Environmental Governance in Latin Americas Modern Agricultural Systems

Christian Brannstrom Department of Geography, Texas A&M University

Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil June 11-14, 2009.

Environmental Governance in Latin Americas Modern Agricultural Systems Introduction Balancing agricultural production with environmental conservation is a major global challenge (Bennett and Balvanera 2007; Foley et al. 2005) confronting many stakeholders in an era of predicted doubling of global cereal production and 22% increase in global cropland by 2050 (Green et al. 2005; Tilman et al. 2001). Agricultural land uses cover approximately 19% of the surface of Mexico and Central America, 5% of northern portions of South America, and 10% of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Pasture covers between one-fifth to one-third of surface land in these regions of Latin America (Ramankutty et al. 2008; Eva et al. 2004: 733). High-input, high-output agricultural systems occupy an unknown but environmentally and politically significant portion of this area. These agricultural systems are defined as crop or livestock production systems that use relatively high inputs of fossil fuels and produce relatively high output of crops or animal products (Pretty et al. 2001). Compared with low-input agriculture, usually practiced by smallholder, peasants, or traditional peoples, high-input agriculture is almost exclusively market oriented, with output frequently transported over long distances to national or international markets. Use of soil, irrigation water, and fossil fuels are far more intensive than in low-input agriculture, as imported soil nutrients are required to maintain productivity and reduce pest infestation. Use of labor may be high or low, depending on levels of mechanization in key stages of crop or animal development. Major representative examples of this type of agriculture include Argentine soy, Brazilian cotton, and Mexican milk. I use the clumsy shorthand modern as a label for this type of agricultural system that is found in nearly every country in Latin America, and overall, constitutes a major portion of humanmodified lands of the region. The environmental impacts of modern or high-input, high-output agricultural systems are well known, including removal of native vegetation, soil erosion, excessive use of irrigation water, and heavy reliance on agrochemicals for pest and weed control. Each of these immediate impacts produces several indirect negative consequences, ranging from greenhouse gas emissions to alterations in the hydrological cycle (Hazell and Wood 2008; Pretty et al. 2001; Solbrig et al. 2001). In South America, high-input, high-output agriculture has expanded during the past two decades, converting large areas of savanna and dry forest formations south and west of the Amazon rainforest into croplands integrated with global markets (Batistella et al. 2002; Bickel and Dros 2003; Brown et al. 2005; Galford et al. 2008; Grau et al. 2005a, 2005b; Fearnside 2001; Morton et al. 2006; Steininger et al. 2001; Warnken 1999; Zak et al. 2004). Urgent predictions abound: 22 million hectares of savanna and tropical forest will be converted to farmland, mainly soy fields, by 2020 (Dros 2004); the Brazilian Cerrado will disappear by 2030 (Machado et al. 2004); the loss of the Argentine Chaco may be inevitable (Zak et al. 2004). This area may be known collectively as a neoliberal agricultural frontier, where agricultural expansion is motivated by global market

demands, policies encouraging agricultural exports, presence of trans-national agri-food corporations, technologies for agricultural intensification, and land privatization policies (Hecht 2005). These factors contrast with fiscal or tax incentives, population growth, and infrastructure construction, which motivated earlier agricultural frontiers in South America and elsewhere (Lambin et al. 2003). Environmental Governance Neither processes nor outcomes of environmental governance in South Americas modern agricultural systems is well understood, although two main positions may be described. These models describe and predict environmental governance in settings of modern agriculture. For Susanna Hecht, agricultural lobbies influence the state to allow unfettered resource use in sacrifice zones, which are created as territories for the development of neoliberal agriculture. For Daniel Nepstad, the global market forces motivating neoliberal agriculture cause farmers to collaborate with the state and comply with environmental policies. In Hechts model, elites empowered by neoliberalism dominate environmental governance. These elites successfully lobby the state to permit the development of modern agriculture in sacrifice zones unfettered by environmental restrictions. Rapid land clearance follows, with agricultural elites subservient to agricultural multinational corporations demanding cheap raw materials. Environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) are not troubled by sacrifice zone policies implemented outside tropical rainforest areas because of their high forest bias. Savanna and dry forest formations become the development substrate for export-oriented farmers (Hecht 2005: 400). The idea of the sacrifice zone or deflected development may be traced at least to Goodland and Irwin (1975: 37), who argued for shifting the projects for intensive agriculture from the Amazon rainforest to the Cerrado. Hecht exposes this bias because she believes that conservation opportunities exist among the matrix environments surrounding agricultural fields of sacrifice zones. Thus, Bolivias ~20,000 km2 Santa Cruz expansion zone, where the relative annual clearing rate of 4.5% was reported for 1990-1998 (Steininger et al. 2001), is considered by Hecht (2005: 400) to be the real centre for considering conservation in the age of neoliberalism. The same type of neoliberal agriculture identified by Hecht is present in the Nepstad model of environmental governance, but different environmental types and outcomes are predicted. In Nepstads model, agricultural elites work within the constraints of the states environmental policies. These constraints, coupled with consumer attitudes in wealthy countries, create conservation opportunities in the form of environmental compliance, adoption of superior environmental practices, and imposition of land-use zoning (Nepstad et al. 2006: 1596, 1599). The state is prominent in Nepstads environmental governance by its policies or experiments that include enforcement of the Legal Reserve requirement (in Amazonian rainforests, landholders must set aside 80% of area for conservation), creation and protection of protected areas, and implementation of agro-ecological land-use zoning. Although earlier work reported favorably on the role of municipal governments in environmental planning and management (Nepstad et al. 2002a: 631), municipalities are absent from more recent

papers. In a formal model of land change, a scenario inaccurately termed governance assumes that these experiments will stimulate environmental compliance with state policies among farmers, resulting in dramatic reduction of future deforestation (Soares et al. 2006). However, either compliance or state-society partnership would be more accurate to describe this scenario. The use of governance to describe an outcome is an example of the normative approach that Jordan (2008) describes. Governance, in the empirical sense, is not a scenario. Recently, Nepstad and Stickler (2008) outlined an emerging strategy to mitigate the environmental impacts of intensive commercial farming in the tropics. He argued that consensus must reached on acceptable levels of environmental impacts and treatment of workers. Second, he highlighted the need for a certification scheme that would identify rural producers who succeeded in meeting environmental and labor standards. Third, he argued that consumers in countries that imported agricultural commodities from tropical farms needed to strengthen their political roles. However, Nepstad and Stickler (2008: 50) noted a stalemate between rural producers and social-environmental groups on how to define environmental and labor standards. In addition, Nepstads governance scenario has been criticized as misleading and perhaps even dangerous (Laurence and Fearnside 2002; also Fearnside 2007: 606). Nepstad and colleagues (2002b) responded that historical steps taken by the Brazilian government must be evaluated and reported by the scientific community. Environmental governance has been defined broadly as a set of regulatory practices, processes, mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and Table 1 Typology of governance types (Jordan et al. 2005: outcomes (Lemos and Agrawal 484) 2006: 298) or the sum of the ways Government Society determines ends determines ends in which environmental affairs are (societal goals) (societal goals) managed (Davies 2005: 378). Government Strong government Hybrid Governance describes the selects means interactions among state actors, (policies) such as various branches of Society selects Hybrid Strong government and regulatory means (policies) governance agencies, and non-state actors, such as civil-society organizations and market or private actors, in setting the means and objectives of policy (Jordan et al. 2005: 484). Co-management, private-social partnerships, and public-private partnerships are among several emerging forms of environmental governance (Lemos and Agrawal 2006: 310). Scholars have studied environmental governance with empirical, theoretical, and normative approaches (Jordan 2008: 21-24). In the empirical approach, which I follow in this paper, governance describes the phenomenon in which state and non-state groups determine policy means and objectives. In some cases, non-state or social actors determine the means and objectives of policy, but in other cases state actors are dominant. A typology categorizes empirical examples of governance according to whether state or non-state actors determine the means and the objectives of policy (Table

