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Aspects of Fiji Indian History, 1879-1939: A Society in Transition: II Author(s): Ahmed Ali Source: Economic and Political Weekly,

Vol. 12, No. 43 (Oct. 22, 1977), pp. 1821+1823-1830 Published by: Economic and Political Weekly Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4366042 . Accessed: 25/04/2011 22:39
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Aspects

of

Fiji

Indian

History,

1879-1939

A Society in Transition -II


Ahmed Ali Following an agreement betweent the colonial oo;ernments in Inidia and Fiji, Indiais wunere indentured to work in the sugar plantations anid mills Whlich were started in Fiji by the Australia-based Coloniail Sugar Refining Company from 1879 onwards. This migration of Indian labour to Fiji wenit on uninterrupted till the end of 1919 when, follotwina nationalist pressure in India, it was stopped from the beginning of 1920. The Indians in Fiji had to live and wvorkin extremely harsh conditions, yet by far the mnajority of these labourers made Fiji their home, even when they had ani option of being repatriaited to India at the cost of the government at the end of their conitracts. This article presents a historic(il accouniit of the migration of Indian labourers to Fiji, the conditions of their life and wvork,and the impact the new environment had on the traditional attitude towards It traces the gradual tranLsformationof traditiotnail Indian society and caste, religion, languiage, etc. the growing diversification of the occupatfions. The major part of the paper deals with the struggles laun-ched by the Indians for economic atnd political rights, including the riglht to (Idult franchise, and the attempts of the colonial gov;ernment to conitain these demands. The article is published in two parts. The first part appeared last week. This, the second part, describes the prolonged struggles of the Indian labouirers with the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, ard thle gradual politicisation of the struggle. The last section traces the actual political struggles that cullminated in the constitutional settlement of 1937, which still fell far short of Indian aspirations.
SUGAR DISPU-T 1921 INDusTmY E, FOUR days short of a y-ear after .he Suva strike had ended, Indian labourers working for the CSR Company and other European planters in Ba stopped work on February 11, 1921. Soon all Indian labourers working for Eiiropeans (including the Government) did likewise and the strike spread immediately west to Penang and then by FebruarY 19 to Lautoka and down the coast as far as the cane district of Nadroga. Indian cane growers belonging to the employer class found themselves equally affected. Though the stoppage was sudden it was not unexpected. Relations between Indian sugarcane labourers and their European masters, especially the powerful CSR Company of Australia, had never been happy. The Indians viewed their employers with suspicion and distrust and saw themselves as martyrs whose blood, sweat and toil had ensured profits for those who worked them.68 After the abolition of the indenture system, the labourers, now free to sell their labour to whoever they wished, had expected a new outlook from the employers. This was not forthcoming, old attitudes prevailed, and the complaints of the workers were given the customary negative treatment. Indian dissatisfaction in the cane areas was common knowledge well before the strike.69 Reports from District Commissioners, Resident Inspectors of Immigrants as well as individuals in conversations with officials all indicatedl a deteriorating situation in 1920 and an imminent strike. Despite widespread discontent the CSR Comp)any announced in September that in 1921 it . would no longer pay the bonus of ?1 per acre of cane plauted; this affected the grower's profits. For the labourers this proved beneficial it forced Indian cane growers to make comnmon cause with their countrymen seeking better wages. Besides the claims. By the time these were presented to the CSR Company a month later (on March 18) they had grown

CSR Company management, both in Fiji and Australia, turned a deaf ear to advice and suggestions, both from government officials as well as labour leaders. They were unwilling to negotiate with anyone but their w orkers who in Fiji were generallv illiterate and needed outside assistance. The Company ignored a set of demands and the deadline (February 1, 1921) set to meet them.70 On February 11 labourers at Ba stopped work and others followed suit, staying out for six months and mnakingit the longest strike. in Fiji's history. Led by a recent arrival from India, a Sadhu Basisth Muini, the strikers called a large meeting at Bulolu, about 7 miles on the Ba-Tavua Road, on February 13, (a Sunday) to discuss their position. On February 16 another meeting drew up their 14-point log of

to 16 demands. They covered a wide field: (1) The employer is to provide each labourer with a good house with its own separate bathroom, dining room and latrine, and furnished with bedding, mosquito net, mattress. a table, two chairs and a large looking glass. (2) Each labourer is to be givern rent-free 5 acres of land to grow food crops. (3) Employers are to allow each labourer to own and have free grazing for cows, 2 bullocks an.l a hack. (4) Wages of at least 12s per diem. (5) The work-day is to be of 6 (6) A five-dav week. (7) Repeal of that section of the Masters and Servants Ordinance which required a month's notice from the labourer if he wished to leave his job. (8) The employer is to obtain thb abrogation of the Ordinance which led to Manilal's removal.. (9) "The release of those innocent strikers who are rotting in Suva gaol". (10) The employers are to ensure punishment of those 'larrikins' who deceived the Suva strikers, aided employers, and "robbe(i the Indians and committed shameful deed on the persons of' many an Indian woman". (11) The labourers are to be giveui free medicine, and during illness all doctors' visits are to be at the employer's expense. 1821
hotirs.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY (12) Compensation and pension by emlployer to be provided in case of an accident which incapacitated a worker by loss of a limb. (13) Payment of half wages during illness whether hospitalised or not. (14) Hindi schools to be provided for the labourers' children with teachers paid by the employer. (15) The employers are to bring downi the prices of foodstuffs, clothing and other goods to the 1914 level. (16) The Company and the employers should not discriminate between Indians and Europeans travelling on railways, and there should be no, restriction on Indians wishing to transport their goods by train in any direction. Had all the demands been acceded to, Fiji would have become a labourer's paradise. The Company and the planters branded the strike as political, adding. that it was aimed at fomenting sedition.7" This was an over-simplification, but useful for its protagonists to deny that the labourers had any cause for dissatisfaction. It was still a dogma of faith among Europeans that the Indian was nowhere better treated than in Fiji; after all, the McNeill-Chimanlal Report had even pronounced the indenture system as possessing more benefits than drawbacks.72 The Europeans argued further that Indians wanted equality with whites; to this the Company was especially vehement in its opposition. The Company view was strengthened by the request of the labourers in the deputation of March 18 for chairs to sit on the verandah and discuss terms with CSR officials. The Government saw its intervention necessary and offeted a Commission to investigate the strikers' claims. It appointed the Chief Justice of Tonga as Chairman and Pillay, a South Indian merchant as the second member. Its third choice fell on Harricks, a planter, who, however, refused to serve, unless the strikers first went back to work. He was replaced by a Ba shop-keeper, H H Ragg. Neither was popular with Indians and
the latter, not even with the Company.73

