Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila EN BANC

PHILIPPINE SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, G.R. No. 169752 Petitioners, Members:

PUNO, C.J.

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA, - versus CARPIO-MORALES, AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and REYES, JJ. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, DIR. RODULFO J. ARIESGA (in his official capacity as Director of the Commission on Audit), MS. MERLE M. VALENTIN and MS. SUSAN GUARDIAN (in their official capacities as Team Leader and Team Member, respectively, of the audit Team of the Commission on Audit), Promulgated: Respondents. September 25, 2007 x----------------------------------------------------------- x DECISION AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Before the Court is a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 2 of Rule 64, filed by the petitioner assailing Office Order No. 2005-021[1][1] dated September 14, 2005 issued by the respondents which constituted the audit team, as well as its September 23, 2005 Letter[2][2] informing the petitioner that respondents audit team shall conduct an audit survey on the petitioner for a detailed audit of its accounts, operations, and financial transactions. No temporary restraining order was issued. The petitioner was incorporated as a juridical entity over one hundred years ago by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905, by the Philippine Commission. The petitioner, at the time it was created, was composed of animal aficionados and animal propagandists. The objects of the petitioner, as stated in Section 2 of its charter, shall be

to enforce laws relating to cruelty inflicted upon animals or the protection of animals in the Philippine Islands, and generally, to do and perform all things which may tend in any way to alleviate the suffering of animals and promote their welfare.[3][3] At the time of the enactment of Act No. 1285, the original Corporation Law, Act No. 1459, was not yet in existence. Act No. 1285 antedated both the Corporation Law and the constitution of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Important to note is that the nature of the petitioner as a corporate entity is distinguished from the sociedad anonimas under the Spanish Code of Commerce. For the purpose of enhancing its powers in promoting animal welfare and enforcing laws for the protection of animals, the petitioner was initially imbued under its charter with the power to apprehend violators of animal welfare laws. In addition, the petitioner was to share one-half (1/2) of the fines imposed and collected through its efforts for violations of the laws related thereto. As originally worded, Sections 4 and 5 of Act No. 1285 provide: SEC. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to exceed five agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed two in each of the provinces of the Philippine Islands who shall have all the power and authority of a police officer to make arrests for violation of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals, and to serve any process in connection with the execution of such laws; and in addition thereto, all the police force of the Philippine Islands, wherever organized, shall, as occasion requires, assist said society, its members or agents, in the enforcement of all such laws. SEC. 5. One-half of all the fines imposed and collected through the efforts of said society, its members or its agents, for violations of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and for their protection, shall belong to said society and shall be used to promote its objects. (emphasis supplied) Subsequently, however, the power to make arrests as well as the privilege to retain a portion of the fines collected for violation of animal-related laws were recalled by virtue of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 148,[4][4] which reads, in its entirety, thus: Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: Section 1. Section four of Act Numbered Twelve hundred and eighty-five as amended by Act Numbered Thirty five hundred and forty-eight, is hereby further amended so as to read as follows:

Sec. 4. The said society is authorized to appoint not to exceed ten agents in the City of Manila, and not to exceed one in each municipality of the Philippines who shall have the authority to denounce to regular peace officers any violation of the laws enacted for the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals and to cooperate with said peace officers in the prosecution of transgressors of such laws. Sec. 2. The full amount of the fines collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was committed. Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Approved, November 8, 1936. (Emphasis supplied)

Immediately thereafter, then President Manuel L. Quezon issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 63 dated November 12, 1936, portions of which provide: Whereas, during the first regular session of the National Assembly, Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred Forty Eight was enacted depriving the agents of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of their power to arrest persons who have violated the laws prohibiting cruelty to animals thereby correcting a serious defect in one of the laws existing in our statute books. xxxx Whereas, the cruel treatment of animals is an offense against the State, penalized under our statutes, which the Government is duty bound to enforce; Now, therefore, I, Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippines, pursuant to the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution, hereby decree, order, and direct the Commissioner of Public Safety, the Provost Marshal General as head of the Constabulary Division of the Philippine Army, every Mayor of a chartered city, and every municipal president to detail and organize special members of the police force, local, national, and the Constabulary to watch, capture, and prosecute offendersagainst the laws enacted to prevent cruelty to animals. (Emphasis supplied)

On December 1, 2003, an audit team from respondent Commission on Audit (COA) visited the office of the petitioner to conduct an audit survey pursuant to COA Office Order No. 2003-051 dated November 18, 2003[5][5] addressed to the petitioner. The petitioner demurred on the ground that it was a private entity not under the jurisdiction

of COA, citing Section 2(1) of Article IX of the Constitution which specifies the general jurisdiction of the COA, viz: Section 1. General Jurisdiction. The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and officers that have been granted fiscal autonomy under the Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government, and for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner explained thus: a. Although the petitioner was created by special legislation, this necessarily came about because in January 1905 there was as yet neither a Corporation Law or any other general law under which it may be organized and incorporated, nor a Securities and Exchange Commission which would have passed upon its organization and incorporation. b. That Executive Order No. 63, issued during the Commonwealth period, effectively deprived the petitioner of its power to make arrests, and that the petitioner lost its operational funding, underscore the fact that it exercises no governmental function. In fine, the government itself, by its overt acts, confirmed petitioner s status as a private juridical entity. The COA General Counsel issued a Memorandum[6][6] dated May 6, 2004, asserting that the petitioner was subject to its audit authority. In a letter dated May 17, 2004,[7][7] respondent COA informed the petitioner of the result of the evaluation, furnishing it with a copy of said Memorandum dated May 6, 2004 of the General Counsel. Petitioner thereafter filed with the respondent COA a Request for Re-evaluation dated May 19, 2004,[8][8] insisting that it was a private domestic corporation. Acting on the said request, the General Counsel of respondent COA, in a Memorandum dated July 13, 2004,[9][9] affirmed her earlier opinion that the petitioner

was a government entity that was subject to the audit jurisdiction of respondent COA. In a letter dated September 14, 2004, the respondent COA informed the petitioner of the result of the re-evaluation, maintaining its position that the petitioner was subject to its audit jurisdiction, and requested an initial conference with the respondents. In a Memorandum dated September 16, 2004, Director Delfin Aguilar reported to COA Assistant Commissioner Juanito Espino, Corporate Government Sector, that the audit survey was not conducted due to the refusal of the petitioner because the latter maintained that it was a private corporation. Petitioner received on September 27, 2005 the subject COA Office Order 2005021 dated September 14, 2005 and the COA Letter dated September 23, 2005.

Hence, herein Petition on the following grounds: A. RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS SUBJECT TO ITS AUDIT AUTHORITY. B. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF SOUGHT, THERE BEING NO APPEAL, NOR ANY PLAIN, SPEEDY AND ADEQUATE REMEDY IN THE ORDINARY COURSE OF LAW AVAILABLE TO IT.[10][10] The essential question before this Court is whether the petitioner qualifies as a government agency that may be subject to audit by respondent COA. Petitioner argues: first, even though it was created by special legislation in 1905 as there was no general law then existing under which it may be organized or incorporated, it exercises no governmental functions because these have been revoked by C.A. No. 148 and E.O. No. 63; second, nowhere in its charter is it indicated that it is a public corporation, unlike, for instance, C.A. No. 111 which created the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, defined its powers and purposes, and specifically stated that it was An Act to Create a Public Corporation in which, even as amended by Presidential Decree No. 460, the law still adverted to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines as a public corporation, all of which are not obtaining in the charter of the petitioner; third, if it were a government body, there would have been no need for the State to grant it tax exemptions under Republic Act No. 1178, and the fact that it was so exempted strengthens its position that it is a private institution; fourth, the employees of the petitioner are registered and covered