1). For example, strong governance results when non-state actors determine means and objectives, while strong government is characterized by the state selecting means and objectives. Hybrid types, in which neither the state nor society determines both means and objectives, are found between end points of the Jordan continuum (Jordan et al. 2005: 484). Study Region In the remainder of the paper, I present results of a case study carried out in the modern agricultural sector of the far west of Bahia state (Fig. 1). Western Bahia is part of the ~2 million km2 grassland-woodland Fig. 1. Brazils soy belt and Cerrado ecoregion, indicating Cerrado (Furley 1999; Oliveira western Bahia state. Abbreviations: states of Bahia (BA), Gois (GO), Maranho (MA), Mato Grosso (MT), Mato Grosso do Sul (MS), Minas and Marquis 2002), of which Gerais (MG), Paran (PR), Piau (PI), Rio Grande do Sul (RS), So Paulo approximately 55% has been (SP), and Tocantins (TO). converted to ranch or farmland (Machado et al. 2004). In 2006, western Bahias cropland covered approximately 1.5 million hectares, dominated by soy (850,000 ha), cotton (250,000), and maize (166,000), followed by ~60,000 hectares of irrigated crops under centralpivot systems. For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the west of Bahia was an isolated backwater, known as Beyond the So Francisco River and reliant on cattle drovers and river commerce that connected Barreiras to the So Francisco River downstream (McCreery 2006). Apart from a brief moment during the Second World War, when the US military built an airport to obtain wild latex from the mangaba tree (Hancornia speciosa Gmez), western Bahia was connected minimally to the national or global economy (Haesbaert 1997). Western Bahia is a region of quintessential high-input, high-output agriculture. Soy area increased from nil in the late 1970s to 400,000 ha in 1988. By 1991, 182 central-pivot irrigation plots were in operation (AIBA 1991), and there would be more than 600 central-pivots by 2005. Farmers are strongly oriented toward export markets for soy, cotton, coffee, and fruit crops. Land clearance did not begin with top-down, stateinspired schemes such as road construction and easy credit; rather, spontaneous settlement began in 1980, seven years before the state-sponsored programs subsidized the conversion of Cerrado in western Bahia and elsewhere to agriculture (CAMPO 1986; Fernandes 1998). Beginning around 2000, the government of Bahia extended modest subsidies for cotton and irrigated coffee and fruit, mainly infrastructure cost-sharing, value-added tax discounts, and rebates on finance charges for large projects. Farms are large, usually exceeding 1,000 ha; single landholdings in excess of 5,000 ha are common. Prime farmland is in the extreme west, where topography is flat, elevation reaches 1,000 meters above sea level, and annual precipitation usually exceeds 1,600 mm during the

October-March wet season. Mean annual rainfall decreases quickly to the east, with pasture replacing annual crops. Soils generally are very low in nutrients and high in aluminium saturation, requiring heavy liming and fertilization (Simpson 1998; Spera et al. 1999). A private organization, AIBA (Associao de Agricultores e Irrigantes da Bahia; Association of Bahian Farmers and Irrigators), supported by ~1,200 dues-paying members (generating ~US$660,000 or BR$1.485 million in 2006), has represented the regions farmers since 1990. AIBA lobbies federal and state governments with regard to farmer indebtedness, infrastructure development, agricultural credit, minimum prices, environmental regulation, and labor policies, among other concerns. In the late 1990s, AIBA created the post of environmental officer. As a result, AIBA has become a major player in the regions environmental policy debates (Brannstrom 2005; Brannstrom & Filippi 2006), and thus a key locus of research on environmental governance. Land change in western Bahia Fig. 2. Land change in western Bahia state, 1986-2000-2005. has been extensive and rapid (Fig. 2). In 1979, the region was covered by various forms of savanna or Cerrado, with virtually no cropland visible in available satellite imagery. By 1986, agriculture covered 12% of the study region, expanding at an annual rate of 1.76%. Clearing had occurred on large scales, with fields in excess of 1,000 hectares visible. By 2000, agricultural land expanded to 44% of the study region, while Cerrado land had decreased to 50% of the study region. Between 2000 and 2005, agricultural land increased by 26%, and Cerrado had been reduced to 40% of the study region. Environmental governance processes encompass six key issues in western Bahia. In all but one issue, the federal or state government has set policy objectives by legislation, but non-state actors such as AIBA, the farmers association, have helped determine policy means, thus resulting in a hybrid type of governance (Jordan et al. 2005). First, Brazils federal Forest Code, established in 1965, requires that farms outside the Amazon region must set aside 20% of area as a Legal Reserve. Farmers are obliged to seek federal or state authorization for clearing the rest of the land, but it is widely understood that most of the 7,300 km2 cleared by 2005 lacked authorization, either because farmers never sought authorization or because state agencies, lacking capacity, failed to issue the authorization. Without authorization, a second issue arises: farmers are unable to obtain an environmental license issued by the state or municipal governments. This license is mandatory to obtain credit from state banks, such as the Banco do Brasil or Banco do Nordeste. Beginning in 2003, AIBA negotiated with state agencies for a streamlined

licensing system and for a legal solution that would legalize the clearings of farmers who had retained the 20% Legal Reserve, but who lacked the authorization for clearing the remaining 80% of their land. Third, farmers wishing to implement irrigation must obtain water licenses from the states water resources agency, which allows them a certain volume of surface or groundwater per given period. For surface water licenses, it is known that AIBA influenced the specific means by which farmers solicited licenses; some informants believed that AIBA also strongly influenced the policy objectives of surface-water licensing, as its president and founder is one of the regions largest irrigation farmers and is known to have close contact with high-ranking public officials in the states capital, Salvador. For groundwater-based irrigation, AIBA influenced both policy means and objectives by partnering with the state water agency for a study of groundwater dynamics and the creation of licensing protocols. Fourth, in 2001 the Brazilian government required collection and recycling of empty agro-chemical containers after triple-washing as a policy objective. Farmers face large fines if they are caught burning, burying, or dumping containers. AIBA partnered with state agencies and firms selling agro-chemicals in the development of the policy means, the construction and management of the regions recycling center. Fifth, since 2005 conservation tillage experiments and practices have developed to integrate no-tillage with cattle-crop integration and green cover crops as a means to improve soil organic matter and reduce weedy pests. These experiments, and the technical recommendations arising, are performed and disseminated with minimal state presence; budgets are supported not by AIBA, but by a network comprising a private research foundation, a regional association of agronomists, a regional no-till cropping organization, and farm-supply retailers. This network has set both policy means and objectives independently of the state. Finally, several government-mandated committees and councils for various environmental concerns require stakeholder participation. AIBAs representatives sit on municipal, state, and federal level-committees and councils established since 2002 for watershed management, environmental licensing, and environmental policy-making. In this case, the state has set policy objectives, but AIBA has participated in a collective approach to determining policy means. Discursive or rhetorical strategies are an important aspect of environmental governance (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). In western Bahia, AIBA presents conservationist and productivist ideas side-by-side. On the one hand, AIBA argues that it is reducing the negative environmental impacts of farming, as evidenced by its leadership in establishing and managing a facility that prepares agro-chemical containers for recycling and encouragement of farmer compliance with requirements for environmental licensing. For example, AIBA has argued that state environmental agencies during the 1980s did not provide any guidance or information on regulation, leading to a chaotic process of land occupation that culminated, years later, in a major environmental problem (AIBA 2002). AIBA also has warned that farmers who do not show concern with environmental conservation will face many difficulties to sell their crops in the not-toodistant future (AIBA 2001b). Promoting its environmental record, AIBA has argued that

