WIEGOREPORTONTHEPOLICYENVIRONMENTOFINFORMAL URBANWASTEPICKERSINPOVERTYINCOLOMBIA

AdrianaRuizRestrepo ShaillyBarnes October2010

THISWIEGOREPORTWASPREPAREDBY:

rra(PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)

attorneys&consultants Ms.AdrianaRuizRestrepo(TeamCoordination&LeadResearcher) Ms.ShaillyBarnes(SeniorResearcher) Mr.SebastianTorres(ResearchAssistant) Mr.CamiloBarrera(ResearchAssistant)

The authors would like to express their gratitude to those who, in the field, through their life stories or through their practitioner knowledgeandinformationinCali,BogotaandNewYorkmadethis reportpossible. Our gratitude extends to colleagues in New Delhi, Pune, Ahmedebad, Patna, Bangalore, Cairo, Buenos Aires, and Belo Horizonte who have allowed us to further our comparative understanding of law, policy and poverty in the global south. Our sincere gratitude to Ms. Marty Chen, Ms. Chris Bonner and the WIEGOnetwork,fortheirtrustandsupport,butespeciallyfortheir important contribution to development and justice through research and advocacy efforts aimed at building a better global understandingoftheinformalworkingpoor. Please cite as: RUIZRESTREPO Adriana, BARNES Shailly, WIEGO ReportonthePolicyEnvironmentofInformalUrbanWastePickers andRuralArtisanalMineWorkersInColombia.


VirtuallyallpoliciesaffecttheinformalEconomy. Inthepast,interestedpolicymakershaveadvocatedsomemixofthefollowing policies for those who work in the informal economy: social policies to improve their health and education; infrastructure and services to improve their housing and living environment; microfinance and enterprise development services to increase the productivity of their enterprises; bureaucratic and legal changes to reduce the barriersand related transaction coststo registering their enterprises; and, more recently, property rights to give them the ability to transformtheirassetsintoliquidcapital.Toofewpolicymakershaveconsidered how other areas of policieseconomic policies, labour legislation, and social protectionschemesaffecttheinformaleconomy. ()Untilrecently,therewasawidespreadassumptionthatmainstreameconomic policiesdonotandcannotreachtheinformaleconomy.()Clearly,areappraisal oftheimpactofexistingeconomicpoliciesandtheneedforsupportiveeconomic policies is called for. This is because economic policies impact the process of redistributionbetweentheformalandinformaleconomy.Policyanalysisneedsto determine whether the informal economy shares in benefits from government expenditureandprocurementpolicies. APolicyResponsetotheInformalEconomy WIEGOBrochure,CambridgeMA

TABLEOFCONTENTS
TABLEOFCONTENTS.............................................................................................................4 ACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................6 EXECUTIVESUMMARY...........................................................................................................7 1.AUTHORSCONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFORTHISWIEGOREPORT...................................12
1.1.SURVIVINGPOVERTYINTHEINFORMALECONOMY.............................................................................................13 1.1.1.POVERTYASACONSEQUENCEOFBADLAWANDNEGLIGENTPOLICYMAKING.........................................................13 1.1.2.THEINFORMALECONOMYREALM..............................................................................................................................16 1.1.3.OWNACCOUNTWORKERS:ATTHECROSSROADSOFENTREPRENEURSHIPANDLABORRIGHTS.............................21 1.1.4.COLOMBIA,POVERTYANDTHEINFORMALECONOMY..............................................................................................25 1.2.MAINCHALLENGESFORINCLUSIVEPOLICYMAKING............................................................................................29 . 1.2.1.WOMEN ......................................................................................................................................................................29 1.2.2.CHILDREN....................................................................................................................................................................32 1.2.3.ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIESOFINDIGENOUSANDAFRODESCENDANTPEOPLES.................................................34 1.2.4.THESOCIALPROTECTIONISSUE..................................................................................................................................36 1.2.5.DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCEFORINCLUSIVEDEVELOPMENT....................................................................................38 1.3.INTERNATIONALAGENDASONTHEINFORMALITYOFPOVERTYTRAPPEDWORKERS...........................................39 1.3.1.THEDECENTWORKAGENDA ......................................................................................................................................39 . 1.3.2.THELEGALEMPOWERMENTOFTHEPOORAGENDA..................................................................................................41 1.3.3.THEREVISEDFIRSTMILLENNIUMDEVELOPMENTGOAL............................................................................................41

2.URBANANDINFORMALWASTERECYCLINGWORKERSINCOLOMBIA.............................43
2.1.CONTEXTANDHISTORYOFWASTEMANAGEMENT..............................................................................................46 2.1.1.HISTORICALCONTEXTOFWASTEMANAGEMENTSERVICEANDECONOMYINBOGOTA...........................................47 2.2.PUBLICPOLICYOFWASTEMANAGEMENT............................................................................................................51 2.2.1.CONSTITUTIONALUNDERSTANDINGOFWASTEMANAGEMENT...............................................................................51 2.2.2.LAW142OF1994........................................................................................................................................................55 2.2.3.WASTEMANAGEMENTDECREES1713OF2002AND1505OF2003...........................................................................57 2.2.4.LAWINTHEFIELDORPUBLICPOLICYIMPLEMENTATIONOFWASTEMANAGEMENTDECISIONS .............................64 . 2.2.5. THE NEED TO RECONCEPTUALIZE THE NOTION OF WASTE IN THE XXI CENTURY FOR SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE WASTEMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSINTHEGLOBALSOUTH....................................................................................................67 2.3.INFORMALWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS.............................................................................................................68 2.3.1.WASTEDUMPWASTEPICKERSANDSTREETWASTEPICKERS.....................................................................................69 2.3.2.WOMENWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS......................................................................................................................70 2.3.3.CHILDRENINWASTERECYCLINGWORK......................................................................................................................71 2.3.4.ELDERLYWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS.......................................................................................................................72 2.3.5.ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIESINWASTERECYCLINGWORK.....................................................................................73 2.3.6.SOCIALPROTECTION...................................................................................................................................................73 2.4.TRADECONTEXTOFWASTEPICKERS....................................................................................................................75

2.4.1.THECOLOMBIANSTATE..............................................................................................................................................78 2.4.2.BUSINESSCORPORATIONSINTHEWASTEINDUSTRY.................................................................................................78 A.THEBUSINESSCONTRACTFORTHECOLLECTIONANDTRANSPORTOFWASTE..............................................................78 B.THEBUSINESSCONTRACTFORTHEFINALDISPOSALOFWASTE.....................................................................................80 2.4.3.AUTHORIZEDORGANIZATIONSUNDERLAW142OF1994..........................................................................................82 WASTEPICKERSCOOPERATIVESANDOTHERNONPROFITORGANIZATIONSASAUTHORIZEDORGANIZATIONS .............82 . 2.4.4.WASTERECYCLINGBUSINESSES..................................................................................................................................83 (I)NATIONALANDINTERNATIONALINDUSTRIALSECONDARYCOMMODITYORWASTEBUYERS......................................83 (II)WAREHOUSESWITHLOCAL,NATIONALANDINTERNATIONALTRANSACTIONSINWASTE..........................................84 (III)OWNACCOUNTWASTEPICKERS...................................................................................................................................85 (IV)ILLEGALLYARMEDGROUPS............................................................................................................................................85 2.5.THELABORANDTHEMARKETOFINFORMALWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS.........................................................85 2.5.1.THELABOROFWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS.........................................................................................................................85 2.5.2THEENTREPRENEURIALISMOFWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS.....................................................................................................87 2.5.3.THELEGALIMPOVERISHMENTOFTHEPOORPORTRAYEDBYARTICLE28OFDECREE1713OF2002;NOWJUDICIALLY REDRESSED............................................................................................................................................................................90 2.5.4. THE LEGAL IMPOVERISHMENT OF THE POOR PORTRAYED BY ARTICLES 6 AND 14 OF LAW 1259 OF 2008; NOW JUDICIALLYREDRESSED.........................................................................................................................................................91 . 2.6.WASTEPICKERSOWNACCOUNTLABORANDENTREPRENEURIALISM .................................................................92 2.7.WASTEPICKERSORGANIZATIONSFORECONOMICINCLUSIONANDPARTICIPATORYGOVERNANCE.....................94 2.7.1.NONPROFITLEGALPERSONSOFSOLIDARITYECONOMYINCOLOMBIA.....................................................................95 2.7.2.EVOLUTIONOFWASTEPICKERSORGANIZATIONSANDLEGALEMPOWERMENTOFCOLOMBIANWASTEPICKERS..98 2.7.2.1.PREMIDEIGHTIESORTHEUNORGANIZEDWASTEPICKERSPHASE:......................................................................99 2.7.2.2.MIDEIGHTIESTOMIDNINETIESORTHEORGANIZATIONANDCAPACITYBUILDINGPHASEOFWASTEPICKERS:99 2.7.2.3.MidNinetiesuntil2003orPartneringToFightagainsttheLegalImpoverishmentofthePoor..........................100 2.7.2.4. 2008 AND FORWARD: THE EMPOWERMENT OF WASTE PICKERS AS ENTREPRENEURS IN THE COLOMBIAN WASTEECONOMY...............................................................................................................................................................103

3. NOTE: THE ARTISANAL MINERS CHAPTER HAS BEEN EXTRACTED AND IS PART OF A SEPARATEDOCUMENT............................................................................................................107

ANNEX 1. THE CIVISOL CASE ON CALIS WASTE PICKERS: FROM MARGINALIZED WASTE PICKERSTOENTREPRENEURSINRECYCLING..........................................................................108 ANNEX2.MAPPINGOFWASTEPICKERSORGANIZATIONS................................................. 20 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................... 21 1

ACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS
ANR AsociacinNacionaldeRecicladores ARB AsociacindeRecicladoresdeBogot ASM ArtisanalandSmallScaleMining CEDAWConventionontheEliminationofallformsofDiscriminationagainstWomen CiViSOL FoundationfortheCivicSolidaryBuildingofSystemicChange CLEP/TheCommission TheCommissionontheLegalEmpowermentofthePoor CONES ConsejoNacionaldelaEconomaSolidaria CRA ComisindeRegulacindedeAguaPotableySaneamientoBsico CRC ConventionontheRightsoftheChild CVC CorporationoftheValledeCauca DAGMA DepartamentoAdministrativodeGestindelMedioAmbiente DepartamentoAdministrativodeEconomaSolidaria DANSOCIAL EDIS EmpresaDistritaldeServiciosPblicosdeBogot EMSIRVA EmpresadeServiciosVariosMunicipalesdeCali GERT GrupoEmpresarialdelaRecuperacinyTransformacindematerialesS.AESP GREMIVALLE AsociacionGremialDeMinerosDelValle ICBF InstitutoColombianodeBienestarFamiliar ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights ICESCR InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights IDP InternallyDisplacedPeople ILO InternationalLabourOrganization INGEOMINAS InstitutoColombianodeGeologayMinera MDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoal NGO NonGovernmentalOrganization NPO NonprofitOrganization NOVIB OXFAMNOVIBNetherlands PGIRS ElPlandeGestinIntegraldeResiduosSlidosPGIRS POS PlanObligatoriodeSalud ServicioNacionaldeAprendizaje SENA SISBEN SistemadeIdentificacindeBeneficiariosdeSubsidiosSociales SSPD SuperintendenciadeServiciosPblicosDomiciliarios WIEGO WomeninInformalEmploymentGlobalizingandOrganizingGlobalPolicyResearchNetwork UNEP UnitedNationsEnvironmentalProgramme SSPD SuperintendenciadeServiciosPblicosDomiciliariosdeColombia UAESP UnidadAdministrativaEspecialdeServiciosPblicosdelaAlcaldaMayordeBogot MBOP MembershipBasedOrganizationsofthePoor OSEs OrganizationoftheSolidaryEconomy OSDs OrganizationforSolidaryDevelopment CTA CooperativadeTrabajoAsociado

EXECUTIVESUMMARY
ThisdocumentpresentsaresearchandpolicyanalysisencompassedunderWIEGOsGlobalProjecton Law and the Informal Economy. Initiated in India in 2008, WIEGOs project aims to contribute to developinganenablinglaborlawenvironmentforinformalworkers,onethatpromotesdecentwork andeconomicopportunity,laborrights,benefitsandprotection,andactivelyencouragesthegrowthof strong, democratic, sustainable unions or memberbased organizations of informal workers. This document continues WIEGOs Global project and identifies the public policy barriers facing own account workers in two occupational groups of Colombias informal economy urban waste pickers andruralmineworkerslivinginpoverty.Bymakingexplicittherolethatlawandpolicyhaveplayedin shaping the waste and mining sectors of the Colombian economy, this report also reveals the space withinwhichwastepickersandmineworkers,andtheirorganizations,maymaneuvertochallengethe presentregulatoryenvironment,protecttheirconstitutionalrightstolive,workanddevelop,aswellas thetradesthattheyhavecultivatedanddevelopedovertime,andseekopportunitiesforgrowthand progress. ThefirstoccupationalgroupofinformalownaccountworkersconsideredinthisreportisColombias urban recyclers, who are also known as waste pickers. This trade has emerged throughout the developingworldasaresponsetolimitedmunicipalresources,theinabilityoftheformaleconomyto absorbagrowingurbanpopulation,andtheparticularmarketvalueplacedonrecyclablematerialsin the modern globalized economy. Although engaged in the provision of recycling services and contributingtoagreenerenvironment,themen,womenandchildreninthistradedonotworkina welldefined trade environment within the more comprehensive economy for waste management services. Linkedtothecountryshighlevelsofurbanizationandgrowingneedforefficientanduniversalwaste services, Colombias waste management sector has evolved from a municipally ownedandoperated servicedeliverytoonethathasbeenincreasinglyprivatizedsincethe1990s.Yet,andasestablishedby theColombianConstitutionandrelevantpolicymeasures,namelyLaw142of1994andDecree1713of 2003, waste management remains an essential public service in Colombia for which the public administration remains responsible to every Colombian constituent. Included within this set of essentialpublicservicesarethewastemanagementelementsoftheenvironmentalsanitationpublic service,notablywastecollection,transportation,finaldisposal,andtheadvantageoususesofwaste,a category that encompasses, among other things, recycling, and linked to it, the trade of the waste pickers.Theimplicationsofthischaracterizationofthewastepickerstradearesignificantandlieat the heart of the waste pickers body of law, a series of cases in front of the Constitutional and AdministrativeCourtsofColombiathathaveestablishedthestatesobligationtofacilitatethewaste pickersinclusionintotheformalwasteeconomy. The informality of the waste pickers trade is rooted in their history as internally displaced people settling on the margins of urban life by salvaging recyclables from trash heaps. Initially a womens 7

 trade,asincomeopportunitiesdwindledandurbanpopulationsgrew,thetradeexpandedtoinclude itscurrentpopulationofwomenandmen,children,andtheelderly,allofwhommaybefoundgoing fromtrashcantotrashcancollectingbottles,glass,cardboard,andotherrecyclablematerials,orliving andworkinginpublicdumpsdoingthesame.Overthepastseveralyears,andasthemarketvalueof recyclablematerialshasincreasedinColombia,thetradehasgrownbothformallyandinformally,with capitalintensive, private sector companies entering the market, alongside more traditional actors in waste management, such as the State, private concessionaires providing waste collection, transport anddisposalservicesviaconcessioncontract,andotherauthorizedorganizationsunderrelevantwaste lawandpolicy,i.e.,wastepickerscooperativesandothernonprofitorganizations,aswellasthenewly poor,indigentordisplaced. However, and even as the value chain for recyclable materials has extended beyond Colombia into internationalmarkets,Colombiaswastepickersremainatitstailend,dependingonsocietystrashto survivefromdaytoday.Forthem,accesstothistrashisparamounttosurvival.Whenprovisionsin thepublicpolicyofwastemanagementthreatenedtocurtailthataccess,organizedwastepickersand their allies embarked on a decadelong struggle to protect it and create further opportunities for growth in their trade. In 2003, the Asociacion de Recicladores de Bogot (ARB) and their lawyers brought a Constitutional challenge to the terms of reference for the public procurement of waste managementcontractsinBogotthatwasopenonlytoequityownedcorporationsandexcludednon profit, solidarity based organizations of the poor, i.e., waste pickers organizations, from competing. TheCourtsdecisionrecognizingthattheirexclusionwas,indeed,unjustifiedandconstitutional,paved thewayforsubsequentcasesthatincreasinglygrewthepublicpolicyspaceforwastepickersinclusion intheformalwasteeconomy.Laterdecisionshavedeterminedthatthetermsforfutureprocurement processesbereachablebywastepickersorganizationsandrecognizedtheirlegitimaterightstoaccess the trash that is at the heart of their trade. And, in 2009, waste pickers from Cali organized to challenge recent legislation that prohibited characteristic elements of the waste pickers trade, e.g., thetransportationofwasteinnonmotorizedvehicles,andtheirexpulsionfromapublicdumpwithout anyprovisionsforworkorsurvival.InitsdecisionT2912009,theConstitutionalCourtbothaffirmed thetradeidentityofwastepickerswithintheformalwasteeconomyandmandatedtheirinclusionas entrepreneursinrecycling. As highlighted in section 2.6 (Governance: Pursuing Open Democracy and Inclusive Development ThroughOrganizationsofaCivicSolidaristicNature),whileconfrontingthesenumerousandcomplex struggles, from displacement and marginalization to informality and unfair competition, the organizations of the waste pickers primarily in the form of cooperatives, foundations and associationshavebeeninstrumental.Itisintheircollectiveformthattheybargainforbetterpricesin themarketplaceand,withintheruleoflaw,otherwisemitigatetheirhighlyvulnerableandprecarious status as own account workers in the informal economy. Unfortunately, time, space and resource limitations have so far prevented the mass organization of Colombias entire population of waste pickers and organizations of waste pickers in Colombia. The organizational history of waste pickers from the mid1970s to the present, and especially that of ARB and the Cali waste pickers who were 8