by the Social Security System at the latter s initiative and not through the Government Service Insurance System, which should have been the case had the employees been considered government employees; fifth, the petitioner does not receive any form of financial assistance from the government, since C.A. No. 148, amending Section 5 of Act No. 1285, states that the full amount of the fines, collected for violation of the laws against cruelty to animals and for the protection of animals, shall accrue to the general fund of the Municipality where the offense was committed ; sixth, C.A. No. 148 effectively deprived the petitioner of its powers to make arrests and serve processes as these functions were placed in the hands of the police force; seventh, no government appointee or representative sits on the board of trustees of the petitioner; eighth, a reading of the provisions of its charter (Act No. 1285) fails to show that any act or decision of the petitioner is subject to the approval of or control by any government agency, except to the extent that it is governed by the law on private corporations in general; and finally,ninth, the Committee on Animal Welfare, under the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, includes members from both the private and the public sectors. The respondents contend that since the petitioner is a body politic created by virtue of a special legislation and endowed with a governmental purpose, then, indubitably, the COA may audit the financial activities of the latter. Respondents in effect divide their contentions into six strains:first, the test to determine whether an entity is a government corporation lies in the manner of its creation, and, since the petitioner was created by virtue of a special charter, it is thus a government corporation subject to respondents auditing power; second, the petitioner exercises sovereign powers, that is, it is tasked to enforce the laws for the protection and welfare of animals which ultimately redound to the public good and welfare, and, therefore, it is deemed to be a government instrumentality as defined under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of which is connected with the administration of government, as purportedly affirmed by American jurisprudence; third, by virtue of Section 23,[11][11] Title II, Book III of the same Code, the Office of the President exercises supervision or control over the petitioner; fourth, under the same Code, the requirement under its special charter for the petitioner to render a report to the Civil Governor, whose functions have been inherited by the Office of the President, clearly reflects the nature of the petitioner as a government instrumentality; fifth, despite the passage of the Corporation Code, the law creating the petitioner had not been abolished, nor had it been re-incorporated under any general corporation law; and finally, sixth, Republic Act No. 8485, otherwise known as the Animal Welfare Act of 1998, designates the petitioner as a member of its Committee on Animal Welfare which is attached to the Department of Agriculture. In view of the phrase One-half of all the fines imposed and collected through the efforts of said society, the Court, in a Resolution dated January 30, 2007, required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the parties to comment on: a) petitioner's authority to impose fines and the validity of the provisions of Act No. 1285 and Commonwealth Act No. 148 considering that there are no standard measures provided for

in the aforecited laws as to the manner of implementation, the specific violations of the law, the person/s authorized to impose fine and in what amount; and, b) the effect of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions on whether petitioner continues to exist or should organize as a private corporation under the Corporation Code, B.P. Blg. 68 as amended. Petitioner and the OSG filed their respective Comments. Respondents filed a Manifestation stating that since they were being represented by the OSG which filed its Comment, they opted to dispense with the filing of a separate one and adopt for the purpose that of the OSG. The petitioner avers that it does not have the authority to impose fines for violation of animal welfare laws; it only enjoyed the privilege of sharing in the fines imposed and collected from its efforts in the enforcement of animal welfare laws; such privilege, however, was subsequently abolished by C.A. No. 148; that it continues to exist as a private corporation since it was created by the Philippine Commission before the effectivity of the Corporation law, Act No. 1459; and the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The OSG submits that Act No. 1285 and its amendatory laws did not give petitioner the authority to impose fines for violation of laws[12][12] relating to the prevention of cruelty to animals and the protection of animals; that even prior to the amendment of Act No. 1285, petitioner was only entitled to share in the fines imposed; C.A. No. 148 abolished that privilege to share in the fines collected; that petitioner is a public corporation and has continued to exist since Act No. 1285; petitioner was not repealed by the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions which contain transitory provisions maintaining all laws issued not inconsistent therewith until amended, modified or repealed. The petition is impressed with merit. The arguments of the parties, interlaced as they are, can be disposed of in five points. First, the Court agrees with the petitioner that the charter test cannot be applied. Essentially, the charter test as it stands today provides: [T]he test to determine whether a corporation is government owned or controlled, or private in nature is simple. Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a public function, or by incorporation under the general corporation law? Those with special charters are government corporations subject to its provisions, and its employees are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission, and are compulsory members of the Government Service Insurance System. xxx (Emphasis supplied)[13][13]

The petitioner is correct in stating that the charter test is predicated, at best, on the legal regime established by the 1935 Constitution, Section 7, Article XIII, which states: Sec. 7. The National Assembly shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof.[14][14] The foregoing proscription has been carried over to the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Section 16 of Article XII of the present Constitution provides: Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. Section 16 is essentially a re-enactment of Section 7 of Article XVI of the 1935 Constitution and Section 4 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. During the formulation of the 1935 Constitution, the Committee on Franchises recommended the foregoing proscription to prevent the pressure of special interests upon the lawmaking body in the creation of corporations or in the regulation of the same. To permit the lawmaking body by special law to provide for the organization, formation, or regulation of private corporations would be in effect to offer to it the temptation in many cases to favor certain groups, to the prejudice of others or to the prejudice of the interests of the country.[15][15] And since the underpinnings of the charter test had been introduced by the 1935 Constitution and not earlier, it follows that the test cannot apply to the petitioner, which was incorporated by virtue of Act No. 1285, enacted on January 19, 1905. Settled is the rule that laws in general have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.[16][16] All statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retrospective effect.[17][17] There are a few exceptions. Statutes can be given retroactive effect in the following cases: (1) when the law itself so expressly provides; (2) in case of remedial statutes; (3) in case of curative statutes; (4) in case of laws interpreting others; and (5) in case of laws creating new rights. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 91649 May 14, 1991 ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent. H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners. Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners. Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR. PARAS, J.:p A TV ad proudly announces: "The new PAGCOR responding through responsible gaming." But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law; B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy; C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices; D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo) In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended Petition; p. 21, Rollo). The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.

The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to fully attain this objective. Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under the following declared policy Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in order to attain the following objectives: (a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government. (b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2) create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869) To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified. It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred NinetyFour (4,494) families.

But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323). As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra). In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar underscored the . . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W. 2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540) Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of petitioners to file the instant petition. Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371)

With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised. In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343). Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised. Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power. The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386). Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra) It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978). The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change. What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?

P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one corporate entity the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896. Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local." (2) Income and other taxes. a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal, provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]). Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons: (a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes (Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p. 445). (b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus: Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked. Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application and verification of the qualification of the applicant . .. Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila. (d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus: Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure, capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original incorporation. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local government. The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579) This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States (Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be

agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2, p. 140, emphasis supplied) Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42). The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland, supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the inherent power to wield it. (e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D. 1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides: Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government. (emphasis supplied) The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio." Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied) As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539). What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void. (Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 ExParte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You, 88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis supplied) Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because "it legalized PAGCOR conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo). We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989). The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827). Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449) horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional. If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827) The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v. Arizona, 249 US 2651). Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).

On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that: Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and Patrimony) It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and, policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles. In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2) Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore, for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine. As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521 Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to

this Court and which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the political departments of government: the President and the Congress. Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life. However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling. Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, GrioAquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority, except only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not involve such a factual situation. However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's selfrespect, which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national development. Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to the people's moral values. Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate.

One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein asgambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation. Melencio-Herrera, J., concur. Separate Opinions PADILLA, J., concurring: I concur in the result of the learned decision penned by my brother Mr. Justice Paras. This means that I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as gambling properly pertain to "state policy." It is, therefore, the political departments of government, namely, the legislative and the executive that should decide on what government should do in the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the people for such policy. The courts, as the decision states, cannot inquire into the wisdom, morality or expediency of policies adopted by the political departments of government in areas which fall within their authority, except only when such policies pose a clear and present danger to the life, liberty or property of the individual. This case does not involve such a factual situation. However, I hasten to make of record that I do not subscribe to gambling in any form. It demeans the human personality, destroys self-confidence and eviscerates one's selfrespect, which in the long run will corrode whatever is left of the Filipino moral character. Gambling has wrecked and will continue to wreck families and homes; it is an antithesis to individual reliance and reliability as well as personal industry which are the touchstones of real economic progress and national development. Gambling is reprehensible whether maintained by government or privatized. The revenues realized by the government out of "legalized" gambling will, in the long run, be more than offset and negated by the irreparable damage to the people's moral values. Also, the moral standing of the government in its repeated avowals against "illegal gambling" is fatally flawed and becomes untenable when it itself engages in the very activity it seeks to eradicate. One can go through the Court's decision today and mentally replace the activity referred to therein asgambling, which is legal only because it is authorized by law and run by the government, with the activity known as prostitution. Would prostitution be any less reprehensible were it to be authorized by law, franchised, and "regulated" by the government, in return for the substantial revenues it would yield the government to carry out its laudable projects, such as infrastructure and social amelioration? The question, I believe, answers itself. I submit that the sooner the legislative department outlaws all

forms of gambling, as a fundamental state policy, and the sooner the executive implements such policy, the better it will be for the nation. Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989 SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA, petitioner, vs. CONTE MANGELIN, SALIC ALI, SALINDATO ALI, PILIMPINAS CONDING, ACMAD TOMAWIS, GERRY TOMAWIS, JESUS ORTIZ, ANTONIO DELA FUENTE, DIEGO PALOMARES, JR., RAUL DAGALANGIT, and BIMBO SINSUAT, respondents. Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner petitioner. Makabangkit B. Lanto for respondents. SARMIENTO, J.: The acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII are assailed in this petition. The antecedent facts are as follows: 1. On September 24, 1986, petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was appointed as a member of the Sangguniang Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government, Region XII, representing Lanao del Sur. 2. On March 12, 1987 petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly for brevity). 3. Said Assembly is composed of eighteen (18) members. Two of said members, respondents Acmad Tomawis and Pakil Dagalangit, filed on March 23, 1987 with the Commission on Elections their respective certificates of candidacy in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections for the district of Lanao del Sur but they later withdrew from the aforesaid election and thereafter resumed again their positions as members of the Assembly. 4. On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited Mr. Xavier Razul, Pampook Speaker of Region XI, Zamboanga City and the petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly, Region XII, in a letter which reads: The Committee on Muslim Affairs well undertake consultations and dialogues with local government officials, civic, religious organizations and traditional leaders on the recent and present political developments and other issues affecting Regions IX and XII. The result of the conference, consultations and dialogues would hopefully chart the autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned and may prod the President to constitute immediately the Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the Commission.

