The Honda Accord The Honda Accord, launched in 1976, is today one of the most popular cars in the

world. You can buy an Accord in India today provide you have money! In the late 1980s, Honda faced the challenge of developing a version of Accord that would be popular all over the world. Like any good marketer, Honda first studied carefully the requirements of different markets. In the US, a two door coupe, a station wagon and a four door sedan were needed. In Japan, a four door hard top was needed along with the sedan and the coupe. Europe needed the sedan, the coupe and the station wagon. Honda could not afford to develop completely new vehicles for each region. The company decided to subdivide its development work into one Japanese team responsible for the basic car (including the four door sedan), one team in the US to develop the coupe and station wagon variants and one separate team in Japan for the four door hard top. The coupe and station wagons were to be produced only in the US, the sedan in both Japan and the US and the hard top in Japan only.

Once the blue print was finalized, Honda moved ahead at breakneck speed. Team members were involved in product development even as they continued to work closely with their functional departments. The Accord succeeded beyond all expectations. What Honda had done was lean product development, even though at that time, the term lean was not so much in use.

The Toyota Prius The Toyota Prius is a more recent example of innovative product development. The trigger for the project was a keen desire on the part of Toyotas management to develop a new method for developing and manufacturing cars for the 21st century. Toyotas engineers identified the following requirements for what they believed would be a truly breakthrough vehicle:

a) b) c) d)

roomy cabin space a relatively high seat position to facilitate getting in and out of the car an aerodynamic exterior a fuel economy of 20km per litre

e) a small horizontally placed engine with a continuously variable automatic transmission (to improve fuel efficiency).

The team leader, Takeshi Uchiyamada decided to emphasise the Japanese management principle of Nemawashi, i.e., decision making by consensus, after considering all options. Uchiyamada gathered the group of experts in a big room (obeya) to discuss, review and make key decisions. This way communication among the team members improved significantly. Uchiyamada decided against quickly building a prototype to avoid getting bogged down in the details of improving the vehicle. He wanted to discuss multiple alternatives first. Uchiyamada also asked the team to focus more on the software, i.e., the customer needs, than the hardware, i.e., the engineering. Brainstorming sessions resulted in key words such as natural resources and environment. In their search for a fuel efficient car that would minimize environmental pollution, the product development team came up with the idea of a hybrid engine. Hybrid technology promised the optimum blend of fuel economy, low emissions feasibility and convenience. Electric motors would be used for acceleration while gas engines would be efficient when a certain speed was achieved. When the gas engine ran, the batteries would recharge. Computers could determine which of the two engines was most efficient, based on speed, road conditions, etc.

Having finalized the concept, Toyota developed a three year plan. In the first year Toyota decided to concentrate on developing a prototype, the second on working out details and the third on finalizing the production version and the manufacturing set up.

Later, the new Toyota president, Hiroshi Okuda wanted the launch time to be crashed by one year. Rising to the challenge, Uchiyamada refused a suggestion to go for a compromise approach: We are trying to build a car for the 21st century, and our work isnt about applying the hybrid system on existing models. If we take the conventional method of first trying out the system in a large car, we would end up making too many compromises in terms of cost and size. There would be less waste if we worked with a smaller car from the beginning.

Toyotas engineers worked hard and diligently, canceling all their vacations. They started work on commercializing the prototype after the clay model was selected in July 1996. The Prius was launched in October 1997, two months ahead of the December target date. The car was launched in Japan, followed by the US. Today, Toyota is a clear leader in the hybrid car segment.

The Prius project demonstrated Toyotas world class capabilities in concurrent engineering, which is a hall mark of lean product development. The manufacturing people were involved very early in the design process. Toyota had been using simultaneous engineering even before the Prius but Uchiyamada gave a new thrust to it. Unparalleled cooperation across divisions was the result.

