Evaluate Agehananda Bharatis contributions to 20 th century religious studies scholarship on mystical traditions

Although Agehananda Bharatis writings on mystical traditions have not been as prominent as other 20th century religious studies scholarship on the subject, his contributions are just as if not more, relevant than other scholars efforts. In this project I wish to defend this stance by looking critically at his work along with other 20th century scholars, such as William James, Evelyn Underhill, R. C. Zaehner, Steven Katz, Wayne Proudfoot and W. T. Stace. More specifically, I will be focusing on Bharatis epistemology of mysticism, the correlation between spiritual practice and mystical experience (or lack thereof) and finally, his assertion that there is no link between mystical experience and morality. Preliminarily, a brief account on Bharatis background is needed to be able to locate his scholarship within a wide context. Born in 1923, Bharati had a Viennese upbringing which he claims contributed to a departure from dogmatic thinking. A Catholic childhood followed by an education under the Nazi regime were enough to steer him towards less rigid ideologies and eventually, he joined the Hindustan Academical Association, where he immersed himself in Indology. 1 In 1949, Bharati arrived in India where he became a brahmacari (one who has immersed himself in Brahman), of the Dasanami Order, having already become proficient in Hindi and other regional Indian languages.2 Before his death in 1992 he established himself as a Sanskritist, a Hindu monk and an academic, specialising in anthropology.3 Bharati claimed himself to be a mystic and referred to attaining a state of oneness on four separate occasions , firstly at the age of twelve while falling asleep, secondly as a young adult while in a cellar following a row with an officer, thirdly as a tantric initiate in Assam and finally, as an adult in America a little while after having taken LSD, listened to Bach and Purcell and made love with a woman. 4 These experiences are relevant due to the fact that Bharatis thinking can be located in both emic (as an insider, having had mystical experiences) and etic (as an outsider, having analysed these experiences) contexts.

Bharati, p. 45, 1980 ibid., p. 98 3 ibid., p. 269 4 Bharati, p. 39-43, 1976

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Before delving into Bharatis idea of mystical experience itself what he calls the zeroexperience5 it is necessary to look at how he defines mysticism and how this definition stands with other scholars interpretations. Following from this, I would like in this section of the project to consider Bharatis work in light of epistemological theories of mysticism. Bharati had serious reservations with the way the term mysticism was used throughout the 20th Century. In his most relevant book, The Light at the Centre,6 he provocatively argues that the term had been used far too loosely by many who had an interest in mysticism, but lacked the commitment and discipline required to fully engage with the terms meaning. Bharati claimed that just as writing about poetry is not poetry, similarly there is a difference between writing about mysticism and mysticism itself.7 This resonates with Walter Staces borrowed analogy of Mohammeds donkey, where Mohammed compares a scholar or philosopher who writes about mysticism without having had any mystical experience to a donkey carrying a load of books.8 According to Bharati, the conditional qualities of the term mysticism are the turning away from worldly things and certain types of committed reliance such as faith, devotion, sacrifice. He further mentions implicitly that mysticism is not adherence to any one type of moral or social behaviour, 9 a theme that will be dealt with in more detail in a later section of this project. In addition to this, Bharati accepts that a response to the query of what a mystic is will inevitably be untidy since linguistic endeavours can only take one so far.10 The breadth of this definition is testament to Bharatis objection that mainstream readers of mysticism have used the term carelessly. His approach in this case is open in that he accepts that there are a variety of means through which one can come to the mystical experience. Consequently, he is unforgiving when it comes to other scholars using the term too narrowly, often projecting their own bias onto their definition. The main perpetrators of this fallacy are the influential writers on mysticism, Evelyn Underhill and R. C. Zaehner.

ibid., p. 48 ibid. 7 ibid., p. 37 8 Stace, p. 18, 1960 9 ibid., p. 15 10 ibid., p. 16

