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Herausgegeben von
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begründet von
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 VI, 250 Seiten mit 10 Abbildungen und 3 Tabellen

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Günther, Sven;
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 Inhaltsverzeichnis

Band XXXIV 2016

Stephan SEILER; Trier

Agrarwirtschaft und Krisenphänomene des 3. Jh. n.Chr. im Trierer Land .......... 1

Andreas KAKOSCHKE; Osnabrück

Zwei Agrippinenser an der Rhône: Bemerkungen zur Inschrift
CIL XIII 2037 aus Lyon/Lugdunum ................................................................... 31

Tong WU; Changchun

Public Festivals, Political Manipulations and Civil Strife:
Aeneas Tacticus on Rituals and City Defenses .................................................. 41

Patrick REINARD; Trier

Vom Wert der Dinge II: Addenda zu Qualitätsbezeichnungen
und gebrauchten Waren im griechisch-römischen Ägypten .............................. 53

Maria ARGYROU-BRAND; Würzburg

Die Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der frühen spätägäischen Bronzezeit:
der ökonomische Güterhandel in der ägäischen Frühgeschichte ....................... 71

Elisabeth GÜNTHER; Berlin / Changchun

Femaleness Matters: Identity and Identification Processes
in the Severan Dynasty .................................................................................... 113

Johannes DIETHART / Werner VOIGT; Weißenkirchen / Bremen

Zu griechischen Berufsbezeichnungen aus Beinamen, Ortsnamen
und Landmarken vornehmlich in Athos-Urkunden ......................................... 169
VI

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN
Heinz Barta, „Graeca non leguntur“? Zu den Ursprüngen des
europäischen Rechts im antiken Griechenland, Band II/1–2 (Th. Blank) ....... 217

Jan Wolkenhauer, Senecas Schrift De beneficiis und der Wandel

im römischen Benefizienwesen (F. Carlà-Uhink) ............................................. 227

Catherine Apicella / Marie-Laurence Haack / François Lerouxel (eds.),

Les affaires de Monsieur Andreau: économie et société
du monde romain (S. Günther) ........................................................................ 231

Octavian Bounegru, Mercator. Studien zur antiken Wirtschaft

im Pontosgebiet und in der Ägäis (S. Günther) ............................................... 235

Albrecht Matthaei, Münzbild und Polisbild. Untersuchungen zur

Selbstdarstellung kleinasiatischer Poleis im Hellenismus (P. Reinard) ........... 237

Sven Page, Der ideale Aristokrat. Plinius der Jüngere und das
Sozialprofil der Senatoren in der Kaiserzeit (S. Günther) ............................... 241

Lucia Cecchet, Poverty in Athenian Public Discourse. From the Eve

of the Peloponnesian War to the Rise of Macedonia (S. Günther) .................. 244

V. H. Mair / J. Hickman (eds.), Reconfiguring the Silk Road.

New Research on East-West Exchange in Antiquity (S. Günther) ................... 248
 Public Festivals, Political Manipulations and Civil Strife:
Aeneas Tacticus on Rituals and City Defenses*

Tong Wu
(Changchun)

The favorable connections between ancient Greek rituals and politics have long
been celebrated by classicists. Religious rituals such as festivals and mysteries
were seen as venues of civic cohesion and social value.1 However, what happe-
ned in 415 BC Athens may tell us a different story, and the case itself, as I try to
illustrate, may be more representative in certain ways than we usually think. He-
rewith, it is the aim of this paper first to briefly approach the political implications
of the Eleusinian and Herms affair of that year, then to make a further discussion
of relevant literary sources to shed more light on the connection between rituals
and political disturbances,2 at last focusing on the responses and solutions regar-
ding this matter by Aeneas Tacticus, a military author of 4th century BC, in his
treatise On the Defense of Fortified Positions (Π λὶ κῦ π μ ξλὴ πκζδκλεκυηΫθκυμ
θ Ϋξ δθ).3