Fiat Fiat, the Italian car maker came under pressure to streamline its product development activities in the 1980s when it realized that engineering and manufacturing costs were going out of control. Fiat began to use platform teams, each consisting of the platform director, product managers, engineering managers, platform manufacturing managers, plant general manager, purchasing manager and controller. The functional engineering departments began to staff the platform team with engineers who worked on the chassis, body, electrical and electrical components as well as engine and power train integration. Fiat decided to emphasize simultaneous engineering, i.e, doing work in parallel to speed up problem solving and reduce cycle time. Specialists outside the platform teams continued to work on new technologies so that new platforms would replace existing platforms as they started looking old and jaded. Fiat made great progress in reducing lead times and development costs. The company launched several successful designs, including the Palio, world car for developing countries. As the platform structure matured, Fiat began to look for ways to make more distinctive products from the same platforms.

Eli Lilly Compared to the auto industry, the pharma industry is more volatile. Heavy investments have to be made in product development and the odds of success of a new product are not that high. According to Eric Bonabeau, Neil Bodick, Robert W, Armstrong , companies often view newproduct development as a monolithic process. Instead they should divide it into two distinct stages: an early stage, focused on evaluating the prospects for new products and eliminating bad bets, and a late stage, focused on maximizing the value of products considered suitable for development. This ensures effective utilization of financial and human resources and also reduction of the product development cycle time, which incidentally are two key attributes of lean product development. In 2001 Eli Lilly designed and piloted Chorus, an autonomous experimental unit dedicated solely to early-stage drug development. Chorus started to look for the most likely winners in a portfolio of molecules, recommending only the strongest candidates for costly late-stage development.

By the end of 2007, Chorus had completed work on seven molecules, recommending that four be taken up for full-scale clinical development and the other three be dropped. Chorus absorbs just one-tenth of Lilly's investment in early-stage development. Yet, it has recently delivered a substantially greater fraction of the molecules slated for late Phase II trials - at almost twice the speed and less than a third of the cost of the standard process. In some cases the usual development time has been reduced by 12-24 months. The Chorus model is well suited to drug development. Although it may postpone the scale-up of successful products, it reduces risk in an environment where development costs are phenomenal and failure rates are extremely high. Indeed, any company that needs to absorb a lot of risk in early-stage development like the biotechnology, medical devices and semiconductor industries - could probably benefit from adopting the Chorus model. The model would make less sense for companies that have low development costs and failure rates and are therefore well served by concurrent engineering or rapid-prototyping approaches that promote fast scale-up at relatively low risk.

Academics

Bob Emiliani, while the clinical professor at the Lally School of Management and Technology, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, began applying lean to academic work. He structured a graduate course there with lean, keeping two Toyota Production System pillars in mind continuous improvement and respect for people. In doing so, he applied a range of lean principles common in manufacturing:

Identify the customer: Emiliani recognized that working students (customers) in his executive-level management class were far different from traditional students and, thus, had different needs and wants from the class and different constraints on their capacity to succeed. Customer value: A concise, visual class syllabus helped students understand the value they would receive from the course. Emiliani also solicited anonymous feedback midway through the course so student comments could influence the balance of the course and he could incorporate those changes for the subsequent semester (while he waited for more formal feedback from university). He also posted anonymous student comments with the syllabus so prospective students could see what others think of the course. Eliminate waste: In graduate courses there is traditionally a significant amount of reading, but Emiliani worked to hone reading and keep it thematically consistent with course value. Most professors assign big papers that they dont want to read and studentsespecially

working studentsdont want to write. Are you really getting learning from that? My standard format is to present things in tables and summary fashion and incorporate cause-and-effect analysis. Root-cause analysis: Problem-solving tools such as the 5 Whys and fishbone diagrams often were used in the class to help students understand the root cause of business problems that relate to leadership and to find countermeasures. Scientific method: Emiliani says business-school assignments tend to be fairly ambiguous, but he sought to make clear assignments with well-defined learning objectives. For example, he provided a standard work set of instructions for each assignment, which takes the guesswork out of What does the professor want here? Emiliani says hes focused on the learning objective and how he can help students succeed. In a shop or office world, we dont make it a mystery of how you go about doing the work. We have visual controls and we show examples of errors. So I provide students at the outset of the course examples of what the errors are and how things can negatively impact the grade. I set them up to get a whole lot of learning, succeed, and achieve one of their value propositions for the course in their education, which is to get good grades. Load leveling: Rather than conducting a midterm or final exam, which is essentially batching information, students received weekly assignments. Students really respond to that, particularly these part-time working professionals. They dont have these big chunks of time to do these enormous assignments. They would rather have it spread out over time. Visual controls/course remembrance: Students were instructed to create a visual control with pictures and words that synthesizes the essential things to remember from his course, and they were encouraged to use this at work and home. He also provided them with his visual control for what he hopes they remember. Emiliani says students appreciate the tools because theyre not sifting through books, texts, and documents to find something critical to their learning. Kaizen: Emiliani led a kaizen review at Rensselaer to improve courses in the executive graduate degree program, which he believes is the first effort of its kind. What we found is that the kaizen processjust about the same kaizen process thats applied on the factory floor or the officecan be applied to improving courses with little modification. The summary is that kaizen is an effective process for improving courses, just like it is an effective process for improving set-ups, improving the flow of information in the office. He says faculty enjoyed the kaizen experience and thought it was a really good use of their time and yielded good results. And, whats more, kaizen is fully congruent with an accreditation bodys desire for improvement in courses and programs. It is a specific process that puts meaning to continuous improvement instead of using the words in an open-ended fashion.