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In the early 20th century, psychologist and prominent author on the phenomenology of religion, William James, provided a point of departure for other scholars of mysticism in his The Varieties of Religious Experience.11 In this book he proposes four marks of the mystic state, namely, ineffability, a noetic quality, transiency and passivity.12 Underhill, dissatisfied with Jamess four marks, gave alternative rules which can be used to examine claims to mystical insight. These are: 1. An active practice performed by the whole self and not something separate from ones intellect. 2. A wholly transcendental and spiritual aim which brushes aside the visible universe and is constantly centred on the One. 3. Realisation that the One is a personal Object of Love for the mystic which draws his whole being homeward and is directed by the heart. 4. Acknowledgement that union with the One is a state in which life is enhanced through a laborious psychological and spiritual process (the Mystic Way) beyond the most acute emotions and highest intellectual insights.13 For Bharati it was clear that these characteristics contain a bias stemming from Underhills own Anglo-Catholic background.14 The terminology used (terms such as heart and the One) is not broad enough to cover qualities found in non-unitive and non-theistic mystical traditions such as Advaita Vedanta15 and Zen. Underhill herself would have made no apologies for the terms she used and it does not follow that the lack of breadth in her definition renders it invalid. However, Bharati argued that scholars on mysticism ought to radically criticize their own doctrine, pointing out its weaknesses, its foibles, and the clay feet of its founders and sustainers.16 Through this analysis, scholars are less likely to neglect the wider implications of the term mysticism since they will not have overlooked, as Underhill did, the necessity of an etic framework within the study of mysticism. Zaehners concept of mysticism emphasises, like Underhills, a state of union with God or in the case of non-theistic traditions, union with a certain principle within the tradition. He notes that strictly speaking one cannot speak of union when it comes to the non-dual traditions such
James, 1982 ibid., p. 380 13 Underhill, p. 81, 1930 14 Bharati, p. 68, 1976 15 Strictly speaking non-dual traditions such as Advaita cannot be unitive since there cannot be an other to unite with. 16 Bharati, p. 68, 1976
12 11

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as Vedanta, however accepts that these traditions cannot be ignored when studying mysticism. 17 His main grievance has to do with what he calls praeternatural experience, 18 which is an experience of unity with ones surroundings and nature not unlike Aldous Huxleys mescaline induced experience in The Doors of Perception.19 The majority of his argument in Mysticism: Sacred and Profane is in fact, a reaction to Huxleys writings. At this point it is necessary to appeal to Bharatis concept of the zero-experience. Here his perspective becomes more particular. This is because his assertion leaves little room for an intrinsically dual experience, even though he remains open to the means by which the experience may occur. Bharati calls all consummative experience a zero-experience. Thus, he would point to the solution of a mathematical problem as the zero-experience in the circumstance of the particular mathematical problem. Hence in the mystical situation, it is the moment where there is zero content of a cognitive sort, meaning it is unmediated. 20 As regards Zaehners rejection of the praeternatural experience as a mystical one, it is clear that he would also argue against Bharatis zero-experience, since it unambiguously supports praeternatural means. Zaehners reasons for rejecting praeternatural experiences can be summarised in a passage where he imagines how St. Paul would address the ever back-sliding Corinthians:
Above all do not mistake elation for grace. Elation or exaltation is a state that is common to saints and sinners alike: it can be produced by alcohol or drugs, but do not confuse that with the grace that is infused into you at our agape. for in this agape which we call rational oblation, there is no room for ecstasy. It is a receiving of Christ quietly into the inmost essence of your soul. You must realize that there is a total difference between the two .
21

Zaehner names elation and exaltation as the states that distract the practitioner from what he believes to be union of the soul with God and likens them to the siddhis (occult powers) achieved through Yogic practice.22 Bharati agreed that the siddhis were not the final goal of Yogic practice and could be a distraction to the practitioner, even though he was not as averse towards them as Zaehner was.23 However, Bharati did not liken them to praeternatural experiences. Bharatis zero-experience has to do with locating a minimal denominator of the
17 18

Zaehner, p. 33, 1957 ibid., p. xvii 19 Huxley, 1968 20 Bharati, p. 48, 1976 21 Zaehner, p. 25-26 22 ibid., p. 128 23 Bharati, p. 157, 1976

