SIoveoian and O-oatian
linanee capital, "peasant spontaneity" in !he actMties ol !he O-oatian Peasant Party, and his own lavorite !hemes ol
"sphe.-es ol influence" and "uniQUeoess of!he VU!)l>slav revolubon. " - Ivan BoR, MOlofad and
Vladimir Dedije.-, I storija Juoos!avije (Belgrade: Prosveta, 1972), pp. 3B3-3B4, 394-396, 424-426, 432-433, 529.
:.u. Ibid., p. 236.
1!. Ibid., p. 244.
Z.5.. Latinka Zatvaranje kru"a: Ishod po/iti&ofJ rasrepa u SIO 1971/ 1972 (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991), p. 195.
& lhe issue ol Dubrovnik, mGfe preOsely its depictXm as a city ol "stokavian. speakiog Catholics " but not Cm ats, in !he
book Stpski narod i njefJov jezik (Belgrade: Sfl>ska knjifeVfla zadruga, 1971), by !he Se<bian philologist Pavle was
used by !he new leade.-ship ol Cm atia t o attad< Se<bian and, by implication, !he Seroian leade.-s hip !hat
t""k no repress we actHms against it. See Zatvaranje kru"a [not e 25] , p. 39B.
"J.L. Momcilo "Istorija Ju!)l>slavije: in Vol. 14, No. 3 (Mardl 1973), J>I>. 275, 290, 297.
ZlL. Ibid., p. 264.
Z.2. MOria na Gmss, "Ideja ju!)l>slaveostva u )(1)( u Ist oriji Ju!)l>slavije: in I::.dsopis u suvremenu povijest, Vol. 5
(1973), no. 2, p. 15.
;m. Gora n MoMa uu ludno: PoIemike (2agreb: Globus, 19B3), p. 167.
;u. lhe peoulbmate meeting was at !he spa ol AJandjelovac, in Seroia, in 19B3. lhe last eve.-, ominously, at Kosovos
capital, Pristina, in 19B7.
;u. Branislav "PartUanski Mis ie: in Vreme (Belgrade), 10 Decembe.- 1991, p. 27.
;u. Vladimir Dedije.-, Novi prilozi u bio!Jrafiju Josipa BIOU TIta, vol. 2 (Rijeka : l..ibumija, 19B1), passim.
;H. lhe "Iede.-a!" Borba, !he durable bastion of orthodox Titoists, o<ganized a round table on Dedije.-s book on 6
January 19B2. PartXlpants dlaracterized !he volume as "oontribuboos t o Dedije.-s sQuariog ol accounts wilh!he
revolubon !hat he has deseJted" (Julijana Vrooac), "a oommoo but pmloundly caWated political pamphlet, imbued
wilh prolound anti-sooalism, anti-a>mmunis m, and devised to gIo<ity [Milovan] Dji!as and his blad<est
orieotation" (Djuradj and "contributiofls against losip Broz Tito, his deeds, and (}Uf revolution"
(Jooo In his disrussion, lovan reoognized!he oomplicated array ol xeoophobic and
attitudes !hat we.-e typical ol "old cadres": I olteo asked myseK alte.- [readin!l]lhis book, pemaps eveo
earne.-,;s!he Western public, American and Western public geoe.-ally, really inte.-ested in (}Uf National Libe.-ation
struggle, since already in 1953 Dedije.- st arted wribng books lo< !he West ? What is lhis now? Does America realy
want t o know how t o make revolution, does it want an example? Or is else at wor1< he.-e- !he
destabilization ol VU!)I>slavia? Is!his not ouness policy: do not attad< oommunism Imm!he outside, but Imm
!he inside?" Milovan
eoded his disaJs sion on a n ominous note : AII ol lhis shouId be bome in mind. lest we experieoce some
new tra uma. s ome new dviI wa r. some new massaae. - Branko Jova nov;,: (ed. ). RiJZfJOvot"o knjizi Vladimira Dedijera
Navi prilozi za bior/rafiju Josi"" BIOza 1lta - (Belgrade: Boroa. 19B2). pp. 14. 39. 43. 7B. B4.
Mili m .. Komesar za ishranu radozna lill. in DUfJa (Belgra de ). 10 JuIy 19B4. p. 43.
Among the seosationa list worl<s publisIled in the wa ke ol Dedije<s Navi prilozi. the l onowing we<e notable :
EnifJma 2 vols. (Belgrade: Rad. 19B3); a nd Dfaga n Klja lOC. Dosije HebratIfJ (Belgrade: Partiza ns ka
KIljiga. 19B3). Both stressed the depeodeoce ol Yugoslav Communist s onthe Comintem a nd ra ised s us piOons a bout
the oontinuity ol deviations in the Communist Party ol Cm atia. Both a ls o t oudled on the pe<s erution ol
!hose Yugoslav Communist s. the s o-eaned Cominformist s. who sided with stalin a nd the Cominform resolubon in the
Soviet -Yugoslav spiit ol 194B. Simull:ane-ouslv. the<e appeared a series ot noveIs a nd plays onthe otok
oonceotJation camp. wllidlthe Yugoslav sea.inty police prepared lor the inca rce<ation ol the Cominformist s. lhe most
important ol these wor1<s we<e: AIltonije Isakov;,:. Tren 2 , Kazivanja Ceperku (Belgrade: J>rosveta. 19B2); Sloboda n
Seleoic. Pismo/fJ/ava (Belgrade: J>rosveta. 19B2); a nd Jova nov;,:. Karamazovi (Belgrade: Nezavis na izda nja.
19B4). lhe publication ol these llighIy dla rged fi<bona l worl<s pul: pressure on historia ns t o s olve the questions
that the litte<at eurs J>Osed.
Novi prilozi ... od prigovora do oSJ>Ofava nja ," in Vjesnik 10 Ma rdl19B2. p. 5.
Bra nko petJanov;,:. Revo/udj a i kontrarevo/udj a u Juooslavij i (1 941-1945) . 2 vols. (Belgrade: Rad. 19B3). Vol. l . p. 129.
Andrej Mitrov;,:. Nedovrseoa s lika. in PoIitika (15 Octobe< 19B3). p. 10.
petJanov;,:. Revo/udj a i kontrarevo/udj a [note 3B]. Vol. l . p. 99.
Ibid . Vol. 2. p. B2.
Bra nko petJanov;,: a nd MomOlo (e ds. ). Juooslavij a 1918/1 984: Zbirka dokumenata (Belgra de : IRO Rad. 19B5).
AIlto U J>Ovodu najnovije rene dokumeoat a o .lugoslaviji ... in c..sopis za suvremenu povijest . Vol. l B
(19B6). no. l . p. 111. For the authors resJ>Oflses. see Branko petJanov;,: a nd MomOlo Odgovor na napis
AIlta U J>Ovodu najnovije rene doIrumeoat a o .lugos laviji'" in c..sopis za suvremenu povijest . Vol. l B (19B6).
no. 3. pp. 116-121.
Branko petJa nov;,:. I storij a Juooslavije 1918-1988. 3 vols. (Belgra de : Noiit. 1988). Vol. 2. p. 186.
Vojislav a nd Kost a 5trana&i p/uralizam iIi monizam: pokreti i po/itiCki sisrnm u Juooslavij i
1944 -1949 (Belgrade: Ceote< l or a nd So<ial lheory. 1983).
Pe<o Pletilmsa. Ple doaje za visestra nadci sistem. in Vjesnik (20 Sept embe< 1983). p. 3; a nd Mir1<o
Teodeociozna rel<onstrukcija ," in Politikil (6 Au!)Ust 1983). p. 12. In his attad< on a nd was
espooally ins ist eot onthe spooal role ol the CPY as a party in the great hist orical seose. Sinee the a uthors we<e
incapa ble ol sum obeisance. they we<e incapa ble ol ooJlljlfeheoding the logos ol Yugoslav revolutiorl.
Unde< a ba rra ge ot partisan attad<s. the authors we<e t o plead that it is ma liOous t o d a im that
we
are in lavOf of a system. " Ma,1mv;,:, " Kiselo grozdj e, " in Danas (27 September 1983), p. 19 .
.'!l.. Al so missOnu were MOrjana Gmss, DfaOJ(>van and Jaroslav Sidak, Ihree of the most pmminent Cmatian
historians, all ol them likewise invited to the oonlereoce .
.1lL. SUVar, " Historij a revolucij e bee se nas sm, " in Ivan (ed.), Historija i suvremenost: [ciej ne kontroverze
(2agreb: Centar CI( SKH za idejno-teorij ski rad "Vladimir 1984), p. 9 .
.12. Voj an Rus, "Izmedju i oogmatskih revizij a, " in (ed.), Historija i suvremenost [note 48], p. 131.
lli !';uvar, " Historij a revolucij e bee se nas svih" [note 48], p. 14 .
.u. Ines "I zIoOrri- znameoiti Hrvati," in Nedje/jna Dalmadja (Split), 25 AU(1Ust 1985, p. 22 .
.52.. GOfan "VOla salata iIi pomirenj e svih Hrvata, " in Oko (2agreb), 26 April1984, J>I>. 5, 8-9.
a Sanja vmovec (ed.), Aporije Hrvatskou biorJrafskou /eksikona (Zagreb: Centar za idejno-teorij ski rad Gl( SKH 2agreb,
1984). AIthougoh most participants did not share view that the edition was an " expression ol spiritual
oounterrevoltJtion, " aibcal and even deourriatOf)' tones in the disrussion .
.5A. Ivo lzmec!ju publike i drfDve: Povijest hrvatske kinemato{Jrafije 1896 1980 (2agreb: Zn anje, 1984).
:i.5... Mira " Povij est iIi pamfleti," in Vjesnik: Sedam dana (12 December 1984), pp. 12- 13; and R. "To ",je
istorij a, " in PoIitika (8 Mardl1985), p. 10.
lli Ratko Pe!mv;,:, " Kako ofiveti vreme," in DUfJa (5 NovembeJ 1983), pp. 3D- 32.
:u.. Velimir SIom Kraljevine JufJOS/avije 1941, 2 vols. (Belgrade: Narodna Kniji ga, 1982-83). FOf a response Im m a
leadrO!) Cmatian historian, see Ljubo Boban, " Izvod iz stJoOJ(> povj erljive kombinatori<e Velimira A i o
drugim kombinatori<ama, " in Historija i suvremenost [note 48], pp. 263-275 .
.5.lL. Desanka JufJOS/ovenski komunisti i nacionalno pitanje (1919-1935) (Belgrade: Rad, 1983), pp. 143- 144, 283 .
.5.2. Milomir "Lov na j ednog kialja," in DUfJa (4 NovembeJ 1984), pp. 30-32.
J&. DjOfdj e Dj . stankov;,:, Nikola i jufJOS/ovensko pitanje, 2 vols. (Belgrade: BIG2, 1985).
li.l.. On 18 SeptembeJ 1987, at a session of the Lea(1Ue of Communists ol Serbia (LCS) CeotJal Committee, GeneJal
LjubiOc, Titos Iongtirne ministeJ ol defense, deoounced the IIood of SertJian memoirs: "HeJe, you see, we have
memoirs ol Koca Popov;,:, Milovan Djilas, Voj an Mir1<o Mar1<ov;,:, Mir1<o PeJov;,:, Milij a Kovaeev;,:, Gostav Vlahov,
Patriardl Radivoj e Jovanov;,:, Ljubodrag and I don"t know who else. What will it mean I Of SertJia when
all ol these memoirs are and what will the world Ihiok of us?" aed in Slavoljub Kaka se dofJodio
vodja: Borbe za vlost u Srbiji posIe Josipa BIOza (Belgrade: Filip 1992), p. 160.
& See espooally ZOfan D. Masoni u JufJOS/aviji (1764 -1980): PrefJ/ed istorije s/obodflOfJ zidarst'la u JufJOS/aviji
- Prilozi i fJradja (Belgrade: Narmma Knji ga, 1984). insiouated that Tito and Kardelj weJe Masons and that
they to the MasonOc Iodge with baj Kmj ev;,: and Juraj !';utej , lead
ers ol lhe O-oatia n Peasant Party. See MaSOlli, pp. 417, 634, 646, 649, 665. FOf a polemic on lhis issue, see
Lette<s t o Ihe EditOf, in NIN (7 Octooe< 1984), pp. 4- 6, 8. Fas<ination with Ihe Masons was not exdusive t o
FOf a O-oatia n eQUivalent, see Iva n MaSOllstvo u Hrvata: Masoni i Juoos!avija (Split : Crlcva u svijetu, 1983).
