February 21, 2011 5892 Shoreland Trail Orlando, Florida 32807 NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION of AMERICA Attn.

: Wayne LaPierre & Ted Nugent 11250 Waples Mill Road Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Re: You, Ted Nugent and the rest of your membership should take an interest in an American citizens right to bear arms as a property right. Dear Wayne & Ted, Property law in America is largely defined by state law. BOARD OF REGENTS v. ROTH, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state lawrules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus, the welfare recipients in GOLDBERG v. KELLY, supra, had a claim of entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in the statute defining eligibility for them. The recipients had not yet shown that they were, in fact, within the statutory terms of eligibility. But we held that they had a right to a hearing at which they might attempt to do so.), but any legal proceeding takes cognizance of your property claims in light of your status, and federal citizens are creatures of the federal government which functions in the nature of a charitable corporation with federal citizens as internal beneficiaries thereof, whereas state citizenship derives from English subjectship with its preexistent civil liberties that were grounded in English common law with government functioning in the nature of a charitable corporation with private citizens regarded as external beneficiaries with their civil liberties or fundamental rights held in trust and managed as trust assets by government as their trustees. Since [t]he federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different power, and designed for different purposes, most of a states rights must ultimately be derived from the rights of its citizens. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 330 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1951). . . . Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2d Ed., Mineola, New York: The Foundation

Press, Inc., 1988, p. 385; and, though these are Laurence Tribes words and not that which is found in the first paragraph of said FEDERALIST PAPER, the renowned constitutional lawyer makes it so much clearer; many of the original states constitutions had provisions in their Declaration of Rights which made government and government officers entrusted with the right and duty to exercise sovereign power in a representative capacity as trustees of the people; and, state law, as it existed at the time our federal constitution was adopted became incorporated as a reference given that said instrument was a contract. State citizens compacting with the citizenry in its collective capacity and vice versa thereby defines the Sovereignty of the State as lying in the citizenry collectively with government officialselected or appointedits representatives. VANHORNES LESSEE v. DORRANCE, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (1795) ([T]he right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent, and unalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: Property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects, that induced them to unite in society. No man would become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labour and industry. The preservation of property then is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law. (Emphasis in bold italics, mine)). Where the United States Supreme Court decided that a state constitution was not a contract within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution for the United States of America which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts in light of the Fourteenth Amendment, CHURCH v. KELSEY, 121 U.S. 282, 282-283, 7 S.Ct. 897, 30 L.Ed. 960 (1887) (If we understand correctly the questions on which it is claimed our jurisdiction in this case rests, they are: 1. that the provision in 1, Art. XIV, of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States that a state shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law prevents the State of Pennsylvania from giving jurisdiction to a court of equity of a suit brought by the *283* owner of an equitable interest in land to establish his rights against the holder of the legal title, because it deprives the holder of the legal title of the right to a trial by jury, which he would have in a suit at law, and 2. that, as the constitution of a state is the

fundamental contract made between the collective body of citizens of the state and each individual citizen, a state statute which violates a state constitution is a law impairing the obligation of contracts within the meaning of that term as used in Art. I, 10, clause 1, of the Constitution of the United States. It sufficiently appears from the record that the first of these questions was actually presented to and decided by the court below adversely to the claim of the plaintiffs in error. . . .), and We cannot find that the other question was actually presented to the state court for decision. Certainly it cannot be found in the record in the form it has been stated in the brief of counsel here. . . . A state constitution is not a contract within the meaning of that *284* clause of the Constitution of the United States which prohibits the states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. (Emphasis mine) Ibid., 121 U.S. 282, 283-284, the state constitution can be no contract to federal citizensthe law of presumptions regarding the plaintiffs in error as citizens pursuant to 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; the state constitution is a contract to state citizens of Article IV, 2, cl. 1; and this citizenship was regarded as a choice of law decision which must be claimed prior to the Fourteenth Amendment taking effect; and, the original states had statutes offering citizenship given that requisites of birth in one of the several united States and residence of a time certain which were repealed under the guise of federal preemption regarding Article I, 8, cl. 4, which provides, in pertinent part, that Congress shall have power to . . . establish an uniform rule of Naturalization; and, Ive attached Virginias Citizenship statute for your perusal; the problem with these citizenship statutesif Virginias can be seen as representative of the rest is that they embraced aliens immigrating from without the United States, but this has nothing to do with my vested common law right to claim natural born citizenship pursuant to Article IV, 2, cl. 1. State citizenship could never be regarded as a choice of law decision subsequent to the Fourteenth Amendment because federal citizenship is a second class citizenship: federal citizens are public citizens permanently attached to governmentthe political jurisdiction thereof; whereas, private state citizens owe their allegiance, in a personal capacity, to the citizenry collectively all within the common law jurisdiction of the laws of the United States of America in contradistinction to those attached to government, e.g., government officers, government contractors, military personnel, that