it has always and vigorously sought to facilitate environmental licensing of agricultural enterprises (AIBA 2004; Lopes 2005) and that its many actions in environmental consciousness-raising and sustainable development should have been the responsibility of the state (Raisa 2004; AIBA 2002). On the other hand, AIBA maintains strongly productivist rhetoric. AIBA has argued that western Bahia could nearly double its present cropland to three million hectares (AIBA 2007). AIBA also credits itself for having followed and participated directly in the extraordinary transformation of the then-barren lands of Bahias Cerrado into vast productive fields (AIBA 2001a). AIBA maintains public opposition to several environmental policies and organizations, arguing against the top-down expansion of the Grande Serto Veredas National Park (Lopes 2004) in the southwestern corner of Bahia state. AIBA also promotes the idea that environmental NGOs are supported by foreign governments, mainly the US and EU, in a strategy that uses environmental arguments to attack Brazilian agriculture (Pitt 2004). Methods To elaborate further on the processes environmental governance in western Bahia, I conducted a Q-method study in 2007 and 2008. This study built on semi-structured, confidential interviews I had conducted in western Bahia and Salvador (state capital) with key state and non-state actors in the realm of environmental governance since 2001. Sampling was purposive, and the snowball method was used to find key actors. During in-depth interviews with ~20 key actors, were carried out in 2001 and 2007, research subjects were asked to describe the state of the regions environmental resources, key environmental resource conflicts, and major policy initiatives. Follow-up interviews were conducted in 2002, 2004, 2005, and 2006. In addition, published and unpublished documents (court papers; newsletters; newspaper articles; policy proposals) were obtained; content analysis of materials relating to environmental policies was carried out. Q-method is an intensive (small-n) and quantitative technique (n tests measured by m individuals) that has been applied in environmental policy analysis with regards to views or belief systems in numerous settings (Webler et al. 2009). To create the initial concourse, 26 statements were chosen from 42 concourse statements from previous semi-structured interviews, and published materials, such as pamphlets and newsletters and technical reports (Table A.1). Four foci defined the concourse: organizations; policies; state of the environment; and underlying and driving forces of environmental change. Next, Q-sorts were obtained during July-Aug 2007 from 21 respondents. Respondents were instructed to place each of the 26 statements into a 26-cell quasi-normal distribution, in which only one statement would be described as most agree with my views (+4) cell and one most disagree with my view (-4) cell. Eight statements could be placed in neutral cells. Of the respondents, 12 represented environmental and farming bureaucracies of federal, state, or municipal governments, and nine representatives of CSO groups. 17 respondents were men, and four were women; respondents ranged from approximately 25 to 65 year of age. Nearly all respondents had

college degrees or some college-level education. Thus, the respondents did not reflect the general population; rather, they represented the key actors in environmental policy of WBA. Of the 12 public officials, one was a federal civil servant, five were employees of the state of Bahia, and four were municipal officials. From the CSO sector, four respondents worked for environmental NGOs, while five were affiliated with farming organizations. One potential respondent refused to participate, alleging that the research should have been approved by Brazils federal government and suggesting that the results of the research would be used to criticize Brazilian agriculture.
Table 2. Factor characteristics. Using the freeware PQMethod, F1 F2 F3 F4 four factors extracted and rotated Eigenvalue* 6.4489 4.3106 1.815 1.4485 (per VARIMAX) accounting for No. of Defining ~67% of variance (Table 2; Variables 9 6 2 3 Table A.2). Two main factors % Variance 24 20 10 13 were identified, F1 and F2. F1 is Explained** Average Relative summarized as favorable to Coefficient 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 environmental controls on Composite Reliability 0.973 0.960 0.889 0.923 agriculture, what I call SE of Factor Scores 0.164 0.200 0.333 0.277 environmentalist. F2 is *refers to eight unrotated factors favorable to the continued **refers to four rotated factors expansion of agriculture, what I call productivist. These factors had a strong negative correlation (-0.089) (Table 3). Two other factors, F3 and F4, were also extracted; these had positive correlations with F2 and F1, respectively. These preliminary results formed the basis of semi-structured interviews with respondents in 2008, but the results of those follow-up interviews are not presented here. The full factor array is presented in Table A.3; for the purposes of this paper, I simplify the discussion by focusing on two factors, F1 and F2.

Results The environmentalist factor describes an environmental criticism of high-input, highoutput agriculture as practiced in western Bahia. This factor had nine defining sorts, accounting for 24% of variance, and highest eigenvalue (6.4489), highest composite reliability (0.973), and lowest standard error (0.164). Respondents loading highly on F1 were environmental officials at federal, state, or municipal levels of government, but not all ENGO representatives loaded highest on F1. High correlation was found between F1 and F4 (0.423) and low correlation was present with F2 (-0.089); thus, some respondents loading highly on F1 also had relatively high loading on F4.

For F1, 13 statements were considered distinguishing or statistically significantly different from other factors at P < 0.05 (Table A.4). Among these statements, several articulate environmental criticisms of large-scale agriculture in western Bahia. For example, the warning against the imminent collapse of water resources (17) ranked highly, with collapse referring to a possible result of both extensive clearing and irrigation by central-pivot irrigation. A more radical claim, ranked far lower than the collapse claim, is the idea that western Bahia never should have been converted to high-input agriculture (18). Environmental criticisms are also discernable in the strong disagreement categories. Among these Table 3. Correlation between factor scores are claims that riparian vegetation is 1 2 3 4 mainly intact (13), that properly licensed 1 1.000 -0.089 -0.129 0.423 central pivot irrigation did not degrade the 2 -0.089 1.000 0.474 -0.083 environment (16), that urban land uses in 3 -0.129 0.474 1.000 -0.015 riparian areas represented the regions 4 0.423 -0.083 -0.015 1.000 major environmental concern (26), and that farmland area in western Bahia could double in the near future (23). The environmental critique inherent in the highly ranked statements was articulated by respondents. Water resources were a major concern for some respondents who loaded highly on F1. For example, respondent 106 (F1 loading = 0.7331) justified the strong agreement (+4) with statement 17 by arguing that the Cerrado is a major source of fresh water in Brazil: Este modelo de ocupao afeta diretamente a questo hdrica, porque temos no Cerrado um local de recepo dessa gua da chuva, e sem o Cerrado a infiltrao insuficiente. Another respondent (F1 loading = 0.692), and gave statement 17 the highest agreement (+4), arguing that Estamos numa regio onde a maior produtora de guas dos afluentes do S. Francisco. uma bacia que produz gua para um grande rio, o rio nacional muito importante. For other respondents who loaded highly on F1, the settlement model idea of statement 21 was a major focus. For example, one respondent (116; F1 loading = 0.6243) gave statement 21 the highest score porque estamos numa regio de alimentao do rio SF, numa regio de solos altamente friveis, numa regio distante de tudo. O que se precisava seria a ao do governo de estudar o por que, o quando, o onde, e o como [da ocupao]e isto nunca foi feito. When asked to justify this answer, the respondent answered, Ausncia total do governo, tanto da Bahia, ausncia total. E contina com a ausncia do governo. Another respondent loading highly on F1 (0.6142) also gave this statement the highest score, but used a different argument. For this ENGO representative (115), the politics of encouraging farming in the Cerrado was flawed because it depends on subsidized credit, external inputs and high levels of technology: , so that the settlement model J comea a ser erronea a partir do poder pblico incentivar a poltica de ocupao. For another respondent who loaded highly on F1 (104; 0.5701), statement 21 received the highest score (+4), becuase western Bahias soil and climate demand alternative settlement models, using no-tillage agriculture and maintaining larger areas of native vegetation: as caractersticas de solo e clima no Oeste da Bahia implicam que se tenham muito cuidado na ocupao, mais de que se tem feito, e com a utilizao de tcnicas adequadas. Um examplo, que hoje as tentativas que esto sendo feitas com o