"Memorandum SANU, " in DUfJa (.lune 1989), p.26.
Ibid., pp. 36, 38-40, 42-43, 44, 46, 47.
DiuIOC, Kako se do>Jodio vodja [note ( 1), pp. 111, 121.
Vasilije Dj. Srpsko-hrvatski odnosi i jUfJOskJVenska ideja (Belgrade: Narodna Knijiga, 1983), p. 150.
Vasilije "O geoezi geoocida nad sroima u NDH, " in Knjm.vne fIOvine (15 Septembe< 1986), p. 5.
"D< is kJjuceo iz Saveza komunista," in PoIitika (6 Novembe< 1985), p. 6. lhe a ulhOf a nd Ihe books two
reviewe<s (ZOfa n LalOC a nd Savo 5I<oko) we<e expelled /rom Ihe LCY.
Veselin Saveznid i jufJOS/ovenska ra ma drama, 2 vols. (Belgrade : Narmjfla Knjiga, 1985), Vol. 2, pp. 25 1, 253.
lhe phrase belongs to MilOfad who marged Ihat afusms against various Sert>ian publications st ern /rom
"aggressive a nd orthodox in Ihe public, rultural, a nd ideational"f}Olitical life ol O-oatias
capitaJ. " See Milorad "Protiv nove milita ntnosti, " in Knjm.vne fIOvine ( l Octooe< 1985), p. 2. SIovenian
historia n Dusan Bibe< was actualy Ihe most devastatinu aibc ol book. See Bibe<, "Nauma k"'serija
jednog politid<og pamfleta : U povodu Imjige V. Saveznici i jugos loveoska rama dra ma, " in CiJsopis za
suvremenupovijest, Vol. 17 (1985), no. 3, pp. 95-119.
Vidojko (ed. ), struCna rasprava o knjizi dr Veselina Djuretiffi "Saveznid i jufJOS/ovenska rama drama"
(Belgrade : SANU, 1985), pp. 12-33. had Ihe last word on lhe controve<sy at Ihe heigoht ol powe<
in 1991, "We gave up (}Ul" seamd mance lor Ihe lormation ol (}Ul" st ate alte< Ihe eod ol Wortd Wa r Two. In
Ihe course ol Ihat war, we lougoht ""de< diffe<ent ba""e<s, but we experieoced Ihe most ironical posibon, Ihat is,
Ihat Ihe international dimeosiorl ol our strugQle became Ihe means lor Ihe t otal destructXm ol Sert>ian la nds; Ihat
(}Ul" blood, s hed in Ihe na me ol nebulous s ooalist or Communist ideas, in Ihe na me ol Ihe ideology ol Molhe< Russia,
Ihat is, in lea!)Ue with Russia, whidl was in Ihe ha nds ot Satan, was used lor Ihe destructXm ot Vugoslavia a nd
Sert>ian la nds. " Communist lede<alis m suoceeded in destJoy;.,g lhe Sert>ian la nds, relief will come /rom Ihe
deoommunized homeland ol communis m Ihat just vis ited: "into Ihe cente< ol Russia- New Russia whidl is in
its s low but inevitable birth pangs, we have Ihrown a p""l>le Ihat had disappeared, dis appeared /rom Russias
vis iorl, 0flIy t o erne<ge as a cosmOc pe<>ple. I a m refeffinu to Ihe - Veselin "Nova Rus ija i Srl>ija, " in
PofJ/edi (6 Septembe< 1991), pp. 40-41.
Slobodan "Ravnopravni i s lofni odnosi us lov za opst a nak Jugoslavije, " in PoIitika (29.lune 1989), p. 4.
Milorad "Buduc'nost Jugoslavije, " in NIN (16 Novernbe< 1990), p. 55.
Ibid., p. 56. did not in<lulge in Ihe aude a nti..catholicpropa ga nda Ihat a rose in Sert>ia in Ihe late 1980s. He
le gitimated Ihe anti..catholic lite<ature ol D<a goljub R. Vladimir Dedije<, a nd On lhis
subject, see Ivo Banac, "lhe Fearful AsymmetJy ol War: lhe Ca uses a nd Coflsequeoces ol YU(1l>slavia 's Demise, " in
Daedal us, No. 121 (1992), pp. 161-163, 173.
M",dra u "Kraj Ju(1l>slavije: in KnjiH!vne novine (l JuIy 1991), p. l .
For Booan's diliUeot efforts, see his KOIItroverze iz povijesti, 3 vols. [Za!lfeb: SImiska Imjiua, 19B7, 19B9, 1990).
lhe skilW a nd mode<ate wor1< by a n emI!lfe Se<bia n statistician, BO(1l>ljub was sUJ>plemeoted by a Cm atia n
demo!lfaphe<, Vladimir Ze<javic. See BO(1l>ljub iltve DrufJOfJ svetskou rata u JUfJOS/aviji (London: Nasa r..c,
19B5); Vladimir Gubid Juoos!avije u druoom svjetskom ram (Za!lfeb: Ju(1l>slaveostvo
Drustvo, 19B9); a nd Vladimir Opsesije i megalomani je oko JasenoVCil i Bleiburr;a (Za!lfeb: Globus,
1992).
lhe lollowin!) wor1<s ol Ihree Quite diffe<eot sd>oIa rs a re notable : Iva n ili putokaz (Sarajevo:
Svjetlost, 1990); Arldrej Mitmvic, Rasprav/janja sa Klio (Sarajevo: Svjetlost, 1991); Dfa(1l> Srbi u Hrvatskoj
[Za!lfeb: Vjesnik, 1991); a nd Dfa(1l> Roksandic, Srpska i hrvatska povijest i 'nova historija' (Za!lfeb: stvamost, 1991).
"Ravnopravni i slomi odnosi" [note 72], p. 3.
Roberto Sa"'as Price, Homer's Blind Audience: At! Essay 011 the I liacFs GoofJrapl!ical Prerequisites for the Site ot I lias (San
AIltonio, lex. : Scylax PTess, 19B3); Bruna "Veliki J>ri!Iodni kviz: Jeste lroja nac?" in Zlatlm Seselj (ed.),
Troja i kakoje stOO (Za!lfeb: Laboa et Gfaeca, 19B5), p. B2.
Deja n "1I0k: E!1Zodus Hrvata: in Arena [Za!lfeb), 26 Octobe< 1991, pp. 2-5.
Euripedes, Trojan Women, ve<ses 616--617.
3
The Armed Forces of Yugoslavia:
Sliding into War
Marno
On 26 1991, a YlJ!1Oslav Pe<>ple's Army (VPA) military p.-OSeaJl:Of in Zagreb indicted Col.-Geo. (retired)
Martin Def""se M .... ste.- ot o-oatia, lo< a""gedly organirinu a nd coordinatinu "!he ffimina l ad ol a rmed rebellion. " .:
Now ,eportedly his duties while unde.- heavy (1Ua rd in !';pege.Jj faced at least IW .. years ' rnprisonmeot.
ooovrled. lhe VPA hi!)h command, headed by !he Fede.-al Def""s" Seaetary, CoI.-Geo. Ve.Jjko seerned
detennined to see aJTested a nd med, eveo at !he risk ol a shooting war with!he para- military a rmed lorces
(militia Of police) ol Presideot Fra njo Tudjman'. O-oatian Democratic Union (CDU) (1Ovemmeot.
one month eariier, a n e.Jeveoth hour SertJian-O-oatia n summit acaJfd delused a n escalating oonfrOfltatiofllhat
Tudjman desffibed as beioQ "oo!he vefOJe ol dviI war, " :"'followiou his talk. in Belgrad" wilh Fede.-al Presideot Borisav Jov;c
a nd Presideot Slobodan ol Sert>ia. lhis deal, reportedly mad" unde.- Onteose American and British (1Ovemmeot
Pfess...-e, agreed that O-oatia would demob"'e ts miiitia rese.ves in return for a redtxbon in the combat readiness of VPA
forces in O-oatia. AIl eohanced oombat readiness that involved the ope<ational deploymeot of 5th Military District (HQ:
tJ(}ops, a rmor a nd oombat aircralt in a way that was more alOn t o a wartime mobilization than the regola r military
movemeots of peace time.
Typically, this patdled"'-'D exe<ose resolved nolhinu of a ny importa nce. ThouQh the Tudjman (1Ovemmeot did demob"'e ts
militia rese.ves, t did not disband them, as demanded by the "fina !" ultimatum of the Fede<al Defeose
Secretariat (}fl 23 January, wheo the VPA Ihreateoed to "eohance the oombat readiness of ts units ... a n mobilized a rmed
goroups onthe temtOl)' ol the RepuMic ol O-oatia to be disbanded immediately. " VPA, thougoh t did reduce the
oombat readiness ol ts Io<ces in o-oatia, theo immediately unde<mined the spd ol the Se<bian. O-oatian accord ol the
25th by steppiou UJ> ts campai!)/l in
R"""rtedly oovertly s""ported by Se<bian SoOalist Party (SSP) govemmeot in and
thus anti.Q)U, strug!lle by VPA was giveo a veoeef ol legality on 9 January, wlleo a dose ally ol
puslled Ihrougoh a Fedefal state J>resideocy o<def authoriring the ledefal army to disarm an inegal armed goroups in the
oountJy (i.e., Tudjmans militia, althougll!his was not stated untiIthe 23 January ultimatum).
was preseot at the session wlleo!his pfOvocative o<def was passed, despte the vi!)OfouS protests ol the SIoveoian and
O-oatian members ol the Federai state J>resideocy.
lhe 9 January session ol the state J>resideocy also oonsidefed two Iligllly pe<tineot lettefs Irom the SIoveoian and O-oatian
govemmeots, wllidl demanded the immediate d"""liticizatiOfl ol the VPA. lhougoh mo<e O< less rejected by alter mudl
aaimony at that time (according to O-oatian sources), poiitical demand was to become absolutely ceotJal thefealtef,
as the VPAs political role became mo<e overtly Ihreateoing to the Q)U govemmeot in and, mo<e to the
DEMOS (Demoaatic Opposition ol SIoveoia) govemmeot in Ljubljana. Folowiou the msis ol 23-25 January and ts
immediate alte<math in to the total d"""liticizatiOfl ol the VPA is now a vital preoondition lo< a negotiated
peaceful solt.ition to the oountrys 00!)I>in!) political msis.
lhe msis now readled the point wllere the breakup ol Yugoslavia became not only possble but ooeasiogly probabie in
the not too distaJlt future. SIoveoia, lolowiou an oVe<Wlle-lmingly pro-<ndepeodeoce in Decembef 1990, lormally
oommitted tseK to a negotiated separation Irom the Yugoslav ledefatiOfl by .lune 1991 at a joint session ol the Ihree
mambefs ol the SIoveoe Assembly on 20 1991. Addressiou the joint session, J>resideot Kuean stJessed that
a negot;ated s"f'aratiOfl was not possible,theo SIoveoia would go ts own way without an agoreemeot.
axis in now ooeasingly oommitted to a reoonstituted Gfeater Se<bia in the Balkans, seemed
possibly pr"f'ared to let SIoveoia go, but to do eve<ything in ts poWef - UJ> to and ioduding a Iull-scale war- to preveot
o-oatia, wilhin ts preseot bofdefs, Irom going the same way.
lhe large Se<bian mioority populatiOfl in O-oatia (11.6 pefceot ol ts total population) is at the root ol !his oonflict. In Au!)Ust
1990, Ihree months alter the Q)U was to poWef in Serbs in the Knin area ol northem Dalmatia staged an
armed upr;siou wilh the oovert aid ol both and the VPA, :"wllose!ocal miltary Io<ces eoabled the seW-sr;led
Se<bian Autonomous Regoion ol Krajina (SARK) t o survWe Ihe.-eby showOnu Ihat Tudjman's militia was
powerless in a third ol O-oatia's temtOl)'.
This alfair, along with related in various Se<bian areas in Cmatian Slavonia, became more seOous lat e.-.
Tudjman's govemmeot, haviog promUgated a new unitary and secessionist O-oatian OOflStitution in Decembe.-
1990, Iheo weot on t o 10Dow SIoveoia's de facto exil: Irom Ihe Yugoslav lede.-ation in February 1991. lhus, SIoveoia
100000aly separated its eW Irom Ihe lede.-ation, so would O-oatia. This explicit linkage Iheo prompted Ihe bfeakaway
govemmeot ol Ihe SARK to 100000aly secede Irom O-oatia in Mardl1991, Ihe.-eby sowOnu Ihe seeds ol vet more Sert>-O"oat
oonfIict in Ihe republic in Ihe future . .".