October 22, 1977 ients, though not immediately in the public eye, the Company was culpable. Some even felt that the Company was deliberately permitting this course of events to eliminate European planters and so be able to purchase its cane from Indian growers at a lower price. in interviews and correspondence, the Government tried to counter the Company's arguments but the latter insisted that the strike was purely political and racial. Company officials felt it was of no significance that in Navua -the stronghbold of Basisth Muni - the Vancouver-Fiji Sugar Company had been able to avert a strike by increasing the daily wage to 3s and that consequently it was embarrassed by surplus labour. Nor did it matter that neither Suva nor Nausori bad joined with the cane-farners - in fact in both places Indian opinion was against any participation.77

thing if it had sat and had, in the way of all Commissions, laboriously sifted evidence and pronounced its aflegedly unbiased judgment. No party was anyway legally bound to accept its pronouncement. Throughout the strike the Governmeint found itself in an awkward position. There were the usual pressures from Europeans to adopt a 'firm line' with the strikers by deporting the leaders or restricting their movements.7' Where Government stood was best summed up by the Colonial Secretary, T E Fell, writing at the end of 1920 when strike action was imminent: It is, in these delicate times, imposisible and impolitic for us by public utterance or official documents to openly state what line we consider employers should take. To do so would be to raise a hornet's nest of labourers round the majority of white employers. Labourers would claim that the Government had declared on their side and would back them in any extravagant demands. The result would be chaotic...75 Nonetheless it did muster enougb courage to let the CSR Company know what it really thought of the strike. It sent to Edward Knox (the Company's head in Sydney, Australia) the deliberations of the Executive Council of March 4, 1921, wherein it stated categorically that (1) while the motives of some or all the strike leaders might be political or racial, the grievances, real or imaginary, of the majority of labourers were economic; (2) had the company been willing to discuss terms with labourers and their delegates in 1920, it was possible most of the strikers would have been less inclined to pay attention to political agitators; (3) by disregarding warnings the CSR showed a lack of judgment and, apart from the inconvenience and expenses to Fiji, the Company's attitude to labour had been unsympathetic; (4) failing early indication of the Company's willingness to reach a settlement, the Government would be forced to intervene if necessary in the interests of all sections of the comnmunity. Later in the Legislative Council, the Governor warned that they must not be too quick to brand the strike a political agitation.76 The Govemment also iginored Knox's demand to rescind the above minutes of the Executive Council because, Knox claimed, they were recorded without knowledge of all the facts. In Government's eyes there was tnOdoubt that the Company could have prevented the strike; in official docu-

Nothing

was done by the

The Company objected to the Commission sitting until the labourers had resumed work, and accused the Government of weakness. The Indians refused to give evidence and not even the deportation of Basisth Muni from Fiji made them budge. By April 1, the Government had withdrawn the Commission; its efforts had been in vain. But one wonders whether the Commnissionwould have achieved any-

Company to ensure that Labasa, which struck much later, would not align itself with Viti Levu; the Company Manager blamed it on the Government for not declaring this area out of bounds for 'agitators' from Viti Levu despite the attempts of officials there to coax Indians not to down tools. The strike dragged on. On April 9 the same men who had gone as a deputation to the CSR on March 18, accompanied by W C Thomas, a planter and Richard Piper, a Methodist imissionary, as interpreter, visited the agreement but it had been forced upon Governor. They admitted that the strike was a bad means oi reaching an them. Low wages, a high cost of living and the inability to buy enough food and clothing were emphasised. Housing accommodation in the lines was condemned as unsuitable for married people; there was no privacy, no arrangement for private bathing, conditions for women in child-birth were miserable. They couLldnot save to remit to dependants in India but if conditions improved they would not press for repatriation. The Governor requested that they resume work and they promised to discuss this when they returned home. But at a public meeting later most of the strikers voted against the resumption of work.76 The next move was made by CSR with its announcement of June 4, 1921, authorised as usual, by Edward Knox 'from Sydney. (This need to refer everything to Australia put the Comn pany officials in Fiji at a tactical dis1823

October 22, 1977 advantage.) Actually the company's attorney in Fiji was instructed by Knox to tell the labourers' deputation of March 18 that the matter had to be referred to Sydney and he could hold out no hope for a wage increase. He could have been authorised to make a more definite statement. without stating that the matter had to be refersmacked of delayred to Sydney -it ing tactics, infuriating and negative in value. With the Government's permission the Company called meetings to make simultaneous announcements on June 6, but unfortunately for it not many Indians attended. The tune was the same; no wage increase; separate housing for each family had not been finalised; steps would be taken to reduce the cost of living by importing and selling cheaply necessary articles; and the 6d per day bonus would in future be paid weekly.79 Unimpressed, the Indians stayed out. Not till the end of the second week in August was the strike finally over. The drift back to work, however, began in July. Labasa was the first to return to normal conditions, but elsewhere return to work was slower.80 Unlike the previous year the strike had been orderly and peaceful and this did not escape official comment.8" The aftermath of the conflict was It further not without bitterness. alienated the Indian and European communitie3 from each other. Indians were denounced as poor workers and ingrates and, there was a call for their wanted total repatriation. Some Chinese labourers to be brought in place of Indian labour because these would return home on the expiry of their contract and not wage war for political rights and equality with the Anglo-Saxon.82 The Fiji Times in its leader, however, did not despair of all Indians: The industrious Indian is welcome in Fiji. He is a good citizen, and a valuable asset, but the idle vagabond and the agitating parasite is as great a curse to Fiji as he is to any other land, and we want him blotted out.83 Others interpreted the strike as an attempted Indian takeover. This view was summed in a letter to the Fiji Times by a I P Bayly, later a member of the Legislative Council." To add to the gall the Company announced in February 1922 a reduction in wages because the sugar market had slumped."' Their resources exhausted after the previous year's dispute, the labourers were forced to
1824

