1) U.S. v. SWEET [1 Phil.

18 (1901)] Nature: Appeal from an order of the City of Manila CFI Facts: Sweet was employed by the United States military who committed an offense against a POW. His case is filed with the CFI, who is given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases for which a penalty of more than 6 months is imposed. He is now contending that the courts are without jurisdiction because he was acting in the line of duty. Issues: 1. WON this case is within the jurisdiction of the CFI. Yes. By Act No. 136 of the US-Phil Commission, the CFIs are given original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which a penalty more than 6 months imprisonment or a fine greater than $100 may be imposed. Furthermore, CFIs have jurisdiction to try offenders charged with violation of the Penal Code within their territorial limits, regardless of the military character of the accused. The defendant and his acts are within the jurisdiction of the CFI because he failed to prove that he was indeed acting in the line of duty. 2. WON an assault committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offence under the penal code? Yes. Though assault by military officer against a POW isnt in the RPC, physical assault charges may be pressed under the RPC. 3. Assuming that it is an offence under the penal code, WON the military character sustained by the person charged with the offence at the time of its commission exempts him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals? No. The application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character brought before them for trial (R.A. No. 7055). Appellant claims that the act was service connected. If this were true, it may be used as a defense but this cannot affect the right of the Civil Court to takes jurisdiction of the case. Judgment: Judgment thereby affirmed An offense charged against a military officer in consequence of an act done in obedience to an order is clearly shown on the face, where such offense is against the military law, is not within the jurisdiction of the courts of the Civil Government. Per Cooper, J., concurring

2) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JENNY TUMAMBING y TAMAYO, GR No. 191261,

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

Identity of accused not proved; acquitted. Issue: WON the CA and the trial court erred in finding that accused Tumambing raped DK under the circumstances she mentioned. The Ruling of the Court A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender s identity. The constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.[2] Here, both the RTC and the CA gave credence to DK s testimony. They maintained that DK categorically and positively identified her rapist. The CA invoked People v. Reyes[3] where the Court ruled that it would be easy for a person who has once gained familiarity with the appearance of another to identify the latter even from a considerable distance.[4] Ordinarily, the Court would respect the trial court and the CA s findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses.[5] But the courts mentioned appear to have overlooked or misinterpreted certain critical evidence in the case. This compels the Court to take a look at the same.[6] DK s identification of accused Tumambing as her rapist is far from categorical. The Court s reading of her testimony shows that she was quite reluctant at the beginning but eventually pointed to him when it was suggested that it might be him after all. Several witnesses attested to DK s uncertainties regarding the rapist s identity when the barangay chairman arranged for her to meet Tumambing. PO2 Crispulo Frondozo, one of the apprehending officers, testified as follows: Q: Now in the barangay, do you have any occasion to see whether the complainant pinpointed accused as the person who abused her person? A: No, Sir. Q: What about in any precinct or agency, do you have any occasion to see complainant positively identified the accused? A: No, Sir.[7] Pedrito Yacub, Sr., the Barangay Chairman to whom DK initially reported the incident testified: Q: When the accused enter the barangay hall upon invitation, what happened next? A: Correction Sir. Not at the barangay hall. In my residence. Q: Then what happened? A: He was surprised and [I] told him that he is a suspect of rape and his reply was akala ko pakukunan niyo ako ng dugo. Q: What was the reaction of the accused? A: As we sat down in a table, a confrontation ensued. I assured the complainant. Don't be afraid. Tell me. I will protect you.

I called her two cousins. Then she stare upon the suspect. I ordered the suspect to turn left, right and backways. Q: After you told the suspect to pose left, right and backways, what happened next? A: The suspect told the complainant huwag kang magtuturo. Ninenerbyus na ako. So she could not pinpoint the suspect. I said, Iha, [i]to ba? But she cannot point to.[8] (Underscoring supplied)

