PROPERTY CASE 3 [G.R. No. 116290. December 8, 2000] DIONISIA P. BAGAIPO, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

COURT OF APPEALS and LEONOR LOZANO, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: This petition assails the decision dated June 30, 1994 of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 555-89, of petitioners complaint for recovery of possession with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and damages. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: Petitioner Dionisia P. Bagaipo is the registered owner of Lot No. 415, a 146,900 square meter agricultural land situated in Ma-a, Davao City under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-15757 particularly described as follows: Bounded on the NE., by Lots Nos. 419 and 416; on the SE by the Davao River; on the SE., (sic) by Lots Nos. 1092 and 1091; and on the NW., by Lots Nos. 413 and 418 Respondent Leonor Lozano is the owner of a registered parcel of land located across and opposite the southeast portion of petitioners lot facing the Davao River. Lozano acquired and occupied her property in 1962 when his wife inherited the land from her father who died that year. On May 26, 1989, Bagaipo filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession with Mandatory Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Damages against Lozano for: (1) the surrender of possession by Lozano of a certain portion of land measuring 29,162 square meters which is supposedly included in the area belonging to Bagaipo under TCT No. T-15757; and (2) the recovery of a land area measuring 37,901 square meters which Bagaipo allegedly lost when the Davao River traversed her property. Bagaipo contended that as a result of a change in course of the said river, her property became divided into three lots, namely: Lots 415-A, 415-B and 415-C. In January 1988, Bagaipo commissioned a resurvey of Lot 415 and presented before the trial court a survey plan prepared by Geodetic Engineer Gersacio A. Magno. The survey plan allegedly showed that: a) the area presently occupied by Bagaipo, identified as Lot 415-A, now had an area of only 79,843 square meters; b) Lot 415-B, with an area measuring 37,901 square meters, which cut across Bagaipos land was taken up by the new course of the Davao River; and c) an area of 29,162 square meters designated as Lot 415-C was illegally occupied by respondent Lozano. The combined area of the lots described by Engineer Magno in the survey plan tallied with the technical description of Bagaipos land under TCT No. T-15757. Magno concluded that the land presently located across the river and parallel to Bagaipos property still belonged to the latter and not to Lozano, who planted some 350 fruit-bearing trees on Lot 415-C and the old abandoned river bed. Bagaipo also presented Godofredo Corias, a former barangay captain and long-time resident of Ma-a to prove her claim that the Davao River had indeed changed its course. Corias testified that the occurrence was caused by a big flood in 1968 and a bamboo grove which used to indicate the position of the river was washed away. The river which flowed previously in front of a chapel located 15 meters away from the riverbank within Bagaipos property now flowed behind it. Corias was also present when Magno conducted the relocation survey in 1988. For his part, Lozano insisted that the land claimed by Bagaipo is actually an accretion to their titled property. He asserted that the Davao River did not change its course and that the reduction in Bagaipos domain was caused by gradual erosion due to the current of the Davao River. Lozano added that it is also because of the rivers natural action that silt slowly deposited and added to his land over a long period of time. He further