 engaged in the most recent Constitutional Court decision favoring waste pickers inclusion in the formal waste economy, show that this process of organization is longstanding and even today in a certaindegreeoffluxasthepolicyenvironmentrelatingtothethirdsectorremainswithoutcertainty forthepoorandtheirorganizations.Giventhelegalchallengesthathavebeenmountedthusfar,the disparatelevelsoforganizationamongwastepickers,andthehistoricallynotedlimitationsofthetrade ofwastepicking,thisreportfinallypresentsthepossibilityofexpandingthewastepickersworkinto waste management so as to broaden their horizon for waste pickers formal inclusion in democracy anddevelopment. The second trade group of informal own account workers explored in this report are rural mine workers, and, more specifically, the mining activities of two ethnocultural minorities that have a specialhistoryvisvistheminingtradeinColombianindigenousandafroColombianmineworkers and their communities. These two minority groups continue to find themselves geographically, culturally,andpoliticallyisolatedfromthechannelsofdemocraticgovernanceinColombiaanddeeply entrenchedincircumstancesofpoverty.Aswithwastepickers,theinformalitycharacteristicoftheir miningactivitiesisinpartattributabletothelawandpolicyenvironmentofthebroader,formalmining sector,andemanatesfromtheConstitution,whichrecognizesStateasthesoleownerofallsubsoiland naturalnonrenewableresourcesinthecountry.Thus,andaspresentedinthisreport,ownaccount mineworkersworkinarealmwheretheColombianStatehasanexplicitmonetaryinterestthatbein tensionwithitsresponsibilitiestoconstituentsinformallyengagedandsurvivingtherein. ThedefinitivelegislationfortheminingindustryinColombiaistheMiningCodeof2001.Whilelauded forminimizinggovernmentbureaucracyandusheringinforeigndirectinvestmentintheminingsector ofthecountryseconomy,theMiningCodeisnotwithoutcontroversy.Mostrelevanthere,theCode hasnotadvancedtheinclusionofmineworkerswholiveandworkinpoverty.Thelimitationsonown accountmineworkersinpovertyrangefrominformationasymmetryduetoaninabilitytoaccessand make sense of the Codes provisions, which are themselves fraught with imprecision and a lack of clarity,toitsintenttoencouragelargescalemininginColombia.Further,theStatesroleinmininghas beenrestrictedbyarecentpolicyreformthatdismountedallpublicindustrialminingandpromotion and left a bare minimum State involvement, i.e., protecting natural parks, ethnic groups rights to certain lands or resources, or State security interests, while creating an enabling environment for considerable amounts of private investment monies in the mining sector. The States increasingly limited role has resulted in an expanded privatization of the mining sector, where the States dual obligationsaslawmakerandsoleownerofallmineralandsubsoilresourcestendtoconflictwiththe rights of those ethnocultural minorities and constituents in poverty who engage in microscale and artisanalminingtosurvive. Microscale and artisanal mining have historical and cultural significance to the ethnocultural minoritiesconsideredinthisreport.Theancestorsofcontemporaryindigenouscommunitieshadbeen mining the wealth of resources found underneath Colombias rich ecological landscape since pre Colombiantimes,whileWestAfricanslaveswerebroughttoColombiatosupporttheSpanishcolonial 9

 administrations largescale extractive operations. The contemporary descendants of these ethno culturalgroupsstillretainstrongtiestominingcultureandthecultural,socialandeconomicintegrity oftheircommunitiescontinuestorelyonthenaturalresourcesfoundontheircommunallands.This relationship is recognized and protected under Colombian Constitutional and legal provisions to protect the communal lands of indigenous or Afrodescendant communities, termed resguardos or territorios comunitarios, respectively. The mining that takes place on these lands today is most commonlyartisanal,performedwithouttheuseofanymechanizedoperations,andonamicroscale, in the same manner that their ancestors once mined the same lands. However, the legislative and policyintentiontoprotecttheethnoculturalheritagesofthesegroupshasalsorestrictedtheveryuse ofthenaturalresourcestheyareConstitutionallyentitledtosoastolimittheircapacitytousemine work or mineral resources to break through the poverty traps that constrict their development. Limitationsonindividualbenefitofcommunalresourcesortheprohibitionofsaleofcommunallands prevent members of these communities to take advantage of their mineral wealth to work out of poverty. At the same time, given the multiple degrees of isolation from the centralized locus of political and democratic engagement that indigenous and AfroColombian communities experience, provisions that are intended to protect these groups mineral resources from private sector mining operators are difficult to enforce. They are, therefore, overprotected from development on one hand,andunderprotectedfromenforcementontheother. Thegenderimplicationsofthisstrugglebetweenrecognizingandprotectingethnoculturalminorities special relationship with mine work and creating the space for the individual or community development,aswellasenforcinglegislativeprovisionstoprotecttheserights,arenotable.Women, whose rights to equality must be considered alongside their cultural and ethnic rights protected by international conventions adopted into domestic State obligations, are found in varying degree throughouttheminingsector,inlarge,mediumandsmallscaleoperations,aswellasmicroscaleand artisanalmining,wheretheyaremoreprevalent.Indeed,duetothelowbarrierstoentry,theprimary place for women in mining is in informal and, particularly, artisanal mining, a fact that renders their livelihood greatly vulnerable and precarious. Yet the Mining Code makes no mention of these mine workers,whosecontributiontotheircommunitiesandthetradegovirtuallyunnoticed. Giventhiscontext,theprovisionsoftheMiningCodethatareparticularlyproblematicforruralown accountmineworkersincludethefollowing:(1)Establishmentoftheconcessioncontractastheonly mechanism for legal, formal exploration, exploitation and development of mineral or natural resources.Thisprovisionabrogatesearlierlegislationthathadallowedalternativestotheconcession contractsuchasgrantingapermissionorlicenseforsmallscaleoperations.Incontrasttothislicense, the concession contract demands a great level of economic and resource investment to procure, consequently, those ethnocultural minorities that continue to mine do so in a State of legally compelled informality. (2) A noted absence in the policy framework recognizing the right to prior consultationforminingactivitiestakingplaceonprotectedlands,anobligationunderinternationallaw that the Colombian government has ratified into domestic law and extensively developed through Constitutional jurisprudence. (3) The 30 day timeframe for exercising the first in right authority extendedtoethnoculturalcommunitiesthatcountersthefirstintime,firstinrightrulethatprivate mining companies rely upon to secure their investments. Rather than the Colombian State affirmatively protecting their first in right authority, ethnocultural communities must defensively take advantage of the provision within just one month. (4) Burdensome mechanisms for formal 10

 authorizationtoworkonstateledconcessioncontractsorengaginginuntitledoccasionalminework, suchasgoldpanning,andotherwiselimitingartisanalextractiontosubsistenceminingonly.(5)The complete absence of any gender framework in the Mining Code, thus, the virtual invisibility of all womenengagedinanyscaleormodeofmining.ThreeillustrativeexamplesinSection3.5(FromOwn Account to SelfEmployment Mine Work: Three Illustrative examples of Artisanal and SmallScale MinersPlacedinPovertyTrapsbytheLaw)providegreaterdepthtotheseissuesandhowtheireffects arecompoundedinthedailyrealityoftheindigenousandAfroColombianminingconstituents. The report therefore recommends the following policy recourses for greater inclusion of rural, own account mine workers: (1) Greater clarity and distinction betweenmining that deliberately seeks to violatethemininglawandminingthatisunabletomeetthelawsloftyconditions,inotherwords,a regulatory distinction between mining illegally (or informally) due to convenience and choice and illegality(orinformality)duetobeingpovertytrapped;(2)Reconsiderationofthelimitationsplacedon artisanal mining restricting it to a subsistence trade, and thus denying the right to development, especially in light of the disparate impact of these limitations on indigenous and afrodescendant constituents;(3)Redressingtheburdensplacedonthesecommunitiestoprotecttheirrightstotheir natural resources, land and trade and appealing for State intervention to address the povertytraps that have been created through the mining policy framework; (4) Above all, the absence of a labor identityforartisanal,microandsmallscaleminersandtheabsenceofanygenderinclusioniswhat veilstheseworkerscontributionsandworkintheminingsector.Theirinclusioncannotoccurwithout theformalrecognitionoftheirworkasalegitimatetradeintheminingsector.Thus,theColombian Statepartimperialownerofallsubsurfacerights,partneoliberalcapitalistinitsprivatizationefforts must reorient the rules of the game in mining to better reflect the reality and needs of its indigenousandafrodescendantcitizenswhoareruralmineworkersandwhohavebeenrelegatedto theinformalsectorthroughlawandpolicydirectedbytheStatesinterestsratherthanaconcernfora marginalizedandisolatedconstituency.

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1.AUTHORSCONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFORTHISWIEGOREPORT
This chapter situates the analysis of own account urban waste pickers and rural mine workers that follows in chapters two and three within a framework that considers the role of law and policy in contributing to the poverty and exclusion within which these own account workers live and work. Section 1.1 introduces the dominant survival strategy for those living and working in poverty i.e., informalityasinparttheconsequenceofalegalandpolicysystemthatisexclusionaryofthepoor. Thisideaofthelegalimpoverishmentofthepoorisintroducedandlinkedtothestrategyofusinglaw for poverty reduction in section 1.1.1, then considered in its most prevalent realm the informal economyinsection1.1.2.Section1.1.3continuestoconsiderthephenomenonofthemostvulnerable workersintheinformaleconomyownaccountworkersandtheroleoforganizationsoftheworking poor in their lives and livelihoods. The analysis then focuses on the Colombias informal economy in section1.1.4,linkingthepoliticaleconomyofthecountrywiththecircumstancesofitsinformalown accountworkers.Withinthisinternationallypositionedandnationallysituatedframework,Section1.2 thensetsforththevariedchallengesthatarerevealedwhenusinglawasapovertyreductionstrategy, andthat,whenovercome,wouldresultinamoreinclusivepolicymakingenvironmentwithlawsthat workforall,namely,thedisproportionatenumbersofwomenandchildrenwhoareworkinginformally, often as own account workers, the multiple levels of exclusion facing ethnocultural minorities, especially those of indigenous and African descent in Colombia and throughout Latin America, the particular issues of social protection and democratic or participatory governance, and, finally, the relevantinternationalagendasoninformal,povertytrappedworkers,i.e.,theDecentWorkagenda,the agenda on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, and the more recent Target B to Goal 1 of the MillenniumDevelopmentGoals.

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1.1.SURVIVINGPOVERTYINTHEINFORMALECONOMY
1.1.1.POVERTYASACONSEQUENCEOFBADLAWANDNEGLIGENTPOLICYMAKING Withoutdisregardingthenumerousandimportantdefinitionsofthenotionofpovertyinboththe international development and human rights agendas, the authors of this WIEGO report opt for understanding poverty as a socioeconomic circumstance, rather than a human condition1. The intentionofpresentingandrelatingtopovertyasanexternalcircumstanceratherthananinherent condition2 of the person, is first, to stress the direct role that national law and policy makers have, throughtheirpublicdecisionmakingandimplementingtasks,in(a)theprovision,(b)theabsenceor (c) the removal of opportunities to all fellow constituents of the State, whom they directly or indirectly represent, to live a life with dignity and a horizon of development. Second, this understanding introduces a degree of distance between the person and the fact of their living or working in poverty to psychologically create the space within which to maneuver for contingency to happen and for empowerment to take place, and thus increase the possibilities for the person in poverty to operate and realize change. By depersonalizing poverty and trying to root its source in causesthatareexternaltotheindividual,theideaistoallocateenoughauthorityintheimpoverished personforbreaking,orleapingoutof,thepovertytrap.3 Representing poverty as a circumstance rather than a condition also facilitates approaching poverty notasauniformandhomogenouscategoryofanalysis,butasasetofdiversepovertytrapswiththeir ownspecificities4thatarewithoutprejudicetoconflictand/orforeignaggressionsorthedevastating forceofnaturechieflyandregularlycreatedbynationalpublicdecisionsmakers,intentionallyornot. When intentional, poverty traps often stem from political lobbying or criminal pressures on public decisionmakers;whenunintentional,theyresultfromsheertechnicalincompetenceinlawandpolicy makingorthepoliticalindifferencetowardspowerlessconstituentsandthestakesofthosewhoare
1 United Nations Draft Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: The Rights of the Poor State that Povertyisahumanconditioncharacterizedbysustainedorchronicdeprivationofresources,capabilities,choices,security andpowernecessaryfortheenjoymentofanadequatestandardoflivingandothercivil,cultural,economic,politicaland social rights. A definition borrowed from the Declaration by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on povertyandtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(OfficialRecordsoftheEconomicandSocial Council,2002,SupplementNo.2[E/2002/22E/C.12/2001/17],annexVII),para.8. 2 Besides, poverty as a human condition can eventually end up perversely twisted and presented as a genetic, intellectual,andmoral,psychologicalorphysiologicaldysfunctionofapersonorgivengroupofpersons. 3 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank / LEP LAB; On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Working Document#3,2007(unpublished) 4 The need of understanding or contextualizing within diverse types of poverty was the main crosscutting conclusion arisingfromtwentytwonationalconsultationsthatwereconductedbytheformerCommissiononLegalEmpowermentof thePoor.Areiteratedrecommendationtopolicymakerswastodifferentiatepovertiesinordertogatherbetterknowledge ontheburdens,limitationsandthreatsimposedonthem.Thelegalframeworkaffectingthelivelihoodofaruralfarmeris completelydifferentfromthatofanurbandomesticworkerorwastepicker.Infact,itseemsthattherequestistoapplying adifferentialapproachnotonlybygender,race,etc..butbyoccupationalgroupsofpeoplelivinginpoverty.Inacertain wayitresemblesthedatadisaggregationdemandrecurrentlymadetoeconomists.TheNationalConsultationsanditsjoint analysisshouldbeavailableatUNDP/ILEP.http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/

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 mostvulnerableandfartoreach.Inanycase,theendresultisthesame:policyandregulatorybarriers andgapsthattranslateintheabsenceofopportunitiesforconstituentsoftheStatetocreate,increase andacquireincomethroughwork. Further,byunderstandingpovertyasacircumstancetheroleoflawasapovertyreductionstrategyis betterperceived,becauseitprovidestheneedtoanalyzetheimpactofpolicyandregulatorydecisions on human development. Concretely, it invites the need to assess the legal output of public decision maker,i.e.,tomonitorandevaluatewhetherthelegallybindingprovisionsgoverningthelivesofallare creating and effectively distributing opportunities for income generation to all or only some of the Statesconstituents,whethertheyarenotprovidinganyincomegenerationopportunitiesoronlynot toaparticularoccupationalgrouporsectorofthepopulation,orwhether,intheworstcase,theyare actuallytakingawayincomegenerationopportunitiestoallorsomepartofthepopulation.Whenthe endresultofapolicyorregulatoryframeworklimitsorrestrictsthespaceorconditionsforincome generation of constituents who are not well off, live in exclusion, discrimination or with limited economicresources,withoutprovidingforasystemicinclusionsolutionoranyotherreasonableand effectivealternativetocontinueensuringtheirsurvivalanddevelopment,thenthelattercasefurther worsens,andbecomes,astheauthorsofthisreportinaveryexplicitmannerchoosetodescribeas thelegalimpoverishmentofthepoor. TheLegalImpoverishmentofthePoorresultsfromobservingtheeffectsofnormsandpolicieswhen theyareimplementedontheground,primarilyincountriesrushingforeconomicgrowth.Itisuseful to describe the impact of the trend in contemporary lawmaking processes in developing countries that,whenenteringintovastliberalizationschemes,havenoconsiderationforensuringanyspacefor development and protection the most vulnerable constituents of that State. The term, proposed by legal practitioners observing the potential impact of several Colombian norms on people living in poverty(Carimagua,AIS,ForestryandCTAslaws),andlaterinothercountriesintheGlobalSouthhas nootherpretenseotherthantoturnthespotlightonthesystemicimpoverishmentresultingfrombad law and negligent policy making. Once issued and codified, these provisions become, due to the principle of legality, binding and enforceable on all and thus reshape the life, livelihood and development space and conditions of all constituents. Preventing the negative impact that impoverishing decisions may have on specific occupational groups like waste pickers, artisanal mine workers, indigenous rural farmers or agricultural workers like sugar cane cutters, is particularly difficult.Peopleinpovertyhavetremendousdifficultyinraisingadeliberativevoiceindemocracyorin beingheardinpublicdecisionmakingcircuits.Besides,theseconstituentsarelivinginasurvivalmode, meaningthatbothtimeandspacearescarce,eventhetimeandspacerequiredtoactuallystepinand engageinactivecitizenryandcollectiveorganization,whichitselfrequiresmeetings,associationsanda constant access to pertinent information and the production of information for substantive participation in democratic deliberation. The legal impoverishment of the poor usually passes inadvertently in the flow of public opinion and is only detected once the enforcement of the law is imposed or the barriers and loopholes are felt by those in poverty, which explains the sprouting of

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 seemingly spontaneous manifestations of frustration that are channeled through the most available antiestablishmentideology. Because public decisions are mediated through policy and regulatory frameworks that also relate to other frameworks, and by doing so create a systemic understanding of institutions, it is often very hard for the nonlegally trained eye to detect impoverishing effects. Furthermore if, like vast populationofpeoplelivinginpoverty,thereiseitheratimeand/orskillrestrictiontoanalyzelawand policy and build arguments for protection and advancement, impoverishing policy and regulatory provisions easily enter the social realm and begin to fashion and refashion the lives of the most vulnerableconstituents.Inanycase,therestrictionoflawfullifeanddevelopmentspacemediatedby thelawandenforcedbyauthoritieswillalwayshavegreaterimpactonconstituentslivinginpoverty, who already live in the smallest survival space available to them, and thus receive the most intense effectsofregulatoryrestrictionsandlimitations. The notion of the Legal Impoverishment of the Poor is descriptive of a law making trend in growth driven economies and the rationale for advocating for (a) the development of sound third sector policyandnonprofitlawthatmayenableandfostercivicsolidaritybasedlegalpersons,asthistypeof organizations, better known as non profits, are more likely to reach those living in poverty to foster their collective inclusion in democracy and development5, (b) the overall strengthening of propoor governance and inclusive policy making, and, chiefly, (c) the acute need of justices, lawyers and communitybasedparalegalsinthethesisandpraxisofthedevelopmentagendatorealizesystemic change, as opposed to legal aid and justice reform initiatives, and, concretely, within the realm of constitutional and administrative law. Their role in detecting, claiming and redressing norms that legallyimpoverishthepoorormaypotentiallydosoisfundamentaltoensurethatjusticeisdelivered throughtheexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofpoliticalpower,andremediallythroughthejudiciary, andalsotocreatedisincentivesforpovertycreation.Inotherwords,usinglawasapovertyreduction strategyandthelawtrainedprofessionalsthatmaycompelsystemicchangeintherulesofthegame bringtheaddedvalueofindividualizingtheresponsibilityofpublicservantswhoareatthesourceof manmadepoverty,asthepolitical,disciplinaryandevenpenalconsequencesoflegallyimpoverishing thepoorarerevealedtothepubliceye. Chapterstwoandthreeofthisreportonthelawandpolicyenvironmentoftheoccupationalgroupsof waste pickers and mine workers living in poverty illustrate the burdens of surviving in informality as own account workers, and the fact that, by doing so, they expose the sophisticated and intricate filigreethatunderliesthelegalimpoverishmentofthepoor.6
5RuizRestrepo,Adriana,NatureJuridiqueetRlePolitiquedesOrganisationsSansButLucratifduTiersSecteur,Document derecherchepourunethsedoctoraleendroitpublicdelUniversitPanthonAssas.2000(Sanspublier) 6RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor:AReadingoftheNationalConsultations fortheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor:http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf

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 1.1.2.THEINFORMALECONOMYREALM When understanding poverty as a circumstance, and, by doing so, assessing the role of law in fashioning in whole or in part the life, livelihood and development environment and conditions of a population, it is possible to observe two dominant ways out of poverty: (1) an upward movement consistingofanextraordinaryeffortofthepersonorgroupinpovertytotransitiontotheformalsector to attain formal opportunities of income generation. This is an effort premised on the general understandingthattheformalorlegalsectorprovidesmorecertaintyandthusfacilitatesplanningfor progress, as well as a broadened sense of trust in navigating the field game beyond the immediate circleoffamilyandfriends,whichinturn,facilitatesexpansionandinnovationforincomeproduction. Thepossibilityofeffectingsuchupwardmovementforleapingoutofapovertytrapdependsnotably onthetopdowneffortsmadebyinclusivelawandpolicymakers.Itispreciselyobjectivelaw,i.e.legal, policyandregulatoryframeworks,andtheeffectivepublicadministrationresponsewhatcreatesand deliverseaseofaccessandtransitorgraduationconditionstothepovertytrappedconstituentswilling toshifttoaformalorlegalmodeofincomegeneration.And(2),adownwardmovementconsistingof fasttrackingoutofpovertybytunnelingoutofthepovertytrapthroughexploitationordelinquencyin a crime driven economy that is capable of ensuring income on a constant basis and/or at rapidly increasing rate. Fast tracked income is created by challenging formality / legality and is done regardless of selfinflicted harm or the risk of harming others. Victimization, selfvictimization and delinquency are evident in a vast array of activities that range from robbery, drugcouriering and moneylaundering,passingbykidnapping,humantraffickingforlabourorsexualexploitation,andup tojoiningillegallyarmedgroupsforconflictorterrorism,amongmanyothers. RealmofFormalStateandlegallygovernedlivesandtransactions RealmofInformallivelihoodsandunlegallyframedlivesandtransactions POVERTYTRAPS Realmofcrimedrivenoccupationsandillegalbusinessestablishmentsandemployment rra (PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)thinktank

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 In between these two, there is a formallawlessland: the everextending realm of informality. This realm has experienced such prolific growth that a recent document of the OECD on the subject, entitledisinformalnormal?recognizedthevastscopeandnearnormalcyofglobalinformality.7 Theinformaleconomyunderstoodaseverycountrysrealmofformallawlessland,iswherethepoor surviveoutsideofthereachandprotectionofthelawoftheinstitutionalizedState8.Ininformality,the povertytrappedliveinacontinuumofsurvivaleffortstryingtoearnameagerincomeforsubsistence and through whatever resource is at hand or whatever opportunity, that is harmless to others, appears.Becauseoftheurgencyofneed,considerationsofformalityorlegalityofaccesstoreachable opportunitiesisirrelevant.Decencyorhonestyistheonlylimitationformanyofthepeoplelivingin povertyintheinformaleconomy.Peoplelivinginpovertywillrathercontinuetodosoasbesttheycan earningorcreatingincomethroughwhatevermeansarereadilyavailabletothem,insteadoftryingto risetotheformaleconomyorfalltothecrimedriveneconomy.9Inmostcases,thepovertytrapped willsurvivebyinvestingtheirworkcapacityinanyinformallyavailablewageopportunity(construction, domestic work, home base production, etc.) or any naturally available material resource (timber, waste,fish,leaves,sand,goldglitter,etc.),bothofwhicharebecominglessandlessavailabletothe powerless in this era of organization and globalization.10 These individuals, who are working for themselves and their families survival, regardless of existing institutions and formalities, do not fall withinthelegalorillegaldichotomy.Theyarebetterdescribedasbeingwithinarealmofunlegality, aspacethathasnotyetbeendulyreachedandorganizedthroughlawanditsinstitutionsandwhere instinct and force of life continue to take precedence over the formality derivative of political representation. Abigpartoftheinformaleconomynotthatwhichisinformalbychoiceorconvenience,suchasthe persons and establishments evading taxes and transactional responsibilities is informal for survival. For a person living in poverty, formality is either an unknown concept11 or the silly sophistication of
7Pleasesee:OECDsreportIsinformalnormal? http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_33935_42024438_1_1_1_1,00.html 8Onthisnotion,pleasereadHernandodeSotosbooksentitledTheOtherPathandTheMysteryofCapital 9 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank, On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, LEP LAB Working Document#3,2007(unpublished) 10 Progress brought by science, technology and mechanization tend to end with jobs that were once important. For instance,watercarriers(aguatero,porterdeau)oncecapitalizedonthehumanneedtoaccesswaterdailyforcookingand hygieneandgavetheopportunitytocreateamarketforthedoortodoordeliveryofwatertothosewhodidnothavea groundwater cisterns.. Nowadays access to water does not create work opportunities as it is now universally functional through aqueducts reaching directly to different rooms in the most homes and legally deemed and claimed as a public service. 11Oneofthemostillustrativecasesofunawarenessofformallawandstateorthelackofaformalitycognitionofmany personslivingandworkingforsurvivalintheinformaleconomyisthatofanoldwastepickerinCaliColombia.Duringa meeting convened by State authorities, and Waste Pickers and the CiViSOL foundation for systemic change in view to discusswaystoimplementCourtsordersofformalizingwastepickersLuisstoodupandactuallyclaimedtotheauthorities betterconditionsforhimasanemployee.Herequestedfromthemunicipalityachangeinthenighthourroutesinwhich

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 whatis,inplainandsimpleterms,thegodgivenrightornaturalhumancapacitytodowork.Ineither case, in the absence of formal opportunities and eschewing the criminal economy, these individuals wouldratherworkinformallythanstarvetodeathinduerespectoflaw. These povertytrapped individuals are more concerned with surviving and providing for themselves andtheirfamiliesthanwithwhetherthemeanstodosoareformalorinformal.Forinstance,astreet vendorknowsthatshemightbeforcedtohidefrompolicepatrollingthestreets,andriskslosingsome merchandiseintheprocess;but,becausethestreetvendorisawareoftheserisks,shemaybearand mitigate them to some degree. The costs, however, of identifying, learning and understanding the applicable law, navigating a sea of everchanging public policy, and producing the necessary documentstopresenttothebureaucracyregulatingformalbusinessventuresarefargreaterforthis streetvendorthanlivinginconstantstressandlosingsomemerchandise,especiallywhenthebenefits offormalizingarenotapparentorevencertain.Asimperfectandinefficientasinformalitymaybe,for the working poor the route to formality is as narrow and intricate as for authorities the realm of informalityisvastandprecarious.

theMajormadethewastepickersrunafterwastecollectiontrucks.Heclaimedthatitrunningbehindtrucksat2amwas very inconsiderate from the employer, that these were very hard and difficult work shifts that he would appreciate, particularlyforoldwastepickerslikehim,ifthemunicipalitycouldsendthewastetrucksatmidday.Headdedthatthose nightly hours also exposed them to being murdered by the so called social cleaning groups. By CiViSOLs request, the authorities had to actually answer the question and explain that they were informal workers living outside the reach of workopportunitiesandprotectiongivenbytheState.Anotherinterestingexampleoflegalunawarenessandirrelevance forthosesurvivinginpovertyisthatprovidedbytheformerASENTIRnonprofitcorporationworkingwithstreethomeless youth.Backinthe90smostofthemendreamtofgoingtothearmyforgettingholdofsomepower,respectandhaving legal papers to then work; women dreamt of being street vendors or establishing a home based micro business after marrying and having a baby. All of them commented night after night that the night before they had seen Colombias Presidenthimselfpatrollingthestreetsandridinghissupermotorbike.Veryinterestinglytheyhaddownsizedthelegaland formalinstitutionstheyhaveheardof,totheirquotidiancontext,oneinwhichalltheStateapparatusisrepresentedbya policeofficer.TheeducationtheylikedthemostwasthatofStatenavigationskillsandEmpowermentinrights,whichthey puttouseimmediatelyintheirrapporttothepoliceonthestreetandsocialexchanges.

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 Peoplesurvivingintheinformaleconomy,asopposed tothosecuttingcostsbyoptingtooperateinit,exert their right to life wherever an income opportunity presentsitself.Infact,theymayendupworkingin(i)a precarious informal employment opportunity, that is tosay,sellingtheirlaborinexchangeforoftenmeager wages and rarely any social protections. Even slave like jobs are widely available for those trapped in poverty, which they will still seize as they represent opportunities to provide some modicum of certainty, stability, and even hope to themselves and their Photoby:ShaillyBarnes families. Another path for income generation for the informalworkingpoor,sometimesbychoice,sometimesbecausethereisjustnootheropportunityto survive,is(ii)selfemployment,i.e.,seekingoutresourcesoropportunitiesthatmaybetransformedor to which value may beadded to create somegood or service for sale in the marketplace. Theymay work through an establishment or as individuals in own account work. Examples of selfemployed peopleinpoverty(asopposedtowelloffselfemployedentrepreneursandindependentconsultants whoareeitherinoroutofformalworkrelationships)are,usually,microandsmallestablishmentsand own account workers. The people in poverty who are selfemployed through establishments will in many occasions rely on nonprofit legal persons of a civicsolidarity nature, defined by WIEGO as MBOPs.12Individualsworkingontheirownaccount,suchasmencollectingsand,gravelandstonesat thebottomofariverforsellingittoconstructioncompanies,womenrecoveringtheglitterleftbehind industrialgoldminingoperationsoralongtheriverbedforsaleittointermediaries,women,menand theirchildrenscavengingtrashtosellasasecondarycommoditytoindustrialbuyers,oroldwomen rollingtenduleavestosellascigarsintheDelhimarketplace,allrepresentthepoorestofthepoor, whoworkandlivejustbeyondthelimitationsofextremepoverty. Forthepurposesofthisreport,theinformaleconomyisunderstoodtoincludealleconomicactivities thatarenotcoveredorareinsufficientlycoveredbyformalarrangementseitherinlaworpractice.13 Workersincludedinthisdefinitionwillusuallybeeither(1)wageworkersininformaljobsor(2)non wage workers (or the selfemployed) in informal enterprises or both.14 The first category includes employees of informal enterprises, casual or day laborers, domestic workers, unregistered or undeclared workers, temporary or parttime workers, and industrial outworkers or homeworkers.15
12 On this notion, please read Chen, Martha Alter et al.: Membership Based Organizations of the Poor: Concepts, ExperiencesandPolicy 13ILO.TheInformalEconomy,NotefromtheCommitteeonEmploymentandSocialPolicy 14Forinstance,paiddomesticworkcanbeincludedinthisdefinition.Unpaidorprecariousdomesticworkorcareactivities that most of the worlds poor women engage in for the better part of their reproductive years still remain formally unacknowledged in many countries. Fortunately, ILO is advancing a standardsetting effort, a Domestic Workers rights ConventiontobedefinedonJune2011. 15Pleaseread:MarthaAlterChen,RethinkingtheInformalEconomy:LinkageswiththeFormalEconomyandtheFormal RegulatoryEnvironment

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 Alongwithownersofinformalenterprises,owneroperatorsofinformalenterprises,andunpaidfamily workers16,ownaccountworkers(bothheadsoffamilyenterprisesandindividualworkers)fallunder the second category, and in all developing regions, the second category of the selfemployed constitutes a greater proportion of the informal employment than wageemployment. The self employedrepresentseventypercentoftheinformalworkinsubSaharanAfrica,sixtytwopercentin NorthAfrica,sixtypercentinLatinAmerica,andfiftyninepercentinAsia.17IfSouthAfricaisexcluded, the share of selfemployment in informal enterprises rises to eightyone percent in subSaharan Africa.18Theglobaleconomiccrisiswillhavecontributedtoaconsiderableincreaseinthesenumbers. InfacttheInternationalLaborOrganizations(ILO)GlobalEmploymentTrendUpdatefortheyear2009 estimated that global unemployment would increase anywhere from 29 to 59 million people since 2007,correspondingtoaglobalunemploymentrateof6.5to7.4percent.19Thenumbersofmenand womenwhowillbeinvulnerableemploymentasownaccountworkersorunpaidfamilyworkers arecauseforparticularconcern,becausetheywillhavenorecourseotherthantocontinueworking forlowerwages,andwillconsequentlyfaceevengreaterthreatstotheirlivingandworkingconditions. The ILO estimates that this group of vulnerable workers will account for 48.9 to 52.8 percent of the globalworkforceorbetween1.49and1.6billionworkersworldwide.20Intheworstpossiblescenario, andinlightoftheemergingimpactofthecrisisonlabormarkets,thenumbersoftheextremeworking poororthoseearninglessthan$1.25perdaymayincreasebyasmuchas233million.21Evenby conservativeestimates,thenumberofadditionalworkerslivinginextremepovertymayswellby122 millionsince2007.22Thus,itispossiblethattherewillbemorethan1.4billionworkerslivingbelow$2 perday,showinganincreaseofmorethan200millionpeoplesince2007.23InLatinAmericaandthe Caribbean, it is projected that unemployment will rise by anywhere from 22 million to nearly 26 million,correspondingtoanunemploymentrateofbetween8.1and9.2percent.Theregionsshareof
16 It is important to highlight that the self employed, the component in which the most defenseless poor may be statisticallyencompassedmaybelinkedtowhatclassanalystswillcallthepetitbourgeoisie,thatisprofessionalsandartists thatworkautonomouslyandareincreasinglyhomebasedandthatwillfallintheinformaleconomywhenoperatinginthe marginsoflawforconveniencereasons. 17ILO,WomenandMenintheInformalEconomy:AStatisticalPicture,p.7. 18ILO,WomenandMenintheInformalEconomy,p.7. 19ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrends,p.4,8 20Ibid,p.14 21Ibid,p.16 22Ibid.p.17 23 Global Employment Trend Update, p. 17; According to the Global Employment Trend Update, the United States and European countries are experiencing an increase in unemployment that was much greater than anticipated the total number of unemployed is estimated at 39.7 to 46.4 million people and will account for 35 to 40 percent of the global increaseinunemployment,despitecomprisinglessthan16percentoftheglobal[labor]force.CentralandSouthEastern Europe(nonEU)andCISregionsareexpectinganincreaseofasmuchas35percentin2009.InEastandSouthEastAsia (andPacific),vulnerableemploymentisanotablechallenge,representing51.8to56.6percentoftotalemploymentinEast Asia and over 60 percent of employment in South east Asia; this could rise to as much as 64 percent of employment in SouthEastAsiain2009.InSouthAsia,thenumberofvulnerableworkersmaygrowbyasmuchas493million,whichwould accountfor79percentoftotalemployment.ItisespeciallyalarminginIndia,wherenearly80percentofworkerswere livingonlessthan$2perdaybeforetheeconomiccrisis.23InSubSaharanAfrica,upwardsofthreequartersofworkers willfacevulnerableemployment.Pleasesee:ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendUpdate,pgs.1720

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 vulnerable workers was expected to increase by as much as 34.5 percent in 2009, forecasting a considerabledropinwageemployment.24 Thesefigures,althoughtroubling,stilldonotshowthattheconditionsofthemostvulnerableofthe workingpoorwilldeteriorateastheirranksincrease.Theseworkerswhethertheyarewageworkers orselfemployedwillbecompetingwitheachotherforthedeflatedwagesdescribedaboveandwith stillnosocialprotectiontorelyuponwhenthosewagesfallshortorwheneventheinformaleconomy cannot accommodate them. Yet, their particular circumstances are not necessarily highlighted by domesticregulations.Indeed,althoughtheworkingpoorandtheirlaborcharacteristicshavebecome morestatisticallyvisibletobothscholarsandpolicymakersasthedefinitionoftheinformaleconomy hasevolved,inmanycountries,theinformaleconomyhasremainedofficiallyunchanged.Intermsof lawandpolicy,theinformaleconomyisstillonlyconsideredtoincludeunincorporatedenterprisesand employers,eventhoughinrealityitscomplexityisinlinewiththemodernconceptionadoptedin1993 andrevisedagainin2003.Thepublicpolicyinthesecountriescontinuestopivotonananachronistic definition that not only excludes informal employment relations, but also lacks a povertybased differentiation of the informal economy, one that would more effectively reach the povertytrapped whoaresurvivingthroughinformalmicrobusinessemploymentand,moreover,throughownaccount work. 1.1.3.OWNACCOUNTWORKERS:ATTHECROSSROADSOFENTREPRENEURSHIPANDLABORRIGHTS Despitebeingawareofthevastdimensionoftheinformaleconomy,andthetwomainpathsthatare available for the povertytrapped to create income, this report narrows its scope to own account workers, possibly the most vulnerable and least studied category within the informal economy. As commissionedbyWIEGO,thisreportanditsnarrowedfocusrepresentamajoropportunityforpoverty reduction through law and policy inclusion into mainstream development. For many occupational groupsoftheinformaleconomy,and,notablythetwoconsideredindepthinChapterstwoandthree, lawisveryrelevant:theStateshapesandcontrolswhomayaccessvaluableresourcessuchaswaste orgold,aswellastheparametersofthataccess. For own account workers specifically, their particular vulnerability may be explained by their lack of connectedness25,directlyorindirectly,toformalmainstreamopportunitiesandprotectionsoftheState and the formal market. By comparison, informal employees working in either a formal or informal business have at least, the possibility of learning in the establishments where they work. Through collectiveexchange,itispossiblefortheseinformalemployeestobuildtheirunderstandingofrights, rules and formal justice and detect opportunities to channel their claims into collective voice and organizationspaces.Theownaccountworker,however,isliterallyonherown.Withoutanimmediate surroundingtofostersomekindofautomaticcooperationorsolidarity,herfellowcolleaguesarealso
24Ibid,p.20 25RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor:AReadingoftheNationalConsultations for the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf

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 ownaccountworkers,usuallyindirectcompetitionforaccesstothesameresourcesthatsheneedsfor herandherfamilyssurvival.Their workisinastateofperpetualdisconnectfromworkandmarket networks,dialoguesand,usually,theoutreachcapacityoftheState.26 Fromajuridicalstandpoint,ownaccountworkersfallunderboth(a)therighttobeentrepreneur,i.e. therighttofreelychooseaprofessionoroccupationandtocreateanenterprise,and(b)therightto labor for someone elses venture. In fact, it is possible to say that in the autonomousentrepreneur capacityoftheirworkactivities,ownaccountworkerscreateworkingopportunitiesbyexertingtheir constitutional right to entrepreneur27 and by developing as much innovation as survival requires. In thissense,manyownaccountworkersaretheultimateentrepreneurs,creatingincomeopportunities wherethelabormarketdoesnot.28Thismicroentrepreneurialismdoesnotinvolvethehiringofothers until necessary, although familial help or support is common. The unpaid contributions of family membersensuresthatallincomegeneratedprovidesforthosewhomtheentrepreneurisresponsible.
hastofind andaccess materialon herown account hasto innovate,use ordevelop knowhow hastoadd valueto material provided hastofollow instructions ofthe material owner IFEXERTINGTHERIGHTTOENTREPRENEUR THEN: IFEXERTINGTHERIGHTTOEMPLOYMENT,THEN:

Autonomous Entrepreneur Effort

O W N A C C O U N T

W O R K E R

Subordinate Employee Effort

rra (PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)thinktank

26 It is important to note that persons working in slave like jobs and bonded labor are in even a higher level of defenselessness because infactthey are victims thecriminal exploitation ofhuman beings and the transnational human trafficking,thatfacilitatesit. 27 On this point see the livelihood and entrepreneurship arguments presented by the CiViSOL Foundation for Systemic Change, to the Constitutional Court of Justice in Colombia accepted and further developed through ruling T29109. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=Y2l2aXNvbC5vcmd8bGEtYmFzdXJhLWVzLXZpZGF8Z3g6NmViOWZiM TI3NzcwZTYxYw&pli=1 28Notallownaccountworkersareinnovatorsandentrepreneursinthesenseproposed.Actuallymanyseemtobeown accountworkersleanmoretothedependentemployeeside.Delocalizedfromthefactoryorestablishmentandlaboringin theirownpremises,homebasedproducersreceiveallmaterialthatistobetransformed.Theydonthavetoseekaccess andacquireresourcestoaddvalue.