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mystical experience and he did this due to his belief that the mystical experience is not reliant on specific theological or ideological principles.24 He further claimed that the reason purported mystics who have not entered into or been involved with a tradition are discredited is because ...most writers about mysticism are historians of sorts, and since so many of them entertain strong emotion for or against their theological environment and their background, no title has been found for those people.25 This underlines Bharatis response to Zaehners restrictive scholarship. Zaehners refutation of nature as profane within the mystical context was not the only reason behind his and other scholars negative response to ecstatic experience as opposed to the enstatic experience. Ecstatic experience has also been rejected on the grounds that, allegedly, it comes about without as much effort as the enstatic approach. According to Zaehner, all mystics have been trained in what we call the mortification of the flesh.26 This position highly discredits not only Huxleys experience. As regards Zaehners specific view that druginduced mystical experience discredits the true mystics efforts, Frits Staal has observed that, in truth, a drugs effect is dependent on factors preceding its ingestion, such as ones receptivity and mental attitude at the time. 27 It could be suggested, in fact, that preparation regarding receptivity is as relevant to the substance-induced experience as austere spiritual training is to the theistic mystical one. Besides this, both Dan Merkurs28 and Jess Byron Hollenbacks29 more recent scholarship on ecstatic visionary experience defy Zaehners attitude towards the ease with which praeternatural experiences are derived. Despite his acknowledgement that it is a basic technique, Merkurs interest in Jungs active imagination cannot be taken lightly, especially when considering the interpretation of the experience.30 Similarly, Hollenbacks writings on enthymesis, or the empowerment and interplay between mind, will and imagination would most likely have been inappropriately dismissed by Zaehner. Finally, Zaehners premise is also in opposition to Bharatis view, who argues that the theological or ideological doctrine that usually accompanies mystical experience is the cause of Zaehners hostility, either through misinterpreted scripture or through the sacred texts
24 25

ibid., p. 51-52 ibid., p. 70 26 Zaehner, p. 95 27 Staal, p. 159, 1975 28 Merkur, 1993 29 Hollenback, 1996 30 Merkur, p. 41

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themselves.31 To Bharati the zero-experience, whether achieved by enstatic or ecstatic means is likely to arrive spontaneously. An enstatic example is given by Bharati in the form of 20th century Hindu saint Ramana Maharshi, whose alleged enlightenment arose quite unexpectedly without any prior sadhana, or spiritual practice.32 Accepting this examples validity not only negates Zaehners structured position, but also has relevant implications for how the mystical experience is derived.

This brings us to the correlation between spiritual practice and mystical experience. In this case, Bharati made a claim that should have unsettled 20th century scholarship on mysticism at the time, being that the zero-experience comes to those to whom it comes, regardless of what they do; it also comes, I believe, to those few who try very hard over a long period of time.33 Here Bharati proposes that the zero-experience is not necessarily directly linked to spiritual practice. There is a certain breadth in Bharatis attitude here, since the claim he makes is that the zero-experience can be achieved through practice (though there is no guarantee) but also that it can spontaneously occur without the use of austere monasticism or any other such spiritual practice. Nevertheless, this attitude does not bode well with more etic outlooks on the matter. Two of the main opponents of this claim are Steven Katz and Wayne Proudfoot, who have argued from a constructivist perspective, 34 maintaining firstly that the mystical experience is shaped only by various social and linguistic factors and secondly, that no experience can be unmediated. 35 The constructivist perspective is at odds with essentialism, which regards the mystical experience to have intrinsic value. According to Katz, the ontological structure(s) of each major mystical tradition is different and this pre-experiential, inherited structure directly enters into the mystical occasion itself36 and, therefore, the mystical occasion is wholly dependent on prior events. Regarding the reality of the unmediated experience,
31

Bharati, p. 64, 1976. For example, Bharati mentions the grades of pleasure described in the Taittiriya Upanisad. 32 ibid., p. 109-110 33 ibid., p. 65 (original italics) 34 Forman, p. 1-2, 1999 35 Katz, p. 26, 1978 36 Katz, p. 40, 1983