You are requested to invite some members of the Pampook Assembly of your respective assembly on November 1 to 15, 1987, with venue at the Congress of the Philippines. Your presence, unstinted support and cooperation is (sic) indispensable. 5. Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary Johnny Alimbuyao of the Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as "our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang pampook ... ." 6. In compliance with the aforesaid instruction of the petitioner, Acting Secretary Alimbuyao sent to the members of the Assembly the following telegram: TRANSMITTING FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM SPEAKER LIMBONA QUOTE CONGRESSMAN JIMMY MATALAM CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MUSLIM AFFAIRS REQUESTED ME TO ASSIST SAID COMMITTEE IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE PROPOSED AUTONOMY ORGANIC NOV. 1ST TO 15. HENCE WERE ALL ASSEMBLYMEN THAT THERE SHALL BE NO SESSION IN NOVEMBER AS OUR PRESENCE IN THE HOUSE COMMITTEE HEARING OF CONGRESS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PENDING BUSINESS IN BATASANG PAMPOOK OF MATALAM FOLLOWS UNQUOTE REGARDS. 7. On November 2, 1987, the Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice, with the following assemblymen present: 1. Sali, Salic 2. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 3. Dagalangit, Rakil 4. Dela Fuente, Antonio 5. Mangelen, Conte 6. Ortiz, Jesus 7. Palomares, Diego 8. Sinsuat, Bimbo 9. Tomawis, Acmad 10. Tomawis, Jerry After declaring the presence of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant. 8. On November 5, 1987, the session of the Assembly resumed with the following Assemblymen present: 1. Mangelen Conte-Presiding Officer 2. Ali Salic 3. Ali Salindatu 4. Aratuc, Malik 5. Cajelo, Rene 6. Conding, Pilipinas (sic) 7. Dagalangit, Rakil 8. Dela Fuente, Antonio 9. Ortiz, Jesus

10 Palomares, Diego 11. Quijano, Jesus 12. Sinsuat, Bimbo 13. Tomawis, Acmad 14. Tomawis, Jerry An excerpt from the debates and proceeding of said session reads: HON. DAGALANGIT: Mr. Speaker, Honorable Members of the House, with the presence of our colleagues who have come to attend the session today, I move to call the names of the new comers in order for them to cast their votes on the previous motion to declare the position of the Speaker vacant. But before doing so, I move also that the designation of the Speaker Pro Tempore as the Presiding Officer and Mr. Johnny Evangelists as Acting Secretary in the session last November 2, 1987 be reconfirmed in today's session. HON. SALIC ALI: I second the motions. PRESIDING OFFICER: Any comment or objections on the two motions presented? Me chair hears none and the said motions are approved. ... Twelve (12) members voted in favor of the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant; one abstained and none voted against. 1 Accordingly, the petitioner prays for judgment as follows: WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that(a) This Petition be given due course; (b) Pending hearing, a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter; (c) After hearing, judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void; (d) Holding the election of petitioner as Speaker of said Legislative Assembly or Batasan Pampook, Region XII held on March 12, 1987 valid and subsisting, and (e) Making the injunction permanent. Petitioner likewise prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable. 2 Pending further proceedings, this Court, on January 19, 1988, received a resolution filed by the Sangguniang Pampook, "EXPECTING ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA FROM MEMBERSHIP OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AUTONOMOUS REGION XII," 3 on the grounds, among other things, that the petitioner "had caused to be prepared and signed by him paying [sic] the salaries and emoluments of Odin Abdula, who was considered resigned after filing his Certificate of Candidacy for Congressmen for the First District of Maguindanao in the last May 11, elections. . . and nothing in the record of the Assembly will show that any request for reinstatement by Abdula was ever made . . ." 4 and that "such action of Mr. Lim bona in paying Abdula his salaries and emoluments without authority from the Assembly . . . constituted a usurpation of the power of the Assembly," 5 that the petitioner "had recently caused withdrawal of so much amount of cash from the Assembly resulting to the non-payment of the salaries and emoluments of some Assembly [sic]," 6 and that he had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on question which should have been resolved within the

confines of the Assembly," 7 for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic". 8 The first question, evidently, is whether or not the expulsion of the petitioner (pending litigation) has made the case moot and academic. We do not agree that the case has been rendered moot and academic by reason simply of the expulsion resolution so issued. For, if the petitioner's expulsion was done purposely to make this petition moot and academic, and to preempt the Court, it will not make it academic. On the ground of the immutable principle of due process alone, we hold that the expulsion in question is of no force and effect. In the first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had conducted an investigation, and whether or not the petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, what appears in the records is an admission by the Assembly (at least, the respondents) that "since November, 1987 up to this writing, the petitioner has not set foot at the Sangguniang Pampook." 9 "To be sure, the private respondents aver that "[t]he Assemblymen, in a conciliatory gesture, wanted him to come to Cotabato City," 10 but that was "so that their differences could be threshed out and settled." 11Certainly, that avowed wanting or desire to thresh out and settle, no matter how conciliatory it may be cannot be a substitute for the notice and hearing contemplated by law. While we have held that due process, as the term is known in administrative law, does not absolutely require notice and that a party need only be given the opportunity to be heard, 12 it does not appear herein that the petitioner had, to begin with, been made aware that he had in fact stood charged of graft and corruption before his collegues. It cannot be said therefore that he was accorded any opportunity to rebut their accusations. As it stands, then, the charges now levelled amount to mere accusations that cannot warrant expulsion. In the second place, (the resolution) appears strongly to be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be abduracy on the part of the latter. Indeed, it (the resolution) speaks of "a case [having been filed] [by the petitioner] before the Supreme Court . . . on question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assemblyman act which some members claimed unnecessarily and unduly assails their integrity and character as representative of the people" 13 an act that cannot possibly justify expulsion. Access to judicial remedies is guaranteed by the Constitution, 14 and, unless the recourse amounts to malicious prosecution, no one may be punished for seeking redress in the courts. We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded, to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the Sangguniang Pampook(s) are "autonomous," the courts may not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and XII? The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No. 1618 15 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree established "internal autonomy" 16 in the two regions "[w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution," 17 with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities 18 specified therein. It requires the autonomous regional governments to "undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions," 19 except to "act on matters which are within the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government," 20 "which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) National defense and security; (2) Foreign relations; (3) Foreign trade; (4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing, (5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural resources; (6) Air and sea transport (7) Postal matters and telecommunications; (8) Customs and quarantine; (9) Immigration and deportation; (10) Citizenship and naturalization; (11) National economic, social and educational planning; and (12) General auditing. 21 In relation to the central government, it provides that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ..." 22 Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," 23 "and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." 24 At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" 25 over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 26 He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. 27

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency. 28 But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. 29 Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 30 xxx xxx xxx See. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. 31 An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." 33 In the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services, thus:

SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook. The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local legislative powers over regional affairs within the framework of national development plans, policies and goals, in the following areas: (1) Organization of regional administrative system; (2) Economic, social and cultural development of the Autonomous Region; (3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial programs for the Autonomous Region; (4) Infrastructure development for the Autonomous Region; (5) Urban and rural planning for the Autonomous Region; (6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures as provided for in this Decree; (7) Maintenance, operation and administration of schools established by the Autonomous Region; (8) Establishment, operation and maintenance of health, welfare and other social services, programs and facilities; (9) Preservation and development of customs, traditions, languages and culture indigenous to the Autonomous Region; and (10) Such other matters as may be authorized by law,including the enactment of such measures as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people in the Autonomous Region. The President shall exercise such powers as may be necessary to assure that enactment and acts of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance with this Decree, national legislation, policies, plans and programs. The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain liaison with the Batasang Pambansa. 34 Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. Briefly, the petitioner assails the legality of his ouster as Speaker on the grounds that: (1) the Sanggunian, in convening on November 2 and 5, 1987 (for the sole purpose of declaring the office of the Speaker vacant), did so in violation of the Rules of the Sangguniang Pampook since the Assembly was then on recess; and (2) assuming that it was valid, his ouster was ineffective nevertheless for lack of quorum. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook," 35 but it provides likewise that "the Speaker may, on [sic] his discretion, declare a recess of "short intervals." 36 Of course, there is disagreement between the protagonists as to whether or not the recess called by the petitioner effective November 1 through 15, 1987 is the "recess of short intervals" referred to; the petitioner says that it is while the respondents insist that, to all intents and purposes, it was an adjournment and that "recess" as used by their Rules only refers to "a recess when arguments get heated up so that protagonists in a debate can talk things out informally and obviate dissenssion [sic] and disunity. 37The Court agrees with the respondents on this regard, since clearly, the Rules speak of "short intervals." Secondly, the Court likewise agrees that the Speaker could not have validly called a recess since the Assembly had yet to convene on November 1, the date session

opens under the same Rules.38 Hence, there can be no recess to speak of that could possibly interrupt any session. But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could. do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Thirdly, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. It does not appear to us, moreover, that the petitioner had resorted to the aforesaid "recess" in order to forestall the Assembly from bringing about his ouster. This is not apparent from the pleadings before us. We are convinced that the invitation was what precipitated it. In holding that the "recess" in question is valid, we are not to be taken as establishing a precedent, since, as we said, a recess can not be validly declared without a session having been first opened. In upholding the petitioner herein, we are not giving him a carte blanche to order recesses in the future in violation of the Rules, or otherwise to prevent the lawful meetings thereof. Neither are we, by this disposition, discouraging the Sanggunian from reorganizing itself pursuant to its lawful prerogatives. Certainly, it can do so at the proper time. In the event that be petitioner should initiate obstructive moves, the Court is certain that it is armed with enough coercive remedies to thwart them. 39 In view hereof, we find no need in dwelling on the issue of quorum. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII, is ENJOINED to (1) REINSTATE the petitioner as Member, Sangguniang Pampook, Region XII; and (2) REINSTATE him as Speaker thereof. No costs. SO ORDERED. Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. Padilla, J., took no part. Footnotes 1 Rollo, 115-120; emphasis in the original. 2 Id., 6-7. 3 Id., 134-135. 4 Id., 134. 5 Id. 6 Id., 135. 7 Id. 8 Id., 142. 9 Id., 141.

10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc. v. Achacoso, G.R. No. 81805, May 31, 1988. 13 Id., 135. 14 See CONST. (1987), art. III, sec. 11. 15 IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AND THE LUPONG TAGAPAGPAGANAP NG POOK IN REGION IX AND REGION XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. 16 Pres. Decree No. 1618, sec. 3. 17 Supra. 18 Supra. 19 Supra, sec. 4. 20 Supra. 21 Supra. 22 Supra, sec. 35(a). 23 CONST. (1973), art. XI, sec. 1; also CONST. (1987), supra, art. sec. 3. 24 Batas Blg. 337, sec 2. 25 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 4; Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14. 26 Batas Blg. 337, supra; Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958). 27 Hebron v. Reyes, supra. 28 Bernas, Joaquin, "Brewing storm over autonomy," The Manila Chronicle, pp. 4-5. 29 CONST. (1987), supra, art. X, sec. 1. 30 Supra, sec. 2. 31 Supra, sec. 15. 32 Batas Blg. 337, supra, sec. 14. 33 Pres. Decree No. 1618, supra, sec. 35 (b). Whether or not it is constitutional for the President to exercise control over the Sanggunians is another question. 34 Supra, sec. 7. 35 Rollo, Id., 122. 36 Id. 37 Id., 145-146. 38 Id., 121. 39 See Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949). Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 129093 August 30, 2001 HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA, and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs.

HON. FRANCISCO DIZON PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 dated February 10, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 93, enjoining petitioners from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganof Laguna and its subsequent Order 2 dated April 21, 1997 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995. The ordinance reads: ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA "ILLEGAL GAMBLING" LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna ay talamak na; SAPAGKA'T, ang sugal ay nagdudulot ng masasamang impluwensiya lalo't higit sa mga kabataan; KUNG KAYA'T DAHIL DITO, at sa mungkahi nina Kgg. Kgd. Juan M. Unico at Kgg. Kgd. GatAla A. Alatiit, pinangalawahan ni Kgg. Kgd. Meliton C. Larano at buong pagkakaisang sinangayunan ng lahat ng dumalo sa pulong; IPINASIYA, na tutulan gaya ng dito ay mahigpit na TINUTUTULAN ang ano mang uri ng sugal dito sa lalawigan ng Laguna lalo't higit ang Lotto; IPINASIYA PA RIN na hilingin tulad ng dito ay hinihiling sa Panlalawigang pinuno ng Philippine National Police (PNP) Col. [illegible] na mahigpit na pag-ibayuhin ang pagsugpo sa lahat ng uri ng illegal na sugal sa buong lalawigan ng Laguna lalo na ang "Jueteng".3 As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. The dispositive portion of said decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants, their agents and representatives are hereby enjoined from implementing or enforcing resolution or kapasiyahan blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Laguna prohibiting the operation of the lotto in the province of Laguna. SO ORDERED.4

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated April 21, 1997, which reads: Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendants Jose D. Lina, Jr. and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, thru counsel, with the opposition filed by plaintiff's counsel and the comment thereto filed by counsel for the defendants which were duly noted, the Court hereby denies the motion for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.5 On May 23, 1997, petitioners filed this petition alleging that the following errors were committed by the respondent trial court: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ENJOINING THE PETITIONERS FROM IMPLEMENTING KAPASIYAHAN BLG. 508, T. 1995 OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF THE LOTTO IN THE PROVINCE OF LAGUNA. II THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE ARGUMENT POSITED BY THE PETITIONERS THAT BEFORE ANY GOVERNMENT PROJECT OR PROGRAM MAY BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE NATIONAL AGENCIES OR OFFICES, PRIOR CONSULTATION AND APPROVAL BY THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS CONCERNED AND OTHER CONCERNED SECTORS IS REQUIRED. Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under the General Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.6 They also maintain that respondent's lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160.7 For his part, respondent Calvento argues that the questioned resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already declared lotto as legal and permitted its operations around the country.8 As for the allegation that no prior consultations and approval were sought from the sangguniang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent Calvento contends this is not mandatory since such a requirement is merely stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of the Local Government Code of 1991.9 He also states that his operation of the lotto system is legal because of the authority given to him by the PCSO, which in turn had been granted a franchise to operate the lotto by Congress.10 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the State, contends that the Provincial Government of Laguna has no power to prohibit a form of gambling which has been authorized by the national government.11 He argues that this is based on the principle that ordinances should not contravene statutes as municipal governments are merely agents of the national government. The local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers which have been conferred on them by Congress. This being the case, these councils, as delegates, cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than

those of the latter. The OSG also adds that the question of whether gambling should be permitted is for Congress to determine, taking into account national and local interests. Since Congress has allowed the PCSO to operate lotteries which PCSO seeks to conduct in Laguna, pursuant to its legislative grant of authority, the province's Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot nullify the exercise of said authority by preventing something already allowed by Congress. The issues to be resolved now are the following: (1) whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayor's permit based thereon are valid; and (2) whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue a mayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to the mayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in the province of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to the said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. Even petitioners admit as much when they stated in their petition that: 5.7. The terms of the Resolution and the validity thereof are express and clear. The Resolution is a policy declaration of the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement opposition and/or objection to the operation of and/or all forms of gambling including the Lotto operation in the Province of Laguna.12 As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. The game of lotto is a game of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress. Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchise to the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries. The pertinent provision reads: SECTION 1. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, hereinafter designated the Office, shall be the principal government agency for raising and providing for funds for health programs, medical assistance and services and charities of national character, and as such shall have the general powers conferred in section thirteen of Act Numbered One thousand four hundred fifty-nine, as amended, and shall have the authority: A. To hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, and other similar activities, in such frequency and manner, as shall be determined, and subject to such rules and regulations as shall be promulgated by the Board of Directors.