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 On the autonomousentrepreneur side, the own account worker must identify and obtain her own materialstotransformintocommercialcommodities,whilecarryingalltherisksofafailedinvestment withnosafetynet;andonthedependantemployeeside,sheisworkingunderadependencytothe buyersofherproduceormerchandise,asubordinationspringingfromtheurgencyofsurvival. In this train of thought, and on the entrepreneurlike side, many of the own account working poor stronglydependonlawandregulationforhavingarighttoaccessthematerial,beiturbanwasteor alluvialglittergold,toaddvaluetoitbyseparation,classificationoreventransport.Ontheemployee likeside,theownaccountworkingpoorhavevirtuallynoabilitytonegotiatethetermsofsaleandwill acceptwhateverpriceabuyeroffersfortheirwares,regardlessofthelaborinvestedbothinacquiring thematerialandinitstransformationforcommercialization.Asmuchasthemeanstomaterialaccess ofresourcesisdeterminedbylawandregulation,themarketaccessisdeterminedunilaterallybythe buyer and does not necessarily factor in the varied physical capacities or requirements of individual workers. For example, how much an urban waste picker will earn is a function of that individuals strengthandendurance.Theelderly,disabledandincapacitatedfindthemselvesingreatersituations of defenselessness where their product is valued, but their labor is not. Own account workers are, therefore, intensely unfree, tightly bound by both policy and regulatory frameworks and industrial forces.Atthesametime,thisimpliesthattheretwosetsofrights(businessandentrepreneurial)to claimandlegallyempoweroutoftheirpovertytraps. Upon even closer inspection, an own account worker may find herself facing circumstances that are wellbeyondherabilitytocontrol,influenceormitigate,andwhichmaypropelherintoevengreater conditionsofvulnerabilityandimpoverishment.Returningtotheexampleofwastepickers,theimpact oftheglobaleconomiccrisisonbusinessesandproducersofconsumergoods,whohaveexperienced declines in sales and increases in inventory, has translated into considerable drops in prices for salvagedmaterials.Asexportsofrawmaterialshavedropped,entitiesthatwouldnormallybuythese materials from waste pickers have stopped doing so. 29 In their capacity as entrepreneurs, waste pickers will continue to exploit their personal resources, i.e., their physical capacity to recuperate recyclables,theirknowhowdevelopedoveryearsofdoingso,andtheiraccesstoavailablematerials asbestastheycan;andintheircapacityasemployees,theymustacceptthedeflatedpricesoffered for their wares and labor. These workers will, most likely, work longer hours while earning lower wages,inotherwords,workwithlessstabilityandsecurityandliveingreatervulnerability.
29ForinstancetheAsociaciondeRecicladoresdeBogota(ARB),asofJanuary2009,indicatedthat,themarketforhighand lowdensitypolyethylenehascometoastandstillandtheferrousscrapmetalmarkethasseenadeclineofseventypercent inprices,whilenonferroushasdroppednearlysixtypercent.InIndia,theSelfEmployedWomensAssociations(SEWA) estimates show that the prices of steel iron, hard plastic, plastic bags, paper and cloth in India had all been cut from October2008toJanuary2009,somejustonethirdasvaluableastheyonceweremonthsago.InpartsofBrazil,cardboard wastethatoncewasboughtfornearlyhalfofaBrazilianrealinlate2009wasworthaslittleasonecentandasmuchas fourteencents.Onthistopic,seehttp://www.wiego.org/about_ie/ie_news.php#ieNewsWastePickers

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 While this relationship of the own account worker to the buyers of her goods and services can be highlyexploitative,italsoshowsthattheinformaleconomyisnotaseparateanddistinctentityfrom theformaleconomy.Rather,inmanysituations,informalenterprisesmaybelinkedwithformalfirms through different commercial relationships, individual transactions, subsectors or value chains and informalworkersmaybelinkedtoformalfirmsinsituationsofdisguisedemploymentorambiguous employment. The own account worker above must engage with buyers who may be formal or informaltomakeherliving.Sheis,infact,relyingonsomerelationshipwiththeformaleconomy that establishes the market prices for her goods and services. What differentiates the formal and informalelementsoftheeconomyisinlargeparttheabsencenotonlyofapplicableandappropriate regulation,butalsolegalandsocialprotectionsforworkersintheinformaleconomy,which,therefore assumeacentralroleinthepolicydiscussionaroundinformality.30 When organized into cooperatives and associations, individual own account workers acquire a legal personhoodthatenablesthemtobargainforbetterprices.Onoccasion,however,theseorganizations endupbeingnothingmorethanashellgivingtheillusionofanorganizedandformaltrade;withinit the informality of each individuals own account labor, and the precariousness of their work and exploitativeconditions,remainthesame.31Theindividualworkersremainentrenchedintheinformal economy,withoutanydegreeofsocialprotection,regardlessoftheirorganizationandduemainlyto thelackofaworkeridentityandsomelawandpolicyspacetoeffectivelyworkanddevelop.Whatis worseisthattheguiseofformalityshroudingtheseorganizedinformalworkersmaycometomislead policy makers into believing that these workers are choosing informality, rather than actually being excludedfromtheformaleconomy.Asrationalizedabove,forapersonlivinginpovertychoiceisnot anoption.Theyworkwhereverworkistobefound,withwhateverisathand.AWorldBankstudyon informality in Latin America and the Caribbean32 found that approximately onethird of the informal selfemployedinBrazil(45percentamongwomen),40percentoftheinformalselfemployedworkers in Argentina, 25 percent in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, and nearly 60 percent in Colombia wouldratherbeworkinginsalariedjobswithbenefitsthantheircurrentsituations.33Thesenumbers do not mean that there are not informal selfemployed workers who choose to be informal; they merely indicate that there is a desire among some proportion of the selfemployed who would not chooseinformalityifotheroptionswereavailable.Thissegmentoftheselfemployedaremostlikely
30Heyzer,Noeleen.PresentationonGlobalizationandGenderPerspectivesfortheWomensFederationforWorldPeace http://www.wfwp.org/wfwpi/library/archive/03/NHeyzer03.pdf 31 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank. On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, LEP LAB Working Document#3,2007(unpublished) 32 Unless otherwise specified, Latin America is used in this paper to refer to the following countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,Paraguay,Peru,Suriname,Uruguay,andVenezuela.Caribbeancountries,whichareonlyreferredtoinsomeof thedatainthisdocument,includeAntiguaandBarbuda,Aruba,theBahamas,Barbados,CaymanIslands,Cuba,Dominican Republic,Grenada,Haiti,Jamaica,PuertoRico,St.KittsandNevis,St.Lucia,St.VincentandtheGrenadines,andTrinidad andTobago. 33Perry,GuillermoE.etal.Informality:ExitandExclusion,p.65

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 tobethoseforwhomselfemploymentcarriesthemostrisksandtheleastbenefits,i.e.,ownaccount workers. Yet,theinformalactorswhohavereceivedthemostattentionfrompolicymakersarethosethatare informal out of convenience, in other words, the businesses of those individuals, usually SMEs, who have chosen to be informal rather than those who are forced into situations of informality. In fact, although the informal economy was discovered in the 1970s, own account work was not even included in the idea of the informal economy until over twenty years later. Instead, the informal economy was a term applied only to unregulated economic enterprises or activities. In 1993, the Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector, adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians, began to recognize unregistered (or unincorporated) enterprisesbelowacertainsize,e.g.,microenterprisesownedbyinformalemployerswhohiredone or more employees on a continuing basis, as well as ownaccount operations owned by individuals whomayemploycontributingfamilyworkersandemployeesonanoccasionalbasis.34In2003,the International Conference expanded the notion again in order to capture not only entrepreneurial relations,butalsoemploymentrelationsfoundintheinformalsector,aswellasinformalemployment thatexistsoutsidetheinformalsector. 1.1.4.COLOMBIA,POVERTYANDTHEINFORMALECONOMY SetinthecornerofSouthAmericawithaccesstoboththeAtlanticandPacificoceans,borderedwith CentralAmericaviaPanama,separatedbydenseAmazonjunglefromEcuador,PeruandBrazilandby the vast oriental llanos or plains from Venezuela, Colombia is a country that has developed predominantly through its cities. Most of them are found along the valleys and hills of the three AndeanmountainrangesthatcrossthroughthecountryanddowntotheCaribbeanSea. From a legal perspective it is worth noting that the Political Constitution of 1991 institutionalizes ColombiaasaSocialStateofRights,whichthusservesasthedemocraticpremiseandprinciplefora socialruleoflaw.Thisruleoflawistobedeliveredthroughlaw,policyandregulationframeworks,but it has also been advanced by the very progressive Constitutional Court and judiciary branch of Colombia. Indeed, the Colombian juridical System stems from the civil family of law and thus has a separateAdministrativeCourt,theCouncilofstate,anditsmainsourceoflawiscodifiedratherthan jurisprudential.Increasingly,thepoliticallylegislateddomesticlawisbeingconstitutionalizedthrough groundbreaking precedents, many of which recurrently draw from international human rights standards. Article 93 of the Colombian Constitution is, in fact, at the source of what is called the bloquedeconstiticionalidadaconstitutionalarticlethatratifiedinternationalhumanrightstreaties thatareconsequentlydirectlyincorporatedinthenationallegalorder.
34WIEGO,AbouttheInformalEconomy,http://www.wiego.org/about_ie/definitionsAndTheories.php

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 Fromapoliticalstandpoint,Colombiaisacentralizedrepublicbasedonawellestablisheddemocratic regime and with decentralized territorial administration. Mayors of Colombian municipalities are elected by universal suffrage just as with the President of the Republic and the Senators and Representatives of the Congress. For many years now Colombia has been leaning towards a Presidentialsystemandaneoliberaltrendingeconomicmodel.JuanManuelSantoswaselectedinas President in August 2010 under the same political affiliation as the preceding eight years under President Alvaro Uribe. Initially characterized as a government focusing on democratic security, and implying a concern over State security rather than Human Security, the new central administration claimstobedevotingalleffortstodemocraticprosperity.Acabinetwithtechnicalexpertiseandopen andfrankdialoguewiththeSupremeCourtandleadersoftheoppositionhavesentmessagesofrelief and optimism to a rather small sector of the population that was concerned with former President Uribes trend towards implementing a so called State of Opinion. President Uribe at one point indicatedsomeintenttorunforofficeathirdtime,andbydoingso,increasinglydeinstitutionalized thecountryandweakenedtheruleoflaw.Itisworthnotingthattheaffectionofthepeoplearound the country, with whom the President met weekly, and the vast support within the business community for his economic policies are reflected in former President Uribes 84 percent approval rating. Because it is still too early to assess the new Santos presidency, and because the policy and regulatoryframeworksadoptedandenforcedinthepastyearsarestilltheonesthatremainvalidand shape society and the market, this section will continue to refer to what has been until now the sociopoliticalsituationofthecountry. OneofthemostglaringconsequencesoftheintenseconflictColombiahasenduredoverthepast50 years and the recent Democratic Security program of the former Uribe government has been the obfuscationofpovertyasbothacoreissueandcrosscuttingconcerninlawandpolicymaking.Infact, Colombia,acountryofmorethan40millionpeople,isrankedasoneofthemostinequitablecountries in Latin America, a region that in turn, is considered as one of the most inequitable regions of the world.LivingfarawayfromBogota,thepoliticalcapitalofthecountry,theruralpeasantpoor(many of whom are afroColombian and indigenous) are the visible face of Colombias conflict. With their children recruited by any one of the several illegally armed groups, working in illicit agriculture with cropsthatarefarbetterpaidthancoffeeorbananas,trappedintrilateralcrossfire(army,guerrillas and paramilitaries) and displaced from their lands and livelihoods, they live in conditions of utter exclusion from the policy decisions that affect their every day survival. Rural women bear extraordinaryeconomicpressureswhenmenleavetoworkinthecitiesorarerecruitedfortheconflict byirregulargroups.Meanwhile,theforceddisplacementofruralfamiliestothecitiestranslatesinto greaterurbanpovertyandamoreexpansiveurbaninformaleconomy. FormanyyearsandlikeothercountriesinLatinAmerica,ColombiahadMarxistguerrillaexpressions (M19,EPL,ELNandFARC)fightingfortherevolutionoftheworkingclassandinstallingacommunist politicalregime.TheFARCandELNguerillagroupsarestillactive,butinthe1980s,itiswellknownthat theybegantolosetheirpoliticalideology,or,moreprecisely,totradeoffabigpartoftheirpolitical legitimacybyenteringintoandbeingsustainedbythedrugtraffickingbusiness.Whilestillactive,the 26

 guerilla groups are hidden in the mountains of Colombia and have been working in cities through urbanmilitiasthatare,supposedly,linkedtolaborunionsandpopuliststudentmovements,aswidely messagedoutbyseveralmembersoftheoutgoing,andevenearlier,governments.Ontheotherside ofthepoliticalspectrumaretheparamilitaryillegalarmedgroupsthatdrawfromtheextremerightof Colombiaspoliticalideologicalspectrumandwerebornoutofdesiretorefraintheexpandingleftist guerrillas as they perceived the State was unable to do. Like leftistguerrillas, rightistparamilitaries have also financed their war with the multinational business of drug trafficking to supply an illegal, globaldemandfornarcoticsubstances. With this background, and although difficult to affirm, it is possible to explain that in Colombia, the broadpublicopinionnotably,thatwhichisorientedbymainstreammedia,thatis,inturn,generally ownedbyindustrialsinvestorsandleadersisonewherelaborunionsareusuallyperceivedasbeing either linked or empathically too close to the leftist guerilla groups in the country. This has had enormousimpactonthespacefororganizingandempoweringonworkrelatedrights,ashavemost economic policies tending towards the opening of markets, competition, free trade and foreign investment.Thisapplicationofneoliberalideologyhas,inturn,translatedintoflexiblelaborpolicies thathaveintenselyburdenedworkersbyextendingworkinghours,reducingpaymentforworkingon Sundaysandholidays,andtheauthorizationofintenseoutsourcingoflaborthatispassedonasservice provision. In many cases, this takes place by softly forcing the creation of cooperatives prior to licensing the individual membership as employees so as to ensure a continuous supply of labor. Indeed, for many years, Colombia has been intensely lobbying for a free trade agreement with the UnitedStates,andhasrecentlymadesubstantiveprogressontheapprovalofaTradeagreementwith theEuropeanUnion. With an unemployment rate of 12.2 percent, and ranking second after the Dominican Republic in terms of unemployment in Latin America, Colombias employment policy is actually resulting in a structural problem. Even though this unemployment rate is considerably less than the 20 percent experiencedin2001orthe14percentin2009,itisfarhigherthantheratesthatacountrywithsuch levelsofnationaldevelopmentshouldhave,forinstance,Brazilsunemploymentwasat8.1percent, Peru 8.4 percent, Morocco 9.9 percent, India 5 percent or Iceland 7.6 percent and that after the financialcrisisof2008.35 ThemostrecentnationalpovertydatashowsthatthepercentageofColombianswholivedbelowthe povertylinein2009was45.5percent,comparedto46percentin2008,andthattheGiniindexslightly narrowedto0.578from0.589ofthepreviousyear.Thismeansthatoutof43.7millionofColombians, almost20million(45.5percent)livebelowthepovertylineand7.2million(16.4percent)areindigent ordestitute,ametricthatmaybebroadlyequatedtoanationallineofextremepovertyatUSD2per day.Forcomparisonpurposes,in1995thepercentageofColombianslivingbelowthepovertylinewas 50.9 percent and 17 percent were in extreme poverty or destitution. According to theNational
35Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/actualidad/economia/retossantoseconomia_73275.aspx

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 AdministrativeDepartmentofStatistics(DANE),Colombiansareconsideredpoorwhentheirmonthly incomeislessthan281,384Colpesos(143USD),andindigentordestitutewhentheyearnlessthan 120,588ColPesos(61USD),slightlyhigherthantheglobalstandardofUSD1.25usedformeasuring extremepoverty. Thelegalminimumwagein2009was556.200COPand576.500COPfor2010,36whichmeansthatan averageColombianhouseholdrelyingononesourceofincomelivedonanequivalentof285USDper monthin2009.37 By 2010, the social expenditure, a constitutionally ranked priority in Colombias public budgeting, amountedto14.41percentoftheGDP;however,muchofthesefundsarelostthroughbothpublicand private corruption. For instance, ithas been recently discovered that,when crossed with fiscal data, beneficiariesofSISBEN,thenationalsystemforidentifyingthepopulationinpovertytoreceivesocial services,includedmorethan250.000people38withincomeshigherthanthenationalpovertyline. In this environment, Colombias economic growth for 2010 has been forecasted to be one of the lowest in the region. This is due to the public investment restrictions caused by a failure to collect taxable income and maintaining sovereign debt.39 Private household consumption for 2010 is expectedtobeaslowasaroundonepercentduetoheavyfinancialburdens,thereductionofformal wageworkandhighunemployment. While immersed in the background research for this report, the most conspicuous aspects of Colombiasinformaleconomyarethat(a)itappearsasaverycloseddomainoftheoreticaleconomic researchandthusaccessingrelevantdataformonitoringtheinformaleconomyandparticipatoryand inclusive governance is extremely difficult; (b) the informal economy is mainly of interest to policy makers seeking growth through the promotion of MSME and very rarely will there be more than a slightreferencetotheinformalMSME;(c)theapproachtotheinformaleconomyisdeterminedmainly aroundthosewhooperateinformallybychoiceratherthanthosewhoareinformalbyneed.This,in turn, translates to channeling most authorities thought and action to improving tax collection and easingbureaucraticcontrolsorredtapesoastofacilitatethetransitioningofinformalestablishments totheformaleconomy.However,generallyspeaking,thepopulationofColombianssurvivingthrough the informal economy receives very little or no attention whatsoever, and that (d) in terms of the public opinion, there is a vast grey zone of activity that is broadly identified as the realm of the informaleconomy,withinthereisnocleardistinctionbetweentheeconomythatislegallybasedfrom theonethatiscriminallydriven.Thisisalsotrueforpolicymakersand,basedontheauthorsresearch andunderstandingandasevidencedinthefollowingchapters,theabsenceofacriteriatodistinguish
36Pleasesee:http://www.businesscol.com/empresarial/tributarios/salario_minimo.htm 37Pleasesee:http://en.mercopress.com/2010/05/04/almosthalfof43.7millioncolombianslivebelowthepovertyline 38Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/actualidad/economia/retossantoseconomia_73275.aspx 39AFedesarrolloeconomicprojection;citedinLaEconomaenBarrena,PeridicoAlmaMater,February2010

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 informality by choice and informality by need aggravates the vulnerability of the povertytrapped constituent.Further,thisgapmakesisverydifficulttoholdpolicymakersaccountableforaprocessof inclusivedevelopment.Itispossiblethatthisgapthisfailuretounderstandthespaceandconditions within economic and development policy where the informal working poor of Colombia operate mightexplainwhythepovertytrappedinColombiatendtoonlyreceiveassistanceandhumanitarian attention,insteadofthelaboridentityandeconomicincentivesneededforsecuringaformalspaceto work and develop, to lift themselves out of poverty and effectively contribute to the economic developmentofthecountry. The DANE 2005 definition of informal economy in Colombia deems as informal, all workers in establishments of up to 10 workers; non remunerated family workers; domestic workers; own account workers excluding professional and independent technicians, employers with 10 or less workers.InarecentnationalpolicydocumentofJune2008,theCONPES3527onCompetivenessand Productivity plans for a redefinition of the informal economy concept and the optimization of its statisticalinformation.Ithasalsoagreed40andaimstopivotalllaborformalizationonthedecentwork principlesandthestrengtheningofprotectionsystemtotheunemployed.Thesamepolicydocument aims for bettering social dialogue, corporate social responsibility in labour matters, strengthening labour law inspection and enforcement and to strengthen entrepreneurship for labour inclusion of vulnerable population such as women, people with handicap, ethnical minorities and the youth. Among others, the CONPES also foresees promoting voluntary savings for old age prevision and bettering occupational health and professional risks, among others. If implemented, this CONPES shouldopenchannelsforstartingtostrategicallyaddresstheinformalityofmanyColombianpoorand followrecommendation195oftheILOontrainingfortheinformaleconomyandthemanyotherILO conventions and recommendations on the informal economy and the fulfillment of economic, social andculturalrightsforall.