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY swallow


working.86 LAND AND RURAL CONDITIONS

their

anger

and

continue

Froin statistics on Indian occupations earlier quoted from Census reports it has been estab-lished that by far the majority were engaged in agriculture. Given the additional factor of Indian population growth it was understandable that the need for land which was steady from the beginning should gain impetus after the abolition of the inFollowing the 1921 denture system. strike and gathering momentum in the 1960s as Indian society began to try to carve a permanent niche for itself in Fiji, Indians sought to augment their holdings with guaranteed security of tenure.87 Sir George O'Brien (1897-1901) seems to have been the first Governor to have taken a definite step to keep An Indian Indian labourers in Fiji. Settlement Fund was established with the surplus from the Return Passages' Fund in order to obtain land for settlement and to open up communications.88 During his governorship legislation was passed to enable settlers wanting small blocks of land under 5 acres to do so without surveys. This concession was abolished in 1910.89 Though government settlements continued to increase slowly and were continued even after the abolition of the indenture system, the number of allotments left vacant suggest that they were not as popular as native leases.90 It was native land to which Indians appeared more attracted, but here difficulties. By law no there were native land could be alienated in freehold; this legislation had been enacted in 1880 and except for a brief break (1905-1908) it had continued undisturBut it does not seem at this bed. stage that the Indians were enthusiastic about purchasing freehold.91 When from 1910 all leases had to be surveyed, the Executive Council decreed that in cases of leases of not more than 21 years, the expenses of issuing a lease must be borne by the lessees. For a ten-acre plot the survey in 1922 cost ?6.6.0. and the preliminary expenses amounted to ?10 or ?12 p a-- all a considierable drain on the savings of the average small settler.92 There were some officials who favoured restrictions on the acreage Indians might be permitted to lease, for sometimes large areas were taken, sub-let, and then

inefficient or reneging tenants ran into difficulties and were unable to fulfil their commitments to the original lessor. Further the Executive Council in 1910 advised that as a rule Indians should not be given more than 5 acres of agricultural land or 10 acres of grazing land for more than 10 years at a time except in special cases. There was some relaxation in 1916 when leases for 21 years with extensions of 10 years were permitted, and Government took over responsibility for leasing native land and assumed powers to extend leases or enforce recompensation for improvements unless the owner could show that the land he wished to resume was essential for his own needs.93 The CSR Company too showed some concern and offered a long-term loan of ? 100,000 to facilitate Indian settlement on the land, but after much discussion and correspondence it was decided not to take positive action until a regular supply of Indian labour could be guaranteed; and as this became impossible after the end of the indenture system the scheme was never implemented.94 To facilitate Indians the Government in 1921 abolished the sale of leases by auction.95 Thereaftel the only significant piece of legislation, until the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1940, was passed in 1932 when extension of another 9 years could be Govgranted to a lease of 21 years.996 ernment was committed to its policv of the paramountcy of Fijian interests and therefore every Indian demand bad to be weighed within the context of this requirement before it could be satisfied. Increased Indian demand for land was a consequence of several forces. First, the Indians, especially after the grant of political franchise and an increase in the number of local born, were beginning to accept Fiji as their permanent home where they must prosper or languish in poverty. Second, with the increase in population came a need for resources to satisfy ordinary wants and as most of the Indian population was agricultural, pressure on land was greatest. Third, the introduction of the peasant farmer system in the sugar industry and allied to it the disappearance of the European planters, the concentration of the CSR Company on the manufacture of sugar rather than the growing of cane, the increase in number of cane contracts available for cultivators -all these increased Indian

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY desire for land.9" The difficulty in satisfying this desire was not merely a result of Government policy; it sprang from persistent Fijian reluctance to part with the land, even to hand it over temporarily to Government control for leasing, and in the 1930s, from Fijians' growing awareness that they needed it for their own economic development.93 Furthermore some Fijian owners demanded gifts and other inducements from intending lessees before they would agree to relinquish their land, or permit an extension of a lease.99 These difficulties notwithstanding Fijians showed considerable trust when in 1936 at their Council of Chiefs meeting they gave their lands to Government to demarcate into reserves for their sole utilisation and the surplus to be available for leasing. Though Indians faced obstacles the land they leased changed hands frequently judging by the number of transfers of leases held by them.'00 This might indicate that there were many who found themselves not very successful at agriculture. But it also implies that some transferred their lease in order to obtain a larger or of land elsewhere. better piece Throughout, however, Indian land holdings increased in acreage. Indian agriculturists showed diversification as well: not only was there an increase in the number of Indian cane growers, area of cane grown and production; there was also the cultivation of othei crops like rice, bananas and cotton besides fruit and vegetable for their own consumption as well as for sale.'" Though generally Indians sought land close to the sugar mills and the coastal areas and their settlements grew in these regions, they did not form nucleated villages of the type in their homeland. Proximity to the nuill was essential to reduce transportation costs and closeness to settled areas, especially of non-agricultural workers, meant a market for their vegetables, home-made ghee (if they had a cow), even Indian sweets. Indians on their own leases, unlike on the Government settlements where the village pattern was adopted, kept their disstance from one another; there was social contact and some co-operation but no permanent ties or loyalties, except through marriage. Sometimes quarrels, not conflict resulted, and necessarily with a violent finale, continued beyond one generation. tSometimes friendships cut across linguistic or religious barriers and proved equally lasting. The intense individualism bred under indenture conditions, which also undermined traditional and regional loyalties of the homeland, also militated against the growth of villages. Instead loyalty to one's family, the need to protect one's women, (again a consequence of indenture conditions) prevailed. In addition there was the need for family cooperation and self-help; the smallholders could not afford hired labourers and every member of the family was required to work the larnd to ensure not profit but sheer survival. The farmer depended on the bounty of the seasons and world markets, and in Fiji, satisfying the demands of the exacting CSR Company - all beyond his own control but all liable to fluctuate.'02 Under these circumstances, the extended family proved beneficial in the rural areas. But while this provided help, the extended family also meant greater pressure on the land with increased demands for larger farms and failing this, under-employment. To the officials, the Indian community epitomised prosperity and success.'03 Whereas it would be incorrect to deny that Indians prospered in Fiji it would be equally false to characterise Indian society as opulent. Paupers were few, and their impoverishment, if not brought about by infirmity or physical disability, was frequently of their own making. There was no lack of opportunity, what has been already said despite about land problems. Employment in some form was always available; remuneration might not be what was desired or expected, but there was enough to eke out an existence. Starvation and famine were non-existent; the climate was healthy; floods and hurricanes were rare and when they occurred their effects were localised; pestilence was unknown (barring the 1919 influenza epidemic).'04 Under these favourable conditions a section of the Indian community did accummulate wealth and property and a class of nouveau riche emerged. In the absence of statistics it is impossible to say what portion of their community fell into this category; but conversations with individuals who remembered conditions in their period suggest that about 10 per cent of the Indians who had come as indentured labourers or were descended from thenm became land-