DK s above behavior during her initial confrontation with accused Tumambing gives the Court no confidence that, as she claimed in her testimony, she was familiar with the looks of her rapist because she saw him on the previous day as he passed by her cousin s rented room many times. If this were the case, her natural reaction on seeing Tumambing would have been one of outright fury or some revealing emotion, not reluctance in pointing to him despite the barangay chairman s assurance that he would protect her if she identified him. In assessing the testimony of a wronged woman, evidence of her conduct immediately after the alleged assault is of critical value.[9] The barangay chairman continued: Q: As barangay captain who has the duty to enforce law and city ordinances, you came to know that there were other suspect, what did you do? A: I invited the suspect. Q: Do you remember the person whom you invited known as the second suspect? A: His name is Alvin Quiatcho. For confrontation with the complainant. And confrontation ensued between her and the suspect. I asked her is this the suspect? Q: What was her answer? A: She said, she could not recall. Chairman pa doctor kaya natin siya. It mean[s] makunan ng cells. The complainant told me chairman padoktor natin [sic] na lang natin siya. Q: Presumably to get some sperm? A: Yes, Sir. Q: What did you do if any with the suggestion of [DK]? A: I told the complainant, it would be difficult to do. Q: After that what happened? A: So since she could not pinpoint also the other suspect, I released the other suspect. She could not pinpoint.[10] (Underscoring supplied) That DK wanted the sperm of Alvin Quiatcho (Quiatcho), the second suspect, tested and presumably compared with that found in her clearly indicates that she entertained the possibility that it was Quiatcho, rather than accused Tumambing, who raped her. The Court cannot thus accept DK s testimony that she had been familiar with the looks of the man who violated her and that she could not possibly be mistaken in identifying him as Tumambing.

Crispin Dizon, the executive officer of the same barangay, corroborated the barangay chairman s testimony: Q: So what was the question?

A: The question was that, Is this the person you saw and who rape you? Court: Referring to? Interpreter: Referring to Jenny Tumambing. Q: What was the reply of the victim, if any? A: She did not answer, Sir. Q: What happen next when [DK] did not answer? A: And [DK] was again asked by the Chairman and told her not to fear and tell who raped her and point to him. Q: What was the reply of [DK] if any? A: She did not reply, Sir. Q: Now if you remember how many times did the Chairman asked [DK]? A: Four times, Sir.[11]

The RTC and the CA thought that DK was quite sure it was Tumambing who sexually attacked her. They pointed out her insistence at the police precinct that it was Tumambing who really raped her and that she positively identified him in open court. But this came about much later. The fact is that she did not refute the testimonies given by neutral witnesses that she could not point to accused Tumambing as her rapist during their initial confrontation at the barangay chairman s residence. These witnesses had no motive or reason to fabricate a story for the defense. By the nature of rape, the court has to, quite often, rely on the sole testimony of the victim. For this reason, the court is always reminded to subject her testimony to a most rigid and careful scrutiny. It cannot afford to overlook details that are essential to an understanding of the truth.[12] Here, as shown above, DK s testimony is anything but believable and consistent. Although she categorically said on cross-examination that she saw her attacker enter the room,[13] she did not shout or raise an alarming call. Nor did she try to escape.[14] She just lay in bed.[15] In fact, she maintained that position in bed even when her attacker was standing before her and removing his clothes.[16] She did not shout nor struggle when he penetrated her.[17] There is one thing that DK appeared sure of. Her rapist wore a yellow shirt.[18] But this is inconsistent with her testimony that after the stranger in her room was done raping her, bigla na lang po siyang lumabas x x x sinundan ko siya ng tingin. [19] Since DK did not say that the man put his clothes back on, it seems a certainty that he collected his clothes and carried this out when he left the room. Since DK then turned on the light for the first time, she had a chance to see him clearly. But, if this were so and he walked out naked, why was she so certain that he wore a yellow shirt? With such serious doubts regarding the true identity of DK s rapist, the Court cannot affirm the conviction of accused Tumambing.

WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 12, 2009 in CAG.R. CR-HC 02433 as well as the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Criminal Case 04-227897, and ACQUITS the accused-appellant Jenny Tumambing y Tamayo of the crime charged

on the ground of reasonable doubt. The Court orders his immediate RELEASE from custody unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. The Court further ORDERS the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision forthwith and to inform this Court, within five days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.