This developmeot, needless to say, was warmly weloomed by Ihe govemmeot in Belgrade. Haviog promUgated a
new unitary Se<bian OOflStitution in Sept embe.- 1990, and haviog gained a seemingly de<isive electOfal mandate IOf his
brand ol national oommunism in Ihe Se<bian ele<bon ol Decembe.- ol Ihe same year, now hardly bolhe.-ed to
oonceal his ambition to reoonstitute Ihe Gfeat e.- Se<bia of Decembe.- 191B . .!.lhe first phas e of this policy, Ihe abolition ol
Ihe atJtonomous provinces ol Vojvodina and Kosovo, was oompleted in 1990. lhe next phas e, a radical re<ka wOnu ol
Se<bia's preseot borde.-s at Ihe e""eose ol o-oatia, and Macedonia, would lead t o war in
Ju/le- JuIy 1991.
This slide into war was already aystal dear in Croatia. In Bosnia- He.-zegovina, ruled by an anti-a>mmunist ooalition
govemmeot dominated by Ihe Slavic MusIi m Party ol Demoaatic A<bon (J>DA) since Ihe ele<bons ol Novembe.- 1990, an
oomplicated and politically seositive eIhnic mix existed: 40 pe.-ceot Slavic MusIim, 32 pe.-ceot Sert>, and 1B pe.-ceot
o-oat . My attempt to IOfce this republic- Ihe geopolibcal !indlpin ol Yugoslavia- into a Gfeat e.- Se<bia, Of a Gfeat e.- Croatia,
oouId onIy lead to war. lhe J>DA govemmeot ol PTesideot A1ija also made it dear Ihat SIoveoia and Croatia left
Ihe YlJ!)Oslav lede.-ation, Iheo Bosnia- He.-zegovina would do Ihe same. 10 Similar seotimeots also now in
Macedonia, whose Internal Macedonian RevoltJtiooary Organization-
Demoaatic Party IOf Macedonian National Unity) ooalition govemmeot in January 1991) had Ihe Macedonian
Assemb!y unanimously adopt a dedaration on a sove.-eign and indepeodeot Republic ol Macedonia, whidl indtJded Ihe right
to secede Irom Ihe Yugoslav lede.-ation. ':':
Eveo allies in Monteoegro, whose Lea!)lle ol Communists of Monteoegro (L01) won a electOfal victOl)'
in Decembe.- 1990, we.-e geoe.-aly hostile t o Ihe idea ol beooming a part ol a Gfeat e.- Se<bia, although Ihey would have
little in Ihe matte.- wheo Ihe lede.-ation
oolapsed altogether in the oourse ol 19'91. SUdl seOous oost ades t o a reoonstituted Gfeater SerlJia, however, did not
bother at that time. fus is because he was now oonfideot ol a nythiog he waJlted Imm Cmatia
or a ny other republic that!)Ot in his way on acoount of his stJong wilh the oommunist <:{mtmned VPA (70 perceot of
whose high oommand and office< oorps was sero).
Des pite its sUDfanatiorlal Yugoslav Jlfet""sions, VPA was becoming, little more than a n instrumeot lor
the lorObIe advancemeot of pan-SerlJian ambiboos. '::"As sum, it was a seOous Ihreat t o nume<ous
"""""es, the political revolutions ol 1990 in Yu!)Oslavia reduced its politicized role Imm that ol being the
party-army ol a oommunist Yu!)Oslavia to becoming the de facto party-army ol SerlJian !)Ovemmeot.
The Politics of the YPA in the Post-LCY Era
WiIh the dramatic ool apse ol the Lea!)Ue ol Communists ol Yu!)Oslavia (LCY) at its 14th and, as it tumed out, fina l
ExtJaordinary COflgress in January 1990, the VPA was deprived of its lormer political role virtually ovemight. lhe lormer
",ling LCY had historically oommitted itseK t o maintaining a politicized party-army as a mea ns ol both Jlfese<Ving its own
mIlf)(}j}O!y ol political power and oofltmllirlg its military and !hus alI the military lorces ""der its
oommand. lhe VPA was a n a rmy that!hus would "not accept a ny role as a depoliticized lorce oonfined to its barrad<s, "
acoording to the lorme< Presideot ol the VPAs party organizatiorl, the late Admirai . .:2
fus insisteoce on maintaioiog a poiibcal role that had no legitimate mea ns ol expression alte< Ja nuary 1990, ooupled wilh
the mar1<ed hostility ol the VPA high oommand to the idea ol geouine political was t o be the cause ol seOous
polibcal amfIict betweeo the a rmy and !hose it regarded as its """"""es" Ihroughout 1990. In the case ol SIovenia, the
most politicaly iooovative ol Yu!)Oslavias six republics, !his oonflict actualy bega n in eamest in Septembe< 1989, wh""
various military leade<s, a nd in partirular, stJOfl!)Iy a nd publidy objected t o the republics new OOflstitutiOflal
the one restrictiflg the Fede<al state Presideocys jurisdictXm in dedaring a state ol eme<geocy in
SIovenia without the prior OOflSern: ol its Natiorlal
fus blataJlt polibcal intooe<eoce was lollowed by aude intimidatiorl in April 1990, wheo the VPA attempted t o file mminal
marges (lhrown out by the Maribor public prosea.tor) against Joze PuI'Jlik, the DEMOS Jlfesideotial candidate in
Yu!)Oslavias first Iree a nd lair electXms in ove< lifty years. At the same time, anothe< provocatiorl t ook place wheo
t""k it upon himseK t o mount an unwanted "ins pe<Don t our" in the republic, whidl is part ol the 5th Military District. 15
In May 1990, wheo Tudjmans Q)U was elected to power in Cm atia, the VPA used Federai J>resident Jov;,:s alarmist
inau(1Ul"al s peedl as an exruse t o illegalty and o<de< the disarming ol Temtorial Defeose Fo<ce (TUF) units in
SIoveoia, Cm atia, and other parts ol the oountJy. 16 lhougoh this o<de< was in part blod<ed and reve<sed by the new
anti-<X>mmUr1ist govemments in SIoveoia and Cm atia- with the help ol Ante Ma r1mv;,:s Fede<al Exerutive CounciI (FEC) - it
was highly indicative ol how Kadijevic and the VPA higoh oommand (nominal s""porte<s ol the Yugoslav J>Ome Ministe<, but
mo<e and mo<e oovert anies ol actually regarded the new polibcal o<de< in Yugoslavias two northem republics.
A partirular hostility was resefVed lo< Tudjmans Q)U govemmeot in Zagoreb, whose powe< was shown t o be nominal
in the lace ol VPA military powe< dt.inou, and lo< a lonu time alte<, the sero uprislou in the Knin area in the summe< ol 1990.
lhougoh SIoveoia had no s ero minority J>OI>ulation lo< the VPA higoh oommand and t o play with, its DEMOS
govemmeot was powerless to Jlfeveot VPA Jlfovocations in the republic, sum as the Io<dble seizure ol the
SIoveoe lUf head. QUarte<s in Ljubljana by military police in Octobe< 1990.
At the end ol the Jlfevious month, in a move that was to lead to the Vel)' ve<ge ol war in January 199 1, Ka dijev;,:s
Defeose Seaetariat issued a theo little-<>Oticed statemeot that dedared that the VPA would not pe<mit Yugoslavias
republics t o maintain military Io<ces that we<e ouI:side the lede<al military strudure o< its direct ope<ational 000001.
So-ealled "urgeot st eps" we<e theo Jlfomised to stop sum military Io<ces eme<!1inu, little was actualty done t o
Jlfeveot the development and armiog of Iocal armed Io<ces by both the SIoveoian and Cm atian govemments (the DflIy
exception beiog the raid on the Ljubljana lUf buildinu in Octobe<).
In Novembe< 1990, just as the Iocal refDmled oommunist s went down t o an humiliatinu defeat at the hands of
the J>DA and its future ooalition partne<s in electrons, Ka dijev;,: and othe< t op VPA leade<s, active and
retired, lounded their own orthodox oommunist movement : the Lea!)Ue ol Communists, Movemeot lo< Yugoslavia (Le. MY) .
lhis saJttled Ma r1mv;,:s Lea!)Ue ol Reform Fo<ces (LRF) a eated the previous JuIv, giveo the preseoce ol
Kadijev;,: and other FEC membe<s in the leade<ship of the lhe message ol the latte< was simple : the VPA would not
tole<ate an electo<al victory in by Vuk and his strongoly anti-a>mmunist nationalist Movemeot lo<
Reoewal (MSR), and that people shouId vote lo< and his Party. ' 0
-71-
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lhe ma", Jocal polibcal Iorce, Ihe Kosovo Demoaatic Alliar.ce (KDA) , is now ooovioced Ihat a peacelul settlement wilh Ihe
serns, and in parfu.olar, is impossible. lhis can only mean revolt, a IuU-scale dviI war and, cira.omst ar.ces pe<mit
it, secessioo '" lavor ol a reunilied Gfeat ", st at e in Ihe area. who has st aked ev".-ythinu on winoinu Ihe
on<JOOou dviI war in Kosovo, can only nominally ex",o se oornJOI ollhe area by lorce, whidl means a pe<manent VPA
preseoce. His militia and seaet police cannot hoId Kosovo on lheir own, and it erupts into a gen",al revolt
sUJ>ported by imported weapoos and olh", assist ar.ce /rom nearby Albania and olh", parts ol YlJ!)Oslavia.
lhis is Ihe lJlI:;mat e sern nightmare. Anolh", is Ihe de facto alhar.ce being lorged between Ihe KDA (also
wella>nnected to old and new polibcal lorces in Albania), Ihe J>DA in and Ihe Slavic MlJsli m area
ol Sandfak '" Serbia, and Ihe olh", ma", eIhnic political lorce in Ihe area, Ihe Party ol Demoaatic Prosperity (POP)
in nearby western Macedonia. sum an would represent ov", IWe million MlJslims, who togelh", ooostitute a
major obst ade t o plan lor a Gfeat ", Serbia, whidl also laces Ihe eomity ollhe SIovenes, Cm at s and HlJrlgarians
(or Vojvodina). ' 5
In retJOs pect, Ihe st epping UJ> ol repression in Kosovo /rom Ihe s pring ol 1990 onwa rds was Ihe to
polibcal metamorphosis in lavor ol a Gfeat ", Serbia lat ", lhe same year. A m ange Ihat was obviously s peeded UJ> by Ihe
DEMOS and Q)U electoral victories in Ihe s pring ol 1990. ln .lune 1990, in an important speem to Ihe Serbian Assembly,
first out1ined his vision ol an independent Serbian st at e, whidl would, he slJggest ed, em"'ge YlJ!)Oslavia became
a IDose oon/ed",ation in Ihe luture, as was Ihen beOou demanded by bolh SIoveoia and Cm atia. Secondly, and lar more
da ng",ous)y, he raised Ihe QlJestion ollhe lat e ollhe Serbian dias pora outside Serbia ", Cm atia and Bosni".. Heue!)Ovlna,
noting in pass ing lhat his proposed independent Serbian st at e would protect Ihese serns against lJrlspecified enemies,
and slJggesting Ihat he was oonte-mplating a radical m ange ol SertJias 1945-91 bord",s in lavor ol a
reconstituted Gfeat ", Sernia. ' 6
In JlJIy 1990, Kosovo aga", came t o Ihe lore when Ihe Serbian Assemb)y lit",ally dosed down Ihe provirrial ass embly and
!)Ovemment in 10Uowing a pavement session ollhe lorm", (calJsed by beiog Iod<ed out ollhe ass embly building) ,
wh",e eIhnic Albanian delegat es adopted a dedaration of sov",eignty and replJdiat ed Ihe vahdity ollhe Serbian
ooostitt.6onal ameodments ollhe previous Ma rm. "lhe 10llowOou month, Ihe Knin lJpOsOou tool< place, leading to Ihe
sooseQIJent lormation ol lhe SARK, lh",elJy leading t o a cyde- still in progress- of provocative and e""ansionist
pan-SertJianism outside SertJia prop"" and /urth", moves t owards a unita ry and, in Ihe case ol Kosovo, highIy repres
-73-

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portedly makiou eme.-!jeocy Ioans !rom ts lall"'u official resewes to meet day-to-day VPA and lede.-al !)Ovemmeot eXJl enses
be!jinoOnu in earfy February 1991. H
At the same time, a now briefiou, pmduced by the VPAs poOtX:aI directo<ate, was cirruated t o the tJoops
ol the 5th Military District. Bas ed on receot statemeots, this dorumeot coJltained mudl that is !ranIdy ooedible
(sum as seeing the co"aps e ol communism as a Western plot), but some ol the material was in the real world. lhus, one ot
the majOf practX:a1 priorities ol the VPA was to find stable and seaxe sources ot m ance lo< its eW. l 5 lhis is easie.- said than
done. In 19B9, defense eXJleoditures we.-e just unde.- the eQUivaleot ol US $3 billion (around 5 pe.-ceot ol Gmss Material
Pmduct), whidl were derived!rom the lede.-al !)Ovemmeot (50 perceot ol whose bud!jet weot on defense) . l6
Dt.innu 1990, as virtually an ol Vu!)Oslavias republics (indudin!j Se<bia) stopped pafonu any taxation reveoues into the
lederal exmeQIJer, the hiQh defense bud!jet had to be drasticaly rut in real t erms, as it oouId not be sustained. In 1991,
only National Bank ol Vu!)Oslavia (NDY) resewes were keepin!j the VPA alive m arrially.