October 22, 1977 lords, money-lenders or shop-keepers; most of the remainder made a living and achieved some savings; and the rest survived because they were p epared to work hard and live within their means. Two related problems affected the material prospects of the farmers. One was indebtedness; the other concerned dealings with fellow Indian shopkeepers. There was the practice of cultivators depositing money with shopkeepers, who offered interest (as much as 10 per cent) but provided no security.105 When the shopkeeper ran into difficulty and insolvency, the depositor had no redress and lost everything. An example was the bankr-uptcy in 1929 of a Tamil shopkeeper who had ? 3,000 in his care; Morris Hedstrom and Company took all that was owing to them and the rest was taken by another merchant, a fellow South Indian. Later the two South Indians went into partnership with another South, Indian previously operating separately. The three then established a combined business but to protect their own interests one of the clauses of agreement read: "The firm shall not be liable to pay any. debt of any partner for money held on deposit or borrowed unless his account with the firm is sufficiently in credit to pay the same'06 Those who had deposited their money when these three had separate businesses, knew nothing of the amalgamation. Oftentimes shopkeepers were not as prosperous as they appeared and merely survived on extended and indefinite credit, or by continually borrowing from different sources to keep other creditors at bay.'07 Sometimes the farmers themselves contributed to the precarious financial state of their storekeepers by purchasing goods on credit and paying for them slowly over a long period of time so that the merchant always had large sums owing to him and the trickle of repayments provided him and his family with only a livelihoodd, and little or no capital to re-invest in his business. The crisis was acute and needed urgent remedy, and despite the plea of the Secretary of Indian Affairs in 1929 none was forthcoming: It is no use objecting that it is not our business to save fools from their folly, because in this case wehave to deal with a section of the population which is improving in material prosperity out of proportion to its improvement in education, and modern legislation tends everywhere to protect persons of 1825

October

22, 1977

ECONOMIC

AND POLITICAL WEEKLY

this class against the unscrupulous who have every temptation to prey on them.108 That there were numerous Indian farmers in debt was admitted by the Government but with the proviso that there were "particular cases which [did] not justify the general assumption that all Indian agriculturists [were] in the sanre plight". The official argument was that though there Were many causes of indebtedness, what most called for sympathy was a situation where a person found himself in this plight by entering into "an inequitable contract for the purchase of his landholding". And the commonest cause of general indebtedness was given as "undoubtedly the improvidence of the average Indian farmer, who, in order to obtain prestige at the birth of his child or marriage of his daughter, will incur a debt which may be far beyond his normal means 9 Admittedly there was to repay".1' some truth in this assertion but it was not the whole explanation. Births and marriages in every culture are occasions of joy, celebration and expenditure. What needs answering is why the amount spent by the Indian farmer was beyond his means. Agriculture itself was a precarious means of livelihood for a small farmer with a short-term lease and high rents. Secondly there was dissatisfaction with the CSR Company, both for wages received by its Indian labourers and the price obtained by contractors for their cane. The Company after 1926 had a monopoly and, could dictate terms. Thirdly the farmers had to borrow to make ends meet. Here the money-lender - usually the thrivshopkeeper or the landlord ed 110 Dissatisfaction with the Company's wages and cane prices was expressed by cane farmers in their meeting with its General Manager, Sir Philip Goldfinch in 1937. Indians felt that the Company was making substantial were profits while they themselves receiving insufficient returns for their efforts. Frustration in their dealings with both the Company and the money-lenders inspired the farmers to form their own associations. Indian shortplanters' associations, though lived, appeared in 1934, but the first farmers' union was the Kisan Sangh (1937) which however was hampered by divisions in the Indian community and the refusal of the company to grant it recognition for purposes of
1826