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plantio direto que passa a ser uma alternativano a nicade voc ter uma forma de ocupao adequada. Existem outras formas tambm, mas s um exemplo, sem que falar na preservao de areas de mata e tal em conjunto com a ocupao econmica. Are environmental views in F1 radical or moderate? The most radical criticism among Pset is the idea that western Bahia never should have been converted to high-input agriculture (No. 18; z = 0.19; P < 0.01), which received a neutral score that was significantly different than other factors. The one respondent who scored this statement highest, an ENGO representative (111; F1 loading = 0.6200) argued that Cerrado considerado como pai das guas , que fornece gua para cinco bacias, ento a gente no pode correr o risco dessa gua no poder ser produzida aqui, e escorrer imediatamente [instead of infiltrating] O cerrado nesta regio propcio para produzir gua. Neverthless, other ENGO representatives displayed a more moderate position. For example, one ENGO representative (126; F1 loading = 0.6442) replied that western Bahias environmentalists were commited to desenvolvimento com preservao and desenvolvimento que no agrida o meio ambiente and that improves human quality of life without impacting the environment; this respondent disagreed with the type or form of agriculture practiced in western Bahia, but emphasized that development must occur. The response of this ENGO representative to statement 16, scored as -4, is also indicative of an environmental critique that is opposed to central-pivot irrigation is a particularly egregious use of water and land resources; in justify the negative response, the environmentalist characterized central-pivot irrigation as um tipo de tecnologia medieval, que agride brutalmente o solo exige uma quantidade de agua muito grande, ele agride violentemente o meio ambiente, afetando os cursos dagua, as nascentes. In addition, a moderate position is apparent in the strong support in F1 for the statement affirming the positive role of municipal-level environmental licensing (3), even if no respondents gave it their strongest approval. Further examples of moderate environmentalism within F1 may be found in responses to a statement that criticized the way in which western Bahia was occupied by agriculture, but argued that there was still time to reverse the errors that have been committed (9; z = 1.113; NS). One ENGO representative and two state officials gave this the highest ranking (+4). The ENGO representative (126) justified the high ranking by arguing that if farmers complied with the RL and APP requirements, in addition to creating corridors that would link Cerrado fragments within a network of private reserves, then environmental recovery would occur. One state-level official justified the high ranking by arguing that by reducing the size of the area farmed and improving technology would allow space for more native vegetation to be protected: No usaria tanta terra, e essas terras, no usadas, seriam uma ativa em termos de reserva ambiental. More flavor of the environmental critique of F1 comes from strong disagreement to some statements. For example, one respondent (120) gave the lowest ranking to statement 23, which puts western Bahias future at three million hectares of farmland, or double the current area. Overall in F1 statement 23 was lowly ranked (z = -1.23; P < 0.01), while arguing that o dobro que est a seria o caos absoluto. Other respondents loading highly

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on F1 ranked this statement in the lowest category (-4), arguing that a rea que j est aberta para agricultura suficiente para o desenvolvimento desta agricultura que utilizada aqui. Tem todos estes problemas, e se abrir mais, o dobro, com certeza os problemas sero maiores ainda (111), while another argued that tao bvia abusurdo dizer que tem tanta area para expanso agrcola, extremamente absurdo (115). A productivist factor (F2) emerged from the analysis as representing a pro-farming position critical of environmentalism, but claiming a different type of environmental position. This factor had six defining sorts, accounting for 20% of variance, and secondhighest eigenvalue (4.3106) and composite reliability (0.960), with low standard error (0.200). This factor is positively correlated with F3 (0.4744), as some respondents loaded relatively highly on F2 and F3. The six defining sorts for F2 represent the agricultural sector in municipal governments or in a farmers association; however, not all agricultural representatives loaded highest on F2, while the highest loader on F1, a municipal environmental official (107), loaded relatively highly on F2 (F1 = 0.8036; F2 = 0.4523). In total, eight statements were considered distinguishing or significantly different from other factors (P < 0.05). Several of these statements indicate both a pro-agriculture belief and at least a moderate skepticism of environmental criticisms described in F1. For example, strong mistrust of ENGOs is apparent in the statement (5) that articulated a conspiracy theory holding that ENGOs are tools of international groups seeking to undermine the success of Brazilian agriculture. This criticism largely derives from the first and second volumes of Carrascos Mfia Verde, a polemic work reviled among ENGOs but held as a defining text among oppositional groups to ENGOs. Another defining statement scoring highly in F2 is the argument that the current environmental conflict was the result, in part, of poor state regulation (22). Notably, the statement admitted that the existence of a major environmental conflict in the region, but it placed most blame on state authorities for their weak presence in western Bahia. More evidence for the skeptical environmental position of F2 is the high score for a statement admitting that federal and state governments had good environmental laws, but argued also that corruption and poor capacity plagued enforcement (8). Statements with very low rankings in F2 further indicate a productivist position. For example, the statement critical of western Bahias settlement model (21) received the lowest ranking in F2 of all factors. Strong disagreement also appeared with a statement that migrants from southern Brazil are especially prone to environmental destruction (25); notably, this statement did not rank highly in F1. Finally, the statement with the razors edge metaphor scored low in F2, suggesting that certain farming practices could make soil degradation far less likely than the statement suggested (19). Statements not significantly different from other factors, but which nevertheless scored very high or very low on F2, further describe the pro-farming position of F2. For example, a statement denying that farmers were the only responsible party in the western Bahia for the environmental problems received a high score (No. 20; z = 1.328; NS). An

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even higher score went to the statement affirming that environmental conservation was essential for the future of crop marketing (No. 10; z = 1.497; NS). The statement blaming central-pivot agriculture for environmental damage received a low score (No. 14; z = -1.166; NS), while a similarly low score went to the statement that water resources were near collapse (No. 17; z = -1.166; NS). But, the statement receiving the lowest score in F2 was the claim that western Bahias uplands should never have been used for agriculture because of its supply of water to the So Francisco River (No. 18; z = -2.034; NS). Agricultural officials who loaded highly on F2 could also be very critical of policies supportive of irrigation, and thus appear similar to high loaders on F1, the environmentalist discourse. For example, a municipal agricultural official (122; F2 = 0.7218) gave the lowest score (-4) to no. 16, arguing that the state water resources agency (SRH) quickly approved irrigation projects based on groundwater, but sem muita preocupao, sem exero de um estudo mais apurado, while the environmental bureaucracy acted too slowly to issue a license, and thus encouraged farmers to implement irrigation illegally: A outorga muito rpida, por isto ruim. Em contrapartida, o licenciamento ambiental muito demorado. So dois fatores paradoxaisum muito ruim porque muito rpido, e outro muito ruim porque demora demais. O produtor, que quer produzir, quando a licena chega, ela j tomou uma atitude ilegal. A common response to No. 20 was given by a municipal farming official, who justified the score of +4 by arguing that farmers who arrived in western Bahia lacked knowledge of environmental legislation, compounded by a weak state presence, while emphasizing that the region is 900 km from the state capital, Salvador. If farmers arrived without knowledge of environmental laws, and the state was once non-existent, then h uma dessonncia muito grande entre rgos do Estado, inclusive entre rgos da prpria Sec. do Meio Ambiente. Eles no se entendem (122). In addition, this respondent affirmed that a pegao da lei, no est est sendo aplicado por falta de consonncia entre os rgos e de pessoal para executar. Mas as leis so excelentes, entre as melhores que existe. Another high loader on F2 (124; 0.6929) justified the high score given to statement No. 20 by arguing that farmers were partially responsible for environmental damage, but that blame should be spread more broadly: a culpa, ou o onus da degradao ambiental, de todos nos, de todas as pessoas que se alimentam, que se vestem, a degradao ambiental de todo mundo. In addition, the justification offered a hint at another complaint among farmers: that the taxes they pay on various farm inputs should be considered as their contribution toward investing in environmental conservation The productivist position is further described in terms of the justification that repsondents gave to key statements. One respondent (112; F2 = 0.6356), objected strongly to statement 25 after placing it in the lowest ranking, and went on to argue that southern Brazilians care for the environment more than northeastern Brazilians; the typical Gachos, he argued, always strive to deixar gua no rio, deixar uma rvore para sombra, reflorestamento, while the northeasterners in Barreiras have devastated the

