CONFLICT OF LAWS M.A.

Banco Espaol-Filipino vs. Palanca March 26, 1918 Facts: In March 1908, an action for forclosure of a mortgage was instituted upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. Original party to which it was executed was Engracio Palanca. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again returning to the Philippine Islands. An order for publication was accordingly obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila. At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit, the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. However, whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. Later, due to the non-appearance of the defendant, a judgment was taken against him by default. The court also found the debts left due by the defendant and ordered to pay the same. About 7 years after the confirmation of the sale of the property, Palanca (Vicente) filed a motion as the administrator of the estate of the deceased Engracio to set aside order of default. Issue: Whether or not, the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of defendant? Ruling: Yes. Jurisdiction may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation. The SC ruled that according the Rules on Civil Procedure, subsection 14 and 18, respectively of Section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "that official duty has been regularly performed and that the ordinary course of business has been followed. There is therefore clearly a legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; and the SC think that strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full force under the circumstances of this case.

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Carballo vs. Encarnacion and Mariano Ang April 27, 1953 Facts: Ang filed a complaint for collection of sum of money against Carballo before the Municipal Court of Manila on the amount of P1,860.84. Corresponding summons was served upon Carballo. Atty. Gonzales, counsel for Carballo entered a written appearance on behalf of the latter and on the same day moved for the postponement of trial on the reason of sickness of Carballo. The counsel of Carballo attached a medical certificate. Upon motion, the court postponed the hearing on October 14, 1949. Another motion for postponement was filed by the defendant on the reason of sickness of the counsel. The motion was granted by the court by with a warning that the hearing could not wait until his counsel recovered from his illness, and that if said counsel could not attend the trial he should obtain the services of another lawyer. On the day set for hearing, neither defendant nor his counsel appeared although there was a written manifestation of defendant's counsel requesting further postponement because he was still sick. With that and at the request of plaintiff's counsel, defendant was declared in default. Consequently, Gonzales filed a motion for new trial on the ground that injustice had been done, and that an error was committed in the decision but it was denied. Defendant interposed an appeal before the RTC Manila. Counsel for the plaintiff argued on the ground that the decision appealed from had become final and executory for the reason that said judgment having been rendered by default and no appeal could be validly taken from it. Upon denial of appeal and MR by the RTC, a petition for certiorari has been filed before the SC. Issue: Whether or not, the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of lower court. Ruling: Yes.

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The SC opined that while it is true that a decision by default rendered by an inferior court is not appealable and that the defendant filed no answer, but his counsel filed a written appearance. Further, an appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court over the person. It is, therefore, clear that petitioner Carballo made an appearance in the municipal court. Gemperle vs. Spouses Schenker January 23, 1967

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representative and attorney-in-fact of her husband aforementioned civil case. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had authority to sue, and had actually sued on behalf of her husband, so that she was, also, empowered to represent him in suits filed against him, particularly in a case, like the of the one at bar, which is consequence of the action brought by her on his behalf. Caluag and Garcia vs. Pecson, Mojica and Alejo October 29, 1948 Facts: On August 10, 1937, Alejo filed a complaint against Caluag and Garcia for the redemption of one-half pro indiviso of a parcel of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. After trial, the CFI Bulacan rendered judgment ordering petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of Fortunato Alejo, upon payment by plaintiff, as purchase price, of the amount of P2,551. Petitioners filed an appeal to the CA but it was denied. Consequently, Alejo filed a Motion for Execution. When the petitioners opposed, Alejo filed before CFI a petition for contempt and it was granted by the respondent. A petition for certiorari was filed against the respondent judge, allegedly acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in rendering the resolution which declares the petitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or performing its prior order requiring the petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one-half of the land pro indiviso in question. The petitioners in support of the present petition for certiorari, alleged other 2 grounds, to wit: (1) that plaintiff's action abated or was extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal redemption was a personal one, and therefore not transferable to his successors in interest; and (2) that, even assuming that it is a personal one and therefore transferable, his successors in interest have failed to secure the substitution of said deceased by his legal representative under section 17, Rule 3. Ruling: It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than the general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs. The respondent Judge Mojica acted not only without

Facts: Paul Schenker acting through his wife and attorney-in-fact, filed with the CFI of Rizal a complaint against herein plaintiff Gemperle, for the enforcement of Schenker's allegedly initial subscription to the shares of stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc. and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive rights to the then unissued original capital stock of said corporation and the increase thereof, as well as for an accounting and damages. As a response, Gemperle filed an action against Schenker on the allegation that the latter had caused to be published some allegations thereof and other matters, which were impertinent, irrelevant and immaterial to said case aside from being false and derogatory to the reputation, good name and credit of Gemperle, "with the only purpose of attacking" his" honesty, integrity and reputation" and of bringing him into public hatred, discredit, disrepute and contempt as a man and a businessman. The action was denied by the court as well as the motion for reconsideration. Hence, an instant appeal. Issue: Whether or not, the lower court had acquired jurisdiction over the person of Schenker? Ruling: Yes. The SC ruled on the affirmative. It was not disputed that Schenker, a citizen of Switzerland has not been actually served with summons in the Philippines, although the summons address to him and Mrs. Schenker had been served personally upon her in the Philippines. Gemperle maintained that due to the voluntary appearance of Mr. Schenker, the same is considered a submission to the courts jurisdiction. The SC hold that lower court had acquired jurisdiction over said defendant, through service of the summons addressed to him upon Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer that she is the

