JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC.

, JANSSEN PHARMACEUTICA, AND/OR RAFAEL BESA, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 172799 The instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Present: the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks the reversal of the Decision dated 31 January 2006 and Resolution dated 23 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86963. The Court of Appeals QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, Decision affirmed two resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) directing the reinstatement of respondents Ma. Jesusa Bonsol and Rizalinda Hirondo to their former positions in Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. while the Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

- versus -

CARPIO MORALES, The instant petition originated from the complaint for illegal TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. dismissal filed by respondents Ma. Jesusa Bonsol and Rizalinda Hirondo against petitioners Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceutica, one of the formers divisions. On 11 November 1999, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, Promulgated: prompting respondents to elevate the matter to the NLRC. On 14 December 2001, the NLRC rendered a Resolution, modifying the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC ruled that the violations of July 6, 2007 company procedure committed by respondents did not constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience warranting their dismissal; hence, respondents were entitled to reinstatement.

JOHNSON OFFICE & SALES UNIONFEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (FFW), MA. JESUSA BONSOL and RIZALINDA HIRONDO, Respondents.

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads in part: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED to the effect complainants-appellants [private respondents] were illegally dismissed; that they are entitled to reinstatement to their respective former position[s] without loss of seniority rights and privileges but without any backwages or in the alternative, to payment of separation pay each

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

equivalent to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service; that they merit payment of their claims for thirteenth (13th) month pays, service incentive leave pays and attorneys fees equivalent to ten [percent] (10%) of their monetary awards for thirteenth (13th) month pay and service incentive leave pay.

2. Attorneys Fees: P12,000.00 + 1,972.60 x 10% 1,397.26 P39,369.86 P111,082.18 GRAND TOTAL

The foregoing awarded claim of Complainants-Appellants are computed as follows: 1. Ma. Jesusa Bonsol Salary: P15,000/mo. 1. Separation Pay: From May 1992 to Dec. 28, 1998 7 yrs. P15,000.00 x 7 yrs. x [m]o. P52,500.00 15,000.00 2. 13th Month Pay Service Incentive Leave Pay: P15,000 x 12 / 365 = P493.15 x 5 day 2,465.75 2. Attorneys Fees: P15,000.00 + 2,4465.75 x 10% 1,746.57 Total P71,712.32

========= As regards the other issues, the Decision is SUSTAINED. SO ORDERED.

Petitioners sought partial reconsideration but the NLRC denied the motion in a Resolution dated 11 February 2002. Neither party appealed from the resolution decision of the NLRC within the reglementary period. The Resolution dated 14 December 2001 became final and executory. On 5 March 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Case for Conference before the NLRC, manifesting their willingness to pay respondents separation pay and other monetary awards. According to petitioners, in the conferences called by the NLRC, none of the respondents were in attendance. The Labor Arbiter even suggested to petitioners to prepare the check payment. Instead, in a motion dated 18 December 2002, respondents sought the issuance of a writ of execution to implement the Resolution dated 14 December 2001 and prayed for their immediate reinstatement to their former positions. Petitioners opposed the motion.

2. Rizalinda Hirondo Salary: P12,000/mo. 1. Separation Pay: From April 17, 1995 to December 28, 1998 = 4 yrs. P12,000 x 4 yrs. x mo. P24,000.00 12,000.00 1,972.60 2. 13th Month Pay Service Incentive Leave Pay: P12,000 x 12 / 265 = P394.52 x 5 days