averred that this accretion continues up to the present and that registration proceedings instituted by him over the alluvial formation could not be concluded precisely because it continued to increase in size. Lozano presented three witnesses: Atty. Pedro Castillo, his brother-in-law; Cabitunga Pasanday, a tenant of Atty. Castillo; and Alamin Catucag, a tenant of the Lozanos. Atty. Castillo testified that the land occupied by the Lozanos was transferred to his sister, Ramona when they extra-judicially partitioned their parents property upon his fathers death. On September 9, 1973, Atty. Castillo filed a land registration case involving the accretion which formed on the property and submitted for this purpose, a survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands as well as tax declarations covering the said accretion. An Order of General Default was already issued in the land registration case on November 5, 1975, but the case itself remained pending since the petition had to be amended to include the continuing addition to the land area. Mr. Cabitunga Pasanday testified that he has continuously worked on the land as tenant of the Castillos since 1925, tilling an area of about 3 hectares. However, the land he tilled located opposite the land of the Lozanos and adjacent to the Davao River has decreased over the years to its present size of about 1 hectare. He said the soil on the bank of the river, as well as coconut trees he planted would be carried away each time there was a flood. This similar erosion occurs on the properties of Bagaipo and a certain Dr. Rodriguez, since the elevation of the riverbank on their properties is higher than the elevation on Lozanos side. Alamin Catucag testified that he has been a tenant of the Castillos since 1939 and that the portion he occupies was given to Ramona, Lozanos wife. It was only 1 hectare in 1939 but has increased to 3 hectares due to soil deposits from the mountains and river. Catucag said that Bagaipos property was reduced to half since it is in the curve of the river and its soil erodes and gets carried away by river water. On April 5, 1991, the trial court conducted an ocular inspection. It concluded that the applicable law is Article 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.7 of the New Civil Code and not Art. 461 The reduction in the land area of plaintiff was caused by erosion and not by a change in course of the Davao River. Conformably then, the trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and decreed as follows: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellant. Hence, this appeal. Petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals erred in: ....NOT GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE RELOCATION SURVEY (EXHIBIT B) PREPARED BY LICENSED GEODETIC ENGINEER GERSACIO MAGNO. THE CASE OF DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. HEIRS OF JUANA CAROLINA 140 SCRA 396 CITED BY THE RESPONDENT COURT IN DISREGARDING EXHIBIT B IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. ....NOT FINDING THAT ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE QUESTIONED LOT 415-C (EXHIBIT B-1) OCCUPIED BY RESPONDENT LEONOR LOZANO WAS THE RESULT OF AN ACCRETION, THE PRINCIPLE OF ACCRETION CANNOT AND DOES NOT APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE TO FAVOR SAID RESPONDENT BECAUSE SAID LOT 415-C IS WITHIN AND FORM PART OF PETITIONERS LAND DESCRIBED IN TCT NO. 15757 (EXHIBIT A)

....FINDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF LACHES WHEN SHE INSTITUTED THE SUIT. ....NOT ORDERING RESPONDENT LEONOR LOZANO TO VACATE AND SURRENDER LOT 415-C IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER AND FOR HIM TO PAY PETITIONER DAMAGES FOR ITS UNLAWFUL OCCUPATION THEREOF. ....NOT HOLDING PETITIONER ABANDONED RIVER BED. ENTITLED TO THE

discounted by the appellate court. In Titong vs. Court of Appeals we affirmed the trial courts refusal to give probative value to a private survey plan and held thus: the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. A survey plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary now to discuss the defense of laches. It is mooted by the disquisition on the foregoing issues. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated June 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G. R. CV No. 37615, sustaining the judgment of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 68166 October 13, 1997 HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents. RESOLUTION

For this Courts resolution are the following issues: Did the trial court err in holding that there was no change in course of the Davao River such that petitioner owns the abandoned river bed pursuant to Article 461 of the Civil Code? Did private respondent own Lot 415-C in accordance with the principle of accretion under Article 457? Should the relocation survey prepared by a licensed geodetic engineer be disregarded since it was not approved by the Director of Lands? Is petitioners claim barred by laches? On the first issue. The trial court and the appellate court both found that the decrease in land area was brought about by erosion and not a change in the rivers course. This conclusion was reached after the trial judge observed during ocular inspection that the banks located on petitioners land are sharp, craggy and very much higher than the land on the other side of the river. Additionally, the riverbank on respondents side is lower and gently sloping. The lower land therefore naturally received the alluvial soil carried by the river current. These findings are factual, thus conclusive on this Court, unless there are strong and exceptional reasons, or they are unsupported by the evidence on record, or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. These factual findings are based on an ocular inspection of the judge and convincing testimonies, and we find no convincing reason to disregard or disbelieve them. The decrease in petitioners land area and the corresponding expansion of respondents property were the combined effect of erosion and accretion respectively. Art. 461 of the Civil Code is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim ownership over the old abandoned riverbed because the same is inexistent. The riverbeds former location cannot even be pinpointed with particularity since the movement of the Davao River took place gradually over an unspecified period of time, up to the present. The rule is well-settled that accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: 1) That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2) That it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and 3) That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river. These requisites were sufficiently proven in favor of respondents. In the absence of evidence that the change in the course of the river was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion, the presumption is that the change was gradual and was caused by alluvium and erosion. As to Lot 415-C, which petitioner insists forms part of her property under TCT No. T-15757, it is well to recall our holding in C.N. Hodges vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 133, 135: The fact that the accretion to his land used to pertain to plaintiffs estate, which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot preclude him (defendant) from being the owner thereof. Registration does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the owners of the banks (Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; Art. 457 of the new). Such accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act. Petitioner did not demonstrate that Lot 415-C allegedly comprising 29,162 square meters was within the boundaries of her titled property. The survey plan commissioned by petitioner which was not approved by the Director of Lands was properly

