BOWDLERIZED

THE DOMESTICATION OF THAILANDS MASS MEDIA

AMSTERDAM & PEROFF LLP

THAILAND 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 3

One year ago, the Royal Thai Government massacred almost ninety people to avoid an early election it feared it might lose. Finally, the early general elections for which dozens of Red Shirts gave their lives are scheduled to take place on July 3, 2011. While it is hoped that the elections will be free of outright fraud and ballot stuffing, the competitiveness and fairness of the process are being undermined in many other ways.

The upcoming elections will take place in a context of intimidation and repression, coupled with the continuing efforts by most of the institutions of the Thai state to secure a victory for the Democrat Party. Aside from competing against a hobbled opposition under rules design to artificially boost its seat share, the Democrat Party will once again avail itself of the assistance of the military, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the royalist establishment. These institutions stand ready to commit whatever money, administrative resources, and television airtime might be necessary to haul the otherwise unelectable Mark Abhisit over the hump.

In this series of reports, Amsterdam & Peroff details the attempts by Thailands Establishment to fix the results of the upcoming general elections. This report the third in the series focuses on the bowdlerization of Thailands mass media, resulting from draconian legal restrictions on freedom of expression, the harassment of opposition media and independent news outlets, and the subservience of Thailands mainstream press to the Establishments political agenda.

1. INTRODUCTION
Thailands general election campaign got underway in the presence of the most stringent limitations to freedom of expression and freedom of the press the country has witnessed since the late 1970s. The events of past month alone exemplify the degree to which the opposition is being denied the opportunity to compete on an equal footing. Eighteen Red Shirt leaders many of them candidates for the opposition party Pheu Thai were charged with sedition and lese majeste in connection to a speech given by incumbent member of parliament Jatuporn Prompan during the commemoration of last years April 10 massacre. While Jatuporn was subsequently jailed when the courts revoked his bail, the others were charged on the basis of body language exhibited during the speech smiling, clapping, and cheering were cited as their offenses. A few days after targeting the Red Shirt leaders, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) ordered police to raid thirteen community radio stations that had played Jatuporns now infamous speech. The stations were shut down and their equipment seized.1 Meanwhile, Thailands controversial lese majeste laws claimed two additional high-profile victims among opposition activists and critics of the regime. The editor of a banned opposition magazine, Somyot Prueksakasemsuk, has been held without bail since late April, while well-known historian Somsak Jeamteerasakul was summoned by police to acknowledge charges filed, in an unprecedented move, by the Royal Thai Army. Coming on the heels of a two-year campaign of media censorship, draconian restrictions on freedom of speech, legal harassment of political opponents, and the disproportionately harsh sentencing of many of those charged with offending the monarchy, recent developments do not bode well for the freedom, fairness, and competitiveness of the upcoming elections. Virtually every international organization monitoring freedom of the press around the world has strongly condemned the Royal Thai Governments campaign to silence the opposition, criminalize its own critics, and gag unsympathetic media. Reporters Without Borders (RSF) now ranks Thailand 153rd in its Press Freedom Index, issued in October 2010. Weeks after the release of a detailed report on internet freedom, moreover, Freedom House
1. Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Authorities Silence Red Shirt Community Radios, April 27, 2011. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/27/thailand-authorities-silence-red-shirtcommunity-radios

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downgraded Thailands overall status to Not Free in its annual Freedom of the Press survey. This had never happened since Freedom House started assessing press freedom in 1980. Even in the 1980s, when Freedom House used to give separate scores for print and broadcast, Thailands Not Free rating on broadcast had always been accompanied by a rating of Partly Free on print media. Since 1989, when Freedom House began releasing combined scores, Thailand had never done worse than Partly Free, including in the wake of coups in 1991 and 2006. Thanks to the administration of Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva, press freedom in Thailand has been rolled back over thirty years. Human Rights Watch director Brad Adams aptly described the outgoing administration as the most prolific censor in recent Thai history,2 As the country gears up for a historic election, this report describes the governments attempt to silence voices of dissent, as well as the various forms of pressure (both legal and otherwise) it has brought to bear on each of the various components of Thailands mass media. Aside from exposing the politicized, persecutory manner in which the legislation criminalizing dissent is enforced, the report examines the stranglehold that the Thai Establishment exercises over broadcast and print media. The English-language press is singled out as a special case, owing to both its egregiously distorted coverage in the service of the Democrat Party and its Establishment backers as well as its influence on international news and perceptions of Thailand. Attention is also given to the war that the Thai state is waging for control of the internet, which presents unique challenges for the countrys overzealous censors. The report concludes with a package of minimal reforms necessary to the restoration of a free press and the re-establishment of basic democratic freedoms. These reforms, in turn, are crucial to government accountability as well as to the responsiveness of political institutions to the Thai peoples needs, interests, and aspirations.

