Delta Force K Lab Alex Rosengarten

Federalism CP 1/5

Federalism CP
Federalism CP.....................................................................................................................1 NC burden counter interpretation.......................................................................................5 ........................................................................................................................................5 Note on the framework: I think that the ought as desirability framework should be replaced with a constitutionality standard that has a killer terminal impactthen the impact in the net benefit would link. The other option would be to keep the current framework and find evidence that says allowing states to define their own juvenial criminal laws makes punishments more effective. So far, Ive only found an article that says the opposite, and states why we need to have federal standards. Now that I mention it, that could make a good recidivism AC

Delta Force K Lab Alex Rosengarten

Federalism CP 2/5

NC Shell
I negate, resolved: In the United States, juveniles charged with violent felonies ought to be treated as adults in the criminal justice system The Oxford English dictionary states that ought is used to indicate a desirable state [desirability], Thus the value must be desirable criminal justice systems, because that is the most sensible resolutional end. Prefer this definition over obligation definitions of ought because criminal justice systems already assumes a framework of obligation to citizens, rendering such a value redundant. Instead, criminal justice systems should aim to be the most beneficiary. Furthermore, this approach removes all limits to improvements on criminal justice systems; it can become more and more desirable whereas obligation approaches exist only as a binary; by that I mean, they have either met their obligations, or they havent. This creates the best options for weighing impacts in the round, proving why this framework is better. Observation 1: in the status quo, different states have different criminal legal standards for juvenile prosecution and procedures. Fagan explains:
JEFFREY FAGAN. January/April 1996. The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile Versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism among Adolescent Felony Offenders Law & Policy, pp 79
A comparison of the severity and effectiveness of juvenile and criminal court sanctions directly bears on the jurisdictional debate in several ways. First, there has been rapid change in statutes that determine the judicial forum lo adjudicate felony crimes by adolescents. Since 1978, nearly every state has passed laws to

restrict the jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Feld 1987, 1993; Szymanski l987a, l987b; Wilson 1994). Some states have lowered the age of jurisdiction for criminal court, either for all offenders or for selected offense categories. Other states have expanded the basis for transfer of cases from juvenile to criminal jurisdictions, [and] either by expanding the criteria for transfer or shifting the burden of proof from the slate to the defendant. Still Others have established concurrent jurisdiction for selected offenses or offenders, giving
prosecutors broad discretion in electing a judicial forum for the adjudication and sanctioning of adolescent crimes. However, there has been little systematic research to determine if the sanctions in criminal
court are in fact harsher and more consistent, and if punishment as an adult results in less recdivis'1. The resolution of these questions bears on policy and legislation on the age threshold, offense or offender eligibility criteria for criminal court, and continuing efforts to redefine the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

Observation 2: The text of the resolutions necessitates a federal mandate In the united states indicates the legal scope of the topic. The only legislative body with the jurisdictional authority to pass the resolutional action is the federal government. Also, the resolution specifies the criminal justice system instead of a criminal justice system. The definite article precludes the possibility for state actors to be the affirmative agent, meaning the affirmative must defend federal criminal law. There can be only one agent and that agent is the federal government. Thus, if the negative proves that federalism is inherently harmful and that there is a better alternative, its sufficient to reject the resolutional action and negate. These impacts must be evaluated before evaluating the harms or advantages of a unitary criminal justice system, because it critiques the assumption that the affirmative case depends upon, that being the mechanism for legislation. The burden for the negative is therefore to prove that federalism is inherently undesirable and that state discretion of criminal law is better.