At the conference held on 31 March 2004, petitioners reiterated their intention to satisfy respondents monetary award but the latter refused and insisted on their reinstatement. Thereafter, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion, arguing that the 14 December 2001 Resolution granted petitioners the right to choose between the payment of separation pay and the reinstatement of respondents based on the finding that while their termination was illegal, respondents were not entirely faultless as they did not follow the exact procedure in the performance of their duties. Petitioners also claimed that reinstatement was no longer feasible in view of the strained relations between the parties. On 18 June 2004, the NLRC issued a Resolution, which directed the reinstatement of respondents pursuant to the 14 December 2001 Resolution. The NLRC recognized respondents right to choose between reinstatement and separation pay and disregarded petitioners claim of strained relations. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in the Resolution dated 28 July 2004 Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. They contended that respondents Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution had the effect of altering the 14 December 2001 Resolution, which had already become final and executory and which clearly granted petitioners the option to either reinstate respondents to their former positions or to pay the monetary award. Petitioners also argued against respondents reinstatement in view of the strained relations between the parties.

the resolutions of the NLRC dated 18 June 2004 and 28 July 2004. On 23 May 2006, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the instant petition, imputing the following errors on the Court of Appeals: I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE LITERAL IMPORT AND SPIRIT OF THE NLRCS RESOLUTION DATED 14 DECEMBER 2001 WHICH GIVES TO PETITIONERS THE EXCLUSIVE OPTION WHETHER TO REINSTATE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS OR TO GRANT THEM SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT. II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CONTRADICTED ITS OWN FINDING THAT THE DECISION OF THE NLRC DATED 14 DECEMBER 2001 IS ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY WHEN IT MODIFIED THE LITERAL IMPORT OF SAID DECISION BY HOLDING THAT THE OPTION TO CHOOSE BETWEEN REINSTATEMENT OR SEPARATION PAY BELONGS TO THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS. III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE RULED THAT THE REINSTATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS TO THEIR FORMER POSITIONS IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAD BECOME SO STRAINED THAT REINSTATEMENT WILL NO LONGER BE TO THE BEST INTERESTS [sic] OF ALL CONCERNED.

Petitioners contend that the intent of the 14 December 2001 Resolution was to grant petitioners the option to reinstate respondents to their former positions without the payment of backwages, or in the alternative, to pay them separation pay, because the dispositive portion of the Resolution was directed toward or addressed to petitioners, who are legally obliged to

On 31 January 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and affirming

implement the ruling. According to petitioners, the NLRC erred and modified the Resolution dated 14 December 2001, which had become final and executory, when it stated in its 18 June 2004 Resolution that respondents have the right to choose between their reinstatement and getting paid the monetary award when no such categorical pronouncement can be gathered from the 14 December 2001 Resolution. The petition has no merit. Well-entrenched is the rule that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to reinstatement as a matter of right. Over the years, however, case law developed that where reinstatement is not feasible, expedient or practical, as where reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension and strained relations between the parties, or where the relationship between the employer and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement. In other words, the payment of separation compensation in lieu of the reinstatement of an employee who was illegally dismissed from work shall be allowed if and only if the employer can prove the existence of circumstances showing that reinstatement will no longer be for the mutual benefit of the employer and employee. The NLRC Resolution dated 14 December 2001 expressly recognized respondents right to reinstatement in view of the illegality of their termination. Thus, the dispositive portion of said

resolution ordered respondents reinstatement without, however, the payment of backwages as a primary relief. Petitioners are mistaken in holding that they have the prerogative to choose whether to reinstate respondents to their former positions or to just pay their monetary award. Neither party can claim that it has the categorical right to choose between reinstatement and the payment of the monetary award. Ultimately, the NLRC has the authority to execute its judgment and to settle any issue that may arise pertaining to the manner or details of implementing its judgment. In the instant case, although the opposing parties yielded to the judgment of the NLRC and did not anymore elevate the labor dispute to the appellate court, they are now at odds as to how the 14 December 2001 Resolution should be implemented. Thus, the NLRC properly exercised its authority to resolve the controversy when it issued the Resolution dated 18 June 2004, where it categorically ordered the reinstatement of respondents to their former positions, in consonance with its earlier ruling. The NLRC upheld the continuing primacy of reinstatement as the available relief and made short shrift of petitioners avowal that separation pay should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. Effectively, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals disregarded petitioners claim that the relation between the parties was so strained that only the payment of the monetary award was feasible under the circumstances. The Court defers, as it should, to the common finding of the NLRC and Court of Appeals since the issue of the existence of strained relations between the parties is factual in nature.