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: On March 21, 1997, private respondent Heirs of Sinforoso Pascual, by counsel, filed a pleading denominated as "Omnibus Motion (Re: Motion for Clarification/Reconsideration/ to Remand Case)" with the following presentation: I Re: Motion for Clarification 1.1 Without meaning to be fastidious, the Pascual Heirs find the Decision promulgated by this Honorable Court on 12 February 1997 ("Decision") confusing. 1.1.1 The dispositive portion of the Decision "DENIED and DISMISSED" the petition for review filed by petitioners Heirs of Emiliano Navarro ("Navarro Heirs"). The ordinarily means that the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court was affirmed. Consequently, Pascual Heirs are apparently entitled to the issuance of a decree of registration over the subject land. 1.1.2 In the body of the Decision, however, this Honorable Court declared the subject land part of the public domain, not capable of appropriation by any private person, including the Pascual Heirs, "except through express authorization granted in due form by a competent authority". xxx xxx xxx 1.4 It is in the light that the Pascual Heirs now move that this Honorable Court clarify . . . the dispositive portion of the Decision . . . .

II Re: Motion for Reconsideration 2.1 Should this Honorable Court clarify that the Decision actually reversed, not affirmed, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, the Pascual Heirs respectfully submit that the Decision should be reconsidered. xxx xxx xxx 2.3 Since the Decision was mainly, if not entirely, based on the . . . seriously flawed findings of the Trial Court and Justice Serrano's dissenting opinion in the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the infirmity of the Trial Court's and Justice Serrano's purported findings equally plague the Decision. xxx xxx xxx III Re: Motion to Remand for Further Proceedings xxx xxx xxx 3.3 Should this Honorable Court, however, find the need for more scientific or empirical data, the Pascual Heirs submit that it becomes appropriate to remand the case to the Trial Court for further reception of the appropriate evidence. . . . (Rollo, pp. 408-411) We find no merit in the Omnibus Motion insofar as it prays for the reconsideration of our Decision dated February 12, 1997 and/or for the remand of the instant case to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings. The issues raised by private respondents as grounds for reconsideration have already been passed upon in our Decision and need no longer be belabored. Neither is there a need to remand the instant case to the lower court for further proceedings, our findings and conclusions regarding the public nature of the parcel of land in question having been reached only after an exhaustive and scrupulous study and analysis of all the facts, the evidence, the parties' respective arguments, and the prevailing law and jurisprudence. It is imperative, however, that certain typographical and/or clerical errors in the said Decision be rectified in order that the body thereof and dispositive portion therein be harmonized. WHEREFORE, the following specific portions of our the Decision dated February 12, 1997 in the above-entitled case are ordered rectified as follows: 1. The sentence, "We find no merit in the petition" on page 11 of the Decision shall henceforth read, thus: "We find merit in the petition". 2. The term, "petitioners" used from pages 11 to 16 and on page 18 of the Decision shall henceforth read as "private respondents". 3. The dispositive portion on page 18 of the Decision which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED, shall henceforth read, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in CA G.R. No. 59044-R dated November 29, 1978 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolutions dated November 21, 1980 and March 28, 1982, respectively, promulgated by the Intermediate Appellate Court are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), Branch 1, Balanga, Bataan, is hereby ORDERED REINSTATED. Costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED. The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to make the foregoing corrections in the next of our Decision dated February 12, 1997 in the above-entitled case. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. Nos. L-66075-76 July 5, 1990 EULOGIO AGUSTIN, HEIRS OF BALDOMERO LANGCAY, ARTURO BALISI & JUAN LANGCAY, Petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MARIA MELAD, TIMOTEO MELAD, PABLO BINAYUG & GERONIMA UBINA, Respondents. GRIO-AQUINO, J.: The Cagayan River separates the towns of Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east in the province of Cagayan. According to the unrebutted testimony of Romeo Rigor, Geodetic Engineer of the Bureau of Lands, in 1919 the lands east of the river were covered by the Tuguegarao Cadastre. In 1925, Original Certificate of Title No. 5472 was issued for land east of the Cagayan River owned by defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin (Exh. 2-Agustin).virtualawlibrary virtual law library As the years went by, the Cagayan River moved gradually eastward, depositing silt on the western bank. The shifting of the river and the siltation continued until 1968.virtualawlibrary virtual law library In 1950, all lands west of the river were included in the Solana Cadastre. Among these occupying lands covered by the Solana Cadastre were plaintiffs-private respondents, namely, Pablo Binayug, who has been in possession of Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, and Maria Melad, who owns Lot 3351 (Exh. 3-Binayug; Exh. B-Melad). Pablo Binayug began his possession in 1947. An area of eight (8) hectares was planted to tobacco and corn while 12 hectares were overgrown with talahib (Exh. C-1 Binayug.) Binayug's Homestead Application No. W-79055 over this land was approved in 1959 (Exh. B-Binayug). Binayug's possession was recognized in the decision in Civil Case No. 101 (Exh. FBinayug). On the other hand, as a result of Civil Case No. 343-T, Macario Melad, the predecessor-in-interest of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad, was issued Original Certificate of Title No. P5026 for Lot 3351 of Cad. 293 on June 1, 1956.virtualawlibrary virtual law library Through the years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin's Lot 8457 (Exh. E-Melad), depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Pablo Binayug on the western bank.virtualawlibrary virtual law library However, in 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed, and, in the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the