temporarily waive their rights secured by the federal constitution in return for those granted or created by the instrument for the duration of their attachment which is defined by the political jurisdiction as the statutory jurisdiction and in many instances is more fully defined by the Administrative Procedure Act. A private state citizen stepping onto government property temporarily leaves the common law jurisdiction he/she is domiciled in, waiving his/her rights secured by the federal constitutionsecured because thats all the instrument could possibly do with pre-existing rightsto accept rights granted by government because anyone affecting the internal administration of government must be regulated. When our Declaration of Independence took effect, the civil liberties of English subjectship became the property rights of American state citizens due to a progression of historical events involving contracts. And if the following account of these events is true, it would appear that Congress has converted the property right of state citizenship which is held in trust by each of the 50 states for the beneficial interests of its citizens to a proprietary interest of the federal government. Three of the four principle provisions or statutes restraining the Kings Prerogative have been declared part of the common law by Letters Patent which is an executory contract with the people; the Confirmation of the Charters, (25 Edw. 1), did this for the Magna Carta, and the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act of 1689, (2 Will. & Mar. c. 1), did this for the Petition of Right of 1627 and the Bill of Rights of 1688. Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third Edition), Volume 7, Constitutional Law, BUTTERWORTH & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1954, 482, footnotes (h) & (i) (The extent of the prerogative being necessarily somewhat vague, it has been found necessary at various times to define its limits more accurately by statute (h). The principal provisions, from a constitutional standpoint, are to be found in four great statutes or charters by which the rights and liberties of the subject are preserved and acts of tyranny by the Crown or its ministers restrained (i).), and The Crown or its ministers may not punish, imprison, or coerce the subject in an arbitrary manner. No freeman may be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold or liberties or free customs, or be outlawed or exiled, or in any other wise molested (destruatur, lit. destroyed); nor may he be judged (nec super eum ibimus), or condemned (nec super eum mittimus), except

by the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land; nor may justice or right be sold, denied, or delayed to any (k). Ibid., 483, footnote (k). (footnote (h): The prerogative may also be, in effect, in abeyance where statute has enacted provisions which enable what might have been done under the prerogative to be done under the statute; see p. 222, ante.) (footnote (i): These are Magna Carta, 1215 (see the re-issue Magna Carta, 1297 (25 Edw. 1), and the confirmation by Confirmation of the Charters, 1297 (25 Edw. 1) (both printed in Statutes of the Realm); the Petition of Right (1627) (3 Car. 1 c. 1); the Bill of Rights (1688) (1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2 c. 2), confirmed by the Crown and Parliament Recognition Act, 1689 (2 Will. & Mar. c. 1); and the Act of Settlement (1700) (12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2). Magna Carta is still in force and binding upon the Crown, so far as its provisions are not obsolete or repealed. It was confirmed, and sometimes extended, but more frequently curtailed, by Henry III, and by numerous subsequent charters (Coke reckons thirty-two) down to the reign of Henry IV, and in particular by the confirmation and re-issue of 1297 (25 Edw. 1), by which it was directed to be observed as the common law of the realm and all judgments contrary to it were declared void. The Petition of Right was drawn up by the Commons 1627 (3 Car. 1 c. 1), and recited in particular Magna Carta, 1297 (25 Edw. 1 c. 29), and the statute de Tallagio non Concedendo, 1297 (25 Ed. 1). To the petition itself the King appended the answer, Soit droit fait come est desire. As to the manner in which the Bill of Rights was enacted, see note (i), p. 199, ante. These statutes must not be regarded as curtailments of existing prerogatives, but as declarations of the fundamental laws of England. See 2 Co. Inst. proem., p. 3; 1 Bl. Com. (14th Edn.) 128.) (footnote (k): Magna Carta, 1215 arts. 39, 40 (see the confirmation and re-issue, 1297 (25 Edw. 1) c. 29). See also the Petition of Right (1627) (3 Car. 1 c. 1), ss. 3, 8. But on c. 40 of Magna Carta, see CHESTER v. BATESON, [1920] 1 K.B. 829, at p. 832, per DARLING, J. (Magna Carta has not remained untouched; and, like every other law of England, it is not condemned to that immunity from development or improvement which was attributed to the laws of the Medes and Persians ); the civil liberties of English subjects are contract rights grounded in the common law.

Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third Edition), Volume 7, Constitutional Law, BUTTERWORTH & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1954, footnote (b) to 723 (25 Edw. 1 (Magna Carta) (1297); the Petition of Right (1627) (3 Car. 1 c. 1); the Bill of Rights (1688) (1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2 c. 2); and the Act of Settlement (1700) (12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2), being in the nature of solemn compacts between the Sovereign and people, are usually designated quasi-statutes; see title STATUTES.); BOUVIERS LAW DICTIONARY, Vol. II, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.: New York, NY, 1993, p. 38 (LETTERS PATENT. The name of an instrument granted by the government to convey a right to the patentee, as, a patent for a tract of land; or to secure to him a right which he already possesses, as, a patent for a new invention or discovery. Letters patent are matter of record. They are so called because they are not sealed up, but are granted open. Vide Patent.); BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 7th Ed., West Group: St. Paul, Minn., 1999, p. 707 (GRANT, n. 1. An agreement that creates a right of any description other than the one held by the grantor. Examples include . . . patents, franchises, powers, and licenses. 2. The formal transfer of real property. 3. The document by which a transfer is effected; esp. DEED. 4. The property or property right so transferred.); DOWNS v. UNITED STATES, 113 F. 144, 147 (CA4, Md. 1902) (The word grant is more comprehensive in meaning than the term bounty. It implies the conferring by the sovereign power of some valuable privilege, franchise, or other right of like character, upon a corporation, person, or class of persons. Under the ancient laws of England this was deemed in many cases to be the prerogative of the king, who possessed large powers for the regulation of trade and commerce. It is stated, for example, by Macaulay, as follows: In addition to his [King James Is] undoubted right to grant special commercial privileges to particular places, he long claimed a right to grant special commercial privileges to particular societies and to particular individuals. And again: He readily granted oppressive patents of monopoly. 4 Macaulay, HISTORY OF ENGLAND, pp. 222, 223. A well-known instance of a similar grant was in the great Case of Monopolies (Cokes Reports, pt. 11, p. 86), where a patent had been granted to the plaintiff, giving him the sole right to import playing cards and the entire traffic in them, and the sole right to make such cards within the realm. The court held that the grant to have the sole benefit of making them was against the common law and the benefit and

liberty of the subject. See comment on this case in SLAUGHTER-HOUSE CASES, 16 Wall. 36, 103, 21 L.Ed. 394.). Parliament regarded the abdication of King James II a breach of the contract between the Crown and his people. Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third Edition), Volume 7, Constitutional Law, BUTTERWORTH & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1954, footnote (d) of 481 (The refusal of the King to perform the regal functions, by withdrawing himself out of the realm or otherwise, is abhorrent to the spirit of the constitution, and was regarded by Parliament as a breach of the contract between the Crown and people in the case of James II (see 1 Bl. Com. (14th Edn.) 244, 245).). In the exertion therefore of those prerogatives, which the law has given him, the king is irresistible and absolute, according to the forms of the constitution. And yet, if the consequence of that exertion be manifestly to the grievance or dishonour of the kingdom, the parliament will call his advisers to a just and severe account. For prerogative consisting (as Mr. Locke on Gov. 2, 166 has well defined it) in the discretionary power of acting for the public good, where the positive laws are silent, if that discretionary power be abused to the public detriment, such prerogative is exerted in an unconstitutional manner. Thus the king may make a treaty with a foreign state, which shall irrevocably bind the nation; and yet, when such treaties have been judged pernicious, impeachments have pursued those ministers, by whose agency or advice they were concluded. The prerogatives of the crown (in the sense under which we are now considering them) respect either this nations intercourse with foreign nations, or its own domestic government and civil polity. William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1st Edition, University of Chicago Press, 1979: Volume I, Of the Rights of Persons (1765), pp. 244-245. Several of the original states of the several united States of America obtained colonial charters from the King that stipulated inhabitants of these colonies had the right to the common law of England as if they were within its realm. Examine, in pertinent part, Marylands: Charles, by the Grace of God, of England, Scotland, France, and Ireland, king, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all to whom these Presents