Obviouslv, sum emer!jeocy meas .... es oouId onIy be short-term. As the VPA hiQh oommand laced the real possibility ol
haviou no iooome at all !rom lede.-al so .... ces sometime in 1991, so the probabiOty ooeas ed ol its!)OOou lo< the miNta ry
takeover ""tion disrussed eariier in o<de.- t o survive as an instittJtioo. Thou!)Oh s um a OOUJ> would plunue Vu!)Oslavias
already collapsOou economy into even wo<se m aos, it would also!)Oive the VPA endless opportunities lo< plunde.- p .... e and
simple t o sustain itseK eoonomically in at least the short -term. Beyond that, however, the military, ""der the OOfltJoI ol
hardline nationalist communists like and would not have a due about dealOnu with VlJ!)Oslavias wo<s eoinu
eronomic problems. l7 so-ealled "Ihou!jhts" on the subject, as outlined in the 5th Milt ary District briefin!j, were
meaninuless: !)radual eoonomic reform ol the sort that has in VlJ!)Oslavia ove.- the last QlJarte.- ol a
,,,,,,-,,.
lhe.-e are, howeve.-, sbn a numbe.- ol political and othe.- oonstJaints actiou UJ>Ofl the VPA hi!)h oommand as re!jards any
possible military takeover in the future. 1hou!)Oh now less than was onee the case, the lear that an
attempt at a OOUJ> would lat alIy unde.-mine the internal oohesion ol an army that is around 50 pe.-ceot oonsffip!:, and in
whidl around one in lo .... oonsffip!:s is an ethnic Albanian. la sum a co.apse would almost certainly take place"""" an
attempt at a OOUJ>, leaviou a Se<bian AImy t o fi!jht a 0viI war in p .... s uit ol, its own s urvival and, seoondly, a
Gfeat e.- Se<bia- a developmeot that has now berome reality. lhe lear ol sum a scenario com"'!j about almost certainly
eXJllains the t actX:a1 catJtion ol durinu the m sis ol Ma rm 1991.
-76-
Seamdtv, we may coosOder negative reSJ>Oflses to either a direct war O< a miltary t akeover (an ad: ol war by any
olher name as wel), in a part O< Ihe whole ol VU!)I>slavia. A JllJmber ol interested !)I>vemmeots have already
wamed Ihe VJ>A about Ihe external polibcal and olher cooseQIJeoces t would lace in Ihe event ol a COUJ>, while Ihe key
variable in eveotually puttiog togetner Ihe accord ol 25 JaJllJary 1991 was exteosive politi<;al and
economic press .... e Iwm Ihe u. s . AmbassadOf, WaJTeo Zimmerman, and Ihe Britis h Office. Similar Jlfess .... e was
almost certairlly brought t o bear duriog Ihe msis ol Ma rdl 1991. A letter Ihat as ked lo< lJJls peOtied AmeOcan support
against Ihe VJ>A was also sent. J9 lhe sort Ihat Tudjman had in mind- military as sist ance- was JlIlt an olIer, but effectWe
diplomatic pressure was t o be used to save Ihe peoples ol VlJ!)I>slavia Iwm
The Military Capabilities of the Armed Forces of SFR
Yugoslavia
L(}{}kiog at Ihe vanous armed Io<ces opefative (in 1991) in VlJ!)I>slavia, t is dear Ihat Ihefe is a basic and QUite fundameotal
assymetrical division betweeo Ihem as regards Iheir respectWe military capabilities. On Ihe one hand, Ihefe is Ihe VJ>A, a
oombined se<W:e cadre (pwlessiooal)- coosaipt army of around 200,000 t,."OjlS (around 50 pefceot professional; 50
pefcent oonS<ript ), who are deployed in six Military DisIDcts and one Ma ribme Military Region, and o<ganized into 300rps
HQs, 12 n antJy divisioos (10 active, 2 resewe), 9 n antJy brigades (3 medlanized, 3 motorized, 3 B indepeodeot
tank brigades, 3 mountain brigades, 10 artillel)' regiments, 6 anti-tank regiments, 11 anti-aircralt artillel)' regiments, 4 SAM
(SA..f regimeots (AJmy GWlJJld Fo<ces- 144,OOO tJ(}{}pS, 94,500 coosaipts); 6 naval bases, wilh 5 submarines, 3 mgat es,
71 patJol and ooastal oombatants, 35 amphibious cralt, 7 support 2 marine brigades, 25 ooastal defeose artillel)'
batteries (Navy- ll,OOO tJ(}{}pS, 4,500 coosaipts); 2 air oorps, wilh 431 oombat aircralt and 150 armed heliooptefs, plus
one airtiome brigade, 14 SAM (B SA-2, 6 SA-3) air defeose battalions, 15 anti-aircralt artillel)' regiments (Ai< FOfce- 33,OOO
tJ(}{}pS, 4,500 coosaipts); plus 15,000 para- military FrOfitief Guards lJJldef Ihe oont,."l ol Ihe AJmy GfolJJld Fo<ces.
A res pectable armed Io<ce eveo by First World standards, Ihe o<der ol battle ol Ihe VJ>As COfe, ts army ground Io<ces,
indtJdes 1, 570 main battle tanks, around 1,000 armoured ol vanous types, 1,751 towed artillel)' pieces ol vanous
types (plus a smaner r.umber ol artillel)' systems and multiple rod<et laundlers), 3,000 120-<nm mortars,
1,700 anti-tank !)lJOS ol vanous types, and around 4,000 air defeose !)lJOS ol vanous types. Logistical bad< up lo< this
armed Io<ce is Jlfovided by sophisticated miltary industries, whidl are capable ol Jlfoduciog-
-77-
by a mixture ol indigeoous and liceosed prodtxbon- all types ol nantJy weaJ>OflS and ammunitiofl; solt -s bnned military
armoured induding main battle tanks; and heavy artillel)'; submarines; large< naval platfOfffis;
helioopte<s; and advanced fi ghte< ground attad< airaalt. 1 Few oompleted weaJ>Ofls systems are now imported outright by
!he Vl'A.
lhe eveorual opponeots ol !he Vl'A, on !he o!he< hand, we<e !he republica n SIoveoian and Cm atian remnants ol !he IOfffie<
Vl'A resewe,!he Temtorial Defeose Forces, and !he para-<nilitary militias (police) ol !hese two republics. lhe IOfffie<, a
para-<nilitary militia ol ;ust ove< 800,000 tJoops in ful i wartime mobilization, was (in 1991) a armed lorce with Vel)'
little armor and no airaalt. lhe eQUipmeot !hat it did have was maioly obsolesceot and !hus no matdl lor !he front line
units ol !he Vl'A. It had, howeve<, relatively well st od<ed nantJy weaJ>OOlammunition armories all ove< !he country,
whidl !he Vl'A tried to in SIoveoia and Cm atia- in !he s pring ol 19-90. lhe SIoveoian and Cm atia n police,
though now reinforced wilh some new speOal and units, we<e armed wilh old nantJy weaJ>OflS
and wilh eveo lewe< heavie< armameots/armored !han !ocal lUf' lorces, now !mown as Horne Guards. Logisticaly,
!hese lorces we<e at a disadvantage in relation t o !he Vl'A, as most ol !he countrys military industries we<e in Se<bia. lhe
Zavodi OVeoa Zastava (zez), lor example, was Vu!)Oslavias largest geoe<al produce<, but one ot
its key divisioos, !he Sporting Gon and Defeose WeaJ>Ofl J>l ant, produced all !he countrys nantJy weaJ>OflS and
ammunition. May 19-90, no zez weaJ>Ofls or ammunition have beeo sold to SIoveoia and Cm atia on !he direct
orde<s ol !he Vl'A ..... Ali ol !hese dat a are relevant to unde<sta nding !he situation before !he secessioos ol Cm atia and
SIoveoia and !he subseQIJeot oollapse ol !he Vl'A.
fus lorced bo!h!he SIoveoian and Cm atian lorces to seek t o fi ll !heir weaJ>OflS reQUiremeots abroad, and in
nearby Hungary and Austria, whe<e ceftain agencies and individuals we<e prepared t o relatively smali QlJa ntities ol
various items, induding anti-armor and ariti. airaalt at a high price. In addition, large numbe<s ol private
in Cm atia- we<e t>uy;ng all types ol weaJ>OflS automatic riIIes) abroad and smuggliog !hem
into!he republic, whidl was SOOfl awas h wilh !hem. lhe Serb minority in Cm atia, espeOally in !he SAR)( around Knin, was
also heavily armed. For months, onIy a t eose st and-olf betweeo Tudjmans militia and !ocal Vl'A lorces preveoted a
murde<OlJS free.for -an in !he area. Similar situations, whe<e armed dvilians ope<ate in inlOfffial militias or <riminal gangs,
developed
-78-
in Monteoegro, Macedonia, and, ot oourse, Kos<>vo. lhey we<e more ofteo than not and eveo
s uppofted by the various Iocal and external political aulhorities t o whidl they owed at least nominal aftegi ance.
At the (1Ovemmeotallevel, the DEMOS and Q)U (1Ovemmeots both oooHiinatinu o.gans to bette< oontrol and
expand their res pective armed lo.ces, and t o make the best use ol aW the relevant Iocal resources lo. the defeose
ol their respective republics. In January 199 l, lo. example, the CounciIIo. National Defeose and ProtectXm ol the
Constitutional Orde< was set up by Tudjman. In the same month, a SIoveoe.Q"oatian Agreemeot on Joint Defeose and
Sea.inty COOjl e<ation was siQned by the defense and interiOf ministe<s ol the two republics, whidl agreed, inte< aha, to use
alllegal means- indudinu the armed lo.ces- at their dis posal, to pfOt ect and defend themselves "in the eveot ol armed
intewention against the legal bodies and cit:izens ot the two republics. " Folowing the aeation ot !his rudimeotary
oommon defeose policy, large scale military exe<oses tool< place in both republics dt.inou the lollowiou month. Internal
sea.inty precaubons are also Vel)' strict in both republics, and espooaly in Cm atia, whe<e evel)' key lacility and political
pe<sonaMty is now ""de< Vef"( heavy !)Uard.
In the war, the<efo.e, the YJ>A has certainly had the military edge ove< its OPJ>Oflents, even Ihough it has reverted to being
a purely SertJian Amly, whidl ais<> indudes SertJian lUf' lo.ces and the para-<nilitary militia troops ol the SertJian Internal
Atlairs Ministrv, plus assofted OviIian militias and gangs inside and outside Sert>ia. lhe Serb-dominated YJ>A high oommand
and office< oorps certainly did eve<ythiou in its powe< t o have flOfl -Serb office<s removed afte< the ioitial military
liasoo in SIovenia. lhe new Sert>ian Amly also benelits greatly by the extensive military industries based in Sert>ia.
SIovenia and Cm atia alone are now Ihougllt t o have around 200,()()().. 250,000 para-<nilitary (lUf'/Home Guards and militial
police) trOOjlS, actWe and resewe, ""de< arms and ready to light. lar exceeds the numbe< ol Serb YJ>A trOOjl S in the
5th Military District, whose various barrad<s and bases are, wilh the exception ol Knin, OOffipletely sUITourmed and ""de<
heavy Iocal police surveiftance. lhough lar bette< armed than the Iocal opposition, these lo.ces and their lacilities are
relatively lixed targets, and as sum are vuane<able t o Iocal oounte<measures. As the war has expanded and as Sert>ia and
Cm atia have tena<iously oontested areas ot dispute, casualties and prope<ty da mage have mounI:ed rapidly. Al are Iose<s
in what is Vef"( QUiddy turniou into the nightmare ol a Balka n LebaflOfl.