2. WEAPONIZING THE LAW

While Thai citizens have long dealt with official restrictions on their ability to speak openly about important aspects of the structure and practice of government, especially with regard to the monarchy, in recent years such
2. Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Authorities Silence Red Shirt Community Radios, April 27, 2011. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/27/thailand-authorities-silence-red-shirtcommunity-radios

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constraints have increased in kind, scope, and the vigor with which they are enforced. The states most powerful and controversial instrument to limit freedom of expression is Article 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, defining the crime of lese majeste: Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent, shall be punished with imprisonment of three to fifteen years. While a version of Article 112 has been in force for more than a century, penalties have gradually increased over past decades. At the same time, new legislation has provided the state with a variety of additional means to prohibit, suppress, deter, and punish political speech. In 2007, the military junta introduced the Computer Crimes Act, which features harsh penalties for various types of electronic activities, including posting or transmitting writings and images injurious to the monarchy. Aside from traditionally strict criminal defamation laws, moreover, the emergency legislation promulgated (and grossly abused) in recent years above all the 2005 Emergency Decree and the 2008 Internal Security Act confers upon the authorities broad discretion to restrict, frequently without judicial review, the publication or broadcast of content deemed a threat to vaguely defined notions of public order.3 Since coming to power in late 2008, Prime Minister Mark Abhisit Vejjajiva has often faced tough questions about his governments approach to freedom of expression. Especially when appearing before foreign audiences, the Prime Minister invariably professed his commitment to free speech and condemned the occasional abuse of the legislation. His government, however, almost immediately launched an all-out assault on freedom of expression. At least since the period following the 1976 student massacre, no administration, civilian or military, has done more to limit free expression than Abhisit Vejjajivas government. In 2009 alone, the courts are reported to have accepted charges of lese majeste for 164 cases. That exceeded the previous record of 126 cases set in 2007, in the wake of the coup, and more than doubled the number of cases (seventyseven) taken up by the judiciary in 2008. It should be noted that the highest number of cases prior to the coup was recorded in 2005, when thirty-three were successfully submitted to the courts. Owing to both legal restrictions and the unwillingness of major media outlets to discuss information that might damage the image of the monarchy, the vast majority of the cases have gone
3. For a more comprehensive discussion, see David Streckfuss, The Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason, and Lse-Majest (London: Routledge, 2010).

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unreported by the local and international press.4 While no figures are currently available for cases initiated in 2010 and 2011, arrests for lese majeste have continued to occur with alarming regularity.5 Experts believe that the number of people detained for alleged violations of Article 112 could be in the hundreds.6 What is worse, the situation threatens to deteriorate further. Following the dispersal of the Red Shirt rallies in May 2010, in a crackdown justified in part by the governments claims that the opposition was involved in a conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy, the Department of Special Investigations announced it had assigned three hundred agents to identifying individuals whose statements and behavior with regard to the monarchy were detrimental or ill-minded.7 Department of Special Investigations Deputy Head, Pol. Lt. Col. Seksan Sritulakarn subsequently reported to the Senate that as many as two thousand suspected cases of lse majest are currently under investigation.8 Together with the dramatic spike in the volume of arrests and prosecutions, an equally notable development is constituted by the increasingly harsh sentencing and inhumane treatment reserved for those accused of lese majeste. Most disturbing is the case of Darunee Charnchoensilpakul (Da Torpedo), who was sentenced to eighteen years in prison for three charges of lese majeste (one per offending comment) stemming from a speech she gave at a rally in July 2008. Her trial was held in secret, ostensibly for reasons of national security. Contrary to most defendants facing similar accusations and the routine denial of due process, Da Torpedo refused to plead guilty and beg for forgiveness. In return, she not only received an extraordinarily severe sentence. Once convicted, she was placed in solitary confinement and was forced to wear a name tag that identified the crime for which she was convicted, exposing her
4. Marwaan Macan-Markar, Thailand: Lese Majeste Cases Rise but Public in the Dark, Inter Press Service, May 14, 2010. http://ipsnews.net/login.asp?redir=news.asp?idnews=51434 5. For a partial account of the most controversial recent cases, see Junya Yimprasert, Some Cases of Lse Majest (LM), Time Up Thailand, May 11, 2011. http://hirvikatu10.net/timeupthailand/?p=1226 6. Pravit Rojanaphruk, Lese Majeste Cases Creating Cimate of Fear, Critics Say, The Nation, May 10, 2011. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/10/national/Lese-majeste-cases-creating-climate-of-fear-critic-30154978.html 7. DSI Sets Up Large Lese Majeste Force, The Nation, July 9, 2010. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/07/09/politics/DSI-sets-up-largelese-majeste-force-30133403.html 8. Rong senabodi DSI yom rup me kan muang saek saeng tuk chai per kruang mue, Matichon, July 12, 2010. http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1278918895&catid=17