B-2 Case Study In the wing assembly study, the states of multiple systems were analyzed. Although some differences were found, it was difficult to compare the performance between different systems. The focus was on what the states of the system are but not how to change them. This chapter will focus on this issue of how changes can be made and on what their benefits are. This is done with the approach of examining a process before and after lean implementation projects and analysis using the PSD decomposition. By doing so, companies may assess the impact of potential projects in their own systems. In addition to studying the potential benefits, the strategy and methods of applying these projects is also discussed to provide further insight into implementation issues. At the fall 1998 LAI plenary Factory Operations Breakout Session, Northrop Grumman presented their experiences with lean production and some of their implementation projects on the B-2. They focused on the elimination of non-value added tasks for operators in an attempt to shorten throughput time, decrease cost and improve quality. They reported immediate benefits in all of these areas. The factory operations group decided that this provided an opportunity to study their methodology, execution and results providing valuable insight into implementing lean production in the aircraft industry 1. Background The B-2 is a low-observables strategic penetration bomber [Jane's Information Group Ltd., 1998] designed in 1981 and the military had planned to purchase 132 aircraft. This program was eventually cut and only 21 B-2's were built increasing the expected unit cost by three fold. Currently, production of these aircraft are complete and they are all in service. Northrop Grumman is currently in the process of updating all planes to the Block 30 configuration, but this should be completed by June of 2000. Future business from the B-2 program is expected to come from PDM (product depot maintenance). Northrop hopes to receive the contract to perform this work instead of having it performed by the Air Force at Tinker AFB. This bid for future business is the condition that has set the stage for implementing lean production. The classical crisis situation is setup because there is a possibility of losing the business in the future. This uncertainty provides an additional motivation for shop floor workers, engineers and management to accept a new approach. Scope of Study As the aircraft have already been completed and are in service, the nature of the work studied differs from the assembly tasks from the wing assembly case study. The primary business unit (or cost center) studied was the Low Observabilility (LO) area. This area performs eleven processes required to provide the proper surface finish to ensure low observability of the
1

The site visit for this case study was performed by Daniel Dobbs, also a member of LAI and the PSD laboratory. Thanks to Dan and the participants from Northrop Grumman for their contribution to this study.

aircraft. The tasks involved are cleaning, stripping and the application of tape and fillers. Although the nature of the work is different from assembly tasks, it is still characterized as highly skilled manual work content in the aircraft industry. Methodology Strategy A lean implementation team was selected by the vice-president in charge of operations at the Palmdale facility. As opposed to many other approaches that advocate working with the shop floor workers in improving the process, a team of managers and engineers helped to implement the initial stages. Direct employee involvement was avoided to focus the scope of the projects at the beginning. More employee involvement was solicited after the first major changes and feedback and suggestions were used to further improve the process. Again, the Program Depot Maintenance (PDM) program was identified as the area that would most benefit from applying lean production, which is the program that Northrop Grumman hopes to win the contract for, guaranteeing business for as long as the B-2 program is in active Air Force service. As a prototype project, one of the Low Observability cost center would be addressed first. Timeframe The projects started in July of 1998 and are still continuing. The main thrust is expected to be completed by August. A new production control system will be in place at the end of April. The new system will help coordinate material supply for the specific processes that are being performed. For example, the list of tasks that must be performed can be entered into the system and the system will list the processes required and the kits and materials needed for the processes. Lean Implementation Team Initial Effort After establishing a lean implementation team with four full-time and four part-time members, from manufacturing engineering, production control, management and quality control, consultants were hired to help develop a lean implementation plan. After some training in the philosophy behind lean production, a test project was used to start the program off. The lean implementation team started by videotaping a a tape application process used to seal and fill in gaps around the entire surface of the plane to evaluate the technicians movements. This is to identify waste and develop standard work guidelines. Using this process highlighted the amount of time the technician spent away from the station where she was working to retrieve materials, mix adhesives and perform other tasks in preparation to apply the actual tape. Problems in ergonomics were also highlighted, as the platform she was using was not long enough for the area she had to apply tape to.