*
The article emerged from fruitful discussion within the research seminar «Colloquium
Classicum» at the Institute for the History of Ancient Civilizations (IHAC), Northeast Nor-
mal University, Changchun. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Sven Günther for his support
and improving the article.
1
E.g. Chr. Sourvinou-Inwood, What is Polis Religion?, in: R. Buxton (ed.), Oxford Read-
ings in Greek Religion, Oxford 2000, 13–37; ead., Further Aspects of Polis Religion, in:
ibid., 38–55; generally on rituals and civic cohesion, see also Ed. Muir, Civic Ritual in Re-
naissance Venice, London 1981, passim; contra, i.e. against a connection between Athenian
religion and democratic ideology, cf. H. S. Versnel, Religion and Democracy, in: W. Eder
(ed.), Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr. Vollendung oder Verfall einer
Verfassungsform? Akten eines Symposiums 3.–7. August 1992 Bellagio, Stuttgart 1995,
367–387.
2
For this connection in late archaic Athens, see also W. R. Connor, Tribes. Festivals and
Processions; Civic Ceremonial and Political Manipulation in Archaic Greece, JHS 107
(1987), 40–50; Connor, however, concludes with a positive correlation between political
manipulations and civic communication.
3 Regarding the precautions and regulations during public festivals in Aeneas Tacticus, cf.
also K. Trampedach, Hierosylia: Gewalt in Heligtumern, in: G. Fischer / S. Moraw (ed.),
Die andere Seite der Klassik. Gewalt im 5. und 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr. Kulturwissenschaft-
liches Kolloquium Bonn, Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
11.–13. Juli 2002, Stuttgart 2005, 143–165, here: 152–154. Trampedach provides an analy-
sis of the Argive stasis and the protective measures by Chios during festivals in Aen. Tact.
42

In 415 BC, on the very last day before the Athenian armada sailed out for the
fatal expedition in Sicily, the people of Athens woke up in the morning and found
that all statues of Hermes were knocked down (Thuc. 6.27.1). Most of the citizens
were immediately immersed in the fear of such a bad omen and profanation while
more political minds worried about an aristocratic conspiracy to be behind that
(Thuc. 6.27.3). Although no one was convicted to be the culprit yet, some fo-
reigners and servants came up to accuse certain young men as the criminals of an
outrageous mocking of the Eleusinian Mysteries, among them the general Alcibia-
des (Thuc. 6.28.1). Due to his aristocratic image and frank ambition, Alcibiades’
political opponents did not take much pain to convict him.4 He was sentenced to
death in absentia as the offender of two serious sacrileges after the fleet had alrea-
dy arrived at Sicily (Thuc. 6.53.1).
In order to understand the hysteria of that exceptional “witch hunting” and
the dramatic conviction of Alcibiades, scholars have devoted themselves to find
symbolic correlations between this asebeia affair and Athenian democracy: such
as the questions of how the statues of Hermes functioned in public life or to what
extent the mocking of the Eleusinian Mysteries undermined civic authority.5 Ho-
wever, we can easily find more “secular,” i.e. political implications in Thucydides’
History: although two sacrileges were artificially linked up by the political rivals
of Alcibiades, and a massive investigation on the Eleusinian affair was carried
out, no definite evidence for the vandalism on Hermes’ statues was found (Thuc.
6.27.2), which betrayed the overenthusiastic accusation by Alcibiades’ slanderers.
Besides, the historian informs us, that when Alcibiades demanded an immediate
trial, it was his enemies who prevented exactly that to happen. The struggle over
the “true” course of actions gave way to political manipulations. Indeed we find

17, and draws considerative conclusions, which form a profound basis for the detailed
interpretation here. See also his comprehensive list of acts of violence during Greek rituals,
ibid., 160–162.
4
On the Athenian aristocratic networks of that time, cf. J. F. McGlew, Politics on the Mar-
gins: The Athenian “Hetaireiai” in 415 B.C., Historia 48 (1999), 1–22; on the ambition of
Alcibiades, cf. St. Forde, The Ambition to Rule: Alcibiades and the Politics of Imperialism
in Thucydides, New York 1989; regarding the aristocratic connections of Alcibiades, cf. D.
Gribble, Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation, Oxford 1999, 81.
5
Cf. N. Evans, Civic Rites: Democracy and Religion in Ancient Athens, London 2010,
131–169. On the Herms statues and Athenian politics, see J. Cr. Quinn, Herms, Kouroi and
the Political Anatomy of Athens, G&R 54 (2007), 82–105; on the sacrilegious affairs and
Athenian generation issues, see also B. S. Strauss, Fathers and Sons in Athens: Ideology
and Society in the Era of the Peloponnesian War, London 1993, 16.
 43