The subsequent resolution did not in any manner modify the 14 December 2001 Resolution, which had become final and executory, contrary to petitioners contention, because the dispositive portion of the 14 December 2001 Resolution particularly stated that respondents were entitled to reinstatement to their former positions. In other words, the primary relief granted to respondents was reinstatement to their former positions. What constitutes an alteration of a final and executory judgment is when a court or, in the instant case, the NLRC, executes an award that is not among those stated in the dispositive portion of the judgment. That is not the case here. That the dispositive portion of the 14 December 2001 Resolution contained the phrase or in the alternative, [private respondents are entitled] to payment of separation pay x x x does not mean that petitioners were granted the option to pay the separation pay in lieu of reinstating respondents. More than anything else, the statement was in the nature of an affirmation of the state of the law rather than an adjudication of a right in favor of petitioners. Moreover, a reading of a courts judgment must not be confined to the dispositive portion alone; rather, it should be meaningfully construed in unanimity with the ratio decidendi thereof to grasp the true intent and meaning of a decision. A reading of the Resolution dated 14 December 2001 shows that after finding that respondents termination was illegal, the NLRC held that they were entitled to reinstatement, thus: Having been illegally dismissed as comprehensively discussed above, complainantsappellants are normally entitled to reinstatement to their respective former positions without loss of seniority rights and privileges and to payment of backwages and other benefits.

However, inasmuch, as they are not entirely faultless as they did not follow exact procedures in the performance of their duties in the instant case, like paying for medicines immediately upon their being pulled out of Alstar, not later on, and paying with checks belonging to their customers, not with their personal checks, Complainants-Appellants should thus be reinstated to their former position without loss of seniority rights and previliges [sic] but without any backwages whatsoever or in the alternative, should thus be paid separation pay each equivalent to one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service. The NLRC ruling expressly recognized respondents

entitlement to reinstatement because of the illegality of their dismissal, although they were no longer entitled to backwages. As found by the NLRC, respondents violated certain company policies, the effect of which was the forfeiture of the award of backwages. Petitioners argue that the aforementioned finding of the NLRC that respondents were not entirely blameless grants them the right to choose between reinstating respondents or giving them separation pay. Nothing in the body of the 14 December 2001 Resolution supports petitioners conclusion. As already stated, the finding of the NLRC that respondents were not entirely faultless merely caused them the forfeiture of their backwages and did not deny them reinstatement to their former positions. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and the Decision dated 31 January 2006 and Resolution dated 23 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86963 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 175366, August 11, 2008] J-PHIL MARINE, INC. AND/OR JESUS CANDAVA AND NORMAN SHIPPING SERVICES, PETITIONERS, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND WARLITO E. DUMALAOG, RESPONDENTS CARPIO MORALES, J.: Warlito E. Dumalaog (respondent), who served as cook aboard vessels plying overseas, filed on March 4, 2002 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a pro-forma complaint[1] against petitioners manning agency J-Phil Marine, Inc. (J-Phil), its then president Jesus Candava, and its foreign principal Norman Shipping Services for unpaid money claims, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Respondent thereafter filed two amended pro forma complaints[2] praying for the award of overtime pay, vacation leave pay, sick leave pay, and disability/medical benefits, he having, by his claim, contracted enlargement of the heart and severe thyroid enlargement in the discharge of his duties as cook which rendered him disabled. Respondent's total claim against petitioners was P864,343.30 plus P117,557.60 representing interest and P195,928.66 representing attorney's fees.[3]