negotiation. I I Relations between far- btedness in all the districts was due mers and the Company continued to to Indians exploiting Indians. Governdeteriorate and reached their nadir - in ment seemed unable to provide 1943 when a mutually destructive remedy, and official thinking was divided on such solutions as co-opestrike resulted. The rapacity of money-lenders has rative banks or legislation to limit the known no end and the farmers to this percentage of crops that could be day have been plagued by indebted- signed over in liens. The CSR Comness."12 High rates of interest were pany after careful investigation gave the crux of the problem. The District loans to its tenants if their need was Commissioner of Ba stated in Decem- genuine; beyond this nothing assuaged ber 1927 that money was easily avail- the cultivators' plight. able for 15 per cent interest."" In EDUCAnON Nadi cultivators had no money to and pay for surveys stock, implements Land was essential for material even living expenses. The soluztion prosperity but that was not all that lay in a visit to the money-lender who Indians were seeking. Their experience charged exorbitant interest and some- of the rigours of girmit and their diffitimes took a whole year's crops in culties afterwards determined them repayment leaving the debtor con- to establish themselves on firmer tinually in debt - either the farmer foundations. Though they retained kept renewing his lien or ultimately their culture and religion, with quit the land in despair. Sometimes modifications to suit the new environin obtaining land a cultivator was ment, they recognised early that sucfleeced from ?20 to ?60 per acre for cess depended on their being able to 'goodwill' alone before he acquired emulate Europeans. Indians felt that the lease. In Nadi shop-keepers en- by becoming like Europeans and by couraged clients to run into heavy acquiring their values, they would debts by freely supplying-goods at guarantee that their children would not high prices. On the one hand the have to undergo a second girmit. The cultivator tended to be ignorant, means to this end was the possession though at the same time desirous of of Western education. becoming a landholder at any price Very early in their stay in Fiji they to improve his social standing. On the value of education. other hand, the storekeeper and recognised the Indian hunger for education was as money-lenders were calculating enough of to gain the confidence of others by strong as their quest for security tenure of land. To onlookers this various 'charitable' and 'religious' acts from the and by posing as social 'leaders'. insatiable desire was evident forth some Those who became money-lenders beginning; it also brought Indians in Fiji, brought were usually shopkeepers, govern- concern that policemen, cultivators there to work as agricultural labourers, ment clerks, towards becoming and landlords. Money-lenders who were aspiring baboos; others were more favourable were also landlords aind shopkeepers were thus 'trebly' sure of their towards this thirst for education. The first school for Indians was victims. Daily loans of ?1 or ?2 per week carried 5s or more as interest. started by Badri Maharaj, later to be The District Commissioner of Nadi the first nominated Indian member in reported a case where a landlord- the Legislative Council, in 1899 at shopkeeper borrowed at 5 per cent Wairuku. Badri Maharaj had come as from the CSR Company and re-lent an indentured labourer but by hard the money at 20 to 25 per cent inter- work had been able to improve himest. In 1939, in Macuata in Vanua self and rise to the status of indepenLevu, there was a report of an ex- dent farmer. He was a self-made man treme case where a planter who had who discovered early that Indians had borrowed ?100 and had repaid ?230 to take their own initiative rather than was still owing the money-lender al- rely on others if they wished to better most ?300."14 In Ba, the CSR Com- the quality of life for their descenpany charged 5 per cent interest while dants. His being barely literate himMorris Hedstrom and Company ad- self must have made him aware of his vanced goods on the security of own shortcoming and encouraged him crops at 10 per cent-115 Other Euro- to save the next generation from a pean and Indian money-lenders charg- similar fate. Gov&rnment contribution to Indian ed as much as 25 per cent interest on ?100 loans. Genexally, however, madc- education was, by its own admission,

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY poor. There was no attempt to disguise this before the Education Commission of 1909, and in 1912 an Ordinance was passed requiring the employers of indentured labourers to provide school buildings. Another Ordinance, in 1916, provided for Government assistance to schools which fulfilled certain standards; the following year an amendment extended this scheme to vernacular schools which gave instruction in a dialect approved by the Board of Education. By December 1919 there was only one Government school for Indians and 17 assisted schools of which six gave their instructions in the vernacular and taught 189 of the 997 Indian children in the various schools in the Colony. In 1921 the Government spent ? 350 on sending four Indians to India for agricultural training. At the end of indenture, besides finance, there were other problems. Indians were moving to the hinterland and encountering difficulties in finding centres for properly equipped and staffed schools; in fact the sparse distribution of population meant that there were sometimes not enough children in an area to operate a school. Sectarianism, particularly from the diversity of Indian languages and religion worked against unity in centres large enough for one school only. A shortage of qualified and trained teachers was another obstacle; and in later years the shortage grew worse when government was reluctant to obtain teachers from India because it considered their behaviour seditious. Towards the end of 1929 the Governor admitted that in the field of Indian education, "the progress since 1909 has been very meagre". The Director of Education added: "No one can help noticing the eagerness, amounting to a kind of hunger, for education among the Indians of Fiji". And with the entry of the first elected Indian members in the Legislative Council in 1929 Government was almost annually harangued on its neglect of education for Indians. Moreover the existence of racially separate schools for Europeans, better equipped and better financed, was found to be not in consonance with the equal rights of Indians as British subjects. A hindrance to Indian education had beeit European attitudes in much the same manner they had cavilled at the grant of political rights to this community. Remarks made to the Education commissions in

October 22, 1977 political status of the migrants. It was nevertheless "the intention of the British Government... that the Indians who went to the colonies should be allowed to settle permanently and should be treated as full citizens."116 Earlier in 1910, the Sanderson Committee had stated about Fiji: The present administration itself recognises the value of the Indians as permanent settlers, and is willing to concede to them the enjoyment of equal rights. The whole tenor of the correspondence between India and the Colony shows that it was on this condition that indentured emigration to Fiji has been allowed in the past, and any measures directed towards lowering the political status of the emigrants or reducing their economic freedom would in our opinion involve a breach of faith with those affectYet in 1905, when the first elections for the Fiji Legislative Council were by then numbering held, Indans 22,790, of whom 9,776 were still serving their indenture - did not have the right to vote.1"' The franchise, based on property and income qualifications, was confined to Europeans, who totalled 2,440 they had six the Legislative representatives in Council. The indigenous Fijians who numbered 92,000 had two representatives nominated by the Governor on the recommendation of the Council of Chiefs. The refusal to grant franchise to the Indians was explained thus by the Governor: I do not think it necessary to provide representation for the Indian... element, which has shown itself corruption at the very open to municipal elections, and whose interests I would safeguard by appointing the Agent-General an official Member of Council.119 The Governor did not elaborate and an examination of official records of the time has failed to provide evidence of the corruption attributed to Indians. Apparently the Governor had to local European prey fallen aftershortly which prejudice wards began a campaign to remove non-European voters from the municipal electoral rolls in Suva. In 1910, it was claimed that out of 305 coloureds on the Suva municipal roll 95 were Indians, and that over 85 per cent of these "coloured people [could] neither read, write nor understand English", and that these knew very little about votinig and were "certainly easy to influence and... open to corruption."'20Indians in Suva were alarmed by European intentions and a petition was drafted and sent 1827
.117 ed