1.2.MAINCHALLENGESFORINCLUSIVEPOLICYMAKING
1.2.1.WOMEN Using law as a poverty reduction strategy demands a differential analysis to not only highlight the diversityofpovertiesexperiencedbytheworldsbottombillion,butalsotoilluminatethevariedpaths outoftheircircumstances.Thismaybemostgenerallyapparentwhenanalyzingpovertyintermsof sex: national level data show that the systemic discrimination facing women in terms of education, healthcareandotherresourcestranslatesintomorewomenlivingandworkinginpovertythanmen. These discriminatory practices, often defended by cultural or religious ideology, have multiplicative effects for women in the labor market. Women enter the labor market with fewer marketrelevant skills than men, further limiting their economic opportunities. With formal employment already limitedinitscapacitytoabsorbtheavailablelaborforce,womenarecrowdedintoanarrowrangeof opportunitiesintheformaleconomy,encouragingthemtotakeonwhateverworkisavailable,beit formal or informal.41 These women will accept lowerpaying jobs with increasingly fewer social
40 Republica de Colombia, DNP, Documento CONPES 3527 Poltica nacional de Competitividad y Productividad, Consejo NacionaldePolitiaEconomicaySocial,23deJuniode2008,p.35 41Kabeer,Naila.MainstreamingGenderinSocialProtectionfortheInformalEconomy,p.91.

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 protectionsandsevereblowstotheirinherentdignitytocontinuetoprovidemeagersupportfortheir familiesandchildren.42In2008,womenmadeuplessthanhalfofthegloballaborforce,accountingfor only40.5percentoftheworldsworkers,showingthattheyactuallyhavelessaccesstolabormarkets thanmen.43Ofthesewomen,lessthanhalfwereemployedinwageorsalariedwork(45.5percent), while the percentage of women engaged as own account workers rose over five percentage points from1997to28percentin2008.44Ofthe1.5billionpeoplewhoareownaccountworkersorunpaid family workers worldwide, 51.7 percent were women in 2008.45 The global economic crisis may furtherentrenchwomeninthesecircumstancesofvulnerableemploymentandtheymayaccountfor asmuchas54.7percentofownaccountandunpaidfamilyworkersasthecrisisimpactsettlesintothe worlds labor markets.46 In Latin America, for instance, a more significant impact on vulnerable employmentratecanbeexpectedforwomenthanformen.47Womenare,therefore,amongthemost defenselessoftheworldsworkers.48 Evenintheinformaleconomy,womensworkandcontributionstothehousehold,family,community andcountrygounacknowledgedorunsupported.Forinstance,duetoitsunpaidnature,womensrole inthecareeconomyissimplynotincludedinnationallaborstatisticsoreconomiccalculationsandis insteadcategorizedwithalldomesticwork.Povertytrappedwomen,whousetheirfewfreehoursof thedayweavingmats,makingandsellingfood,cleaningfishorotherwisesupportingtheirmalefamily membersbusinesses,areunderestimatedbotheconomicallyandsocially.Thesewomensworkisnot valuedorrecognizedaswork,whichmeansthenthatthelawdoesntgrantthemalabouridentityon which to build and develop, posing a great challenge to policy makers attempting to address those individualsandfamiliestrappedinpoverty.AccordingtoroughestimatesgaugedbyUNDP,in1995, thevalueofunpaidactivitiesattheprevailingwagetotaledto$16trillionorapproximately70percent of the worlds total output; of this amount, nearly 69 percent $11 trillion was accounted for by womens unpaid work.49 While it is extremely difficult to compare paid and unpaid work, these estimatesindicatethecontributionofwomensworkalbeitunpaidtotheglobaleconomy.50
42Ibid,p.91 43ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsForWomenMarch2009,p.9. 44Ibid,p.9 45Goetz,etal.,WhoAnswerstoWomen,p.118 46ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsforWomen,p.30. 47Ibid 48Thereis,ofcourse,considerableregionalvarietyintermsofwomensvulnerableemployment.Inseveralregionsofthe worldDevelopedEconomiesandEU,CentralandSouthEasternEuropeandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwomen were in less vulnerable jobs than men in 2007. This indicates that access to labor markets does not necessarily provide accesstodecentjobs.Transformingthesejobsintodecentworkrequiresnotonlythatworkerproductivityincrease,but thatthisincreaseinproductivitycorrespondstoanincreaseinwages.Thus,perhapsmoreimportantthantheimpactof thiscrisisisthepersistenceofsocialandculturalbarriersthatwomenexperienceinbothaccessinglabormarketsandonce inthelaborforce. 49Beneria,Lourdes,Gender,DevelopmentandGlobalization:EconomicsasifAllPeopleMattered,p.74,citingUNDP1995 estimates. 50Beneria,p.74,citingUNDP1995estimates;itislikely,ofcourse,thatboththedollarcontributionandthepercentage contributionofwomensunpaidworkhaschangedsince1995.Thisitprovidedjusttounderscoretheextentofwomens

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 Womensrightsare,ofcourse,wellrecognizedundertheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,and other human rights conventions that later determined the specific need of highlighting womens human rights. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),theICESCR,theICCPR,theBeijingDeclarationandPlatformofAction,regionalchartersand protocols, including the UNSC Resolution 1820 recognizing sexual violence against women as a war crime, and others, all recognize the unique position that the worlds women and their economic, political,social,andsexualrightswarrantspecialattention.In2008,poverty,workandgenderwere specifically addressed in the new target under Millennium Development Goal 1 on extreme poverty andhunger.Thenewtargetfocusesonreducingthenumbersofownaccountworkersand,indoing so, encourages countries to begin capturing this element of their labor markets and economics in greater detail and with a disaggregated, differentiated approach, a much needed first step in illuminating the extent of vulnerable work among women and eventually addressing their particular labordemands. Within the category of povertytrapped women there is, however, great complexity, requiring a deliberately designed and executed differential analysis from a law and policy perspective. In Latin America,womenofAfricanorindigenousdescentfaceanaggravateddiscriminatoryexperiencedueto their ethnic origin. In Brazil, for instance, 71 percent of AfroBrazilian women work in the informal economy,whichstandsincontrasttoAfroBrazilianmen(65percent),whitewomen(61percent),and white men (48 percent).51 These women face intersecting forms of disadvantage: as members of a household,theywillhavelessaccesstoeducation,food,healthservicesandvaluableresourcessuchas land;asworkers,thisdiscriminationandtheirgreaterhouseholdresponsibilitiestranslateintolimited opportunities for work in the formal economy, as well as lower incomes in the informal economy; regardless of these conditions, these povertytrapped women must work, and therefore, fall disproportionatelyamongtheranksofthemostvulnerableofworkers. In these circumstances, organization among women workers is crucial to raising their capacity to influence the decisionmaking processes that impact their lives and livelihoods. Womens organizations raise their multiple roles as worker, head of household, mothers, and partners, and express their practical concerns over childcare, safety, sexual harassment and domestic violence, amongotherissues.Whilewomenareoverrepresentedamongownaccountandvulnerableworkers, theirleadershipamongorganizationsoftheseworkersisnotalwaysrepresentativeoftheirnumbers and presence. The waste pickers associations and cooperatives in Colombia present a remarkable exception:whilemenandwomenarenearlyequallynumberedinthisorganizationofwastepickers, womenaremoreorlessequallyrepresentedamongtheirleadership.Thus,theissuesfacingwomen wastepickersasmothers,caretakersofelderlyordisabledfamilymembers,girlsandworkersmay

activitiesthat,althoughhighlyvaluable,remainunvaluedbecausetheyareunpaid. 51Abramo,LuisandValenzuela,MariaElena,WomensLabourForceParticipationRatesinLatinAmerica,p.382

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 beexpressedandmadeexplicit,inthehopesthattheirpublicunveilingwillcompelthepublicdecision makingprocesstotakenoteandveerintheirdirection. 1.2.2.CHILDREN Despite international conventions and norms prohibiting the exploitation of child labor, in particular theConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC)andILOConvention182ontheWorstFormsofChild Labor,childrenremainastapleoftheinformaleconomy.Forapovertytrappedfamilywithoneor bothparentsworkingintheinformaleconomytheopportunitiesforformallyeducatingtheirchildren may be virtually nonexistent; and, without resources to provide for child care, these children, especiallywhenyoung,willendupaccompanyingtheirmothers,fathers,andotherfamilymembersto theirplacesofwork,whetherthatbeinatrashdump,riverbed,orforestcollectingleavesandtimber. Inthiscontext,theybecomeincorporatedintotheirparentstrade,atfirstmimickingintheirplaywhat they see as their adult futures and eventually contributing to the familys income to the extent possible. This is the unfortunate reality for these young workers, even though they require special protections safeguarding their rights as human beings, especially when their parents already encumbered with the responsibilities of providing food and shelter as best as they can, with any availablemeanscannotdoso.Yet,whenacountryslaws,regulationsandpoliciesfailtoreflectthe moderncomplexityandrealityofinformallabor,childrenquicklyfallamongtheinvisiblepopulationof workers in the informal economy and, because of their heightened vulnerability, among the more easilyexploited,commoditizedandvictimized. TheCRCandILOConventionexplicitlyplacetheresponsibilityofcaringforthesechildreninthehands oftheStateapparatus.TheCRCstatesthatratifyingmembersareresponsibleforensuringthatevery childachievesastandardoflivingadequateforthechildsphysical,mental,spiritual,moralandsocial development.52And,ratifyingStatepartiesshalltaketheappropriatemeasurestoassistparentsand othercaregiverstoimplementthisrightandincaseofneed,providematerialassistanceandsupport programs, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.53 The rights that are included under the CRC are, among others, the right to be protected from economic exploitation and performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or interfere with the childs education, or be harmfultothechildshealth,physical,mental,spiritual,moralorsocialdevelopment.54Aswithother provisions of the CRC, and while recognizing the role of parents and caregivers, ratifying States are required to take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure the implementation of these provisions, including providing for minimum employment ages, regulated hoursofemploymentandpenaltiesorsanctionsforviolationsoftheseprovisions.55
52ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article27 53Ibid 54ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article32 55Ibid

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 ChildrenarefurtherprotectedunderILOConvention182,whichrecognizesthelinkbetweenpoverty and child labor, from the worst forms of labor, which include work that by its nature of the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.56 And,althoughColombia,whichratifiedthisconventionin2005,isresponsibletotakeeffectiveand timeboundmeasurestopreventtheengagementofchildrenintheworstformsoflabor,providethe necessaryandappropriatedirectassistanceoftheremovalofchildrenfromtheworstformsoflabor, ensure access to free basic education, identify and reach out to children at special risk and take accountofthespecialsituationofgirls,childrencontinuetoplayvisibleandsignificantrolesinboth wastepickingandartisanalandsmallscalemining(ASM).57Thismaybeinpartduetotheinvisibility of poverty in informality; the need of updating the definition of informality58 to include the intersections between the informal and formal economies or the reality of own account work, self employmentandvulnerableemployment. ASM presents a particular challenge for child labor. Child labor in mining is prohibited under most national and international law, therefore it is only in informal mining, which is usually the case with ASM that child labor persists and, in fact, flourishes.59 These young workers are in danger of being completely marginalized and neglected: in many countries like Colombia, ASM does not even constitute formal, that is, recognized, protected and promoted work. Girls face an even greater danger of this marginalization, because they are not even expected to be working in ASM and their presencevirtuallyoverlooked. 60Yet,theinvolvementofgirlchildlaborismuchmorefrequentand farreaching than was previously recognized, in both the operational aspects of mining such as extraction and processing, as well as the ancillary economies that support mine workers based in a given community.61 Indeed, young girls may carry much of the burden of child labor in countries around the world. A national labor force survey conducted in India for 20042005 showed not only that child labor was driven by poverty62 with 96 percent of employed children coming from householdsconsuminglessthan$2perdaybutalsothatgirlsundertheageoffifteenconstitute42 percentofallemployedchildren.63 Thenumbersforchildrenandyouthworkingintheinformaleconomywillmostlikelyswellasaresult oftheeconomiccrisisof2008.In2006,theILOestimatedthatatleast400millionnewjobswouldbe required to reach the full productive potential of the worlds youth, which was not even a realistic possibilityatthattime.64ILOhadalsoestimatedthattheglobaleconomiccrisiswouldincreaseyouth
56ConventionConcerningtheProhibitionandImmediateActionfortheEliminationoftheWorstFormsofChild,Article3 57ILOConvention182,Article7 58CrdenasS.,MauricioandMejiaM.,Carolina,InformalidadenColombia:NuevaEvidencia,p.4 59ILO,GirlsinMining:ResearchFindingsfromGhana,Niger,PeruandUnitedRepublicofTanzania,p.10. 60Ibid,p.8 61Ibid,p.8 62SeeBasuKaushikandHoangVanPham:TheEconomicsofChildLabor. 63ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsforWomen,p.19 64Pleasesee:http://www.cinterfor.org.uy/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/news/unemploy.htm.

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unemploymentbyasmanyas17millionin2009.65Whilethisincreasewouldbeinlargepartdueto the increase in youth unemployment in Central and SouthEastern European and CIS countries, the effectsshouldhavebeenfeltinallregionsoftheworld.OntheAfricancontinent,youthnowaccount for37percentoftheworkingagepopulation,but60percentoftheunemployed.66InLatinAmerica andtheCaribbean,theyouthunemploymentratewasexpectedtorisefromanywherefrom1.5to4.3 percentagepointsfrom2008to2009.67Moreandmorechildrenwillbeforcedintotoleratingthemost exploitativeanddangerouscircumstancestoprovideforthemselvesandtheirfamilies,yetwillmost likelyremaininvisibleandunprotectedduetofailuresoflawandpolicy. 1.2.3.ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIESOFINDIGENOUSANDAFRODESCENDANTPEOPLES Alongwithownaccountworkers,womenandchildren,indigenouspeoplesandafrodescendantsare marginalized socially, economically, and politically aroundthe world, resulting in greater numbers of individualswithinthesegroupsbeingpovertytrapped.Indigenouspeoplerepresentonlyfivepercent oftheworldspopulation,butaccountfor15percentoftheworldspoor.68Whiletheprecisefigures varycountrybycountry,theiroverrepresentationamongthepovertytrappedisconsistent.AWorld Bank study reported in 2004 that indigenous people represented 10 percent of Latin Americas population and the largest disadvantaged group in Latin America.69 For instance, in Bolivia and Guatemala, more than half of the total population was living in poverty in 2004, but almost three quartersoftheindigenouspopulationlivedinpovertyduringthissameperiod.70 Atroughly150million,AfrodescendantsconstitutenearlyonethirdofLatinAmericaspopulation,but accountfor40percentoftheregionspopulationlivinginpoverty.71InColombia,whichishometothe second largest population of Afrodescendants in Latin America, key economic indicators showed a prominent racial divide 98 percent of black communities in Colombia lacked basic public utilities, while only 6 percent of white communities lacked these utilities; 97 percent of black communities lacked social security benefits, while only 63 percent of white communities similarly lacked these benefits; and literacy was as high as 45 percent in black communities, but only 14 percent in white communities.72Indeed,thepicturethatemergesfrom()LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanisnotthat ofaregionadvancingtowardsequalityofopportunitiesforall,independentofsocialorigin().73

65ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsUpdate,p.12 66Pleasesee:http://allafrica.com/stories/200909250137.html 67ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsUpdate,p.12 68CommissionontheLegalEmpowermentofthePoor,MakingtheLawWorkforEveryone,p.145 69WorldBank,IndigenousPeoples,PovertyandHumanDevelopmentinLatinAmerica:19942004,(2004). 70Ibid 71 Marquez, Gustavo, et al., IDB 2008 Report Outsiders: The Changing Patterns of Exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean,p.3 72AfroDescendants,DiscriminationandEconomicExclusioninLatinAmerica,,p.5 73Ibid,p.10

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 Ascitizens,thesetwogroupsinparticularexperienceincrediblypoorpoliticalrepresentation,further isolating their needs, concerns and awareness of political processes, State mechanisms and their identity as constituents of their States. In Brazil, although 45 percent of its population is of African descent,only5percentofthecongressionalrepresentativesclaimthisheritageandinNicaragua,there is not one person in the national assembly of African descent, which accounts for 9 percent of the countryspopulation.74Asworkers,thissociopoliticalexclusiontranslatesintolessemploymentand lessqualitywork.InMexico,indigenousmenearnabout15percentlessthannonindigenousmenin agriculturalwagejobs;countrydatafromBrazilrevealsthatnonAfrodescendantworkersearnmore thandoublethanAfrodescendantworkersinurbanareas.75Theseworkershave,ingeneral,unstable worklivesandoftendropoutoftheworkforcealtogether.Althoughitcanbearguedthatthispattern maybetheresultofindividualpreference,itislikelythatmanyworkersaretrappedinalifeofbad jobs, poor employment opportunities, low and unstable earnings and no social protection.76 Their circumstancesarethenperpetuatedupontheirchildren,who,withoutaccesstobettereducationand health opportunities and while remaining encumbered by work responsibilities to supplement their familys income, will remain in the poverty trap of their ancestors. Without education and in precariousworkconditions,socialmobilityisextraordinarilydifficulttohappen. In1957,theILOrespondedtostudiesonthevulnerabilityofindigenouspeoplesandcalledfortheir integrationintothelifeoftheircountries,approvingILOConventionNo.107.77Thisconventionhada muchmoreindividualemphasis,focusingontherightsofmembersofindigenousgroups,ratherthan the rights of indigenous groups themselves. This Convention was eventually followed by ILO ConventionNo.169,adoptedin1989,whichplacesmuchgreateremphasisonpreservingindigenous culturesandinstitutions,includingtheirrightsofownershipandpossessionovertraditionallyoccupied lands. The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People goes further to not onlylinkcolonizationwiththedispossessionofthesepopulations,buttoalsolinkthelossoflandwith thelossofculturalrights.Theseinternationalnorms,alongwiththeInterAmericanDeclarationofthe Rights of Indigenous Peoples, protect indigenous peoples rights to their culture, cultural institutions and practices, as well as extending to them their modern rights, including labor rights, recognized under international and domestic law. Land rights warrant special concern in these documents, as they have hold distinctive importance to indigenous peoples lives and livelihoods and have been wrestedfromthembygovernments,multinationalcorporations,andgroupsandindividualsengaged inillicitactivities. WhileafrodescendantsmaytakeadvantageofILOConvention169,aswell,duetothecooptationof communal lands provided to them as refuge from enslavement, and later, an important means of
74Ibid,p.27 75IDB,Outsiders,p.25 76Outsiders,p.83 77Dannenmaier,Eric,BeyondIndigenousPropertyRights:ExploringtheEmergenceofaDistinctiveConnectionDoctrine,p. 18.