13

streambanks. He went on to argue that the Gachos have strong environmental concerns: nos estamos preocupado, porque nos vivemos da agricultura, se a agricultura depois vier um deserto, nos vivemos de que? E o que nos temos, vale que? Nos somos os maiores ambientalistas, somos nos, os agricultores. For example, one respondent (119; F2 loading = 0.7251), indicated statement 17 with the lowest score, arguing that Nos no temos um problema hdrico, se houver uma conservao dessas reas todas. O perigo que existe uma contaminao desses rios. Se no houver, acho que vamos ter gua para muitos e muitos anos. The same respondent indicated statement 5 with the highest score, even while admitting that Tem uns [NGOs] que fazem um trabalho muito grande nesta rea de ambiente. Another example of the productivist position is the respondent (113; F2 loading = 0.8094), who indicated statement 10 as the most agree by arguing that Neste mundo globalizado, est cada vez mais dificil vc colocar os productos, principalmente no mercardo externo. O Mercado est muito exigente quanto a boa qualidade. Para ter esta boa qualidade, o produtor tem que se preocupar com a parte quimica que esta usando nesses produtos, com a qualidade, deixa a desejar. The same respondent put statement 18 in the lowest position, indicating that Se fosse visto dessa forma, que o Chapado no deveria ser usado para agricultura, nenhuma parte do mundo podia se fazer agricultura. Todos os lugares tem rios, e tem nascentes. No concordo com isso, se no, onde que nos iriamos fazer agricultura? An identical response to statement 18 was justified in a similar manner by a different respondent (124; F2 loading = 0.6929), who argued that Nenhum pas pode se dar o luxo de abrir mo de aproveitar de uma area importante como a regio Oeste da Bahia, devido s suas condies de solo, de clima, de todos os recursos naturais que tem aqui, uma regio propcio para produo de alimentos. This respondent even suggested a moral imperative to produce crops on lands in Brazils northeastern region: E at por estar localizado aqui, como se diz, na boca da fome, uma regio de transio entre o Brasil produtivo e o Brasil mais miservel, que a regio nordeste. Um pas com tanta carncia de alimentos, com tanta gente que precisa de terra para plantar, sabendo da importncia da agricultura tambem como aproveitador de mo de obra, no se pode abrir mo de aproveitar uma regio como esta do Oeste da Bahia. Aproveitar, mas racionalmente. No consensus statements were found between environmentalists and productivists. However, the closest to consensus was with regard to statement 15, which admitted that many farmers in western Bahia lacked the 20% minimum on-farm set-aside, known as the Legal Reserve, while claiming that the reason for this omission was that in the past environmental issues were less important and farmers were not held [by the state] to environmental laws. Z-scores for both groups was low, 0.87 for F1 and 0.75 for F2. The ideas held within the environmentalists position were moderate, rather than radical. In response to the statement that The uplands of western Bahia never should have been used for agriculture, because they are the great headwaters of the So Francisco River,

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the environmentalist z-score was 0.19. The productivist group was, of course, more critical of this statement, and the z-score was far lower, -2.034. If environmentalists were unwilling to support the radical claim, they offered much stronger support a more moderate position, the statement that The settlement model of the Cerrado of western Bahia is flagrantly incompatible with environmental equilibrium (z-score = 1.89). By contrast, productivists ranked this statement lowly, with z-score of -1.14. another key point of division between environmentalists and productivists was the view on the Mfia Verde conspiracy theory (statement 5). In the productivist factor, the z-score was 1.49, while environmentalists disagreed, generating a z-score of -0.252. Discussion Environmental governance in sites of agricultural expansion merits empirical analysis to determine means and objectives of policies. In addition, environmental governance should be understood as a process in which meanings, shared or unshared, may play critical roles. In western Bahia, the governance type conforms to Jordans hybrid description, in which the state has set policy goals, but non-state actors are increasingly active in setting means and assisting in goal setting. Moreover, the governance process in western Bahia is fragmented. Shared meaning between environmentalist and productivist discourses is low. Productivists view environmental compliance as transaction cost to be paid for cropland expansion, as well as a means to establish environmental credentials. They are also highly suspicious of NGOs operating at regional and national scales, contending that they have been infiltrated by foreign operatives seeking to undermine Brazilian agriculture. NGOs working in western Bahia have a self-defined narrow remit, focusing on oppositional politics or particular interventions with regard to protected areas. They are highly suspicious of farmers and their representatives, seeing them as rapacious and greedy, with little genuine environmental concern. State officials in the region have few resources for developing enforcing policy, and are dependent on their bosses in Salvador for directives and initiative. The environmental bureaucracy is highly politicized; decision-making is concentrated among political appointees, with the permanent civil service staff relegated to technical functions. Change in state executive political party demands change-over of political appointments throughout the bureaucracy. State officials have wide ranging perspectives on both farmers organizations and NGOs; the key variable appears to be the political party affiliation of bureaucratic officials. Overall, then, is western Bahia an example of Hechts sacrifice zone or is it a place where Neptstads governance is an emerging trend? Elites, represented by the nonstate actor AIBA, lead the commercial farm sector of western Bahia. These elites are empowered by control over large landholdings and access to national and global markets in a way representative of Hechts model. Also, land-cover changes since 1979 are suggestive of the sacrifice zone model: agriculture occupies ~55%, and Cerrado has persisted on ~40% of the study area. However, the environmental policies pursued by AIBA, developed in response to global forces and state regulations, are suggestive of the

15

Nepstad model. In between either model is a rather complicated middle arena, which poses dilemmas for environmental activists and managers, as well as non-state actors such as AIBA. AIBAs environmental discourses and policies are initiatives designed not to interfere with its core mission: the continued expansion and intensification of agricultural land uses. Since AIBAs environmental program began in 1999, annual clearing rates have accelerated, and total Cerrado area has decreased from half of the study area to two-fifths. Indeed, AIBAs key environmental initiatives, such as the recycling of agrochemical containers and proposing reformed environmental licensing, create political cover for its members. These examples of hybrid governance shield farmers from fines and delays that state agencies could create. Notably, AIBA does not argue against Brazils environmental laws, such as the requirement for conservation set-asides or agro-chemical recycling; nor does AIBA initiate debate on the ecological benefits, if any, provided by the 20% Legal Reserve or by the environmental licensing of farm operation and irrigation water use. Rather, in another example of hybrid governance in partnership with the state, AIBA is intent on crafting the means to comply with state-mandated objectives. Thus, the governance type in western Bahia conforms more to the Nepstad model, even though the land-change outcome resembles Hechts sacrifice zone model. A complicating factor in both Hecht and Nepstad models, however, appears when looking closer at the motivation of AIBAs actions and relations among AIBA, ENGOs, and the state. ENGOs confront the possibility that a sacrifice zone will result if they do not encourage positive environmental actions in the farming sector beyond the legal minimum. Farmers show every indication of a strong desire to reduce, by legal means, the area of Cerrado to the 20% Legal Reserve requirement. As Nepstads model suggests, ENGOs could engage in dialogue with non-state actors representing farmers; however, ENGOs must recognize motivating factors within organizations such as AIBA. In AIBA and similar organizations, the production-focused imperative to increase farm output may undermine support for environmental policies. ENGOs should recognize that organizations such as AIBA interpret compliance with environmental regulations as both a transaction cost to be paid in pursuit of economic returns from agriculture and as a means for establishing environmental credentials. Thus, a dilemma appears in the environmental governance of neoliberal frontiers: state environmental managers and ENGOs may encourage farmers to comply with environmental policies while remaining powerless to alter broader land-change dynamics, and AIBA may pursue an environmental agenda until environmental policies are perceived to threaten economic returns from farming. In addition, researchers should expect non-state organizations representing commercial farmers to be sites of vigorous internal debates regarding environmental policies. Further analysis of environmental governance in neoliberal frontiers should focus on non-state actors (e.g., farming cooperatives and organizations), with special attention to compliance, information, agenda-setting, discursive strategies, and outcomes. First, it is important to understand the means by which state and non-state actors encourage farmers to comply with environmental regulations. Second, we must investigate the production

