Name: Angelos Stergiopoulos ID Number: 292562 Degree Title: Msc Middle East Politics Course Title: International Politics

of the Middle East Course Code: 15PPOC027 Tutor/Lecturer Name: Adib-Moghaddam Arshin/ Eskandar Sadeghi Assignment Number: (2) Essay Title: What are the sources of conflict and cooperation in the Gulf? Critically assess in relation to one of the Gulf wars.

The Persian Gulf is a part of Middle East system which arguably has a propensity to war and a significant position in power politics of contemporary world. The Iran-Iraq war in 1980 demonstrates an example that many analysts tempt to examine. It is evident that state relations in this area, either hostile or peaceful, are very complex due to the existence of strong transnational identities and loyalties1. However, if someone wants to examine the origins of this war and the potential alliances that derived from, should not overlook to identity issues only but rather to use a more systematic and pragmatic perception in order to analyze the issue. This paper argues that the sources of the war and the cooperation efforts during it could be explained through a geopolitical analysis, without neglecting of course the importance of identity, but rather suggesting that the strong cultural influence used as a pretext2 in order to give a momentum in regional relations and the pursuing of interests of different political entities. Before analysing the dynamics that brought the situation of war, it is worth to mention the preexistence circumstances in Gulf. In 1971 the British have left the region of Gulf3. Britain from the First World War till early 70 was the guarantor of the stability in the area. In the same period US were preoccupied with Vietnam and thus could not have strong formal military presence in the Gulf. However, the US Cold War doctrine have created the Twin Pillar
4

strategy empowering the Iranian and Saudi

monarchies to prevent the Soviet influence in the Gulf because of the vital economic resources and geostrategic position of the area. The external influence of Soviet Union in the area was depicted in the cooperation treaty with the Iraqi Ba ath regime5. Nevertheless, after the raise of oil prices in 1973, the Iraqi economy flourished due to the high oil revenues and become more independent from Soviet Union and more open to the West. Prior to the Islamic Revolution and the beginning of Iran-Iraq war it is also
1

Tripp cited in Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002 Swearingen, 1988 3 Tripp, 2000/ Marr, 2004 4 Adib-Moghaddam, 2006 5 Marr, 2004
2

essential to mention the actual dynamics of the Algiers treaty in 1975. According to that treaty, Iraq agreed to move the borderline to thalweg in Shatt al-Arab6 and Iran obliged not to interfere again to internal politics of Iraq by helping the Kurds in the north of Iraq. A possible finding from the latter treaty is the involvement of Iran in Iraqi internal affairs even before the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 had a huge impact in the security issues of both regional and external powers of the Gulf. Aside from the cultural aspect of the Islam, which was much constructed by the revolutionary constitution and used as a pretext for political agenda and a possible provocation of war, there was also a significant change of modifications in Gulf which threaten the systemic balance. The core problem was that Iran, a previous ally of US, transformed itself from protector of stability and balance of power to a revisionist power rejecting every existing systemic configuration and legitimacy in the area. This policy caused the rejection of the regional legitimacy of the Gulf Arab states, however encouraged the notion of the Arab states to reject its authority in mutual terms7. In the case of Iraq, particularly, as already highlighted there were also territorial issues mixed with ideological aspects. A geopolitical view offers a dual dimension of analysis. That is because both Iran and Iraq acquiring particular territories could control the existing resources which was arguably a decisive political aim of both, while claiming or re-claiming significant territories could use them symbolically in order to pursue other political aims8. Predominantly, starting off with the territorial issues it is false to generalize that the conflict caused exclusively from the Shatt al-Arab. Shatt al-Arab had arguably symbolic importance because the rivalry about this region originated from the conflicting relations of the Ottoman and Safavid Empire, but there are at least five more territorial issues that worth mentioning with relation to the war. Firstly, the