To alleviate the excessive amount of time retrieving materials, the team created a kit that contained the tools and most of the materials needed by the technician for a job. The material handlers also became responsible for much of the preparation work and delivered mixed adhesives and precut tape when required. A more suitable platform was also installed to eliminate repositioning in the middle of the task. With drastic reductions in throughput time the and elimination of non-value added tasks, the lean implementation team was ready to apply these methods to the rest of the Low Observability area. Analysis Kits and Material Handlers The aircraft is divided into five sections, each of which is the responsibility of one team of technicians. Every morning, each technician picks up a kit that contains the tools and most materials they will need for the process they are performing. The kits are divided into two halves. The A half contains tools such as a flashlight, measuring tape, knife and stopwatch (to time curing). The B half contains consumable items, such as a notepad, disposable applicators, cleaners, solvents and water. Included in each kit are also the work instructions. This allows the technician to stay at the work station instead of spending time acquiring the necessary materials. Figure 1 illustrates the change in the amount of walking necessary by the technicians (DP-D22 Standard tools / equipment located at each station 5S). In this redesigned work pattern, the role of the material handler changed. Instead of operating the various materials, tool and parts cribs, they are responsible for creating the kits. In doing so, there was no increase in the number of material handlers. The roles of the technicians changed as well. Within each team, one member would be responsible for the materials preparation such as trimming the tape and mixing the adhesives. Again, there was no increase in the number of technicians. The material preparation tasks and application tasks were separated so that a worker would not have to stop working on the plane (DP-T51: Subsystems and equipment configured to separate support and production access reqts). Instead, workers called for the materials they would need ahead of time so that they would be delivered ready to apply when needed. The PSD decomposition identifies these DPs as physical implementations that decrease throughput time and production cost.

FR-T51

FR-D22
Minimize wasted motion in operators work preparation

PSD Decomposition

Ensure that support resources dont interfere with production resources

DP-T51
Subsystems and equipment configured to separate support and production access reqts

Separation of surface finish work from material handling and material prep. tasks

DP-D22
Standard tools / equipment located at each station (5S)

Kits and tools are supplied at the work station

Before

After

Each operator travels around plane to obtain required materials

Each operator stays at station and material handler delivers kits and prepared materials (cut tape, adhesives etc.)

Figure 1: Kitting and material handling redesign on the B-2 Standard Work As discussed in chapter 5, standard work refers to two things: for every task, there is a correctly defined method for doing it, and every time the task is done, it is done in the same way. Although all companies have some methods to ensure standard work, improvements on the Low Observables process captured the special techniques used by the technicians that were not documented before. The standardized work was determined by observing many technicians performing the same operation and taking the best practices observed. Before the kits, many workers made their own tools to help them with their work. The best of these tools were copied and included in the kits. The use of common tools and standard work helped to improve consistency between different workers performing the same process. Analysis of the level of standard work shown in Table 1 shows that higher levels of standardization were achievable in the tape application process. Table 1: Standard work evaluation for B-22 Performance of Manual Tasks 1. Operators perform tasks based on their own interpretation of the instructions or task description 2. Tasks are described at a high level so that low level movements are not described in detail but standard procedures are used for each type of task 3. Each task is described in detail so that it is done the same way each time 4. Work content is designed so that in can only be done one way
2