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to harassment.9 While her conviction was recently thrown out on procedural grounds, she continues to be denied bail pending re-trial. The abuse of the Computer Crimes Act has often complemented prosecutions of lese majeste. The three highest profile prosecutions for violations of the Computer Crimes Act are those mounted against Suwicha Thakor, Tantawut Taweewarodomkul, and Chiranuch Premchaiporn. Suwicha Thakor was arrested in January 2009 for posting on an internet forum a picture deemed offensive of the King. While he was later sentenced to twenty years based on both the Computer Crimes Act and Thailands lese majeste statute, the sentence was commuted to ten years on account of his guilty plea. After spending a year and a half in prison, Suwicha eventually received a royal pardon on June 28, 2010. In March 2011, Tantawut Taweewarodomkul was sentenced to thirteen years behind bars, based on a similar combination of lese majeste and computer crimes. His crime is to have served as the web designer for an opposition website (www.norporchorusa.com) that published content deemed by the court as insulting to the monarchy. Tantawut was never accused of having written the material, nor did he have any control over the sites content. His association with the website was sufficient to earn him more than a decade in prison. Chiranuch Premchaiporn, the web manager of independent publication Prachatai, was arrested in March 2009 and charged with ten counts of violating the Computer Crimes Act. She is being prosecuted owing to her failure to promptly remove comments on the Prachatai forum that the authorities had deemed injurious to the monarchy. The comments in question were subsequently removed at the urging of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology (MICT), but that did not spare Chiranuch from prosecution. She currently faces a sentence of fifty years in prison at the end of a criminal trial that began in February 2011. Meanwhile, the Prachatai website has been blocked repeatedly by the authorities since the start of the Red Shirts demonstrations in March 2010. While awaiting trial, Chiranuch was arrested again in early October 2010, upon returning from a conference held in Europe on the subject of internet freedom, and charged with additional counts.10 For her bravery and stoicism in the face of government repression,
9. Corrections Dept Asked to Explain Da Torpedos Solitary Confinement, Prachatai, September 14, 2009. http://www.prachatai.org/english/node/1400 10. Seth Mydans, Fighting for Press Freedom in Thailand, New York Times, Novem-

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she was recently awarded the prestigious Courage in Journalism Award by the International Womens Media Foundation. Other arrests for supposed violations of the Computer Crimes Act include those of Nat Sattayapornpisut (for transmitting anti-monarchy videos via email), Wipas Raksakulthai (for posting an offensive comment on Facebook), Joe Gordon (for posting a link to the banned book The King Never Smiles), and four people accused of spreading rumors about the Kings health at least two of them for merely translating a Bloomberg article on the subject.11 After facing criticism from activists in Thailand and abroad for its inaction and connivance with Thai authorities, Amnesty International recently named Wipas Raksakulthai a prisoner of conscience the first use of such classification for someone accused of insulting the monarchy.12 Aside from the diversification in the instruments of repression, and the intensification in both the frequency of prosecutions and the harshness of the penalties, recent incidents show just how far the statutes have been stretched to serve the political agenda of the Establishment. Jatuporn Prompans speech on April 10, 2011, which prompted the Army Commander in Chief to dispatch representatives to file a complaint with police, is alleged to have violated Article 112 not for criticizing the royal family, but for denouncing the Royal Thai Armys strategy of justifying the murder of protesters based on the need to protect the monarchy. The Red Shirt leaders who shared the stage with Jatuporn may face trial for the same charges again, not for defaming, insulting or threatening the royal family, but for smiling and clapping during a speech that criticized the army. Likewise, the charges pending against Thammasat University professor Somsak Jeamteerasakul are based on a pair of open letters Somsak wrote to Princess Chulabhorn following an appearance on television. Even if Somsaks letters were to be deemed in any way offensive, the Princess is not covered by Article 112. The stretching of these provisions so far beyond the original meaning or intent of the laws suggests two conclusions. First, these incidents confirm
ber 1, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/world/asia/02thai.html 11. EDITORIAL: Criminals or Scapegoats?, Bangkok Post, November 3, 2009. http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/26746/criminals-or-scapegoats 12. Pravit Rojanaphruk, Amnesty International Names Thailands First Prisoner of Conscience, The Nation, May 10, 2011. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/14/national/Amnesty-Internationalnames-Thailands-first-prison-30155366.html