the Athenian demos being oversensitive6 to protect its civic unity, but this very
mentality as well opened the door for factionalism and abuse, which finally resul-
ted in the unity of polis being dissolved.
The sacrilegious affair underlines the vulnerability of political figures while
facing religious accusations. According to Andocides, not only he, the orator him-
self, was convicted; among the alleged criminals there was also a brother of Nicias
(Andoc. 1.35). This shows us that a lot of influential politicians in Athens were
involved. Moreover, we are informed by Plutarch that when Alcibiades returned
from exile seven years later, “the moment of his return” (ὁ μ εαγσ κυ εαδλσμ)
(Plut. Alc. 34.1) coincided with the ritual of the Plynteria, a day which was re-
garded by the Athenians as the unluckiest for all kind of business. Blaise Nagy’s
study on this event may help us to understand the political implication here: given
the taboo nature and flexible date of the Plynteria, what Alcibiades encountered
was another manipulation by his opponents inside Athens; the latter intentional-
ly postponed the ritual to cause a “second profanation.”7 Whether this deliberate
trick actually happened or not,8 Nagy’s emphasis on the vulnerability of Athenian
political figures fits with the contemporary background, and we may wonder if the
affair of 415 BC and the ill-fated kairos constructed by the opponents of Alcibia-
des in 407 BC, stand alone in the dimension of rituals and political disturbances.
In the cases above, neither the ritual’s function of civic cohesion could stop po-
litical manipulations, nor any value of community managed to prevent the polis to
become a warzone of factional strife. Quite the opposite: ritual itself supported the

6
We are not unfamiliar with the oversensitive Athenian demos which was eager to accuse
the ritual contaminants afterwards, e.g. the aftermath of the battle of Arginusae: the Athe-
nian generals were put to trial on account of the default of the recovering of the drowned
soldiers (Xen. hell. 1.7.1–35).
7
Bl. Nagy, Alcibiades’ Second Profanation, Historia 43 (1994), 275–285.
8
Contra Nagy it can be argued that Alcibiades fixed the date of his return at the Plynteria
on purpose, to imitate that of Peisistratus (Hdt. 60.1), but later this was interpreted in a hos-
tile way by his opponents. We are informed by other ancient authors that Alcibiades antici-
pated the mass gathering at Piraeus, and was not blind to the situation in Athens; instead he
vigilantly mined out the potential plots of his enemies by waiting for his friends during his
return (Xen. hell. 1.4.13, 18–19); cf. also the panegyric records in Diod. 13.68.6, where the
heroic return of Alcibiades was not thought as ill-fated by the Athenians at all, but nearly
all men thought that “along his return from exile, good fortune in their undertaking had
also come again to the city” (εαγσζκυ ὲ βζδεατ βθ πσζβοδθ ἶξκθ πὲλ α κῦ ξ θ
παθ μ, ὥ γ᾽ ηα ε έθκυ εαγσ ῳ εαὶ ὴθ θ πλαΰηΪ πθ υξέαθ μ ὴθ πσζδθ ε δθ
δ ζΪηίαθκθ). Such a non-inauspicious narration also appears in Nep. Alc. 6.2: after Al-
cibiades had fought valiantly against the superiors, his return was deemed by the Athenian
people as being accompanied with “their present good fortune” (praesentes secundas res).
44

political strife by providing the frame and the right moment (εαδλσμ) to start the
strife. Thus, it is important for us to look deeper into those “dark sides” of politics.

Exploiting the kairos: rituals and staseis

Rituals left striking marks on the late archaic tyranny in Athens. Our earliest li-
terary account is the conspiracy of Cylon, who, according to the extant sources,
was eager to seize the acropolis at Athens to make himself a tyrant. Encouraged
by an oracle which told him to act “at the greatest festival of Zeus” (ξλπηΫθῳ ὲ
Κτζπθδ θ Δ ζφκῖμ θ ῖζ θ ὁ γ μ θ κῦ Δδ μ η ΰέ ῃ κλ εα αζαί ῖθ
ὴθ Ἀγβθαέπθ ελσπκζδθ), the man identified his opportunity as the Olympic
9

Games. According to Thucydides, Cylon’s doomed failure was due to his misin-
terpretation of the oracle, “for in fact the Athenians also have a festival in honor
of Zeus Meilichius, the Diasia, as it is called.”10 Does this simply mean that this
“adventurist” bet on the wrong horse? We may find the historian was implicating
more when he depicted that other festival as “greatest (η ΰέ βθ) festival celebra-
ted outside the city ( ιπ μ πσζ πμ), where all the people offer sacrifices, many
making offerings particular in the country ( πδξπλέᾳ) instead of victims.”11
The point Thucydides is making here seems not so much about which of the
two festivals has the highest reputation of being the “greatest” (η ΰέ βθ), but
about the right moment for the revolutionist to undertake his strike, i.e., a festival
being celebrated outside the city ( ιπ μ πσζ πμ). Impressive echoes of such a
connection between a ritual, the place it takes place, and attempts of overthrowing
the political order can be found in Aeneas Tacticus.12 This military writer from the
middle of the 4th century BC13 strongly exhorts those who are going to defend