Observed ratings are bolded

Sequence of Assembly 1. Entire assemblies may be built out of order. (removing entire assembly which is delayed from a jig to start the next one) 2. Entire work packages may be done out of order (done out of sequence and/or out of station) 3. Assembly of parts in different sequences (eg. Sequence of attaching parts, A-B-C vs. A-C-B, or sequence of tightening fasteners) 4. Assembly tasks are usually done in the correct sequence 5. Methods in place to prevent out of sequence work Use of Standards/Instructions 1. Standards/instructions not used by operators 2. Standards/instructions used when learning new tasks or when tasks change 3. Operators are familiar with standards/instructions and keep themselves updated frequently 4. Operators are familiar with standards/instructions and are active in updating and improving them Compared with wing assembly, which involved the fitting of high tolerance parts, greater work content variation and more parts, the low observable process is less complex and perhaps easier to standardize. However, the improvement in standardization within the process has an impact on quality, time variation and throughput time as shown in Figure 2.
PSD Deco position
FR-Q FR-P131
Reduce variabilit f task c pleti n ti e

FR-

DP-Q

DP-P131
rk Standard rk et ds t pr vide stabilized pr cessing ti e

DP-

t ndard et ds

Design f appr priate operator ork content/loops

Quality

Figure 2: Impact of standard work in the system Standard work is a design element that satisfies many FRs, which is a physical integration of functionally independent (or decoupled) requirements [Suh, 1990]. Work Instructions As the work was being standardized, the work instructions were redesigned as well, providing much more detail in describing how tasks are done instead of stating what needs to be done. The work instructions are rated in Table 2 using the same rating system [Shields, 1996] as in chapter 5. The rating of the work instructions did not differ significantly from the wing assembly sites. However, the written descriptions were more detailed in describing how the tasks are to be performed.

Throughput ti e variation (W)

Mean throughput ti e ( x )

   

 

Oper t r c sistentl perf r s t sks c rrectl

Manual c cle ti e takt ti e

 

  

Table 2: Work instruction rating in wing assembly3 Definition (each level adds additional information to the level above) Work Instruction Rating 1 2 Low level of detail consisting of only the blue prints and no written instructions Blue print data with information about changes to the drawings and some written instructions Blue print data with changes identified and information about the effectivity of those changes readily available and written instructions for sufficiently skilled individual to accomplish the work All of the above with additional information about certain fabrication or assembly operations to include the use of pictorials for these details. All the above with added information in areas peculiar or easily confused instructions are supplemented with three-dimensional pictorials All the above with the addition of photographs or pictorial drawings of correctly fabricated or assembled areas as examples All the above with process information, characteristics and restrictions imbedded in the instructions All the above with detail that is sufficient to be used by workers with less skill training or experience All the above with the addition of key characteristics for particular fabrication or assembly attention or measurement All the above with the addition of real time access to multiple databases to capture information about the fabrication or assembly and the ability to enter prescribed data relative to the fabrication or assembly

4 5

6 7

10

Ergonomics In order to improve the ergonomics for the technicians, new scaffolding and platforms were purchased. Before the improvements, operators had to kneel on top of the wing to perform all operations above the wing and had to stand on narrow platforms or lie on their backs to perform all operations under the wing. The new platforms allow the workers to remain standing for operations performed on the top edges of the wing and for all operations under the

Observed ratings are bolded.

wing. This change illustrates FR-D23: Minimize wasted motion in the operators work tasks being satisfied by DP-D23: Ergonomic interface between the worker, machine and fixture. Impact Improvements were measured using the metrics of throughput time, actual labor hours, rework and overtime. Data from the four units before the projects and five units after the projects was available for analysis. Rework Comparison of the before and after units show not only a decrease in the total number of rework hours, but also decreased rework as a percentage of total actual labor hours as shown in Figure 3. The mean of the before and after samples are 12.3 % and 5.9% respectively, a decrease of 52%. It is expected that the decrease in rework hours, (quality improvement) has an impact on the variation in throughput time and mean throughput time, which collectively impact production cost.
14% Rework ours / Total direct labor ours 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 Units done 6 7 8 9 After lean projects

Figure 3: Rework hours / total labor hours before and after lean Overtime Overtime may be viewed as an indicator of throughput time variation if it is used to make up the time lost when unforeseen production disruptions arise (when it is not planned). Again, comparison of the before and after units show a decrease in both the total number of overtime hours as well as a percentage of total actual labor hours as shown in Figure 4. The mean of the before and after samples are 12.5 % and 6.5% respectively, a decrease of 48%. This decrease in overtime hours, (time variation reduction) is also expected to impact mean throughput time and production cost.