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the suspicion that lese majeste is invoked to protect Thailands social and political hierarchy far more often than it is to defend the King, Queen, the Heir-apparent or the Regent. The legislation is especially effective in light of the Kings popularity, the lack of transparency in the resulting judicial proceedings, and the historic reluctance of international organizations to condemn its use. Second, the laws are not only an instrument to discredit, intimidate, and punish the alleged offenders, but on occurrence can be used to great effect to block the diffusion of information or content that various components of the Establishment might consider damaging. Whether or not, for instance, Jatuporn is ultimately tried and convicted for his speech, the fact that charges based on the speech are pending serves to discourage anyone who might consider distributing its contents. The frivolous lese majeste complaint filed by Democrat Party MP Watchara Petthong against Robert Amsterdam and former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra over the White Paper published by Amsterdam & Peroff in July 2010 is another clear example. More than to punish the accused, the charges were a ruse to get bookstores to take copies of the White Paper off their shelves, after the book had become a best-seller.13 Many observers of the Thai political crisis have correctly pointed out that the abuse of the lese majeste laws, though expedient in the short run, in the long run undermines the institution that the laws are designed to protect.14 Most generals, politicians, and media personalities who wield this blunt object to bludgeon their enemies no doubt understand this. That they persevere is a clear sign of heedlessness, desperation, or most likely a combination of both.15

3. MEDIA WARS
Historically, the Thai media world has evidenced a degree of bifurcation between broadcast and print. The broadcast media, access to which has always been easiest for much of the population (especially in the provinces), has typically
13. For a description of Watcharas complaint, see Police Urged to Charge Thaksin for Robert Amsterdams Book, Prachatai, November 18, 2010. http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/2145 14. For the most recent example, see Joshua Kurlantzick, Will Thailands Lse Majest Arrests Backfire? Council on Foreign Relations, May 12, 2011. http://blogs.cfr.org/asia/2011/05/12/will-thailands-lese-majeste-arrests-backfire/ 15. For a similar analysis, see Jon Ungpakorn, Is the Military Really Protecting Our Monarchy? Bangkok Post, May 18, 2011. http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/237520/is-the-military-really-protecting-our-monarchy

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been the subject of tight state controls. Radio stations are often owned and operated by the military and by the government. Similarly, both the government and the military have traditionally owned and in some cases directly managed all major television stations. As a result, radio and television are known for broadcasting state-sanctioned programming, including a hefty amount of outright propaganda, and to zealously self-censor coverage of events that might show the government and the army in a negative light. The print media, conversely, has tended to be a great deal more diverse, vibrant, and critical. Since the late 1970s (and indeed much of the time before then), ownership of large-circulation newspapers has been private. Though major publications have always had to contend with varying restrictions as governments came and went, the degree of editorial control exercised by the state has generally been negligible. With the important exception of royal coverage, by the late 1990s the Thai print media had largely secured the right to say what it like[d].16 The print medias freedom from state control, however, has never signified independence, objectivity, impartiality, or adherence to basic journalistic standards. As Duncan McCargo described it a decade ago, press coverage tends to be driven by personal agendas and vendettas, distorted by incestuous and often corrupt ties between journalists and state officials, and generally impoverished by the lack of rigorous analysis, the absence of any investigative impulse, and dubious journalistic ethics. In McCargos words, the Thai press has always worked as a partisan political actor, albeit one with multiple loyalties17 to politicians, high-ranking state officials, generals, godfathers, and business interests. The bifurcation has largely persisted to this day, though important developments driven by technological change and events on the ground have resulted in an important change in the role of the broadcast media. On the one hand, the state has largely preserved its dominant ownership role and editorial control over the vast majority of licensed radio stations and all terrestrial television channels. On the other hand, both kinds of broadcast media have experienced a degree of pluralization as a result of the proliferation of hundreds of community radio stations and a variety of satellite television channels. The diversification has been accompanied by the growing role of the broadcast media for protest movements seeking to offer their own political commentary
16. Duncan McCargo, Politics and the Press in Thailand : Media Machinations (London: Routledge), p. 1. 17. Ibid., p. 21.