3) THE U.S. plaintiff-appellant, vs. EL CHINO CUNA (alias SY CONCO), defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-4504 On the 12th of August, 1907, the provincial fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Isabela, an information charging the defendant Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), with a violation of section 5 of Act No. 1461 of the Philippine Commission, committed as follows: That the said Chinaman Cuna (alias Sy Conco), on or about the 30th day of June, 1907, in the municipality of Echague, in the Province of Isabela, in the Philippine Islands, sold for ten cents, Philippine currency, a small quantity of opium, to Apolinaria Gumpal, a Filipino woman, who was neither a doctor, pharmacist, vender of opium with license, nor an inveterate user of opium duly registered; all contrary to the law. Thereafter the defendant demurred to the information on the ground: 1. That the information alleges that on the 30th day of June, 1907, in the town of Echague, Province of Isabela, in the Philippine Islands, the accused violated the provisions of section 5 of Act No. 1461. 2. That the said Act No. 1461 was repealed by Act No. 1761, enacted on the 10th day of October, 1907, and in effect on the 17th day of October, 1907, during the pendency of this case. 3. That the said Act No. 1461 having been repealed during the pendency of this case, and the repealing law not containing any exception touching pending cases, there is no law in force which penalizes the alleged offense. Wherefore, this court has no jurisdiction over the case.

The trial court in its order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information held as follows: After hearing he arguments of counsel and examining the record, the court finds that at the time when it is alleged this accused committed the offense with which he is charged, Act No. 1461, known as the "Opium Law" was in force, and continued to be in force until the 17th day of October, 1907, when it was superseded by a new Act, No. 1761, which, in section 33 thereof, repeals Act No. 1461, without excepting from the provisions of the repealing clause cases pending at the time of its enactment, for the

infraction of Act. No. 1461, and without prescribing what disposition should be made of such cases. This being true, the court is of opinion that this case should be dismissed, there being at this time no law in force, in accordance with which this accused, if he be tried and convicted, can be punished for the offense committed in June, 1907. (U.S. vs. Tynen, 11 Wal., 88 Mongeon vs. People, 55 N.Y., 613; State vs. Wilder, 47 Ga., 522). The court, therefore, sustains this demurrer, and dismisses the case, declaring the costs de oficio. From the judgment sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the information, the Government appealed, and the only question submitted for consideration is whether the provisions of section 33 of Act No. 1761, which in express terms appeal Act No. 1461, should be construed so as to deprive the courts of jurisdiction, after the date when the repealing Act went into effect, to try, convict, and sentence persons guilty of violations of Act No. 1461, committed prior to that date uaPChaxzVv. The cases cited by the trial court, as well as many others of like tenor and effect which are to be found in the reports, leave no room for doubt as to the American and English common-law doctrine touching the effect of a repeal of a law prescribing penalties; most if not all of the state courts holding that, in accord with this doctrine, the repeal of a law prescribing penalties has the effect of remitting or extinguishing any penalty, loss or rights, or responsibility incurred under such law as to all persons who have not been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of such law prior to the enactment of the repealing law; the Supreme Court of the United States declaring that "under the general principles of the common law, the repeal of a penal statute operates as a remission of all penalties for violations of it committed before its repeal, and a release from prosecution therefor after said repeal, unless there be either a clause in the repealing statute, or a provision of some other statute, expressly authorizing such prosecution." (U.S. vs. Reisinger, 128 U.S. Rep., 398, 401.) But neither English nor American common law is in force in these Islands, nor are the doctrines derived therefrom binding upon our courts, save only in so far as they founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing law; and, in our opinion, the common-law rule of interpretation just cited is in conflict with existing law in these Islands, and directly opposed to the rule of interpretation laid down by the supreme court of Spain and the learned commentators on Spanish written law; and, in the language of a learned American judge, "the rule is an arbitrary one, and never had anything to commend it, except in the United States an undue sympathy for wrongdoers, and in England an early prejudice among common-law judges against "statute-made law." (Opinion of Judge Deady, Eastman vs. Clackamas Co., 32 Fed. Rep., 24, 33.)