Delta Force K Lab Alex Rosengarten

Federalism CP 3/5

Contention 1: If states are allowed to choose for themselves, and the affirmative advantages are as legislatively attractive as [he or she] says they are, then state would adopt a unitary criminal justice system on their own. Broad legal change in juvenile criminal law has happened before, as Bishop explains, therefore it can happen again.
Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System. Donna M. Bishop. Crime and Justice, Vol. 27 (2000), pp. 81167. The University of Chicago Press. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1147663 Accessed: 26/07/2010 04:18

. Between 1992 and 1997, legislatures in fortyfour states and the District of Columbia enacted provisions to facilitate the removal of young offenders to criminal court (Torbet et al. 1996; Torbet and Szymanski 1998). To make transfer more expedient, they established offense- based, categorical, and absolute alternatives to individualized, offender-oriented waiver proceedings in the juvenile court (Feld 1987; Dawson, forthcoming). Besides streamlining the transfer process, most states expanded the list of cases eligible for transfer by making modifications in offense, age, and prior record criteria. Others took a far more sweeping approach and lowered the maximum age of the juvenile court's original jurisdiction, thereby transferring entire age categories of young offenders no matter what the offense. As a result, in many states transfer
The transformation of transfer policy has been quick and dramatic

implicates a broad range of offenders who are particularly serious nor particularly chronic, some of whom are not yet in their teens.

Note that the causal factor for change was the successfulness of the policy. Thus, the level of solvency of the legislation is a direct result of the effectiveness of the AC advocacy. Thus, there is no unique advantage to federal legal mandate. Contention 2: Granting states legal discretion in their criminal justice systems is net beneficial. [First], horizontal federalism undercuts the democratic representativeness of the criminal law. This turns officials intro free riders and forsakes states autonomy. Logan 2 writes:
WAYNE A. LOGAN HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IN AN AGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERCONNECTEDNESS University of Pennsylvania Law Review VOL. 154 DECEMBER 2005 NO. 2 pp 318-19. Accessed 7/26/10 2:23 AM http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/lawreview/articles/volume154/issue2/Logan154U.Pa.L.Rev.257(2005).pdf7/26/
First and perhaps foremost, the external approach

undercuts the democratic representativeness of the criminal law. By bootstrapping value judgments of their fellow

state criminal laws reciprocally reflect 335 and shape 336 the normative views of the jurisdiction that enacts them. As Dan Kahan has observed, the criminal law is suffused with meaning. What it punishes (drug possession, sodomy) can tell us what kind of life the community views as virtuous; how it punishes (imprisonment, corporal punishment, fines) can tell us what forms of affliction it views as appropriate to mark wrongdoers disgrace . . . . 337 While some have argued that the decentralizing effect of federalism in itself
sovereigns, external approach states flout the premise that fails to ensure politically representative, localized governance, 338 the external approach renounces outright any such prospect, and with it what the Anti-Federalists lauded as state individuality. 339 Much as a ven- triloquist uses a dummy, states employing the external mimic the value judgments of other states, 340 with the revered fifty labs model of horizontal federalism, and the dynamism and diversity it hopefully entails, consequently diminished. 341 In turn, by creating a legal landscape in which it becomes difficult to ascribe value judgments with geo-political accuracy, the external approach also

By deferring to the laws of other sovereigns, forum state officials become free riders: they avoid any possible negative political consequences that might attend enforcement of such laws in the first instance in the forum. 343 For instance, a state with an external approach registration law can effectively codify peeping
functions to undermine governmental transparency and political accountability. 342 (South Carolina) or adultery (Kansas) as convictions requiring registration, if it is otherwise politically wary of adopting the requirements via the formal

The external approach thus permits jurisdictions to indulge in a kind of stealth legislation: laws are applied by the forum without having been subject to the debate and compromise common to the legislative process, 345 depriving the public of an important occasion for norm identification and support. 346 While it might be
legislative process. 344

Delta Force K Lab Alex Rosengarten

Federalism CP 4/5

the case that the imported value judgment parallels that of the forum, this is not necessarily so, and stealth quality of the approach undercuts the consensus-based (or at least majority-approved) value choices a formal law embodies. 347 Importantly, this outcome does not derive from any strong-arm political measure by another sovereign, such as occurs in instances of federal commandeering. 348 Nor does it stem from a [d]enial of [states] right to experiment, the concern animating Justice Brandeis in New State Ice, 349 as occurs with federal usurpation of state criminal law prerogatives under vertical federalism; 350 nor from any constitutional compulsion, such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause, requiring one state to recognize anothers penal judgment, as none exists. Rather, the disempowerment is self-willed and self-imposed. 352 Despite states unquestioned sovereignty in the criminal law realm, which is so powerful that it permits multiple states to successively prosecute and convict the same individual for identical criminal misbehavior, 353 the states self-consciously defer to the laws and judgments of their fellow governments.