18% 16% Overtime hours / Total direct labor hours 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% 1 2 3 4 5 Units done 6 7 8 9

Figure 4: Overtime hours / total labor hours before and after lean Throughput time The throughput time of the process decreased on average by 24% between the two samples but this must be moderated by the fact that the throughput time showed a general decreasing trend (except for one point) before the lean implementation projects. To test whether this difference in the mean of the two groups is statistically significant, the following hypothesis was tested, H0: There is no statistically significant difference in the mean throughput times of the two samples (before and after the lean projects: m1 m2 = 0) H1: otherwise; there is a statistically significant difference in the mean throughput times of the two samples (before and after the lean projects: m1 m2 0 The null hypothesis could not be rejected with a 95% confidence interval so the difference in mean throughput time is not statistically significant. This result is due to the large variation in throughput time of the sample before the lean projects and the low number of samples. Even though the results are not statistically significant, there was still an observed decrease in throughput time and the variation in throughput times decreased. The first unit to undergo the lean projects also showed a continued decrease in throughput time even though it included the process of setting up the kits and improving the work standards. As the throughput time continued to decrease, the operating pattern changed from 5 days a week to 4 10-hour days a week (on last 2 units).

fter lean projects

60 50 Thr hput ti e nuf turing )

10 0 0 1 2 3 4 Unit 5

6 ne

Figure 5: Throughput time before and after lean Labor Hours Comparing the mean of the total labor hours from before and after the projects, there was a mean decrease of 40% for the process. Although this figure sounds like an incredible improvement, there are a few factors to consider. Firstly, these processes, like in airframe assembly have a natural amount of learning so that the total labor hours should decrease after each successive unit as shown in chapter 3 (equation 2). So, comparing the average of samples that are temporally separated would always give a decrease in mean shift. To account for the learning curve, the exponential curve was fitted to the first 4 units (before lean) in Figure 6. In this graph, it is obvious that the decrease in labor hours for the process decreased beyond the amount that would be expected from normal learning. In fact, after the lean projects, the actual labor hours were on average 21% less than the trend projected from the units before the projects.
1.2 Nor ali ed direct labor hour

1 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0 0 1 2 3 4 Unit 5 ne 6 7 8 9 10

ctual direct labor hour

Projected direct labor hour (fitted learning cur e)

fter lean project

$# "

68 7

43

02 ( 0) % 10 '&

40 30 20

fter lean pr ject

10

A @ 9

Figure 6: Total labor hours for tape application process before and after lean projects (exponential learning curve fitted to first four units)4 Discussion Reaction to Change The most difficult part in the implementation was reported to be the change in the corporate culture. Overcoming the resistance to change was difficult and success was attributed to strong leadership and support from the highest levels of the organization. It was also reported that difficulties arose when trying to apply changes beyond the scope of the cost center where the lean projects were being focused. In retrospect, it was reported that it would have been helpful to train the entire facility in lean production first to prevent the problems encountered outside of the cost center being changed. Making improvements by process rather than cost centers would have been easier to implement. Summary In providing kits and prepared materials to the operators, these tasks were not eliminated but decoupled from the technician. Instead of the technician interrupting their tasks for material handling and preparation tasks, another worker does them in parallel so that the value-added tasks are continuous. However, the amount of walking away from the stations was isolated to the material handler and all the materials necessary were centralized for them. Further improvements in ergonomics, work instructions and standardization were also applied. These lean implementation projects showed significant decreases in the amount of rework (52% decrease), overtime (24% decrease) and total labor hours (21% decrease compared to expected reductions). The throughput time variation decreased as well. An interesting example of Lean implementation is the success story of a factory known as Green Camp, from Ohio, USA, which was acquired by Parker Hannifin in 1988. Parker Hannifin, which has 45,000 employees, is a manufacturer of atmospheric products for the industrial and commercial markets. The factory had undergone difficult times and was on the brink of closing down. The factory was struggling with many problems such as worker, management and union relations. The organizations lean idea was to adapt an efficient training program through the use of the value-stream mapping. This process verified which elements and processes were necessary, from the first phase of the launching of the product to the last phase of delivery to the customer, and eliminated all the non-value adding processes. The company had consulted with

Labor hours normalized by dividing each value by maximum observed value to obtain a ratio.