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of environmental information by non-state actors and its influences on environmental policy formulation and implementation. Third, governance analysis should focus on how and why non-state actors set environmental agendas. Agenda-setting is strongly related to a broader fourth category, the discursive or rhetorical strategies employed by non-state actors. Finally, longitudinal studies, coupled with stable metrics such as land cover and land use, are critical to understanding governance outcomes. This framework will aid understanding of the environmental governance appearing in the many sites of South Americas neoliberal frontiers. References AIBA. 1991. Levantamento dos recursos hdricos da Bacia do Rio Grande. Barreiras: AIBA. . 2001a. Caderno Especial. Barreiras: AIBA. . 2001b. Um novo model de ocupao dos cerrados do Oeste da Bahia. Barreiras: AIBA. . 2002. Caderno Especial: Meio Ambiente. Barreiras: AIBA. . 2004. Bancos avisam. InformAIBA, March, 14. CAMPO. 1986. Diretrizes tcnicas para o Prodecer II: Abertura, Limpeza, Correo e Fertlizao de Solos de Cerrados na Regio de Influncia da rea de BarreirasBA. Braslia, D.F.: CAMPO. Batistella, M., M. Guimares, E. E. Miranda, H. R. Vieira, G. S. Valladares, J. A. C. Mangabeira, and M. C. Assis. 2002. Monitoramento da expanso agropecuria na Regio Oeste da Bahia. Campinas: EMBRAPA Monitoramento por Satlite. Bennett, E. M., and P. Balvanera. 2007. The future of production systems in a globalized world. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 5 (4):191-8. Bickel, U., and J. M. Dros. 2003. The Impacts of Soybean Cultivation on Brazilian Ecosystems: Three Case Studies. Braslia, D. F.: WWF. Brannstrom, C. 2005. Environmental policy reform on north-eastern Brazil's agricultural frontier. Geoforum 36 (2):257-71. Brannstrom, C., and A. M. Filippi. 2006. Environmental policies for modern agriculture? Evaluating the case of western Bahia state, Brazil. In Sustainable Development: National Aspirations, Local Implementation, eds. J. Hill, A. Terry and W. Woodland, 271-91. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. Brown, J. C., M. Koeppe, B. Coles, and K. P. Price. 2005. Soybean production and conversion of tropical forest in the Brazilian Amazon: The case of Vilhena, Rondnia. Ambio 34 (6):462-69. Davies, A. R. 2005. Incineration politics and the geographies of waste governance: A burning issue for Ireland? Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 23:375-97. Dros, J. M. 2004. Managing the soy boom: Two scenarios of soy production expansion in South America. Amsterdam: AIDEnvironment; World Wide Fund for Nature. Eva, H. D., A. S. Belward, E. E. de Miranda, C. M. Di Bella, V. Gond, O. Huber, S. Jones, M. Sgrenzaroli, and S. Fritz. 2004. A land cover map of South America. Global Change Biology 10:731-44. Fearnside, P. M. 2001. Soybean cultivation as a threat to the environment in Brazil. Environmental Conservation 28:23-38.

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. 2007. Brazil's Cuiab-Santarm (BR-163) Highway: The environmental cost of paving a soybean corridor through the Amazon. Environmental Management 39:601-14. Fernandes, J. I. C. 1998. A soja na Bahia: Desafios e estratgias competitivas no agribusiness. Fortaleza: Banco do Nordeste. Foley, J. A., R. DeFries, G. P. Asner, C. Barford, G. Bonan, S. R. Carpenter, F. S. Chapin, M. T. Coe, G. C. Daily, H. K. Gibbs, J. H. Helkowski, T. Holloway, E. A. Howard, C. J. Kucharik, C. Monfreda, J. A. Patz, C. Prentice, N. Ramankutty, and P. K. Snyder. 2005. Global consequences of land use. Science 309:570-4. Furley, P. A. 1999. The nature and diversity of neotropical savanna vegetation with particular reference to the Brazilian cerrados. Global Ecology and Biogeography 8 (3-4):223-41. Galford, G. L., J. F. Mustard, J. Melillo, A. Gendrin, C. C. Cerri, and C. E. P. Cerri. 2008. Wavelet analysis of MODIS time series to detect expansion and intensification of row-crop agriculture in Brazil. Remote Sensing of Environment (112):576-87. Goodland, R. J. A., and H. S. Irwin. 1975. Amazon Jungle: Green Hell to Red Desert? An Ecological Discussion of the Environmental Impact of the Highway Construction Program in the Amazon Basin. New York: Elsevier. Grau, H. R., T. M. Aide, and N. I. Gasparri. 2005b. Globalization and soybean expansion into semiarid ecosystems of Argentina. Ambio 34 (3):265-66. Grau, H. R., N. I. Gasparri, and T. M. Aide. 2005a. Agriculture expansion and deforestation in seasonally dry forests of north-west Argentina. Environmental Conservation 32 (2):140-8. Green, R. E., S. J. Cornell, J. P. W. Scharlemann, and A. Balmford. 2005. Farming and the fate of wild nature. Science 307 (5709):550-55. Haesbaert, R. 1997. Des-territorializao e identidade: A rede "gacha" no nordeste. Niteri, RJ: Editora da Universidade Federal Fluminense. Hajer, M., and W. Versteeg. 2005. A decade of discourse analysis of environmental politics: Achievements, challenges, perspectives. Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7 (3):175-84. Hazell, P., and S. Wood. 2008. Drivers of change in global agriculture. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 363:495-515. Hecht, S. B. 2005. Soybeans, development and conservation on the Amazon frontier. Development and Change 36 (2):375-404. Jordan, A. 2008. The governance of sustainable development: Taking stock and looking forwards. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 26:17-33. Jordan, A., R. K. W. Wurzel, and A. Zito. 2005. The rise of 'new' policy instruments in comparative perspective: Has governance eclipsed government? Political Studies 53:477-96. Lambin, E. F., H. J. Geist, and E. Lepers. 2003. Dynamics of land-use and land-cover change in tropical regions. Annual Review of Energy and Environment 28 (1):20541. Laurance, W. F., and P. M. Fearnside. 2002. Issues in Amazonian development. Science 295 (5560):1643-4.

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Lemos, M. C., and A. Agrawal. 2006. Environmental governance. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 31:297-325. Lopes, J. C. M. 2004. [no title]. InformAIBA, June, 4. . 2005. Licenciamento ambiental coletivo. InformAIBA, November, 2. Machado, R. B., M. B. R. Neto, P. G. P. Pereira, E. F. Caldas, D. A. Gonalves, N. S. Santos, K. Tabor, and M. Steininger. 2004. Estimativas de perda da rea do Cerrado brasileiro. Braslia, DF: Conservao Internacional. McCreery, D. 2006. Frontier Gois, 1822-1889. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Morton, D. C., R. S. DeFries, Y. E. Shimabukuro, L. O. Anderson, E. Arai, F. d. B. Espirito-Santo, R. Freitas, and J. Morisette. 2006. Cropland expansion changes deforestation dynamics in the southern Brazilian Amazon. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (39):14637-41. Nepstad, D., D. McGrath, A. Alencar, A. C. Barros, G. Carvalho, M. Santilli, and M. d. C. V. Diaz. 2002b. Response. Science 295 (5560):1643-4. Nepstad, D., D. McGrath, A. Alencar, A. C. Barros, G. Carvalho, M. Santilli, and M. d. Vera Diaz. 2002a. Frontier governance in Amazonia. Science 295 (5555):629-30. Nepstad, D., C. M. Stickler, and O. T. Almeida. 2006. Globalization of the Amazon soy and beef industries: Opportunities for conservation. Conservation Biology 20 (6):1595-1603. Nepstad, D. C., and C. M. Stickler. 2008. Managing the tropical agriculture revolution. Journal of Sustainable Forestry 27 (1-2):43-56. Oliveira, P. S., and R. J. Marquis eds. 2002. The Cerrados of Brazil: Ecology and Natural History of a Neotropical Savanna. New York: Columbia University Press. Pitt, S. 2004. Paradox nacional: Produtor penalizado por produzir. InformAIBA, November-December, 2. Pretty, J., C. Brett, D. Gee, R. Hine, C. Mason, J. Morison, M. Rayment, G. v. d. Bilj, and T. Dobbs. 2001. Policy challenges and priorities for internalizing the externalities of modern agriculture. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management 44 (2):263-83. Raisa, A. 2004. Editorial. InformAIBA, March, 2. Ramankutty, N., A. T. Evan, C. Monfreda, and J. A. Foley. 2008. Farming the planet: 1. Geographic distribution of global agricultural lands in the year 2000. Global Biogeochemical Cycles 22:GB1003. Simpson, L. D. 1998. The Rio So Francisco: Lifeline of the north-east. In Management of Latin American River Basins: Amazon, Plata, and So Francisco, eds. A. K. Biswas, N. V. Cordeiro, B. P. F. Braga and C. Tortajada, 207-44. Tokyo: United Nations University Press. Solbrig, O. T., R. Paarlberg, and F. d. Castri eds. 2001. Globalization and the Rural Environment. Cambridge: David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University. Spera, S. T., A. Reatto, E. d. S. Martins, J. R. Correia, and T. J. F. Cunha. 1999. Solos areno-quartzosos no Cerrado: problemas, caractersticas e limitaes ao uso. Planaltina: EMBRAPA Cerrados.

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Acknowledgements Grants from the National Geographic Society and National Science Foundation supported research for this paper.

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Table A.1 Statements use for Q-Method study (concourse).