6 7

Ismael, 1982 Adib-Moghaddam, 2006 8 Baram, 1991/ Swearingen, 1988

strategic heights of Zain al-Qaws and the Saif Saad region9 which is a vast territory that Iran ought to return after 1975 and never did. The importance of this territory resides mostly in the fact that contains a large proportion of oil and thus the claim of that region had economical and political effects. A second territorial issue was the diversion of Tigris River which had a tremendous impact to the sustainability of the agricultural economy of Iraq and also created an imminent problem of Iraqi water supply10. Another territorial issue includes the Kurdish question in the Iraqi state. Kurdish populations are resided in the north Iraq in an oil rich area. Ba ath regime had called the Kurds to participate in a national unity project in order to consolidate its authority 11. The refusal of Kurdish side to participate in such discussions had elevated the Kurdish identity notion as a separatist movement inside Iraq and thus a threat for the national cohesion and regime s stability. Iranian state had obliged to stop supporting the Kurds in 1975 Algiers treaty, nevertheless after 1979 the revolutionary Islamic constitution started to challenge again the Iraqi authority by providing help to the Kurdish rebels. These three geopolitical factors show more the materialistic aspect of the Iran-Iraq war and the political impact that had. The following two, however, demonstrate a mix of symbolism and also justification of authority through idealism. They were both pretexts and serious motives for war, as the previous three were, but they also provide substantial explanation of how strong identities or cultures could serve or fitted to pursue interest in the most realistic way of thought. In particular, following the Foucauldian perception that power determines predominantly the context of culture, one could argue that could also determine the relations of two political entities with distinct cultural aspects. Moreover, how these entities could use their different cultural aspect to shape their mutual relations. Khuzistan region12 was a territory with long lasting rivalries between the political entities that pre-existed in the place of Iran and Iraq. The region of

Swearingen, 1988 Swearingen, 1988 11 Tripp, 2000 12 Swearingen, 1988

10

Khuzistan had a large population of Arabic speaking people and also called Arabistan

13

. After 1975

Iraq withdraw its claims about the area. Nevertheless, the emerging of the war created an opportunity for Iraq to reclaim the region. The significant symbolism of Khuzistan had a substantial political importance for Iraq both internally, by stabilizing its authority with more efficiency, but also externally that projected it as the champion-protector of Arabs against Persia14. The last geopolitical feature is the most important one which connects the issues of power with those of culture. The Shii Muslims of Iraq are the majority of state s population15 and a huge issue for the stability of the ruling elite of Ba ath regime which was originated from Sunni Islam. The Islamic constitution of Iran raised more severely the issue of the political discrimination of Shii Iraqi people and the overthrown of secular Ba ath party. There was arguably a pre-existing tension about the claims of Iran in southern Iraq in Shah s era, but the difference was between the Shah and the Islamic regime existed in the pattern of identity policy that they follow and not to the political goal that they both wanted to achieve. In particular, Shah tried to revive a nationalistic identity that originated from the Ancient Persian Empire. On contrary, Khomeini promoted another type of identity that based upon the universal and transnational view of Islam. While the nationalistic Persian identity had easily neutralized from Arab nationalism of Ba ath, the Islamic Shia identity that Iran projected was very influential and could destabilize the Ba ath s authority. Iran used this cultural agenda aiming to achieve political goals. The spread of revolution in Iraq, the overthrown of Ba ath and the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iraq patronized by Tehran could modified the power balance relations not only in Gulf but also to the whole Middle East system. The pretext of culture and revolution could have given to Iran a status of hegemonic power and the Islamic perception the dynamics of power maximization. This view of course threatens all the Arab Gulf states, not only Iraq. However, it might be worth to analyze shortly the Iraqi war decision. There is a tendency to believe that