-79-
Notes
PrOSerul:Of'S office statemeot camed by TiJnjufJ (Belgra d,,) on 26 February 1991, quoted in "Military loMs
O-oatian Defeos" Ministe.- a nd Seveo othe.-s: REuters, Belgrad .. , 26 February 1991.
2.. Quoted in IndependentOtlSllnday (London), 27 January 1991.
:L. Fede.-al Defeos" Seaetariat statemeot camed by TanjufJ (Belgrad,,) in Seffio.- o-oat on 23 January 1991,
translated and reproduced in BBC Moroitonnu Se<W:e, Sllmmary ot World Broadci1sts (he.-einalte.- SWB), Part 2,
Eastem Europe, 25 January 1991, EE/D979, p. BI B .
.1. RespectWe!y, Janez and stipe Mesie:, who walked out ol !he session atteoded by as ,eported
by Radio Ljublj ana in SIoveoe (9 January 1991), translated and reproduced in SWB, 11 January 1991, EE/D%7. p.
BI B.
KINA (a-oatian News AOJeocy) ,eported by Rad", (9 January 1991), tJanslated and ,eproduced in SWB, 11
January 1991, EE/0%7, p. BI B.
lext ol report ol "peem by Kuea o camed by TiJnjufJ (Belgrad,,) in Sert>o-o-oat on 20 1991,
tra ns lated a nd r""roduced in SWB, 22 February 1991, EE/ l003, p. BI B.
L. a Knin Sert>, a nd Ihe VPA Oliel-ol-stalf, Col.-Geo. Bla (1Oje a nolhe< Sert>. lhe Iheo
Fede<al lJlterior Seaetary, CoI.-Geo. (retired) petar Gfacanin (Sem) was a lso reportedly involved in alfair. FOf
see "YlJ(1Os lavia : lhe Brink, " in Eastem Europe News/etter (London, he<einalte< EEN), Vol. 4, No. 17 (27 AlJ!lotIst
1990), p. 2.
lL. 1helndependent(London), 2 Ma rdll 99 1.
2. adopted posibon in 1990, haviou Jlfeviously to berome a serond Tito in a uoitary oommunist
YlJ(1Os.lavia, whidl he, more Ihan a ny olhe< poOtician, lJIlwittingly destroyed. FOf see Sabrina P. Ramet,
"SerlJias Slobodan A Profile: in Orbis (Philadelphia), Vol. 35, No. l (Winte< 1991), pp. 104- 105 .
.lll. fus a rises out ol Ihe J>DAs 1990 electOfal manifesto oommitmeot to a n ind""eodeot Bosnia-
Heae(1OvIoa within, it was Iheo hoped, a oonfede<al ylJ(1Os.lavia . FOf see: "YlJ(1Os.lavia : War Sireos, " in EEN,
Vol. 4, No. lB (10 Septembe< 1990), pp. 7-8.
11. fus was done on 25 January 199 1, and reported by TanjufJ (Belgrade) in EOQIis h onlhe same day, reproduced in
SWB, 29 January 1991, EE/09B2, p. BI ll .
.u.. Whidl is not to say Ihat it does not have its own political and eronomic reasons IOf as it does nowo FOf
see "YlJ(1Os.lavia : lhe Waitiou Game, " in EEN, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Februa ry 1991).
U Remar1< made in a speedl in Split on 29 Septembe< 19B9, a nd reported in PoIitika (BelQrade), 3D Septembe< 19B9,
QUl>ted in Mila n Andrejevidl, "lhe Militarys Role in Ihe CUrTeot CoostittJbonal Cris is, " in Repott on Eastem Europe
(Radio Fr ee E .... ope/Radio Uberty, MlJI1idl, he<einalte< REE), 9 Novembe< 1990, p. 26 .
.H. Andrejevidl, "lhe Milita rys Views on Receot Domestic in RiN!io Free Europe R2search, REE
(Octobe< 19B9), p. 15 .
.l.5.. Mila n Andrejevidl, "Military Attempts to Olarues Auainst SIoveoian Presideotia l Candidate, " in REE (27 April
1990), p. 40.
lli "YlJQI>s.lavia : Meta morphosis, " inEEN, Vol. 4, No. 12 (11 Ju/le 1990), p. 6.
-Bo-
The Independent (6 October 199{)) .
.llL. Andrejevidl. "lhe Military's Role " in [note 13). p. 24 .
.l2. "Yu(1Os lavia : lhe Geoerals ' Inteotiofls. " in EEN. Vol. 4. No. 24 (3 December 199{)). p. 6.
Zll. lhis Iink had astronu personal aspect lo< whose Mi!jana was bo!h a prime
member ol !he and a !l'lIest ol honor at its first oornereoce in December 199{). as reported by TanjufJ
(Belgrade) in Sert><>-O"oat on 24 December 199{). trans lated and rellfOduced in SWB (l January 1991). EE/D959. p.
B/ 14.
:.u. First dralted in 19BB by !he Se<bian Assembly. !he Io<dble imposibon ol !hese ooostitutional ameodmeots in
Kos.(}Vo was to be !he cause of violeot in !he area. rulminatinQ in !he dea!h of over a hundred people
dt.inou dashes betweeo Albanians and Se<bian sea.inty Io<ces. Fo< !his. see Marno Desrent Infi
Chaos: YUfJOS/avia's Worsenint;J Ctisis. European 5eaJtity study No. 7 (London: InstittJte lo< European Defeose &
strategie studies. 19B9). p. 10.
:.22.. Andrejevidl. "lhe YU(1Os lav Amly in Kosovo: Unrest Spreads to Macedonia. " in REE (23 February 1990). p. 3B
& note 3 (p. 40) .
II "Yu(1Os lavia : lhe Waitinu Game: in EEN. Vol. 5. No.4( lB February 1991). p. 5.
1!. FOf!he Se<bian media. whidl is dominated by OOOSplracy !heorists ol one sort o< ano!her.!his Slavic MusIim-
Albanian a lliance is itseW part ol what one MiIofad Jorganovic sees as a 'ooospiratorial
axis ' against!he Sert>s (oommeotary in by Radio J>Ostina on lB February 1991). trans lated and
reproduced in swa (20 February 1991). EE/l00l. pp.
:.2.5.. lhough QUiet wheo oompared to !he Albanians ol Kosovo.!he Hungarians ol Vojvodina
- represented by !he Demoaatic lJniofl of Ma gyars ol Vojvodina (DUMV) - are now becomiog ooeasiogly restive in
reSJ>Oflse to Milosevic's poliOes in !he area. lwo recent incidents are typica l. In February 1991. !he Sert>ian
Assembly rejected a DUMV can lo< a nationality ministJy in !he republic (reported by Budapest home s...w:e on 5
February 1991. translated and reproduced in SWB (B February 1991). EE/D991. p. BI B). and !he DUMV rejected a
SSP (Vojvodina) daim !hat it was a secessionist and separatist o<ganization hostile to YU(1Oslavia (reported by
TanjufJ (Belgrade) in Sert><>-O"oat on lB February 1991. translated and reproduced in SWB (20 February 1991).
EE/l00l. p. B/ 14).
& Speedl in PoIitika (Belgrade). 26.lune 199{). translated and reproduced in Broadcast Irnormation
S...w:e (FBIS). Daily REpott (Eastem Europe). 26.lune 199{). pp. 51-55.
:.u. "Yu(1Oslavia : Shding into War. " inEEN. Vol. 4. No. 14 (11 1990). p. 3.
ZlL. MSIl. leader. is eveo mofe e><treme !han on some issues. sudl as his cali lo< !he Io<dble
repatriation ol al YU(1Os lavia 's ethnic Albanians into neartiy Albania. Fo< !his. see Independent on Sllnday (London).
25 February 199{).
Z.2.. The Guaroian (2B September 199{)).
;m. The Guaroian (29 January 1991).
;u. Independenton Sllnday (10 mardll991); and The Guaroian (16 Mardll991).
;u. EEN (3 December 1990). p. 6. Fo<!he Evreo ooup its .... see Mehmat Ali Briand. The Generals ' Coup in Turkey: At!
Inside S!uty ot 12 September 1980 (London: Brassey's Defeose 19B7).
-81-
;u. For Ihe Jaruzel ski precedeot, see Marno Milivojevic, "lhe YlJ(1I>slav People's Army: Anolhe.- Jaruzel ski onlhe Way?, " in
The South Slav Joumal (London), Vol. 11, Nos. 2-3 (SUmme.-/ Autumn 1988), pp. 1- 18.
;H. EEN (18 February 199 1), p. 4.
:!5.. "Geoe.-als' Last stand: in EEN, Vol. 5, No. 3 (4 February 1991), p. 2.
For ove.-all defeose expeoditures, see The Mili tary Ba/aflffi, 1989-1990 (London: I Jltemational lnstitute lor strategie
studies, 1989), p. 92; l or Iheir share ollhe l ede.-al blJdget, see Yuoos/avia: Coun try Profile, 1990-91 (London:
Eronomist I Jltelligeoce Unit, 1990), p. 26.
;u.. F. stepIleo Larrabee, " Long Memories and Short FlJses: Olange and I nstability in Ihe 8alkans," in InrnmaOOnal
Serutity (Cambndge, Mass. ), Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winte.- 1990/ 91), p. 71.
:HL. For lhis and olhe.- oonstJaints a<Dng lJPOfllhe VPA, see Marno Milivoj evic, "lhe Polibcal Role ollhe YlJ(1I>slav People's
Army in Corltemporary YlJQI>slavia," in Marno Milivoj evic, et al. (eds. ), Yuoos/avia's Serutity Dilemmas: Atmed Fotres,
NaOOnal Defeflffi and Foreign Policy (Oxford: Be.-g, 1988), pp. 56-59.
:!2.. " Balkan BlJst -VP: in EEN, Vol. 5, No. 5 (4 Mardl l 991), p. 2 .
.1ll.. The Mili tary Ba/aflffi, [ note 36) , pp. 92-93
!l. Marno Yuoos/avia's Mili tary Industties, Bradford studies on YlJ(1I>slavia No. 16 (Bradford: Researdl Unit in
YlJQI>slav studies, 1990), p. 8 (Fig. l ) .
.1Z. The Mili tary Ba/aflffi, [note 36) , p. 92 .
.1:L. James P. Nidlol, "YlJ(1I>slavia," in James E. Katz (ed. ), Anns Production in DevelopitIfJ Coun tties (Lexiogton, Mass:
Lerington Books, 1984), p. 349 .
.1.1. "YlJ(1I>slavia: EEN, Vol. 5, No. 2 (21 January 1991) .
.1.5.. OIteo with Ihe assist ance ol sIlady middlemeo, IholJgll lhis was publidy deoied by Ihe SIoveoe Defeose Minist e.-,
Janez For lhis, see " SIoveoe Defeoce Ministe.- on sources ol weapoos l or republican army" (Belgrade Ilome
se<Vice in Sert>o-o-oat on 19 January 1991), tJanslated and reproduced in S WB (23 January 1991), EE/D977, p. B/ 5 .
.12.. " o-oatian Councillor National Defeoce Set Up" (reported in TanjufJ (Belgrade) in Sert>o-o-oat on 4 January 1991),
tJanslated and reproduced in S WB, 9 January 1991, EE/D%5, p. B/ 14 .
" o-oatian-SIoveoe Agreemeot on Defeoce and Sea.inty Coope.-ation (reported in TanjufJ (Belgrade) in
Sert>o-o-oat on 13 February 1991), tJanslated and reproduced in S WB (15 February 1991), EE/D997, p. B/17. lhe
agreemeot was si!)/led on 20 January 199 1 .
.1lL. For Ihe will t o fi gllt, see The Guaroian (21 January 1991).