# 1 2 Statement in Portuguese Os rgos ambientais estaduais no atuam conjuntamente A AIBA um parceiro dos rgos ambientais estaduais, por ter um canal direto com os produtores no Oeste da Bahia O CONDEMA ser um mecanismo muito importante para a gesto ambiental no Oeste da Bahia O trabalho desenvolvido pela AIBA na rea ambiental e tantas outras aes voltadas para a conscientizao e o desenvolvimento sustentvel da regio Oeste da Bahia caracterizam a execuo de programas que constitucionalmente deveriam ser desenvolvidas pelo setor pblico Os lobbies internacionais, interessados em manter as barreiras protecionistas, estimulam uma campanha de algumas ONGs e parte da imprensa internacional contra o agronegcio brasileiro. Os ataques comeam fora do Brasil e aqui ganham adeses ingnuas. Estes movimentos atribuem o crescimento e a qualificao da agropecuria nacional ao despeito do meio ambiente O central Campo Limpo indica que falsa a acusao de que a agricultura do Oeste da Bahia desrespeita o meio ambiente A AIBA acompanhou e participou diretamente da extraordinria transformao das ento ridas terras do cerrado baiano em infinitos campos produtivos O Brazil e a Bahia tem boas leis ambientais, porm ha muita corrupo e os rgos do estado so omissos de conhecimento pblico que a ocupao empreendida no cerrado do Oeste da Bahia no se mostra adequada s condies naturais aqui encontradas, especialmente em relao ao solo e aos recursos hdricos, mas ainda h tempo para a reverso dos equvocos at agora cometidos Num futuro breve, o agricultor que no estiver preocupado com a conservao ambiental ter muitas dificuldades em vender os seus produtos no mundo globalizado A ampliao do PN Grande Serto Veredas, em terras produtivas da Bahia, sem prvia consulta classe agrcola, um exemplo do tratamento que o governo dispensa a quem est dando a sustentao econmica ao Pas A AIBA sempre participou ativamente no English translation The states environmental agencies do not act in concert with each other AIBA is a partner of the states environmental agencies because it has a direct link to the farmers in western Bahia CONDEMA will be an important tool in the administration of the environment in western Bahia The work carried out by AIBA regarding the environment and its activities in various other areas aimed at the sustainable development of western Bahia, is comprised of programs that, constitutionally, should have been developed by the public sector International protectionist lobbies promote campaigns against Brazilian agribusiness, using some NGOs and international media. The attacks begin outside of Brazil and, within Brazil, they gain naive supporters. These movements attribute the growth and quality of the Brazilian agriculture and cattle breeding to environmental degradation. The Campo Limpo facility shows that the accusation that western Bahias agriculture has no regards for the environment is false AIBA followed and participated directly in the extraordinary transformation of the then-barren lands of Bahias Cerrado into vast productive fields Brazil and Bahia have good environmental laws, however, there is much corruption and state agencies disregard infractions It is widely known that the settlement of the Cerrado, in western Bahia, is not well suited to the natural conditions existing there, especially regarding the soil and water. However, there is still time to reverse the mistakes that have been committed In the near future, farmers who do not show concern with environmental conservation will face many difficulties to sell their crops in a globalized world The expansion of the Grande Serto Veredas National Park into productive land, in Bahia, without prior consultation with farmers, is an example of how the government treats those who are economically supporting the country AIBA has always and vigorously sought to

10

11

12

21

13

14

15

16

17

18

trmite das aes visando viabilizar o licenciamento ambiental dos empreendimentos agrcolas, inclusive, na instituio de novos normativos mais simplificados, como a idia do licenciamento coletivo por bacia hidrogrfica 80% das veredas e as nascentes do Oeste da Bahia so bem preservadas; portanto, importante recuperar as mais afetadas reas por reflorestamento No Oeste da Bahia, h muitos casos de desmatamento de reas de Prerservao Permanente, porm, os danos causados pelos pivs centrais um problema ambiental muito mais srio No Oeste da Bahia, so muitos os proprietrios sem a Reserva Legal, considerando que em pocas passadas as questes ambientais eram relegadas a segundo plano e no era exigido do produtor o cumprimento da legislao vigente Pivs devidamente outorgados no Oeste da Bahia no degradam o meio ambiente, pois a outorga um atestado de disponibilidade hdrica concedida pela SRH, respeitando os critrios legais de gesto dos recursos hdricos, e no uma licena ambiental para devastao Existe uma situao alarmante no Oeste da Bahia no que se refere ao uso dos recursos hdricos e as novas reas abertas para agricultura, que vem acontecendo de maneira desordenada, comprometendo seriamente a conservao e preservao destes mananciais. Entretanto, o mais preocupante a situao hdrica que, devido a grande presso que vem sofrendo sobre seus recursos, segue a passos largos a um colapso O Chapado do Oeste da Bahia nunca deveria ser usado para a agricultura, porque uma grande nascente do Rio So Francisco O grau de liberdade entre o processo de produo agrcola no Oeste da Bahia e a agresso ambiental praticamente zero como se trabalhar no fio da navalha: qualquer descuido pode ser fatal No se pode atribuir somente ao produtor a responsabilidade pelo estado em que se encontra o ecossistema do Oeste da Bahia O modelo de ocupao dos cerrados do Oeste da Bahia flagrantemente incompatvel com o equilbrio ambiental Na dcada de 80 os agricultores no encontraram nenhuma orientao ou

facilitate environmental licensing of agricultural enterprises, including the use of new and simplified procedures, such as the idea for collective licensing in watershed districts 80% of the stream banks and headwaters of western Bahia are well preserved, therefore, it is important to use reforestation to recover the most affected areas In western Bahia, there are many cases of clearing of Permanent Protected areas, but the damage caused by central pivots is a much more serious environmental problem In western Bahia, many landowners lack the Legal Reserve because, in the past, environmental issues were relegated to a second place and farmers were not held to environmental laws Central pivots that are granted water rights in western Bahia, do not degrade the environment, because the SRHs grant is a certificate of water availability that follows legal criteria, and not a permission to devastate the environment An alarming situation exists in western Bahia regarding the use of water resources and the new areas cleared for agriculture, which have been done without any planning, and thus, seriously compromising the conservation and preservation of these sources of groundwater. But, the most worrisome issue relates to water which, due to the great pressure its resources have been under, it is rapidly heading towards collapse The uplands of western Bahia should have never been used for agriculture, because they form a large headwater reach of the So Francisco River In western Bahia, the degree of freedom between crop production and environmental aggression is practically zeroit is like working on a razors edge: any mistake could be fatal One cannot blame only the farmer for the stage that the ecosystem of western Bahia finds itself. The model utilized for the settlement of the Cerrado of western Bahia is completely incompatible with the concept of environment equilibrium In the 1980s, environmental agencies did not provide any guidance or information on

19

20

21

22

22

23

fiscalizao por parte de instituies ambientais, assim que teve incio um processo desorientado de ocupao da terra, o que culminou, anos mais tarde, num grande contencioso ambiental no Oeste da Bahia O Oeste da Bahia cultiva atualmente 1.5 milhes de hectares, e h potencial de expanso para at o dobro desta rea A ocupao e uso de reas de sequeiro no Oeste da Bahia estimulado pelo governo para produo de gros, fugindo da competncia e controle da SRH, embora sistematicamente afete os regimes hidrolgicos dos rios e aqferos O desmatamento de grandes reas de cerrado, contra a proviso do Cdigo Florestal para a Reserva Legal, ocorreu porque o produtor no est nem a, no se preocupa pelas questes ambientais, porque oriundo do Sul, e nem entende o estrago que fez l; o problema ambiental o problema de immigrantes sem razesquem migra nunca amigo da flora, sempre tem viso de curto prazo

regulation to the farmers in western Bahia. Consequently, a chaotic process of land occupation took place which culminated, years later, in a major environmental problem 1.5 million hectares of area are being currently cultivated in western Bahia, and potentially that area could be nearly doubled The settlement and use of dry land farming in western Bahia is encouraged by the government for grain production, which is not controlled by the SRH, even though settlement systematically affects the hydrological management of streams and aquifers The clearing of large areas of the Cerrado, contrary to Legal Reserve provisions of the Forest Code, occurred because farmers were not concerned with environmental issues, because farmers are not concerned about environmental issues, because farmers are from the South, and because farmers do not understand the damage caused to the Cerrado; The environmental problem is the problem of immigrants without roots, that is, migrants are usually not friends of flora and always have short-term vision In western Bahia, there are many prejudices against farmers regarding environmental issues, however residential subdivisions are the real problem with water resources, not the Gachos

24

25

26

No Oeste da Bahia existem muitos preconceitos contra os agricultores quanto s questes ambientais, porm o principal problema dos recursos hdricos o loteamento urbano, no os Gachos

23

Table A.2 Factor matrix.