spouses Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate those lots they had to cross the river.virtualawlibrary virtual law library In April, 1969, while the private respondents and their tenants were planting corn on their lots located on the eastern side of the Cagayan River, the petitioners, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao, claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the private respondents from the premises.virtualawlibrary virtual law library On April 21, 1970, private respondents Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 343-T) to recover Lot No. 3351 with an area of 5 hectares and its 6.6hectare accretion. On April 24, 1970, private respondent Pablo Binayug filed a separate complaint (Civil Case No. 344-T) to recover his lots and their accretions.virtualawlibrary virtual law library On June 16, 1975, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby made: virtual law library In Civil Case No. 343-T, commanding Eulogio Agustin, Gregorio Tuliao, Jacinto Buquel and Octavio Bancud, or anybody acting as their representative[s] or agents to vacate Lot No. 3351 of Solana Cadastre together with its accretion consisting of portions of Lots 9463, 9462 and 9461 of Tuguegarao Cadastre and for these defendants to restore ownership in favor of Maria Melad and Timoteo Melad who are the only interested heirs of Macario Melad.virtualawlibrary virtual law library In Civil Case No. 344-T, commanding defendants Justo Adduru, Andres Pastor, Teofilo Tagacay, Vicente Camilan, Nicanor Mora, Baldomero Cagurangan, Domingo Quilang, Cesar Cabalza, Elias Macababbad, Titong Macababbad, Arturo Balisi, Jose Allabun, Eulogio Agustin, Banong Aquino, Junior Cambri and Juan Langoay, or any of their agents or representatives to vacate the Lots 3349, 7876, 7877, 7878, 7879, 7875, 7881, 7882, 7883, 7884, 7885, 7891 and 7892, together with its accretion and to restore possession to plaintiffs Pablo Binayug and Geronima Ubina. Without pronouncement as to damages which were not properly proven and to costs.virtualawlibrary virtual law library SO ORDERED. (As amended by the order dated August 15, 1975.) (pp. 24-25, Rollo.) Only defendant-petitioner Eulogio Agustin appealed in Civil Case No. 343-T, while in Civil Case No. 344-T, only defendantspetitioners Eulogio Agustin, Baldomero Cagurangan (substituted by his heir), Arturo Balisi and Juan Langcay appealed. But upon motion of plaintiffs-private respondents, the trial court ordered the execution pending appeal of the judgment in Civil Case No. 344-T against Cagurangan, Balisi and Langcay on the ground that their appeal was dilatory as they had not presented evidence at the trial (Order dated August 15, 1975).virtualawlibrary virtual law library On November 29, 1983, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the judgment of the trial court, with costs against the defendantsappellants.virtualawlibrary virtual law library In their petition for review of that decision, the petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred: 1. in declaring that the land in question had become part of private respondents' estate as a result of accretion; virtual law library 2. in declaring that the accretion to private respondents' estate which used to pertain to petitioners' estate cannot preclude the private respondents from being the owners thereof; and virtual law library