-82-
Jasmina
4
Media: The Extension of Politics
by Other Means
Wheo QUestions are asked about reasons lo< !he YlJ!1Oslav breakup and about!he sava!)e war inIIicted on two forme.-
YlJ!1Oslav ,,,,,ublics,!he media are among lhe first t o be blamed. lhis is why it is necessary t o highlight, On !he intmdtxbon
to !his m a pte.-, one ol !he most widespread a nd rGOted myths in COflteffiJ>Ofa ry COflsOouSlless: !he myth ol
"objectWe ,eportiou. " In spite ol decades ol state-a>ntJo. ed media,!he public ol forme.- YU(1Oslavia has obviously beeo
ioduI!)inu in Ihat mvth, ;ust as many Western media OOflSUffiefS have- whidl is resull: ol years ol
Americanization: as our oommuoist soul-keepe.-s would have pul: t. lhe myth ol "objective ,eportiou" was alive
in television reportinu; !he prlure was Ihe",. alte.- ag, and came<as ;ust canoot ar carl they? Afte.- Vukovar, Dubmvoik,
Sarajevo, and many olhe.- places had beeo seeo by "!he came.-a's objective "ye, " not t o meotion desaibed by objective
peocils and pad., Of on objective reco<de.-s, it became dear Ihat tedlooloOJY does not Jlecessarily breed objectMty. IJl real
Me, "objective repoM!)" is resIDcted by two major lacts. First , reporte<s IuJlctH>Jl as exteoded arms of Jletwmb m
Jlewspape<s whidl are, at best, mar1<et -<lrieoted oorpo<ations OJ, at wOJst, Ihe !)Ovemmeots moutt-.pieces. IJl bolh cases,
Ihey are susceptible t o pressure. Second, Ihe reporte<s UJliQUe way ol receMrl!), processirl!), aJld editirl!) irlIormation
Jlecessarily reRects his OJ he< value system, iodudirl!) prejudices, education, and emotions. "ObjectMty, " Ihe pheoomeoon
we so li ke t o tJeasure, exist s onIy irllhe eye ol Ihe beholde<. But Ihe public are flOt media experts; aJld eveo .lhey mi!)ht
not t ake IOJ graJlted eve<ythiog Ihey read, Ihe majority still t ake IOJ graJlted eve<ythiog Ihey see.
IJllhe earty 197Ds, British mass media expert Pete< wrote Ihat "lhe mairllheme ooncemirl!) mass media is Ihe
recor.ciliation Ihat Jleeds t o
be made betweeo Ihe ioIormation and value people derive Irom direct pe<sonal expeOeoces and !hose Ihey rec..we Irom
Ihe media. " ':"Goldiou conduded Ihat "it is lair to say Ihat [lhe] media play Iheir most siQnificant role in impaftinu values in
areas ol oomparative abstractedness, distanee, and inaccessibility, behaviof and attitudes about
pe<sonally expeOeoced cirrumstanees are more Ihe result ol Ihe situation surmunding lhese cirrumstanees. " ::
And what can be bette< desaibed as "distaJlt, and abstract" Ihan Ihe destructHm and dealhs in distaJlt cities,
Ihe suffeOng of people, and Ihe alleged seose ol "lhreat" in oountrymeo living 500 kiIomete<s away? War is Ihe
situation whe<e Ihe media not reftect reaMty (as is sUJ>posedly Iheir main fuoctXm] but also creorn reality,
espooally so Ihe oonftict takes place in an already exisbng atmosphe<e ol war -<nOngeOng and. Ihe public has to rely on
only one ioIormation system. Sioce 1987 (lhe year Slobodan came to powe< in Se<bia], one ol Ihe most aucial
issues in lorme< Vugoslavia has beeo who oomJOls Ihe ioIormation space.
The Breakup Begins
lhe information space ol Vugoslavia was lor decades sectXJoed alorlg republic bofde<s. Eadl of Ihe republics and
two autonomous provinces had a !ocal broadcasting system (Radio-Television Skopje, RlV Ljubljana, RlV Novi Sad, etc.]
and one or more major newspape< OOfJ>Ofations (Vjesnik in Zagreb, PoIitika in 8e1grade, Os!obodjenje in Sarajevo, etc. ]lhe
electJOf"o'c media and usually one daily newspape< (Vjesnik in Croatias case, PoIitika in Se<bias case, DeIo in SIoveoia]
s...ved as Ihe semi..,ffi<jal mouthpiece ol Ihe republic govemmeot. Editorial poliOes and staff, espooally !hose ol Ihe
electJOf"o'c media, we<e dosely monitored by Ihe Communist partys Ceotral Committee ol Ihe republic in QUestion. A head ol
one sum RlV system was traditiorlally Ihe membe< ol Ihe republican Ceotral Committee himseK. In Ihe seoond haK ol Ihe
1980s, graduallibe<alization ol Ihe sodal dimate in geoe<al eooouraged a numbe< ol newspape< and magarnes to adopt a
more li be<al and demoaatic outlook: above aD, Ihe weeldy Danas in Zagreb, Ihe weeldy NI N in Belgrade, Ihe bimonthIy start
in Zagreb, and Ihe alternative/YouIh weeldy MW ina in Ljubljana. lhe typical strategy ol Ihe "li be<ated medium, " sum as
start, was to its name wilh artides on a>lture, eotertaiomeot, art, or life-style, areas not so dosely watdled by
party watdldogs, in whidl Western values and attitudes have beeo pfOmoted. Eveotually Ihe space ol real polibcs was
OOflQUe<ed, to Ihe point Ihat in 1989, Ihe year before Ihe first Iree electXJos in Croatia, Ihe editorial board of Danas had
more or less beeo dete<mining
-84-
Ihe next move ol O-oatia's party Central Committee. mar1<et ID< prioted media went beyond republican bofde<s,
makiou it an e<a ol hu!)e cirruations ID< many ma!)arnes. In Ihe late 1980s, oanas rad<ed UJ> a cirruation ol 180,OOO- an
a .ume hi!)h- with one fifIh ot sales beirl!) outside O-oatia. lhe situation was sOmila r with BeI!)rade's NIN, whidl readled a
cirruation well above 200,000, while Ljubljana's pmvocaw e ,.,Wina eveo mana!)ed t o break Ihe larl!)Ua!)e bame<
and sen mo<e Ihan 100,000 in SIovenia and olher republics.
lhe late 1980s set maio< media st anda rds ID< demoaacy in all, D< almost aU, republics. lhose lew months in o-oatia, alte<
Ihe oommunist s were pressed by a series ol East E .... opean "velvet revolutions" into permittin!) lhe syst em in
Novembe< 1989, and Ihe lirst Iree electXms in April199O, are still re!)arded as Ihe hi!)h point ID< Ireedom ol Ihe
J>fess in recent O-oatian hist Of)'. fus pheoomeooo was a lOnd ol trademar1< ot Ihe Yu!)Oslav media in transition Irom
oommunism t o nabonal demoaaaes. In sprirl!) 1990, Ihe wa r -ffiOfl!)eOn!) on behaW ol Ihe maio< part ol Ihe Se<bian media
had beeo!)Oirl!) on ID< mo<e Ihan two years, ever sOnee Sloboda n came t o powe<. Communist
!)Ovemments in olhe< republics seemed ""able t o respond to st ate"f}fomoted nabonal hyst eria Irom BeI!)rade, breedin!) a
seose ol helpless ness and oonfusKm amofl!) Iheir cit:izeos. In o-oatia, Ihe reluctance ot Ihe Iheo leaders t o read: in any
way t o risirl!) Se<bian had beeo t atJrlted by Ihe Za!)reb media as "Ooatian electXms in SIovenia
and Ooatia we<e held in Ihese oonditions, whidl inevitably blew wind into Ihe sails ol Ihe mo<e nabonahst parties. lhe
oppos itional ooalition DEMOS won in SIovenia, and Ihe ceote<-<l!)Ot Ooatian Demoaatic Community won in O-oatia. Late< in
1990, nationalist parties won Ihe electXms in Macedonia and 0nIy Se<bia and Monteoe!)ro had
reelected Ihe communist parties by Ihe end ot 1990. Political dlarl!)es thrOU!)hout Ihe country also hit Ihe
media. Yu!)Oslavia was now break.in!) alon!) nationallines, and most ot Ihe media had to lolow suit. Orle obvious
e>q>ectXm was a supranational D< trans national t elevisKm dlarlrlel, 'lUTEl (YlJ!)Oslav Televisionl , lounded in 1990 in
Sarajevo, Iheo a model city ot a meltin!) pot Yu!)Oslav style. 'lUTEl was headed by a Ooat Irom BeI!)rade, Gofa n and
had a nationally mixed a ew. 'lUTEl reported about Se<bian a!)!)I"essKm a!)ainst O-oatia with a certain dist ance, avoidirl!)
any jud!)ffient, and seardled ID< ao "independent apJ>foadl. " In so doin!), 'lUTEl pleased neithe< side and was oondemned
by boIh Se<bian and Ooatian ofuals as a subtle ve<sion ol "eoemy J>fopa!)anda. " But as Se<bian a!)!)ression contintJed
and spread t o 'lUTEl 's li ne ol eQUidist ance Irom bolh Ihe a!)!)reSSD< and Ihe victirn came ""de< stress.
Tom by internal disa!)reemeots and Ihe s hee< impossibility ol maintainirl!) "neutrality" in Ihe middle ol a besie!)ed city,
'lUTEl dosed down in May 1992.
-85-

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For !he first two years ol t s exist eoce. MOtIitor has beeo higohly aibcal ol !he <UTeot (1I>vemmeot ol Monteoegro. It
has olle<ed a diffe<eot pe<spective and has olteo run stories Imm o!he< YlJ(1I>slav publicatiorls. diminishiou !he impact ol !he
(1I>vemmeot""'posed n ormatiorl blod<ade. lhe weeldy has beeo subjected t o (1I>vemmeot press .... e and less lormal ways
ol intimidatiorl. iodtJdinu physical lhreats t o reporte<s and editors. BUl: t has mana!)ed t o s urvive.
"lhe oId spd ol lose<s mtJst be replaced by !he spd of wooe<s" - with !hese words. <UTeot Monteoe""", Prime Mi",st e<
Milo Djukanov;,: announced !he pe<sonnel dlanues in !he natiorlal broadcastinu system in s priou 1991. immediately alte< he
assumed his posibon. lhree top p"""le ol RlV Monteoegro we<e s wept 011 by Djukanovics orde<s: MiltJtin Radt.ilov;,:.
actiou !)eoe<al mana!)e< ol Monteoegro Televisiorl; Cedomir mana!)e< ol Radio Monteoegro; and Danilo Burzan.
edtor ..,-d1ief ol Radio Monteoegro. In so doin!). Prime Mi",st e< Djukanov;,: acted in acrordance with his alJlhority. For urnie<
!he republics Ad: Public Ente<prises. whidl unde< Monteoe""", law re!)OJlat es !he natiorlal radio and t elevisiorl. !he
(1I>vemment is entitled t o appoint editors and mana!)e<s in !he st ate media. Seve<al wee-l<s Prlor t o lhis media p .... !)e. !he
united oppos ibon had proposed t o !he Monteoe""", Pariiameot !hat !he alJlhority ove<!he t op appolntmeots in !he st ate
media s hould be !)iveo t o !he pariiament. lhe proposal was rejected by a two-thirds majority ol !he 12()" membe<
pariiament. In Septembe< 1991. six t elevision who had occasiorlally oontributed t o MOtIitor we<e fired Im m RlV
Tt ograd. lhe Monteoe""", Prolessional Joumalist s Assooatiorl isslJed a shafll prot est . pointin!) out !he "t ot alitarian.
rep<essive manne<" ol !he actHm. ::,
and ts media have lon!) abstained Im m!he Sern.. Cm at "pape< wa r." Wheo !he Cm atian Demoaatic
Community 1990 ele<bons. ot ts first moves was t o replace!he !)eoe<al mana!)e< ol !he natiorlal televisiorl
st atiorl. BUl: in Bos"'a. wheo a Ioose ooalition ol Ihree natiorlal parties came t o powe< in Novembe< 1990. !hey left !he
media alone lor !he first seve<al monIhs. lhe major da ily Os!obodjenje and !he peOodicals Veffirr!je fIOvine and Svijet. and
!he altemative weeldies Va/ter and Voks. al! camed acrordin!) t o new st anda rds dt.inou!he ele<bon campai!)Ol. lhe
republics first Informatiorl Ministe<. Veli bor wor1<ed prior t o !he ele<bons as a lan<Jl.la!)e editor lor !he natiorlal radio.
bUl: by !he eod ol 1990. was t o announce a "major deaninu" in !he media oceoe . has sinee joined Se<bian
irre(1lJlar lorces in Bos"''''' Heue(1l>vlna. )
It was to be expected !hat !he tripartite ooalition would S""" dlanue !he natiorlal stru<hore of p"""le employed in !he
state media. and briou t into line with!he demographic pattem in lhe republics media. and espeOally
!he natiorlal television. had beeo tradi
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Ihat Ihe media should be "educational," resu"=ed in a <UlouS pheoomeoon. Fo< Ihe first several weeks of Ihe war, Sarajevo
lV was pleading and preadliog, ralher Ihan reportiong on what was !)I>iog on. Fo< Ihe most part, it was inteoded
pleadin!l, its viewers to "reason, " but at Ihe same time, it was palheticaly out ol toum with reality and usually
also with elemeotary prolessional standards. Wheo Ihe shootiogs started in mid-April and Ihe first barricades in
Sarajevo were erected, television speakers would invariably can to an Ihree ethnic leaders to "stop Ihe maos" and "save
Ihe city, " as all lhree were eQUal1y resJ>Oflsible lo< aeatiog Ihat maos.