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and mobilize supporters. The Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) used its free-to-air satellite television channel ASTV to great effect in its campaigns against the governments of Thaksin Shinawatra and Samak Sundaravej. The PADs approach was later emulated by the National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD). The Red Shirts have also benefited from the activities of community radio stations in the provinces, which continue to help disseminate alternative narratives of Thailands political crisis. Whereas freedom of the press has experienced a drastic deterioration since the 2006 coup, and especially under the government led by the Democrat Party, traditional print and broadcast media have been less affected by censorship, shutdowns, and prosecutions. Terrestrial television stations rarely stray off the official narrative. Meanwhile, given that most newspapers are closely affiliated with Establishment interests, many have been outspoken in their support of the military and the Democrat Party, while some have been eager participants in the governments campaign to discredit the Red Shirts before and after last years massacres.18 Even less conservative outlets have shown restraint and deference in their criticism of the government, and have generally refrained from asking difficult questions about the killings, the cover-ups, or the illegal detentions.19 Whatever impulse individual journalists might feel to take on the Establishment with greater vigor is easily limited by the intervention of their editors or, failing that, disciplinary action, defamation, and lese majeste.20 Consequently, Thai authorities do not generally need to take very public, draconian measures to shape the traditional medias coverage. Interference is constant, but generally takes place informally. With the exception of small magazines explicitly affiliated with the UDD, at least five of which were banned after the state of emergency was declared in 2010,21 episodes of official censorship of the local print media are rare. Even the Economist, which has published several articles critical of the monarchy in recent years, has never
18. For a number of examples, see Pravit Rojanaphruk, Some Attitudes Towards Red Shirts Shameful, The Nation, April 1, 2010. http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/1697 19. Jon Ungpakorn, Thai News Media Not Asking Any Questions, February 23, 2011. http://facthai.wordpress.com/2011/04/09/thai-news-media-not-asking-any-questions-bangkok-post/ 20. For three examples of broadcast journalists punished for straying from the governments position during the 2010 Red Shirt rallies, see Wassana Nanuam Becomes Latest Victim of Thai Media Intimidation, TumblerBlog, April 26, 2010. http://www.tumblerblog.com/2010/04/wassana-nanuam-becomes-latest-victim-ofthai-media-intimidation/ 21. Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Descent into Chaos, May 2011, p. 145.

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been formally banned by the state; the distribution of the offending issues has always been blocked on the distributors own initiative (or accord). While the mainstream press has remained docile throughout the crisis precipitated by the 2006 coup, few print outlets have supported the destruction of democracy and the rule of law with as much zest as the English-language newspapers the Bangkok Post and the Nation. Both newspapers are only read by a tiny sliver of the population in Thailand and almost never break news of any consequence. As a result, what renders their role problematic is not their power to influence the domestic debate or shape domestic public opinion; it is rather the effect that both outlets have on the international coverage of Thailand.22 Troubling though it may be, the Bangkok Posts slogan is accurate these papers are indeed the worlds window to Thailand. Unfortunately, the window is offered by newspapers that routinely disseminate government propaganda, occasionally incite violence,23 applaud or rationalize the murder of Thai citizens,24 cheer impunity,25 defend restrictions to freedom of the press,26 or openly fantasize about theocracy.27 As highlighted by a pair of editorials recently published by the Nation, even when the paper is compelled to lament developments that attract international condemnation, great care is taken to absolve the government of responsibility28 or spread the blame around.29
22. See Jim Taylor, Truth and Media Hegemony, Prachatai, April 22, 2010. http://www.prachatai3.info/english/node/2433 23. For an example, see Sophon Ongkara, City Residents Become Hostages to RedShirt Anarchy, The Nation, April 6, 2010. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/04/06/opinion/City-residents-become-hostages-to-red-shirt-anarch-30126446.html 24. For example, see Debasing a World Court, Bangkok Post, November 1, 2010. http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/204183/debasing-a-world-court 25. For example, see Questionable Use of the Law, February 2, 2011. http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/219413/questionable-use-of-the-law 26. For example, see Thanong Khantong, Lese Majeste Allows Criticism but Not Abuse, The Nation, March 6, 2009. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/03/06/opinion/opinion_30097261.php 27. For example, see Bangkok Pundit, Columnist: Buddhist Principles not Democracy the Answer to Thailands Ills, March 4, 2011. http://asiancorrespondent.com/49580/thai-columnist-buddhist-principles-and-notdemocracy-is-the-answer-to-thailands-ills/ 28. See Thailand Can No Longer Celebrate Freedom of Speech, The Nation, May 4, 2011. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/04/opinion/Thailand-can-no-longercelebrate-freedom-of-speech-30154496.html 29. See No One Will Accept Responsibility for their Actions, May 6, 2011. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2011/05/06/opinion/No-one-will-accept-responsibility-for-their-action-30154673.html