indicate that there was a fear that Western education would spoil Fiji Indians and make them similar to the nationalist politicians in India. This was linked with the notion that the Indian ought to remain on the land rather than compete with the Europeans. Such prejudice meant that Eu.o-, pean members in the Council and the press kept close scrutiny on every item of Government expenditure on For the Indians, Indian education. towards contribution Government their education failed to keep up with relative neglect was demand. The illustrated by Census figures which showed Indian illiteracy rates to be the worst in the Colony. Had the Christian missionaries not made a substantial contribution (though aided immensely by financial grants from the Government) and had Indians themselves not been prepared to undergo many sacrifices for the education of their children the situation would have been considerably worse. Despite their keenness for education Indian parents, particularfy in rural areas, not infrequently forced their sons to miss classes so that they could assist in the cultivation or harvesting of crops. Also there was all through the thirties and for some time beyond reluctance to send girls to school. Fear, ignorance and early marriages were responsible for such a state of affairs. However, Government's willingness to help in the education of girls, missionary promptings and the determination of the girls themselves contributed to the slow erosion of the barriers of prejudice. Though Indians remained dissatisfied with Government policy on education, by the end of the thirties, the Government was becoming more aware of its obligations. Besides contributions to primary schools and the training college -in Fiji and admittance to the medical school, Government even provided aid to a very small number studying abroad. But it seemed that Government was still wary of too much education for Indians, reflected by its strong but unsuccessful opposition to the Marist Brothers when in 1937 they opened up a multi-racial high school of which, it was obvious, the greatest beneficiaries would be Indians.

1909 and 1926

STATUS POLIIICAL When Indians left to work as indentured labourers there was no clharter drawn between India and the recipient colonies on the subject of

October 22, 1977 on their behalf deprecating such moves and demanding "the right to elect two English gentlemen to represent [them] in the [Legislative] Council."121 While the Indian request bore no fruit, consistent European pressure by 1915 was able to introduce a stringent literacy test in English as a prerequisite for municipal franchise. Despite protests from Indians in Fiji as well as the Government of Inidia, the colonial regime surrendered to European demands which resulted in the number of Indian voters on the Suva Municipal rolls being reduced to 14 in 1915.122 The Indians too reacted to these European attitudes. The arrival of the lawyer, Manilal in 1912 and his efforts thereafter to seek redress for Indian grievances led to Indians in Fiji becoming vocal on the issue of political rights. In 1915 a number of Indians petitioned the Governor to nominate Manilal as their representative in the Legislative Council.'23 The Governor responded that Indian interests were adequately catered for but he was prepared to grant the request provided an Indian with the necessary qualifications could be found and the Government of India supported the demand. The Government of India was of the view that Indians in Fiji were "under a political disability to which they are not subject in any other colonies which recruit Indian labour".124On the basis of India's recommendation the Governor of Fiji nominated an Indian, Badri Maharaj, in 1916 to represent Legisiahis community in the tive Council. Neither the form of representation nor the man chosen proved popular with the Indians. Instead of Badri Maharaj, a former indentured labourer turned farmer, and a successful one at that, Indians preeligiferred Manilal, who was not ble as he was born in Baroda and was therefore not a British subject. The matter did not end there. By 1916 it was becoming obvious that Fiji would not be able to receive for long a continuous supply of cheap labour from India. It was felt in some quarters that one of the points against Fiji was its failure to give Indians there suitable political representation. C W Doorly, who had been the Emigration Agent in India of the Fiji Government told the Colonial Office that "my knowledge of the opinions held by --leaders of native public opinion in India has forced me to the 1828

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY definite conclusion that no scheme for the future emigration of Indians to Fiji will be accepted unless it assuires to all Indians in the Colony full political rights".1'25 As a result London sent the following telegram to Fiji Doorly holds oninion that unless Indians have political rights, any scheme of Indian emigration will be unacceptable. He suggests that Indian community should elect two or more representatives to Legislative Council. I am impressed by advice ss to effect on Indian oninion of franchise in British Guiana. I would agree to two members being elected by Indians if you should so recommend. In order to safeguard official maiority add another two representatives. Separate Indian electorate with fairly wide franchise would seem desirable. Please consider whether an offer of this kind could be made to Indian Government and report by telegram.'26 The reply from Fiji was favourable. rndian labour was considered indispensible for the maintenance of the colony's economic lifeline, its sugar industry. On January 9, 1920 the Fiji Executive Council authorised the Governor to announce publicly that the franchise for Indians would come into effect at a later date on the basis of two Indian members to be elected by their own race. Though the industrial dispute of January 20, 1920 and its afterma aroused considerable anxiety in official minds, the Governor appointed on August 25 a Commission to make recommendations after public discussion. Its report was tabled in April 1921 when Fiji was in the grip of another strike which caused further disenchantment of the Government and European settlers with the Indians. At this stage, Fiji's recommendation based on the Commission's report two Indians elected on a communal franchise - was forwarded to India for comment. India opposed communal franchise and pressed for a common franchise of one man, one vote. Within Fiji this was resisted. The Government felt this would undermine the principle of paramountcy of Fijian ;nterests; while Fijians feared that it would lead to Indian domination. Thus the debate between Fiji, the Colonial Office and India became a protracted affair. Fiji stood firm on its principles and India continued to argue that a communal franchise was a denial of equlal status for Indians with others in Fiji. Though unwilling to concede on common franchise, Fiji was prepared to pass legislation guaranteeing equal status for Indians in Fiji; in fact an ordinance was drafted but then pressure from India on the subject subsided and the bill was not brought before the Legislative Council. Besides, the franchise for Indians outside India became an imperial question. Suffice it to say here that beyond causing delay nothing of substance was achieved. Given the nature of the British empire with its bias towards the interests of the white dominionis and its proclamation of the paramountcy of native interests, consideration of the grievances of Indians and their redress occupied a subordinate place. After much correspondence between Fiji, London and India, Indians in Fiji went to the polls for the first time in 1929 to elect three representatives to the Legislative Council on a communal franchise, limited further by property and income qualifications. If the colonial regime had anticipated peace from Indians after their enfranchisement it was extremely disappointed. Once in the Council they began by asking numerous and detailed questions on a plethora of subjects affecting their community. The Government responded with patience. Then on November 5, Vishnu Deo, Indian member for the Southern constituency moved : (a) that political rights and status granted to Indian settlers on racial lines are not acceptable to them, and (b) that Indians in Fiji should be granted Common Franchise along with other British subjects resident in the Colony. In support Vishnu Deo contended that communal franchise segregated the races and was a denial of the equality promised by the Government. His opponents argued that a common franchise would lead in the end to the domination by Indians who were the fastest increasing component in the population. If this were permitted, it was contended, then it would be a breach of the undertaking given to the Fijian people through the Deed of Cession. The combination of Fijian, European and official votes defeated the Indian motion. Vishnu Deo and his two colleagues, Parmanand Singh and James Rao Ramchandar, resigned. The Indian seats remained vacant till 1932 when two of them were filled by the election of K B Singh and M Mudaliar; there were no contenders for the third which remained vacant. K B Singh once more introduced thepcontentious motion of common roll; it was again defeated; and he