9
Thuc. 1.126.4; translation after C. F. Smith (trans.), Thucydides, History of the Pelopon-
nesian War, Books I–II, London 1956 (LCL), 209 (ad loc.).
10
Thuc. 1.126.6: Ἔ δ ΰὰλ εαὶ Ἀγβθαέκδμ ΔδΪ δα εαζ ῖ αδ Δδ μ κλ ὴ Μ δζδξέκυ. Τransl.
Smith (as n. 9), 211 (ad loc.).
11
Ιbid: Ἔ δ ΰὰλ εαὶ Ἀγβθαέκδμ ΔδΪ δα εαζ ῖ αδ Δδ μ κλ ὴ Μ δζδξέκυ η ΰέ β ιπ μ
πσζ πμ, θ παθ βη ὶ γτκυ δ πκζζὰ κ ξ λ ῖα, ζζ᾽ < ΰθὰ> γτηα α πδξυλδα.
12
See also representative events in other authors: Hdt. 1.150.1: Smyrna was seized by the
exiles of Colophon when the citizens were celebrating a festival of Dionysus outside the
wall ( ιπ έξ κμ); Xen. hell. 4.4.2–4: a massacre of Lacedaemonian supporters organized
by the hawks of Corinth and other anti-Spartan poleis; 5.2.28–29: Leotiades betrays the
Theban acropolis to Phoebidas on the right time (kairos), i.e. when the council was in ses-
sion in the portico in the market-place due to the women’s celebration of the festival of the
Thesmophoria in the Cadmea.
13
On the life and other probable works of Aeneas Tacticus, cf. D. Whitehead, Aeneas the
Tactician. How to Survive under Siege, Oxford 1990, 4–17.
 45

their polis, to make a proclamation that “the usual festivals are to be celebrated in
the city (εα ὰ πσζδθ ΰ δθ)” (Aen. Tact. 10.4).14 In a later chapter, the author again
warns his readers (Aen. Tact. 17.1; all translations of Aeneas Tacticus in this paper
are my own):
Ἐθ ὲ ηὴ ὁηκθκκτ ῃ πσζ δ εαὶ πσπ πμ πλ μ ζζάζκυμ ξσθ πθ ξλὴ
πλκθκκῦθ α ζαί ῖ γαδ ὰμ η ̓ ξζκυ ισ κυμ πὶ γ πλέαθ ζαηπΪ κμ εαὶ
ππκ λκηέαμ εαὶ θ ζζπθ ΰυθπθ αδ ΰ λκπκδέαδ παθ βη ὶ ε μ μ
πσζ πμ εαὶ θ πζκδμ πκηπαὶ επΫηπκθ αδ, δ εαὶ π λὶ ὰμ παθ άηκυμ
θ πζεέαμ εαὶ ὰμ υθ εφκλὰμ θ ζ υ β Ϊθ πθ: θδ ΰὰλ εαὶ θ κδ
εαδλ φαζ θαδ κ μ Ϋλκυμ.
In a city being without harmony and where the citizens are mutually
distrustful, make foresight and caution on the crowds that going out for a
torch-race, horse-racing and other contests, when there are sacred rituals of
entire people being outside the city, and processions being sent out the city
under arms, also about the public hauling up of the ships and the funerals of
the dead. For one faction might be overthrown in such a moment.

We can easily find that there is a shared weak point, which lies in the very structure
of those various kinds of rituals, that makes Aeneas Tacticus to connect them tog-
ether: namely, when and if the authority and masses of citizens leave the city with
their vigilances relaxed and being separated from the rest, the opposite faction
may exploit the right moment (εαδλ μ) by making deliberative plans. Thus Aeneas
Tacticus goes on with an example of a successful but short-lived oligarchic revolu-
tion in Argos (Aen. Tact. 17.2–4).15 Calculated moves of the oligarchs are vividly
depicted by the author, which start from a public festival outside the city ( ιπ μ
πσζ πμ), where many of the plotters with hidden daggers joined, followed by the
pilgrim citizens; after the latter have laid their arms down at the temple to engage
in the sacrifice, the plotters take the initiative by striking down the officials and
distinguished citizens, while the accomplices in the city seize the crucial points