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While the Bangkok Post has a long history of supine coverage and proEstablishment bias, it is the Nation that has most recently produced the kind of rabidly conservative content that most stands out for intellectual dishonesty and disregard of the facts. The Nations transformation into the premier outlet for anti-Reds propaganda30 represents the complete betrayal of the important role that the newspaper played in 1992 to expose the armys crimes during the crackdown of Black May. Much like government mouthpieces in neighboring countries, like the New Light of Myanmar in Burma31 or the Peoples Daily in China,32 the Nation was not content with simply demonizing protesters and justifying the governments abuses, but actively orchestrated a campaign against media outlets like CNN and BBC, which had sought to present a more balanced coverage of the Red Shirt rallies in 2010.33 Award-winning CNN reporter Dan Rivers was driven out of the country by the ostracism that resulted from this odious campaign.34 Given the complicity of much of the mainstream media, and the effectiveness of the informal pressure applied by the state, much of the outright repression on broadcast and print has focused on alternative outlets such as opposition magazines, community radio stations, and the UDDs free-to-air satellite television stations. Even before the most recent raids, Thai authorities had repeatedly sought to silence community radio stations in the provinces. After the imposition of the emergency decree in April 2010, the government shut down forty-seven radio stations in thirteen provinces in Central and Northeast Thailand, with the pretext that the stations either incited unrest or distorted information.35 Meanwhile, satellite television channels associated with the UDD have recurrently been censored. Once again, the imposition of the Emergency Decree was used to block D-Station and Peoples Television (PTV) during the mass protests of April 2009 and April 2010, respectively. PTV stopped
30. See Elizabeth Garrett, Q&A: Dutch Journalist Michel Maas Talks to IPI about Being Shot in Thailand Clashes, International Press Institute, July 6, 2010. http://www.freemedia.at/singleview/5032/ 31. See Kerry Howley, Dont Be Bought By Those Slickers, Reason, October 5, 2007. http://reason.com/blog/2007/10/05/dont-be-bought-by-those-slicke 32. See Chris Hogg, How the Chinese Reported Tiananmen, BBC, June 4, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8069940.stm 33. See Napas Na Pombejra, Open Letter to CNN, The Nation, May 19, 2010. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/home/2010/05/19/opinion/Open-letter-toCNN-30129682.html 34. See Nirmal Ghosh, Dan Rivers Leaving Thailand, September 5, 2010. http://blogs.straitstimes.com/2010/9/5/cnn-s-rivers-leaving-thailand

35. Human Rights Watch, Thailand: Descent into Chaos, May 2011, p. 142-143. AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 3 11