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY resigned and was re-elected in a byelection in 1933. Meanwhile the Government, concerned about its relations with the Indian community, sought, apart from grantirqg them the franchise, to involve them in local affairs. There was, at the time, a general inactivity in local government and in the two municipalities, Suva and Levuka, which had councils, educational qualifications and the racial pattern of voting pr-evented the election of an Indian. Despite considerable pressure from Indians to amend the municipal ordinance to enable better Indian representation in the municipalities the governiment held firm. In 1930, it tried to placate Indian opinion by appointing Indians to .the various Provincial Road Boards, which already had officials and European settlers, and whose function was purely* advisory. Two difficulties were apparent. First in certain areas, Europeans objected; in Lomaiviti they had no wish to welcome James Rao Ramchandar, former MLC; in Ba, there was outright rejection of the idea of an Indian sitting on the Board. Elsewhere the response was favourable, as in Lautoka, which was willing to acaccept S B Patel, a lawyer. Secoind, the search for able men possessing a sufficient knowledge of English exposed the paucity of such leaders in the Indian community, particularly in the rural districts. Usually there was no other alternative in a -province but the one selected by the Governor. If these appointments were meant to placate -the Indians politically , they proved unsuccessful. Besides the jurisdictioin of these boards was limited and did not traverse those spheres wherein Indians sought redress. To improve communication between the Government and the Indian community, the former also established the first of Advisory Committees; these was appointed in 1932 in the Rewa district. Originally Government had thoughts of reviving panchayats which could settle their differences quickly and peacefully without repercussions on the social and political life of the colony; but the concept was found impracticable and abandoned. When selections were being considered to the Advisory Committees which were preferred to panchayats, it decided that instead of the headmen of various settlements representatives of different classes and interests should be chosen. In Rewa the choice was made after consultation between the Secretary for Indian Affairs and the District Commissioner. The six men chosen were: Rambissessar, an Arya Samaji rice miller; Gulam Nabi, a Muslim tailor; Thakur, a Christian rice miller; Ramsamujh Maharaj, a Sanatani shopkeeper; Ram Singh, an Arya Samaji planter and Battan Singh, a Sikh shopkeeper. All these men were from the proprietor class, all owning land as well. They comprised a minowere rity in their community and among those who had prospered significantly by their abode in Fiji. They were expected to explain government advise measures to the people and the District Commissioners on Indian matters. Their capacity was solely advisory, no resolutions were passed or votes cast at their meetings and the minute book was to record general not individual opinions. What the various committees discussed were somewhat similar, if the proceedings at Rewa and Nadroga during the period 1932 to 1939 are taken as typical. In Nadroga, the discussions centred on hurricanes, food relief, burials and cemeteries, water supply to Koronumu cemetery, rents of leases, ieSimilar gistration of Indian births. topics were considered in Rewa as well as repatriation, immigration, land disputes, and destitute Indians. The majority of Indians were l ot diverted by such concessions from what they considered the panacea for

October 22, 1977 but was dissuaded from this course by the Colonial Office acting on the advice of the Government of India. There were also a number of rnnMuslim Indians who did not favour common roll. Space does not premit a dis-cussion of the debate that accompanied efforts to replace elected members with nominated members. The Governor justified his intention to the Secretary of State on the grounds of wanting to preserve the principle of paramountcy of Fijian interests. While the Secretary of State did not dispute this doctrine, he did not entirely agree with Fletcher and, instead, suggested a compromise. The official majority in Council was retained while the three major races were to receive equal representation. For the Fijians their five members were still to be selected by the Governor from a panel of names chosen and submitted by the Council of Chiefs. The Indians and Europeans each had five members, three elected on a communal franchise and two nominated by the Governor. One of the Indian nominated members through practice thereafter was a Muslim. The constitutional settlement of 1937 was far from what the Indians desired but it endured till 1963.

Notes

68 R C Sharma, "Fiji. Digdarshan" Mandawar, United -Province, India, 1937, p 37. 69 A great deal of the material used francommon their political ills in this section is derived from official sources marked 'confidenchise. They continued to agitate for tial'; hence specific references it and when they found their two cannot be given for all that is representatives in the Legislative stated. Council insufficiently vocal on their 70 The demands were submitted by NkB Mitter of Nadi who had behalf they, clamoured for it at meetformed the Fiji Indian Labour ings and gatherings outside. UnabatFederation in October 1920. The ing Indian demands for common roll following scale of per diem wages triggered a reaction in the other comwas requested: ordinary male labourer 5s, women 3s, sirdar munities and certain European lead8/6, engine driver 10s, skilled the ers pressed for a reversion to workman 8s to 10s. nomination system. Fijian leaders, no 71 CSO, 3953/1921; Fiji Times Febless frightened about the future of ruary 26, 1921. in case of the ar- 72 Report to the Government of India their own people on the Conditions of Indian Imrival of common franchise, became migrants in Four British colonies similarly insistent. And they found in and Surinam, by James McNeill, Sir Murchison Fletcher a Governor ICS and Chinian Lal Cmnd 7744-5. fully willing to oblige them. These 73 CSO, 1781/1921. forces were joined by members of the 74 Fiji Times, June 18, 1921. Muslim community who did not thinlk 75 Fell to Green (Private), December 30, 1920; CO, 83/153. they had a chance of getting one of 76 Fiji Legislative Council Debates, their own people chosen through the 1921, p 3. fact 77 CSO, 1362/1921, 1534/1921. elective- process. Muslims in sought separate representation from 78 R Piper to Governor, May 20, other Indians. The colonial regime 79 1921, MMC. Fiji Times, June 8, 1921. in Fiji was willing to oblige them 80 CSO, 3246/1921, 452/1921. 1829