By Decision[4] of August 29, 2003, Labor Arbiter Fe SuperiasoCellan dismissed respondent's complaint for lack of merit. On appeal,[5] the NLRC, by Decision of September 27, 2004, reversed the LaborArbiter's decision and awarded US$50,000.00 disability benefit to respondent. It dismissed respondent's other claims, however, for lack of basis or jurisdiction.[6] Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration[7] having been denied by the NLRC,[8] they filed a petition for certiorari[9] before the Court of Appeals. By Resolution[10] of September 22, 2005, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' petition for, inter alia, failure to attach to the petition all material documents, and for defective verification and certification. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the appellate court's Resolution was denied;[11] hence, they filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

x x x x[15] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied) Respondent's counsel also filed before this Court, purportedly on behalf of respondent, a Comment[16] on the present petition. The parties having forged a compromise agreement as respondent in fact has executed a Quitclaim and Release, the Court dismisses the petition. Article 227 of the Labor Code provides: Any compromise settlement, including those involving labor standard laws, voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Department of Labor, shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of non-compliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

During the pendency of the case before this Court, respondent, against the advice of his counsel, entered into a compromise agreement with petitioners. He thereupon signed a Quitclaim and Release subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter.[12] On May 8, 2007, petitioners filed before this Court a Manifestation[13] dated May 7, 2007 informing that, inter alia, they and respondent had forged an amicable settlement. On July 2, 2007, respondent's counsel filed before this Court a Comment and Opposition (to Petitioners' Manifestation of May 7, 2007)[14] interposing no objection to the dismissal of the petition but objecting to "the absolution" of petitioners from paying respondent the total amount of Fifty Thousand US Dollars (US$50,000.00) or approximately P2,300,000.00, the amount awarded by the NLRC, he adding that: There being already a payment of P450,000.00, and invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, we pray then [to] this Honorable Supreme Court that the said amount be deducted from the [NLRC] judgment award of US$50,000.00, or approximately P2,300,000.00, and petitioners be furthermore ordered to pay in favor of herein respondent [the] remaining balance thereof.

In Olaybar v. NLRC,[17] the Court, recognizing the conclusiveness of compromise settlements as a means to end labor disputes, held that Article 2037 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[a] compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata," applies suppletorily to labor cases even if the compromise is not judicially approved.[18] That respondent was not assisted by his counsel when he entered into the compromise does not render it null and void. Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc. v. Go[19] so enlightens: A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily, with a full understanding of what he was entering into. All that is required for the compromise to be deemed voluntarily entered into is personal and specific individual consent. Thus, contrary to respondent's contention, the employee's counsel need not be present at the time of the signing of the compromise agreement. [20] (Underscoring supplied)

It bears noting that, as reflected earlier, the Quitclaim and Waiver was subscribed and sworn to before the Labor Arbiter. Respondent's counsel nevertheless argues that "[t]he amount of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P450,000.00) given to respondent on April 4, 2007, as `full and final settlement of judgment award,' is unconscionably low, and un-[C]hristian, to say the least."[21] Only respondent, however, can impugn the consideration of the compromise as being unconscionable. The relation of attorney and client is in many respects one of agency, and the general rules of agency apply to such relation.[22] The acts of an agent are deemed the acts of the principal only if the agent acts within the scope of his authority.[23] The circumstances of this case indicate that respondent's counsel is acting beyond the scope of his authority in questioning the compromise agreement. That a client has undoubtedly the right to compromise a suit without the intervention of his lawyer[24] cannot be gainsaid, the only qualification being that if such compromise is entered into with the intent of defrauding the lawyer of the fees justly due him, the compromise must be subject to the said fees.[25] In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent intended to defraud his counsel of his fees. In fact, the Quitclaim and Release, the execution of which was witnessed by petitioner J-Phil's president Eulalio C. Candava and one Antonio C. Casim, notes that the 20% attorney's fees would be "paid 12 April 2007 - P90,000." LAGUNA METTS CORPORATION, vs. COURT OF APPEALS CORONA, J.: This petition arose from a labor case filed by private respondents Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra against petitioner Laguna Metts Corporation (LMC).[1] The labor arbiter decided in favor of private respondents and found that they were illegally dismissed by G.R. No. 185220

WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of all the foregoing discussion, DISMISSED. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished respondent, Warlito E. Dumalaog, at his given address at No. 5-B Illinois Street, Cubao, Quezon City. SO ORDERED.