airing programming at the end of the crackdown. One other key feature of Thailands media landscape and regime of censorship and control is its obvious double standard. While opposition media outlets are routinely shut down on the pretext that they encourage violence and instability, pro-establishment media, such as the PAD-owned ASTV television station and its offshoot, the Manager website and newspaper, have never been sanctioned or censored. From the routine publishing of personal details of persons it deems a threat to the monarchy such as home addresses and phone numbers to outright abuse and the vicious language of hatred displayed towards Cambodians (a favorite target), the tone of the PAD media is as low as it gets. In recent months, outright calls for war with Cambodia have peppered the PADs usual mix of racist hate-speech and extreme right wing fanaticism. Furthermore, while often drawing on violent imagery and ugly stereotypes, ASTV and Manager have clearly encouraged the PAD to engage in illegal activities, including violent attacks on elected Thai politicians and police officers. They have, as yet, almost completely escaped any form of censure. It is nonetheless the world wide web that has become the main battlefield where the war to suppress alternative sources of information is waged. The internet presented a near impossible challenge to the Thai authorities. The government cannot impose the licensing requirements that make radio stations vulnerable to closure, while the nominal start-up costs involved in opening and operating a website or a blog removed the barriers to entry that used to ensure only the wealthy and well-connected could work as producers of news content. The diversification brought by the world wide web, the sheer volume of comments and posts, the degree of anonymity one might be able to maintain, and the possibility of easily hosting content in countries where speech is protected have both complicated the task of policing nonconformists and neutralized the effectiveness of the informal pressure with which the government easily keeps the mainstream media in line. At the same time, the smart, well-researched commentary that often appears on the web has undermined the credibility of mainstream media outlets whose job it is carry the governments water. Perhaps the best example is the role that the internet has played in turning the Nation into a laughingstock among those who follow Thai politics closely. The level of repression unleashed by the state on the world wide web, and the clumsiness with which it has gone about doing so, is driven by the pluralization inherent to the mediums diffusion and the growing irrelevance of traditional AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 3 12

means of managing information. Unable to shape news coverage through less conspicuous methods, Thai authorities have taken a brute force approach to the internet. Old and new legislation has been used to hound editors of online publications, bloggers, web designers, and users who post comments and pictures on public forums. Substantial resources have been committed to monitoring and surveillance. New agencies like the Bureau of Prevention and Eradication of Computer Crime have been set up.36 State-sanctioned volunteers, whose rhetoric and indoctrination are evocative of infamous civilian vigilantes from the 1970s,37 trawl the web for content they can report to the authorities.38 Most prominently, in recent years the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MICT) has undertaken a campaign to block access to thousands of internet sites found to contain inappropriate (or inconvenient) content, frequently attracting condemnation for its tendency to do so without the requisite court order. While estimates of the number of blocked websites are disputed, in May 2010 Police Colonel Suchart Wongananchai, Inspector of the Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, admitted to blocking over fifty thousand websites.39 As a result of the prolonged enforcement of the Emergency Decree (which allowed the authorities to block websites arbitrarily and without seeking the courts permission) through most of 2010, censorship has intensified since then. The watchdog group Freedom Against Censorship Thailand (FACT) estimated that by the end of 2010 more than four hundred thousand webpages had been blocked.40 The governments war on the internet has turned into an unmitigated public relations disaster. While the information the authorities have sought to suppress continues to be available, censorship has only heightened the
36. MICT to Curb Violations of Computer Act, National News Bureau of Thailand Public Relations Department, June 15, 2010. http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255306150051 37. Nicholas Farrelly, From Village Scouts to Cyber Scouts, New Mandala, July 2, 2010. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2010/07/02/from-village-scouts-to-cyber-scouts/ 38. Daniel Rook, Thai Cyber Scouts Patrol Web for Royal Insults, AFP, May 11, 2011. http://news.brisbanetimes.com.au/breaking-news-technology/thai-cyber-scoutspatrol-web-for-royal-insults-20110511-1eijz.html 39. 50,000 Websites Shut Down, MICT Inspector Says, Prachatai, May 7, 2010. http://www.prachatai.org/english/node/1795 40. Thailands Backdoor Censorship 425,296 Webpages Blocked, Freedom Against Censorship Thailand, January 5, 2011. http://facthai.wordpress.com/2011/01/05/factorial-thailands-backdoor-censorship425296-webpages-blocked/

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publics interest by underscoring just how threatening the banned content is considered by the state. Meanwhile, these extreme measures have attracted unprecedented international scrutiny and condemnation, damaging the governments credibility, diminishing the countrys prestige, and destroying the myth of Thailand as a country tolerant of alternative political views. Recent reports by Freedom House suggest that the overall decline that Thailands freedom of the press has experienced in recent years is driven primarily by the shambles that is the countrys record with regard to internet freedom.41 The scrutiny also exposed senior Establishment figures to ridicule for the outrageous public statements they were forced to make to rationalize the campaign. Shortly after his appointment in June 2010, for instance, Minister of Information and Communication Technology Juti Krai-rirk claimed that the government has given too much freedom for its citizens hence the need for more censorship.42