14
Cf. Dem. 19.89. Such a proclamation was issued when Athens was facing the immi-
nent Macedonian threat in 346 BC, which caused all the people in the country to retreat
to the city with their properties, and the festival of Heracles was held within the walls
( θ μ έξκυμ); on this event and the Athenian defensive mentality after the Peloponnesian
War, see J. Ober, Fortress Attica. Defense of the Athenian Land Frontier, 404–322 B.C.,
Leiden 1985, 55–56.
15
The stasis is usually identified as the one in 417 BC, which is also reported by Thucy-
dides (Thuc. 5.81) and later Plutarch (Plut. Alc. 15); for the identification of this event,
see E. David, The Oligarchic Revolution in Argos, 417 B.C., AC 55 (1986), 113–124, esp.
119–121; cf. also Whitehead (as n. 13), 146–147.
46

of the polis.16 The rest of the citizens flee to the city, only to find it being already
controlled by the other revolutionists.
A scrutiny on Thucydides shows us how such kind of deliberative plan presents
itself in a religious ritual. As the historian informs us, Harmodius and Aristogeiton
had to wait for the Panathenaean festival,17 after they had decided to commit the,
later idealized, tyrannicide and “had everything arranged in the action with the
accomplices” ( ὰ ηὲθ ζζα πλ μ κ μ ιυθ πδγβ κηΫθκυμ λΰῳ πΫπλαε κ), for
“on that day only ( θ ησθκθ ηΫλᾳ) it existed no suspicion for the citizens who
were to take part in the procession to be assembled in arms;”18 besides, by showing
themselves as example, the mass of the people was supposed to join them with ea-
gerness. The story continues that, when Hippias was outside19 ( ιπ) at Ceramicus
with his bodyguard at the turning point, and being “accessible to all” ( θ ὲ πᾶ δθ
πλσ κ κμ), the tyranniciders resolved to act. On this occasion, both the situation
at the festival and the plan they carefully prepared, are another striking example
of the exhortations we find in Aeneas Tacticus: at first, the tyrant being outside
the city and his guards divided up, since some of them remained at Leocorium
with his brother Hipparchus (Thuc. 6.57.4); then, when the tyrant is accessible,
that weak point is shown to the plotters, and they can exploit it to encourage the
sympathizers by taking the lead – the foreseeable procedure of the Panatheaean
festival made it the only day which they had been waiting for. That this act failed,
nevertheless, was then only due to a wrong interpretation of the behavior of one
of the plotters talking to Hippias, which caused the lethal attack on Hipparchus, in
the heat of the moment, which was neither planned nor put an immediate end to
the rule of the tyrant Hippias.
The episodes above have illustrated that rituals with their particular structures
appear as a potential threat especially in a city which lacks civic cohesion. It goes
16
As one can see, Aeneas presents this episode in a literally deliberative way in the text,
cf. Aen. Tact. 17.3: the plotters which stand near the officers and the leading citizens (κ ὲ
αῖμ λξαῖμ εαὶ θ πκζδ θ κῖμ πλκΫξκυ δ παλΫ β αθ θ αῖμ ξαῖμ) were arranged
accordingly besides their target ( θὴλ θ λέ); here the grammatical structure clearly reflects
the careful plan of the conspirators.
17
Cf. the suggestive remark on the correlations between the Great Panathenaea’s qua-
drennial intervals and the political crisis in 6th century Athens by Th. J. Figueira, The Ten
Archontes of 579/8 at Athens, Hesperia 53 (1984), 447–473, esp. 466–469.
18
Thuc. 6.56.2; translation after Smith (trans.), Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian
War, Books V–VI, London 1959 (LCL), 283 (ad loc.).
19
Cf. Xen. Hiero 1.11–12: Hiero warns the dangerous outcomes for the tyrant who goes
to the chora for a sight-seeing and attends a national festival ( ὰμ εκδθὰμ παθβΰτλ δμ), that
they would be outnumbered by the crowd (ηὴ ελ έ κθ μ θ παλσθ πθ ηΫζζκυ δθ -
γαδ) or even be deprived of the throne ( λβγ δ μ λξ μ).
 47

beyond political manipulations by domestic factionalism, to the point of staseis

being started at such events by deliberative planning of opponents within the polis.
Whence a structural advice and solution became a necessity and demand for those
who attempted to neutralize such a matter.