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 survival in a socially and economically exclusionary society, afrodescendants in Latin America have beeningeneralmuchlesssuccessfulinobtainingcollectivelandrightsthanindigenouspeoples.78The Brazilian and Colombian constitutions include some normative provisions extending cultural and agrarian land rights to their Afrodescendant citizens; however, in Brazil, these provisions do not extendtoagriculturallandandinColombia,titlesdonoteffectivelyprotectthesecommunitiesfrom the dispossession driven by illegally armed groups like rightist paramilitaries or leftist guerrillas who needthelandforillicitcroppingofcocaforsupplyingmultinationaldemand.79 Whiletherehavebeensomemonumentalsuccessesinthesegroupsattemptstosecuretheirhuman rights, especially their land rights the landmark Awas Tingni case against the State of Nicaragua brought the country to account for treating untitled indigenous lands as State land and granting loggingconcessionstoprivatecompaniesindigenousandafrodescendantsinLatinAmericapersist amongthepoorestmarginsofsociety.80 1.2.4.THESOCIALPROTECTIONISSUE Of critical importance to own account workers, women, children, and ethnic minorities within the informaleconomyisprovidingsocialprotectionstopreventtheirdeclineintofurtherimpoverishment. Conceivedasabenefittobederivedfromlaborthatisboughtandsoldthroughemployeremployee relationships, social protection is usually a set of normative provisions set in place and jointly implementedandpaidforbyboththeemployerandtheemployee.Thisprotectionnotonlyassuresa senseofstabilityinworkers,butalsoisintendedtominimizetheriskthatindividualsfallintopoverty through no fault of their own.81 The provisions usually include basic social security, some kind of contingencybased assistance of the poor, prevention of threats to livelihood security, promotion of livelihoods and labor markets, transformative measures that addresses the cause and symptoms of poverty and vulnerability.82 While providing social protection involves significant transfers from governmentstoitscitizenstotalinguptotwentyfivepercentofGDPindevelopedcountriesthese measures have also contributed to reductions in poverty in developed countries over the past fifty

78IDB2008Report,Outsiders,p.22;AfroDescendants,DiscriminationandEconomicExclusioninLatinAmerica,p.11. 79Ibid 80TheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRightsorderedNicaraguatodemarcateandtitleAwasTingnistraditionallandsin accordance with its customary land and resource tenure patterns, to refrain from any action that might undermine the Communitysinterestsinthoselands,andtoestablishanadequatemechanismtosecurethelandrightsofallindigenous communitiesofthecountry.SeeCaseoftheAwasTingiCommunityv.TheRepublicofNicaragua.InterAm.Ct.,H.R.Series CNo.66.(2001),http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/66ing.html 81 Canagarajah, Sudarshan & S.V. Sethuraman, Social Protection and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries: ChallengesandOpportunities,,p.16. 82Kabeer,MainstreamingGender,p.2526

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years.83 In fact, investments in social protection can () help to ensure that progress in poverty reductionisnotreversed.84 However, social protections have not necessarily been provided to those who are in most need of them.Indeed,thepoorhavegenerallybeenleftoutofformalsocialprotectionprovisionsbecauseof the dispersed nature of their employment, the irregularity of their incomes and their inability to contributetosocialsecurityschemes.85At the same time, international efforts to extend social protection to the povertytrapped tend to organize their strategies around global value chains, focusing their attention on wage workers in the traded sectors of the global economy, virtually ignoringinformalworkers,andthemostdefenselessamongthem.86Indevelopingcountries,whereup toninetypercentoftheworkforceisintheinformaleconomy,thereisarenewedconcernforthese workers who lie beyond the reach of social protection measures typically afforded by the State and formal employers.87 Informal employment has not been able to provide the quality of income and social security characteristic of the formal economy, although the need or social protection has not been eliminated. These workers are arguably in more need of social protection not only are they subject to the same risks of aging, illness and jobrelated injury as other workers, but the circumstancesoftheirworkareoftenmoredangerous. Yet, social protection has traditionally been conceptualized as linked with labor rights, rather than fundamentalhumanrights.88Focusingontheuseoflawforpovertyreductionprovidesamechanism to tackle the complexity of determining the discrete needs of the individuals who are currently excluded from social protection mechanisms. On the supply side, State structures must be made awareofthechallengesofanybiasesthatareinadvertentlycreatedandimplementedinthepolicy making process, including geographical, ethnic, or the social distribution of State services.89 This engageslawfromthetopdown,whenlawandpolicymakersrealizethetrue,livedexperienceoftheir decisionsonthepoorestoftheirconstituentsandwhooftheirconstituentsremainexcluded,outside the reach of their laws, policies and regulations. On the demand side, individuals must be made awareoftheirrightsascitizensandengagetheirpoliticalorientationtoadvocateforandrealizetheir rights to life, work, health and livelihood. Here, law is engaged from the bottomup, as the worker realizesherstatusascitizen.

83 Canagarajah, Sudarshan & S.V. Sethuraman, "Social Protection and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries: ChallengesandOpportunities,"p.16. 84ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrends,p.19,discussingChinasinvestmentinsocialprotectionascurbingtheimpactofthe globaleconomiccrisisonitsworkersandcitizens. 85Kabeer,Naila,SocialProtectionStrategiesforanInclusiveSociety:ACitizenCenteredApproach,p.4. 86Kabeer,MainstreamingGender,p.279 87 88 That is why, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, in order to enforce the social protection rights of the elder, for instance,linkstheserightstothefundamentalrighttolifeandenjoyingavitalminimum. 89Kabeer,MainstreamingGender,p.332

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 1.2.5.DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCEFORINCLUSIVEDEVELOPMENT On her own, the povertytrapped person exists in state of survival, with limited engagement with society or State institutions. Through developing her voice and identity, perhaps through organizing efforts or greateraccess to information, she comes to realize and understand her status as a citizen andherincumbentrightsandresponsibilitiesattachedthereto.Theexclusionarybarriersencirclingher show cracks as she begins to identify as someone more than a poor individual; a povertytrapped constituentofherState.Shemaynowreachoutandgrabontoopportunitiespresentedbyacademia, civilsocietyandmediaoutletstoadvanceherempowermentandaccessherrighttorights.Whenshe accesses the State institutions that are obligated to deliver the rights enshrined under the social contractbetweenthem,shehasnotonlydestroyedtheexclusionarybarriers,buthascompelledher Stateinstitutionstoprovideherwiththetoolstodoso. Forthemostvulnerableoftheworkingpoorlegalpersonsofacivicsolidarynature,betterknownas nonprofitsandrangingfromcharitiestocoopsandmutuals,constituteidealvehiclesforinclusionin both democracy and development.90 The organization enables the individual worker to not only see thestructuralinequalityshefaces,buttochallengeitinunityandsolidaritywithotherslikeher.Her voiceisraisedwithothersimilarvoices.Atthesametime,organizationmayonlyyieldaloudervoice and a more visible presence; it alone cannot guarantee access to the resources and institutions necessarytobeliftedoutofdeprivation.ThisrequiresaresponsiveStateand,inademocracy,itisthe constituent that may elicit a response from her State and all of its institutionalized resources and opportunities. Indeed, the relationship of the individual as a constituent with her State may be her mostvaluableassetintermsofaddressingpoverty,accessingtheStatemechanismandreinvigorating theirsocialcontract.91 Asaconstituent,shemayinsertherselfintothepublicdecisionmakinginademocraticState,butonly so far as she has access to the publicdecision making circuits and mechanisms. If she is isolated geographically, politically, economically, socially or culturally from that locus, then her opportunities andabilitiestoinfluencethatdecisionmakingprocessandtheresultinglaws,policiesandregulations disappear. If, on the other hand, the question is one of the States responses to her raisedvoice, then it is the nature and quality of the State apparatus that is at issue. Thus, governance, and moreover, democratic and participatory governance is absolutely fundamental for ensuring that marginalized members of society, especially those living in poverty traps created, propounded and perpetuated by poor law and policy, may influence the publicdecision making process to work for them,ratherthanagainstthem.92
90 CivicSolidary Organizations is a term proposed to designate nonprofit organizations in positive sense instead of a negativeorresidualone.RuizRestrepo,Adriana,NatureJuridiqueetRlePolitiquedesOrganisationsSansButLucratifdu TiersSecteur,DocumentderecherchepourunethsedoctoraleendroitpublicdelUniversitPanthonAssas.2000(Sans publier) 91RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor,p.3 92Ibid,p.25andAnnexes1and2

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1.3. INTERNATIONAL AGENDAS ON THE INFORMALITY OF POVERTYTRAPPED WORKERS

Duetoavarietyoffactors,therehasbeenapersistentriseininformalityinthedevelopingworld.In 2002,informalemploymentaccountedforonehalftothreefourthsofnonagriculturalemploymentin developingcountries,i.e.,fortyeightpercentofnonagriculturalemploymentinNorthAfrica,fiftyone percent in Latin America, sixtyfive percent in Asia, and seventytwo percent in subSaharan Africa; excluding South Africa, the share of informal employment in nonagricultural employment rises to seventyeight percent in subSaharan Africa.93 In 2007, it was estimated that the informal economy employed up to ninety percent of subSaharan Africas workforce, anywhere from fortyseven to eightyfourpercentofAsiasworkforce,andnearlyseventyfivepercentofLatinAmericasworkforce.94 Asindicatedabove,itisprojectedthat,duetotheglobaleconomiccrisisof2008,therewillbeupto50 millionnewlyunemployedindividualsandthenumbersoftheworkingpoorearninglessthan$2per daywillincreaseby200million,withmostofthemworkingintheinformaleconomy(since2007).95 As the informal economy has grown, its contribution to gross domestic product and job growth likewise increases, swelling to represent over forty percent of the regional GDPs of Africa, Latin AmericaandCentralAsia/EasternEuropein2002200396InLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountries,it isestimatedthattheinformaleconomyhasaccountedfornearlyseventypercentofalljobscreated overthelast15years.97 Indeed,theconsensusisthattheinformaleconomyisagrowing,permanent phenomenonofcapitalistdevelopmentandtraditionaleconomies.98 Thereis,however,greatconcernoverthelowqualityjobsthathavebeencreatedduringthistimeand the changing patterns and demographics of workers, giving greater momentum to the informal economy debate in international policy discussions. The international community has specifically addressedtheneedfortacklingtheprecarioussituationsofownaccountworkerandtheworkingpoor from several different angles. The following international agendas consider these individuals socio economic circumstances through addressing work quality, labor rights, legal empowerment and extremepovertyreduction. 1.3.1.THEDECENTWORKAGENDA
93WomenandMenintheInformalEconomy,p.7 94ILO,CommitteeonEmploymentandSocialPolicy,SocialSecuritystandardsandtheILOcampaignfortheextensionof socialsecurity,Notefordebateandguidance,Geneva2008,GB298/ESP/4 95GlobalEmploymentTrendsReport2009,inGlobalEconomicCrisisandtheInformalEconomy,RealizingRights(2008) 96 World Watch, Vital Signs 20072008, using data from Friederich Schneider, The Size of Shadow Economies of 145 Countriesfrom19992003,IZADiscussionPapers(Bonn:InstitutefortheStudyofLabor,December2004). 97ILO,TheInformalEconomy,NotefromtheCommitteeonEmploymentandSocialPolicy,p.5. 98Chen,RethinkingtheInformalSector,andILO,Chen,Martha,Jhabvala,Renana,&FrancesLund,SupportingWorkersin theInformalEconomy:APolicyFramework,WorkingPaperontheInformalEconomy,No.2,Geneva2002

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 TheILOsagendaondecentworkstressesthatnotanyjobwillprovidetheopportunityforindividuals toavoidorliftthemselvesoutofpoverty;rather,onlyajobthatrealizestheirpotentialasworkersand recognizestheirhumandignitywilldoso.Adecentjobisonethatgivespeopletheopportunityto earn enough for themselves and their families to escape poverty, not just temporarily but permanentit provides social security and ensures protection by labor laws, and a voice at work throughfreelychosenworkersorganizations.99Decentwork,therefore,providesamoreproductive andsatisfyinglabormarketandthejustdistributionofthebenefitsofworkthatarefundamentalto democratic societies that foster human development. The decent work agenda is applicable to all workers,bothformalandinformal.Indeed,theILOhasforseveralyearsinsistedthatitsdecentwork agenda be applicable to both the formal and informal economies and in 2008, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) incorporated the informal economy in its first goal of reducing extreme povertyandhunger.100Yet,howtoimplementthisgoal,extenddecentworktoworkerswhoremain outside the regulatory framework, and to ensure that a regulatory framework that does not in fact furtherimpoverishinformalworkersstillpresentapracticalchallengeforresponsivegovernments. As recognized by the ILO, democratic governance must play a key role in addressing decent work deficits in the informal economy. While political will, specific laws, policies and programs to extend protectiontoallworkersandremovethebarriersofentryintothemainstreameconomywillvaryby countryandcircumstances,theirformulationandimplementationshouldinvolvethesocialpartners andtheintendedbeneficiariesintheinformaleconomy.101Atthesametime,anymeasurestakento address informality should not restrict opportunities for those who have no other means of livelihood...it should not be a job at any price or under any circumstances.102 Further, public authoritiesshouldinclude[membershipbasedorganizationsofthepoor]inpublicpolicydebatesand providethemaccesstotheservicesandinfrastructuretheyneedtooperateeffectivelyandefficiently andprotectthemfromharassmentorunjustifiedordiscriminatoryeviction.103Itisintheirmeaningful participationininclusivepolicymakingthatpublicmeasurestoaddresstheneedsoftheseworkers andthemorevulnerableanddefenselessamongthemthatwillbringthemunderaresponsivelegal andinstitutionalframework,and,eventually,themainstreamlabormarket. A relationship of particular concern in the decent work agenda is that between law, regulation and informality. The ILO has defined three different manifestations of this relationship, each requiring differentpolicyresponses:(1)wherelawissilentwithrespecttoactivitiesorgroupsfallingoutside theregulatoryframework;(2)wherelawsexist,butlackof complianceandenforcementininformal
99ILO,KeyIssuesintheLaborMarket:DecentEmploymentandtheMDGs 100 The first Millennium Development Goal, to eradicate poverty and hunger, has set as Target 1B to achieve full and productive employment anddecent work for all, including women and young people indicators are the growth rate of GDPperpersonemployed;theemploymenttopopulationratio;proportionofemployedpeoplelivingbelow$1(PPP)per day and the proportion of ownaccount and contributing family workers in total employment http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal1.cfm# 101ILO,Resolutionconcerningdecentworkandtheinformaleconomy,2002,paragraph21 102ILO,Resolutionconcerningdecentworkandtheinformaleconomy,paragraph21 103ILO,Resolutionconcerningdecentworkandtheinformaleconomy,",paragraph24

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 economy is the problem; and (3) where regulatory framework does not provide basic protection or create a level playing field, but acts as an impediment to job creation and a factor contributing to informality.104Indeed,informalworkersandownaccountworkersespeciallyarenotonlyexcluded fromformalregulatoryschemes,buttheyaresometimesimpoverishedthroughlawsandpoliciesthat arenotmerelyunresponsive,butcreateadversecircumstancesforgroupsofinformalworkers. 1.3.2.THELEGALEMPOWERMENTOFTHEPOORAGENDA AsarticulatedbytheformerCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor,povertyandinformality must be approached from four angles access to justice, property rights, business rights, and labor rights to both identify and redress the social, political, legal and economic exclusion that have resultedincircumstancesofdeprivationfortheworldsbottombillionandmore.105Thisagendacuts acrossvariousinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentstoarticulateawaytorealizethoserightsusing the law and the rule of law to lower the exclusionary mechanisms that prohibit povertytrapped individualsandcommunitiesaccesstoStateandmarketinstitutionsandtheresourcestheyrequireto lift themselves out of poverty. Using law for poverty reduction is both a bottomup and topdown processofinclusion106.Thisstrategyprovidesameansfortheseworkerstobegintheirjourneyoutof precariousness and towards greater security by widening the avenues through which these workers mayaccesstheirgovernmentsanddemandtheirrights.Itallowsforinformalworkerstoraisetheir voicesaspersons/constituentsanddemandtheirrightsfromtheirgovernments,whoseresponsibility itistoprovideandprotecttheirrightsatleastoflifewithdignity,anddecentwork107 In an early 2010 resolution the UN General Assembly, based on the normative framework on international human rights, and recognizing the Commissions Final Report as a useful reference: Encourages countries to continue their efforts in the area of legal empowerment of the poor, including access to justice and the realization of rights related to property, labour and business, addressingbothformalandinformalsettingsbytakingintoaccountthosedimensionsintheirnational policiesandstrategies,whilebearinginmindtheimportanceofnationalcircumstances,ownershipand leadership. 1.3.3.THEREVISEDFIRSTMILLENNIUMDEVELOPMENTGOAL Althoughtheworldsbottombillioninclude550millionpeoplewhoareworkingtosurvive,butwho willneverworkthemselvesoutofpoverty,theMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsdidnotaddresswork
104ILO,TheInformalEconomy,2007 105TheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoorconcludedthatoverfourbillionpeopleintheworldliveandwork beyondthereachofthelaw.Pleasesee:MakingtheLawWorkforEveryone,2008 106 On the need of understanding legal empowerment as much more than a normative change in regulation but the appropriationoflawinthemicro,mesoandmacrostructuresofgovernancethatwillclaim,advanceandproducechangein law,withorwithouttheinitiativeandhelpoftheestablishment,pleasesee:RuizRestrepo,Adriana,ALegalEmpowerment StrategyforLatinAmericanPoor. 107Ibid

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 andemploymentletalonedecentworkandemploymentwhentheywereinitiallyconceivedand adoptedbytheUnitedNations.However,in2008,anewtarget(tobeincludedinthesetoftargets thateachoftheeightgoalsencompasses)wascreatedunderthefirstMDGthataddressedthisgap. This target aims to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies and our national development strategies.108 The indicators for this target include measurementsofthemaincategorieswithintheinformaleconomyasdefinedabove,capturedinthe vulnerableemploymentindicatormeasuringthenumbersofindividuals(orpercentageofworkers) who may be categorized as informal wage and salary workers, contributing family workers, self employedemployers,ownaccountworkersandmembersofproducerscooperatives. Compilingcountrylevelstatisticsonthenumbers,ageandsexofownaccountworkerswillnotonly unveil the extent of this sector of the labor economy, it will also inadvertently force policylevel discussionsonwhatownaccountworkis,whereitfitsintotheregulatoryedifice,andhowtoresolve the issues confronting these workers through law and policymaking. In this sense, it is a necessary step in the prelaw phase of the own account workers who have not yet been seen by their State actorsandinstitutions.109Atthesametime,thechallengesincumbentuponthediscoveryofthese workers will be significant; once these workers have captured the attention of their representatives andStateinstitutions,theywillrequireanddemandamoreresponsivereactionfromtheState.Itisat thisphasethatlawonceagainenterstoopenthedoorsofdiscussionamongthesevariousactorsto liftthevoicesoftheworkersastheyrealizetheircitizenshipstatusandtoopentheearsoflawand policymakers to this frequency.110 Implementing the new target for MDG 1 will necessitate strong State action and responsive democratic institutions that are willing to reassess and redress their conceptionsoftheinformaleconomyandlabormarkets.