come, Greeting. Para. I; [a]lso We do grant and likewise Confirm unto the said Baron of Baltimore, his Heirs, and Assigns, . . . ample Rights, Jurisdictions, Privileges, Prerogatives, Royalties, Liberties, Immunities, and royal Rights, and temporal Franchises whatsoever . . . as any Bishop of Durham, within the Bishoprick or County Palatine of Durham, in our Kingdom of England, ever heretofore hath had, held, used, or enjoyed, or of right could, or ought to have, hold, use, or enjoy. Para. IV; [a]nd forasmuch as We have above made and ordained the aforesaid now Baron of Baltimore, the true Lord and Proprietary of the whole Province aforesaid, Know Ye therefore further, that We, forges, our Heirs and Successors, do grant unto the said now Baron, (in whose Fidelity, Prudence, Justice, and provident Circumspection of Mind, We repose the greatest Confidence) and to his Heirs, for the good and happy Government of the said Province, free, full, and absolute Power, by the Tenor of these Presents, to Ordain, Make, and Enact Laws, of what Kind soever, according to their sound Discretions whether relating to the Public State of the said Province, or the private Utility of Individuals, of and with the Advice, Assent, and Approbation of the Free-Men of the same Province, or the greater Part of them, or of their Delegates or Deputies, whom We will shall be called together for the framing of Laws, when, and as often as Need shall require, by the aforesaid now Baron of Baltimore, and his Heirs, and in the Form which shall seem best to him or them, and the same to publish under the Seal of the aforesaid now Baron of Baltimore, and his Heirs, and duly to execute the same upon all Persons, for the time being, within the aforesaid Province, and the Limits thereof, or under his or their Government and Power. . . . So, nevertheless, that the Laws aforesaid be consonant to Reason, and be not repugnant or contrary, but (so far as conveniently may be) agreeable to the Laws, Statutes, Customs, and Rights of this Our Kingdom of England. Para. VII; In Witness Whereof We have caused these our Letters to be made Patent. Witness Ourself at Westminster, the Twentieth Day of June, in the Eighth Year of our Reign. Para. XXIII. . . . [A]nd the inhabitants of Maryland are also entitled to all property, derived to them, from or under the Charter, granted by his Majesty Charles I. to Crecilius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore. (Emphasis mine) MARYLAND

CONSTITUTION of 1776, Declaration of Rights, Article III; contract rights are property rights. UNITED STATES TRUST CO. v. NEW JERSEY, 431 U.S. 1, 20 n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (Contract rights are a form of property, and, as such, may be taken for a public purpose provided that just compensation is paid. CONTRIBUTORS to PENNSYLVANIA HOSPITAL v. PHILADELPHIA, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); see EL PASO v. SIMMONS, 379 U.S. 497, 533-534 (1965) (BLACK, J., dissenting).). Rights derived from and under the Charter granted to colonial Maryland by King Charles I of England pursuant to his Letters Patent which is an executory contract flow through Article V of the Maryland Constitutions Declaration of Rights as a fundamental right to state citizens of Article IV, 2, cl. 1 of the Constitution for the United States of America. BOARD of PUBLIC WORKS of MARYLAND v. LARMAR CORPORATION, 262 Md. 24, 277 A.2d 427, 432 (Md.App. 1971) ( . . . The lands in Maryland covered by water were granted to the Lord Proprietor by Section 4 of the Charter from King Charles I to Caecillius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, his heirs, successors and assigns, who had the power to dispose of such lands, subject to the public rights of fishing and navigation. BROWNE v. KENNEDY, 5 Har. & J. 195 (1821). By virtue of Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights in the Maryland Constitution, the inhabitants of Maryland became entitled to all property derived from and under the Charter and thereafter the State of Maryland had the same title to, and rights in, such lands under water as the Lord Proprietor had previously held. These lands were held by the State for the benefit of the inhabitants of Maryland and this holding is of a general fiduciary character. KERPELMAN v. BOARD of PUBLIC WORKS, Md., 276 A.2d 56.); KERPELMAN v. BOARD of PUBLIC WORKS of MARYLAND, 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56, 61 (Md.App. 1971) (Mrs. Kerpelman, secondly, . . . seeks to establish her standing to sue upon the novel theory that she, as a member of the public of Maryland, is a beneficiary of a public trust flowing from Art. 6 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution stating that persons invested with the legislative or executive powers of government are Trustees of the Public, and, as such, accountable for their conduct. . . . Article 6 is hortatory in naturesee BERNSTEIN v. BOARD of EDUCATION of PRINCE GEORGES COUNTY, 245 Md. 464, 226 A.2d 243, 248 (1967) and sets forth the well-established doctrine that the duties of public officials are fiduciary in character and are to be exercised as a public trust. The