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Proudfoot assertively states that there are no modes of experience and certainly no sources of knowledge that are unqualified by the cognitive activity of the mind, and that do not assume particular beliefs. He extends the constructivist argument to religious belief, suggesting that such belief ought to be construed as hypotheses that are the result of inferential processes and subject to much the same criteria as are any other beliefs and hypotheses.37 To Katz and Proudfoot, the mystical experience can be seen merely as a self-fulfilling prophecy and both authors directly challenge Rudolph Ottos claim in The Idea of the Holy that: it is not easy to discuss religious psychology with one who can recollect the emotions of his adolescence, the discomforts of indigestion, or say, social feelings, but cannot recall any intrinsically religious feelings.38 To the constructivist this view leans far too much towards the emic approach to the study of mysticism. Indeed, Proudfoot does not make a significant effort to empathise with this stance39 and refuses to take into account Bharatis observation that there is all the difference in the world between what the mystic says when he talks about his experience, and what non-mystics say when they talk about mystical experience.40 Furthermore, the constructivist position leaves no room for unpredictability or spontaneity, two almost inevitable characteristics of a mystical path. Robert K. Forman accentuates this argument by simply indicating that, clearly, not all mystical paths are straightforward routes to the foretold mystical experience: I used to think of that experience as samadhi, but now I think of it as sunyata makes sense. Yet on Katzs account of the incomparability between experiences in different traditions, this sentence should be utter nonsense.41 There are other major issues with constructivism which ultimately lessen its credulity. Firstly, it ignores the noumenal aspect of experiences in general, let alone mystical experiences. Put simply, Katzs and Proudfoots premise that there are no unqualified modes of experience is an assumption that is not properly analysed prior to the extension of their argument. As regards ignoring experience in itself, Sallie B. King offers the example of ones first experience of tasting coffee. The tradition of coffee tasting with its many descriptions such as being bitter, addictive, stimulating or wonderful, along with its multiple commercial

37 38

Proudfoot, p. 344, 1977 Otto, p. 8, 1958 39 Proudfoot, p. 344 40 Bharati, p. 66, 1976 41 Forman, p. 47 (original italics)

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images give one a preconceived idea or of what to expect when they take their first sip. 42 King maintains that the noumenal aspect of the sip, or the sip in itself, is entirely different from the coffee taste as a phenomenon and the variety of descriptions and interpretations associated with the taste. King does not, of course, argue that the experience of tasting coffee is unmediated. After all, it is clear that there are a number of sensual constituents involved in the act of tasting it and one is fully conscious of these constituents. However, she maintains that the prior conception of the taste cannot cause the experience, since only after one has tasted it can one know its true taste. In other words, one has gained something subsequent to the experience. A second fallacy of constructivism is the degree of mediation that entails the mystical experience. Assuming that the constructivist argument is accepted, to what extent can one predict the nature and timing of the experience and to what degree is it mediated? Bharati admits to there being a connection between a variety of events in his life as well as decisions he made, and his zero-experience. He states that prior to his third experience of oneness that LSD was the trigger but so was the initiatory phase in Assam, and so was the narrow cell in the Indian Legion of the Wehrmacht near Bordeaux.43 This shows that Bharatis final experience had been conditioned by certain events to some extent; however they were not the cause behind the nature and timing of the experience. To Bharati, the notion of predicting any constituent of the zero-experience with the use of triggers or inquiring into how far the experience is mediated was absurd, since such things as constituents and any degree of mediation do not in any way come into the zero-experience itself. As he states in his usual startling but humorous fashion: mysticism is like virginity you either have it or you dont; there are no intermediate degrees.44 Similarly, G. William Barnard shows that Katz and Proudfoot, along with other supporters of the constructivist approach, have sidestepped concerns to do with unmediated experience since their position is entirely etic. He argues that the they have refused to enter into the inconvenient realm of causality beyond social context, maintaining that if beliefs can be seen as the formative element of what is distinctively religious about a religious experience, then religious experience can be understood and explained in a purely naturalistic sense, without having to deal with the unnecessary, messy complication of any causality that might
42 43