This statute remains valid today. While lotto is clearly a game of chance, the national government deems it wise and proper to permit it. Hence, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, a local government unit, cannot issue a resolution or an ordinance that would seek to prohibit permits. Stated otherwise, what the national legislature expressly allows by law, such as lotto, a provincial board may not disallow by ordinance or resolution. In our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac,13 ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp.14 Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute. Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature (citing Clinton vs. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455). Nothing in the present constitutional provision enhancing local autonomy dictates a different conclusion. The basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power to tax (citing Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution), which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.15 Ours is still a unitary form of government, not a federal state. Being so, any form of autonomy granted to local governments will necessarily be limited and confined within the extent allowed by the central authority. Besides, the principle of local autonomy under

the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization". It does not make local governments sovereign within the state or an "imperium in imperio".16 To conclude our resolution of the first issue, respondent mayor of San Pedro, cannot avail ofKapasiyahan Bilang 508, Taon 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna as justification to prohibit lotto in his municipality. For said resolution is nothing but an expression of the local legislative unit concerned. The Board's enactment, like spring water, could not rise above its source of power, the national legislature. As for the second issue, we hold that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto outlets around the country. These provisions state: SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. . . . (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. SECTION 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless, appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code. Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.17 Section 26 reads: SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof. Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in loss of crop land, range-

land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna. Moreover, the argument regarding lack of consultation raised by petitioners is clearly an afterthought on their part. There is no indication in the letter of Mayor Cataquiz that this was one of the reasons for his refusal to issue a permit. That refusal was predicated solely but erroneously on the provisions of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, Taon 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. In sum, we find no reversible error in the RTC decision enjoining Mayor Cataquiz from enforcing or implementing the Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna. That resolution expresses merely a policy statement of the Laguna provincial board. It possesses no binding legal force nor requires any act of implementation. It provides no sufficient legal basis for respondent mayor's refusal to issue the permit sought by private respondent in connection with a legitimate business activity authorized by a law passed by Congress. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing Resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995, of the Provincial Board of Laguna is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ ., concur. Footnotes 1 Rollo, pp. 18-20. 2 Id. at 21. 3 Records, pp. 8-8-A. 4 Rollo, p. 20. 5 Id. at 21. 6 Id. at 13. 7 Section 2. Declaration of Policy. . . . (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in Section 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained; Provided, that occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. 8 Rollo, p. 25. 9 Id. at. 27.

10 Id. at 28. 11 Id. at 58-61. 12 Id. at 13. 13 207 SCRA 157, 161 (1992). 14 Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., 234 SCRA 255, 272-273 (1994). 15 Id. at 273. 16 Basco vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52, 65 (1991). 17 Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., The Local Government Code of 1991, p. 124. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 125350 December 3, 2002 HON. RTC JUDGES MERCEDES G. DADOLE (Executive Judge, Branch 28), ULRIC R. CAETE (Presiding Judge, Branch 25), AGUSTINE R. VESTIL (Presiding Judge, Branch 56), HON. MTC JUDGES TEMISTOCLES M. BOHOLST (Presiding Judge, Branch 1), VICENTE C. FANILAG (Judge Designate, Branch 2), and WILFREDO A. DAGATAN (Presiding Judge, Branch 3), all of Mandaue City, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to annul the decision1 and resolution2, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) affirming the notices of the Mandaue City Auditor which diminished the monthly additional allowances received by the petitioner judges of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Municipal Trial Court (MTC) stationed in Mandaue City. The undisputed facts are as follows: In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances of P1,260 each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the said city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge. On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that: "x x x xxx xxx 2.3.2. In the light of the authority granted to the local government units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other benefits to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional allowances

in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and P700.00 in municipalities may be granted subject to the following conditions: a) That the grant is not mandatory on the part of the LGUs; b) That all contractual and statutory obligations of the LGU including the implementation of R.A. 6758 shall have been fully provided in the budget; c) That the budgetary requirements/limitations under Section 324 and 325 of R.A. 7160 should be satisfied and/or complied with; and d) That the LGU has fully implemented the devolution of functions/personnel in accordance with R.A. 7160.3" (italics supplied) xxx xxx xxx The said circular likewise provided for its immediate effectivity without need of publication: "5.0 EFFECTIVITY This Circular shall take effect immediately." Acting on the DBM directive, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of disallowance to herein petitioners, namely, Honorable RTC Judges Mercedes G. Dadole, Ulric R. Caete, Agustin R. Vestil, Honorable MTC Judges Temistocles M. Boholst, Vicente C. Fanilag and Wilfredo A. Dagatan, in excess of the amount authorized by LBC 55. Beginning October, 1994, the additional monthly allowances of the petitioner judges were reduced to P1,000 each. They were also asked to reimburse the amount they received in excess of P1,000 from April to September, 1994. The petitioner judges filed with the Office of the City Auditor a protest against the notices of disallowance. But the City Auditor treated the protest as a motion for reconsideration and indorsed the same to the COA Regional Office No. 7. In turn, the COA Regional Office referred the motion to the head office with a recommendation that the same be denied. On September 21, 1995, respondent COA rendered a decision denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. The COA held that: The issue to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether or not the City Ordinance of Mandaue which provides a higher rate of allowances to the appellant judges may prevail over that fixed by the DBM under Local Budget Circular No. 55 dated March 15, 1994. xxx xxx xxx Applying the foregoing doctrine, appropriation ordinance of local government units is subject to the organizational, budgetary and compensation policies of budgetary authorities (COA 5th Ind., dated March 17, 1994 re: Province of Antique; COA letter dated May 17, 1994 re: Request of Hon. Renato Leviste, Cong. 1st Dist. Oriental Mindoro). In this regard, attention is invited to Administrative Order No. 42 issued on March 3, 1993 by the President of the Philippines clarifying the role of DBM in the compensation and classification of local government positions under RA No. 7160 vis-avis the provisions of RA No. 6758 in view of the abolition of the JCLGPA. Section 1 of said Administrative Order provides that: "Section 1. The Department of Budget and Management as the lead administrator of RA No. 6758 shall, through its Compensation and Position Classification Bureau, continue to

have the following responsibilities in connection with the implementation of the Local Government Code of 1991: a) Provide guidelines on the classification of local government positions and on the specific rates of pay therefore; b) Provide criteria and guidelines for the grant of all allowances and additional forms of compensation to local government employees; xxx." (underscoring supplied) To operationalize the aforecited presidential directive, DBM issued LBC No. 55, dated March 15, 1994, whose effectivity clause provides that: xxx xxx xxx "5.0 EFFECTIVITY This Circular shall take effect immediately." It is a well-settled rule that implementing rules and regulations promulgated by administrative or executive officer in accordance with, and as authorized by law, has the force and effect of law or partake the nature of a statute (Victorias Milling Co., Inc., vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, cited in Agpalo's Statutory Construction, 2nd Ed. P. 16; Justice Cruz's Phil. Political Law, 1984 Ed., p. 103; Espanol vs. Phil Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314; Antique Sawmills Inc. vs. Tayco, 17 SCRA 316). xxx xxx xxx There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges in excess of P1,000.00 chargeable against the local government units where they are stationed, this Commission finds no substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor, Mandaue City, disallowing in audit the allowances in question. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal of the MTC and RTC Judges of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not covered by Circular Letter No. 91-7, is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. xxx xxx x x x4 On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole, for and in behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion. Hence, this petition for certiorari by the petitioner judges, submitting the following questions for resolution: I HAS THE CITY OF MANDAUE STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND OTHER BENEFITS TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO THE CITY? II CAN AN ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR OR GUIDELINE SUCH AS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 RENDER INOPERATIVE THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY OF A CITY BY SETTING A LIMIT TO THE EXTENT OF THE EXERCISE OF SUCH POWER? III HAS THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 TO INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY IN FIXING THE CEILING OF ADDITIONAL ALLOWANCES AND BENEFITS TO BE PROVIDED TO JUDGES STATIONED IN AND ASSIGNED TO MANDAUE CITY BY THE CITY GOVERNMENT AT P1,000.00 PER