Framing the solution: Aeneas Tacticus on the regulation of rituals

With his practical mind which is fully aware of the potential danger of public
rituals and other occasions, Aeneas Tacticus offers his solution systematically in
his work. From his view, the political crisis caused by public festivals, reflects
serious distrust and disharmony between different groups (democrats and olig-
archs, the mass and the wealthy, citizens and foreigners, etc.) within the polis;
thus, the dangerous structure of rituals mirrors the potentially problematic social
structure in the city. A defensive war to survive under siege is warfare going on
outside as well as inside a polis.20 Although his advice regarding religious rituals
may seem scattered within various chapters, from the conventional titles21 of them
(4: Concerning signals, 10: Proclamations, 17: Other reliefs, 22: Guards, 29: Se-
cret smuggling of weapons) we can find a deliberative structure which targets
several times specifically at the weak points of the rituals as well as the potential
social problems. In the narration of Aeneas Tacticus, the evidence (παλα έΰηα α)
of past events22 clearly show which points are exploitable for the plotters (and,
therefore, have to be observed by preventing authorities), as well as where the crux
20
As a military technical literature in the middle of 4th century, the work of Aeneas Tacti-
cus deals with the technical matters of defensive war (e.g. devices, tactics, etc.), as well
as the maintaining of harmony (ὁησθκδα) between the citizens within a polis to prevent a
stasis or a treachery beforehand, since the lacking of the harmony ( θ ηὴ ὁηκθκκτ ῃ πσζ δ)
is more often the situation to deal with; cf. e.g. Aen. Tact. 10.20, 14.1, 17.1; cf. also White-
head (as n. 13), 27–33; for precautious measures especially towards non-citizens, see Aen.
Tact. 10.5, 10.9–10, 12.4; for the distrust of Aeneas in foreigners cf. Whitehead (as n. 13),
120–121; for the strict division between citizens and non-citizens, see S. Günther, Fram-
ing the Financial Thoughts of Aeneas Tacticus: New Approaches of Theory to Economic
Discourse in Antiquity, JAC 29 (2014), 77–86, esp. 82; cf. also A. Winterling, Polisbegriff
und Stasistheorie des Aeneas Tacticus, Zur Frage der Grenzen der griechischen Polisgesell-
schaften im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Historia 40 (1991), 193–229, esp. 212, 220–222.
21
The chapter titles seem not originally added by Aeneas himself, but they were known in
the Kestoi of Julius Africanus in the 2nd century AD, and retained by modern editors; cf.
W. A. Oldfather et al. (trans.), Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onsander, New York and
London 1948, 19.
22
Among the five chapters in which public rituals are dealt with, five times suggestions are
juxtaposed with evidence; see Aen. Tact. 4.7 ( πὶ παλα έΰηα κμ εαὶ ηαλ υλέκυ εαγαλκῦ
παλαζΫΰβ αδ),17.2 (παλΪ δΰηα ὲ ικέ π ΰ θση θκθ πΪγκμ), 22.18 ( α ὲ πΪγ α ΰΫΰκθ
48

of the social problem lies. Therefore it is important to examine its structural nature
by a scrutiny on the suggestions and examples which he offers.
Just as the previously mentioned cases have illustrated, it is the procession of
citizens outside the city that causes the division of power; that is the first of the
weak points for potential plotters. Therefore, Aeneas Tacticus (Aen. Tact. 10.4–5)
advices the authority to give the following proclamations from “time to time” ( δΪ
δθκμ ξλσθκυ): festivals must be held in the city (εα ὰ πσζδθ ΰ δθ), making the
authority able to put all the participant groups under control within a closed and
defensible polis. Having anticipated the next move which is regularly taken by the
conspirators, supplementary proclamations which prohibit any private gathering
shall be issued to prevent their potential accomplices being gathered. Moreover,
seers should not make any sacrifice “without the presence of the officials ( θ υ
κυ λξκθ κμ),” thus, he gives the advice to leave no room for religious insti-
gations to happen among the citizens without any supervisory authority. On the
other side, rituals are not to be banned once for all, necessary private feasts like
weddings and funerals are allowed, but in advance they are to “be announced to
the officials (πλκαπαΰΰ έζαθ αμ κῖμ λξκυ δθ).”
These proclamations intend to regulate mainly where and when rituals should
be held. The problems still left are how and who. Taking the Chian festival of Dio-
nysus as a positive example, a fully-armed procession and control of the crucial
roads are suggested by Aeneas Tacticus, too, as “it is best for the officials to begin
the festival with a selected force; and only after these have been announced to the
mass,” he says, “thus the others should be allowed to come” (Aen. Tact. 17.6).
Such a model can assure the armed-force of the city to remain as a whole body
between the officials and the masses during the procedure, and the procedure of
the festival procession will be controlled by the authority.23
Regarding the persons to join the festival and to remain as guards, the author
has the following suggestions for the authorities (Aen. Tact. 22.16):
Ἐθ ὲ αῖμ παθ άηκδμ κλ αῖμ ξλὴ θ εα ὰ πσζδθ φυζΪεπθ κδ θ υηα δ
ηΪζδ α πκπ κδ κῖμ α θ εαὶ πδ κδ, φέ γαδ π θ φυζαε έπθ εα ̓
κ εέαμ κλ Ϊα δθ. Καὶ ηα ηὲθ πκζυπλ ῖ γαδ σικυ δθ, ηα ὲ κ ὲθ θ
π̓ α κῖμ ἴβ πλᾶιαδ. θ ὶ ὲ κτ πθ ζζκυμ μ ὰ φυζαε ῖα εαγδ Ϊθαδ