108ILO,KeyIssuesintheLaborMarket:DecentEmploymentandtheMDGs,p.1 109 (1) Prelaw; (2) Law, and (3) Post law are the three moments in which the rra thinktank divides participatory governance & and policymakers inclusion analysis. RuizRestrepo, Adriana. A Legal Empowerment Strategy for Latin American Poor: A Reading of the National Consultations for the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf and rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank/THRDSECTORLAWLAB/WorkingDocument#23,2007(unpublished) 110Ibid

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2.URBANANDINFORMALWASTERECYCLINGWORKERSINCOLOMBIA
This chapter analyzes the law and policy environment for own account urban waste pickers in Colombia.Aswithmanycountriesintheglobalsouth,thisoccupationalgrouphasgrownconsiderably with increasing urbanization and limited municipal resources and capacity. Section 2.1 sets for the historyandcontextofthewastemanagementeconomyinBogotaanditsevolutionintoanessential publicservicethatwasincreasinglydeliveredbyprivatewasteoperatorsthroughapublicprocurement process beginning in the 1990s. Section 2.2 then considers the public policy environment for waste management, first under the Colombian Constitution and its provisions for the environmental sanitation public service, then the relevant legislative provisions, namely Law 142 of 1994, Decrees 1713 of 2002 and 1505 of 2003, Decree 805 of 2005, followed by judicial orders relevant to waste pickerstradewithinthewasteeconomy.Section2.3continuestoanalyzetheoccupationalgroupof ownaccountwastepickersinmoredetail,fromtheirhistoryofinternaldisplacementtothedifferent groupsofworkerswithinthetrade,includingwastedumpandstreetwastepickers,women,children, theelderly,andethnoculturalminorities,andfinally,socialprotectionandhealthissuesfacingthese workers. Section 2.4 then analyzes the trade context of own account waste pickers including the various actors interacting with, and competingwith, the waste pickers, such as the Colombian state, private sector corporations in waste management, authorized organizations under Law 142 of 1994, andbusinessesandindividualsengagedinwasterecyclingspecifically.Section2.5thenconsidersthe labor and market for own account waste pickers, from the physical labor of their trade to the entrepreneurialismoftheirwork.Thissectionalsosetsforththelegalimpoverishmentofwastepickers through the relevant public policy environment and how this impoverishment was redressed through strategiclitigationandadvocacyefforts.Finally,Section2.6completesthisanalysisbylookingatthe roleofwastepickersorganizationsinadvancingwastepickersinclusionandparticipatorygovernance. This section looks at both the space available for the solidarity economy in Colombia to act as mechanisms of inclusion for informal workers and the evolution of waste pickers organizations and theirlegalempowerment. 43

 Itisestimatedthatthenumberofcitydwellerswilldoublearoundtheworldbetween1987and2015, with over 90 percent of this growth hitting third world nations whose growth rate is approximately three times that of developed countries1. In Colombia, approximately 74 percent of the population already lives in urban environments2, and as any other country in the world, it is consuming large quantities of plastic, metal, paper and glass products. In this face of this demographic reality, solid waste management has emerged as a critical issue relating to the health and safety of burgeoning urbanpopulations.Evenso,formalwastecollectionusuallyaccountsforonly5080percentoftrash generated, with even less waste formally disposed of by municipal authorities directly or indirectly.3 AccordingtoWorldBankestimatescitedintheUNEPs2008reportonGreenJobs:TowardsDecent Work in a Sustainable, Low Carbon World, municipalities spend on average 20 50 percent of their available budgets on solid waste management, even if only 30 60 percent of the solid waste is collected and less than 50 percent of the population is served by these formal services.4 Inincome countries, the mere collection of waste may use up to 90 percent of municipal solid waste managementbudgets;thisdropsto5080percentinmiddleincomecountriesandatmost10percent inhighincomecountries,whosebudgetsfortheseservicesaresubstantiallygreater.5 Limitations of capital resources or logistical or management capacity in the municipal waste management of developing countries often leave space for informal waste collection to flourish and complement the formal waste operations around the world. Informal waste collection is, in fact, a workopportunityfortheverypoor;althoughthereisnoauthoritativenumberofformalandinformal jobs created by the waste management industry globally, it is estimated that up to 2 percent of the population in third world cities are engaged in some kind of informal waste collection activity.6 In China, the number of informal waste collectors (2.5 million) is nearly double that of formal waste collectors (1.3 million), while in Cairo, there are approximately 70,000 informal waste collectors (zabaleen),whocollectapproximatelyhalfofthecitystrash.7Despitetheenormousenvironmental and socioeconomic impact of waste on the informal work and livelihoods of recyclers and waste pickers around the world, municipal governments of developing countries have embarked on waste management privatization efforts, usually following macrostructural adjustment recommendations madetonationalgovernments,withoutprovidingorevenconsidering8anysubstantivealternativefor

1Medina,Martin,TheWorldsScavengers:SalvagingforSustainableConsumptionandProduction,p.50. 2Pleasesee:https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/co.html 3Medina,Martin,TheWorldsScavengers:SalvagingforSustainableConsumptionandProduction,p.51. 4UNEP,p.7 5UNEP,p.7 6Medina,Martin,WastePickerCooperativesinDevelopingCountries,ElColegiodelaFronteraNorte,Mexico,p.8. 7UNEP,p.17;Medina,Martin,TheWorldsScavengers,p.213 8 CiViSOL, Arguments to the Constitutional https://sites.google.com/a/civisol.org/labasuraesvida/ Court of Colombia / Judgment T29109

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 protecting the right to life with dignity, work and development of those constituents whose only opportunityforworkandlifearefoundinscavengingtrashandsalvagingrecyclables.9 Considering that many of the countries in the global south have not implemented a waste recycling system or grown a culture of separating garbage at its source, most waste recycling in the cities of ColombiaandelsewhereistheproductofthephysicaleffortandsweatoftheStatesmostdeprived constituents.Theirworknotonlypreventscontaminationandclimatechangebyminimizingtheburial or incineration of waste in landfills, but also supports national industries by recuperating tons of secondarycommoditiessuchasusedpaper,scrapmetal,plasticsandglass.Theprivatizationofwaste management without considering the traditional work, livelihood and social contribution made by urbanandinformalwasterecyclingworkersillustratesperfectlythenotionoflegalimpoverishmentof thepoor,10i.e.theclosureoftheonlyspacethatthepoorestofthepoorhavefoundforrealizingtheir survivalneedsanddevelopmentaspirations.Duetoitshighcommercialvalueandinlightofincreasing costsofproductionanddemographicgrowthlinkedtoconsumerism,wasteisnowatthecenterstage ofboththemarket,asasecondarycommodity,anddevelopingcountriesgreenagendasfocusingona cultureofzerowaste.Unfortunately,effortsbycityauthoritiestoprivatizethisindustrydonotoften provide alternative livelihood options for informal waste pickers or options that satisfy their existing economic conditions. In fact, and until recently, waste pickers have existed in a minimal economic security; the security that they have enjoyed is, in large part, due to their own hard labor and innovation,ratherthansupportiveStateormarketefforts.Forinstance,somewastepickersinsome Colombian, Indian and Mexican cities receive as little as 5 percent of the formal price for recyclable materials,andevenstillmanagetoearnmorethantheminimumwagebyworkingarduoushours.11In Colombia, waste pickers work on average 10 physical hours per day along city streets, to earn their living.12 ThischapterexaminesandanalyzesthelegalandpolicyenvironmentofColombiaswastepickersas informal workers in the waste collection and management economy and as situated within the internationaldiscourseoninformality,wasteandthegreenagenda.Asownaccountworkers,these men,womenandchildrenpersistinvulnerabilityandprecariousness,outsidetheverymarginsoflaw and policy. Over the past seven years13, through organization and diverse type of advocacy interventions, including voluntary constitutional litigators and other professionals, the CiViSOL Foundation and other members of civil society, the waste pickers socioeconomic and political exclusion has managed to receive national and international attention. The waste pickers insertion andvisibilityinthepublicsphereandargumentsforsystemicchangehaveforcedtheStatetowarda
9 Padilla, Nohra, Ruiz, Silvio, and RuizRestrepo, Adriana (attorney at law), Arguments to the Constitutional Court of Colombia/JudgmentT72403http://www.scribd.com/doc/36979764/CasodeLaSentenciaT72403SobreLicitacionde AseoEmpobrecedorayparaARB 10Onthisnotion:RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor 11Medina,Martin,WastePickerCooperatives,p.10. 12Ibid,p.163. 13Pleaseseethelegalstrugglestartingbackin2003:http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM999638

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 more inclusive process, and, most recently, by order of the Court, a formalization effort that should maintainandnurturethewastepickersentrepreneurialendeavors.Theirparticularjourneytowards achieving better governance in the formal waste management system is unique and illustrates the possibilitiesforwideningthepublicdecisionmakingspaceforthosewhoremainpovertytrapped.

2.1.CONTEXTANDHISTORYOFWASTEMANAGEMENT
As in many places around the world, the phenomenon of waste management in Colombia was a necessaryconsequenceofurbanization.Beforetheadventofthemoderncity,peoplelivedinopen rural areas where individuals and households could manage the disposal of their private trash and waste.Notonlyweretheirdisposableitemsmadeoutofnaturalmaterials,oftenprovidingfeedfor animals,fertilizerforfieldsorotherwisedecomposingintheirnaturalenvironments,ruralhouseholds hadaccesstoenoughphysicalspaceforsuchdomesticdisposal.14 With the arrival of industrialization, cities soon followed, teeming with an influx of rural inhabitants drawn to the lure of urban employment. In these cities, populations were more concentrated and personal space was limited to the confines of the home. Yet, households did not abandon their approachtothedisposalofwasteitwasstilleachhouseholdthatmanageditsownwastedisposal and, as before, trash was disposed of in the space separating households, i.e., public streets; during this same time frame, the very nature of waste changed as nonorganic materials, like plastic, were introducedtodailylife.Thiscombinationoffactorsdensecommunities,theabsenceofvastpublic space,andsyntheticornonorganicrefusesoonculminatedinseverehealthandsanitationproblems forcityresidentsastheirtrashcollectedinurbanpublicspaces.Theseproblemsfellunderthedomain of municipal authorities, who were charged with caring for the collective hygiene and health of the inhabitantsintheirjurisdictions.15 Thus,hingedonthepremiseofpublichealth,sanitationandenvironmentalcleanliness,municipaland urban authorities began addressing the issue of urban waste disposal. Initially, these efforts were concentrated on the removal and transport of waste to outside of the city centers. This collected wastewasoftenplacedinoneoftwoareas:wastedumpsattheedgesofcitiesorinbodiesofwater, where vermin and other creatures access would be limited, thus preventing the spread of infection anddisease.16InCali,Colombia,andinmanyotherplacesaroundtheworld,thegrowthofthecity canbetracedbythehistoryofpublicwastedumpsattheoutskirtsofthecityslimits;asCaligrew,its municipalauthoritieslookedforwastesitesthatcouldnotonlyprovidefortheincreasingamountof wasteproducedbythecitysinhabitants,butthatwerealsofarenoughawayfromthecitytomeetthe health and sanitation responsibilities of the government. These heaps of waste collections of discardedfood,clothes,boxes,bottles,andotherorganicandnonorganicmaterialsattractedthose 14 rra (PublicLaw+SocialInnovation) thinktank /SOCIALINNOLAB;WastePickers,PolicyReformandCSRintheGreenEra,
WorkingDocument#1,Cali,Colombia,2009(unpublished) 15Onthistopic,theFrenchSchoolofPublicServiceandAdministrativeLawincountriesofcivillawtradition. 16Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/Bogot

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 inneedofwhatmightbefoundthere.SilvioRuiz,aColombianwastepicker,remembershowdecades agointhecityofManizales,wastepickerswaitedforthecarriagestransportingurbanwastetorivers toeventuallyfishoutwhattheyneededfromthecitystrash.17Thisincludedmeatdiscardedbythe citysbutchers,whichwascapturedbywastepickersyieldingmetalhooksbeforeitfellintotheriver water. Because rural communities may continue to address their waste needs on a personal or household level, waste disposal is, therefore, primarily an urban phenomenon. For instance, in rural Nigerien villages, families still tend to the disposal of waste on a household level, reusing organic materials whenpossibleandtakingadvantageofthespacebetweenvillagesandcompoundsforwastedisposal. Just outside the villages edges will lie piles of waste dirtied shards of cloth, plastics, animal droppings,andotherdiscardedmaterialswheregoatsroamtoscavengeforfoodandnourishment. However,inlargerNigerienvillagesorcentraltowns,whoseinhabitantsaremoredenselypackedthan in smaller villages, waste disposal poses more serious health and sanitation problems and must be addressedbythelocalauthorities.And,incountrieslikeColombia,wherenearlythreequartersofthe populationliveinurbanareas, 18wasteremovalanddisposaltakeonamorepressingcharacterand responsibilityforurban,municipal,andStateauthorities.AcountrysuchasColombia,whichfunctions around cities and its urban population, requires an efficient, capable and expansive waste managementsystemtoprovideforitspublichealth,sanitationandenvironmentalcleanliness. 2.1.1.HISTORICALCONTEXTOFWASTEMANAGEMENTSERVICEANDECONOMYINBOGOTA Bogotascurrentwastemanagementsystemhasevolvedoverthepast150years,asthecityitselfhas grownandattemptedtoaddressitsmountingwasteconcerns.In1875,bytowncouncilagreement,a body of municipal watchmen was created whose charge was to manage the citys cleanliness, embellishment,healthandsafety.19Justafewyearslater,in1880,thecityappointedtheDirectorof PublicConstructiontobethenewchiefofthisgroupofwatchmen.20Theappointeehad,infact,been addressingthecityscleanlinessforsometimebytakingadvantageoftheinmatepopulationofBogota itwasregularpracticeatthattimeforupto100inmatestocleanthecityeveryday.21 However, by the mid1880s, due to the citys growing population this municipal body required additionalresourcestocontinueitsactivities.Thus,in1884,asmalltaxof1015pennieswasexacted uponbusinessownersinBogota.22CollectedbytheCleanlinessandEmbellishmentGuild23,aprivate
17Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 18CIA,WorldFactBook,Colombia 19rra(PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)thinktank/SOCIALINNOLAB;CSR&CSOsforPovertyReductionthroughInclusive WasteManagementPolicyandPublicCleanlinessChoices,WorkingDocument,2006(unpublished) 20Ibid 21Ibid 22Ibid 23Ibid

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 nonprofit organization, and following Town Council Agreement 36 of 1902, this money was used to create a new Agency for Public Cleanliness, which was responsible for the collection, transport and disposalofwaste()inthemainroadsofcentralneighborhoods.24Thismandatewasexecutedby hiredworkers,whowereinfactpublicemployees,andwho,inexchangeforpaymentof12pesosper monthwill take care of the cost of twentythree chariots and their animals, the conductors of the chariotsandtheworkersthemselves.25Despitetheseearlyeffortstoaddressthewasteremovaland disposalneedsofBogotasresidents,manycityresidentsweredissatisfiedwiththepersistentpresence oftrashinpublicspaces.ItisunbearablethelackofcleanlinessonthestreetsofBogota.Wherever onelooks,trashandwasteispiledup.Thereisnotonesinglecleanroad.IfBogotadeservedthetitle oftheverynobleandveryroyal,nowitdeservesthetitleofthesuicidalandfilthynotedonecitizen.26 Municipal efforts were simply insufficient to resolve the growing problem of waste management, whichmultipliedasBogotaspopulationgrewyearbyyear. In1911,wastecollectionwasformallyhandedovertomunicipalauthorities,whoreceived36coaches and53animalstotransportanddisposeofthecollectedwaste.27Municipalresourceswere,however, rapidlydepleted,withonlytencoachesand36animalsremaininginafewyears.28Tosupporttheir additionalworkrequirements,taxeswereagainlevied,thistimeuponresidentswhosepoultryroamed along public roads, fruit vendors, and citizens who did not clean their homes or sweep the citys streets.29 Yet this was still not enough. In the 1920s, the municipal authorities attempted to revolutionize their responsibilities by introducing mechanical cars to make the process of collection, transportanddisposalmoreefficient.30However,theglobaleconomiccrisisof1929forcedBogotato return to its early collection and transport mechanism of animaldrawn coaches.31 This waste collectionandmanagementsystempersistedforovertwentyyears. Then, in 1954, the city of Bogota became a Capital District and was thus able to revisit its waste management operations and design. By Town Council Agreement 115 of 1956, the city hired a consultanttostudyandreportonthemostefficientmethodtomanagethewastecreatedbyBogotas inhabitants.32 Around this time, thecityexperienced a change in the very approach it took towards waste management. What was once an issue purely of hygiene and sanitation facility was reconceptualizedasapublicservicethateachinhabitantwasentitledtoandthatwastobeprovided for by the State. The premise of providing for the citys inhabitants basic needs inspired Bogotas
24Ibid 25Ibid 26Ibid 27Ibid 28Ibid 29Ibid 30Ibid 31Ibid 32Ibid

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 waste management policy as Colombian policymakers adopted the rhetoric and approach of public service.33Yet,onceagain,thewasteprobleminBogotacontinuedtogrowbeyondthecityscapacity toaddressit. In 1958, Bogota passed Town Council Agreement 30, which stated, among others, the following considerationsforcreatingEDIS,thecapitaldistrictspublicservicesenterprise:
1.Itisthedutyoftheauthoritiestoprovidetheefficientdeliveryofpublicservices;2.Forbetteringthe provisionofpublicservicesofcleanlinessandstreetsweepingandofdomiciliarycollectionofwaste,itis necessary to create an autonomous and decentralized enterprise with sufficient resources; 3. In accordancewiththebindingandvaliddecisionsoftheCapitalDistrict,thereisataxexclusivelydesigned forthesweepingandcleanlinessofthecitystreets;4.OrdinaryresourcesonwhichtheCapitalDistrict relies are unable to provide an efficient service of domiciliary/household waste collection; 5. Various legaldispositions,especiallythelegislativedecree3300of1954,authorizethedistricttoorganizepublic services through autonomous administrative entities with independent juridical personhood and patrimony.34

Thismunicipal,andthusStateowned,enterprisebecamethesoleentityresponsiblefordoortodoor wastecollectionandfinaldisposalinBogota. Bogotacontinuedtogrowatanamazingpaceinthemidtwentiethcentury.In1960,therewere378 neighborhoods in Bogota; less than five years later, in 1964, there were 653 neighborhoods.35 EDIS had 863 public employees devoted to sweeping city streets alone, illustrating the great demand for wastemanagementservices.36Duringthistime,EDISreliedheavilyonmultilateralfinancing.37This, alongwiththeincreasinginfluenceofneoliberalideologyinasmallnoninterventionistState,andthe realneedforbetter,morefrequentwastemanagementservices,contributedtothepublicperception thatEDIShadfailedtoprovidequalityservicestothecitysinhabitants.BY1993,EDISwasofficially dissolved38, and its low quality services, excessive administrative costs, and clear financial insolvency,39 were perfect evidence of the need for privatization schemes in domiciliary public utilitiesorservices.Consequently,Law142of1994waspassedandaimedtoreformtheprovisionof services,whichincludedamongotherservices,thewastemanagementpublicservices.Accordingto the rationale of Law 142, it is undeniable that many public entities reveal highly intolerable inefficiency, above board operational costs and extraordinary failures of management () there is a needforindepthsolutiontomanagethesecompaniesifwewanttoguaranteeandensureadequate