lands in Maryland covered by water were granted to the Lord Proprietor by Section 4 of the Charter from King Charles I to Caecillius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, his heirs, successors and assigns, who had the power to dispose of such lands, subject to the public rights of fishing and navigation. BROWNE v. KENNEDY, 5 Har. & J. 195 (1821). By virtue of Art. 5 of the Declaration of Rights in the Maryland Constitution, the inhabitants of Maryland became entitled to all property derived from and under the Charter and thereafter the State of Maryland had the same title to, and rights in, such lands under water as the Lord Proprietor had previously held. These lands were held by the State for the benefit of the inhabitants of Maryland and this holding is of a general fiduciary character.). It would appear that the English civil liberties that became the fundamental rights of American state citizens were grounded in the common law of England as contract rights, Halsbury, THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Third Edition), Volume 7, Constitutional Law, BUTTERWORTH & CO. (PUBLISHERS) LTD., London, England, 1954, footnote (b) to 723 (25 Edw. 1 (Magna Carta) (1297); the Petition of Right (1627) (3 Car. 1 c. 1); the Bill of Rights (1688) (1 Will. & Mar. sess. 2 c. 2); and the Act of Settlement (1700) (12 & 13 Will. 3 c. 2), being in the nature of solemn compacts between the Sovereign and people, are usually designated quasistatutes; see title STATUTES.), and thats what our founding fathers regarded as the common law as our birthright. CALVIN v. SMITH, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398 n. K (K.B. 1608) (Memorandum 9th of August, 1722, it was said by the Master of the Rolls to have been determined by the Lords of the Privy Council, upon an appeal to the King in Council from the foreign plantations:1st. That if there be a new and uninhabited country found out by English subjects, as the law is the birthright of every subject, so wherever they go, they carry their law with them, and therefore such new found country is to be governed by the laws of England. . . . ); BOUMEDIENE v. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 06-1195, Decided June 12, 2008, 553 U.S. ____ (The common-law . . . , as received into the law of the new constitutional Republic, took on such changes as were demanded by a system in which rule is derived from the consent of the governed, and in which citizens (not subjects) are afforded defined protections against the Government. As Justice Story wrote for the Court,

The common law of England is not to be taken in all respects to be that of America. Our ancestors brought with them its general principles, and claimed it as their birthright; but they brought with them and adopted only that portion which was applicable to their situation. VAN NESS v. PACARD, 2 Pet. 137, 144 (1829). See also Hall, The Common Law: An Account of its Reception in the United States, 4 Vand. L. Rev. 791 (1951). (Emphasis mine)) (JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE THOMAS, and JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.); WHEATON v. PETERS, 33 U.S. 591, 607 (1834) (The American colonies brought hither, as their birthright and inheritance, the common law, so far as it was applicable to their situation. Judge Chase, in UNITED STATES v. WORRALL, 1 Dall. Rep. 384. (Emphasis mine)); and, [i]t was very properly admitted by the court below, on the trial of this cause, that when the American colonies were first settled by our ancestors, it was held as well by the settlers, as by the judges and lawyers of England, that they brought with them, as a birthright and inheritance, so much of the common law as was applicable to their local situation and change of circumstances; and that each colony judged for itself, what parts of the common law were applicable to its new condition. Mr Justice Story recognises the same principle in his Commentaries, vol. 1, 137 to 140. Englishmen, says he, removing to another country, must be deemed to carry with them those rights and privileges which belong to them in their native country; and that the plantations formed in this country were to be deemed a part of the ancient dominions, [33 U.S. 591, 688] and the subjects inhabiting them to belong to a common country, and to retain their former rights and privileges. That the universal principle has been (and the practice has conformed to it), that the common law is our birthright and inheritance, and that our ancestors brought hither with them, upon their immigration, all of it which was applicable to their situation. The whole structure of our present jurisprudence stands upon the original foundation of the common law. The old congress, in the year 1774, unanimously resolved, that the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England. 1 Story's Com. 140, and note. (Emphasis mine) Ibid., 33 U.S. 591, 687688. In order to accommodate necessary legislation without deviating from the principle that all laws impairing the obligations of contract are constitutionally prohibited, the Court developed two basic analytical devices

the obligation-remedy distinction and the reserved powers doctrine8 both of which dominated contract clause interpretation for the next century. John F. Cooper and Thomas C. Marks, Jr., FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cases and Materials, 4th Edition, Carolina Academic Press: Durham, NC, 2006, p. 473 and n. 8 (citing POMPONIO v. CLARIDGE of POMPANO CONDOMINIUM, INC., 378 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1979)). (n. 8: For a brief discussion and comparison of these two approaches, see, e.g., COMMENT, Revival of the Contract Clause, 39 Ohio St. L. J. 195, 196-98 (1978). . . .); it would appear that the reserved powers doctrine used to determine impairment of the obligation of contract is most appropriate when state citizenship in contradistinction to federal citizenship is in issue. Into all contracts there enter conditions which arise, not out of the literal terms of the contract itself, but out of deference to the Sovereignty that was created by the compact clause of Floridas 1838 Constitution, Declaration of Rights, 1 in the state citizens in their collective capacity where they were also part of the Sovereignty of the several united States of America as American citizens in their collective capacity as each and every state citizen, in their individual capacity, is party to the implicit compact clause of the Constitution for the United States of America; and these conditions are superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority of the community to which the parties belong which leaves the citizens attached to the political jurisdiction free to act as trustees to the private citizens unattached to the political jurisdiction because they are of the common law jurisdiction. HOME BLDG. & LOAN ASS'N v. BLAISDELL, 290 U.S. 398, 435-436, 54 S.Ct. 231, 78 L.Ed. 413 (1934) (Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile,a government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the necessary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in the decisions of this Court. . . .