13

Tripp 2000 Baram, 1991/ Marr cited in Brown, 2004 15 Gause, 2002
14

Saddam Hussein declared war from purely opportunistic reasons. This perception is not efficient because Iraq had many opportunities to invade Iran from 1977 with the starting point of instability up to 1979 with the US hostages incident. The fact that not only invaded but also firstly cooperated with the Shah and after welcome the new constitution in Iran show that offensive realism statements are not relevant16. On contrary, Saddam acted cautiously threaten from the probability of external intervention in favour of Iran or even believed that the left-radical powers of Prime Minister Barzagan would prevail in the end17. The Khomeini pre-eminence in 1980 accelerated the deterioration of relations. Moreover, the aggressive rhetoric of Khomeini was also another motive for the war. Saddam s reaction proved that he acted in terms of defensive realism18, trying to prevent the instability both in his state and in his area. The most important, though, is to highlight that both sides had use, as previously stated, the cultural aspect as pretext of conflict. The creation of a Hegelian division19of Iraqi perception containing an Arab self and a Persian other while that of Iran a true Islamic self with a heretic other served to legitimate the actual political rivalry. The construction of those images was a notion related to the Hobbesian perception of survival20 and an effort to keep the political stability at all cost. The latter conception was a view related to Iraq rather than to Iran. Moreover, the creation of the image that Iraq created for itself as a protector of the Arabs and as a new leader of the Arabs21 after 1973, helped actually by the outbreak of war with Iran. On the other hand, Iran tried to project itself as the champion of the true Islamic faith and also the protector of all the discriminated people. The spread of the revolution via aggressive rhetoric in the neighbour Iraq was more an action of provocation for war rather than the reality on the ground. That is because the political turmoil in Iran created instability and uncertainty about the political authority of Khomeini and the Shii clergy in general. The Islamic self of
16 17

Gause, 2002 Adib-Moghaddam, 2006 18 Gause, 2002 19 Ismael, 1982 20 Hobbes cited in Reichberg, Syse and Begby, 2006 21 Gause cited in Fawcett, 2005

Khomeini perception had firstly to prevail against the leftist and liberal views of Barzagan, who seemed to compromise with Iraq and Ba ath regime. After the ousting of Barzagan, the Khomeini regime wanted to consolidate its authority internally. In order to do so he had to rally Iranian people in a common cause or threat. He had already constructed the image of the other with the depiction of Iraq as an illegitimate regime and continue to provoke Iraq. Moreover, Khomeini with the outbreak of war found a very good opportunity to keep the army busy in the border and away from Tehran minimizing the possibility of a military counter-coup22. From the latter observation it might be argued that Khomeini wanted the war to pursue his political goal rather than his ideological views. The cooperation issue is also significantly important in the framework of Iran-Iraq war. As already mentioned in this paper, the Cold War modification of Twin Pillars was the most important operational project. However, after the Islamic revolution Iran refute its systemic role in Gulf and reject the existence of Cold War politics, causing substantial threats to the Gulf Arab states and scepticism to the superpowers. There are two major and one minor issue of cooperation that originated within the context of Iran-Iraq war. The first is the creation of GCC in 15 May of 198123. The Gulf States and Saudi Arabia align together in a summit with predominantly economic and cultural context. The ties between them elevated to certain degree of security level after 1982 and the counter attack of Iran against Iraq, with the backing of US. In essence, this alignment was a type of a different Arabic identity that based upon the common economic interests of the Gulf States24.This cooperation effort was created as a counterbalance of the increasing revolutionary threat of Iran both in terms of politics and identity. The political threat embodied to the fact that Iran by rejecting the systemic balance of power had also rejected the authorities of the Gulf monarchies. The identity reinforced the claims of Iran because there are significant Shii populations in most of the Gulf State, in particular to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The
Ismael, 1982 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), Barnett & Gause cited in Adler & Barnett, 1998 24 Barnett & Gause cited in Adler & Barnett, 1998
23 22

mobilization of this people against the monarchical authorities could easily used as a political momentum for Iranian political pre-eminence in the Persian Gulf. However, GCC never invited Iraqi in the coalition fearing the hegemonic perception of Saddam, but after 1982 they started to provide loans and credits to Saddam. Moreover, they never strengthen their connections in a regular security council fearing the dependence of the small states to Saudi Arabia25. Their position during the Iran-Iraq war was neutral at the very beginning. The second important issue about cooperation was the external help that Iraq received during the war. Soviet Union had already significant relations with Iraq, but stopped providing armament to Iraq soon after the invasion to Iran26. US, on the other hand, were at first neutral about the conflict. They believed that both states would achieve a mutual balance. Moreover, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the change of military intervention policy after Vietnam dictated on one hand a low profile policy in the Gulf and a preoccupation with the Afghanistan issue on the other. Only after 1982 US started to support actively Saddam with financial credits and armament via Britain, threaten from the Iranian counter-attack which could result in a changing of balance of power and significant loss of control of an oil rich region27. Furthermore, the involvement of US became direct in 1984, when Kuwait asked for US help in order to protect its commercial oil tankers from Iranian naval attacks28. However, it might be argued that US followed an equilibrium policy towards both states by supplying Iran with armament29. During 1984, Soviet Union started to resupply Iraq with armament fearing of Islamic Revolution spill over to Soviet territories. The last but also important, in an effort to prove the durability of realism theory within the context of Iran-Iraq war, was the coalition between Syria and Iran. It might be argued that the ruling elite of Syrian Ba ath party originated from Alawi30, Shia Muslim branch, and therefore the religion ties played a decisive role in this alignment. Nevertheless, it
25 26