3. in declaring that the ownership of private respondents over the accretion is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed The petition is unmeritorious and must be denied.virtualawlibrary virtual law library The finding of the Court of Appeals that there had been accretions to the lots of the private respondents who did not lose the ownership of such accretions even after they were separated from the principal lots by the sudden change of course of the river, is a finding of fact which is conclusive on this Court. That finding is supported by Art. 457 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (366) Accretion benefits a riparian owner when the following requisites are present: (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it resulted from the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of a river (Republic vs. CA, 132 SCRA 514).virtualawlibrary virtual law library All these requisites of accretion are present in this case for, as the trial court found: . . . Cagayan River did move year by year from 1919 to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. Within this period, the alluvium (sic) deposited on the other side has become greater in area than the original lands of the plaintiffs in both cases. Still the addition in every year is imperceptible in nature, one could not discern it but can be measured after the lapse of a certain time. The testimonial evidence in these cases that said Cagayan River moved eastward year by year is overwhelming as against the denial of defendant Eulogio Agustin alone. Cesar Caronan, one time mayor of Solana, Cagayan, said so. Arturo Taguian said so. Timoteo Melad said so. Francisco Ubina said so. Geodetic Engineer Rigor impliedly said so when he testified that when Solana Cadastre was executed in 1950 it overlapped portions of Tuguegarao Cadastre executed in 1919. This could not have happened if that part of Tuguegarao Cadastre was not eroded by the overflow of the Cagayan River. These testimonies cannot be destroyed by the denials of Vicente Cauilan, Marcelo Agustin and Eulogio Agustin alone . . . . (p. 27, Rollo.) The appellate court confirmed that the accretion on the western bank of the Cagayan River had been going on from 1919 up to 1968 or for a period of 49 years. It was gradual and imperceptible. Only when Lot No. 3351, with an original area of 5 hectares described in the free patent that was issued to Macario Melad in June 1956, was resurveyed in 1968 did it become known that 6.6 hectares had been added to it. Lot No. 3351, covered by a homestead patent issued in June, 1950 to Pablo Binayug, grew from its original area of 18 hectares, by an additional 50 hectares through alluvium as the Cagayan River gradually moved to the east. These accretions belong to riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made (Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408; Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil. 806). The reason for this principle is because, if lands bordering on streams are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers as may prejudice the owners thereof should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion (Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567).virtualawlibrary virtual law library The private respondents' ownership of the accretion to their lands was not lost upon the sudden and abrupt change of the course of the Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed, and separated or transferred said accretions to the other side (or eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil Code apply to this situation. Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land

and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within two years.virtualawlibrary virtual law library Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. (Emphasis supplied). In the case at bar, the sudden change of course of the Cagayan River as a result of a strong typhoon in 1968 caused a portion of the lands of the private respondents to be "separated from the estate by the current." The private respondents have retained the ownership of the portion that was transferred by avulsion to the other side of the river. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, is hereby affirmed. Costs against the petitioners.virtualawlibrary virtual law library SO ORDERED.