π λέ κτμ εαδλκτμ), 29.2 ( ικέ π ὲ εαὶ παλα έΰηα κμ θ ε θ πὶ πλΪι δ ΰ ΰ θβηΫθα), and
29.11 (ὁηκέαμ πλΪι δμ).
23
λδ κθ ὲ ὰμ λξὰμ πλ κθ η ὰ μ πλκῃλβηΫθβμ υθΪη πμ λκπκδ αδ, κτ πθ ὲ
ε κῦ ξζκυ παζζαΰΫθ πθ, κ π κ μ ζζκυμ υθδΫθαδ. With a scrutiny on this text, one
will see clearly that Aeneas Tacticus is highlighting the separation between ὰμ λξὰμ and
κ μ ζζκυμ with a genitive absolute ( κτ πθ ὲ ε κῦ ξζκυ παζζαΰΫθ πθ) as a dividing
line between both.
 49

πδ κ Ϋλπμ ξκθ αμ: π λὶ ΰὰλ ὰμ κλ ὰμ εαὶ κ μ κδκτ κυμ εαδλκ μ

ηΪζδ α κ ίκυζση θκέ δ θ π λέα δθ ΰξ δλκῦ δθ.
In the time of the public festivals those of the city guards who are greatly
suspected and distrusted by their own comrades should be sent away from
the guard posts to celebrate the festival at home. They will think that they
are being honored, at the same time they would have no opportunity to
carry out any plot. And instead of them, more trustworthy men should be
set down to guard duty; for the plotters are extremely likely to start a revo-
lution during the festivals and in such moments.

Apparently, the personnel transfer of the guards is not only aiming at putting the
officials’ own men in charge, but also at a policy of stick and carrot which tries to
reconcile the tension within the citizens.24 Besides, for the suspicious guards being
sent back to home, the festival will be celebrated privately; and for the authori-
ties, a dangerous gathering of the potential plotters with other citizens25 will thus
be avoided. Herewith we see a vision of the author that he attempts to dissolve
the tension beforehand, rather than merely to offer remedies after the problem
breaks out. Whether those who are under suspicion would be genuinely grateful
for joining the festival or not, this advice, having both, temporal trouble and the
long-term problem, in mind, shows us that the author fully realizes that the real
crux lies in the lack of unanimity within the city.
A polis which is busy celebrating a festival may be endangered to be attacked
by their enemies from outside. Aeneas Tacticus gives an example in his chapter
on signals (Aen. Tact. 4.8–11). When “Peisistratos was general in Athens,”26 a
Megarian fleet made a plan to seize Athenian women when the latter were celebra-
ting the Thesmophoria in Eleusis.27 Peisistratos not only annihilated the invaders
24
Aen. Tact. 22.17: Καὶ ηα ηὲθ πκζυπλ ῖ γαδ σικυ δθ, ηα ὲ κ ὲθ θ π̓ α κῖμ ἴβ
πλᾶιαδ. Those two ηα show us a suggestion which will create a win-win situation both for
the suspicious guards and the authority.
25
For Aeneas Tacticus, most of the citizens are under constant suspicion as well; for the
precautions and surveillance measures on the citizens, see Aen. Tact. 1.3, 10.5, 10.20,
10.23–24; cf. also Whitehead, (as n. 13), 25–27.
26
Latter extant sources tell us when the Athenian women at Colias were “performing the
sacrifice to Demeter” ( Δάηβ λδ ὴθ πΪ λδκθ γυ έαθ πδ ζκτ αμ), Solon came up a simi-
lar plot against the Megarians (Plut. Sol. 8.4–6); cf. also Polyain. Strat. 1.20.1. Thus, the
event described here was thought to be the “original form” of the Solonian stratagem; cf.
T. H. Williams, The Authorship of the Greek Military Manual Attributed to ‘Aeneas Tacti-
cus’, AJPhil 25 (1904), 390–405, esp. 390.
27
Although an armistice for the safe passage of the athletics during the time of the Olym-
pics Games was a common nomos for the ancient Greeks, however, such kind of nomos
50