In so doing, external approach states forsake what Professors Baker and Young have called the negative freedom of federalismthe right to act autonomously and independently, free of the constraining authority of other governmental units. 354 Over eighty years ago, some ten years before
Justice Brandeis language in New State Ice, Justice Holmes extolled the capacity of federalism to foster social experiments . . . in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states. 355 The external approach ignores this invitation and thus gain says a central animating value of horizontal federalism. 356

[Thus, Federal legal mandates destroy the 50-labs federalism necessary to represent the values and norms of the individuals that make the state. This proves that the federal approach is undesirable, so you must negate. ] [second,] Lack of federal mandate allows states to be autonomous and experimentalists, thereby inspiring legal evolution in other states. Logan [1] writes:
WAYNE A. LOGAN HORIZONTAL FEDERALISM IN AN AGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERCONNECTEDNESS University of Pennsylvania Law Review VOL. 154 DECEMBER 2005 NO. 2 pp 318-19. Accessed 7/26/10 2:23 AM http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/lawreview/articles/volume154/issue2/Logan154U.Pa.L.Rev.257(2005). pdf7/26/
In a fundamental sense, internal approach states can be considered stalwarts of fifty-labs federalism.

By insisting that foreign convictions warrant recidivist or registration treatment under their own laws, and not deferring to the judgments of the states where the convictions occurred, the states reify federalist values of self-governance and autonomy. While perhaps representing a slap in the face in terms of comity, the absence of deference underscores such states resolve to honor their own criminal law standards and the normative positions they represent. As recently noted by the Georgia Supreme Court:
A state cannot express its public policy more strongly than through its penal code. When a state defines conduct as criminal and sets the punishment for the offender, it is conveying in the clearest possible terms its view of public policy. Full faith and credit ordinarily should not require a state to abandon such fundamental policy in favor of the public policy of another jurisdiction.322

By sticking to their sovereign guns, and adhering to recidivist and registrant eligibility criteria prescribed by their own legislatures, internal jurisdictions also serve the experimentalist values of federalism in a more indirect way. To the extent that interconnection functions to promote inter-governmental dialogue, 323 if policy makers in the foreign state are listening, 324 and they desire continued accountability of and social control over their migrating offenders, 325 rejection by the internal state of the prior conviction might serve to hasten legal evolution there. This can entail changes to substantive law, such as clarifying aspects of statutory language, 326 or procedures, such as when the foreign state provides less in the way of access to counsel or jury trial rights than the forum. 327 Whether such change itself is salutary, of course, is in
the eye of the beholder. For instance, offenders convicted of carrying a concealed weapon in the North, where such an offense commonly is punished harshly, can often travel south (where firearms are more loosely regulated) free of worry that their felony record will pose a risk of recidivist enhancement. 328 Similarly, a conviction for possessing illegal drugs might warrant felony status in one state that takes an especially negative view of drug use, yet might be sanctioned mildly in another with a more lenient view. 329

the forums critical approach might encourage the foreign states to reconsider their harsh stance. On the other hand, the forum states refusal to consider a foreign conviction because the offense
Under both circumstances, did not warrant felony status there might prompt the foreign state to punish the offense more harshly. 330

Delta Force K Lab Alex Rosengarten

Federalism CP 5/5

NC burden counter interpretation

Prefer this interpretation of the resolution for __ additional reasons: 1. Linguistic integrity words are meant to represent certain meanings. Holding strict linguistic standards to some part of the resolution and not others is arbitrary and would render the resolution meaningless. Also, allowing debaters to force their own grammatical meaning allows them to skew ground to prefer their position, which proves that this standard is also key to fairness. 2. Predictability this position is sufficiently predictable because A] it was in the topic analysis, meaning it was a legitimate position I could have chosen, so the affirmative was able to prepare for it, and B] The issue of federalism has literally existed since the beginning of the country and is an important stepping stone to cross for every legislative action.