4. BEYOND ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM

Elections are an essential component of any functioning democratic regime. Democracy, however, is not just about elections, even when elections are free of outright fraud. Democracy cannot exist when elections are undone by the courts or rendered meaningless by the militarys refusal to submit to the control of an elected civilian government. Democracy cannot exist when political parties are barred from fielding their best candidates, are denied the opportunity to mount a vigorous campaign, and are forced to enter into alliances by threats of dissolution. Equally important, democracy cannot exist when voters are denied access to alternative sources of information, such that they cannot make a free and informed judgment about the options before them. Without the rule of law, freedom of association, freedom of speech, and an independent press, elections cannot, on their own, make a country a democracy. Indeed, elections held in these circumstances often run the risk of becoming just another instrument of authoritarian rule. That is the difference between electoral democracy and electoral authoritarianism. In Thailand, the subversion of each of these indispensable features of
41. Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2010: Thailand, April 2011. http://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/FotN/Thailand2011.pdf 42. MICT to Curb Violations of Computer Act, National News Bureau of Thailand Public Relations Department, June 15, 2010. http://thainews.prd.go.th/en/news.php?id=255306150051

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democracy casts a dark shadow on both the conduct and the significance of the upcoming elections. While previous reports in this series have described the manner in which the army and the courts undermine the competitiveness and the democratic content of Thailands elections, the restrictions placed in recent years on freedom of expression and freedom of the press are especially troubling. Political parties must now tread carefully on controversial issues for fear of being branded enemies of the monarchy a label that is increasingly easy to earn given the stretching of lese majeste provisions. Citizens are denied the right to speak freely, which in turn deprives them of an opportunity to shape government policies, party platforms, and public debate based on their true political preferences. And while the mainstream press offers for the most part one-sided information designed to benefit the Establishment and boost the electoral prospects of its parliamentary wing, the Democrat Party, alternative media outlets are continuously engaged in a cat and mouse game with the authorities. Much of their financial resources, manpower, and time are expended trying to elude government censorship, circumventing filtering mechanisms, and fending off the threat of arrest or prosecution. Thailands general elections cannot be described as genuinely free, fair, and competitive so long as citizens do not have the right to express their opinions and are denied access to a wide range of alternative information. For that to happen, old and new restrictions on freedom of speech must be lifted, while the regulatory framework that governs Thailands media landscape must be brought in line with fundamental principles shared by every democratic society. At the very least, this requires a series of reforms: (a) The Thai armed forces, and any member thereof, must be prohibited from owning and operating any television or radio station; (b) Defamation laws must be overhauled, such that the offense of defamation/libel is decriminalized and re-classified as a civil offense punishable only by a monetary fine. In addition, proving defamation in court must require proof that the statements in question are false, and evidence that they were made by the accused with knowledge of the truth and intent to cause harm; (c) The 2007 Computer Crimes Act must be repealed in its entirety; (d) Article 112 of the Criminal Code, sanctioning the crime of lese majeste, must be amended in accordance with legislation that exists in countries AMSTERDAM & PEROFF | 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 3 15

that have the benefit of both a stable constitutional monarchy and a functioning democracy. In practice, any such reform must entail limitations to the right to file a complaint, the drastic reduction of prison terms, the requirement that the proceedings not be held in secret, the lifting of media restriction on reporting on the charges, and the admissibility of truth as a viable defense. Aside from removing the most serious impediment to freedom of expression in Thailand, reforming Article 112 is arguably the most constructive, most sensible way to uphold the monarchy. The reforms guarantee that ill-intentioned people or groups seeking political advantage can no longer use the monarchy as a weapon to stifle debate and criminalize oppositions; (e) Finally, no political content, whether in print or in electronic format, shall be censored by the state, whether before or after its publication, and under no circumstances prior to a court judgment finding that the content in question constitutes defamation or lese majeste (according to the revised definitions). Army Commander in Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha recently spoke to reporters about his apparent unease with one of the central tenets of democracy. The Thai people, he stated, cannot have freedom of thought, because with freedom of thought come problems.43 General Prayuths fears are well founded. Freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press have always presented military regimes with insurmountable problems. Indeed, that is possibly the most compelling reason why such freedoms must be restored. Ultimately, it should not be up to the generals, or any other member of the Establishment, to decide what rights the people deserve to enjoy. It is rather for the Thai people to decide, through open and public debate, the configuration of Thailands political institutions and the prerogatives exercised by each. Judging from the draconian measures put in place over the last five years to stifle public debate, there is nothing the Thai Establishment finds quite so downright terrifying.

43. DNN-News, April 29, 2011: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d-T0SVEIEFU

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THAILAND 2011 GENERAL ELECTION REPORT SERIES, NO. 3