MONTH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVING ALLOWANCES OF P1,500.00 MONTHLY FOR THE PAST FIVE YEARS? IV IS LOCAL BUDGET CIRCULAR NO. 55 DATED MARCH 15, 1994 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT VALID AND ENFORCEABLE CONSIDERING THAT IT WAS NOT DULY PUBLISHED IN ACCODANCE WITH LAW?5 Petitioner judges argue that LBC 55 is void for infringing on the local autonomy of Mandaue City by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. They maintain that said circular is not supported by any law and therefore goes beyond the supervisory powers of the President. They further allege that said circular is void for lack of publication. On the other hand, the yearly appropriation ordinance providing for additional allowances to judges is allowed by Section 458, par. (a)(1)[xi], of RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides that: Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city government, and in this connection, shall: xxx xxx xxx (xi) When the finances of the city government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the city; (italics supplied) Instead of filing a comment on behalf of respondent COA, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation supporting the position of the petitioner judges. The Solicitor General argues that (1) DBM only enjoys the power to review and determine whether the disbursements of funds were made in accordance with the ordinance passed by a local government unit while (2) the COA has no more than auditorial visitation powers over local government units pursuant to Section 348 of RA 7160 which provides for the power to inspect at any time the financial accounts of local government units. Moreover, the Solicitor General opines that "the DBM and the respondent are only authorized under RA 7160 to promulgate a Budget Operations Manual for local government units, to improve and systematize methods, techniques and procedures employed in budget preparation, authorization, execution and accountability" pursuant to Section 354 of RA 7160. The Solicitor General points out that LBC 55 was not exercised under any of the aforementioned provisions. Respondent COA, on the other hand, insists that the constitutional and statutory authority of a city government to provide allowances to judges stationed therein is not absolute. Congress may set limitations on the exercise of autonomy. It is for the President, through the DBM, to check whether these legislative limitations are being followed by the local government units.

One such law imposing a limitation on a local government unit's autonomy is Section 458, par. (a) (1) [xi], of RA 7160, which authorizes the disbursement of additional allowances and other benefits to judges subject to the condition that the finances of the city government should allow the same. Thus, DBM is merely enforcing the condition of the law when it sets a uniform maximum amount for the additional allowances that a city government can release to judges stationed therein. Assuming arguendo that LBC 55 is void, respondent COA maintains that the provisions of the yearly approved ordinance granting additional allowances to judges are still prohibited by the appropriation laws passed by Congress every year. COA argues that Mandaue City gets the funds for the said additional allowances of judges from the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). But the General Appropriations Acts of 1994 and 1995 do not mention the disbursement of additional allowances to judges as one of the allowable uses of the IRA. Hence, the provisions of said ordinance granting additional allowances, taken from the IRA, to herein petitioner judges are void for being contrary to law. To resolve the instant petition, there are two issues that we must address: (1) whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for not having been published and (2) whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by Congress. We rule in favor of the petitioner judges. On the first issue, we declare LBC 55 to be null and void. We recognize that, although our Constitution6 guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that: Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x In Pimentel vs. Aguirre7, we defined the supervisory power of the President and distinguished it from the power of control exercised by Congress. Thus: This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,i 5 the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -- differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: "x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."ii 6 In Taule v. Santos,iii 7 we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were

performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"iv 8 we said. In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,v 9 the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.vi10 The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.vii 11 In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his or her alter egoscannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. Does LBC 55 go beyond the law it seeks to implement? Yes. LBC 55 provides that the additional monthly allowances to be given by a local government unit should not exceed P1,000 in provinces and cities and P700 in municipalities. Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160, the law that supposedly serves as the legal basis of LBC 55, allows the grant of additional allowances to judges "when the finances of the city government allow." The said provision does not authorize setting a definite maximum limit to the additional allowances granted to judges. Thus, we need not belabor the point that the finances of a city government may allow the grant of additional allowances higher than P1,000 if the revenues of the said city government exceed its annual expenditures.

Thus, to illustrate, a city government with locally generated annual revenues of P40 million and expenditures of P35 million can afford to grant additional allowances of more than P1,000 each to, say, ten judges inasmuch as the finances of the city can afford it. Setting a uniform amount for the grant of additional allowances is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par. (a)(1)(xi), of RA 7160. The DBM overstepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. In other words, the prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, in violation of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera8 where we held that: xxx. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of an administrative agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Respondent COA claims that publication is not required for LBC 55 inasmuch as it is merely an interpretative regulation applicable to the personnel of an LGU. We disagree. In De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit9 where we dealt with the same issue, this Court declared void, for lack of publication, a DBM circular that disallowed payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees. In refuting respondent COA's argument that said circular was merely an internal regulation, we ruled that: On the need for publication of subject DBM-CCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Taada v. Tuvera, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law.Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBMCCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowance and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their

stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency. (emphasis supplied) In Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Commission on Audit10, we again declared the same circular as void, for lack of publication, despite the fact that it was reissued and then submitted for publication. Emphasizing the importance of publication to the effectivity of a regulation, we therein held that: It has come to our knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items were disallowed in audit? The answer is in the negative, precisely for the reason that publication is required as a condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal limbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Taada v. Tuvera, "prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it."11 We now resolve the second issue of whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by Mandaue City providing for fixed allowances for judges contravenes any law and should therefore be struck down as null and void. According to respondent COA, even if LBC 55 were void, the ordinances enacted by Mandaue City granting additional allowances to the petitioner judges would "still (be) bereft of legal basis for want of a lawful source of funds considering that the IRA cannot be used for such purposes." Respondent COA showed that Mandaue City's funds consisted of locally generated revenues and the IRA. From 1989 to 1995, Mandaue City's yearly expenditures exceeded its locally generated revenues, thus resulting in a deficit. During all those years, it was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to incur a surplus. Respondent avers that Mandaue City used its IRA to pay for said additional allowances and this violated paragraph 2 of the Special Provisions, page 1060, of RA 7845 (The General Appropriations Act of 1995)12 and paragraph 3 of the Special Provision, page 1225, of RA 7663 (The General Appropriations Act of 1994)13 which specifically identified the objects of expenditure of the IRA. Nowhere in said provisions of the two budgetary laws does it say that the IRA can be used for additional allowances of judges. Respondent COA thus argues that the provisions in the ordinance providing for such disbursement are against the law, considering that the grant of the subject allowances is not within the specified use allowed by the aforesaid yearly appropriations acts. We disagree. Respondent COA failed to prove that Mandaue City used the IRA to spend for the additional allowances of the judges. There was no evidence submitted by COA showing the breakdown of the expenses of the city government and the funds used for said expenses. All the COA presented were the amounts expended, the locally generated revenues, the deficit, the surplus and the IRA received each year. Aside from these items, no data or

figures were presented to show that Mandaue City deducted the subject allowances from the IRA. In other words, just because Mandaue City's locally generated revenues were not enough to cover its expenditures, this did not mean that the additional allowances of petitioner judges were taken from the IRA and not from the city's own revenues. Moreover, the DBM neither conducted a formal review nor ordered a disapproval of Mandaue City's appropriation ordinances, in accordance with the procedure outlined by Sections 326 and 327 of RA 7160 which provide that: Section 326. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Provinces, Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities, and Municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area. The Department of Budget and Management shall review ordinances authorizing the annual or supplemental appropriations of provinces, highly-urbanized cities, independent component cities, and municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila Area in accordance with the immediately succeeding Section. Section 327. Review of Appropriation Ordinances of Component Cities and Municipalities.The sangguninang panlalawigan shall review the ordinance authorizing annual or supplemental appropriations of component cities and municipalities in the same manner and within the same period prescribed for the review of other ordinances. If within ninety (90) days from receipt of copies of such ordinance, the sangguniang panlalawigan takes no action thereon, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed in accordance with law and shall continue to be in full force and effect.(emphasis supplied) Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the 90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution, dated September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit are hereby set aside. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur. Puno, J., on official business. Azcuna, J., on leave. Footnotes 1 COA Decision No. 95-568; Rollo, pp. 42-47. 2 COA Decision No. 96-282; Rollo, pp. 48-49. 3 Rollo, p. 128; Rollo, p. 47.