Duriog !hose lew weeks wheo Ihe war in Bosnia started but polibcal oommunication was still possible (o< so it seemedl, Ihe
two Sarajevo networ1<s- lhe official Television and 'lUTEl- rumed a new page in Ihe history ol Ihe
COfltempOfary media, bolh prolessionaly and ethically. lhey played a most e",,1icit political role, in Ihe most direct game ol
and dealh, more Ihan any media have eve< played. Romanian television and its role in ove<throwiog pales in
oomparison. While Sarajevo was under fire, 'lUTEls edito< ..,-dlief Gafan a live telephone COfltact in Ihe
studio with bolh A1ija Ihe presideot, and Radovan Ihe Se<bian leade<. made Ihem talk to eadl
olher and had himseK tried to talk Ihem into tempOfary reconciliation, wllile cit:izeos ol Sarajevo watmed lhis most inteose
talk-show eve<. (lt was as ' mNs Bernard Shaw had had Saddam Hussein and George Bush on studio lines and had tried
to talk Ihem into peace.l Wheo Ihe Fede<al p"""les AImy lcidnapped Presideot in April 1991 and held him lo<
one day, Television andlOf initiated a live telephone COfltact betweeo imprisoned his
keepe< Ihe army geoeral, and members ol Ihe Bosnian presideocy.
We<e Ihe Sarajevo right in takio!) politics into Iheir own hands? Was it a maio< vioIation ol prolessional
standards, o< just a desperate attempt to save Ihe city and Ihemselves? lhe answers are hard to find, since professional
standards and have neve< anticipated sum situations. In bolh cases, Ihe meddling ol Sarajevo television joumalists
eveotualy did not worl< out. lhey did not help mange history, though Ihey had certairlly jumped right in Ihe middle ol Ihe
process. Quite apart Irom all rules, Ihe television was Ihese days makio!) history in Sarajevo, not orily reco<ding it.
As attad<s on Sarajevo inteosified Ihroughout May, Television Bosni".. Herze!)l>vlna was laced with polibcal manges and
growing prolessional malleoges. 0nIy !hose staff- Mus li ms, Croats, and we<e Ioyal to Ihe Bosnian !)I>vemmeot
remained in Ihe television building. Because ol targeted mortar and attad<s, Ihey wor1<ed in shifts ol seve<al days,
bravely ooveOng lhe city and airing ve<y impressive I(}{}ta ge. By Ihe eod
-90-
ol May, Sarajevo reporte.-s iss ued an appeal addressed "to !he world. " It was sadly reminiscent ol !he lamous appeal
issued by !he director ol Budapest Television in 1956, who addressed Europe, while Soviet tanks we.-e rolling in, wilh news
!hat he and his staff lor "European and dvilization. " The Sarajevo appeal said: "The television building
was hit by s hells more !han a hundred times, was rod<eted six times,!he AImy has oca.opied seveo ol Dur tJa nsmission
towe.-s and kined six ol Dur employees. We implore you, of!he world, to inform yDur !)I>vemments and
international organizations abotA: lhis mme in !he ceote.- ol Europe. We still air!he pro!)l"am." .:.:
Not long alte.-lhis appeal,!he powe.- supply to !he city was rut and Sarajevo Television stopped broadcasting. But !he
da ily Os!obodjenje has pe.-sisted to lhis day, a shorte.- ve.-sion ol !he pape.- eve.-y day urnie.- almost impossible
oooditions. '::"In Novembe.- 1991,!he pape.-s Kemal and deputy editor, Gofdana we.-e
awarded lor oourage in by !he International Womeo in Media Foundation.
The Paper War
"SUrreode.-- ali resistance w. be lorcefully brokeo. " SUdl leallets we.-e dispe.-sed by VPA jets in SIovMa in lune 1991,
mar1<.ing !he eod ol !he Serbian pape.- war and !he beginoing ol !he real one. The Serbian media war started almost a
decade a!)l>, and at first was aimed onIy against!he Albanians in Kosovo. The major Belgrade newspape.- eote.-prise PoIi tika
and its namesake da ilies PoIi tika and PoIi tika ekspres led !he media marge, lollowed by !he electmnic media,!he weeldy
Du"a, and !he da ily Veeemje fIOVOSti. The idea was to demonize!he Albanians, by calliou!hem lhieves, rapists, illite.-ate,
murde.-ous, by aeatinu a geoe.-al atmosphe.-e whe.-e!he Albania ns would be viewed, and ooeas ioulv tJeated, as
secood dass citizeos. In lhis period,!he notion ol "geoocide" against!he Serbian p"""le appeared in !he printed media lor
!he first time since World Wa r Two. The turniou point in history ol bo!h poMtics and media was !he EiQhIh
CDflfe.-eoce ol !he Lea!)Ue ol Communists ol Serbia in 19B7, wheo Slobodan seized powe.- in Serbia and
began to purge!he Belgrade printed and electmn'c media. fus year mar1<ed!he be!lir.nir>u ol a new e.-a in in whidl
almost an media, wilh!he exception ol !he lede.-al daily, Borba, a"=ernative radio station B-92, and late.-,!he independent
weeldy, Vreme- have functWned as !)I>vemmeot mouthpieces. And ""li ke some ordinary repressive system !hat uses!he
media to keep its s ubject ""de.- oontJol, lhis !)I>vemment was gettinu ready lor war, and needed!he media to Pfepare!he
battlefield.
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exteosOon ol politics, in !his case of wa r, "by o!he.- means. " In lact,!he media played an actWe role in bringinu on !he war.
From late 1987 t o spring 1990, SertJian media published and aired a numbe.- ol materiais !hat evoked
eveots Irom World Wa r l wo, always in a partial and dwelling, in partirular, on !he mmes oommitted against Serbs by
spooal lNlits ol !he Cm atian Ustasha. lhe Belgrade magarne DUfJa m e serials on Ustasha mmes in World Wa r
lwo, dt.inng !hose monIhs.
DufJa's oolumnist Ilfana writiog in his weeldy oolumn "SertJian alfairs," has p",sued!he !heme ol an
geooOdal nature" ol o-oats. 0Ihe.- typical stones in DUfJa o< !he da ily PoIitika ekspres in !hat period deall: wilh
acaJsations ol O-oatian and SIovenian exploitation ol !he SertJian eamomy lo< !hat last haK ceot...-y o< eveo Ionge.-, o< Ilow
SertJian lactones we.-e removed alte.- World Wa r lwo t o SIovenia lo< alleged strategie reasons. !..::
Arlti-O-oatian and anti-SIovenian leelings we.-e stoked and blown UJ> by state media, wilh geoe.-ous help Irom promineot
write.-s and academics. SertJian poet Matija Be&ov;,: ooined a phrase about t oday' s Serbs as "remnarits ol a slaugllte.-ed
nation."
In spring 1990, ele<bons in O-oatia and SIovenia, !he media demonization ol non-Serbs, espooally o-oats, was
at its peak. PoIitika and DUfJa relerred t o most ol O-oatia's newly lounded parties, induding!he O-oatian Demoaatic
Communitv, as o< -=-"--On !he oIhe.- hand, Serbs in O-oatia have invariably beeo desaibed
as deprived ol!heir political and national rigIlts, Ihreateoed, and "barehanded" - !his last attribute li nge.-ed on eveo alte.- it
became evideo!: !hat a good part ol !his "barehanded pe<>ple" managed quite wilh riRes, morta rs, and rrlet
laundle.-s.
Dt.inog and alte.-!he ele<bons, seve.-al funded peOodicals we.-e started in O-oatia. lwo ol !hem, SIobodni tjec!nik
and Globus, have s urvived!he first monIhs and buill: cirruations ol 100,000 and more. Afte.-Ihree years ol national hysteria
in most of !he SertJian media, national passions we.-e now JUr"or"oiog high in O-oatia. Danas magarne, wllidl tried t o t o
an objectWe and calm pe.-spectWe, e""erieoced a dedine in cirruation Irom 180,000 at !he time ol !he 1990 ele<bons t o
W,OOO ;ust war. Radio-lelevision dlanued its name t o O-oatian l elevision; instead ol itseW
into!he state t elevisOon, it S""" became!he mouthpiece of!he party in powe.-. SIobodni tjec!nik was on !he rise, selling!he
ve.-sion of national politics, JUr"or"oiog urwerified and olteo ooncod:ed stones, and dep;ct;ng ag Serbs in
O-oatia as seK-evideot s uspects lo< treason. In SIobodni tjec!nik , and t o some exteot!he weeldy GIobus , !he Serbian war
Pfess has finalIy lound a sparring partne.-. Seve.-al monIhs late.-, !he real war began. By !his time, !he SertJian and O-oatian
media mar1<et had dosed wilhin !heir respectWe republic boundaries.
-93-
Reporters in Helmets
lhe war betwe"" Se<bia and O-oatia has Irom!he start also beeo a war lo< Iote<pretation: !he iote<pretation ol what is
!1Oinu on, who is and who is attadOnu. and what is!he "truth. " (In receol: years, "tru\h" has be"" a mudl
misused word: in 1987, in Kosovo, seros eveo a Committee lor TruIh.")
lhe strug!)l .. lo< !he "oorrect" Onte<p<etation has mad .. reporters and who were ooveOnu!he war oow.us
tar!)ets, since many ol Ihem we ... , eoda"geOng lhe olhe.- side'. Odea ol "tru\h" Of, in some cases,!he official iote<pretation
of Iheir Gwn side. In !he "yes ol oonfIicted parties, a domestic report...- is automaticaly partial; he Of she is ;ust anolher
warriof in !he ioIormation war. And !he death toll ol unloJtunate ioIormation warriors sonn !)rew more rapidty !han in any
olher modem war.
lhe first victirns we", two Austrian 'eporteJs killed durin!) lhe.lun" 1991 war in SIoveoia. lhe VU(1Oslav People 's AImy
lauodled a mortar attad< oolheir jeep at !he Bmik Airport. AccOfding to !he International Assocation, 20
we", killed in O-oatia betweeo June 1991 and February 1992; two Russian joumalists have beeo reported
missiou sOnce September 1991. Ol the lOIIed, seveo were o-oatian, lour ol them worlOng lo< O-oatian TelevisKm.
O-oatian and joumalists were killed by sniper fire, greoade o< mortar fire, by Se<bian irregular and YU!)l>slav
People's AImy Io<ces. A British reporter worhn!) lo< ITN was also shot by sniper fire while reportiog Irom the O-oatian
Irontiine near two Swiss reporteJs stepped toto a mine field surTOunding VPA baJTad<s in Petrinja. Orle Se<bian
reportiog lo< the Belgrade daily Veremje fIOVOSti, reportedly died in aoss fire. Four membeJs ol a TelevisKm
Belgrade aew weJe lound on the mad betweeo Petrinja and whidl is O-oatian temtory urnieJ Se<bian 000001. The
war in darned mDfe lives. A SIovenian died in a s hel explosKm in Sarajevo, a om pwduceJ
was shot by snipeJ fire on the way Irom Sarajevo airJ><>rt, and seveJal otheJ joumalists weJe also wounded.
Some have violated the oode ol ethics lo< war reporters. DUfJa's has repeatedly writteo
how he part in fi!)llting and Iooting on the Se<bian side near Knin in o-oatia, while researd"oing his story. DUfJa 's
editorial board Jlfaised and another reporter lo< havin!) takeo part in that actroo. Reporters hke Jlfompted
ex-YUTEl joumalists hke Jela and ljeO:a to write an inmminating essay on "ReporteJs- War
Criminals" lo< the SIovenian periodical, Republika, in lan 1991.