King, p. 264-265, 1988 Bharati, p. 44, 1976 44 ibid., p. 95

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transcend cultural, linguistic, or historical matrices. 45 In effect, looking at mystical experience in a purely naturalistic way is a convenient method for sweeping aside the core of the essentialists argument. If we are, then, to accept that there is no necessary link between spiritual practice and mystical experience, why would one practice austerity or go through any spiritual training at all? Bharati appeals to his own gurus teachings in reply to this question. Swami Visvananda implied that people have their own path and will do what they are accustomed to do: Some plough the fields, some go to war, and some do tapasya.46 A further underlying argument seems here to be that there is more to spiritual practice than the zero-experience, and that if one does happen to have had it, they are unlikely to abruptly give up their practice because of it, as if the end of a certain path had been reached. The zero-experience to Bharati, ought to be sought after because it is a skill which confers delight and yields a highly pragmatic result.47 This of course, does not sit well with some approaches towards mystical experience which Bharati claimed have tried to elevate the mystics significance to society.

Following on from this point, I wish in this section of the project to explore Bharatis position regarding mysticism and morality. As I have already mentioned, Bharati claimed that mystical experience does not involve any kind of commitment to certain moral or social conduct. These attributes, he claimed, have been unnecessarily added onto by mystics who have attached themselves to the doctrine and custom within their particular tradition. Richard Kirby, in his urgently entitled book The Mission of Mysticism, unwaveringly states that:
Mysticism has expressed itself in many human contexts, but it really has only one purpose: the perfection of the human race. Mysticism is the conductor of the symphony orchestra of human perfections in art, science, religion, philosophy, and every other human cultural enterprise. There can be no dilution of this vision; it is nothing less than perfection to which mysticism calls mankind.
48

45 46

Barnard, p. 236, 1992 Bharati, p. 65, 1976 47 ibid., p. 75 48 Kirby, p. 198, 1979

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To call Kirbys mission for mysticism an improbable task would be an understatement and this kind of assertion was ludicrous to Bharati, who understood this attachment to duty to be an illustration of the apologetic scholar or alleged mystics emotional investment to their tradition. 49 A less extreme and perhaps more convincing view than Kirbys was that of W. T. Stace. In theory, he argued that since love and compassion are indivisible from mystical experience then it follows that the event must have some positive impact on ones moral outlook. 50 In practice Stace was rightly more cautious and maintained that the empirical facts of history are so complex that the strands of good and evil tendency cannot be disentangled from the vast mass of events.51 He concluded that despite this, in essence mysticism veers one towards love and in turn, good moral values. William Wainwrights scholarship on this subject was richer than Staces in a comparative sense, and he distinguished between theistic and non-theistic mystical approaches as regards morality. He claims that non-theistic traditions such as Advaita Vedanta and Theravada Buddhism are pure expressions of monistic mystical consciousness52 and do not necessarily ascribe to a theistic soteriology which Wainwright argues, connotes a firm emphasis on moral value. This is confirmed by Underhills vision of the mystical life where ones vocation will become so varied following the unitive experience that one will hardly fail to find something to do.53 Furthermore, the mystic will be compelled to work for mercy, order, beauty, significance: shall mend where you find things broken, make where you find the need. William James went even further than Underhill, saying that the experience ought to be judged by its fruits, claiming that if the fruits for life of the state of conversion are good, we ought to idealize and venerate it...if not, we ought to make short work with it, no matter what supernatural being may have infused it.54 Besides Wainwright, most of the scholarship illustrated above is based on theory and/or personal experience, as in Underhills case. As regards James claim that the mystical experience can only be merited on the fruits it brings about, Bharatis position was in stark contrast, stating that the mystic is one who draws no objective conclusions from his
49 50

Bharati, p. 95, 1976 Stace, p. 333 51 ibid., p. 340 52 Wainwright, p. 217, 1981 53 Underhill, p. 157, 1914 54 James, p. 237

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experiences, who either keeps them to himself or imparts them merely as an incentive to others to seek the same experiences.55 James emphasis on how good the state of conversion is raises concerns firstly due to the fact that the term good can hardly be accepted as objective, meaning there will be just as many interpretations of the fruits for life as there are of the experience itself. Secondly, as Bharati has shown, James has added an unnecessary quality to the experience which is not part of the experience itself. If one is to judge the experience on its fruits then one is at risk of inappropriately imposing an etic quality onto the experience which is tied up with the doctrinal elements of the culture or tradition and has nothing to do with the noumenal aspect of the experience. Paradoxically, James himself wrote about over-beliefs, which are the doctrinal and religious structures that attach themselves onto the mystical experience and somewhat mould its interpretation.56 Bharati would most likely have seen no distinction between over-beliefs and fruits for life, due to his insistence on the total isolation of the zero-experience and his almost hedonistic view on its function.57 Zaehners differentiation between theistic and non-theistic (especially non-dual) mystical experiences is worth mentioning here, since he implies that this contrast contains moral implications. His claim is that in monism there can be no love,58 since the non-dual59 experience is segregated from any moral consideration. On the other hand, Zaehner unsurprisingly supports that the theistic mystical way provides for moral structure. This is because, ontologically, a moral framework can only be conceived of through duality, which is a central aspect of a theistic mysticism that emphasises such attributes as grace and love.60 Bharatis response to Zaehners challenge is not dissimilar to his response to James. By etically applying Occams razor, he argues that if entities are not to be multiplied beyond heuristic necessity, grace, among other things, does not have to be adduced to explain the zero-experience and its sequels.61 To Bharati, Zaehner has added moralistic attributes to a fundamentally quality-less experience. In addition to this, Bharati confronts Zaehners attitude towards the non-dual experience, stating that it is a bit like saying beer cannot be as

55 56

Bharati, p. 125, 1980 James, p. 513 57 Bharati, p. 82, 1980 58 Zaehner, p. 172 59 I assume, here, that Zaehner is speaking about non-dualism and not monism since he cites Advaita, which affirms the non-dual as a soteriological path rather than the one. 60 Zaehner, p. 144 61 Bharati, p. 122, 1976

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good as good as in Munich, even if it tastes exactly like Munich beer. 62 Essentially, the Munich-ness of the beer is what Zaehner is adding onto the beers taste, despite the fact that in reality it is intrinsically the same. Bharatis model on mysticism in this regard has been termed amoral by Jeffrey J. Kripal, who goes on further to assert that Bharatis model suggests that the mystical experience can potentially be socially dangerous.63 This view is supported by Richard H. Jones who argues that an isolated experience of selflessness may not change a persons negative psychological characteristics but only increase his or her sense of self-importance and pride.64 In other words by identifying with the zero-experience, the mystic is likely to inflate the significance of it and its relation to his or her life. This position arguably has as much support as that which declares the mystical experience to be positively associated with morality. In Holy Madness, Georg Feuerstein compiled a variety of cases displaying how dubious moral behaviour cannot be separated from mysticism. Appealing to spiritual adepts such as G. I. Gurdjieff, Chogyam Trungpa and Da Free John, he concluded that at times, their assumed responsibility to express their experience can essentially be a social role...engaged with passion and yet also with sublime indifference.65 It could be said that Feuersteins position is the closest of all to Bharatis since Bharati claims that the zero-experience can be imparted as an incentive to others to seek the same experience. The only difference here is that Feuerstein implies an assumed teaching function whereas Bharati excuses the mystic of any necessary responsibility.66 Where then, is one to find a moral guideline if not from purportedly the most profound transpersonal experience? Bharati here invoked the Western rational approach and claimed that the East ought to adopt the Western humanist ideal: to be a better human being you have to think better. Theres no other answer. To be moral means to be rational.67 This declaration shows how radically Bharati divided the zero-experience from morality and the rational, verifying his assertion that the mystic remains the person he was before a king, a knave, a dentist.68 He even saw no complication with embedding a seemingly conflicting humanism into the mystical life, since humanism is immersed in the world of thought while mysticism is
62 63

ibid. Kripal, p. 218, 2001 64 Jones, p. 304, 2004 65 Feuerstein, p. 253-254, 1990 66 ibid. 67 Bharati, p. 130, 1979 68 ibid., p. 53, 1976

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immersed in doing something, practising something.69 In other words, they are on a different plane of human experience. Having said this, Bharati was unable to completely divide the mystical from everyday life, since he accepted that the zero-experience had the function of making one impervious to the vicissitudes of life, against boredom and despair. 70

Bharatis often controversial position challenged much of 20th century scholarship that was, and to a great extent still is, deemed as the most important in the field. This position was far from straightforward and was intricately developed through an honest and direct approach towards a range of human experience, including monasticism, tantric practice, hedonism, and Western rationalism. His claim that morality and mysticism are not linked is problematic for some scholars and mystics alike. However, his conclusions cannot easily be dismissed, mainly because they are logical and cut through the doctrinal baggage that accompanies the mystical experience, be it theological or ideological. Perhaps Bharatis most worthy accomplishment lies in his assertion that the mystical experience is essentially unmediated. The fact that his scholarship is conscious of the significant interaction between emic and etic attitudes gives his position more credibility and strength than most scholars, who refuse to look at the mystical experience empathetically. This interaction is, I believe, so relevant as to necessarily be a point of departure for future scholarship and a framework which ought to be employed within mysticism studies.

69 70

ibid., p. 241, 1980 ibid., p. 75, 1976

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

Barnard, G. William, Explaining the Unexplainable: Wayne Proudfoots Religious Experience, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 2, pp. 231-256 (Summer, 1992) Bharati, Agehananda, The Ochre Robe, 2nd Edition, Santa Barbara: Ross Erikson (1980)

Bharati, Agehananda, True and False Prophets of Todays Hinduism, Asia, November/December (1979)

Bharati, Agehananda, The Light at the Centre, London: East-West Publications (1976) Feuerstein, Georg, Holy Madness: The Shock Tactics and Radical Teachings of Crazy-Wise Adepts, Holy Fools, and Rascal Gurus, New York: Arkana (1990) Forman, Robert K., Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness, Albany: State University of New York Press (1999) Hollenback, Jess Byron, Mysticism: Experience, Response and Empowerment, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press (1996) Huxley, A., The Doors of Perception: and Heaven and Hell, London: Chatto & Windus (1968) James, W., The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, (1982) Jones, Richard H., Mysticism and Morality: A New Look at Old Questions, Oxford: Lexington Books (2004) Katz, Steven T., Mysticism and Religious Traditions, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1983) Katz, Steven T., (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis, New York: Oxford University Press (1978) Kirby, Richard, The Mission of Mysticism, London: SPCK (1979)
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King, Sallie B., Two Epistemological Models for the Interpretation of Mysticism, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol. 56, No. 2, pp.257-279 (Summer, 1988)

Kripal, Jeffrey J., Roads of Excess, Palaces of Wisdom: Eroticism & Reflexivity in the Study of Mysticism, London: University of Chicago Press (2001)

Merkur, Dan, Gnosis: An Esoteric Tradition of Mystical Visions and Unions, Albany: State University of New York Press (1993) Otto, Rudolph, The Idea of the Holy, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1958) Proudfoot, Wayne, Religious Experience, Emotion and Belief, The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 70, No. 3/4, pp. 343-367 (Jul. - Oct., 1977) Staal, F., Exploring mysticism, Harmondsworth: Penguin, (1975) Stace, W. T., Mysticism and Philosophy, London: Macmillan (1960) Underhill, Evelyn, Mysticism, London: Metheun & Co. LTD (1930) Underhill, Evelyn, Practical Mysticism: A Little Book for Normal People, London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd. (1914) Wainwright, William J., Mysticism: A Study of its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications, Brighton: The Harvester Press (1981) Zaehner, R. C., Mysticism: Sacred and Profane, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1957)

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