Article 1 of the Penal Code in force in these Islands defines crimes and misdemeanors as voluntary acts or omissions penalized by the law; and complementary to this provision, article 21 provides that no crime or misdemeanor shall be punished with a penalty of which has not been prescribed by law prior to its commission. In accordance with these provisions the question whether an act is punishable or not depends upon the question whether or not at the time of its commission, there was a law in force which penalized it; this rule being modified, however, by article 22 of the same code, which provides that

penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor persons convicted of a crime or misdemeanor, and this notwithstanding the fact that at the time of the enactment of such laws, final and judgment may have been pronounced and the convict may entered upon the execution of his sentence. The courts of Spain and learned commentators on Spanish law have construed these provisions to mean that penal laws are to be given a retroactive effect only in so far as they favor the defendant charged with a crime or a misdemeanor, and that, when a penal law is enacted repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an offender in the whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only by extent to which the new law is favorable to the offender. In other words, that the enactment of new penal law, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing clauses, does not deprive the courts jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law. Thus Pacheco, commenting upon the new Penal Code of 1848-1850, of which article 506 provided that all general penal laws were repealed by its publication, says: At this time when the Penal Code is being put into effect and given force, we have in fact two criminal laws in Spain, and close attention is necessary to apply them properly. There may be prosecutions which it is necessary to dismiss, as, for example, those for sodomy; others which it may be necessary to decide in conformity with the provisions of the new code, as, for example, those for carrying concealed weapons; and others which must be judged in accordance with the old provisions, as, for example, many cases of robbery. The rules of procedure in one or other manner being furnished us by the former article (article 19 of the Penal Code of Spain identical with article 21 of the Penal Code of the Philippines), and the present article (article 20 of the Penal Code of Spain and article 22 of the Philippine Code). Has the code increased the penalty? Then it is not applicable to crimes committed prior to its enactment. Has it extinguished or diminished them? Then it is clearly applicable to them. (1 Pacheco, 296.) And a similar construction was placed upon the provisions of the Penal Code of 1870 by the supreme court of Spain. Article 626 of this code (which is substantially identical with article 506 of the Penal Code of 1848 and article 611 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands) repealed all general penal laws prior to its promulgation, but the court held that, where a crime was committed prior to the publication of the reformed code, the penalty prescribed by the code of 1850 (the code prior to that of 1870) being more favorable to the accused, that must be applied. (Decision of the supreme court of Spain, 17th of January, 1873.) It is contended, however, that the general provisions of the Penal Code thus construed are not applicable to Acts of the Commission or of the Philippine Legislature defining and penalizing offenses, these provisions being limited in their application to the subject-matter embraced in the code itself. In answer to this suggestion it is said that, while all the provisions of the Penal Code may not be applicable

to special Acts defining and penalizing offenses, article 22 of that code prescribes a rule of general application, and in the absence of other provisions this rule is universally applicable in all cases where new penal law repeal former laws touching the same subject-matter jlzmTEeTGp. For the purposes of this decision, however, it is not necessary to determine this question, because the penalty prescribed in both Acts under consideration is the same, and, even if the rule prescribed in article 22 of the code were not applicable to Acts of the Commission or of the Philippine Legislature, article 3 of the preliminary title of the Spanish Civil Code, still in force in the Philippines, which treats of laws in general, their effect, and general rules of application, provides that laws in general shall not have a retroactive effect, if the contrary is not expressly provided; so that, if it be granted that the express provision of article 22, prescribing that penal laws shall not have retroactive effect save only where favorable to the offender, is not applicable to Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, then it must be held under this provision of the Civil Code that such Acts can have no retroactive effect whatever; and the reasoning advanced in support of the Spanish doctrine as to the effect of general repealing clauses in the code, which is based upon a comparative examination of the limited retroactive effect given its provisions in article 22, read together with articles 3 and 21 (which undoubtedly declare the principles of universal application), applies to such Acts with equal if not greater force and cogency, since, unless article 22 be held to apply to them, these Acts can have no retroactive force whatever. We conclude, therefore, that the doctrine of English and American common law relied upon by counsel for defendant is not and has not been the accepted doctrine in this jurisdiction, and that, in accordance with the accepted doctrine, the courts in these Islands are not deprived of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders who have violated the provisions of Act No. 1461 prior to the date when Act No. 1761 went into effect, notwithstanding the provision of the latter Act repealing Act No. 1461; and that the penalty prescribed by the repealing Act for violation charged in the information not being more favorable to the accused than that prescribed in the old law, the penalty to be imposed is that prescribed by the old law. But we expressly reserve our opinion as to which penalty would properly be imposed in case wherein a later Act of the Commission of the Philippine Legislature imposed more favorable penalty than that prescribed in a repealed Act. The reason originally advanced in support of the common law of interpretation, was that the former law, defining and penalizing certain acts committed prior to the enactment of the new law, having been repealed, there is no law in force after the date of the repeal by virtue of which the court can impose the penalties prescribed in the repealed law. This proposition will not bear close scrutiny. Either it assumes that the repeal of a law defining and penalizing an offense has the retroactive effect of remitting penalties already incurred under the repealed law, and assumption which if carried to its logical conclusion would require the discharge of all offenders against the old law, whether actually convicted or not; or else it assumes that, when the legislator repeals a law defining and penalizing an offense, there is an implied derogation of the jurisdiction of the court to try and convict persons who have already incurred penalties under the repealed law, but not have been tried and sentenced therefor. No satisfactory reason can be assigned for reading such provisions into the repealing law. Where the repealing law itself penalizes the acts penalized in the repealed law, it is absurd to say that