Barnett & Gause cited in Adler & Barnett, 1998 Tripp, 2000 27 Tarock, 1998 28 Tarock, 1998 29 Tarock, 1998 30 Hinnebusch cited in Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002

seems evident that the common identity was used only as a pretext. Firstly because Syria, after the peace treaty of Egypt with Israel, was the only Arab state that officially continue the war against Israel and Zionism. Moreover, Syria was surrounded by enemies with Turkey, Israel and Iraq encircles it. Syria chose to align with Iran for purely realistic reasons. Hence, confronted Iraq which was a powerful regional enemy relieved from at least one opponent. It seems also evident that the so called Arab solidarity was not so much effective when the Middle East states decide to act with pragmatism in order to pursue their interest rather than idealism in correlation of a common cause that derived from a cultural unity. Concluding, the sources of conflict and cooperation in Gulf could not only be explained via ideological perceptions and of course a total realistic prospective is also not sufficient. Rather a geopolitical examination which provides equilibrium between the latter views could result in a more plausible explanation of almost all political incidents. The mixture of territorial, economic and symbolic actions but also the political environment of the Gulf system crystallized the relation either hostile or peaceful during the Iran-Iraq war.

Bibliography -Adib-Moghaddam, A. The International Politics of the Persian Gulf: A cultural genealogy , Routledge, 2006, chapters 2-3 -Baram, A. Culture, History and Ideology in the formation of Ba athist Iraq, 1968-89 , Macmillan Academic and Professional Ltd, London, 1991 (1-18 pp) -Barnett M. & Gause G.F III Caravans in opposite directions: society, state and the development of a community in the Gulf Cooperation Council in Adler E. & Barnett M. (eds) Security Communities , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998 (161-197 pp) -Gause G.F III Iraq s Decisions to Go to War, 1980 and 1990 in Middle East Journal, Vol. 56, No.1 (winter, 2002), 47-70 pp, Middle East Institute, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4329720 Accessed: 27/01/2011 -Gause G.F III The International Politics of the Gulf in Fawcett L. (ed) International Relations of the Middle East , Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005 (263-280 pp) -Hinnebusch R. The Foreign Policy of Syria in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A. (eds) The Foreign Policies of the Middle East states , Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, London, 2002 (143-159 pp) -Hobbes T. Solving the Problem of the Civil War in Reichberg G.M, H. Syse & Begby E. (eds) The Ethics of War: Classic contemporary readings , Blackwell Publishing, Malden-USA, 2006 (441-450pp) -Ismael T.Y IRAQ AND IRAN: Roots of conflict , Syracuse University Press, New York, 1982 (20-40 pp) -Marr P. Iraqi Foreign Policy in Brown C. (ed) Diplomacy in the Middle East , I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, London, 2004 (181-199 pp)

-Marr P. The Modern history of Iraq (2nd ed) , Westview Press, USA, 2004 (89-145 pp) -Swearingen W.D Geopolitical Origins of the Iran-Iraq War in Geographical Review, Vol.78, No.4 (Oct 1988), 405-416 pp, American Geographical Society, http://www.jstor.org/stable/215091 Accessed: 27/10/2010 -Tarock A. The superpowers involvement in Iran-Iraq War , Nova Science Publishers Inc., New York, 1998 (31-58, 91-148 pp) -Tripp C. A History of Iraq , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000 (206-248 pp) -Tripp C. The Foreign Policy of Iraq in Hinnebusch R. & Ehteshami A. (eds) The Foreign Policies of the Middle East states , Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., London, 2002 (167-189 pp)