Respondent 107: Municipal environment official 106: Federal environment official 123: Municipal environment official 120: State attorneys office official 126: ENGO representative 116: Municipal environment official 111: State environment official 115: ENGO representative 104: State environment official 121: ENGO representative 105: State environment official 114: State farming official 122: Municipal farming official 101: State environment official 119: Representative of farming sector 113: Representative of farming sector 117: ENGO representative 118: Municipal farming official 125: Representative of farming sector 124: Representative of farming sector 112: Representative of farming sector % Variance explained F1 0.8036* 0.7331* 0.6962* 0.6448* 0.6442* 0.6243* 0.6200* 0.6142* 0.5701* 0.4838 0.4111 0.2942 0.175 0.1318 0.0894 -0.0122 -0.0552 -0.0814 -0.2006 -0.3856 -0.5316 24 Rotated Factor Pattern F2 F3 0.4523 0.0877 -0.1741 -0.0003 0.0877 -0.0353 -0.0156 -0.2753 0.0840 -0.3244 -0.3273 -0.1943 -0.3046 -0.0362 -0.0818 0.4384 0.0633 0.2218 -0.2408 0.3246 0.0264 0.0721 0.0777 -0.2624 0.7218* 0.2693 0.436 0.5822* 0.7521* 0.2596 0.8094* 0.0627 -0.1417 0.2461 0.8428* -0.2229 0.3428 0.8466* 0.6929* 0.3068 0.6356* 0.0606 20 10 F4 -0.0752 0.3749 -0.0045 0.3696 0.4825 0.3190 -0.0320 0.3370 0.3071 0.4103 0.5981* 0.7320* 0.0756 0.3098 -0.2479 -0.0131 0.8236* -0.0382 -0.1309 0.1328 -0.0911 13

24

Table A.3 Factor array for Q-sort statements

No. Summarized Text (Portuguese) Os rgos ambientais estaduais no atuam conjuntamente A AIBA um parceiro dos rgos ambientais estaduais O CONDEMA ser um mecanismo muito importante O trabalho desenvolvido pela AIBA Os lobbies internacionais, interessados em manter as barreiras protecionistas O central Campo Limpo A AIBA acompanhou e participou diretamente da extraordinria transformao O Brasil e a Bahia tem boas leis ambientais de conhecimento pblico que a ocupao empreendida no cerrado Num futuro breve, o agricultor que no estiver preocupado com a conservao ambiental A ampliao do PN Grande Serto Veredas A AIBA sempre participou ativamente 80% das veredas e as nascentes do Oeste da Bahia so bem preservadas No Oeste da Bahia, so muitos os proprietrios sem a Reserva Legal Pivs devidamente outorgados no Oeste da Bahia no degradam Existe uma situao alarmante no Oeste da Bahia O Chapado do Oeste da Bahia nunca deveria ser usado O grau de liberdade No se pode atribuir somente ao produtor O modelo de ocupao Na dcada de 80 os agricultores no encontraram O Oeste da Bahia cultiva atualmente 1.5 milhes de hectares A ocupao e uso de reas de sequeiro no Oeste da Bahia estimulado O desmatamento de grandes reas de cerrado No Oeste da Bahia existem muitos preconceitos No Oeste da Bahia, so muitos os proprietrios sem a Reserva Legal F1 F2 F3 F4

1 2 3 4 5 6

0 0 3 -1 0 -2

-1 0 -1 0 3 1

3 2 0 -1 -1 1

1 0 -1 -4 -2 -2

7 8 9

-1 1 2

1 2 0

2 -2 -3

-3 0 2

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

1 -2 0 -4 -1 2 -3 3 0 -1 2 4 1 -2 1 0 -3

4 1 0 0 -2 2 -1 -3 -4 -2 3 -2 2 1 0 -3 -1

1 0 4 0 -3 1 -1 -4 -2 2 3 0 1 0 -1 -2 0

3 -3 -1 1 2 0 0 1 -2 2 4 3 -1 0 0 1 -1

25

Table A.4. Distinguishing statements for Factor 1. All statements are significant at P < 0.05; ** indicates statements significant at P < 0.01.
No. Text In western Bahia an alarming situation exists with regard to water resources and new areas cleared for agriculture, which occurs in an unorganized manner, seriously compromising the conservation and preservation of groundwater. But, the most worrying issue is the water situation that, due to great pressure, is a few steps from collapse CONDEMA will be an important instrument in western Bahias environmental management The responsibility for the state of western Bahias ecosystem cannot be placed only on farmers The uplands of western Bahia never should have been used for agriculture, because they are the great headwaters of the So Francisco River The clearing of large areas of Cerrado, against the Forest Code provision for the Legal Reserve, occurred because farmers werent concerned about environmental issues, because they are from the South, and dont even understand the environmental damage they caused their; the problem is one of immigrants without rootsmigrants are never friends of flora, and always have a short-term view In western Bahia, the degree of freedom between crop production and environmental aggression is practically zeroit is like working on a razors edge: any mistake could be fatal AIBA followed and participated directly in the extraordinary transformation of the then-barren lands of Bahias Cerrado into vast productive fields In western Bahia there are many cases of clearing of Permanent Protection areas, but the damage caused by central-pivots is a much more serious environmental problem The expansion of the Grande Serto Veredas National Park, without prior consultation with farmers, is an example of how the government treats those who are economically supporting the country Today 1.5 million hectares are cultivated in western Bahia, and there is potential to nearly double that area In western Bahia there are many biases against farmers with respect to the environment, but residential subdivisions are the real problem with water resources, not the Gachos Central pivots in western Bahia that are granted water rights do not degrade the environment, because the SRHs grant is a certificate of water availability following legal criteria, not licenses for environmental devastation 80% of the streambanks and headwaters of western Bahia are well preserved; but it is important to use reforestation to recover the more affected areas Rank z-score

17

1.72*

3 20 18

3 2 0

1.24* 0.81 0.19*

25

-0.24

19

-1

-0.26

-1

-0.30

14

-1

-0.34*

11 23 26

-2 -2 -3

-0.88 -1.23* -1.52*

16

-3

-1.61*

13

-4

-1.97*

26

Table A.5. Distinguishing statements for Factor 2. All statements are significant at P < 0.05; ** indicates statements significant at P < 0.01.
No. Text International protectionist lobbies stimulate campaigns against Brazilian agribusiness using some NGOs and international media. The attacks begin outside of Brazil and within Brazil they gain naive adherents. These movements attribute the growth and quality of Brazilian agriculture to environmental destruction In the 1980s farmers in western Bahia had no information or regulation from environmental agencies, and so an uninformed process of land occupation began that ended, years later, in a big environmental problem Brazil and Bahia have good environmental laws, but there is a lot of corruption and the state agencies are not accountable AIBA followed and participated directly in the extraordinary transformation of the then-barren lands of Bahias Cerrado into vast productive fields It is well known that the occupation of western Bahias Cerrado is not well suited to natural conditions, especially with regard to soil and water, but there is still time to reverse the errors committed until now In western Bahia, the degree of freedom between crop production and environmental aggression is practically zeroit is like working on a razors edge: any mistake could be fatal The settlement model of the Cerrado of western Bahia is flagrantly incompatible with environmental equilibrium The clearing of large areas of Cerrado, against the Forest Code provision for the Legal Reserve, occurred because farmers werent concerned about environmental issues, because they are from the South, and dont even understand the environmental damage they caused their; the problem is one of immigrants without roots migrants are never friends of flora, and always have a short-term view Rank z-score

1.49*

22

1.25

8 7

2 1

1.18* 0.3

0.14*

19 21

-2 -2

-0.86 -1.14*

25

-3

-1.96

27