the legislator, although continuing in force the penal provisions of the old law, intended to remit the penalties as to certain persons guilty of the very acts which the new law itself penalizes, because of the mere accident that they might had not been brought to trial and sentenced before the enactment of the repealing law; and the court by the laws creating them and defining their powers, are clothed with power to try, convict and sentence all persons guilty of a violation of law which constitutes a crime or a misdemeanor, and unless this jurisdiction is expressly taken away from them by the repealing law, or unless penalties incurred under the old law are expressly remitted, there is no ground for denying to the courts jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence violations of the old law. All persons who violated the provisions of the old law prior to its repeal thereby incurred the penalties therein prescribed, and thereafter the jurisdiction of the courts to try, convict, and sentence such offenders does not depend upon the continuance in favor of that law as to future offenders, but upon those provisions of law which clothe the courts with power to hear and decide complaints charging the commission of violation of law, and upon the observance of those rules of procedural law which prescribe the steps to be taken in prosecuting criminal offenses. The mere repeal of a penal statute is by no means equivalent to a declaration that the statute was invalid from the date of its enactment. On the contrary, it continues on the statute book as the law of the land touching the subject-matter of which it treats; so that, unless the contrary expressly appears, a repealed penal statute loses none of its force and effect as a law defining and penalizing certain acts committed prior to its repeal, and the courts may and should find in the repealed statute that the rule whereby to determine whether penalties have been incurred thereunder, and the nature and extent of such penalties as may have been incurred JQjxVoK. We the more readily accept the doctrine laid down by the Spanish authorities, because it leads to a conclusion which appears to be in consonance with the dictates of good sense and sound judgment, while the rule of interlaw authorities results in a construction of repealing statutes which it is difficult to believe the law maker has in mind when these statutes are enacted. A rule of interpretation which results in a conclusion manifestly contrary to the intention of the legislator and which, as was well said by Judge Deady, is an arbitrary rule, with nothing to commend it, should not be adopted in this jurisdiction where it is not supported by those binding precedents which alone have kept it alive in England and the United States. We are confirmed in our conclusions by a review of modern American legislation modifying and restricting the application of the common-law doctrine; for it appears that the Congress of the United States, and many if not most of the States have adopted statutory provisions for the express purpose of escaping the absurd and unreasonable consequences flowing from a strict application of the common law doctrine, and it appears that American courts of last resort have never hesitated to give full force and effect of these statutory modification of the common law doctrine. (U.S. vs. Jacobus, 96 Fed. Rep., 260; Lang vs. U.S., 133 Fed. Rep., 201, 206; Daggy vs. Ball, 7 Ind. App., 64, 34 N.E., 246; Art. 13, Rev. Stat., U.S.) The judgment of the trial court sustaining the demurrer to the complaint interposed by the accused is reversed, and the record will be returned to that court for further proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.

4)