Flow Cycle Inc, a consultancy firm, which advised them on lean principles and techniques of value stream mapping. The managers in the manufacturing department declared to its workers; We are about to change and we expect you all to change too. The gimmick which was used was a placard that was worded I am committed to decreasing cycle times. The following placard was signed by all. Amazingly enough, the following gimmick worked. 80% of the plant workers signed the placard immediately. As more workers were exposed to the companys mission, to decrease cycle times, improve the work flow and increase efficiency as well as the moral of the workers, 95% of the workers were encouraged to sign the placard. The first phase included training and educational programs for all workers of the plant. The second phase involved distinct mapping of the work flow to allow the management as well as the workers to understand which processes were value adding and which processes could be eliminated (non-value adding). Following the second phase it was necessary to re-design the work flow as well as the plant itself in order to enable the elimination of non-beneficial processes. Adapting to the drastic changes was not an easy task; many workers had performed their old tasks for a long period of time. In the Green Camp plant communicational barriers were evident between the workers and the management. As part of the value stream mapping philosophy, it was decided that the entire approach would change and that the workers would lead the changes. The outcomes were outstanding: Cycle times decreased by 80%. Waiting periods for orders in line decreased from 90 days to 30 days. Overtime was cut in half. Inventory decreased by two thirds. Lower percentages of defects. Better utilization of space

Number of shifts decreased from three shifts a day to two shifts a day with the same number of workers. Boeing is another example of a company that had undergone the Lean Revolution. In 1990 Boeing began to implement lean manufacturing principles. The first phase entailed full understanding of the manner in which Japanese quality driven companies, such as Toyota,

were managing their organization. The managers of Boeing visited in Japan in 1990 in order to learn the new manufacturing techniques. The following educational visit lead to the formation of World Class Competitiveness training. Over 100,000 Boeing workers were included in the implementation plan of the organization. The process adapted new regulations for all manufacturing areas and processes. In the mid 90s, Boeing was assisted by The Shingijutsu Consultancy Firm, known for being the leading consultancy firm in lean practices. Boeing was to change its manufacturing system to a lean one. JIT deliveries, flow manufacturing techniques and flawless manufacturing processes were implemented as well as reengineering and redesigning of the product. The unique manufacturing system was successful as a result of the simple objective which was to provide the customer with products that are: Personalized for the needs of the customer. Delivered at the required time. Delivered in the required amount. Delivered with no defects/flaws. At minimal manufacturing costs.

The use of visual control in the manufacturing line allowed the workers to measure and asses the manufacturing in a precise and efficient manner. The use of technologically improved and advanced communication tools such as small mobile radios and digital apparatus, helped the workers to locate and track what they needed easily. Monitoring devices with signaling lights where located along the production lines in order to track down problems across the entire manufacturing process. The system was designed in such a manner that every tool or element needed for a specific procedure was available. Workers who were not posted at a specific station roamed around in order to lend a hand when needed (multi-skilled workers). A good example of this was at Renton, the workers found an efficient way to load the seats onto the plane without the use of an expensive crane. This eliminated non-value adding access motion, saved time and space. The use of conveyor belts was introduced in the assembly line. The conveyor belts allowed easy of mobility of planes from one assembly team to the next. Only when a problem or mistake was evident was the process halted. Similarly to surgeons in a surgery room, who have the right tools placed in their hands for each procedure, the mechanics had the ability to concentrate on each segment as it passed by their working station. The implementation of the process at Boeing required complex planning and implementation, but above all it also required the commitment of the staff, whose main aim was to make it work.

The objective was to create an environment, which encourages teamwork. The working environment provided the workers much confidence to express their ideas and to motivate innovative thinking. It was also important to recognize and reward workers who had contributed. The simple philosophy behind the great success story of the Renton factory in Washington is team work. The Renton plant is currently manufacturing the planes for Boeing in an efficient and lean way.