The reservation of this necessary authority of the state is deemed to be a part of the contract. In the case last cited, [(WEST RIVER BRIDGE v. DIX, 6 How. (47 U.S.) 507), 12 L.Ed. 535 (1848),] the Court answered the forcible challenge of the states power by the following statement of the controlling principle, a statement reiterated by this Court speaking through Mr. Justice Brewer, nearly fifty years later, in LONG ISLAND WATER SUPPLY CO. v. BROOKLYN, 166 U.S. 685, 692, 17 S.Ct. 718, 721: But into all contracts, whether made between states and individuals or between individuals only, there enter conditions which arise, not out of the literal terms of the contract itself. They are superinduced by the pre-existing and higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties belong. They are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must yield to their control, as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their execution shall occur. ). The sovereignty of Florida state and its prerogative of self-protection is at issue with the omission of the compact clause of the FLORIDA CONSTITUTION of 1838, Declaration of Rights, 1, and it may be its dual nature that makes it problematical. ALLIED STRUCTURAL STEEL CO. v. SPANNAUS, 438 U.S. 234, 240, n. 10 omitted, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978) (The language of the Contract Clause appears unambiguously absolute: No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. U.S.Const., Art. I, 10. The Clause is not, however, the Draconian provision that its words might seem to imply. As the Court has recognized, literalism in the construction of the contract clause . . . would make it destructive of the public interest by depriving the State of its prerogative of self-protection. W. B. WORTHEN CO. v. THOMAS, 292 U.S. 426, 433.); the compact as a covenant that is compelled by the FLORIDA CONSTITUTION of 1838, Declaration of Rights, 1 has a dual nature in that it must be consummated in Floridas common law jurisdiction since that is where the state sovereignty resideswhere the state citizens are domiciledwhich gives said compact a private nature and yet it can only be brought into being with the aid of the people of the political jurisdiction in their representative capacitynotably the Florida Attorney Generalwhich

gives said compact a public nature; it is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States. It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals. MANIGAULT v. SPRINGS, 199 U.S. 473, 480. Ibid., 438 U.S. 234, 241; and, a states police power must be used to preserve the State of Florida acting in the nature of a charitable corporationa political corporationwith respect to all individuals attached to government and, at the same time, a states police power must be restrained from impairing civil liberties of those individuals unattached to government who are owed a trustees fiduciary duty of protection; [t]he severity of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature and purpose of the state legislation. The severity of an impairment of contractual obligations can be measured by the factors that reflect the high value the Framers placed on the protection of private contracts. Contracts enable individuals to order their personal and business affairs according to their particular needs and interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to rely on them. Ibid., 438 U.S. 234, 245, n. 17 omitted; and, a state citizens vested right to consent to be governed by contracting to pledge his allegiance in return for the state citizenrys pledge of protection and vice versa which is a pre-existing right; there is no showing in the record before us that this severe disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to meet an important general social problem. The presumption favoring legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure, UNITED STATES TRUST CO., 431 U.S., at 23, simply cannot stand in this case. Ibid., 438 U.S. 234, 247; there is no showing in the record justifying Floridas compact clause omission; This Minnesota law simply does not possess the attributes of those state laws that, in the past, have survived challenge under the Contract Clause of the Constitution. The law was not even purportedly enacted to deal with a broad, generalized economic or social