October 22, 1977 81 Fiji Legislative Council Debates, 1921, p 111. 82 Fiji Times, March 7, 15; April 4, 5, 21; November 21; (1921) Fiji Legislative Council Debates, 1921, pp 125-134. 83 Fiji Tinmes July 1, 1921. 84 Fiji Timies March 28, 1921. 85 CSO, 885/1922. 86 Cessation of work was expected. It was reported, however, that out of the normialslack season complement of 550 labourers at the USH mills 365 were currently employed; of the 4,000 fleldworkers,1,653 were at work. This was the result of a continuing shortage from the events of the previous year and not of any new strike. Rodwell to Colonial Office 111, April 28, 1922. 87 As early as 1885 an official minuted: "No coolies should be allowed to squat on land that does not belong to them." And the Commissioner of Lands (April 23, 1885) wrote in the same file that he had been informed that a number of Indians had squatted on land in Navua and built several houses there; he too was of the opinion that they ought not to do this on
either government

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Sangh" (in Hindi), Bombay, 1962. when the account runs to six 103 CP, 33/1930; CSO, 717/1930. months or over. The result is a 104 In December 1929 and early 1931 wvrit for debt, then judgment, and Fiji experienced severe hurricanes then the attaching of his cane and floods. There was loss of proceeds. The Court and Counsel property and life (fewer than 100 costs soon reduce any cane profits lives lost in 1929 and fewer than that may be made." 200 in 1931). Grave as these 111 Interview (in 1970) with the late disasters were, these were insigniPundit Ayodhya Prasad, founder ficant compared to the loss of life and subsequently Secretary of the in similar circumstances in India Kisan Sangh. of the time. 112 Rural Credit Surveys,, 1961 and 1967 (unpublished) Department of 105 CSO, 1098/1926. Co-operatives, Fiji; R M Frazer, 106 CSO, 4504/1929, 4804/1929. Ap'A Fiji-Indian Rural Community', parently one individual had dePacific Viewpoint Monograph No posited as much as ? 744 with this 3, Wellington, 1968. merchant. 107 The District Commissioner, Lau- 113 CSO, 1098/1926. Subequent details in this paragraph relating to toka, reported in 1922 that if the other districts are from reports in businesses of 90 per cent of the the same file. Indian shopkeepers were wound up they would be insolvent (CSO, 114 CSOF, 18/2 Pt 2. 115 CSO, 1098/1926. 1162/1923). 116 Gillion, op cit, p 27. 108 CSO, 4804/1929. 117 Cmnd 5192, p 87. 109 CP, 39/1938. 118 On this subject see Ahmed Ali, 110 Thne Acting Secretarv for Indian 'Fiji: the Arrival of Communal Affairs, J Judd minuted on SepFranchise', Journal of Pacific Stutember 18, 1935: "The Indian dies Volume I, 1975, pp 20-46. farmer has a penchant for living 119 Governor to Colonial Office, 39; under a burden of debt. This is April 24, 1903, FRG, 1905, p 107. seized upon by money-lenders and 120 Fiji Legislative Council Debates storekeepers, many of whom are 1910 p 32. far from scrupulous in their system 121 CSO, 4608/1910. of accounting." Another official 122 CSO, 10819/1915. reporting from the cane region for 123 CSO, 4365/1915, 5884/1915. the half year ending June 30, 1935 124 India Office to Colonial Office, commented: "A. good deal of March 30, 1916. harm is the credit system. The 125 Doorly to Green, Private NovemIndian and Chinese storekeepers ber 11, 1919, Colonial Office 83/ are only too happy to give credit 149. and the average Indian does not 126 Colonial Office to Rodwell, Novkeep a close check on the prices ember 21, 1919, Colonial Office, and items he receives, especially 83/149.

88 89 .90 91
92

without proper authority (CSO, 1144/1885). The Government, aware of their difficulties and needs, began (in 1887) to establish Indian settlements when it granted 37 one-acre leases near- Suva on land specifically -surveyed for the purpose; by 1888 there were 53 such blocks (CP, 29/1888, 17/ 1889; CSO, 269/1887, 392/1887). Gillion, op cit, p 140. CP, 31/1912. CP, 31/1921, 28/1914, 58/1918, 43/1924. R G Ward "Land Use and Population in Fiji: A Geographical Study", London, 1965, p 117.
Raju Report, op cit.

or native

land

93 CP, 13/1959. 94 CP, 7/1916, 21/1916; CSO, 820! 1920. 95 CP, 26/1921. 96 C K Meek, "Land Law and Custom in the Colonies", London, 1949, p 203ff; R C Sharma: op cit, p 32. 97 For these changes see, A G Lowndes, 'The Sugar Industry of Fiji' in "South Pacific Enterprise: The Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited", Sydney, 1956; J C Potts: 'An Outline of the Successful Development of Small Farm System in the Fiji Sugar Industry', Transactions of the Fiji Society, Volume 9, 1968, pp 26-38. 98 CSO, 4041/1899, 1527/1905, 10921/1915, 5071/1916, 5300/ 1929; also, Proceedings of the Council of Chiefs, 1876 onwards. 99 CSO, 5098/1915; Pacific Age January 4, 1923, has an interesting editorial on the difficulties of the 100 Reports of the Department of Lands, 1920-1930. 101 Stockcale Report (1937). 102 For a discussion of Indians' views on the CSR Company, see A Prasad, "Th}e Story of the Fiji Kisan
1830 small-holder'.

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