LMC. On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in a decision dated February 21, 2008. Private respondents motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated April 30, 2008. Counsel for private respondents received the April 30, 2008 resolution of the NLRC on May 26, 2008. On July 25, 2008, he filed a motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[2] The motion alleged that, for reasons[3] stated therein, the petition could not be filed in the Court of Appeals within the prescribed 60-day period.[4] Thus, a 15-day extension period was prayed for.[5] In a resolution dated August 7, 2008,[6] the Court of Appeals granted the motion and gave private respondents a non-extendible period of 15 days within which to file their petition for certiorari. LMC moved for the reconsideration of the said resolution claiming that extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari are no longer allowed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC dated December 4, 2007.[7] This was denied in a resolution dated October 22, 2008. According to the appellate court, while the amendment of the third paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 admittedly calls for stricter application to discourage the filing of unwarranted motions for extension of time, it did not strip the Court of Appeals of the discretionary power to grant a motion for extension in exceptional cases to serve the ends of justice. Aggrieved, LMC now assails the resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It contends that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari as the Court of Appeals had no power to grant something that had already been expressly deleted from the rules. We agree. Rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.[8] As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.[9]

In De Los Santos v. Court of Appeals,[10] we ruled: Section 4 of Rule 65 prescribes a period of 60 days within which to file a petition for certiorari. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case. (emphasis supplied) While the proper courts previously had discretion to extend the period for filing a petition for certiorari beyond the 60-day period, [11] the amendments to Rule 65 under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC disallowed extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari with the deletion of the paragraph that previously permitted such extensions. Section 4, Rule 65 previously read: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days. [12] (emphasis supplied) With its amendment under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, it now reads:

SEC. 4. When and where to file petition. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from the notice of the denial of the motion. If the petition relates to an act or an omission of a municipal trial court or of a coporation, a board, an officer or a person, it shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals or with the Sandiganbayan, whether or not the same is in aid of the courts appellate jurisdiction. If the petition involves an act or an omission of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed with and be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certain words or phrases indicates an intention to change its meaning. It is presumed that the deletion would not have been made if there had been no intention to effect a change in the meaning of the law or rule. The amended law or rule should accordingly be given a construction different from that previous to its amendment.[13] If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition for certiorari. The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

In granting the private respondents motion for extension of time to file petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. The action amounted to a modification, if not outright reversal, by the Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itself a power it did not possess, a power that only this Court may exercise.[14] For this reason, the challenged resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 were invalid as they were rendered by the Court of Appeals in excess of its jurisdiction. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals retained the discretion to grant extensions of time to file a petition for certiorari for compelling reasons, the reasons proffered by private respondents counsel did not qualify as compelling. Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving.[15] Standing alone, it is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule.[16] As to the other ground cited by private respondents counsel, suffice it to say that it was a bare allegation unsubstantiated by any proof or affidavit of merit. Besides, they could have filed the petition on time with a motion to be allowed to litigate in forma pauperis. While social justice requires that the law look tenderly on the disadvantaged sectors of society, neither the rich nor the poor has a license to disregard rules of procedure. The fundamental rule of human relations enjoins everyone, regardless of standing in life, to duly observe procedural rules as an aspect of acting with justice, giving everyone his due and observing honesty and good faith.[17] For indeed, while technicalities should not unduly hamper our quest for justice, orderly procedure is essential to the success of that quest to which all courts are devoted.[18] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The resolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104510 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the said case is ordered DISMISSED for having been filed out of time.