problem. Cf. HOME BUILDING & LOAN ASSN. v. BLAISDELL, 290 U.S., at 445. It did not operate in an area already subject to state regulation at the time the companys contractual obligations were originally undertaken, but invaded an area never before subject to regulation by the State. Cf. VEIX v. SIXTH WARD BUILDING & LOAN ASSN., 310 U.S. 32, 38. It did not effect simply a temporary alteration of the contractual relationships of those within its coverage, but worked a severe, permanent, and immediate change in those relationshipsirrevocably and retroactively. Cf. UNITED STATES TRUST CO. v. NEW JERSEY, 431 U.S., at 22. Ibid., 438 U.S. 234, 250, n. 25 omitted; and, in the instant case, it is the replacement of Floridas compact clause with the Fourteenth Amendment citizenshipa second class federal citizenshipthat I am complaining about. Note well, Floridas case law on the subject of the impairment of the obligation of contracts. COASTAL PETROLEUM CO. v. CHILES, 672 So.2d 571, 573-574 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (. . . [U]nder the contracts clause of our state constitution, little tolerance has been shown for the states attempts to alter its own contracts. For example, in CHILES v. UNITED FACULTY of FLORIDA, 615 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1993), an agreement for pay raises for state workers was reached and initially funded by the legislature. When a shortfall in projected revenue required legislative action to balance the budget, the legislature attempted to postpone the raise. The supreme court held this action violated article 1, section 10, explaining: The right to contract is one of the most sacrosanct rights guaranteed by our fundamental law. It is expressly guaranteed by article 1, section 10 of the Florida Constitution. . . . The legislature has only a very limited authority to change the law to eliminate a contractual obligation it has itself created. Id., at 673. While recognizing that the legislature has authority to reduce previously approved appropriations where it can demonstrate a compelling state interest, the court emphasized: Before that authority can be exercised, however, the legislature must demonstrate no other reasonable alternative means of preserving its contract with public workers, either in whole or in part. Id. The court concluded that the state had not met that burden where it had not demonstrated that the funds were unavailable from other possible reasonable sources.

Similarly, the trustees have failed to demonstrate that imposing the bond at issue is the only means available to protect the state lands, particularly in light of the existing surety requirements of section 377.2425, Florida Statutes, and Coastals agreement in the lease contract to assume responsibility for all damages caused by [its] operations. Accordingly, we must conclude that the $1.9 billion bond requirement would substantially impair the obligation of the lease contract in violation of article I, section 10.); Florida had a contract clause from the very beginning [t]hat no law impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed. FLORIDA CONSTITUTION of 1838, Declaration of Rights, 19; and, in the instant case, Floridas compact clause was not created by the Legislaturea creature of the constitutionbut, by the people; the people are the principal and the Legislature is the agent; a constitutionstate or federalis the supreme law of the land; its the will of the people in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity; statute law is the will of the legislature in their derivative or subordinate capacity. RISON v. FARR, 24 Ark. 161, 87 Am.Dec. 52, 55 (1865) (Paterson, J., in VANHORNE v. DORRANCE, 2 Dall. 308, in defining what a constitution is, says: It is the form of government delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the legislature, . . . . And in defining what legislatures are, the same learned judge says: They are creatures of the constitution; they owe their existence to the constitution; they derive their powers from the constitution. It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The constitution is the work or will of the people themselves in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity; law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative or subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the creator, the other of the creature. (Emphasis mine)). The United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit characterized the difference between the federal and the Florida contract clauses in GEARY DISTRIBUTING COMPANY, INC. v. ALL BRAND IMPORTERS, INC., 931 F.2d 1431, 1434 n. 4 (11th Cir. 1991): . . . [T]he Supreme Court of Florida adopted an approach to the Florida contract clause that the court termed similar to that of the United States Supreme Courts approach to the federal contract clause. [Citation omitted.] Although the approach is similar, Florida courts interpreting the Florida contract clause appear to tolerate less

impairment than the federal courts interpreting the federal contract clause. . . . John F. Cooper and Thomas C. Marks, Jr., FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Cases and Materials, 4th Edition, Carolina Academic Press: Durham, NC, 2006, p. 480 and n. 17. Indian cases can be very instructive on certain points, as a matter of law, because there are parallels allowing a comparison of the American Indian to the American state citizen; they both pre-existed our federal government and its constitution; examine STATE of WASHINGTON v. BUCHANAN, 138 Wash.2d 186, 978 P.2d 1070, 1076 (1999) (At the time the treaties were negotiated, approximately three-fourths of Western Washingtons 10,000 or so inhabitants were Indians. WASHINGTON v. WASHINGTON STATE COMMERCIAL PASSENGER FISHING VESSEL ASSN, 443 U.S. 658, 664, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (1979) (hereinafter FISHING VESSEL). . . .); and A treaty, including one between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract between two sovereigns. FISHING VESSEL, 443 U.S., at 675, 99 S.Ct. 3055; STATE v. COURVILLE, 36 Wash.App. 615, 619, 676 P.2d 1011 (1983). Ibid., 978 P.2d 1070, 1077; and The goal of treaty interpretation is the same as the goal of contract interpretationto determine the intent of the parties. FISHING VESSEL, 443 U.S., at 675, 99 S.Ct. 3055; UNITED STATES v. WASHINGTON, 157 F.3d, at 642. Ibid., 978 P.2d 1070, 1078; and A key principle of treaty interpretation is known as the reservation of rights doctrine. First announced in UNITED STATES v. WINANS, 198 U.S. 371, 25 S.Ct. 662, 49 L.Ed. 1089, a case involving interpretation of a Stevens Treaty made with the Yakama Indians,7 the reservation of rights doctrine holds that a treaty between the federal government and an Indian tribe is not a grant of rights to the Indians but, rather, a grant from them. In other words, the Indians ceded certain rights possessed by them at the time of making the treaty but reserved whatever rights were not expressly granted to the United States. WINANS, 198 U.S., at 381, 25 S.Ct. 662. See also SEUFERT BROS., 249 U.S., at 199, 39 S.Ct. 203; FISHING VESSEL, 443 U.S., at 679-81, 99 S.Ct. 3055; WILKINSON, supra, at 454-55. Under the reservation of rights doctrine, tribal members have possessed certain rights, such as hunting and fishing rights, from time immemorial. A treaty between a tribe and the United States documents a grant of some rights from the tribe to the federal government. However, those rights not expressly ceded in the treaty, as well as those expressly reserved, remain