As a part ol the war ol tote<pretation, one ol the most aucial media issues was, ol oourse, naming the eoemy. The Se<bian
and Monteoegrin
electJDf1ic media have not set up pre<ise termiooJogy, varionu /rom " Ustasha lo.ces" to "Tudjman's blado: legions." Some
BelOJO"a de TelevisOon reporte<s have used Cm atian old-<lew wo.ds (wo.ds Ihat we<e banoed in oommunism, li ke "bojovnOk"
o. "Cas nOk") and have (1iveo Ihem de<ogatOf)' meaninus. As lo. Ihe Serbian irregoulars, Ihe t em!s "resefYe lo.ces" and
"defeode<s" have beeo Ihe tem!S ol dwiee in all Ihe state-amtJolled media in and MonteoeOJO"o. In parfu.olar
situatiOfls where Ihe VPA and Serbian irregoulars were besie(1inu a city o. area wilh a dear Croatian majority, paradoxes
t ook place. "lhe defeode<s ol Mri:ovO [a Serbian village] have eocirded Osijek: BelOJO" ade TelevisOon reported in Octobe<
1991. Late<, wheo Serbian irregoulars attado:ed Ihe Croatian city ol Zadar and lought a battle near Mas lenica Bridge,
MonteoeOJO"o TelevisOon reported Ihat "lhe defeode<s ol Ihe bridge are PfoOJO"essiou toward Ihe city."
Croatian media first dr"""ed Ihe wo.d "YUO}Oslav" in talIOnu aboul: Ihe Yu!)Oslav p"""le's Amly. Croatian TelevisKm
eveotually decided on Ihe expressKm Amly," sometimes addinu Ihe modifie<, "oca.opatiOflal." othe< media
used "Oletniks, " "t errorists, " "fi ghters lo. Gfeater Serbia, " "Serbian Amly, " and sometimes ;ust
lhe war ove< inte<pretation has also beeo a war lo. radio /reQUeoOes. It had st arted in sPnnu 1991, wheo Ihe first
Serbian radio statiOfl began bmadcastinu in Petmva GOfa (Ra dio Petmva GOfa). I"egal Serbian radio st atiOfls also
appeared in Min<ovO, Celarac, and Sveta Nedjelja. lhe Croatian TelevisKm transmissKm towe< on Sljeme above was
twOce hit by army rod<ets in lan 1991.
The Press in eroatia
At Ihe moment wheo Western sanctHms we<e imposed on SertJia at Ihe end ol May 1992, Ihe /ree Pfess in SertJia was
represented only by Ihe independent Vreme, lounded in Novembe< 1991. A1ternative radio B-92 and Ihe
independent lV dlanoel studio B have beeo Ihe electJDf1ic media to deviate /rom official policies. By Ihe end ol 1992,
fuMe< purges eosued in state-<Ul BelOJO" ade TelevisOon, Ihrowing a large numbe< ol joumalists out ol work
Croatian natiOflal radio and television have officially remained st ate o. official media. In reaMtv, Ihey have beeo unde< Ihe
fun 000001 ol Ihe party in powe<- Ihe Croatian Demoaatic Community. In lan 1991, a s pe<ial Ad: onlrnormation in War was
passed, Ihat introduced ceoSOfship lo. revealiou informatiOfllhat couId harm Ihe country. Peoalties induded police seizure
of Ihe eotire cirruatiOfl ol Ihe issue in QUestiOfl, and a prison t ern! ol up t o m e years lo. a o. edito.. In May 1991,
Ihe Law retumed to Ihe status befo.e Ihe war. Except lo. two private
-95-
weeldies, Globus and SIobodni tjednik, Ihe rest ol Ihe prlnted media are in various degorees ol (1Ovemmeot oontJol.
lhe O-oatian press in !)eoe<al has suffe<ed doe to Ihe war and rapidly lalliou standards. Respected periodicals hke start O<
Ihe eotertainmeot weeldy studio went bankrupt , and olhe<s experieoced si!)Oificant Iosses in cirruation. Orle ol Ihese was
Ihe official dailv, Vjesnik, whidl in sJ>riou ol 1992 leli to an aU.ume Iow ot 20,000. lhe pape<, briefty reoamed Navi Vjesnik,
partly recove<ed wheo lhe O-oatian authorities !)ave t m arrial s""port in April 1992.
lhe O-oatian (1Ovemment has repeat edly proda""ed Ihat Ihe privatization ol sooally owned property is one ol ts main
aims. lhe (1Ovemmeotal A!)eocv lo< Restru<hinou and Development was authorized, in 1991, t o s""e<V"ise Ihe process
Ihrou!)hout O-oatia. In ApriI and May 1992, Ihe a!)eocv repeat edly rerused to allow Ihe tJanslormation ol Ihe independent
weeldy Danas into a private oorporation, althou!)h Ihe prospective buye< and Ihe weeldy had lultilled allle!)al pre<eQUisites.
Danas was experieociou linarrial diffirulties, and Ihe boye< was winiou to as sume ts and olhe< as wen
as t o oontinue t o t . In earfy.lune 1992, Ihe (1Ovemmental a!)eocv, whose job t was t o prot ect sooal property in Ihe
tJansibon period, dedared Danas banl<rupt . Its and edito<s !)alhe<ed around private publishe< Emil Tedesd1i and
lounded Navi Danas Ihat same monIh. lhe lirst two issues we<e sold out. But st ate. oontJolled Vjesnik, whidl
maintains a virtual ove< Ihe distribution and sales ol O-oatian press, prosaitJed Navi Danas and
rerused to place tonIhe news st ands. Ba""ed Irom Ihe mar1<et and tJoubled with finarrial Navi Danas loIded in
Septembe< 1992. At Ihat momeot, ts predecesso<, Ihe bankrupt, sooally..,wned Danas, was stil waitin!) t o be "privatized."
lheo, in January 1993, Danas was res urrected, but in a pro-(1Ovemmeot incamation; !his new ve<sion ol Danas is run by
joumalists dos e t o Ihe O-oatian Demoaatic Community. lhe majo< episode in Ihe national larce ol media privatization!hus
eoded.
O-oatia eote<ed 1993 with a dama!)ed repUl:ation re!)ardinu Ireedom ol Ihe press and with only one iodependeot dailv, Ihe
Splt SIobodna Da/macija. lhe m arrially successlul newspaper OO/l>Ofation Ihat Ihe namesake dailv as wen
as Ihe weeldy Nedje/jna Da/macija, be!)an Ihe tJanslormation into a shareholdin!) oompany in 1990, urnie< Ihe existinQ
lede<al (i.e., YU(1Oslav) laws . But in October 1992, Ihe ubiQutous A!)eocv lo< Privatization imposed a mana!1ln!) board onlhe
In spte ol protests Irom joumalists' assooations Irom all over Ihe world, SIobodna Da/macija's iodependeoce
seemed, as ol earfy 1993, doomed.
Freedom ol speedl has lately beeo receivinu olhe< blows. In late May 1992, O-oatian public proseaJl:o< Vladimir !ieks
st arted Ihe investiuation a!)ainst six promineot O-oatian Orle ot Ihem, Denis KuI;;s, Ihe
-96-

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country as a n exruse t o Ihe media, Ihe e><treme vulnera b.itv of truncated O-oatia rema ;"s a l act. On Ihe olher
ha nd, one olteo wonde<s O-oatia n or Mus Iim or some olhe< tJ(}ops we<e only 25 kiIomete<s Imm BeI!)I"a de, would
Ihere, ;., Ihat case, a ls o be Vreme a nd independent lV_ m a JlOeJ studio B a nd indepeodent radio B-92?
fus QUestion, though impossitile t o a ns wer, offers a differeot perspective a nd eveo has a ceftain PfO!)OOStic QUa lity.
ObWluslv, Ihe future ol Ihe media in eadl country ol lorme< VU(1Os lavia depends onlhe outoome ol Ihe Jlfeseot msis. II
O-oatia n temtories a re not reinte!)l"ated in Ihe nea r future, it win res ull: in interna l dissatislactHm a nd dis illusionmeot.
Polibcal e><tremism would a nd true demoaacy would be eveo furthe< away. II, onlhe othe< ha nd, SertJia (whe<e
3D perceot ol Ihe vote at Ihe 19-92 eJectrons wa s won by Ihe neo.fa sast Radica l Pa rty a nd its leade< Vojislav is
not deoazified in Ihe nea r future, Ihe deepeoinu poiibcal msis win furthe< affect Ihe media.
Notes
.l. pete< Goldinu, The Mass Media (London: Longma n, 1974), p. 102.
Z. Ibid.
:L. Jeleoa "Hrvat s ki Idjuc za Ju(1Os laviju, " in Danas (13 Februa ry 1990), p. 7 .
.1. Jeleoa "Novo izda nje idejnog plenuma, " in Danas (26 April 19BB), p. 13.
:i... Dfa gica Kuna de, "Dffava, mediji in Jlfavica javnosti, " in Defo (lB Februa ry 19-92).
2. Luka Bra ilo, "stJO(1O kontJolira na javnost: in Nedje/jna Da/macija (10 Ma rm 19-91), p. 12.
z.. O-oatia n News Ageocy (Im'A), novina rima koji s u s uradjiva li s Monitorom: in Vjesnik (11 Septembe< 19-91).
lL. Mla deo "Opet in Vjesnik (21 Februa ry 19-91).
2. Seoad "Isbna u tri dijela, " in Danas (2 Aprill 9-91, p. 2B) .
.lll. "PoltJons ki Ilrumahzam: in Nedje/jna Da/macija (14 April 1991).
11. Jas mina "K1etYe s ba lkona, " in Nedje/jna Da/macija (27 May 19-92) .
.u. In Ma rm1993, Os!obodjenje wa s stil! being
U Fa hrudin "TeJcu dani kos ma ra, " in Danas (13 Ma rm1990), p. 21 .
.H. VU!)Os lav News Ageocy (TANJUG), in Vjesnik (2B Octobe< 19-91).
ll. Ibid.
ili Ibid.
lL. Ma mko "Cega s a boje srtJi, " in Danas (29 May 1990), p. 13 .
.llL. Ibid .
.l2. Da ,1m Hudelist, serial "Reporteri pod s ljemom, " in SIobodna Da/macija (ApJ"il. May 19-92).
Zll. Dubravlm "Duhovni petokolona si, " in Tomis/av (Ja nua ry 19-93); a nd "Hrvat s ke leminislkioje s iluju
Hrvat s ku, " in Globus (11 Dece-mbe< 19-92), by Globus Investigative Tea m.
-9B-
PARTTWO
The Republics
Sabrina PetTa Ramet
5
The Serbian Church and the
Serbian Nation
lhat re hgoion a nd natiooa lis m a re Ioterrelated, fi(1Uriou at tim" s as altemative dimen.""'" ol a oomplex ideotitv, is well
known. Ukewise, it is we n known Ihat reliOJious fe<Vor may reinfOfce leNor a nd v;ce versa. What is less
noted is !he luli pa nop!y ol reason" why !his relations hip is not OOflstant a monu cases. deartv,!he lheoJogy a nd natur .. ol
!he O>urdl stru<hore must have some role here, as li kewise !he ethnic ma k""" ol !he J>OI>UIation ol !he state, a nd ol !he
O>urdl its e4. But olhe.- factOfS impioue as iodudinu!he history ol !he nation a nd ol !he O>urdl- whidl may indeed be
a aucia l determina nt as t o whether!he O>urdl carl, let us s ay. rel...- t o itseK as "!he nation's O>urdl. " And, as we s ha n see
below. elite ma nOpulation ol public oonscious ness may tJa nsform bolh natiooalism a nd t s r<>l atio" to religoion.
It is unde.-stood that a ny pa rtirula r ",eligoion" is not ",eligoion in geoeral," but a s pedfic embodimern: modulated
Ihrougoh a pa rtirula r historie pris m a nd wilh features a nd oonteots speOOC t o t se . But while Ihe div",se oonteots ol religoion
have been studied in extenso, Ihere has been la r less atteotiofl t o Ihe lad Ihat Ihe OOfltent ol may a is o va ry.
Ihe lad Ihat Ihe oontent ol natiofla lis m va ries Irom case to case, stated in !his ba ld way, will scarcely surprise
a nyone, Ihere have been lew a ny systematic efforts t o Odentify different 100000s ol I myseK bega n to develop
my own typo!ogy in essays in 19B9 ':"and 1991. :"lhis axreot essay re preseots, thus, Ihe third st a ge in my ellort
to develop a typoJogy of natiofla lis m.
My typo!ogy is inevta bly lounded on speOOC aiteria lo< cate!)Of"izatiofl. lhe aiteria I have s elected a re: first, a portJaya l ol
Ihe world to Ihe natiofl (as Ihreateoing, as indiff",eot o< mixed, o< as bedmniog) ; a nd s econd, a nations recollectron ol its
past (as triumpha nt, as uncertain, o< as catadysmic). lhese dua l meas .... es yield Ihe lollowiog matrix: