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7 December 1981
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History of the Anti-Submarine Measures Division of the Tenth Fleet

&*Z
This document is a typescript of a xerox copy of a microfilm obtained n>" from the Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Washington, {jj^ *A D. C, in November of 1981. There are many typos owing to the difficulty ' in reading the xerox prints. Also, because of the way in which this r~^'* jP > document was typed the page numbers differ from the original film of this manuscript

DAVID SYRETT John F. Morrison Professor of Military History Combat Studies Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

\u25a0~*w

*"*~-^-^ <^

This document is completely declassified.

only.

Original is ott microfilm

Declassifi cation was verified with Hr D. C. Allardt Headr Opera

tional Archives Branchy Naval Historical Center* Washing ton f DC by Autovon

call on 18 Nov 1981 at 1340 hours.

Elizabeth R Snoke
Librarian Combat Studies Institute, CGSC Fort Leaven worthf Ks

WTC4SSOE/NOMBI

f
PREFACE Division of Tenth Fleet. with every appendix. the
chronology.

There are four copies of this History of the Anti-Submarine Measures

Only the number

one copy (original) is conplete

The other copies contain only Appendix Blue A which is

This history is concerned

but, in

not merely with the efforts of TENTH Fleet measures-

broard outline* with all the principal anti-submarine

adopted by the United States Navy between

the summers of 1941 and 1945.

Reference made to the actual combat operations at sea is limited to that which necessary

to make clear the mutual interaction of these operations an measures actually adopted or considered.

the anti-submarine

WPC4SSOE/NOVBI

CONTENTS
*
.f

Ease
February

Chapter I

February

1941 to

1942

Chapter

II

February 1942

to June 1942

12

Chapter 111

June 1942 to January 1943

17

Chapter

IV

January 1943

to December 1943

24

Chapter

December 1943 to June 194S

47

Chapter VI

Prospects

for the Future

59

Appendix Blue 6-Chronolofly

WPC4SSOE/NQVBI

**,s\u25a0"*

HISIQBY_QE_IUE_^IIzSUe6BiyE_ttE6SUBS_DiyiSIQy

QE-lENBLELEEI

The significance of the history of th Anti-Submarine Measures Division

of TENTH Fleet is best understood measures
by first considering

the anti-submarine

which were instituted

prior

to the time when TENTH Fleet was estab war provided a basis for
the Anti-

lished.

There prior efforts in th anti-submarine

much of the later work of TENTH Fleet.

In a number of instances

Submarine Heasures Division merely provided a more effective adminstration of measures

previously adopted and r in some

cases

the same personnel who continued to supervised The continuity

had been instrumental in formulating these measures

their was after being transferred of the anti-submarine

the staff of TENTH Fleet.

interrupted.

effort was not

Prior to the outbreak of war anti-submarine

training

was a responsibi

lity of the Director of Fleet Training in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations.

The specification of the details od actual anti-submarine

exer
for

cises and practice attacke was a responsibility of the type commanders

destroyers.

QcdfiE&~QEJaUaenxJiaeEi&fi&
commanders

<OGE) provided

fthe general guide

for the

type

in such matters.

Viewed in rerospect some of the provisions of QGE concerning anti submarine drills now seem rather quaint. For
example*

the admonition that

in practice depth charge attacks it was not allowable for the comming offi cer to take sextant sagles

on the bearing of the periscope some other provi

in column while conducting a sonar search
r

sions of OGE such as

steaming

3A

were

ore

fundamental violation of basic an ti-submarine

tactics.

It would be a mistake, hhoweverr

reflected

r to

assume that such provision of OGE

readiness
prior to

the true state of out anti-submarine

Hany

the

beginning of the war.

thinking-

officers of the
the case

Navy were

far in advance of such

This was particularly

for these officers who were

actually charged with the greatest example?

responsibility

in these matters.

For

in a Hemorandum for the Chief of Naval

operations

on 27 June 1941

under the subject "Prudent State of Training* U.S. Fleet* in Torpodo Fire*
Depth Charge

Attacks* and HiTie

Planting one finds the following

statements:

"The execution of
continues to present

supersonic

search and depth charge attack which have not as yet been

grave problem

sat ifac torily solved.

The need for more sound school graduate who

have had extensive training in supersonic search under service conditions with actual submarines employing evasive tactics is

acute*
the

difficulty of accurately measuring

the effectiveness

of

depth charge practiced has separated depth charge doctrine and procedures. Sono-Impule Recorders

to retard the development of

The new Noise Bombs and

study

will furnish scans to

and

improve pre

sent practices and procedures."

WPC4SSOE/NOVBI

To meet at least part of "the need for more sound school graduates"

course for Prospective Commanding Officers and Prospective Executive Offi

cers was established at the sound school on 3 October 1941.

The absence of

any really precise method

for measuring the affectivene&s It apparently led

of practice attacks was a particularly serious drawback.

to the belief in a much higher probability of inflicting severe or lethal

damage

in an attack than later

proved

to be

justified,

for as late as

4 August 1941 BuOrd was informed with regard to impulse charges what
single range of 50 yards for depth charge projectors is considered satisfactory."

In the other main division of anti-submarine

measures r mainly that of

training and tactics.

materiel&r the situation was similar to that in

The

same discrepancy existed between materiel available and materiel desired.

In the major
anti-submarine
to the outbreak

category of

anti-submarine materiel

that suitable well understood prior

shipsi the requirements

were reasonably

of war.

It was realized that the fleet type of destroyer

weapon.

would not be the major

During his

tour of duty as Assistant Naval

(then

Attache at London during the latter part to 1940 Rear Admiral Cochrane
Captain) had the opportunity of closely observing th naval

war experiences

of the British. As a result of these observations

Navy's needs for a destroyer escort Washington and attachment
type

be anticipated our own

Upon his

vessel.

return to

to the Bureau of Ships he cause plans to be pre

pared and the first blue prints of the future Destroyer Resort

were made in

Hk

February

1941.

In 1938 the Navy by means of a competition offering each

interested
type.
private designers

prices

had chaser

in the problem of the small submarine

This led to the design of a 110 ft. wooden hull SC type, which was

similiar to its counterparts in World Uar I, and also produced the 173 ft. steel hull PG.
prior to

A program of construction of these craft was well

underway

the war.

Although these small craft did

required
voy.

not have the endurance or other qualities

were useful as escorts

of modern A/3 craft

, they

for coastwise con

Equally important was the fact that their construction provided the training fleet for use while the Destroyer Escorts

Navy with an excellent

were building. Beginning his active duty progessing a few months to aPC
with five officer and about twice as many man, the inexperienced reserve officer received responsibility far faster than would have been possible in
larger
problem

types without being confronted

at any stage of his development with

Hence when

too large to be comprehended by his limited experience.

the Destroyer Escorts finally began to be available in early 1943, there was
at hand to man then a body of reserve
techniques personnel better acquanited

with A/3

and having more knowlege of practical seamanship

than would have

boss the ease without the *PG-Navy.*

WPC4SSOE/HOVBI

On IS

August 1941 a

conference

with Gibbes and Cox Co., was held at

Buships with a view of having that company Destroyer Escorts.

set as design agency for the

This company assumed

the responsibility and shortly

thereafter

on 19 August the United Kingdom requested one hundred Destroyer

design.

Escorts of U.S. Navy

The first
-13) which was

delivered to the United States Navy was to WES BRENNAN <_ commissioned at
Navy

Yard*

Island? on 20

January

1945.
August.

The keel had been laid as

February

1942 and the ship launched on 22

ship

The first duty of BRENMAN was as a school

at the Submarine

Chaser Training Center at Kiami.

The QC type sonar gear available at the beginning of the war was* in
general

satisfcatory?

but the major weapon was still the "ash can* type The sinking rates of both

depth charge whose limitations were well known.

the Hark 6 and Hark 7 depth charges were not only very slow but quite erractic. The Hark 6
charge

could have an error in depth of as much as 90

feet at an assumed depth of 800 feet* depending upon the posture of the
charge as

it sank.

The significance of a slow sinking rate when combating evasive submarine

was appreciated
pistols

and it also was realized that the provision of depth charges

only

with maximum settings down the

300 feet, so was then the ease,

capable

would be a sovere handicap in attaching modern submarines

submergence.

of deep

By November 1941 steps had been

taken to provide pistols with settings

upon an influence (magnetic) type

down to 600 feet

and* in addition, tests

pistol were expected before the end of the year.

being given to adding

Consideration was also

charges

lead weight to the Hark 6 and Hark 7

A small fast sinking contact

to

achieve a faster sinking rate.

type charge had depth

"been under consideration for some time* as an alternative to the

charge.

Those matters were discussed is an important conference as anti submarine

ference
weapons on

17 November 1941.

A copy of the notes on this con

is included in this history as Appendix Blue B.

The factors contributing to the ultimate success

of anti-submarine

mea

sures were already in operation late in 1941. One of these factors was the
mass of data becoming available from British experiences
during two years of

war.

These data* properly analyzed were invaluable in reducing the number The other factor
(QSRD)

of pitfalls which might otherwise have been encountered. was the creation of the Office of Scientific Research

and Development

in the Office of Emergency Hanagement.

This had been done by the President One of the two principal

under Executive Order No. 8807 on 28 June 1941.

divisions of ODRD was the National Defense Research Council (NDRO* the other divisions being concerned with medical researchf NDRC made available

WPC4SSOE/NOMBI

trained scientists
already arising

to undertake

the systematic

analysis

of the

many problems

in connection with anti-submarine

warfare.

On 27 August 1941 British aircraft had

captured

the D-570 in one of the

most unusual exploits of the war. This submarine was subjected to a

thorough series of
CHAPUL)

tests being therefore appropriately re-named H.H.S.

of this U-Boat were available by the time of

and the characteristics

the November conference

mentioned above.

Hence the capabilities of the

principal enemy weapons were known.

Subsequent

to the conference on 17 November 1941 the

and

analyzed the depth charge problem and indicated that weight is not an efficient pointed

"addition of dead

of increasing the rate of sinking" and

sinking

out that "considerably increased rates of

the case."

could be obtained

by streamlining

BuOrd undertook the development of such a streamlined charge and on

5 June 1942 announced that the "pear shaped* or "tear drop* depth charge had
been completed. On 9 June Cominch directed BuOrd to proceeded with produc

tion of these Hark 9 depth charges

"with the view of

ultimately replacing

all stern dropped 'ash can* type."

On 5 December 1941 an important conference on training and held.

personnel

was

This conference was attained by many of the same officers who were at
may

the earlier material conference of 7 November and

counterpart

be considered the with other than the

of that conference in that it was concerned

6a

material aspects

of anti-submarine

measures.

At this conference*

which was held jointly with NDRC it was estimated

by 1 July

that 3600 sonar operator would be required submarine craft.

1942 to man Navy anti The met

were dis

Of this number only about 2600 were available.

training of

hods being employed in selection and

cussed

sonar

operators

and it was

agreed

that committee members shouls go to Key West to

in effect.

observe actual
Appendix

practices

Notes on this meeting are included as

Blue C.

The

question

of NDRC assistance

in framing attack methods was considered

but "it was the Navy's opinion on this phase of the problem that the commit

tee members could not be of much

the final analysis,
up to

help

inasmuch as the attach methods are Officer of the individual

ship

in

the

Commanding

concerned."

This
cherished

point of view was*

peace

of courser

consistent

with one of th Navy's

time policies* but it later had to be almost completely

abandoned.

Experience later shoved that such a degree of individual tacti

cal liberty in anti-submarine

matters was simply not feasible.

r

Personal

"hurtshoes" in tactical matters

proved

matter how how great general experience*

experimentation supplemented by

to be no match for controlled

the

WPC4SSOE/NOVBI
7

most

rigorous

scientific analysis.

In any case there was only a handful of

naval officers at that time who were really qualified to hold soundly based
opinions in such

matters.

As training actually developed later, tactical

doctrine was prescribed almost to the last detail in a manner which was pro
bably

unthinkable in late 1941.

Specific scanning procedures

were devised

and promulgated in a manner which left little scope for personal

taste of

"seaman's

eye.

Searching

tactics and attack

team procedure had finally to

be specified in almost every respect.

There was a

very good reason

why this evolution of training policy

occurred as it did. It was gradually realized that the design of effective anti-submarine taction was essentially an exercise in the
investigation of

mathamatical probabilities.

Those tactics would them be adopted which in of success* the Navy

the over-all effort would assure the protest measure

adopting the same attitude toward the total effort of many A/S units as an

insurance

company

does in its operations.

The experience of
necessarily

any commanding

officer, no matter how extensive, was

quite meager

when compared with the total.

ending one

But the struggle for

"standard doctrine" was a never

and required an unremitting

experience

effort by TENTH Fleet, for those officers whose personal

merely

had

contributed the ciphers in the total statistics were naturally con Events
proved

vinced that "standard doctrine" was worthless.

otherwise.

As a result of this conference

11 December to authorize

on & December

1941 a decision was made on

the visit of the NDRC committee to Fleet Sound

7a

School, Key
ing of

West* to

study problems associated

with the selection and trai fl

sound operators.

On 11 February 1942 CominCb directed DuPers to established soundmen.

a rating for

A third important conference the end of 1941.

assigned

on anti-submarine

measures

was held near

On 19 December

the Coordinator of Research and Development attack directors to Division 6 of

<a)

the development

of anti-submarine

NDRC.

Three types were under development at the time:

the Barber Cole

man Triangle Solver, (b) the Armour Research

(c)

Foundation Attack Directory and

the General Electric Course Plotter.

Somewhat earlier

, on

7 October
with Libra-

1941, the West Coast Sound School had been directed to cooperate
scope

Co. in development of a "Computer for Determining Point for Depth after Sound Search.

Charge Release

Only

one of the above efforts finally resulted in an instrument which war in the Atlantic, namely,

received service use during the anti-submarine the General Electric Course Plotter.
period

This device during its developmental Its

was more familiarly known as "Dr. Kingdom's Course Plotter."

<ASAP).

later designation was "Anti-Submarine Attack Plotter"

The first

test afloat of this

gear

securred on USS SIKHES on 15 July 1942 off New

WPC4SSOE/NOMBI

London aganist friendly submarine and was pronounced a success.

Procurement

in quantity was initiated and the Hark 1 Hod 2 version of the ASAP received
wide use.

The ASAP was a cathode ray tube which presented a navigational

own ship's course and submarine's
ship's gyro, and the

plot

of

course from inputs received fro pit log*

The two tracks
ray

sonar gear.

persisted briefly

on the

flourescent screen of the cathode

tube.

In a number of features the ASAP was not a true attack director* for
course to steer was subject

to

operator

error in determining it and no pro

vision was inside for automatically near

determining the time

to fire. Horeever*
perfect

the close of the Atlantic anti-submarine

was a device had been

ed which would modify the ASAP so as to bring it more closely to the ideal of a true attack director.
(Saberinal Templates).

This device was the Course Finder Hark 111 Hod 0

On 21 April 1945 COHTENTM FLEET directed the procurement of 1500 copies of the "Tactical Hanual on the Operation of the Course Finder Hark 111 Hod

0% which had

recently been prepared r and procurement

of the gear itself

was initiated at about the same time.

Throughout

the entire war there was constant agitation for an anti

by

submarine

attack director and some impatience was displayed with the essential

those who

were not acquainted

difficulties involved in the design

of such an instrument.

These difficulties were two. First* no director is

8a

any

better than its

inputs.

But sonar-

gear in

use from 1941 to 1944 provid

was last

ed BQ_iDeul_ai_all in the closing stage of an attack, for contact because

of the target

passing under

the sound be aw.

With

deep targets

this

occurred several hundred yards short of the firing position for depth charge

attack

hance the conning officer's estimate was as accurate as a director

Second,

under such circumstances.

complex

the Cosign of a director becomes

speed

very

when the ratio of projectile

to target speed is small for in

such cases

linear extrapolation of data received will not give satifactory But in a depth charge attack
attack)

results against evasive maneuvering targets.

(and

for a considerable part of the ahead thrown the anti-submarine

ship itself.

the "prejectile" is

really

Thus the design of a5O ft/sec tar director for a

get is

not quite the same as the design of an anti-submarine

aganist

15 knot "projectile"

a 5 knot target.

It was clear, therefore,

that director design would be dependent upon The

the development of improved sonar gear and different attack methods.

progress made in 1945

as the so-called "ultimate sonar," having stabilized

systems

horizontal and vertical scanning

gave promise

providing

contact to close

ranger

that the Hark IV director

(Libras cope) might prove satisfactory.

WPC4SSOE/NOVBI

One phase of anti-submarine measures bution to success 1941

which later made a decisive contri

in 1943 was practically non-existent at the close of

aviation.
war seems

This was naval anti-submarine

The decisive importance of

not to have been recognized

naval aviation in an an ti -submarine

prior to

the outbreak of hostilities.

Fortunately

its importance was

recognized

even later

by

the

enemy.

The development of the sono-buoy* aircraft searchlights* the Mark 24 mine all occurred after 1941. The lack of

rockets* aiid
naval A/S

adequate

aviation produced a situation throughout 1942 and into 1943 wherein the Army carried the main burden in the an ti-submarine air war. The Navy was lacking
Very

not

only

in aircraft weapons but also in the planes as well.

operations

few naval

planes

suitable for anti-submarine

could be made available in

1942-

The use of Army planes and personnel reporting as Sea Frontier Com

mands* but not under control of CominCh* led to an intolerable administra

tive situation whose liquidation was one of the main objectives when TENTH
Fleet was created in 1943.

One of the principal aircraft anti-submarine

development yearly in
i

devices was started toward

February

1942* however* when on 6

the Coordinator

Research and Development requested NORG to develop as expendable radio somebuoy* a device which when dropped from planes would receive underwater

sounds and broadcase

them to a receiver in the plane* thus providing the for attempting to maintain contact with a submerged

aircraft with some means submarine.

9a

The Hark Isono-buoy was first dropped from a blimp on 3 April and was
in production by June 1942.

The shore based anti-submarine later

developed* was overwhelmingly

training program for surface dependent

crafty

as it
attach

upon the an ti-submarine

teacher.

The Navy did not

particular
Sangamo

the sangame

attack teacher.

The Navy

did not possess

any of these

models at the close of 1941.

At the end of that year the Navy possessed

six attack teachers.

Two of

these were of British type and four were an American type produced by Nare Island
Navy

Yard.

The four Nare Island type were distributed as follows:

one at each of the sound schools! one at Portlandr Haine for use of

Atlantic Fleet Destroyers at Casco Day? and one enroute installation.

to Pearl Harbor for

One of the British type was aboard the destoyer tender WAS

PRAIRIE and the other was soon to be installed at Navy Yard Boston.

The Sangame

Attack Teacher was shortly to be produced and a contract Host of the ten had been allocated to tenders. models correspondence

for

ten had been signed.

test of these Sangamo

After

stated that "it is expected that

procured.

about ten or twenty additional Attack Teachers will have to be

Considering that

"

one hundred and seventy five of these attack teachers were

this
quotation gives some

ultimately procured,

estimate of the amount

by

WPC4SSOE/NOVBI
10

which the training

program was

underestimated.

The language "will have to of a new

be procured" make it clear that it was not caution in acceptance

product (for successive improvements

did cause procurement usually of not

more than about a score at a time of any particular model) but an estimate of training requirements which was influencing the

author's remarks.

This

letter summarizing the attack teacher situation at the close of 1941 is

reproduced

in this

history as Appendix

Blue D.

It is no particular criticism of an individuals to point out the extent

to which th training program was underestimated
magnitude of by no means

in December 1941 f for the

necessary

the entire anti-submarine

effort which would be

was

appreciated.

For example* the Sea Frontier Commanders

were

directed on 8 February 1942 to train JROTC students in district craft during the summer of 1942.

Hanever on 16
by

January German submarines

arrived off

the Atlantic coast and of its most

desperate

that summer the anti-submarine

war had reached one

phases.

The distribution of the attack teachers as they actually became avail able also reflected confidence in training methods which placed minor
emphasis

on training ashore,

for it

appears

that a disproportionate

number

of those units wre allocated to tenders.

This ultimately

produced a

situa

tion where one thousand officers at SCTC Miami f were being trained on two attack teachers.

On 20 June 1942 CinClant request some reallocation or Attack teachers and one assigned

to USS ALTAIR was reallocated to Navy Yard New York. But

\OA

the idea of alTitos t exclusive dependence

on afloat training died hard.

As

late as 17 July 1942 one of the officers immediately concerned with policy

in anti-submarine

training

wrote:

"I an convinced that the results of our

"means" for such

efforts can be materially increased if by some means we can afford adequate

training in

the 'School ot The Ship.*

Unfortunately the

"adequate

training" afloat

never became available in sufficient amount to

carry out

meet the requirements.

gress of late

To

the

tremendously

expanded

training pro

1942 and 1943 it was

absolutely

essential to supplement

the

afloat training with an extensive and through program of shore training.

Moreover*
it was found that the
improved when proceeded

efficiency of training afloat was vastly

by adequate

instruction ashore.

On the other hand the importance of the attack teacher itself was realized from the beginning. Thus on 29 January 1942 it was requested "that of the

the Chief of the Bureau of Ships advise the contract manufacturers

subject attack

teachers

to the urgent need for these instruments and the

the present sheduled delivery dates."

desirability of anticipating

WPC4SSOE/NOVBI

11

Chapter

II

On 7 February 1942 CinClant established Submarine Warfare Unit at Boston. of the developing anti-submarine

the Atlantic Fleet Anti-

This was a decisive step in the evolution

organization. Throughtout

the LantASUUnit

played a major role in the anti-submarine

effort.

On 14 February CominCh directed each Sea Frontier Commander to assign a liasion officer to LantASWUnit and the submit copies of A/S action reports

to that unit. A

copy

of this letter *m reproduced in Appendix Blue E.

In recognition of the Army's participation in A/S air

officer for liasion with the unit was
requested

operations an Army

on 22 February.

Thus*

i\ a sense
I 1

LantASttUnit became the first organization specifically charged

wijth overall coordination of anti-submarine

The commanding officer of LantASUUnit soon realized the need for expert advice and assistance
in the statistical
analysis of reports of anti-sub

marine actions and the formulation of doctrine? hence on 16 Harch 1942 he

requested
1

the Coordinator of Research

and Development

to use the facilities

of NDRC to establish "an analytic and statistical organization" attached

his command.

to

It was proposed that the organization consist of ten civilian five fpr statistical studies and five for other phases of research and analysis. This was the origin of the Anti-Sub
<ASttORG).

scientists:
operational

marine Warfare Operations Research Group

This organization ulti scientists.

mately expanded until it included approximately

seventy

11a

The detailed history of ASWORG is much too extensive to be given in a brief summary of this nature! hence a move detailed "Review of Activity* of ASWORG has been included in this history as Appendix Orange 0. also contains a
Development.
copy

The "Review
and

of the letter to the Coordinator of Research

This letter is an admirable statement research.

of the purpose and need

for operational

The significant history of ASWORG f like that of all scientists research

organizations*

is to be found in the research papers which it produced.

These papers were first known as "memoranda* and later as "research

reports."

A list of these memeranda and reports is also contained in the

has a profound effect

dolder with Appendix Orange D. These investigations

on the development

of anti-submarine

tactical doctrine.

WPC4S67E/NOVBI

12

On 18

April

1942 an Anti-Submarine Warfare Unit was established

at

CominCH Headquarters
announcing

in the Readiness Division. A copy of the letter

the formation of this unit and outlining its functions in includ

ed in this history as Appendix Blue F. These functions were:

(a)

Hake a continuing study of all aspects of anti-submarine

warfare.

(b)

Coordinate and exercise broad supervision of all ASM training.

<c> Further the

<d)

development

of ASW material.

Review evidence of all anti-submarine

attacks for final adjustments

as to probable damage to the

enemy.

<c)

Disseminate current and pertinent information relative to ASW f

advising

as appropriate on attack

technique

and

operational

methods.

The formation of this unit at CominCh Headquarters

was the real

of

what ultimately became the A/S Measures Division of TENTH Fleet.

It was clear that there would be an undesirable duplication of effort between LantASttUnit and the new unit at Headquarters if the former continued

without change! therefore the AStiORS part of LantASWUnit was transferred

Headquarters

to

late in Hay 1942.

Some consultants remained at LantASttUnit in

accordance

with the policy of attaching ASHORG members to units in closer

contact with the forces afloat.

|iA

This change in the structure and functions of LantASUUnit diminished its importance* but* on the
contrary,

by no means

left it free to deal with

Although the

other pressing matters in the an ti-submarine effort.

new unit

in Headquarters
training" there

was properly charged with "broad supervision of all ASW were many
important

of such training which required

much more than broad supervision.

One important ed attention.

problem in

connection with A/S measures

corps

particularly need

This was the formation of a

of officers to serve as of the summer of

efforts,

instructors in the rapidly expending training 1942.

quick

program

LantASWUnit* being in close touch with the training to see this need.

was

For example, an officer of the CominCh unit* after

upon

conferences

at lantASUUnit on 1? Hay 1942* wrote in his memorandum

return:

*.

.continued discussion of problems of ASW.

Much concern is

expressed

from all QEeciliD3_SDUCces about our lack of facililies for training

and definite arrangements

ing

especially

in ASM hunt

and attacks tactics."

{Underlining in the orginial memo)

WPC4S67E/HOVBI
13

On 31 October 1942 CominCb directed BuPers to supply officers for train

ing

as anti-submarine
LantASWUnit.

warfare instructors in accordance

with a plan submitt

ed

by

As a result of this plan a large number of officers were commissioned from civil life for training as anti-submarine warfare instructors. These

officers were trained at the Anti-Submarine Warfare Instructors School

(ASWIS)

at Boston and also received additional instruction aflcat and ashore

at the sound schools.

At the beginning the policy of procurement

was to seek individual who to select those who in

However
?

had had civilian teaching experience and if possible, addition had some background in science or engineering.
requirements

the

of civilian teaching experience did not always insure a high for no distinction was made as to the level on which had been gained.
The result, at first, was that a

quality of personnel?

this

teaching experience

large number of high school instructors of mouter personality

were obtain

ed.

This was inevitavle under the policy then being followed* for unfortun school system is so organized that? with the exception
?

ately the secondary

of some large city systems

only two positions:

so vigorous man can earn a respectable

living in

principal*
necessary

or atheletic coach. assurance

Some of the later were

obtained?

but with no

of tuterial talent.

On the other hand the lack of personal aggressiveness

on the part of

some of the instructors at the beginning was not wholly without advantage?
for their lack of venturesome nature caused them to base all of their

13a

instruction
fident

on the

back."

This was a very useful counterweight to the con

convoy

of "old salts" who had made two coastwise

Hence

runs on

a 110 ft. SC.

the instructors were a widespread and powerful force

to

tending to promote an adherance

"standard doctrine" at a tine when

were
making

rapid

expansion and a velter of untested ideas occasionally approached

for a condition that

tactical chase.

LantASWUnit prepared materiel to be used by these instructors and a

copy

of the "Manual of Attack Teacher Instruction" is included in this history in

Appendix

Green I.

Later as the training program matured and the Destroyer Escorts began to be manned it was realized that a highly trained an ti-submarine officer for staff duties in Escort Divisons afloat would be very useful in maintaining maximum efficiency.
and delegated

LantASUUnit assumed

the administration of this program

the actual selection of the personnel to the ASW Department at where the other officers of the escort
navy were being

SCTCr

Hiamiy

trained.

These prospective staff officers were selected after personal interview

from the upper 15% of each class as estimated

from all objective tests

available.

Again an attempt

was made to obtain man with tutorial talents

policy was

and scientific educational background* but the

not

rigidly

WPC4S67E/NOVBI

14

followed* and other factors

appropriate

necessary

for

seagoing

officers were given

consideration.

A high quality of officer was obtained in this

manner.
completed

This was possible because the basic course in ASW

selection was wade aflec the officers had

given

at BCTC to all watch officers and

had thus had an opportunity to have their specific ability tested and would themselves express an intelligent opinion about their interest in anti-sub marine measures. The large numbers of officers under instruction at Miami

namely 150-200 per week

at its peaky provided an ample pool from which to

make selections.

These A/S specialists

were given as advanced course in anti-submarine

warfare tactics at SCTC and then proceeded to the sound schools where they
completed both the

sonar officers course and the materiels course.

At the

end of this study they proceeded

to Boston to ASUIS for additional study and

by

final assignment

to duty afloat

LantASUUnit.

At its maximum extent the two groups of officers* A/S Instructors and A/S Specialists,
together included

over five hundred individuals.

A list of

those officers* as of the summer of 1944 together with their duty assign

ments is included in this history as Appendix Green J.

An idea of the
they con

extent of their distribution and an appreciation of the fact that

stituted the essential backbone of the anti-submarine afloat and ashore can be obtained merely by which
they reading

training progress

both

the list of the billets

filled.

The demand for those officers in Pacific areas began to increase in

1944 and since ASWIS was decommissioned

necessary

in November of that

year*

it was The

to effect a careful redistribution of a limited supply.

policy governing this redistribution is outlined in this history in the

latter of Appendix Green K.

The first half of 1942 also witnessed rapid progress in the other phase of anti-submarine
ing conferences tory t

measures*

namely

that of material development.

The train

at Houston on 19 Hay 1942* mentioned previously in this his

was the counterpart of a material conferences held about the same time

at New London.

At the New London conferences

many of the future basis developments

in

sonar gear were observed in

projector heady a development

mock-up.

Maintenance

of True Bearing

<HTB)

of

greately siding the sonar operator* was demon

(TUG) was

strated in mock-up.
ner.

Time Varied Gain

examined in a similar man

A model of the radio sono-buoy

was viewed and the idea of a console

type sonar

stack was discussed and

approved.

One of the most important developments

Hay 1942 was the Simultaneous

examined at this conference in

<SLC)

Lobe Comparison

Device which was later

known as the Bearing Deviation Indicator

(BDI).

On 15 July 1942 this devise

was tested afloat on USS SIHHES off New London against a friendly sub
marine and was pronounced a success. On 24 July the Bureau of
Ships was

WPC4S67E/NOMBI
15

directed "to

place

SLC equipment in service use at the earliest practicable

time." A

copy

of this letter is included in this history as Appendix Blue 1.

The RDI was a major improvement of sonar gear.

ing information made possible

Its refinement of hear

more precise attack methods and improved the

preliminary

usefulness

of the ASAF and was a necessary

to the development

of an attack director.

mock-up

of a scanning sonar

system

was also viewed at the Hew London

hoped

conference.

This was a rotating receiver which the inventor

"to

attach to a cathode ray tube and use as a PPI indicator for sound echoes." November
r

it was stated that there were "many problems to be solved before

this device would be ready for

demonstration."

These problems were never

solved in time for scanning sonar to be used in the Atlantic anti-submarine

war.

The progress made in 1945 however? gave promise that a scanning

sys

tems would be an integral part of the so-called

"ultimate sonar."

A few days after the Hew London conference the Barbar-Coleman

was tested on 27 Hay 1942 by a series of attack

computer

teacher runs at Sangame

Electric Co.
language

The officer witnessing the tests described the results in

which revealed that the hope of obtaining a true attack director in

war was being somewhat

time for use in the anti-submarine

dimned:

"The

computer was adjusted and

a series of comparative runs

(sub

were made.

The computer gave fair results on straight runs

not maneuvering)

but when zig-zag or evasive tactics were made by

15a

subr

computer

was unable to give necessary

information to conning

officer to head ship on attack course.

disappointing.

...

Results were distinctly

Although

no attempt was made to make a quantitative comparison

runs?

of runs with computer and straight coming

it was obvious

that results would have been at least as good* if not better,

without computer. ..."

The observing officer concluded on a brighter note

however* by remarking
praised by all

that "The Sangamo Attack Teacher was enthusiastically

hands."

He had previously examined the first Submarine Signal Co. attack

equal

teachers when at Boston and stated that they were not the
Sangamo

of the

models.

The first part of 1942 was also marked ahead throwing

weapons.

by progress

in the development of

The "small fast sinking contact charge" which had

been "under consideration"

at the end of 1941 had resulted in the develop

On 10 April 1942 an afloat test of the Prejector

ment of the "Mousetrap."

Hark 20 (Mousetrap) was authorized to take place at Key West and on 21 April this
projector was

authorized for installation on 110 ft. SC craft.

WPC4SA7E/NOVBI
16

Chapter

111

Although training and materiel progress

was repaid in 1942* the pace of

On 16 January German U-Boats

the enemy's submarine effort was equally fast.

appeared

off the Western Sea Frontier and a furious campaign against our

shipping began.

Navy forces

were simply not sufficient to meet the vast extent of opera

this menace. Plans had been seriously upset by the

tions required to check

transfer of fifty destroyers

to the Bristish and the situation had never

when the attack
began.

recovered to the Point where forces were adequate

During this period of crisis the Navy received valiant aid from a number

of sources.

The Army Bomber Command carried the main burden in the air
by pilots of the Civil Air Patrol equipped with light

effort?

supplemented

private planes with

flying

no armament and virtually no navigational equipment

well off shore to the limits of their endurance.

The British sent

over some craft to assist.

ing type, but

These were old steam travelers of the coal burn

were manned by veteran anti-submarine

crews and they provided

invaluable aid.

Every effort

was made to meet the threat posed by the

against

growing

list of

U-Boat successes North Atlantic

our shipping.

Destroyers were withdrawn from the Every small

convoys

and assigned to the Frontier Commanders.

boat which was at all suitable was taken over T manned* and sent out to pat rol the
convoy

lanes

along

the coast.

Host of these former yachts had no

16a

sonar gear and very little armament.

Ships

were routed as such as possible

A vine field was laid

on short runs which could be covered during daylight.

at Point Lookout south of Datteras to give an additional overnight stopping

point

on the Atlantic Coast.

Since the Key West harbor was too snail to

accomodate

the traffic in and out of the Gulf of Mexico, another nine field
anchorage.

was laid there to provide an additional protected

In spite of all these efforts losses rose.

A blackout was

imposed along

the cast coast and the sight of bushes covered with oil and ships burning off shore were fimilar ones in the
Spring

and Summer of 1942.

Reactions to such events varied.

manager

The telegram from the

representative

nay or

and town

of Palm Beach to their congressional

is a fair sample

of some of the public reaction at the time.

Appendix Blue H together

This telegram is reproduced in

with a reply.

Other communications

tried to be more

helpful.

One such letter to the the

President is also reproduced in Appendix Blue H. Its author suggested

use of

"small boats wood in the charter business and for

private fishing"

for fighting submarines.

practicable.)

<This was already being done to the maximun extent have

The author admitted that "these boats would necessarily

to be equipped with radio and listening

devices* and was honest

enough to

WPC46O3E/NOMBI

17

admit that

"whether or not

listerning devices are available I do

not know."

However

, he

confidently assorted

that "I do know that ample craft and

crews... are available."

man~will-spring-to~arms

This was another manifestation of the a-million belief. The sonar gear and facilities for install

ing it in such craft were

not available and* moreover had these "arms"

existed for these crews to "spring" to* they would not have known what to do after they had "sprung*" for sink submarines
experience exseting

was showing that training crews to

business.

was a long and

Many suggestions

for new scientific devices for detection and attack

were received.

These continued to arrive well into 1943 and varied from theories closely approximately standard procedures

carefully considered

to

more bizarre proposals of the comic strip variety.

A flag officer, weary

from examining a number of the latter type* finally pencilled across one of them "to Comuckogers for action.

On 14 Hay 1942 the first coastal convoy route was established

ing losses required

and shipp

in the Eastern Sea Frontier immediately

dropped.

But it had
group escort

efforts to gather together the "heterogeneous

by a few Atlantic Fleet destroyers"
enemy

vessels strengthened
ble, hence

to make this possi

when the

shifted his efforts south to the Gulf and Carri

bean Sea Frontiers

the losses continued.

Heanwhile it had become clear that offensive operations against U-Boats

in transit areas and before their dispersal

desirable. On 6 Hay 1942 Rear Admiral Bloch

throughout
suggested

the sea frontiers was such a

plan in

\lf\

letter which is reproduced in Appendix Blue 6.

A memorandum supplying

information for a reply to this proposal to establish offensive task units is also reproduced in the sane appendix. the type of forces required
by

This memorandum pointed out that

simply not

such an operation were

at hand.

Snail craft such as SC's and PC's were not suitable for these extended offensive operations. Such operations had to wait on the production of the

DE's and the CME's.

However

in the second half of 1942 developments moved toward a situa

counter-offensive

tion which did make possible a successful

August, 1943 top priority was assigned

in 1943.

On 12

to the procurement

of the Hark 24

Mine.

On 23 August it was directed that all Hark 17 aircraft depth bombs be

installed with 25 foot depth springs and also that the Hark 24 hydrostatic fuse be issued with depth setting of 25 feet.
(Experience

had shown that

the previous settings were too deep for satisfactory

results).

On 26 September

1942 the first CME to be assigned

to Atlantic anti
the keel hav

submarine operations, namely the USS BOQUE, was commissioned?

ing been laid 1 October 1941 and the ship launched on 15 January 1942.

On 20 January 1943 the first Destroyer Escort, USS BRENNAN (DE-13), was commissioned at Navy Yard, Hare Island, the ship
August 1942.
having

been launched on 28

The keel had been laid on 28 February.

WPC46O3E/NOVBI
18

On 23 August 1942 forty additional Sangamo Attack Teachers were order ed. Certain valuable minor training aids became available soon thereafter: the Advanced Bearing Trainer designed by NDRC was
to the sound schools.
completed

on 15 September

and twenty of them were assigned

Somewhat

later, on

29 October the Special Devices Section of BuAer was directed to procure one hundred of the Squastum-Peace submersible
targets

for training aviators.

This was a device resembled a partly surfaced submarine and was capable of
diving and expelling

soap

solution to simulate the submarine's

swirl.

Rapid progress

was made in the standardization of tactical doctrine and

its promulgation to the forces afloat.

"Information Bulletin No. 14 Anti-Submarine Warfare" which had been

On 9 July 1942 CominCh issued

prepar

ed by LantASUUnit. This publication superseded Fleet Training Bullentins No. 2, 3r A f and S and also
replaced

U.S. Fleet Information Bullentin No. 10.

Information Bullentin No. 14

providing adequate

represented

a considerable

stop forward in

anti-submarine

instructions to the operating forces.

copy of this bulletin is included in this history

as Appendix Green L.

Bullentin No. 14 contained pertinent instruction on nearly all phases of anti-submarine

operations.

warfare:

individual ship attack

escort of

convoy

, and

air

This was feasible at the time because

the amount of approved

doctrine was small.

This system of placing all tactical doctrine in one for a time as tactics in the separate fields

publication was later abandoned developed rapidly? but it

was finally adopted again with the publication

indicated that
degree of stabilization

of

223 after

experience

18a

of ideas had occurred.

The conning procedure for depth charge attack set forth in "Information Bullentin No. 14" was based on the principle of steering the collision
course with the submarine and then adding an appropriate

amount of "lead."

This principle is* of courser

theoretically

sound! but at the tine its

to the installation of
system

application involved considerable

difficulty. Prior

EDI the bearing data received were of such a nature as to wake any
based on collision course very difficult to apply
where the collision course
against

evasive submarine

would necessarily have to be changed from time to

time.

Moreover the method of determining the "lead" to be added to the

collision course required the use of a specially prepared slide rule and was
too complex for practical use.
Attempts

to teach this conning procedure to

hundreds of new officers proved hopeless and the scheme was abandoned. Honths later * after 801 was adopted and the conning officers were more
experienced*

a simple collision course procedure

was published and proved to

be

popular

with the forces afloat.

The problem of obtaining a teachable

conning procedure

which would

afford the required accuracy was not to be lightly dismissed* for it lay at the heart of surface craft efficiency.
searching* convoy screening*

It was obvious that plans for

materiel readiness*

ect.

Were merely means to

WPC46O3E/HOVBI
19

an

end? if* after the A/S

ship had made

contact with a hostile submarine

then the efficiency of the anti

no

successful

attack could be prosecuted,

drastically

submarine effort would be

reduced.

Hany schenes

were tried.

The "PC Navy* in its early

days w

indoctrinated with the so-called "400 yard lead angle procedure."

a method which took advantage

This was

of the

very

small turning circles of these

small craft.
practicable

The ship was steered directely for the target until the last

moment and the "lead" then applied, usually at 400 yards, on the
Tables of lead the

basis of information obtained while steering for the target.

angles

were computed in advancer

but a fatal defect of the

system was

assumption

of a constant

speed of five knots for the submarine.

variety

On the

other handf computation of lead angles for a

of submarine speeds led

to a hopelessly complex scheme.

Nearly all of the early conning procedures

devised were defective in The great importance of

that too much reliance was placed on range rate.

the doppler effect in obtaining the target's component of motion along the sound beam was not at first realized. The accumulation of data on range situation when attacking an eva

rate lagged so far behind the instantaneous

sive submarine that systems based too much upon determining this component from range rate were gradually abandoned.
importance

The growing appreciation of the

of doppler effect, together with a developed theory of recorder

trace interpretation and installation of the ASAP* produced better means for
determining
target aspect.

19a

In 1942 it was necessary

and mass instruction.

to use the same organizations

for both research

This was inevitable, for no specific research organi

zation for tactical development existed apart from ASVJGRG which did not have facilities for afloat tests. This situation was remedied in 1943 after the

Anti-Submarine Development Detachment

was established.

Nearly every anti-submarine developing tactical doctrine

either

organization

in 1942 was busily engaged in

with or without authorization,

lant-

ASWUnit was investigating numerous problems and in April 1942 the ASM Unit of Eastern Sea Frontier was charged with developing tactics for PC's.
July ComServFortant

On 1

and ComGulf SeaFron

were directed to develop "Mousetrap"

tactics in conjunction with SCTC Miami, and Fleet Sound School, Key West. On 11 June ComKleventh Naval District had requested a submarine and a 110 ft. SC to develop "Mousetrap" tactics and had been refused. hand* the West Coast Sound School had
prepared a

On the other

Sound Operator's Handbook

and on 23 June it was decided to issue it from CominCh Headquarters

as well

ad from VQSS.

On 15 August the Handbook was On 9 December

adopted by

CominCh as a stan with search

dard publication.
lights and assigned

twelve PSY-s's were

equipped

to ComCaribSeaFron

who was then forthwith charged with

developing tactics for employment of this

new device.

ypC46O3E/NOVBI
20

Such widespread decentralization

of tactical development

was inevitable

at the tine and* indeep, had definite advantages,

for the contribution fo

new ideas from many sources was favorable to rapid advance in an ti-submarine
techniques.

By the end of 1942, however

such decentralization

had exhausted its

usefulness.

Officers engaged in both instruction and research were not

always careful

to distinguish between authorized doctrine and experiments

This was stimulating for the instructors but confusing

still in progress.

for the officers under instruction who had little time for reflection but
urgently needed ships.

some definite information before reporting aboard their

Forces afloat were confused at times by operating first with one command and then later with another which
example*

a different doctrine.

For

ComFastSea

from forbade the use of aircraft flares to illiminate

whereas CinCLant took exception to this doctrine.
finally

contacts near a

convoy*

CominCh series 02134 of 11 September 1942

resolved the

controversy.

On 15 July 1942 officers from the staffs of CominCh and CinCLant held a conference in Boston at which LantASWUnit agreed to supply corrections to Information Bullentin Ho. 14 from time to time. also agreed that "the Headquarters Fleet the
r

At this conference it was

of the Commander in Chicf f United States

would undertake to issue a manual which would be very brief and to and would be binding on all Fleets and Forces." This was the

point

origin

of FTF 212.

ZIW

On 10 October 1942 the materiel intended for publication in this new manual was forwarded from CominCh Headquarters tion and comment.
as

to LantASUUnit for examina

On 1 December

the manual was issued to the forces afloat

"instructions for Anti -Submarine Urn-fare

Surface

Craft*

(FTF 212).

The new publication superseded

Chapters

Iand IV of "Deformation Bul

letin Mo, 14." FTF 212 contained only doctrine for surface craft and the
applicable portions of

Information Bullentin No. 14 continued in forced as

A copy of FTF 212 is in Appendix Green H.

doctrine for aircraft.

Considerable

progress

was made in anti-submarine

aircraft developments

in the latter half of 1942.

At that time the Navy was interested in the

Army's projects in this field prior to the actual assumption of these pro
jects by the Navy in 1943.

Considerable

progress

was made in anti-submarine

aircraft developments

in the latter half of 1942.

At that time the Navy was interested in the of these pro

Army's projects in this field prior to the actual assumption

jects by the Navy in 1943.

WPC4AO3E/NOVBI

21

On 25 November the air development

Army were outlined in outstanding

programs of both the Navy and the

a memorandum for Rear Admiral Bellinger. One of the

features of the program at that time was the importance attached

<HAD).

to the Hagnetic Airborne Detectors

The HAD Hark IV-B-2 was in pro

duction and the Army was fitting about five per week* thirty planes having
already been equipped.

The Navy was also producing this gear at Hinsola.

The Army had developed an HAD Hark VI which was an Hark IV device 65 lbs.
f

improvement

of its

the weight having been reduced from 2SO lbs. to

only

It was intended to use two of these Hark VI models > one on each

wing top in an attempt

to obtain

directionality.

The
<HABS)

Army

also had under development a Hagnetic Airborne Bomb Sight

carry out retro-bombing
t

which was to be used with HAD to

a system of

bombing which achieved a nearly vertical drop of projecticles by using a

rocket propellent to fire the projectile backwards with just enough force to cancel out the effect of the plane's forward motion. It was intended to

have an automatic release so that the sight would fire the projectives
immediately

after a contract had been made with HAD.

The Navy was considering adoption of an HAD which had been developed by
Naval Ordnance Laboratory and one hundred sets of this gear had been ordered

for trial.

The Navy also had under development above submarines

plotted for various

the

study of magnetic

maps of fields

latitudes? altitudes*

headings*

and

21a

submarine magnetic conditions.

An attack teacher for HAD training was also being considered.

The Army had ordered 2fo o2 f000 sono-buoys development at Underwater Sound
Laboratory

at Hew London and had ordered 100 receivers and 1000 buoys.

An acoustic torpedo to fit a 1000 Ib. bomb station was under development
with the code name *Fido." Both the Army and the Navy were interested in this project. It was expected that test quantities would be available
weekly

before March 1943 and a

rate of 200

by Hay

was anticipated.

The question of target identification after planes had made ra^ar con

tact at night was receiving considerable attention.

parachute

Some rocket

propelled

flares had been tested by the Tests were

Army.

Retro-flares

for use iwth HAD

Navy

were under developments.

being

conducted by the

with three

types of airborne searchlights

and experience were being carried out with

ultra-violet challenging lights and "auto-collimating* designs of the road marker

type.

WPC46O3E/NOVBI

22

Tests were being carried out to examine the underwater trajectory of both the Hark 17 and Hark 29 depth bombs. both streamlined and flat nose
projectiles.

These were being conducted for

The Navy had under developments

two low level bomb sights.

Various flares were

other projects such as towed listening devices and underwater also being
given

some attention.

A very important development in A/S measures

was the inauguration of regular anti-submarine
quarters.

in the second half of 1742

conferences

at Cominch Head

A copy of the minutes of one of the earliest

of these conferences

is

included in this history as

Appendix Orange

E.

The first of these conferences CominCh Headquarters

on anti-submarine

measures

was held at

on 20 October 1942.

For a time they were held every

two weeks and, finally? once each month.

These meetings were very valuable in acquainting the various anti submarine organizations with the latest tactical and materiel developments. facilitated the centralized administration of

Moreover, these conferences

anti-submarine

measures

which was instituted a few months later when TENTH The monthly conferences
provided

Fleet was established.

a useful forum at

which, on the one handy problems of the operating forces could be presented?

andr on the other, results of research and the

background

of doctrine about

22a

to be promulgated could be explained in sowe detail.

The nenoranda which 1942

ar&

admirably

summarized

the situation at the end of

included in this history as Appendix Blue J.

WFC46O3E/NOVBI

23

Chapter

IV

At the beginning of 1943 it was becoming clear to those in a position to

survey

the entire an ti-submarine effort that the time was rapidly

approach

ing when centralization of effort would be desirable if maximum results

were

to be achieved

by

the forces which were at last

coming to

hand.

On 9 January 1943 CominCh directed CinClant and CinCpae to establish

operational training commands.

A copy of this directive is contained in

this history as Appendix Blue K.

The functions of these

operational training

commands were:

*<a) In conjunction

with the Vice Chief of Naval

operations

and

the Bureaus of the Navy Department* schedule and supervise the operational
ing of training of officers and

man during assembl

crews for new construction for all seagoing ships one

hundred feet or more in lengthy including motor torpedo boats and vessels

to be assigned ultimately to Sea Frontiers

excepting

and Naval Districts r but

craft.

submarine and amphibious

*<b) Direct command and supervision

of all training during the

outlined in
<a)

shakedown

periods of

all

ships as

above.

"(c) Provide periodic refresher

training

for crews of operating

23a

vessels."

In addition it was directed that "Close cooperation between the two fleet
commands shall be maintained to ensure

standardization

of training methods

and indoctrination."

The establi shmen t of the Fleet Operational

Training Commands

was a con

siderable administrative advance.

These commands ensured

the close coopera

tion of the many training units with one another and with the operating

forces* and at the same time

provide

an essential administrative channel to

these units from the higher echelons of command.

The early part of 1943 was marked

evolving anti-submarine organization
r

by by

antoher definite advance in the the establishing of the Air AntiThis was done on

Submarine Development Detachment 3 February.

Atlantic Fleet.

A copy of the pertinent directive is included in this history

as Appendix Blue H.

Although airASDevLant did provide some special engaged

training for aviators

in anti-submarine
clearly

operations*

it was primarily a research organiza

purpose

tion. It was

stated that "The

of this detachment

is to

MPC464SE/NOMBI

24

develop

measure*,

to increase the effectiveness

of aircraft in ant i -submarine

warfare."
with:

In further elaboration of its purpose the detachment

was charged

*<a>

Conducting experiments

with air-borne anti-submarine

equip

ment to determine the practical value of this materiel and

recommand
improvements

thereto.

"<b>

Development

of the best tactical use of accepted equipment search plans>

convoy

including attack procedures?

escort

and night tactics for aircraft units assigned submarine

to anti

warfare r and application of available weapons and Where applicable the develop

devices to these purposes.

ment of coordinated tactics with surface craft is to be

stressed.

<c>

Recommend methods and doctrine for aircraft anti-submarine warfare for promulgation to fleet units."

It was further provided that "To assist in analysis of the results attained. Commander in Chicf t United States Fleet t will provide trained analysts and

statisticians."
were assigned

As a result of this last provision some members of ASWORG

to the detachment.

Another advance in air anti-submarine

measures occurred on iMarch 1943

when the publication "Doctrine for Anti-Submarine Warfare by Aircraft" was

24a

issued.

A copy of this publication is Appendix Green Hof this history.

With the issue of this publication all tentative instructions were super
seded and "Information Bullentin No.

14* became obsolete.

Although

"Doctrine for Anti-Submarine Warfare

by

Aircraft contained some

convoy

brief comments about other matters?

escort
plans.

it was essentially a manual of

On 10 February 1943 the first Anti-Submarine Attack Teacher Training Unit Plan was outlined. This was superseded
on 12 Hay by the revised ASATTC

plan which is contained in this history

as Appendix Blue S.

The revision

consisted

largely

Df an increase of personnel allowed at these units.

The ASATTU attack teachers,

plan provided systematic

refresher

training

principally

on

at widely scattered

points.

This program was the result of

the discovery that much more refresher tactical

efficiency

training

was necessary

to maintain

than was at first estimated.

Indoctrination at SCTCr
against

Miami r and further intensive drill on attack

teachers and

"tarne

11

WPC464SE/NOMBI

25

submarines

at the Sound Schools had

by no means

proved sufficient.

On sum

marizing the situation

quarters

at the end of 1942 the staff officer at CominCh Head

with the matter had written:

most concerned

"From a

survey

ot our

experience

to date* the outstanding indica

the amount of train
Not only is initial
f

tion is that we have seriously underestimated

ing necessary

to

develop

affective ASW units.

necessary

instruction and training

to familiarize sound operators

sound officers and conning officers with the problem of attacking

submerged

submarines?
training

but frequent opportunities must be provided and drill."

for refresher

This officer concluded his summarizing memorandum

with the remark:

"To summarize* while efforts should continue to

quality and effectiveness

improve the

of our detection devices and ASW ordi number

nance

our principal aim should be to provide an adequate

of properly trained units to provide effective protection in all

areas.*

It will be recalled that the end of 1941 the Navy had possessed
an ti-submarine

only six

attack teachers,

none of which were of the Sangamo type.

Some ideas of the progress which had been made can be obtained by examining
the list of extisting and proposed installation in the ASATTU plan of
Appendix Blue S. Actually,

most of the

proposed

installation were also

quickly put into operation.

At their greatest extent in 1944 the ASATTU1 s

2_-TA

in the Atlantic area extended from Calves

and from Rio de Janiero Brazil, to

ton, Texas,

to Bizerte, Tunisia*

Argentia*

Newfoundland.

As a part of the ASATTU plan an extensive the Sangamo attack

program

of modernization of

teachers was undertaken.

many new

Since the original design of

the Sangamo models

attack aids had been developed and their

operation had become

part of the duty of the attack

team.

The orginial

attack team consisting of sonar operator, conning officer, and recorder

operator

had now expanded to include an attack plotter operator

DET

plotters* a standby enlarged unit.

sonar

operator

and a sonar officer to supervise this

In addition BDI was being incorporated in the sonar gear and

practice in its use was highly desirable.

The modernization progress consisted essentially of making certain

changes

in the older models to bring them abreast of later designs* addition

of BDI and true bearing follower units to most of the equipments* and design of a so-called Attack Aids Adapter unit to enable the attack teachers
supply inputs to

to

the ASAP and DRT.

The first ten attack teachers were not

modernized because of the excessive re-design which would have been neces
sary.

The later models such as QFAS and QFA6, produced after the moderniza

tion was begun did not require additions but included RDI and Attack Aids
Adapters as an integral part of the equipment.

WPC464SE/NOVBI

26

A summary of the modernization

Appendix Orange

program is included in this history as

H.

The month of Harch 1943 marked the beginning of the effort to develop
countermeasures

to the German Navy Acoustic Torpedo

(GNAT).

Fortunately

this program of developing countermeasures use of the GNAT by the enemy.

was begun well in advance of the

On 15 March 1943 CominCh informed the Coordinator of Research and

Development

of the indications that the

enemy might

be

preparing

to use such

device and stated:

"The

provision of

an effective counter for acoustic torpedoes

is considered

to be a matter of extreme urgency and it is request

be made with the National Defense Research

ed that arrangements

Committee to proceed with the development of such a device with the

highest priority."

A copy of this letter to the Coordinator is included in this history as

Appendix

Blue R.

A number of devices were tested ultimately as possible countermeasures.

One of these was an expendable acoustic grenade. its further
development

This proved unsuitable and 1943.

was abandoned

on 15 December

Another device which was tested and proved unsuccessful

was the CO

<LtA

Hammer Bottle (FIH) designed by the Massachusetts

Institute Technology.

This was a hammer which was driven by CO

2
beating against

and set up a noise source by

the metal anvil to which it was attached.

A third device which likewise failed in test was the Asmonia Noise Maker
<FXA) designed

by the Naval Research

Laboratory.
r

The ammonia device con

sisted of an ammonia flask f a chemical hheaterr

multiple noise making jets.
deep on

a delayed opening valve* and

The jets were radial V-grooves about 1/32 inch

plastic disc,

the surface of S inch diameter

in sandwiches.

12 grooves per disc.

The disc were assembled bubbles which

The ammonia escaped from the jets as the extremely

generated rapid

collapsed violently by virtue of

rate of

solution of ammonia in sea water. ed

propeller

The noise thus

closely resembl

cavitation.
acceptable.

The noise output of the device was, unfortunately

too low to be

The device which finally noisemaker

proved satisfactory

was the FXR gear, a towed

consisting of parallel metal have which were activated

to strike

against one another by virtue of being pulled through the

water.

On 21 October

the immediate procurement

of FXR gear was directed.

WPC464SE/NQVBI

27

On 6 April 1943 an Assistant Chief of Stafff Anti-submarine

appointed

<F-3(B>

was

at CiminCh Headquarters.

He was co-equal with the Assistant Chief

of Staff t Operations F-3<A)> and had available to him the operational

organization of F-3.

The

Convoy

and Routing Division and the Anti-Submarine The name of this

Warfare Unit of F-4 were also placed under his command.

unit was

changed

to the Anti-Submarine Heasures

Division.

The

appointment

of F-3(B> was an important step preliminary to the

actual information of TENTH Fleet about a month later.

On 24 April 1943

F-3(B) presented

a memorandum to CominCh on "Apprecia

the need for broad

tion of the Anti -Submarine Situation" which stressed

governing directives which would clarify

some of the existing confusion and

control the anti-submarine

effort.

This memorandum was a part of the study from Harch to Hay 1943 on the best ways

in progress at Cominch Headquarters

and means of improving a complicated command relationship and placing more

emphasis

on anti-submarine

warfare,

through

the medium of supervisory

organization.

The

complicated

command

relationship

resulted

mainly

from:

<a)

Difficulty in integrating

the Atlantic Fleet and Sea

Frontier activities since the latter were directly under CominCh.

<b)

The fact that

Army

aircraft

assigned

to A/S operations

2.7 A

reported only

to the operational control of the Sea Frontier

Commanders.

This resulted in the peculiar situation of

CominCh being unable to give orders to echelons under his

juniors because

of the Army interpretation that such a cow-

wand relationship precluded issue of orders to Army A/S air craft issue of orders to
Army

A/S aircraft by anyone except

the Sea Frontiers Cornwall ders and the Army Commanders.

Two principal methods of clarifying this unsatisfactory

tionship

command rela

were considered.

The first of these was to place all anti

submarine effort under CinCLant.

gration with the Sea Frontiersposition

This had the advantage of

complete

inte

On the other hand CinCLant was met in a

to deal safisfactorily with Army Defense Commands, nor did he have

the facilities to control A/S activities based on the U-Boat plot which was

at CominCh Headquarters.
anti-submarine

The second method involved setting up a separate

Navy Department.

command in the
adopted.

This second method was the

solution finally

At first it had been intended to establish a seperate Commander TENTH Fleet at the Navy Department with the rank of vice admiral. For this com

mand it was desired to obtain an officer with Atlantic anti-submarine

experience or

a naval aviator.

The latter was a

possible

choice because of

yPC464SE/NOMBI
28

the increasing importance of aviation in anti-submarine because it was essential

operations

and also

to correct the ascendancy

an ascendency

of Army Air over Navy Air

in anti-submarine

measures*

at that time which had led to a

situation where the Navy was on the point of losing control of antisubmarine
operations.

Funding the availability of a Commander

TENTH Fleet CominCh himself

assumed

that duty with CominCh Assistant Chief of Staff r Anti-Submarine

<F-3<B>>, becoming Chief of Staff, TENTH Fleet.

On 20
quarters.

Hay

1943 at 12002 TENTH Fleet was established

at CominCh Head

CominCh despatch 182307 of Hay 1943 had announced the formation of TENTH Fleet. The actual "Directive for TENTH Fleet* was promulgated by CominCh
Appendix

and CEO to U.S. in

Blue W of this

history.

The directive

specifically charged

TENTH FLeet with the following tasks:

*<a) Destruction of enemy submarines.

*<b) Protection of Allied shipping in the

Eastern?

Gulf* and

Caribbean Sea Frontiers.

<c) Support

of other Anti-Submarine Forces of our own and of the

Allied Nations operating in the Atlantic Areas.

Z.SA

*<d) Exercise

of control of convoys and shippng that are U.S.

responsibilities.

*<c)

Correlation of U.S. ant i -submarine

development.*

training and material

The staff organization of TENTH Fleet is shown on the chart in Appendix Blue Wof this history. The staff consisted of four divisions:
<3) Convoy U) Opera (4)

tionsr

<2)

Anti-Submarine Measures*

and Routing, and

Scienti

fic Council.

On 7

July

1943 Dr. Vannevar Bush* Director of the office of Scientific

f

Research and Development

directly

directed Research Group M

part

(ASWORG)

to report

to ComTENTH Fleet as a

of that organization.

On 9 July

Cominch endorsed

this directive and ASWORG became a part of the Anti-

Submarine Measures Division of TENTH Fleet.

The particular function of the Anti-Submarine Measures Division of TENTH Fleet was to implement item
<c)

of the directive?

namely

"Correlation of
The chart in

U.S. Anti-submarine training and material development."

WPC464SE/NOVBI

29

Appendix Blue W above the organization

of the A/S Neasures Division.

(2)

It

consisted of four sections:

(3)

(1)

Surface Section* and

{4)

Air Section*

Statistics and Publications Sections?

ASWORG.

The surface and air sections were each organized into three sub-sections
on materiel* tactical analysis*

and training.

The materiel sub-sections

had cognizance over establishing

priorities

for the development of all anti-submarine

specification of the essential operational

ordnance and detection devices* characteristics of such materiel*

and final administrative supervision of the development of new materiel and

its procurement for service

use:

Tactical analysis had originally been made at LantASttUnit in Boston amd

a report of the findings there sent
quarters

with the pertinent data to CominCh Head Committee which had been established

for review

by Hay

the Assessment 1942.

in Readiness on 14
transferred

When TENTH Fleet was formed an officer was

to CominCh Headquarters

from LantASWUnit.

This officer became

the tactical analysis officer.

The work of tactical siderable

/

analysis

officers and the committee was of con

by other

importance

for their judgements* when supplemented

intelligence* provided

an estimate of the forces the

enemy

still had avail

able.

The close study of attack reports also provided a continuous picture of doctrine and its implementation
by

of the effectiveness

the forces afloat.

2- cih

An outline of the procedure of the tactical

tained in Appendix Green A of this history.

analysis

sub-section is con

In addition to analysis of attacks* the tactical analysis section was

called make
upon*

together

with other officers of the A/S Heasures Division* to

on proposed doctrine and procedures.

pertinent comments

The sub-section on training were cognizance of the issue of standard instructions on training* of providing assistance

in the preparation of the

official tactical publication* and* in the case of the surface section* with
supervision

of the distribution of the

major

items of

training equipment.

On 1? Hay 1943 CominCh and CNO issued a directive on Anti-Submarine

Measures

which outlined the training objectives and essential

administrative

responsibilities

in achieving these objectives.

A copy of this directive is

concerning

in Appendix Blue Tof this history.

This was the basis directive

WPC464SE/NOVBI

30

anti-submarine
to insure that:

training.

It specified that appropriate

steps would be taken

*(a>

each ship and plane is proficient in the basis

technique of

normal operations both as to personnel and materiel.

*<b>

training in use of sound and special equipment

is intensive

and sustained.

*<c)

surface escort

groups

are trained as units with

emphasis

on

coordinated operations between ships and aircraft and on

simpler sure communications.

<d)

all units

(surface

and

air) are subjected

to regular

refresher courses at training centers appropriately

organized*

staffed and equipped.

(e)

training is conducted

through the medium of a standardised

instructions

approved by

this Headquarters."

The enforcement of provision

(c)

above led to a gradual diminution of

unauthorized publication and this aided materially in the reduction of con fusion.

The statistics and Publications Section of the A/S Measures Division had its actual origin on 6 February 1942 when an officer was ordered to CominCh

Headquarters

and attached to the Readiness Division.

Records were kept by

him* with the assistance

of several yeoman r aboving records of sinkings of

merchant vessels and of attache on U-Boat. ed and when

pertinent placed

A special punch card was design

in use

provided a fairly rapid

net hod of obtaining

information.

The increase

in the pace of the war and the desire for

punch

complete system.

data at Hence

all times soon made obvious the inadequacy of the

on 14 December

card

1942 an International Business Machine was released

for the

joint use of the Statistics Section and ASWORG.

All previous records were

then recoded and transferred

to this system.

A copy of the punch cards and the IBM coding systems are contained in

this history as Appendix Orange F.

priate wiring diagrams.
By use

This appendix also contains the appro

of this appendix and the punched cards now

operations
may

on file almost any desired analysis of anti-submarine

be made.

On 7 August 1942 a small miroso graphed synopsis of anti-submarine tions.

opera

*ASW Bulletin Ho. I>* was issued for use of officers at Headquarters.

This was continued until 21 April 1943.

WPC464SE/NOMBI

31

In the Spring of 1943 it wafc decided that publication of a monthly anti

submarine bulletin for issue to the operating forces would be very helpful

in promulgation of doctrine* review of materiel developments and training

methods*

survey of anti-submarine

operations

and other matters which would readiness. Hence in June

serve to maintain a high degree of anti-submarine

1943 the first issued of the "U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine Bulletin" was
published.

The Bulletin was published every month thereafter

sample
copy of

through May 1945.

the Bulletin is included in this history as Appendix Organge

G.

The preparation of material for the Bulletins was dose

of the A/S Heasures
responsibility

by

all officers

staff bu the actual details of publication were the

of the Publication Section.

The value of the Anti-Submarine Bulletin can hardly be overestimated. It provided an essential
operating

medium for communicating now developments

to

forces and discussing controversial matters in a detail not possi The practice was adopted

ble in circular letters or standard publications. of using the Bulletin to promulgate

(ASSI's).

"Anti-Submarine Interim Instructions"

These instructions were additionsr permanent or temporary* to

standard doctrine as contained in the Fleet Tactical Publications which* of

course* were published at much longer intervals. measures

It is difficult to see how

anti-submarine

afloat could have been kept alert and up-to-date

without some medium such as the Anti-Submarine Bulletin.

*lA

The fourth section of the A/5 Measures Division was ASWORG.

Some of the

salient facts of its history have been set forth earlier in this summary and detailed information will be found in Appendix Orange D.

It is perhaps appropriate
relationship

to wake a few comments concerning the

between a group of civilian scientists and naval officers

charged with the ultimate responsibility

in tactical matters.

Usually

com

plete reliance could be placed upon the accuracy of mathematical

calcula

tions or the validity of deductions made by the scientists.

sary
f

It was neces
points:

however* that the officer address his attention to two

assumption

the

realism of the

from which the deductions were obtained* and the

By

form of presentation

of the final result to the operating forces.

con

ferring with scientists in the early stage of investigation the officer

could give them the benefit of his practical experience so that their
investigation

would proceed from postulates

which were in accord with actual

conditions faced by forces afloat.

completed

After an investigation had been

and the decision made to promulgate the results or incorporate for the officer to give much This second point was
unfortunately
hardly

them in standard doctrine it was necessary attention to the manner of presentationimportant than the

less

first* for research results are

seldom cast

up in a form which makes for their ready comprehension

and facile use by

officers under the stress of actual

operations.

yFC464SE/NOVBI
32

The Spring of 1943 just of TENTH Fleet was

prior

to and immediately after the formulation

of important A/S measures.

very productive

On 20 March 1943 the procurement

designed by NDRC was directed.

of the

Shipboard

Sonar Operator Trainer

This device came to be erroneously known as

Teacher).

a SASAT (Shipboard
essentially

Anti-Submarine Attack

In reality it was

a primary bearing trainer which injected a synthetic echo into

the ship's sonar and also produced some rather unrealistic recorder traces

thus permitting a useful amount of shipboard training* skillful instructor the device
proved

In the hands of a

to be a helpful training aid.

On IX April the procurement directed.

of ten thousand Hark 8 Depth Charges was

This was the proximity influence type charge which had ultimately

been developed and was previously mentioned in connection with the materiel conference of November 1941.

The following is a brief summary of the types of depth charges or under development
f

in

use?

at one time or another during the anti-submarine

war.

The Mark 6 and Hark 7 charges were of the "ash can" type and were in use
at the beginning of the war.

The overall weight of the first was 420 lbs.

(terminal

the explosive charge being 300 lbs of TNT. Its sinking rate
city) was only about 8 ft/sec.

velo

The pistols used in this charge were hydro

static type.
charge being

The overall weight of the Hark 7 was 768 lbs. the explosive 600 lbs. of TNT. The
sinking

rate

(terminal velocity)

was

about 9 ft/sec and hydrostatic pistols were used.

32A

These charges* with flight adapters*

were aho in use by aircraft at the

commencement

of hostilities.

The Hark 8 Depth Charges was a cylindrical "ash can" type also f but its aluminum case was weighted in one end with 150 lb& of lead.
weight

Its overall

was 520 lbs> the explosive

(terminal

charge being

270 lbs- of TNT. Its sink The firing mechanism was the
type (hydrostatic

ing rate

velocity)

was 11. 5 ft/sec.

N-7 Mechanism (magnetic

electrical
combinations).

influence)

and Pistol Hark 7

and

The Hark 9 Hod 0 and Hark 9 Hod iDepth Charges are now obsolete.

These

were *tear drop"

charges

of total weight 320 lbs.* the explosive charge The sinking rate was 14.5 ft/sec. The Hark 6 and

being 200 lbs. of TNT.

Hark 6 Hod 1 hydrostatic pistol was used with these charges.

The Hark 9 Hod 2 and Hark 9 Hod 3 were alike except in the construc
tion. These were

"tear

drop" charges

weighing 340 lbs. and having an

explosive charge of 195 lbs. of TNT.

The sinking rate of these charges was

Touch faster than that of the Hark 9 and Hod 0 and Hark 9 Hod 1 being about 23 ft/sec. The Hark 9 Hod 2 used the hydrostatic type pistol Hark 6 Hod

2 pistols were assembled and a new Mechanism Hark 4 and Pistol Hark 12 was
used and it was then known as Depth Charge Assembly Hark 14.

WPC4A4SE/NOMBI
33

The Depth Charge Hark 10 was a snail cylindrical charge weighting only 29 lbs. total.
the miserable

The explosive charge was 25 lbs. of TNT. This charge had

sinking

rate of only 4.5 ft/sec.

It was seen dubbed the

"paint- can" type charge-

This missile was intended for rather indiscrimi

early

nate use by the small harbor fleet of

the Hark 6 depth charges.

1942 f which were too small for

The method of launching over the side was by of modern submarines and the

hand.
fragile

In view of the

rugged construction
many of

structure of
The

the boats the use of such the boat then to the

submarine.

pistol

in this charge was of the time delay type with sett

ings for depths of 50 ft. f 75 ft., and 100 ft.

The Hark 11 Depth Charge was a long* thin f highly streamlined charge
with a plastic body and stainless
charge weighed

steel spiral tail fin assembly.

explosive charge of

This

480 lbs. and had an

230 lbs. of TNT.

This charge had the ed

only

very high sinking

rate of 36 ft/sec and could be launch

from throwers because of danger to the ship if dropped from tracks.

This charge was intended for use with another type launched from the tracks

to

complete

the pattern,

but the development of the Hark 11 was never com

influence)

pleted.

The firing mechanism was the H-12 (magnetic

arming device).

with the

Hark 11 Pistol (hydrostatic

It was not completed due to the

perfection of the Depth Charge Hark 14 t

to the necessity for using two types

of charges, device.

conversion of ships and difficulties with the magnetic firing

The Hark 12 Depth Charge was intended to complete the pattern of the Hark 11
by being

launched from tracks.

It was a

torpedo shaped

stell case

charge

weighing 93

lbs.*

being leaded with 45 lbs of torpex.

Its sinking

rate was 40 ft/sec.

The trajectories of the Hark 12 did not prove stable It was

and its development was cancelled when the Hark 11 was abondoned. intended to use a contact fuse with the Hark 12.

The Hark 14 Depth Charge was a very modern charges of the "tear drop*
type weighting the same as Hark

9 Hod 3; namely 340 lbs. total with 195 lbs. Its sinking rate is about 23 ft/sec. The

of this being the TNT explosive. naval features

of this charge was the firing mechanism which was of the echo

ranging influence type with the Hark 12 Pistol hydrostatic arming device.

This charge was

ready

for use at the end of the an ti-submarine war in the

Atlantic but received no significant use there because of the termination of

hostilities.

Additional information about depth charges and depth charge pistols will be found in Appendix Green 5 of this history. Files of the Anti-Submarine ordnance and

Bulletin contain detailed information about most anti-submarine

materiel.

Another accomplishment

of the Spring of 1943 was the issue of the Basis

Directive for Sound Schools in Hay.

copy

of this directive is contained

WPC464SE/NOV-81

34

in Appendix Blue 0.

This was a modification of a directive previously issu

ed on 20 September 1942 on the basis of a report of a board of 24 August which met "for the purpose of coordinating the efforts of the two Fleet Sound Schools-* The Officers in Charge of the two sound schools were

directed to use the report of this board, with slight modifications* as a * "basis for instruction. This report continued in force until modified and
enlarged upon by the

directive of

Hay

9143.

The directive of Hay 1943 continued in force until 1 Novweber 1944 at which tine a new basic directive was
prowal gated.

A copy of this new direc

tive for the sound schools is contained in Appendix Blue P.

The essential

difference between the old and the new directives is that warfare which had

the latter reflected the broader concept of anti-submarine

developed

with the experience gained between the time the two directives It was also
necessary

were promulgated.

to insure by means of the second

directive that the sound schools assume certain training which had been
given

elsewhere at the time of the first directive.

Something of the difference between

the two directives can be understood The

by examining the attitude toward sonar officers which they reflected.

first directive stated that:

"It is intended that

conning instruction will be held

to a

minimun for sound officer students ands such conning instruction

given

shall be

given

on the attack teacher.

The

primary object

in

JHA

empasising

operating efficiency in the training of the sound offi

s cer i tQ_iLcCease _tii-ef ficieDi:-SS-SD_QEecaiQi:_DL_tiQaCl_shiE-snii

iQ^fii_biffi_iQ_csi:Ei:_DD-.iDsiculiQii-aiid-.suiiec^isQii_Q_Dfir:aliD^3i

sea."
(underlining

in the

directive)

The second directive stated that:

"There are three officer's course?

major objectives

to be attained by the sonar

namely

to ensure that the students arei

(1) Competent

evaluation, capable of imparting a smooth flow of

information to the conning officer during a sonar attack;

<2)

Effective training officers f capable of developing an effici

ent attack

team,

and

<3> intelligent assistants

of anti-submarine

to be commanding officer in all phases

warfare."

WPC464SE/NOVBI

35

It further stated that "Sonar officers shall be exercised on all types of

sonar attacks on th attack

regards

teacher,

and* where feasible at sea."

As

the Sonar Officer's ability as an operator the new directive stated

proficiency in the
f

that "A high

sary; however

actual operation of the stack is not neces

in its use is

an ability to train operators

essential."

The new directive thus tool into account the increase in the importances and the
enlarged
scope

of the Sonar Officers duties which had been caused by the

development

attack team and the

of a number of attack aids.

The nature of the training given to Prospective Commanding officers was also altered somewhat by the new directive.
Recognition

was given to the war

fact that conning sonar attacks is not the only phase of an ti-submarine

fare which can properly be taught in a sound school. that:

The directive stated

"The
advanced

training given in the PCO-PEO

course shall be of an

nature to ensure that these officers are met only adept

a satisfactory
general

at comming sonar attacks but also possess

knowledge of

an ti-submarine warfare.

Only such competence

in the
to

operation of specific gear should be required as is necessary impart

to these officers a knowledge of the problem of their sub

ordinates."

When the new directive was promulgated in November 1944 it was essential for the sound schools to assume some of the instruction which had previously

35 A

been given at NTC r

Miami* for the DE Command Course had been discontinued at Therefore* some of the methods of instruction in
at Hiami were used at the sound

that activity because of the virtual completion of the destroyer escort new construction progress-

tactics which had proved successful schools. For

example,

the new directive required that:

"to

encourage

the most effective type of study of FTF

223* and

related publications* a problem shall be given* specifically

designed so that its solution will ensure an understanding relationships

of the

between various an ti-submarine

tactics required by a

changing situation such as

occurs in escorting a convoy or a task

force.

"The
specific

purpose

of this problem is not to test a knowlege of

organize his know

facts* but to induce the officer to

ledge
in such

a manner that it will form a sound basis for further

decisions.

"For the solution of this

timate to
procedures*

problem it shall be considered

legi

require a familiarity with

sources of communications matters as

maneuvering board

theory* and such other

may reasonably

be expected to be known by officers soon to

ye

charged with the responsibliity of command.

WPC464SE/NOVBI
36

"This

problem should be distinct from the final examination.

It should be assigned

well in advance of that examination so that

efforts to obtain a solution may extend over a period of several

days.

"Officers should be encouraged

to work together on this pro

blem* making an equal contribution toward its solution.

This

pro

blem?

together

with a review of the final examination* should form

with the class."

the basis

for a final seminar

A copy of the type of problem given is contained in this history history as

Appendix

Blue Q.

In summary

it

may

be said of the contrast between the two directives

that in the interim between their issues the quality of sonarman had improv

ed so that is was no
approximate

longer necessary

to have the sonar officer training

as closely to operator

training as

before? likewise the

given prospective

quality

of sonar officers had improved so that the training

manding officers need no longer approximate

com

that of these junior officers.

was possible.

Thus a general

raising of

standards

throughout

In summary

it

may

be said of the contrast between the two directive

that in the interim between their issue the quality of sonar wen had improv ed* so that if was no loger necessary
approximate

to have the sonar officer training

as closely to operator
improved

training as

before? likewise the

given prospective

quality

of sonar officers had

so that the training

com-

7A

manding officer* need no longer approximate

that of these junior officers.

Thus a general raising of standards

throughout

was possible.

Other events besides promulgation of the first prevised directive for sound schools marked the month of
Hay

1943.

On 1 Hay the publication "Tentative Instructions

A/S Projector Hark

20 and Hark 22 (Mousetrap)" was issued.

copy

of this publication in

included in Appendix Green F. This was the first official doctrine on the tactics for the use of the ahead throwing
as the first presentation
weapon.

It is also distinguished

of the theory of recorder trace interpretation.

On 1 Hay 1943 the Office of Scientific Research md Development was

requested

to develop a range recorder trainer which would permit systematic

and intensive training in the new trace interpretation theory and its appli cation. Trainer
aganist

This resulted in a device first known as the Phonograph Recorder

(PRT)

which

by means

of Phonograph records made during actual runs

submarines

at sea reproduced on five recorders

the exact trace

obtained.

WPC464SE/NOVBI

37

Five of these PRT were produced for service test and their immediate

success

resulted in the production of fifty wore. Teachers

The fifty standard units

were known as Tactical Range Recorder

<QFL).

On 9 Hay 1943 DuPers was directed by CominCh to retain in so far as

practicable*

all trained and experienced A/S personnel in A/S activities.

This "freeze" of personnel was an important move in producing sn efficient

organization both afloat and ashore.

This policy remained in effect until

21

Hay

1945.

It is not the part of this history to record the an ti-submarine tions if tge Atlantic war
T

opera

but it is perhaps pertinent to recall that on

31 Hay 1943 the first offensive CVE Anti -Submarine Task Group was organiz ed. This was TG 21.12 consisting of MSB BOGUE and the ships of CertDiv 1.

The operation of this group were the beginning of the summer offensive of this group were the beginning of the summer offensive of 1943 which was the decisive campaign that broke the back of the German U-Boat effort. For a
peood

of about three months during the summer of 1943 the combined Allied
per day.

forces sank an average of one U-boat

ately successful

The CUE groups were immedi

and ultimately their efficiency reached the point where in

the six months April through September 1944 they accounted for about 60 per

cent of all U-Boats sunk by U.S. forces in the Altantic and Hediteranean
during

that

pe-riod.

On 7 June 1943 the expeditious development and test of the 3 inch high
velocity foreaed firing rockets for

use with A/S aircraft was directed.

57/t

This was the

beginning

of a long and important program.

ComFairWestCoast aircraft.

undertook the development of the type installation for

outfitting

The letter of 7 June contained instructions for

12 TBF's and IB PV-i's.

In addition

arrangements

were to be made to make

proved the weapon's

installation in 200 TRF's and 200 PM's if tests

tiveness,

effec

it was estimated

that ultimately the rocket installation would be

made on 1500 Altantic and 4SOO Pacific aircraft.

On 13 September 1943 the Special Devices Section of BuAer was directed

to undertake

the development of a towable underwater target for training in On 26 October a training film for
produced.

use od rocket projectiles by aircraft.

instruction of pilots in the use of rockets was ordered

On 4 Novmeber ComAirLant outlined the shore training program to support rocket training.
this history. A copy of this letter is contained in Appendix Green D of

Some idea of the wide extent of the rocket program can be It provided for rocket ranges from Iceland to

obtained from this letter.

Braz il.

WPC464SE/NQMBI

38

Although rocket

armament on aircraft did not result directly in numerous

it did provide planes with a heavy weapon to use at a

sinkings of submarines

time when German U-Boats displayed a tendency to remain on the surface and
fight back.,

Forcing the U-Boats

to dive while in actual contact with

planes

thus opended the way for the very effective employment

weapons such as depth

of other aircraft

bombs andr

notably r

the Hark 24 mine.

The colleteral results of the rocket development

ing.

program were

far reach

On 7 December 1943 a memorandum from the Joint Staff Planners to the

Joint Logistics Committee stated the "urgent Military need exists for grant
ing priorities

to facilite the

production of rockets.

With this the rocket

development program

moved into fields far distant from anti-submarine

research was largely instrumental in giving the initial impetus to use of rockets
by

the Navy* but in some respects of TENTH Fleet.

this was one of the most signifi

cant achievements

In

general r air developments

in anti-submarine

matters moved rapidly in

the summer of 1943.

On 27 July the tactics to use with aircraft searchlights

were issued.

On 12 July Admiral King wrote a memorandum to the Cheif of Staff of the

Army on

"Anti-Submarine Air Operations" suggesting a plan for the Navy to

On 23 July the
of the

take over the Army Anti-Submarine Air Development program.

agreements

were summarized

and the Navy began the gradual assumption air activities.

burden in the anti-submarine

?#A

On 26 June 1943 the publication "Escort of Convoy Instruction

(FTF 215)"

was issued to the forces afloat.

This formed a complementary

publication

to

FTT 212 which had been issued the previous December

and "Doctrine for Anti-

Submarine Warfare

by

Aircraft" issued in

April.

A copy of FTF 215 is contained in Appendix Green 3 of this history.

There had lons been a need for such a publication.

23 January 1?43 a conference

In factt on

had been held at CominCh Headquarters

recently

to

consider the possibility of adopting the

issued Joint British U.S.

convoys

"Altantic

Convoy

Instructions* for U.S. controlled

in the Atlantic.

At this conference.

"it was

brought

out that Lantfit 9A was the only publication

convoy

now available to coastal

escort commanders

and that due to commanders*

permit

the relative inexperience of the coastal convoy escort

this

publication

did not go into sufficient detail to As a

consequence*

its

effective use.

it was agread that some publica

tion similar to ACIr should be provided. ..."

WPC464SE/NGVBI

39

On 28 July 1943 the Air Anti-Submarine Development Detachment was chang ed to Anti-Submarine Development Detachment added* This was a
very important step.

and a co-equal surface section

A copy of the directive establish

ing AsDevLant in contained in Appendix Blue H of this history.

The directive

provided

that:

"This detachment shall consist of two divisions:

<a)

The Aircraft division^ formerly known as fiicccafl Anti-Submarine Warfare Development Detachment
f

Altantic Fleet? and

<b)

the Surface Craft division."

AsDEvLant was essentially an organization

for test and development of

now

gear

and tactical methods.

was also provided.

A limited amount of training of a specializ

ed nature

The control of assignment

of projects to ASDevLant was vested in Com-

TENTHFIeet, the directive providing that:

"Bureaus and offices of the

Navy Department

and other Naval

Commands which desire to submit projects and problems for develop

ment by this detachment

will forward requests

necessary

to the Commander

TENTH Fleet.

If approved* the

directives will be issued After initial approval of

which will include relative

priorities.

?^A

a specified project, interested

bureaus* officers, and other Naval

Commands are thereafter authorized do deal directly with the Detachment Commanders

in regard to details of that project.*

Although ASDevLant

was under the immediate command of CinClantr COH-

TENTHFIeet dealt directly with the Detachment Commander* the directive

providing

that:

"In the interest

of expediting action.

the commander TENTH

Fleet will,.deal directly with the Detachment Commander

copies of correspondence

, with

to the appropriate superiors in the

echelon of command.

In

practice?

these administrative

arrangement

proved

to be quite satisfac

tory.

On 30 October 1943* after intervening study and discussion, a number of surface craft projects were assigned ASDevLant supplementing
jects already under development ing thse first surfaces

aircraft pro

or evaluation.

A copy of the latter assign

craft projects is contained in Appendix Blue N of

this

history.

WPC464SE/NOVBI

40

ASDevLant submitted a status report

outlining the progress

every two

weeks to ComTENTHFIeet
report

on each projects.

A copy of a status

is con

tained in Appendix Blue H.

This appendix also contains a list of the major

air and surface projects undertaken by ASDevLant.

By the summer of 1943 the matter of

some control control of the develop

A

ment of anti-submarine

ordnance and other equipment had become pressingcompeting

multitude of agencies were

for a limited amount of technical with

brains and production facilitiesvarying degress

Projects were under development

of urgency by BuShips

BuDrd*

and their associated

laboratories.
even state

Ho one was in a position to assign relative priorities or

conclusively

what was

being

done in all this welter of

activity.

A few

examples

will illustrate the situation.

On 3 June 1942 the officer at CominCh Headquarters

who was immediately

concerned with such matters wrote to a civilian scientist about primary

bearing trainers

in the following language:

"I have heard the the

NDRG has arranged

to obtain 20 of these

instruments in addition to the 6 experimental models which were

first constructed.

"As soon as I know definitely how many have been ordered 1 intend to
arrange.

..

.to

procure

additional instruments

to bring

the total to at least fifty.

Hofi

In another letter on 30 June 1942 deal i with an entirely different 719

natter r namely the Hark 127 aircraft depth bomb, one finds these words

addressed

to

yet

another individuals.

"To date I have not been able to find

how
you

anyone who could tell me

were getting alone.

any points

I wonder if you could write me a few

yoy

lines outlined
changes*

which

have established

and what

or corrective measures*

are indicated at this

time."

At times the confusion was so great that the officers involved had to
make decisions while aware of the fact that they processed
quate knowledge of the governing factsentirely made

For example* one finds a letter 1of

a & August 1942 stating:

"1 have
the Towed

just read with much interest your letter describing

Repeating Target* developed by your people

The day before it arreived Dr.

and asked who had requested

...

out there.

of NDRC in New York called

that NDRG proceed with the manufacture

of a number of these targets* which had me mystified somewhat.

arose to the occasion* however* and siad that I would request them
if you had not already done so."

WPC464SE/NOMBI

41

Some attempts were made to assign priorities to a few of the ware

important projects.

For

example, a

memorandum on 21 January 1943 on

"Development and Supply of ASM Material

-
Relative

Priority

of" listed the

relative priority of the important projects as follows:

1. 2. 3.

Microwave Search Radar

High Frequency Direction Finder

Hark 24 Mine
Proximity Fuse for Depth Charges

4. 5.
6. 7. 8.

*ear

Shaped*

"

Torpex Loaded

Depth Charges

Admiralty

Net Defense

Bearing Deviation Indicator

Aircraft Mounted Searchlights

Oscilloscope

9. 10.

Course Plotter

<ASAP)

Vertical Rocket Bombs

Magnetic Airborne Detector
Expendable

11. 12.

Radio So no-Buoys

With the advantage of hindsight some of the above priorities

questioned.

may

be

For example* the priority assigned

high

to the Admiralty Net Defense

scheme seems too

and that of the Radio Sono-Buoy too low.

When TENTH Fleet was established

it becomne clear that the time had materiel program into line.

arrived for bringing the entire an ti-submarine

Hence after considerable

study and a number of

conferences*

the

"Anti-

Submarine Materiel Program Priorities* were promulgated on 28 July 1943.

H ( A

These were concerned not with a brief list of about a dozen items* but with
approximately

a brief list of about a dozen items, but with approximately

twenty-five projects.

one hundred and

The "Priorities* were revised from time to time as material developments and
changing

tactical

requirements

made such revisions desirable.

Revisions

were issued on 14 October 1943* 31 January

1944* and 24

January 1945.

A copy of each is included in Appendix Green G of this history.

It is interesting to observe some of the changes which had occurred by

January

1945 by listing those projects which were then assigned

AAA

priority.

The AAA priority was defined as

"Highest priority.

Urgently needed

will materially increase

offensive value of unit carrying it* or needed as counter-measure

against enemy weapons

or technique.

This priority justifies pro

f

secution of work in shifts? overtime materiel if necessary

uneconomical

use of labor or

and application of the "enforced production

law."

WPC464SE/NOVBI

42

the projects having this priority

were:

A He chan ism Hark 4 and D/C Pistol Mark 12 QDA Depth Determining
Sonar
(Sword)

OKA Resolving Recording Equipment Ultimate Sonar and

Armament:

1.

Hodel A <NRL tilt beam and horizontal scan).

scan).

2. Hodel B <NUSL horizontal and vertical

3. OR/ER Sonar
(horizontal

scan>

Attack Director Mark 4

Counterweasures for Target Seeking Torpedo

1. FIR Mark S 2. HAE Mark 2

3- N-l
4. Towed M-l

5.

Towed Electronic

6. NAE Mark 1-1

Deep Echo Repeater

Targets

1.

Towed
Stationary

2.

Coordinated Attack Plotted

HIh

Directional Radio Sono-Buoy

AER 16 Hodified for BRAS

AER 16
(XN-1)

Final Hodel

(RASP)

Rocket Vestor Sight Hod 3

Delay Hose Fue 4

to 5

sec,

AN/CRN-1, Nadie Navigation Buoy

Forward Firing Rocket Flar Hark 7-1

Colored Smoke Harker
Aircraft Parachute Flare Hark 8-3
Aircraft Parachute Flare Hark 11-0
Infra Rod Detection Devices
D.C. Pistol Hark 12
(50-1500 ft.)

Bomb Director AN/ASGIC

(Toss Bombing)

Sono-Buoy B Battery CNC 19032

Thermal Hake Detection

1473 Gear (Depth Determining)

Other evuate of some interest as anti-submarine measures

the summer of 1943.

occurred during

WPC464SE/NOVBI

43

On 13 July the "Badgehog* Projector Hark 11 was authorized tion.

for installa

The projector produced a different pattern from that of the Hark 10

"Badgehog* on 12 October 1942 BuOrd had indicated that the new pattern would

be more effective.

The Hark 10 pattern

(when

fired dead

aboad)

was ellipti

cal r that of the Hark 11 was circular.

On 18 August 1943 the Columbia University Division of War Research

was

authorized to develop a recorder trace projector unit. This was a device for projecting recorder traces as a screen and was an aid in instruction of
large

classes.

Ultimately about a score of these devices were procured.

On 20 August

paper

facsimiles of the slant range correction plates for The design of the recorder did not take

the range recorders were issued.

account of error due to slant range to the target, but treated all such
ranges

as horizontal ones.

This was not a serious error as long as a sub

marine did not use drop diving

becoming clear

tactics* but

by the

summer of 1943 it was

that modern German U-Boats could* and did* dive to

200 meters.
recorder,

Thus it was essential

to correct the slant range error of the

The metal engraved

at least in so far as it affected firing time.

later,

plates were issued by BuShips somewhat

the

paper

facsimiles being at

first merely pasted over the old plates.

In the middle of September 1943 the Germans first resorted to use of the
acoustic torpedo
against
<GNAT) aganist a convoy

from Balifax.

It was employed

escorts,

and later intelligence revealed that the enemy hoped by the balance which* from his
point

this means to redress

of view, had been so

H7A

disastrously

turned against hire that by the end of the

suimer

he dhad

recalled his U-Boat fleet for re-organization.

beguns months earlier had yeielded a satisfactory

Fortunately*

the efforts

countermeasure

in the FIR

gear end on 21 October 1943 the immediate procurement

of that gear was

directed.

The

enemy

dubbed this gear the "singing saw" and* although some

of them at first thought that it was a new search devices > by the end of the

Atlantic war its mature was understood and its effectiveness

appreciated
ships using

so generally

that many U-Boat commanders

had decided that use of GNAT against

FIR

gear

was so futile as not to be worth the effort.

On 16 October 1943 the Bureau of Aeronautics Anti-Submarine Uavfare Com

mittee was established.
expediting anti-submarine

This committee was specifically charged with

measures of CominCh in so far as such measures

concerned BuAer.

This committee was of great assistance

to the Air Section

of the Heasures Division of TENTH Fleet.

On S November 1943 it was directed that a number of PCS craft be con verted for use as training ships at the sound schools. been a miscellany of craft: The school ships had

ous

Eagle Boats,

PC'si SC's old DD's and vari

Although

a number of these were retained for a time* the POS

By using some of the topside living

became the typical sonar school ship.

WPC464SE/NOVBI

44

spaces

it was possible to obtain a large sonar but appropriate The development of the ASAP, BDI* console stack
upon plotting techniques

for underway

instruction.
ing emphasis

and increas

in consar attacks had nade use of such

The 136 ft. wooden
The sonar school

craft as SC's hull PCS

squadrons

impossible

for modernized instruction.

proved to be very

useful answer to the problem.

destroyer

also included a ship of destroyer?

escort and frigate

type in addition

to the PCS, thus permitting officers to become acquainted

of these
larger

with the tactical characteristics

craft.

It was also
shaking down and

arranged

to have some of the new fleet type submarines*

enroute to the fleet * spend a few days at the sound school

This proved of mutual benefit to both the
A number of articles in the

for exercises submarines

with A/S craft.

and the A/S craft.

"Anti-Submarines
particularly in

Bulletins" dealt with results achieved in these exercisesr

respect

to deep submarines
assigned

operations

which were not possible with the old R

boats regularly

to the sonar schools.

The

major

effort of TENTH Fleet

was* of course*

always

confined to the

Atlantic. However* there was some contact with Pacific anti-submarine

activities* and the closeness of this liaison increased with time. On

6 November 1943 CinCPac organized Pacific Anti -Submarine Training under ComDesPac.
A copy of the letter accomplishing

this contained in Appendix Green

E.

There was an increasing demand for anti-submarine

specialists

in the

Pacific and this lead to the revision to the distribution of these offi-

HHk

cers.

The policy effecting this redistribution was outlined in the letter

of 1 December 1944 previously mentioned in the discussion of the specialist

program.

On 22 November 1943 an important conferences

was held to consider mea

This conference

sures to clarify the electronic maintenance

included representatives
of TENTH

problem.

Fleet*

BuShips,

BuPers* VCNOr CinCLant,

problem had arisen
types

and the Fleet Sound Schools-

A serious maintenance

because of the vast increase of electronic equipment of all occurred since the beginning of the war.

which had

As the amount of rradarr r radio

and sonar equipment aboard ship multipli

ed each indivicual rate was still attempting

equipment.

to provide maintenance

of its

In addition as tactics developed the demands being made on

redarmon and scnarmon from an operational point of view were being increas ed. To insure a type of recruit who could meet both operational and main

tenance demands the authorities concerned with the individual training pro
gram were constantly raising their standards
f

and multiplying their require

ments.
sonarmen

For example

increasing
doppler

emphasis

was being placed on the ability of

to discriminate

effect.

WPC464SE/NOVBI

45

The compounding of requirements soon lead to a situation where not

enough

men could be found with these multiple talents* to meet the demand of
program*.

all the

A nan might possess

great natural aptitude a* an elec

tronic "trouble shooter*

for example* yet be tone deaf.

Such a

mat*

could

not be used as a sonar- wan.

On the other had a man might have a considerable

"flair" for

learning code rapidly and have no natural aptitude whatsoever

for maintenance.

Such a man was not desired as a radioman.

In order to braoden the range of individuals available for selection for

the various programs it had been decided that a radio- technician* not charg ed with operation of
gear*

should be responsible

for maintenance of all

electronic equipment aboard.

separated

Thus the operating aspects of the rates were

ones*

from the maintenance

At the time of the conference of 22 November 1943 the radio technician

rate

was*

of course* already in existence.

At this conference it was decid

Steps

ed that sonar maintenance

was properly a responsibility of that rate.

were taken to implement that decision by supplying necessary

sonar equipment

to the new Radio Technician Schools to permit adequate instruction in sonar

maintenance*
requirements."

and have "BuPers revise rating requirements for soundmen in character only as distinguished from technical

view of their new operational

A copy of the conclusions of the conference

of 22 November is contained

in this history as

Appendix

Green H.

ISA

Since the radio technicians were not

bility, in fact, for

prepared

to assume

full responsi

sonar maintenance*

the maintenance
operation

courses wre continu

ed at the sound schools and were still in dissolved in 1945.

when TENTH Fleet was

WPC464SE/NOVBI

46

Chapter

Administrative centralization of anti-submarine

by the end of 1943.

measures

was completed

Meanwhile the summer campaign of 1943 had proven the essential soundness of the measures which had been adopted. The training given and the materiel

developed during the previous eighteen months

were demonstrated

as equal to

the requirements of the situation.

By the end of the year

some units of the

new

navy

were already veterans and the escort carrier groups were the

scourge of the U-Boat packs.

In 1942 when coastal econvoys had been established and land based air
craft had made the enemy's position near the coast untenable, had withdrawn far out beyond the reach of land based aircraft.
strategic

the U-Boats Thus by a

device the Germans had avoided a conclusive tactical test in

1942.

This was not feasible in 1943.

During the

summer of 1943 the battle had veen joined in mid-ocean and

the U-Boats had been decisively beaten in a tactical test which was conclu sive and could no longer be avoided.

The Type VII G U-Boat and the 750-tonners

weapons*

the enemy's principal tactics.

were obsolete in the face of the new anti-submarine

planes with radar
f

Ship-borne

and surface craft with radar and direction

proportions.

finders, and reduced

the search problem to manageable

More

4b fi

over* the ahead

throwing weapons,

the new depth charges,

an the Hark 24 nine

had raise

the probability of a "kill",once the U-Boat had been localized,

to an amount success.

which*

although falling short of certainty,

was an assurance

of

The U-Boats had tried the wore obvious expedients.

Anti-aircraft arma

ment was greatly increased and the submarine captains instructed to remain on the surface and fight it out.
The answer had been to use rocket firing and fast closing escorts.

fighter planes in pairs, following with bombers,

The results for the U-Boats were disasterous.

The U-Boats tried the tactics of diving as soon as a plane was spotted.
They fell a

victim of the Hark 24 mine.

Reports

have indicated that the enemy

undoubtedly became

aware of the

use and nature of the Hark 24 mine soon after its introduction and it is a
fact that U-Boat tactics were shifted to the obvious countermeasure. resorted to
very deep diving and very quiet running.

They

UPC4623E/NOVBI

47

This development led to the

hunt to exhaustion
by escorts.

employment of

the "creeping attack" and the

Quiet running meant slow running, and night

flying ra^ar and searchlight

planes could ensure

that the slow

moving target

would remain localized.

Within the localized are the sonar

improved that they

techniques

of

the surface escorts were so

would maintain contact, with

With one ship at a

the exception of brief intervals, for hours at a tine. distance permitting contact with a very deep
(J-=Boat f

and another "creeping"

in slowly on the basis of the data being furnished by the first, a large and
tremendously

destructive pattern of charges would be laid.

literally days

This procedure

would be continued for

destroyed.

at a tine until the submarine was

The significance of all this was clear to the German high command. twelve months the north Atlantic* which had been U-Boat paradise

In

, had

become

a U-Boat graveyard.

The

convoys could go through essentially

unmolested and

the great attack in Western Europe was merely a matter of time.

The German high command resorted to two steps:

the remaining U-Boats

were recalled to be fitted as quickly as possible with new devices and

weapons, and completely designed

new and revolutionary types of submarines

were

to replace them as soon as possible.

From this time on the problem of A/S Measures

superiority

was to maintain tactical

The superiority over the

at each stage of a changing situation.

refitted old type U-Boats was never lost.

Moreover, it is

not clear what

the situation would have been with respect

to the new and revolutionary

47a

designs,

for victory in Europe occurred before they became

operational.

One of the first counter moves of the enemy after his the summer of 1943 was to introduce the use of SWAT
middle of September.

heavy

defeat in the

(acoustic

torpedo)

The FIR gear was ready at hand to counter itf as men

tioned elsewhere.

The problem of deep submarine was a vexing one.

every effort should be made

It was obvious that

to eliminate the depth variable in the attack

and reduce the "blind time" as much as possible with fast sinking ahead thrown ordnance.
depth determining

Hence, the invention of "Squid," used in conjunction with

sonar gear, was a step in the right direction.

The "Squid" was a British devlopment and on 14 December 1943 ASDevLant

was directed to test and evaluate the "Squid" installation and associated
depth determining
gear

in

HADUEIGH CASTLE.

The "Squid" was a projector which fired three

Squid") depth charges

(or

six in the "Double

out ahead of the A/S

ship

into the path of the sub

by these charges:

marine.

There were two novel features possessed

an

extremely fast sinking setting.

rate

(excess

of 40 ft/sec) and the method of fuse

UPC4623E/NOVBI

48

The "Squid" was used in conjunction with the 147 Depth

gear and the fuses were set automatically
sear*

Determining

Asdic

for the depth determined by that

On 5 February 1944 it was directed the "Squid" and associated

be obtained for test on a U.S. ship.

sonar gear

On 6 April it was directed that this

gear be installed in USS ASERMILLE (PF-1) for

test.

Thus a long series of

tests of "Squid" was begun and continued for about a year, authorization of
removal of the test gear from ASERVILLE being given in the summer of 1945.

Procurement anti-submarine

of a "Squid" type weapon for actual use during the Altantic

was was not feasible, but it appears

that some improved type

of ahead throwing weapon will undoubtedly be part of the essential armament of future A/S craft. obtained
$

Some of the sonar gear associated

with "Squid" was

however,

and saw service.

On 23 Kay 1944 the procurment of forty sets of 1478 depth detemining

sonar gear was directed.

On 7 June sixty additional sets were ordered

procured. Nearly all of these

one hundred equipments were turned over to

CinClant for installation in ships selected by him, first priority being

given

to "killer group" destroyer escorts working with Atlantic CVE's.

13 February 1944

may

be remembered

as a date which marked the end of an

era, for on this date ConTENTHFIt announced

investigation of new

the policy that "no further

or proposed an ti-submarine attack aids" would be

preclude

initiated.

This* of course, did not

the improvement of existing

HZfi

attack aids or completion of ones under development.

The policy reflected a confidence

that additional attack aids could not

be initiate, developed, and procured in tine to be used in the war. More

over, it underlined the belief, which had been justified by events* that
existing attack aids such as the range recorder,

ASAP, and EDI were adequate

and had carried sonar attack techniques to as high a state of perfection as could reasonably be reached short of use of an actual attack director.
Therefore,
the time had passed

for consideration of additional "gadgets."

It was more pertinent to concentrate

on developing as much skill as possible

in the actual use of the ones available and to devote long range efforts to
the development of a director.

On 22 February 1944 slant range correction plates for the recorder for

use with the Hark 9 Hod 2, Hark

11, and

Hark 12 depth charges were issued. These supplemented

The two latter ones were never actually needed. issued the previous August.

ones

In Harch the manual "Operation of The Sonar Range Recorder" was issued

to the forces afloat.

C of this history.

A copy of this manual is contained in Appendix Orange

WPC4623E/NOVBI

49

Issue of the range recorder manual was in accordance

developing maximum skill in the

with the policy of The look net a

use of existing attack aids.

need which had long existed.

No really complete treatment of the use of the

Fragmentary

recorder was in existence prior to the issue of this manual. discussions issued

had been available in the "Mousetrap" manual and in publications

by the training

centers.

Experience had brought about the realiza

tion that efficient recorder operation was second only to coming in impor

tance in a successful attack, and the development of the

interpretation and the devlopment of the theory of

theory of

trace

trace interpretation and

the Tactical Range Recorder Teacher

in the use of this important gear.

(QFL)

had revealed great potentialities

In an attempt to avoid the distastrous surprises which radar had caused

them to experinece, the enemy had developed and installed the German Search
Receiver, a device which would betray the presence of r^fi^r equipped forces
by receiving the pulse.

On 4 March 1944 the tactics designed to reduce the

effectiveness

of GSR to a minimum were issued to our forces.

On 9 March the experiment of using "Mousetrap" projectors on destroyers

was terminated.

Installations had been made on a dozen 1200 ton destroyers

They were

of the Atlantic Fleet.

not successful.

The "Mousetrap" mount

could not be trained by was fixed to fire dead ahead, therefore the ship had

to be pointed up at the target and the target's maneuver anticipated

swinging the ship.

by

The destroyers did not have tactical characteristics

which permitted such use.

\u25a0au

The "Mousetrap" was installed on smaller craft such as PC's and SG's

butt unfortunately, after its installation these craft were never used in

areas of great U-Boat density; hence conclusive combat

"Mousetrap"

experience

with the

was never obtained as it was with the "Hedgehog".

The devlopment of a "Mousetrap" mount capable of variation in asimuth

cany of course^ destroyer

be carried out for a type as large as a destroyer or unfitted for these craft. On the contrary,

escort; essentially

the extra range which this rocket type projectile has over the inverted
mortar type of the "Hedgehog" (approximately 100 yards wore) is a definite
advantage.

In addition the negligible deck reaction of "Mousetrap"

feasible. The "Mousetrap" achieves

may

make

very large patterns very little increase

its extra range with

in "blind time" due to flight; the increase of this

flight time may preclude the range,

use of ahead thrown projectiles of very long

trajectories

for stabilization of underwater

seems

to require that this in turn

long range, the

ahead thrown projectiles enter the water at

requires a highly arched trajectory

large angler

through the air

and* for

flight time may be excessive.

Hence, in consideration

of future A/S weapons

the possibility of an improved type of "Mousetrap" should not be overlooked.

On 16 April 1944 the contracts for additional shipboard sonar operator trainers
(SASAT Type A)

were ordered cancelled.

MPC4623E/NOVBI

50

On 1 April the procurement of one thousand radio

sono-buoys

was

directedt this device

anti-submarine

having be cone a permanent

feature of aircraft

operations.

On 30 April 1944 the Ships Magnetic Submarine Detector

pronounced

(SWSD)

was

impracticable.

It was directed that installations ordered be Thus a final judgment was

persistent

stopped and those already made be removed.

rendered against one of the most venerable and anti-submarine detection

projects.

of the many

The Spring of 1944 was also notable for one the most brilliant tional exploits of the entire anti-submarine
operation of the destroyer

opera

war. This was the offensive

In company

escort USS ENGLAND in the Pacific.

with the other lE's, USS GEORGE and USS RABY, ENGLAND carried out a mission

to the eastward and north of the Solomon Islands which resulted in the
destruction of six Japanese submarines between 19 Hay and 31 May. ENGLAND

received credit for the destruction of five and major credit in the destruc tion of a sixth. From the standpoint of A/S measures
an outstanding

feature

of this series of actions is that all of the sinkings were acheived by use " of the "Hedgehog. This success gave a considerable impetus to anti submarine interest in the Pacific when the results of the new techniques which had previously been principally exploited in the Atlantic were made obvious in such dramatic fashion.

On 26 Hay a conference
design of

was held with officers of BuShips concerning

The

a Group Operator Trainer for use of the sound schools.

ft

limitations of the Advanced Bearing Trainer were realized and the GOT was
designed

to suppliment then at the sound schools.

problems for

The GOT was a device

which

generated

ten console

type

sonar stacks simultaneously

The

and permitted instructor monitoring of individual student performance. realism

surpassed

that of the Advanced Bearing Trainer Installations were

obtained for each of the sound schools.

On 1 June 1944 "United States Fleet Anti-Submarine and Escort of Convoy Instructions"
(FTP 223) was

issued to the forces afloat.

This superseded

both FTP 219 and FTP 215.

T of this history.

A copy of FTP 223 is contained in Appendix Green

FTP 223 combine instructions for both surface craft and aircraft.

It

included doctrine foe escort of convoy as well as for the other aspects of
anti-submarine
operations
and, hence,

was a complete manual.

This

re-established

a policy of unified publication which had not been in effect

since Information Bulletin No. 14 was superseded.

On 16 June 1944 "British

- United Stated

Convoy Instruction" (BUSCI)

was

approved and issued to forces afloat,

to become effective 1 July in the to FTP 223 for joint

Atlantic north of 35 N. Busci provided a supplement

section.

WPC4623E/NOVBI
51

On 21 June 1944 the West Coast Sound School was directed to forward the
Coordinated Attack Plotter
(COAP)

to ASDevLant for evaluation.

The COAP was

a device devloped by WCSS which made the ASAP suitable for use in a coordi

nated attack on a submarine

by

two ships.

The submarine's

track and echo

adapted

ranging ship's track appeared

on the regular ASAP.

The COAP

the

ASAP to receive manual inputs of range and bearing of the attacking ship and
reproduces

its course on the plotter's scope.

Thus all three courses would

be visible at one place.

This reduced the time lag somewhat from that

inherent in other plotting techniques.

The COAP was evaluated as useful and its procurement was authorized, but installations were not obtained in time to see service in the Atlantic war.

The summer of 1944 was marked by the extension of the activity of the

A/S Measures Divison of TENTH Fleet to the domain of submarine sonar train
ing.

On 7 July the Commanding Officer of the submarine

base at New London

successfully

expressed

the view that some of the personnel and methods used

in anti-submarine

sonar training

night prove

of assistance

in our own sub

marine program.

He requested that the matter be considered and personnel

to provide this assistance.

made available, if possible,

On 3 August a board consisting of officers from TENTH Fleet, BuShips, West Coast Sound School, NTC Miami, and a representative ted to review submarine sonar training. of NIRC was appoin

Two members of the board proceeded

at once to new London to begin the study and were joined somewhat later by
the other members.

\k

As a result of the boards findings extensive changes were made in sub marine sonar training.
separate

This phase of submarine training was concentrated in

courses at the West Coast Sound School courses being given in sub
personnel.

marine sonar for both officers and enlisted

At the time of the board's meeting in New London a number of its members had also gathered there to consider matters concerned with the proposed new directive for the sound schools?
tory.

a topic discussed elsewhere in this his

As a resultf specific provision was made in the new directive for the Installation of

West Coast Sound School to assume submarine sonar training.

equipment began almost immediately?

the new directive was promulgated on 1

November, and submarine

1945.

sonar

training

was in progress by the beginning of

The spring fo 1944 saw the introduction of "Schorchel* by German U-Boats. This was a large tube which included both air induction and

exhaust pipes and thus made it possible for the boat to operate submerged*

at Schnorchel depth, using the Diesel motors instead of electric motors

supplied by

batteries.

The Schnorchel could also be used to permit battery charging without

surfacing.

WPC4623E/NOVBI
52

The Schnorchel

was the

enemy's

answer to the plane and radar search, and

The radar
target presented by

it was a very effective answer Schnorchel

indeed.

was trivial in comparison

with that afforded by a surfaced sub

marine and the Germans resorted to a type of radar camouflage of the part which was above surface.
This was fairly successful,

but, on the other

assembly

hand, a radar search receiver was mounted in the Schnorchel

provide warning.

to

In addition, a sharp periscope watch was maintained.

As a result of these enemy efforts aircraft contacts with submarines

dropped to near the vanishing point.

The old pattern of operations

which

had distinguished anti-submarine

itely

over

probably

operations

in the summer of 1943 was defin

never to return.

The long range significance of this

fact for an ti-submarine

tactics can not be over-estimated.

At first the enemy used the new device for only a few hours at a time, but after a few months of experience some U-Boats operated
literally weeks submerged

for
by day

at a time.

Such U-6oats would run wholly submerged

and oeprate on Schnorchel at night for a few hours to recharge the batteries and
provide

fresh air for the crew.

In practice the Schnorchel was still a defensive device when the war
ended. The speeds possible when using Schnorchel never exceeded about seven Such speeds do not
convoys*

knots as a maximum and five was more common.

permit

the

assembling of "packs" for attacks on well guarded permit frequent escape

but they do

from destruction

by air

and surface escorts.

S-2-A

Near the end of the war the enemy's confidence in his new device caused
him to again move close inshore, inside the 100 fathom curve* in almost
complete disregard of land based

air power.

At the close of the war now

tactics of lying on the bottom* drifting with the tide, etc* were being
developed in

a manner which was very disquieting.

The immediate effect of Schnorchel was to transfer the main burden of

anti-submarine
operations

back to surface craft equipped with sonar gear.

Since localization of the target in a small area by aircraft had become far

more difficult than in 1943, the surface craft search problem assumed
primary importance.

This led to a complete re-casting of surface search

planes in a form which would make their

most efficient employment at sea

matter of the simplest and most specific routine possible.

On 16 August 1944 the new surface search plan

in detail in a conference
redesigned

requirements

were outlined

with members of ASWORG.

The plans were completely

to cover the most probable U-Boat speeds was taken of the progress

under the new condi

tions, account
bathythermograph

which had been made by virtue of

information, and the plans were presented

as simple time
craft.

tables for use with formations of from one to six anti-submarine

WPC4623E/NOVBI

53

Great emphaisis had to be

by employing

placed on achieving max i nun? effective possible*

search width

as many craft as

therefore,

all turns were standar

by

dized as either 45 or 90 degrees,

complete finally,
provided.

the tine tables were supplemented

set of diagrams showing the nature of the retiring search,

and,

a master table for proper selection of the appropriate plan was

To provide for prolonged searching and maximum flexibility in use, the

plans twenty

were calculated for eleven escort speeds

inclusive and such

every

knot from ten to

features as a method of changing speed of forma

tion during search, doubling back of a ship for additional radar search,
etc. were included.

Coincident with the revision of the surface craft search plans the per fection of the technique of barrier patrols of both air and surface craft
was a primary obect of tactical research.

This was another attempt to

insure the localization of U-Boats which had penetrated into restricted

areas or focal

points.

These improvement in tactics were presented in a series of articles in the Anti-Submarine Bulletin in the Fall of 1944 while an extensive revision of FTP 223 to incoporate these, and other changes,

was underway.

On 1 January 1945 "United States Fleet Anti-Submarine and Escort of

Convoy Instructions" (FTP 223A)

was issued to the forces afloat.

A
copy

This

contained the new tactical developments.

of FTP 223 Ais contained in

X3A

Appendix Orange A of this history.

In addition, other tactical ideas which were developed too late to be

were promulgated by weans of the Bulletin. One of included in FTP 223 A these was Operation "Scour," a search

tactic designed to aid in locating

bottomed submarines.

Meanwhile, every effort was being made to improve the technique in use

with existing sonar gear,

on 28 July 1944 a "Tentative Operating Procedure

for Type 1478 Sonar" was issued to the forces afloat.

special

On 22 August a

course was set up at the sound schools to provide training in the

of this new equipment. On 3 October ten synthetic
On 12 October BuAer was

operation and maintenance

shore trainers for type 147 training were ordered.

directed to produce and distribute copies of the British training file on

this gear.

On 2 October 1944 ASDevLant was directed to produce QFL recordings

displaying the effects of FIR gear ranging technique

so that recorder

operation and

echo

in the presence of FIR interference could be improved.

WPC4623E/NQVBI

54

On 21 November 1944 a conference

attempt

was held at Aangaso Eledctric Co. to

complete Shipboard

to expedite

the production of a

Anti-Submarine

Attack Teacher aboard ship.

(SASAT Type B)

which would insure a high state of training

The limitations of shore training were will know.

In parti

cular, it was difficult to insure the presence

of commanding officers or

executive officers at shore based training activities during the press of

other duties attendant upon United availability.
by a

This would be eliminated

true SASAT.

Some progress was made on this device, a report being

but the anti-submarine was in the

received from BuShips on 1 February 1945,

Atlantic ended before the device could be perfected.

development in

It was still under

the summer of 1945 after TENTH Fleet was dissolved.

On 17 August 1944 a conference was held with representatives

to expedite the production of training courses

of BuPers

for sonar men.

10125)

On 12 January

1945 the course "Sonar man 3/c and 2/c" forces afloat,
superseding

(NavPers

was issued to the

Sound Operators Handbook

(1942).

Copy for "Sonar man 1/c and Chief"

was approved in the Spring of 1945 and

its publication was

expected by 1 August.

On 17 August 1944 a memorandum was submitted outlining the unsatisfac

tory performance

of the QFG SASAT (Type

A).

This device was capable of use

with only certain types of sonar gear and did not develop an automatic range

rate.

Steps

were taken to remedy these defects of the QFG by means of a

The units retained at the factory were modified Kits were dis

simple modification device.

and kits prepared for modifying these already distributed.

fHh

tributed in the summer of 1945.

As a result of this Modification the QFG The policy on distribution escorts.

had been made completely portable.

gear provided a reasonably

This

satisfactory

inter in SASAT pending the develop

ment of the SASAT

Type

B.

By aid-summer

of 1944 it seemed possible that the German war night end reduction of

at any time, hence plans were fornulgated for an appropriate

anti-submarine activities in the Atlantic.

A conference between officers

and

fron OinCLant's staff and TENTH Fleet was held at CominCh headquarters
shortly thereafter,

on 18 August, the guiding policy was outlined in the

letter "Action with Respect the Defeat of Germany."

to Anti-Submarine Activities in the Atlantic on

A copy of this serial is contained in Appendix

Green F of this

history.

Details of the plan were contained in two enclosures:

(A)

Plan for

Reduction of Anti-Submarine Surface Training Activities in the Atlantic, and

(B)

Plan for Reduction of Anti-Submarine Aircraft Squadrons in the Atlantic.

UPC4623E/NOVBI

55

In broad outline the plan provided for the following:

(a)

GinCLant to continue Boca Chica and Quonset Area

(rocket ranges

at

both places) for Anti-Submarine and other air training as necessary

to

satisfy Pacific

Fleet requirements.

(b) Continue

ASDevLant but reduce personnel.

(c)

Abolish ASWIS at Boston and transfer refresher training of A/S

specialists

and instructors at the sound shcools.

(d)

Reduce Fleet Sound School* Key West, from three unit basis to two
units and later to one.

(c) Reduce

IG training establishment
center)

at Bermuda (which had been the to accord with reductions in the DE

principal DE shakedown building progreess.

(f)

Reduce anti-submarine
the basic course.

instruction at NTC, Miami, to that given in

The enclosures

(A) and (B)

set forth in detail the surface and air activi

ties which were to be reduced.

Because of the prolonging of the German war the plan was put into effect more gradually than was at first anticipated; however, it formed the outline

s S A

of the reduction which was

accomplished.

On IS January 1945 the Attack Teacher Training Unit Plan was revised and
personnel allotted on the basis of the needs

of each unit.

Throughout

the

Fall and Winter there was a gradual decommissioning ASATTU's in accordance with the enclosure
(A)

of a nunber of these

of the basic reduction plan.

In November of 1944 ASWIS was closed and the training of A/S specialists
and instructors transferred to the sound schools.

On 19 April 1945 Fleet Sonar School, Key West, was directed to reduce to a two unit basis by 1 June.

On 11 Kay it was directed that a further reduc

by 1 July.

tion to a one unit basis be accomplished

When the reduction of anti-submarine in 1944 plans were at the same

training in the peace virtually non-existent

trainng

was being
improve

accomplished

late

time formulated to

anti-submarine

time naval establishment.

Such training had been

in the pre-war education of reserve officers in the

To one who was conversant
with

NROTC and regular officers at the Academy. the amount of anti-submarine

training which was necessary,

and actually

given during the war, this situation

seems very strange indeed.

The peace

WPC4623E/NOVBI

56

time training of officers in any one aspect

sarily seen quite then in comparison

of naval science

will neces
given under

with specialized courses

the urgency of war. But such training as is given in peace

emphasize

tine should

fundamentals

in all aspects

of naval warfare in a proportion which

during

bears a reasonable

approximation

to the distribution of effort needed

war. The conclusion is incapable that naval officer education prior to the war was designed with a very inadequate understanding
importance of anti-submarine operations.

of the scope and

should,

Although major importance

of course,

be attached to gunnery instruction, among other things? neverthe

less, it should be realized that the battle of the Atlantic was fought
essentially by ships which rarely mounted a gun larger than the 3V50, with
and, moreover,

out a director;
importance

the use of these guns was of distinctly minor

in the tactical employment of these ships.

The Navy's deficiency

in anti-submarine

air training prior to the war use, if possible, even more

striking and has been mentioned elsewhere.

After prolonged efforts by officers of TENTH Fleet some progress

was

made toward the incorporation of at least minimum anti-submarine

the NROTC program.

training in

As activities of the Operational Training Commanders

available,

were reduced and some attack teachers became

these were set aside

with a view to installing one at each NROTC unit.

On 11 Hay ConTENTHFIt informed BuFers that additional equipments were available for assignment
to NROTC units and on 19 July BuFors addressed a

letter to all of these units outlining the nature and use of the attack teacher and requesting advice concerning space available at each college to

xU

determine the

possibility of

installation.

Although progress was thus made by the summer of 1945 in introducing

this training gear into the college program,

concerning

very little had yet been done

the details of its use, the amount of training to be given with

it, or the integration of this training with the traditional parts of the

NROTC program.

A copy of the BuFors letters is contained in Appendix Blue ROTC of this

history.

In May 1945 just prior to its dissolution officers of TENTH Fleet

revised some of the anti-submarine revision USF-108. The screens

screens in USF-10A for inclusion in the

were brought more into accord with modern screens made more

practice and the use of both the bent line and circular

flexible and at the same time more

precise.

At this time great need was being felt in Pacific operations combined anti-aircraft and anti-submarine
ing ships enemy

for a

screen which would permit screen

to rotate at a reasonable speed about slow, crippled units in

Such screens had to be compatible with the requirements of

waters.

practical seamanship

and reduce station keeping difficulties to a minimum.

WPC4623E/NQVBI

57

Officers of TENTH Fleet designed Around Slow Speed Units."

supplemented
They

these

"Rotating A/A and A/S Screens

were proposed to CinCPac in completed form,

CinCPac concurred in their

by the appropriate general signal.

adoption and the screens

were issued as a change to USF-108.

In Hay 1945 the last "U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine Bulletin" was published.

On 8

Kay

hostilities with Germany ceased.

On 14

Hay

the coastal

convoy system

was abolished.

On 22 Hay the cognizance of A/S publications Readiness.

was transferred

to

On 29 Hay Trans-Atlantic-Hediterraniean
on 4 June the ones

Trade convoys were abolished and

to the United Kingdom were terminated.

On 12 June 1945 TENTH Fleet was dissolved.

A reduced anti-submarine
remaining

unit was set

up

in CominCh Readiness

from the

officers of the TENTH Fleet Anti-Submarine Heasures

Section.

WPC4623E/NOMBI

_Co_

Chapter

It is perhaps pertinent to conclude this history with some brief specu

lations concerning the prospects for anti-submarine
operations

in the future.

A brief history, such as this outline f presents

the appearance

of a

success story.

In a sense this is not

deceptive,

for final victory in the

Atlantic was practical proof of such success.

From this point of view,

however, it is easy to draw the unwarranted conclusion that the future of

the submarine is strictly limited and that anti-submarine

successfully

nwassures

employed

in the past would also prove sufficient in the future.

Such a

conclusion is not valid.

In essence

it may be stated that the submarine was defeated in the

Radar

Atlantic because its classic defense, invisibility, was compromised.

and aircraft in large measure
bility which destroyed

that part of a submarine's

invisi

was a function of darkness or distance on the surface from A/5

craft.

But this had always been the largest part of what might be termed
"invisibility factor."

the submarine's
submerged

The submarine

had been built with a

speed and endurance

which was calculated to be just adequate

to

enable it to move safely outside the range of operations of surface craft

dependent

on sound equipment.

When the largest portion of the "invisibility

factor" was compromised*

this limited submerged endurance proved to be the The enemy was never able to redress
the

Achilles heel of the submarine. balance in time.

58a

On the other
waking

handy at the

close of the war in the Atlantic the enemy was toward increasing that part of the "invisi
only on submergence.

considerable

progress

bility factor" which is dependent

The Schnorchel did

not afford perfect invisibility, of course,

expressed

but if perfect invisibility be

by a

by unity the Schnorchel

did afford invisibility represented

large fraction.

At the close of the war the Germans had in production a U-Boat of

greatly increased Type XXI. It submerged speed and endurance.

This was known as the

was alleged to have an endurance of about an hour at IB knots,

about five or six hours at 10 knots, and at its economical speed of 5-6 knots was really limited by the endurance
days.

of the crew at three or four

operating

These figures are for full submergence

on electric motors.
It will thus be these

These boats were, of courser also equipped with Schnorchel.

seen that, wholly apart from any advantage conferred

boats had submergence
which were defeated.

by Schnorchel,

qualities fully twice as effective

as the U-Boats

In a sense,

the true submarine has not

essentially

yet been

built. The craft which

were defeated were

submersible
standpoint of

torpedo boats whose principal

domain of operation,
type XXI was

from the

timer was the surface,

fcven the

not a true submarine in this sense, but it may well have been
torpedo boats.

the last of the temporary submersible

WPC4663E/NOUBI
59

The future submarine assumed.

may be

nearer realization than is generally

At the end of the war the Germans had developed a type of fuel

known as Ingolene which permitted submerged operation of diesels, the

required oxygen of combustion present being obtained from the two oxygen

atoms
This This fuel

in the hydrogen peroxide constituent

of this novel fuel.

brought the ideal of

a closed cycle engine a step near reality.

experimental

had been used to operate a thirty ton

U-Boat.

It is probable that the true submarine

closed, or approximately
closed,

may

be developed with some

cycle engine and with

a Schnorchel as emer
speeds.

gency equipment or for use in making very high underwater

It may be
to

that with such a boat surface performance will be entirely subordinated

submerged operation. performance

which will be the typical and routine manner of

Against such submarines

aircraft will probably be much less effective

expected
f

than in 1943.

Surface craft may be

to be the primary weapon

against such an enemy. equipment and techniques

It is essential

however

, that

surface craft have

far in advance of anything in prospect in 1945.

In retrospect

one can see how little advance

in basic search

techniques

have been made.

gives essentially
Yet,

The QGB or QJA sonar gear with which the Atlantic war ended the same range as the QC gear with which the war began.
search and

as between the two problems of anti-submarine

attack* the

former is basically much the more difficult.

<?A

Basic research in all parts of the vibration spectrum should be vigor

ously prosecuted

for its bearing on the search and detection problems.

It

is necessary

to free our minds of all preconceptions

about directionality,
explore

if attenuation limits results at high frequencies* and bilities.

other

possi

It may be that the problem of search and the problem of attack

gear, possibly in

should not be solved with the same gear p but with separate
separate ships.

The "hunter-killer" groups of 1943-44 probably foreshadow

the use of coordinated groups combining search elements and attack elements. There is no essential

reason why such a group should combine

The essential consideration is a combi
appropriate

exactly those elements

of 1943-44.

nation of localization and attack

to the new situation.

It is necessary
\

to be on the alert against the accumulated prestige of one post war plan for the Navy envisages the use of
destroyers

past methods.

Already

only four destroyer

escorts and two

with an escort carrier an an

A/5 force. Yet on 10 January 1944 CinCLant was instructed of the desira
bility of increasing escorts convoys.

with the CVE's even at the expense of the

Actually, in the final battles of the Atlantic

war an average of

ten destroyer excorts per carrier were employed, for against U-Boats having
high submerged speeds

it is essential to have surface craft within very

close range of any contact by aricraf t, and further, against deeply

submerged targets

the true attack unit is not one ship, but at least two,

and preferably three.

WPC4663E/NQMBI
60

There

nay be a

lesson for our own submarines

Our own submarines

in the experience

of the

Atlantic U-Boat war.

are not essentially

different from

the U-Boats which were decisively beaten.

Without detriment to the valor

it may be said that

and skill of the officers and nen of our own submarines much of their success

has been due to the utter inadequacy of Japanese

Against modern

an ti -submarine measures and industrial production capacity.

anti-submarine

measures

our own submarines are probably

already obsolete.

Our anti-submarine
Russians,

measures are known in detail by the British, the

Their main the Japanese.

and to a lesser degree by a host of other nations.

by

features are probably known by the Germans and possibly

Time and industrial limitations will probably not permit the Japanese
profit from whatever they may now know.

to

We may not always be this fortunate.

WPC4663E/NQVBI

61

UNITED STATES FLEET

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT.
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

CJLB-QJLILL-Q-GJC
27 June 1941 Memorandum for Chief of Naval Operations on "Present State of Training of U.S. Fleet in Torpedo Fire* Depth Charge Attacks* and Mine Planting."
Buships letter to CoTndt Navy Yard Boston outlined charac teristics of Destroyer Escort vessel.

29 July 1941 25 Aug. 1941 2? Aug 1941

Conference byp BuShips

design agency

for

wit Destroyftscorts.

Gihbej?

& Cox Co. to act as

BuShips received requisition No. 4271 from the United Kingdom requesting 100 Destroyer Escort vessels of U. S. Navy design.

27 Aug 1941 3 Oct 1941 7 Oct 1941

U-570 captured by British aircraft as H.H.S. Graph). POO-PIO course established

(test

ship later known

at sound schools. to cooperate with Libra-

Search.

"Computer scope Co. in development of an attack director: for Determining Point for Depth Charge Release after Sound
M

West Coast Sound School directed

17 Oct 1941
28 Oct 1941 31 Oct 1941

First routing directive issued to U.S. Me rchant me n under title "Routing of American Flag Merchant Shipping."

BuAer directed to
Buord directed

prepare

training film "Supersonic

and Depth Charge Attacks by

Destroyers.//'

Search

to investigate possibility of using service torpedoes running at submergence down to 200 feet in attacking submerged submarine.
(op3B-0) established under Ship (This may be considered the

18 Nov 1941

Convoy and Routing Section

Novemente Division in CNO. birthday of C&R.)

WPC4BI9E/DECBI

26 Nov 1941

Depth charge allowance

of DD's increased

from 42 to 66.
by 1 July

5 Dec 1941

Joint Navy-NDRC conference on selection and training of

sound wen estimated 3600 new sound men needed

1942.
7 Dec 1941 11 Dec 1941 15 Dec 1941
Japanese

attacked

Pearl Harbor.

NDRC committee authorized to visit Fleet Sound School r Key West* to implement decisions of conference of 5 December.
(UPSC-46)"

Instructions."

16 Dec 1941 19 Dec i 941

"Principal Navy Shipping Control Plan, Rainbow Ho. 5 superseded "Navy Shipping Control General

Depth charge allowance of DD's increased of eight patterns of nine charges each.

to provide total

At conference in Washington the Coordinator of Research and Development assigned attack director development to Division 6of NDRC: three types under development (a) Barber-Col eman Triangle Solver (b) Armour Research Founda tion Attack Director (c) General Electric Course Plotter
(future ASAP).
L.

20 Dec 1941 30 Dec 1941

Admiral King was

As of this date
type. )

appointed

CominCh.

total of six anti-submarine attack seven allocated^ and twenty additional (None of the foregoing were Sangamo were being procured.

teachers installed?

6 Feb 1942 7 Feb 1942 S Feb 1942 11 Feb 1942 14 Feb 1942

Coordinator of Research CinClant established

and Development requested NDRC to

develop an expendable radio sono-buoy.
LantASUUnit at Boston.

CominCh directed Sea Frontier commanders to train NROTC students in district craft during summer of 1942.
CominCh directed BuPers to establish a rating for soundmen.

Each Sea Frontier commander directed to assign a liaison officer to LantASUUnit and submit copies of all A/S action reports to that unit. First trials of tilting projector authorized
NOA). (aboard

20 Feb 1942

USS

WPC4BI9E/DECBI
2

22 Feb 1942 27 Feb 1942 1 Mar 1942 1 Mar 1942 2 Mar 1942 5 Mar 1942

Army

Air Officer for liaison at LautftSUlMt requested.

Key

Sound schools ships at General Instructions."

West orgaiized as a squatfcon

tlree "Sandy Andy" type

General Electric Co- manufactured anti-submariie attack teachers.

Admiralty coicurred in world wide raiting agreement "British-United States Routing Agreement" (BUSRA).

Sound school squadron at Key West separated Haval District and placed in ServFortant.

from Seventh

Report of somd schools showed 60 ssend operators graduat ing every three weeks from Key West and 30 every two weeks from San DiefD. These numbers statei to be insufficient. desigt sono-buoy demonstrate! to Navy. First drop Mark I blimp on 3 April. Accepted amd being manufactured from a by June 1942.
Captain Baker of LantASUUnit requested Coordinator of Research and Development to establish an analytical md

12 Mar 1942

16 Mar 1942

statistical research organization at LantASUUnit usiis facilities of NDRC. (This was origii of ASWQRG.)
18 Mar 1942 24 Mar 1942 7 April 1942 10 April 1942 11 April 1942 12 April 1942

Admir)eal Kins was appointed CominCh and CNO.

CominCh disapproved BuPers tional sound schools.

available

proposal to establish

addi

Coast Guard informed no anti-submariae

for their activities.

attack

teachers

First afloat test of Projector Mark 20 (Mousetrap) authorized tc take place at Key West.
Ships of West Coast Sound School

organized as a squairon

but left under ComEieven.

reports

Anti-submariie warfare unit established at CominCh \tead quarters in S&adines. Commands aflsat directed to submit
and recommendations to this unit.
charged ith developing

13 April 1942

ASW unit of ComEestSeaFron

for PC's.

tactics

WPC4BI9E/DECBI

21 April 1942 6 Hay 1942 10 May 1942 14 May 1942 15 May 1942 19 May 1942

Projector Hark 20 (Mousetrap) authorized

for HO 1 SC's.

Rear Admiral Claude Block proposed combined airsurface

offensive in U-boat transit areas.

Inadequacy

Block's

of small A/S craft in implementing Admiral

A/S attacks

proposal pointed out.

Assessment Committee to evaluate at CominCh Headquarters.

Convoy and Routing transferred

established

from CNO to CominCh as F-37

Important early conference at Hew London on new material developments: TMGr BDI, MTB, and Scanning Sonar viewed in "mock-up" and idea of a console type stack approved. Preliminary design for a towed depth charge completed.

23 May 1942 25 May 1942 27 May 1942 3 June 1942 3 June 1942 5 June 1942 9 June 1942

ASWORG established at CominCh Unit of Readiness.

Headquarters

as part of ASW

Barher-Coleman
Results

computer

disappointing.

tested at

Sangamo Electric Co.

First of Primary Bearing Trainers, designed by NDRCy completed by RCA. Twenty additional ordered. First training recordings (excerpts from British origi nals) under preparation at NRL Anacostia. BuOrd announced that the "pear shaped" depth charge has been developed. or "tear drop"

ft

BuOrd directed to proceed with production of Hark 9 Depth Charges with view of ultimately replacing all stern
dropped

"ash can"

type.

11 June 1942 20 June 1942 23 June 1942

CominCh refused request of ComEleven for submarine and 1

HO SC to develop "Mousetrap" tactics. Some attack teachers for tenders training activities. re-allocated to shore

Decision made to distribute Sound Operators Handbook from CominCh Headquarters as well as from West Coast Sound School

UPC4BI9E/DECBI

23 June 1942 1 July 1942

Development by NRL of a towed echo repeater announced as completed.

target

Convoy and Routing assumed full responsibility for the policy of routing* reporting* and evasive diversion in

US

areas. 1 July 1942

ComSerForLant

and CoroGulfSeaFron directed to develop "Mousetrap" tactics in conjunction with Sub Chaser Train ing Center* Miami* and Fleet Sound School* Key West.

9 July 1942

"Information Bulletin No. 14-- Anti-Submarine Warfare" prepared by LantASWUnit issued by CominCh to forces afloat. Superseded Fleet Training Information Bulletin's No. 2, 3, 4, 5 and US Fleet Information Bulletin No. 10.
Tests made on linked depth charges.
satisfactory.

11 July 1942 12 July 1942

Results not
>

Memorandum Committee

"Possible Recommendatiions
on."

Comments

for Assistant Chief of Staff

(Readiness)

on

of Joint New Weapons

15 July 1942

First test afloat of BDI (then known as Dr. Kingdon's Course Plotter) on USS SEMMES off New London against friendly submarine. Results: successful. Production of sonar operations: at San Diego 15 per week. at Key West 53 per

20 July 1942 10 Aug 1942 12 Aug 1942 15 Aug 1942

week*

Instruction in Ship's Magnetic Submarine Detector included in course at sound schools. Procurement of Mark 24 mine assigned
top priority

(SHSD)

"Sound Operators Handbook*" published by West Coast Sound School* adopted as standard by CominCh.
"Mousetrap" live ammunition test conducted

19

Aug

1942

off Key West.

23 Aug 1942

Procurement of forty (40) additional SangamD Attack Teachers directed. Issue of all Mark 17 aircraft depth bombs with 25 foot
depth springs

23 23

Aug 1942

installed directed

(CominCh

serial

01938).

Aug 1942

Issue of the Mark 24 hydrostatic of 25 feet directed.

fuse with depth setting

WPC4BI9E/DECBI

S~

24 Aug 1942 6 Sep 1942

Attack teacher

distribution reviewed and altered.

First six ASAP's completed by General Electric Co- and allocated. Five on training ships and one to Naval Gui Factory for tests with Hedgehog. Results of research and development on "Mousetrap" and BDI communicated to the British. Distribution and use of British training films on ASW
authorized.
Training of Brasilian officers and men at SCTC authorized.

8 Sep 1942

11

Sep

1942

15 Sep 1942 15 Sep 1942 15 Sep 1942 22 Sep 1942 26 Sep 1942

Miamir
first

NDRC

designed Advanced Bearing Trainer completed and twenty allocated to the sound schools. by

New form for "Report of Anti-Submarine" Action distributed to forces afloat. Tests of A/S Projector Hark 10 SEMMES authorized. First CUE
(Hedgehog)

f
;J
\i

Aircraft"

aboard uSS

assigned to Atlantic A/S operations, USS BOGUE <CVE9)r commissioned* keel having been laid 1 October 1941 and ship launched 15 January 1942.

8 Oct 1942

Conference with Coordinator of Research and Development on Directional Radio Sono-Buoy. Coordinator of Research and
Development
requested

NDRC to develop it.

10 Oct 1942

Material intended for publication in proposed new publica

tion

Craft" (ultimately FTP

examination 12 Oct 1942 15 Oct 1942 20 Oct 1942 29 Oct 1942

"Instructions for Anti-Submarine Warfare Surface

212) forwarded

to LantASUUnit for

and comment.

BuOrd memorandum indicated new Hedgehog pattern of the Mark 11 projector will be more effective than the Mark 10.

"General Instructions to
(GIRO)

Routing and Reporting

Officers*

issued.

First regular A/S conference

held at CominCh

Headquarters.

Special Devices Section of BuAer directed to procure one hundred submerible targets (Squantura Pease target) for (CominCh serial 02658.) training. A/S aircraft

UPC4BI9E/DECBI
6

31 Oct 1942

Bureau of Personnel directed to supply officers in train ing as anti-submarine warfare instructors in accordance with plan of LantASWUnit. (CominCh serial 02685.) First operating model of the console demonstrated.
type

20 Nov 1942 25 Nov 1942 29 Nov 1942 1 Dec 1942

stack
Army and Navy

Memorandum for Admiral

projects under

Bellinger

reviewed

development

for aircraft:

A/S operations.

Plans completed for training film on "Mousetrap" to be made in Key West in December.
(FTP 212) issued to forces afloat. This superseded Chapters I and IV of "Information Bulletin No. 14.

"Instructions for Anti-Submarine Warfare

- Surface

Craft

9 Dec 1942 6 Jan 1943 7 Jan 1943 9 Jan 1943 11 Jan 1943 13 Jan 1943 13 Jan 1943 17 Jan 1943 17 Jan 1943 20 Jan 1943

Twelve PBY-5 or PBY-5A directed equipped laith search light (CominCh serial 03059) and suitable tactics developed.
Armour Research Foundation Depth Charge Course Predictor scheduled for tests at Key West. Mark 24 mine scheduled for service test about 1 February.

CinCLant and CinCPac directed to establish operational < CominCh serial 112) training commands.
Development of the

"escort of
serial

convoy

animated
aircraft

game

board"

abandoned. An additional
(Device 7-H)

(CominCh

0112)

one hundred submersible

targets

ordered

procured.

Program for training aircraft radiomen in sono-buoy opera

tion established.
Training procedure

(CominCh

serial

0146)

for use with Squantuin

- Pease

target

issued.
Development of lights and slick markers as integral parts of sono-buoy cancelled.

First Destroyer Escort, USS BRENNAN (DE-13), commissioned at Navy Yard, Mare Island, Keel having been laid 28 February 1942 and ship launched 22 August 1942.

WPC4BI9E/DECBI

21 Jan 1943 22 Jan 1943

Memorandum for Captain Moon on relative priority of A/S materiel development. "Characteristics of Enemy Submarines" (FTP 213) based on H.H.S. Graph (ex U-570) superseded Information Bulletin No. 9 "Elementary Notes on Submarines" and Chapter IIof Information Bulletin No. 14 "Anti-Submarine Warfare." Atlantic Fleet ASU Officer directed to test the "direct

24 Jan 1943 2 Feb 1943 3 Feb 1943 15 Feb 1943 17 Feb 1943 1 Mar 1943 9 Mar 1943

attack"

using hedgehog

projectiles.

Further development directed toward placing sonic detec (CominCh serial 0347) tion gear in aircraft cancelled. Air Anti-Submarine Developement Detachment (CominCh serial 0429)

established
for use in

BuAer directed to test and evaluate helicopters (CominCh & CNO serial 0477) A/S operations. Attack teacher
BDI, DRT, and ASAP

modernization program to incorporate to (CominCh serial 0492) authorized.

by

"Doctrine for Anti-Submarine Warfare

to forces afloat.
Army requested

Aircraft" issued

contract
late in 15 Mar 1943

OSRD to develop radio sono-buoy under Army (Army participation in this development ended

1943).

Coordinator of Research and Development requested to arrange with NDRC for development of countermeasures to the acoustic torpedo "with the highest priority." (CominCh serial 0765)

20 Mar 1943 2 April 1943 2 April 1943 6 April 1943

Procurement
Trainer

(SASAT A)

of NDRC designed Shipboard Sonar Operator directed.

SCTCf Miami f directed to assume cognizance of preparation and revision "Submarine Chaser and Escort Vessel Manuals."
Delivery of aircraft
(CominCh

searchlight assigned

AAA priority.

serial

0974)

Assistant Chief of Staff Anti-Submarine F-3(B) appointed at CominCh Headquarters.

WPC4BI9E/DECBI
8

13 April 1943
,15 April 1943

(Replaced by Film "General Convoy Procedure" requested. "Anti-Submarine Measures" on 8 November 1943.)

CinCLant directed to set up general project on Might <CominCh Illumination for Aircraft Attacks on Submarines.
serial 01117)

23 April 1943
May 1943

Memorandum from Rear Admiral Low to Admiral "Appreciation of A/S Situation".

Basic Directive for Sound Schools issued.

King on

1 May 1943 1 May 1943 4 May 1943 9 May 1943

"Tentative Instructions A/S Projector Mark 20 and Mark 22 (Mousetrap)" issued to forces afloat. Coordinator of Research
develop Range Recorder

3nd Development Teacher (QFL).

requested

OSRD to

Helicopter evaluation extended participation in the project.

so as to include British

BuPers directed to retain A/S personnel in activities concerned with A/S operations and training. (CominCh and CNO serial 2898)

12 May 1943 18 May 1943 18 May 1943

Revised Anti-Submarine Attack Teacher Training Unit Plan

outlined.
(CominCh

serial

01465)

Installation of A/S Projector Mark 22 (Double Bank "Mousetrap") on twelve destroyers authorized. TENTH Fleet established at 1200Z on 20 May announced CominCh dispatch 182307.
by

19

May 1943

(This Directive on "Anti-Submarine Measures" promulgated. was the basic outline for the work of the A/S Measures section of TENTH Fleet)

20 May 1943 22 May 1943

TENTH Fleet established Procurement of Practice serial 01586)

at 1200Z this date. Attack Meters directed.

(CominCh

31

May 1943

First CUE task group organized as TG 21.12 with USS BOGUE and Court Div 1. Ordered about 30N-35W.
First issue of monthly "United States Fleet Anti-Submarine

June 1943

Bulletin."

WPC4BI9E/DECBI

7 June 1943

Expeditious development
velocity serial 01791)

and test of the "3 inch high forward shooting rocket" directed. <CominCh
exchange

14 June 1943 23 June 1943 26 June 1943 29 June 1943

Admiral King proposed

of B-24 airplanes between

II) developed

the Army and the Navy. for training

Device 7-K-2 (Analattack Hark pilots in air A/S operations.

"Escort of
afloat.

Convoy

Instructions"
and

(FTP 215)

issued to forces

Transfer of
completed.

Convoy

Routing to

TENTH Fleet as FX-37

July

1943

Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of OSRD, directed ASUORG became a part of TENTH Fleet A/S Measured^Section. Admiral King endorsed Dr. Bush's directive of 7 July and ASI4ORG became a part of TENTH Fleet A/S Heasured Section.

9 July 1943 10 July 1943 12 July 1943

Installation of bathythermograph each escort division directed.

equipment

in two ships of
03386)

(CominCh serial

Admiral King's memorandum to Chief of Staff* U.S. Army on "Anti-Submarine Air Operations" suggested a plan for the Navy to take over Army Anti-Submarine Air Development
program.

13 July 1943 23 July 1943 27 July 1943 28 July 1943 29 July 1943 18 Aug 1943

Installation of Hedgehog Hark 11 instead of Hark 10 (CominCh serial 02325) authorized.

Agreements with Army on anti-submarine (CominCh serial 02463) summarized.
(ComAirASDvLant

development

program

Tactics to use with aircraft searchlights

formulate

serial

082)

Anti-Submarine Material Program Priorities established. <Cominch and CNO serial 001499) Directive for TENTH Fleet promulgated (CominCh and CNO serial 02561)
to US Fleet.

OSRD authorized Columbia University Division of War Research to develop Recorder Trace Projector.

WPC4BI9E/DECBI
10

20 Aug 1943

range Slant range correction plates (paper facsimile) for Mark depth charges recorders issued to forces afloat for (CominCh serial 02851) 6, 7f7 f 8, 9, Mousetrap and Hedgehog-

20 Aug 1943 21 Aug 1943 9 Sep 1943

Procurement of one hundred General Electric Co- aircraft

searchlights

directed.

(CominCh serial 02865)

Further
installation of Ships Magnetic Submarine Detector (SMSD) halted. (CominCh serial 02882)
"Instructions for The A/S Projector Mark 10 and Mark 11
(Hedgehog)" issued to forces afloat.

Special Devices Section directed to undertake the development of a towable underwater target for training in use of rocket projectiles by aircraft.

13

Sep

1943

1 Oct 1943

US Fleet Anti-Submarine Instructions (FTP 219)" issued to forces afloat. This superseded FTP 212 and "Doctrine for .Anti-Submarine Warfare by Aircraft."
H

14 Oct 1943 16 Oct 1943 19 Oct 1943 21 Oct 1943 26 Oct 1943 30 Oct 1943 4 Nov 1943

First revision of A/S materiel program.

002232)

(CominCh

serial

Bureau of Aeronautics

established.

(BuAer

Anti-Submarine Warfare Committee

planning directive 80-A-43)

Basic letter outlining forward

firing rocket progress (CominCh serial 03591)
issued.

Immediate procurement
serial
002280)

of FXR gear directed.

(CominCh

Production directed.

of a training film on forward firing rockets

(CominCh serial 03706)

Assignment of surface craft projects at ASDevLant (ComTENTHFIt Serial 03740)

made.

ComAirLant outlined shore facilities to be used in support (ComAirLant serial of forward firing rocket program.
02267)

5 Nov 1943 5 Nov 1943

First recorder trace projector unit demonstrated and .Sound Lahoratoryr New London. Conversion of PCS type craft to sonar school (CominCh serial 03815)
ships directed.

at Radio

training

UPC4BI9E/DECBI
11

6 Nov 1943 7 Nov 1943 8 Nov 1943 22 Nov 1943

CinCPac organized Pacific A/S training under ComDesPac.

(CinCPac

serial

02686)

ComAirLant outlined the rocket projectile

(ComAirLant serial 02298)

program.

Procurement
Conference

of twenty sound
(CominCh

range recorder
7382)

trace projector

units directed

serial

between TENTH Fleet, BuShips, BuPers, VCNO, CinCLantr and Fleet Sound Schools, at which it was agreed that sonar maintenance was to be a responsibility of the
radio technician rate. Letter from Chief of Division 3, NDRC, to BuOrd emphasized need of expanded facilities for manufacturing rocket
propellant.

3 Dec 1943

7 Dec 1943

Memorandum from Joint Staff Planners to Joint Logistics Committee states "urgent Military need exists for granting priorities to facilitate the production of rockets."
Development
ing

11 Dec 1943 14 Dec 1943

directed.

of a sub-caliber rocket ammunition for train (CominCh serial 04187)

ASDevLant directed to test "Squid" and depth determining gear aboard H.H.S. Hadleigh Castle. (ComTENTHFIt serial
002746)

15 Dec 1943 23 Dec 1943 31 Dec 1943

Development of acoustic Grenade Mark 1 cancelled. (CominCh serial 002762) ated as inadequate.

Evalu

Installation of SMSD in
because

ships of Pacific Fleet reduced of poor performance of that gear.

ASAP sent to Sangamo Electric Co. for use in developing the Attack Aids Adapter Unit for Attack Teachers. (CominCh serial 04397) Conference
torpedo.

4 Jan 1944 10 Jan 1944

at ASDevLant on countermeasures

to the acoustic

CinCLant informed of desirability of increasing the number of escorts with a CVE, even if necessary to reduce escorts in convoy screens.

13 Jan 1944

"Wartime Instructions for Merchant Ships"

(WIMS) issued.

WPC4BI9E/DECBI
12

14 Jan 1944 19 Jan 1944

Production of a
serial Surface
0172)

sono-buoy

training film ordered,

(CominCh

craft projects at ASDevLant revised and countermeasures to the acoustic torpedo given top priority.

<ComTENTHFIt serial

0256)

20 Jan 1944 31 Jan 1944 5 Feb 1944 8 Feb 1944 13 Feb 1944

Routing Instructions" principal Pacific routing directive. as

"Mercantile Pacific

(MPCRI)

issued

A/S Material Program revised.

<CominCh serial

004)

Procurement of "Squid" and associated sonar (CominCh .serial 00377) on US ship directed.

gear

for test

Memorandum from Sangamo Electric Co. outlined details of attack teacher modernization program. ComTENTHFIt announced policy that "no further investigation of new or proposed anti-submarine attack side" be initiated. <ComTENTHFIt serial 0521)
OSRD informed by Rear Admireal Low of desirability of keeping ASUORG intact.
range correction plates for recorder for Depth Charges Mark 9 Mod 2, Mark 11 and Mark 12, forwarded. CominCh serial 0654)

19 Feb 1944 22 Feb 1944

Slant

<

28 Feb 1944 Mar 1944 4 Mar 1944 9 Mar 1944

"Operating Plan for the United States Merchant trol Service" (MERI) issued.

Ship Con

Recorder" issued.

CominCh publication "Operation of the Sonar

Range

Tactics to use against German Search Receiver issues forces afloat.

to

CominCh serial 0856 stated that tests of "Mousetrap" on twelve destroyers had
shown them to be an unsatisfactory installation for this type craft and authorized removal.

15 Mar 1944 15 Mar 1944

FIR

gear

tried at sea
Sangamo

by CTF 62.

Conference at
unit.

Electric Col. on Attack Aids Adapter

WPC4BI9E/DECBI
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1 April 1944 6 April 1944

Procur -fluent of one thousand

(CominCh

radio sono-buoys directed.

serial

01116)

Installation of
directed.

"Squid" in USS ASHEVILLE (PFI) for

test

(CominCh

serial

01175)

16

April

1944

Contracts for additional Shipboard Sonar Operator Trainers

(CominCh serial 2903) Type A) ordered cancelled. (SASAT
Development of SASAT serial 2904)

16 April 1944 20 April 1944

-
Type

B ordered expedited.

(CominCh

Noise output of NRL designed FXA (ammonia bottle) found 15 decibels below desired levell MIT designs CO bottle 12
2 decibels too low.

30 April 1944

Ships Magnetic Submarine Detector (SMSD)J pronounced impracticable. Installations ordered stopped and those (CominCh serial 01509) already installed ordered removed. Destroyer Escort USS ENGLAND sank six Japanese submarines using "Hedgehog" during period 19 May to 31 May.

19 May 1944 23 May 1944 26 May 1944

Procurement
directed.

of forty

(40)

sets of 1478 asdic from British

01781)

(CominCh serial

Conference with BuShips on development of a Group Operator Trainer to replace the Advanced Bearing Trainer at the
Sound Schools.

1 June 1944 7 June 1944 16 June 1944 21 June 1944

Instruction"

"United States Fleet Anti-Submarine and Escort of Convoy (FTP 223) superseded FTP 219 and FTP 215.

Procurement of sixty (60) additional 1478 sets directed. (CominCh serial 01976) Busci approved and issued to forces afloat to become effective 1 July in Atlantic north of 35N.
West Coast Sound School directed to forward Coordinated Attack Plotter (COAP) to ASDevLant for evaluation.
(ComTENTHFIt

serial

02143)

July

1944

CO. Submarine Base r New London* requested assistance of personnel experienced in ASU training to assist in revi sion of submarine sonar training. (CO. Sub Base serial
2653)

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11

July

1944

Coordinator of Research and Development requested to assign project on Thermal Wake Detection to appropriate (CominCh serial 02360) agency for development. ASDevLant projects on NRL Ammonia Bottle, Pinwheel and Rotating Barriers, Scatter Depth Charges, Counter-measures to Radar Decoys, and Thermal Wake Detection cancelled.
(ConTENTHTFIt

12 July 1944

serial 02370)

22 July 1944

Procurement
of twenty-five (25) OTE-8 kits adapting QFD Advanced Bearing Trainer to BDI instruction directed.
(CominCh serial 02498) Coordinator of Research and Development requested to (CominCh complete UCDWR SASAT B for test at ASDevLant. serial 02500) "Tentative Board
Operating

22 July 1944

28 July 1944 3 Aug 1944 3 Aug 1944 15 Aug 1944 16 Aug 1944

Procedure

to forces afloat. London.

(CominCh

for Type 1478 Sonar" issued serial 02563)

training at New
5603)

appointed to study
(ComTENTHFIt

submarine sonar

serial

CominCh serial 02641 proposed revision of Basic Directive for Sound Schools and requested comments.
Commands afloat directed to train replacements for factory trained sangamo maintenance men. (CominCh serial 5905)
Convoy and Routing became

merely a distributing agent

for

MPRI. CinCPac authorized referring to C&R.

16 Aug 1944 Conference Conference courses.
retiring search

to change HPRI without first for new

training

with ASWORG outlined requirements plans for surface craft.

17

Aug

1944

with BuPers on sonar operators'

performance of

17 Aug 1944 18 Aug 1944

Memorandum on unsatisfactory

GFG SASAT.

Basic policy on reduction of Atlantic A/S activities out lined in CominCh serial 002359 "Action with Respect to Anti-Submarine Activities in the Atlantic on the Defeat of
Germany."
Training program for 1478 set up at sound schools. (ComTENTHFIt serial 02915)

22 Aug 1944

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27 Aug 1944 4 Sep 1944

Development of starter and stopper for FXR gear assigned (ComTENTHFIt serial 002455) as project at ASDevLant.

Location of Surface Section of ASDevLant transferred to Fort Lauderdale f Florida. (CominCh and CUO serial 002545)

14

Sep

1944

Memorandum comparing comments of sound schools on proposed

revision of basic directive.
Ability to send and receive Morse code on sonar gear at rate of eight words per minute included in requirements for sonarman. (ComTENTHFIt serial 03224)

17 Sep 1944

26

Sep 1944

Last monthly anti-submarine

Headquarters.

conference held at
displaying

2 Oct 1944 2 Oct 1944 3 Oct 1944 12 Oct 1944 1 Nov 1944 21 Nov 1944 27 Nov 1944

ASDevLant directed to produce QFL recordings effects of FXR gear. (ComTENTHFIt 002859) *

COAP's ordered procured and installed on all DD f PF equipped with ASAP. (CominCh serial 03384)

DE and

Procurement of ten type 1478 shore trainers directed. (CominCh serial 002870)
BuAer directed to prepare and distribute copies of train ing film "Type 147 Asdic." (CominCh serial 002971) New Basic Directive for Sound Schools promulgated. (CominCh and CNO serial 03675) Conference at Samgamo Electric Co. on design of SASAT

"B".

BuPers directed to initiate action to provide adequate reliefs for Sangamo maintenance men. (ConTENTHFIt serial
03951)

24 Nov 1944 1 Dec 1944

Joint training of CVE groups and sea frontier forces (CominCh serial 003411) recommended. To implement new Basic Directive for Sound Schools Offi cers' Courses prepared by West Coast Sound School and Enlisted Operators' Courses prepared by Fleet sonar Scholl adopted. (CominCh serial 03993)
Policy on re-distribution of Anti-Submarine Specialists (CominCh serial 03987) and Instructors outlined.

1 Dec 1944

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8 Dec 1944 9 Dec 1944 19 Dec 1944

BuOrd directed to produce Sono Optical Recorder

for test purposes.

ammunition

Operating requirements of SASAT "6" outlined and develop (CominCh serial 04063) ment directed.

CominCh serial 04156 directed that sonarmen and sonarmen strikers be given preliminary code instruction before reporting to the Sound Schools.

1 Jan 1945 12 Jan 1945 12 Jan 1945 15 Jan 1945

"United States Fleet Anti-Submarine and Escort of Convoy Instructions" <FTP 223A) superseded FTP 223.
Operators'

"Sonarman 3/C and 2/C" Handbook".

(NavPers
(CominCh

10125)

superseded
095)

"Sonar
ordered

serial

Hayes submarine sound equipment for helicopters evaluated by ASDevLant. (CominCh serial 0102)
\

Attack teacher and assignment recommended.

00243)

training unit plan of 12 May 1943 revised of personnel on basis of need of each unit (CominCh serial 0118)
program revised. (CominCh

24 Jan 1945 16 Feb 1945 17 Feb 1945 2 Mar 1945

Anti-submarine materiel

serial

ASDevLAnt directed to develop "Self Propelled Schnorchel Target". (ComTENTHFIt serial 00434) Draft of "Instructions for the Operation of the
(147B)" approved.

Anti-Submarine

Depth

Finder

First anti-submarine attack teacher for NROTC college program assigned to Northwestern Unitversity. (CominCh serial 0579) CominCh serial 0833 directed that further investigation of the possibilities of sonic listening be made. BuOrd directed to develop the Sono Optical Recorder (CominCh serial 0834) ammunition.
BuShips directed
operators.

26 Mar 1945 26 Mar 1945 2 Apr 1945 18 Apr 1945

and

to develop a synthetic trainer for QDA (CominCh serial 0913) of German submarines

Plan to facilitate sursender submitted.

WPC4BI9E/DECBI -17

1? Apr 1945

Fleet Sonar School t Key West* directed to reduce to a two (CominCh serial OHIO) unit basis by 1 June.
"Operation of the Anti-Submarine Depth Finder (1471)" (CominCh serial 01117) issued to forces afloat-

20 Apr 1945
21 Apr 1945

Procurement

of 1500 copies of "Tactical Manual on the Operation fo the Courser Finder Mark 111 Mod 0" directed. (ComTENTHFIt serial 01132)

25

Apr 1945

ComASDevLant serial 0031 recommended that a more powerful helicopter be made available and some means of stabilizing
the Hayes gear developed before further tests. Last issue of U.S. Fleet Anti-Submarine A/S Screens for USF 108 revised. Bulletin.

May 1945 May

1945

1 May 1945 8 May 1945 11 May 1945 11 May 1945 14 May 1945 21 May 1945

"Wartime Pacific Routing Instructions" written and distributed by CinCPac* superseded MPRI. Hostilities with Germany cease.
Fleet Sonar School f Key West* directed to reduce to a one unit basis by 1 July. (CominCh serial 0134) ComTENTHFIt serial 01351 outlined to BuPers of A/S training in the NROTC program. Coastal
convoy system abolished.

desirability

personnel into (CominCh and CMO serial 4359) other duties authorized. This cancelled the policy which had been in effect since 9 May 1943.
Cognizance

Ordering of A/S trained and experienced

22 May 1945 29 May 1945 June 1945 4 June 1945 June 1945 12 June 1945

of A/S publication transferred

to CominCh

Readiness. Trans-Atlantic-Mediterranean
Rotating A/A and A/S Screens

trade convoys abolished. for USF 108 designed.

Trans-Atlantic-United

Kingdom convoys abolished.

CominCh dispatch 051538 announced Fleet at 0000Z on 12 June.

dissolution of TENTH

TENTH Fleet dissolved at 0000Z this date. (Atlantic Sea Frontiers revert to status prescribed in General Order No.
213.)

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