with the tribe. JOHNSON, supra, at 553. Ibid., n. 7 omitted; and The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the treaty language securing or secured rights to be synonymous with reserving rights previously exercised. FISHING VESSEL, 443 U.S., at 678, 99 S.Ct. 3055. Ibid., 978 P.2d 1070, 1078-1079; a comparison of STATE of WASHINGTON v. BUCHANAN, supra, with what HALSBURYS LAWS OF ENGLAND has to say about the nature of English civil liberties as they came to American state citizens as fundamental rights should allow the understanding that there should be a corresponding reservation of rights doctrine applicable to American state citizens and the meaning of securing or secured rights in the above Indian case is the same regarding American state citizen civil liberties. RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS, INC. v. VIRGINIA, 448 U.S. 555, 579 & n. 15, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out a guarantee for the right of the public to attend trials, and that accordingly no such right is protected. The possibility that such a contention could be made did not escape the notice of the Constitutions draftsmen; they were concerned that some important rights might be thought disparaged because not specifically guaranteed. It was even argued that because of this danger no Bill of Rights should be adopted. See, e. g., The Federalist No. 84 (A. Hamilton). In a letter to Thomas Jefferson in October 1788, James Madison explained why he, although in favor of a bill of rights, had not viewed it in an important light up to that time: I conceive that in a certain degree . . . the rights in question are reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted. He went on to state that there is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. 5 Writings of James Madison 271 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).15 ) (n. 15: Madisons comments in Congress also reveal the perceived need for some sort of constitutional saving clause, which, among other things, would serve to foreclose application to the Bill of Rights of the maxim that the affirmation of particular rights implies a negation of those not expressly defined. See 1 Annals of Cong. 438-440 (1789). See also, e. g., 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 651 (5th ed. 1891). Madisons efforts, culminating in the Ninth Amendment, served to allay the fears of those who were concerned that expressing certain guarantees could be read as excluding others.); and let there be no confusion between civil rights and civil liberties which are fundamental rights. SOWERS v. OHIO

CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, 20 Ohio Misc. 115, 252 N.E.2d 463, 475 (1969) (Civil rights then, within the meaning of [the Ohio statutory code] . . . are economic rights functioning as legally enforceable claims which are structured in legislation. On the other hand civil liberties are natural rights which appertain originally and essentially to each person as a human being and are inherent in his nature; such rights, which are constitutionally protected, are not actually rights but are immunities, or restraints on government. (Emphasis mine)). In summation, Michael Hodge and I need backers to sustain us in order to bring this forward. In simplistic terms, legal action needs begin with a petition to the state attorney general for state citizenship pursuant to Article IV, 2, cl. 1 and Floridas compact clause found in its first constitution with a simultaneous renunciation of federal citizenship pursuant to 1 of the Fourteenth Amendmenteach individual state citizen owes allegiance to the Sovereignty which lies in the state citizens collectively and not the political jurisdiction. The political jurisdiction is set up to exercise our sovereignty in a representative capacity. This petition must be accompanied by a declaration of domicile which must be seen as having been created in the common law jurisdictionnot the statutory jurisdiction. SMITH and ARMISTEAD v. CROOM[2], 7 Fla. 180, 185 (1857) ([T]he law of citizenship, as it is known in America [ ] is found in American decisions. This citizenship I understand as equivalent to domicil, when applied to an American born or a foreigner naturalized. To be a citizen of a State, says Judge Story, a man must have his domicil in the State.). We would appreciate hearing from you at your earliest convenience. Very Truly Yours,

J. Patrick Simpson 321-299-5773 (SU, MO, & TU are days off; otherwise my 12-hour driving shift precludes me from talking on my cell phone)