but also made a cunning counter-attack on the Megarians, since he was informed
about the moves of the enemy. The city was saved due to his resourceful leader-
ship and the vigilance of the polis.
However, a stasis could also happen in a festival during which the citizens
remain inside the polis. Collaborations between the conspirators from outside
( ιπγ θ) and inside ( πγ θ) are most serious moments (εαδλκέ) of crisis for the
citizens,28 especially when foreigners within the city were involved; in the pre-
supposition of Aeneas Tacticus, the latter appear as a serious potential threat and
being extremely inclined to cooperate with ambitious citizens or exiles. An an-
onymous polis that was enjoying a public festival, according to him (Aen. Tact.
29.3–10), was betrayed by such a deliberative trick. The plotters, being outside,
fooled the revenue officers who were responsible of checking the imported wares,
and therewith they managed to smuggle weapons into the city; the accomplices
within the city, among them both citizens and foreigners (!), having anticipated
what was going to happen ( πέ σ ηΫζζκθ), waited for ( δ) the right moment
(εαδλσθ) to come, when “all the citizens were completely intoxicated, as usually
happens on a festival (κἶα θ κλ ).” A pre-arranged signal given by the plotters
is the culmination of the story; men from outside storm the city with ladders while
their accomplices inside take the weapons from the chest to finish the resistance.29
According to our military writer, the lesson here demands inspectors and supervi-
sors to survey ( ῖθ) the imports personally and in detail (Aen. Tact. 29.12), which
means a strict administrative intervene to block the danger from outside, so that
the authority could check the things coming inside to undone the εαδλ μ which a
plotter waited for ( δ).
To sum up, given the expectable crisis which rituals present, the solution of-
fered by Aeneas Tacticus is a structural and comprehensive one, if not too ambi-
tious. It intends to deal with threats from within and outside, immediate crisis and
long-term dangers, and to keep the rituals under control by overall administrative

appeared not to be strictly applied to domestic festivals by the belligerent poleis. See Thuc.
3.3.3: the Athenians were ready to attack the Mytilenians when the latter celebrated the
festival of Apollo Maloeis outside the city ( ιπ μ πσζ πμ); see also the suggestion given
by Philo of Byzantium (Ph. D2. 1–4 (96.28–31)) to make the attack “during a festival which
they are celebrating outside the gates” ( κλ μ κ βμ θ ΰκυ δθ ιπ μ πυζ θ). Cf. also
Ad. Lanni, The Laws of War in Ancient Greece, LHR 26 (2008), 469–489, esp. 477–478.
28
Cf. Aen. Tact. 29.2: Νῦθ βζπγά αδ. π λ ζαί ῖ γαδ ῖ εαὶ ηὴ φλκθ έ πμ
α θ ξ δθ, εαὶ ηΪζδ α θ πυζπλ θ θ δ δ εαδλκῖμ, αθ ιπγΫθ δ πγ θ φκί λ θ .
29
Aeneas Tacticus also briefly mentions one of the similar occasions ( μ Ϋ ὁηκέαμ
πλΪι δμ) and another Sicyonian event in Aen. Tact. 29.11–12, which show us that such kind
of conspiracy did not happen rarely.
 51

regulations. The regulations aim at carefully examining, and changing, the struc-
tures of rituals instead of cancelling them completely. However, with the absence
of a highly centralized authority and the ever-presence of the endemic disharmony
in the world of ancient polis, one may wonder how far this solution could lead for
the ancient Greeks; on the other hand, regarding the totally negative view on the
citizens and the various groups within the polis, and the ubiquitous precautions on
the trivial details of daily life, one may ask whether Aeneas Tacticus goes too far.

Conclusion
Without the intention to draw an utterly gloomy picture, the paper has refused the
delightful opinion which depicts ancient Greek rituals as only a joyful moment
of civic cohesion and political unity. It was not rare that a festival was not only
vulnerable to political manipulations, but also seen as the right moment (εαδλ μ)
for a start of upheaval, civic strife or stasis. Even more, there are several literary
“responses” to this particular and imminent problem, both in the records by anci-
ent historians and the technical work of the military writer Aeneas Tacticus. The
former vividly show us how the foreseeable structures of rituals were deliberative-
ly exploited by plotters to overthrow an existing regime, while the latter presents a
solution for the sake of the very survival of a polis. Having learnt from numerous
examples (παλα έΰηα α) from the past, Aeneas Tacticus suggests that the poten-
tially weak points which were immanent in the problematic structure of a public
ritual, have to be protected cautiously, both by short-term measures and long-term
regulations, in order to neutralize the possible crisis which could be brought up by
the dangerous moment (εαδλ μ).