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jurisdiction in proceeding against and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the confinement of the petitioners, because it had no power to impose such punishment upon the latter. The respondent judge has no power under the law to order the confinement of the petitioners until they have compiled with the order of the court. A wrong decision made within the limits of the court's authority is erroneous and may be corrected on appeal or other direct review, but a wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is void, and may be set aside either directly or collaterally, where the court exceeds its jurisdiction and power in rendering it. Hence though the court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and the particular case has been submitted properly to it for hearing and decision, it will overstep its jurisdiction if it renders a judgment which it has no power under the law to render. Perkins vs. Roxas, et. al. July 27, 1941

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against respondent, Eugene Perkins, from the Supreme Court of the State of New York, wherein it is declared that she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the possession and control of the shares of stock in question together with all the cash dividends declared thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and prays for various affirmative reliefs against the respondent. Respondent Perkins filed a reply and an answer to the cross-complaint in which he sets up several defenses to the enforcement in this jurisdiction of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York. As a result, Idonah filed a demurrer thereto on the ground that "the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action," because the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York is res judicata. Upon overruling the demurrer of the Idonah, she filed a petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not, in view of the alleged judgment entered in favor of the petitioner by the Supreme Court of New York, and which is claimed by her to be res judicata, the local court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action in the said case? Ruling: Yes. The respondent's action, which calls for the adjudication of title to certain shares of stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company, and the granting of affirmative reliefs, which fall within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Further, Idonah Slade Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought suit against Eugene Arthur Perkins and the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company upon the alleged judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of New York and asked the court below to render judgment enforcing that New York judgment, and to issue execution thereon. This is a form of action recognized by section 309 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39, Rules of Court) and which falls within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, to adjudicate, settled and determine. The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, not whether its conclusion in the course of it is right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its judgment case be reversed on appeal; but its determination of the question, which the petitioner here anticipates and seeks to prevent, is the exercise

Facts: Perkins filed a complaint before the CFI Manila against the Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the recovery of the sum of money consisting of dividends which have been declared and made payable, the shares of stock registered in his name, payment of which was being withheld by the company, and for the recognition of his right to the control and disposal of said shares, to the exclusion of all others. Later, the trial court ordered the Eugene the respondent to include in his complaint as parties defendants petitioners Idonah Perkins and Engelhard. The complaint was accordingly amended and in addition to the relief prayed for in the original complaint, respondent Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest in the shares of stock in question and excluded from any claim they assert thereon. Thereafter, summons by publication were served upon the non-resident defendants, Idonah Slade Perkins and George H. Engelhard, pursuant to the order of the trial court. Defendant Engelhard filed his answer to the complaint. However, petitioner filed her answer with a cross-complaint in which she sets up a judgment allegedly obtained by her

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by that court and the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction. Testate Estate of C.O. Bohanan, Phil. Trust Co. vs. Bohanan January 30, 1960 Facts: On April 24, 1950, the CFI Manila, Judge Amparo, presiding, admitted to probate a last will and testament of C. O. Bohanan, executed by him on April 23, 1944 in Manila. It does not appear that the order granting probate was ever questions on appeal. Later in 1956, the executor filed a project of partition. Meanwhile, the wife of Bohanan and his two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them. The will has not given the wife any share in the estate left by the testator. Magdalena further argued that it was error for the trial court to have recognized the Reno divorce secured by the testator from her, and that said divorce should be declared a nullity in the courts jurisdiction. However, the court refused to recognize the claim of the widow on the ground that the laws of Nevada, of which the deceased was a citizen, allow him to dispose of all of his properties without requiring him to leave any portion of his estate to his wife. On the part of the children, both received legacies in the amount of P6,000.00 only. Issue: Whether the testementary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the Philippines, are valid? Ruling: Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. Article 10 of the old Civil Code provides that the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, already indicated above, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will, as in the case at bar, the

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order of the court approving the project of partition made in accordance with the testamentary provisions. Gibbs vs. The Government of Philippine Islands December 23, 1933 Facts: Petitioner Gibbs was appointed administrator of estate of his deceased wife. Gibbs filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged that the parcels of land subject of the case belong to the conjugal partnership of him and his wife, Eva Johnson Gibbs. He further alleged that his said wife, a citizen and resident of California, died on November 28,1929; that in accordance with the law of California, the community property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration; and that the conjugal partnership has no obligations or debts and no one will be prejudiced by adjucating said parcels of land to be the absolute property of the said Allison D. Gibbs as sole owner. The court granted the petition of Gibbs. However, by virtue of Section 1547 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code, the register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of court and refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Gibbs, on the ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid. Thereafter, Gibbs filed a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds to issue the corresponding titles to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance tax. The court reaffirmed said order of and entered the order which is under review on this appeal and later remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs, also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the property involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at the time of such acquisition.

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However, the respondent maintained that the same was governed by Philippine Law under Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the contention of the public respondent is correct? Ruling:

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