4 Rollo, pp. 44-47. 5 Rollo, p. 24. 6 Sec. 25, [Art. II]. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments. Sec. 2, [Art. X]. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy. 7 336 SCRA 201, 214-215 (2000). 8 146 SCRA 453, 454 (1986). 9 294 SCRA 152, 157-158 (1998). 10 309 SCRA 179, 189 (1999). 11 Id., p. 189. 12 SPECIAL PROVISIONS xxx xxx xxx 3. Use of Funds. The amount herein shall, pursuant to Section 17(g) of the Code, provide for the cost of basic services and facilities enumerated under Section 17(b) thereof, particularly those which have been devolved by the Department of Health, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as well as other agencies of the national government, including (1) construction/improvement, repair and maintenance of local roads; (2) concrete barangay roads/multi-purpose pavements construction and improvement program to be implemented in accordance with R.A. No. 6763; (3) construction, rehabilitation and improvement of communal irrigation projects/systems; PROVIDED, That each local government unit shall, in accordance with Section 287 of the Code, appropriate in its annual budget no less than twenty percent (20%) of its share from internal revenue allotment for development projects; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That enforcement of the provisions of Sections 325(a) and 331(b) of the Code shall be waived to enable local government units to absorb national government personnel transferred on account of devolution, create the mandatory positions specified in the Code, enable the barangay officials to receive the minimum allowable level of remuneration provided under Section 393 of the Code as well as continue the implementation of the salary standardization authorized under R.A. No. 6758: PROVIDED, FINALLY, That such amounts as may be determined by the Department of Budget and Management corresponding to the requirements of health care and services as devolved to Local Governments Units R.A. No. 7160 shall not be realigned or utilized by LGUs concerned for any other expenditure or purpose. 13 SPECIAL PROVISIONS xxx xxx xxx 2. Use of Funds. - The amount herein appropriated shall, pursuant to Section 17(g) of the Code, provide for the cost of basic services and facilities enumerated under Section 17(b) thereof, particularly those devolved by the Department of Health, the Department of Social Welfare and Development, the Department of Agriculture, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources as well as other agencies of the National Government, including (1) construction/improvement, repair and maintenance of local roads; (2) concrete barangay roads/multi-purpose pavements, construction and improvement program to be implemented in accordance with R.A. No. 6763; (2) construction,

rehabilitation and improvement of communal irrigation projects/systems; and (4) payment of not less than fifty percent (50%) of the total requirement for the Magna Carta benefits of devolved health workers pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 7305 and such other guidelines that may be issued by the Department of Health for the purpose: PROVIDED, That each local government unit shall, in accordance with Section 287 of the Code, appropriate in its budget no less than twenty percent (20%) of its share from Internal Revenue Allotment for development projects; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That enforcement of the provisions of Sections 325(a) and 331(b) of the Code shall be waived enable local government units to absorb and/or maintain national government personnel transferred on account of devolution, create the mandatory positions specified in the Code, enable the barangay officials to receive the minimum allowable level of remuneration provided under Section 393 of the Code, as well as continue the implementation of the salary standardization authorized under R.A. No. 6758 and the payment of not less than fifty percent (50%) of the total requirement for the Magna Carta benefits of health workers mandated under R.A. No. 7305 and such other guidelines as may be issued by the Department of Health for the purpose. EN BANC [G.R. No. 132988. July 19, 2000] AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR., petitioner, vs. Hon. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Hon. EMILIA BONCODIN in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, respondents. ROBERTO PAGDANGANAN, intervenor. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Constitution vests the President with the power of supervision, not control, over local government units (LGUs). Such power enables him to see to it that LGUs and their officials execute their tasks in accordance with law. While he may issue advisories and seek their cooperation in solving economic difficulties, he cannot prevent them from performing their tasks and using available resources to achieve their goals. He may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the law. Thus, the withholding of a portion of internal revenue allotments legally due them cannot be directed by administrative fiat. The Case Before us is an original Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking (1) to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. On November 17, 1998, Roberto Pagdanganan, through Counsel Alberto C. Agra, filed a Motion for Intervention/Motion to Admit Petition for Intervention,[i][1] attaching thereto his Petition in Intervention[ii][2] joining petitioner in the reliefs sought. At the time, intervenor was the provincial governor of Bulacan, national president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local

Governments. In a Resolution dated December 15, 1998, the Court noted said Motion and Petition. The Facts and the Arguments On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372. Its full text, with emphasis on the assailed provisions, is as follows: "ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998 WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country's growth momentum; WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources; NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations and local governments units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total expenditures for the year by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas: 1. Continued implementation of the streamlining policy on organization and staffing by deferring action on the following: a. Operationalization of new agencies; b. Expansion of organizational units and/or creation of positions; c. Filling of positions; and d. Hiring of additional/new consultants, contractual and casual personnel, regardless of funding source. 2. Suspension of the following activities: a. Implementation of new capital/infrastructure projects, except those which have already been contracted out; b. Acquisition of new equipment and motor vehicles; c. All foreign travels of government personnel, except those associated with scholarships and trainings funded by grants; d. Attendance in conferences abroad where the cost is charged to the government except those clearly essential to Philippine commitments in the international field as may be determined by the Cabinet; e. Conduct of trainings/workshops/seminars, except those conducted by government training institutions and agencies in the performance of their regular functions and those that are funded by grants; f. Conduct of cultural and social celebrations and sports activities, except those associated with the Philippine Centennial celebration and those involving regular competitions/events;

g. Grant of honoraria, except in cases where it constitutes the only source of compensation from government received by the person concerned; h. Publications, media advertisements and related items, except those required by law or those already being undertaken on a regular basis; i. Grant of new/additional benefits to employees, except those expressly and specifically authorized by law; and j. Donations, contributions, grants and gifts, except those given by institutions to victims of calamities. 3. Suspension of all tax expenditure subsidies to all GOCCs and LGUs 4. Reduction in the volume of consumption of fuel, water, office supplies, electricity and other utilities 5. Deferment of projects that are encountering significant implementation problems 6. Suspension of all realignment of funds and the use of savings and reserves SECTION 2. Agencies are given the flexibility to identify the specific sources of costsavings, provided the 25% minimum savings under Section 1 is complied with. SECTION 3. A report on the estimated savings generated from these measures shall be submitted to the Office of the President, through the Department of Budget and Management, on a quarterly basis using the attached format. SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. SECTION 5. The Development Budget Coordination Committee shall conduct a monthly review of the fiscal position of the National Government and if necessary, shall recommend to the President the imposition of additional reserves or the lifting of previously imposed reserves. SECTION 6. This Administrative Order shall take effect January 1, 1998 and shall remain valid for the entire year unless otherwise lifted. DONE in the City of Manila, this 27th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-seven." Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO 43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs. Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the power of controlover LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only the power of general supervisionover LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of these units its share in the national internal revenue. The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO 372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local

governments to identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for nonpersonal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation." The Issues The Petition[iii][3] submits the following issues for the Court's resolution: "A. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion [in] ordering all LGUS to adopt a 25% cost reduction program in violation of the LGU[']S fiscal autonomy "B. Whether or not the president committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the withholding of 10% of the LGU[']S IRA" In sum, the main issue is whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local governments. Additionally, the Court deliberated on the question whether petitioner had the locus standi to bring this suit, despite respondents' failure to raise the issue.[iv][4] However, the intervention of Roberto Pagdanganan has rendered academic any further discussion on this matter. The Court's Ruling The Petition is partly meritorious. Main Issue: Validity of AO 372 Insofar as LGUs Are Concerned Before resolving the main issue, we deem it important and appropriate to define certain crucial concepts: (1) the scope of the President's power of general supervision over local governments and (2) the extent of the local governments' autonomy. Scope of President's Power of Supervision Over LGUs Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over local governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows: "Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. In Mondano v. Silvosa,[v][5] the Court contrasted the President's power of supervision over local government officials with that of his power of control over executive officials of the national government. It was emphasized that the two terms -- supervision and control -differed in meaning and extent. The Court distinguished them as follows: "x x x In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or

modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer ha[s] done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."[vi][6] In Taule v. Santos,[vii][7] we further stated that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than that of checking whether local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the fundamental law and by statutes. He cannot interfere with local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority. "Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over such body,"[viii][8] we said. In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim,[ix][9] the difference between control and supervision was further delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in the President.[x][10] The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed.[xi][11] In contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President s supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. Extent of Local Autonomy Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.[xii][12] In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals,[xiii][13] we said that local autonomy signified "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to "break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units x x x." Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing self-government.[xiv][14] Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may provide.[xv][15] The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin[xvi][16] as follows:

"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments 'more responsive and accountable,'[xvii][17] and 'ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.'[xviii][18] At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises 'general supervision'[xix][19] over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.'[xx][20] He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.[xxi][21] Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,' since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency."[xxii][22] Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the national government.[xxiii][23] The Nature of AO 372 Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudential precepts, let us now look into the nature of AO 372. As its preambular clauses declare, the Order was a "cash management measure" adopted by the government "to match expenditures with available resources," which were presumably depleted at the time due to "economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation." Because of a looming financial crisis, the President deemed it necessary to "direct all government agencies, state universities and colleges, government-owned and controlled corporations as well as local governments to reduce their total expenditures by at least 25 percent along suggested areas mentioned in AO 372. Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends

to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments, whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not. Hence, the necessity of a balancing of viewpoints and the harmonization of proposals from both local and national officials,[xxiv][24] who in any case are partners in the attainment of national goals. Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. Significantly, the President, by constitutional fiat, is the head of the economic and planning agency of the government,[xxv][25] primarily responsible for formulating and implementing continuing, coordinated and integrated social and economic policies, plans and programs[xxvi][26] for the entire country. However, under the Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally. Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:[xxvii][27] "x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x." There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management. Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Petitioner points out that respondents failed to comply with these requisites before the issuance and the implementation of AO 372. At the very least, they did not even try to show that the national government was suffering from an unmanageable public sector deficit. Neither did they claim having conducted consultations with the different leagues of local governments. Without these requisites, the President has no authority to adjust, much less to reduce, unilaterally the LGU's internal revenue allotment. The solicitor general insists, however, that AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his power of supervision over local governments. It is intended only toadvise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake costreduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country, which is

facing economic difficulties. Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while we agree with petitioner that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been satisfied, we are prepared to accept the solicitor general's assurance that the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that emanates from a boss to a subaltern. Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1. Withholding a Part of LGUs' IRA Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is theautomatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.[xxviii][28] The Local Government Code[xxix][29] specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."[xxx][30] As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory meaning.[xxxi][31] The provision is, therefore, imperative. Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means "something held back or withheld, often temporarily."[xxxii][32] Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited. In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing his Order to withhold the LGUs IRA, but the rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. Refutation of Justice Kapunan's Dissent

Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan dissents from our Decision on the grounds that, allegedly, (1) the Petition is premature; (2) AO 372 falls within the powers of the President as chief fiscal officer; and (3) the withholding of the LGUs IRA is implied in the President's authority to adjust it in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit. First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function." This is a rather novel theory -- that people should await the implementing evil to befall on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Taada v. Angara,[xxxiii][33] this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court: "In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 'The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.'[xxxiv][34] Once a 'controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x , it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.'[xxxv][35] xxx xxx xxx "As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,[xxxvi][36] it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government." In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:[xxxvii][37] "x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts. Besides, the issue that the Petition is premature has not been raised by the parties; hence it is deemed waived. Considerations of due process really prevents its use against a party that has not been given sufficient notice of its presentation, and thus has not been given the opportunity to refute it.[xxxviii][38] Second, on the President's power as chief fiscal officer of the country. Justice Kapunan posits that Section 4 of AO 372 conforms with the President's role as chief fiscal officer, who allegedly "is clothed by law with certain powers to ensure the observance of safeguards and auditing requirements, as well as the legal prerequisites in the release and use of IRAs, taking into account the constitutional and statutory mandates."[xxxix][39] He cites instances when the President may lawfully intervene in the fiscal affairs of LGUs. Precisely, such powers referred to in the Dissent have specifically been authorized by law and have not been challenged as violative of the Constitution. On the other hand, Section 4 of AO 372, as explained earlier, contravenes explicit provisions of the Local Government Code (LGC) and the Constitution. In other words, the acts alluded to in the Dissent are indeed authorized by law; but, quite the opposite, Section 4 of AO 372 is bereft of any legal or constitutional basis. Third, on the President's authority to adjust the IRA of LGUs in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit. It must be emphasized that in striking down Section 4 of AO 372, this Court is not ruling out any form of reduction in the IRAs of LGUs. Indeed, as the President may make necessary adjustments in case of an unmanageable public sector deficit, as stated in the main part of this Decision, and in line with Section 284 of the LGC, which Justice Kapunan cites. He, however, merely glances over a specific requirement in the same provision -- that such reduction is subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and, more importantly, with the presidents of the leagues of local governments. Notably, Justice Kapunan recognizes the need for "interaction between the national government and the LGUs at the planning level," in order to ensure that "local development plans x x x hew to national policies and standards." The problem is that no such interaction or consultation was ever held prior to the issuance of AO 372. This is why the petitioner and the intervenor (who was a provincial governor and at the same time president of the League of Provinces of the Philippines and chairman of the League of Leagues of Local Governments) have protested and instituted this action. Significantly, respondents do not deny the lack of consultation. In addition, Justice Kapunan cites Section 287[xl][40] of the LGC as impliedly authorizing the President to withhold the IRA of an LGU, pending its compliance with certain requirements. Even a cursory reading of the provision reveals that it is totally inapplicable to the issue at bar. It directs LGUs to appropriate in their annual budgets 20 percent of their respective IRAs for development projects. It speaks of no positive power granted the President to priorly withhold any amount. Not at all.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents and their successors are hereby permanentlyPROHIBITED from implementing Administrative Order Nos. 372 and 43, respectively dated December 27, 1997 and December 10, 1998, insofar as local government units are concerned. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion. Purisima, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., join J. Kapunan in his dissenting opinion. DISSENTING OPINION KAPUNAN, J.: In striking down as unconstitutional and illegal Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 ("AO No. 372"), the majority opinion posits that the President exercised power of control over the local government units ("LGU ), which he does not have, and violated the provisions of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, which states: SEC. 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. and Section 286(a) of the Local Government Code, which provides: SEC. 286. Automatic Release of Shares. - (a) The share of each local government unit shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. The share of the LGUs in the national internal revenue taxes is defined in Section 284 of the same Local Government Code, to wit: SEC. 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year as follows: (a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%); (b) On the second year, thirty-five (35%) percent; and (c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%). Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the recommendation of Secretary of Finance, Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year: Provided, further, That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of devolved personal services.

xxx The majority opinion takes the view that the withholding of ten percent (10%) of the internal revenue allotment ("IRA") to the LGUs pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation as called for in Section 4 of AO No. 372 transgresses against the above-quoted provisions which mandate the "automatic" release of the shares of the LGUs in the national internal revenue in consonance with local fiscal autonomy. The pertinent portions of AO No. 372 are reproduced hereunder: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998 WHEREAS, the current economic difficulties brought about by the peso depreciation requires continued prudence in government fiscal management to maintain economic stability and sustain the country s growth momentum; WHEREAS, it is imperative that all government agencies adopt cash management measures to match expenditures with available resources; NOW THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order and direct: SECTION 1. All government departments and agencies, including x x x local government units will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that will reduce total appropriations for non-personal services items, along the following suggested areas: xxx SECTION 4. Pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld. xxx Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued Administrative Order No. 43 ( AO No. 43 ), amending Section 4 of AO No. 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the IRA to be withheld from the LGUs, thus: ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 43 AMENDING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 372 DATED 27 DECEMBER 1997 ENTITLED "ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY 1998" WHEREAS, Administrative Order No. 372 dated 27 December 1997 entitled "Adoption of Economy Measures in Government for FY 1998" was issued to address the economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation in 1997; WHEREAS, Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 372 provided that the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to local government units shall be withheld; and, WHEREAS, there is a need to release additional funds to local government units for vital projects and expenditures. NOW, THEREFORE, I, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order the reduction of the withheld Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local government units from ten percent to five percent.

The five percent reduction in the IRA withheld for 1998 shall be released before 25 December 1998. DONE in the City of Manila, this 10th day of December, in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety eight. With all due respect, I beg to disagree with the majority opinion. Section 4 of AO No. 372 does not present a case ripe for adjudication. The language of Section 4 does not conclusively show that, on its face, the constitutional provision on the automatic release of the IRA shares of the LGUs has been violated. Section 4, as worded, expresses the idea that the withholding is merely temporary which fact alone would not merit an outright conclusion of its unconstitutionality, especially in light of the reasonable presumption that administrative agencies act in conformity with the law and the Constitution. Where the conduct has not yet occurred and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function. Petitioners have not shown that the alleged 5% IRA share of LGUs that was temporarily withheld has not yet been released, or that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) has refused and continues to refuse its release. In view thereof, the Court should not decide as this case suggests an abstract proposition on constitutional issues. The President is the chief fiscal officer of the country. He is ultimately responsible for the collection and distribution of public money: SECTION 3. Powers and Functions. - The Department of Budget and Management shall assist the President in the preparation of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the management of government operations, administration of compensation and position classification systems, assessment of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational implications.1 In a larger context, his role as chief fiscal officer is directed towards "the nation's efforts at economic and social upliftment"2 for which more specific economic powers are delegated. Within statutory limits, the President can, thus, fix "tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the government, 3 as he is also responsible for enlisting the country in international economic agreements.4 More than this, to achieve "economy and efficiency in the management of government operations," the President is empowered to create appropriation reserves,5 suspend expenditure appropriations,6 and institute cost reduction schemes.