33Ibid 34Ibid 35Ibid 36Ibid 37Ibid 38Ibid 39Ibid

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 delivery of services () one of the reasons why Colombians do not take advantage of domiciliary servicesisthattherehasbeennocompetitionwithinthissector.40 Indeed, in practice, the domiciliary public services sector had been subject to an official monopoly underEDISinBogota,justlikeEMSIRVA41wasforCaliuntilMarch2009.Law142of1994permittedthe participation and involvement of private actors in providing and delivering public services, including waste management services to Bogotas inhabitants. These private actors appeared on the waste managementsceneasconcessionairesoftheState,whowouldusuallybeawardedexclusiveservice contractsforwastemanagementservices:acontractforanExclusiveServiceArea(ASE)42.SinceLaw 142of1994,itisthroughapublic,andtherebyopen,biddingprocess,thatcompetitionforproviding wasteservicesismadeavailabletoprivateactorsofnational,internationalormultinationalorigin,who bid for the exclusive right to operate integrated waste management services for the citys residents (doortodoorcollectionandtransporttothefinaldispositionplace).Thismodelofwastemanagement was eventually implemented throughout Colombia and private concessionaires flourished within the countrys waste management economy. However, traditional and informal waste picking workers persistedonthemarginsofthewastetrade,specializingconcretelyinthecollection,separationand commercializationofrecyclables.Thisspaceforthewastepickerstraderemainseventoday,because, ingeneral,municipalitiesandconcessionariesimplementandoperateonlyonewastecollectionroute fortrash,43whichendsbyburyingallcollectedtrashandpotentiallyrecyclablematerialthatisnot previouslysalvagedbythewastepickersinpublicwastedumpsandsanitarylandfills. Itisworthnotingthatcurrently,thecityofBogotisamidstanewtenderpublicprocurementprocess for rewarding the private operation of Bogotas Doa Juana sanitary landfill44. Terms of reference indicatethatthecityofBogotaiswillingtoalsofindsomeadvantageoususeofthewastedestinedfor the landfill. Bogota already initiated a biogas operation and is also requesting landfill bidders to presentintheirbidsacomponentaddressingtheadvantageoususefor20percentofthelandfillwaste destinedforDoaJuana.Despitethisexplicitrequestforproposalsfortheadvantageoususesofthis waste,includingrecycling,thiscontractualschemehasnoteffectivelyincludedwastepickersandthus
40Ibid 41 EMSIRVA was Bogotas pubic waste management company; the one in charge of the collection and final disposal of wastepriortotheprivatizationofwastemanagement. 42 The exclusivity of an area for operation is structured in the public contract or procurement scheme not only for clarifyingtheterritorialclauseofoperationbutdefiningthefinancialexploitationpossibilitiesofthebidderandmoreover forensuringthatpublicsanitationwillalsobeofferedtodeprivedneighborhoodswhereotherwise,amarketdrivenwaste collectionoperationwouldntgo. 43Apilotprojectforcreatingasecondrouteforrecyclables(selectiveroute)wasconceivedandisinoperation(minimal) since2003.However,itisnotverysuccessfulastheselectivetruckscollectingdoortodoorrecyclablesthroughasecond routearriveusuallyhalfempty.TherecyclableorselectiverouteinBogotaendsinarecyclableplant,calledLaAlquerathat isoperatedbymunicipalcontractwiththeARBprovidingjobsformoreorless30wastepickers. 44 Please see: http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/bogota/articulo220535recicladoresadviertendesacatocorte licitaciondedonajuanaand http://www.terra.com.co/noticias/articulo/html/acu33559licitantesdedonajuanadeberanincluirrecicladores.htm

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 hasnotabidedbytheaffirmativeactionofinclusionofwastepickersorderedbytheCourt,particularly indecisionT72403whichspecificallyaddressedpublicwastemanagementprocurementcontractsin Bogota. The CiViSOL Foundation has recommended thatwaste pickers request the Court to suspend thistenderprocessundercontemptofcourtorders,stressingthatalthoughnotthemainandprincipal sourceoflawinthecivillawtraditionofcountrieslikeColombia,jurisprudenceremainsasourceoflaw thatismorerelevantwhenitconsecratesanaffirmativeactionforpovertyreduction.TheAsociacion de Recicladores de Bogota (ARB) has followed this recommendation and requested a contempt of courthearingandthesuspensionoftheDonaJuanatenderfordueinclusionwiththeassistanceofone oftheirprofessionallawyersandfriendsbasedinBogot.

2.2.PUBLICPOLICYOFWASTEMANAGEMENT
Thelivelihoodofthewastepickersdependsdirectlyonaccesstowasteandthustotherelevantlaw and public policy on waste management. The regulation that defines the rules applicable for waste pickers is the set of norms that have, eitherat the theory level of norms or at the practicelevel of implementedpolicy,residuallyleftsomespacesavailableforthewastepickerstrade,andinwhichself employmentandownaccountworkinwastehaveflourished. InColombia,andpartlyduetotheabsenceofaneffectivelyimplementedurbanrecyclingpolicyasit existsintheory,itisinthepracticelevelwhereaspacewasfoundanddevelopeddefactointoawaste recycling trade. In fact, it is quite surprising that the authorities, who are well aware that almost 90 percentoftrashisrecyclableandthatithasnowcommercialvalueassecondarycommodityinboth national and international industry, have left the recycling trade open for interpretation, without defining and controlling it within the existing legal framework for the advantageous uses of waste. Understandingwastemanagementpolicyisthereforecrucialforunderstandingthelivelihood,identity, work, economy, and moreover, the challenges of waste pickers inColombia and the Global South in light of a poverty reduction strategy reflecting a rights based approach to development, global engagementoftheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsandcounterglobalwarming. 2.2.1.CONSTITUTIONALUNDERSTANDINGOFWASTEMANAGEMENT Municipalwastemanagementisencompassedunderthenotionofenvironmentalsanitation,which, inColombia,isconsideredadomiciliaryandessentialpublicutilityorservice,i.e.,onethatonethatis crucialtosatisfythebasicneedsofthepopulation.Itis,simply,essentialtothelifeofthecitizens.The twowordsenvironmentalandsanitation,referringtocleanliness,health,safetyandthephysical environment, as well as the notion of environmental sanitation as an essential public service immediatelyrevealthelinkbetweenwaste,health,lifeandtheenvironment.Thisconnectionfurther explainswhyunderstandingthetradeandenvironmentofthewastepickersinColombiarequiresan analysisofconstitutionallaw,administrativelawandenvironmentallaw.Wherethereisimproperor inadequate waste management, or in other words where this essential public function is not being properlyperformed,thepublicsuffersdetrimentalconsequencesinthreedimensions:asindividuals, 51

 theimpactmanifestsontheirpersonalhealthandsafety;asacollectivebodytheimpactmanifestson the fundamental right to enjoy a healthy environment in the city; and as a civilization, the impact manifests on good climate as a global public good. At its largest scale, improper environmental sanitation will have multiplicative effects on the health of the planet at large, thus implicating the global environmental policy agenda in the domestic discussion of waste management and waste pickerslivelihoods.45 As in other countries, in Colombia the notion of environmental sanitation includes within it the provision of public utilities or services relating to water, sewage and cleanliness. The cleanliness componenthasspecialapplicationforthewasteremovaldimensionoftheenvironmentalsanitation public service. Wastecomes in different andvaried qualities and quantities including, liquid, solid andgaseouswaste,domiciliaryorresidentialwaste,biological,industrial,agricultural,radioactiveand nuclearwasteandimpactseveryresidentofacountryintheirindividualandcollectivedimensionsof life.Inthisregard,acomprehensivewastemanagementpolicyiscriticaltoanypolicyframeworkin anygivencountry. The basic principles and rules of environmental sanitation policy in Colombia begin with the 1991 PoliticalConstitutionofColombia.UndertheoverarchingsocialpurposeoftheState,theColombian government is responsible for providing for the general wellbeing of its population, as well as improvingitsqualityoflife.46Providingpublicservicesisinherent47torealizingthesocialpurposeof
45 CiViSOL, Arguments to the Constitutional Court of Colombia / Judgment T29109 https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=Y2l2aXNvbC5vcmd8bGEtYmFzdXJhLWVzLXZpZGF8Z3g6NmViOWZiM TI3NzcwZTYxYw&pli=1 46Article366.Thegeneralwelfareandimprovementofthepopulationqualityoflifearesocialpurposesofthestate.A basicobjectiveofthestate'sactivitywillbetoaddressunsatisfiedpublichealth,educational,environmental,andpotable water needs. For this purpose, public social expenditures will have priority over any other allocation in the plans and budgetsofthenationandoftheterritorialentities.//Artculo366.Elbienestargeneralyelmejoramientodelacalidadde vida de la poblacin son finalidades sociales del Estado. Ser objetivo fundamental de su actividad la solucin de las necesidadesinsatisfechasdesalud,deeducacin,desaneamientoambientalydeaguapotable.Paratalesefectos,enlos planesypresupuestosdelaNacinydelasentidadesterritoriales,elgastopblicosocialtendrprioridadsobrecualquier otraasignacin. 47 Article 365. Public services are inherent to the social purpose of the state. It is the duty of the State to ensure their efficient provision to all the inhabitants of the national territory. Public services will be subject to the juridical regime determinedbythelaw,maybeprovidedbytheStatedirectlyorindirectly,byorganizedcommunities,orbyindividuals.In anycase,theStateisresponsiblefortheregulation,control,andapplicationofsuchservices.Ifforreasonsofsovereignty or social interest, the State, by means of a law approved by the majority of the members of both chambers upon the initiative of the government, should decide to assign to itself specific strategic or public service activities, it must first indemnifyfullythoseindividualswhobyvirtueofthesaidlawaredeprivedoftheexerciseofalawfulactivity.//Artculo 365. Los servicios pblicos son inherentes a la finalidad social del Estado. Es deber del Estado asegurar su prestacin eficienteatodosloshabitantesdelterritorionacional.Losserviciospblicosestarnsometidosalrgimenjurdicoquefije laley,podrnserprestadosporelEstado,directaoindirectamente,porcomunidadesorganizadas,oporparticulares.En todocaso,elEstadomantendrlaregulacin,elcontrolylavigilanciadedichosservicios.Siporrazonesdesoberanaode interssocial,elEstado,medianteleyaprobadaporlamayoradelosmiembrosdeunayotracmara,poriniciativadel Gobierno decide reservarse determinadas actividades estratgicas o servicios pblicos, debern indemnizar previa y

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 theStateanditis,accordingly,thedutyoftheStatetoensuretheefficientprovisionofpublicservices toallcitizensofthenationalterritoryandprotecttheirrightsthereto.48ThePresidentoftheRepublic of Colombia is responsible for setting the general administration and efficiency control over public policies of Colombian domiciliary public services and to exert this function via the National Superintendent of Domiciliary Public Services49. Public services are legally framed; they may be provided directly by the State or indirectly by delegation to private entities, usually through the contractualtechnique of theconcession contract. In eithercase, the State as theconstitutional duty holdermaintainstheresponsibilityofregulation,controlandsupervisionoverthesepublicservices.In regardstoenvironmentalsanitation,Article49oftheConstitutionindicatesthatthisparticularpublic servicefallsunderthedomainoftheState50.Specifically,theStatemustorganize,direct,andregulate thepublicservicesofenvironmentalsanitationfollowingtheprinciplesofefficiency,universalityand solidarity51.Further,everypersonhastheobligationordutytoprovidefortheirownhealthandthat
plenamentealaspersonasqueenvirtuddedichaley,quedenprivadasdelejerciciodeunaactividadlcita. 48 Article 369. The law will determine the duties and rights of users, the regime of their protection, arid their form of participationinthemanagementandfundingoftheStateenterprisesthatprovidetheservice.Similarly,thelawwilldefine theparticipationofthemunicipalitiesortheirrepresentativesintheentitiesandenterprisesthatprovidedomesticpublic services.//Artculo369.Laleydeterminarlosdeberesyderechosdelosusuarios,elrgimendesuproteccinysusformas de participacin en la gestin y fiscalizacin de las empresas estatales que presten el servicio. Igualmente definir la participacin de los municipios o de sus representantes, en las entidades y empresas que les presten servicios pblicos domiciliarios. 49Article370.ItistheresponsibilityofthePresidentoftheRepublictostipulate,subjecttothelaw,thegeneralpoliciesof administration and efficiency control of domestic public services and to exert through the Superintendence of Domestic PublicServices,thecontrol,inspection,andsupervisionoftheentitiesthatprovidethem.//Artculo370.Correspondeal PresidentedelaRepblicasealar,consujecinalaley,laspolticasgeneralesdeadministracinycontroldeeficienciadelos serviciospblicosdomiciliariosyejercerpormediodelaSuperintendenciadeServiciosPblicosDomiciliarios,elcontrol,la inspeccinyvigilanciadelasentidadesquelospresten. 50 Article 49. Public health and environmental protection are public services for which the State is responsible. All individualsareguaranteedaccesstoservicesthatpromote,protect,andrehabilitatepublichealth.Itistheresponsibility of the State to organize, direct, and regulate the delivery of health services and of environmental protection to the population inaccordance with the principles of efficiency,universality, and cooperation, and to establish policiesfor the provision of health services by private entities and to exercise supervision and control over them. In the area of public health,theStatewillestablishthejurisdictionofthenation,territorialentities,andindividuals,anddeterminethesharesof theirresponsibilitieswithinthelimitsandundertheconditionsdeterminedbylaw.Publichealthserviceswillbeorganized inadecentralizedmanner,inaccordancewithlevelsofresponsibilityandwiththeparticipationofthecommunity.Thelaw willdeterminethelimitswithinwhichbasiccareforallthepeoplewillbefreeofchargeandmandatory.Everypersonhas theobligationtoattendtotheintegralcareofhis/herhealthandthatofhis/hercommunity.//Artculo49.Laatencinde lasaludyelsaneamientoambientalsonserviciospblicosacargodelEstado.Segarantizaatodaslaspersonaselaccesoa losserviciosdepromocin,proteccinyrecuperacindelasalud.CorrespondealEstadoorganizar,dirigiryreglamentarla prestacin de servicios de salud a los habitantes y de saneamiento ambiental conforme a los principios de eficiencia, universalidadysolidaridad.Tambin,establecerlaspolticasparalaprestacindeserviciosdesaludporentidadesprivadas, y ejercer su vigilancia y control. As mismo, establecer las competencias de la Nacin, las entidades territoriales y los particularesydeterminarlosaportesasucargoenlostrminosycondicionessealadosenlaley.Losserviciosdesaludse organizarn en forma descentralizada, por niveles de atencin y con participacin de la comunidad. La ley sealar los trminosenloscualeslaatencinbsicaparatodosloshabitantessergratuitayobligatoria.Todapersonatieneeldeber deprocurarelcuidadointegraldesusaludyladesucomunidad. 51 Article 368. The nation, departments, districts, municipalities, and decentralized entities may grant subsidies in their respectivebudgetssothatindividualswithlowerincomesmaypayratesofdomesticpublicservicesthatcovertheirbasic needs.//Artculo368.LaNacin,losdepartamentos,losdistritos,losmunicipiosylasentidadesdescentralizadaspodrn

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of his community within the ambit of environmental sanitation.52 The Constitution further indicates thatpublicdomiciliaryserviceswillbeprovideddirectlybyeachmunicipalitywhenthetechnicaland economiccharacteristicsoftheservicepermitsitandisadvisable.53Thus,Article367implicitlyreveals that,notonlyistheprivatesectorallowedandwelcomedtoprovidepublicservices,butitisonlyin certainsituationsi.e.wherethetechnicalandeconomiccharacteristicsoftheservicebeingprovided require it to be as such that the municipality itself will provide and operate the given service.54 Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the private sector will provide such public services to the population as a general rule, with the State indirectly serving its mandate through contracting with these private providers. As with all industrial and commercial public services (and as opposed to administrativepublicservicesoftheState),wastemanagementisanoperation,thatalthoughcarried onbehalfoftheState,isbelievedtobebetterrunandprovidedbytheprivatesector.55 The foregoing articles, when taken together, clearly indicate that (1) public services are the quintessential responsibility of the State, (2) they may be provided by the private sector through contractingmechanismsand(3)theStatedoesnotabrogateitsresponsibilitytoprovidetheseservices eveniftheyarebeingprovidedthroughtheprivatesector.Inthecontextofwastemanagementand recycling, this implies that potentially recyclable waste falls directly within a Constitutional environmental sanitation concern of the State as much so as nonrecyclable organic waste; thus, recyclablewasteisencompassedwithintheprovisionofthemunicipalitiescleanlinesspublicservices andconstitutesamatterofdirectresponsibilityoftheState56.Inotherwords,thetraditionaltradeof wasterecyclingwork,andofinformalworkerstakingcareofnonorganicwastecollection,separation and valorization who work in a regulatory absence of implemented recycling policies, fall under the responsibilityoftheGovernmentintwocapacities:asthepovertytrappedworkingpoorconstituents
concedersubsidios,ensusrespectivospresupuestos,paraquelaspersonasdemenoresingresospuedanpagarlastarifasde losserviciospblicosdomiciliariosquecubransusnecesidadesbsicas. 52Ibid,Article49. 53 Article 367. The law will determine the relative jurisdictions and responsibilities for domestic public services, their provision, quality, and financing, and the schedule of rates, which will take into account the following criteria: cost, cooperation, and the redistribution of revenues. Domestic public services will be provided directly by each municipality when the technical and economic characteristics of the service and the general benefits of the services indicate it to be possible and advisable, and the departments provide support and coordination. The law will determine the entities competenttodeterminerates.//Artculo367.Laleyfijarlascompetenciasyresponsabilidadesrelativasalaprestacin de los servicios pblicos domiciliarios, su cobertura, calidad y financiacin, y el rgimen tarifario que tendr en cuenta adems de los criterios de costos, los de solidaridad y redistribucin de ingresos. Los servicios pblicos domiciliarios se prestarn directamente por cada municipio cuando las caractersticas tcnicas y econmicas del servicio y las conveniencias generales lo permitan yaconsejen,ylosdepartamentoscumplirnfuncionesdeapoyoycoordinacin.Laley determinarlasentidadescompetentesparafijarlastarifas. 54Ibid,Article367. 55Colombiaslegalsystemfallsinthecivilfamilyoflaw.IthasaRomanoGermanicoriginandassuchhasbeenintensely influenced by French Administrative law and Public Administration structure. The difference between Industrial and CommercialPublicServicesorutilities(SPIC)andAdministrativePublicServicesorutilities(SPA)rootsinFrenchlawandits distinctiononlegallyapplicableregimeofcontractingaccordingtothenatureofoneorother. 56CiViSOL,ArgumentstotheConstitutionalCourtofColombia/JudgmentT29109

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 of the State, and as preeminent, if not exclusive, actors within the public service of collection and disposalofrecyclablewaste. The public policy framework on cleanliness and waste management is further articulated and established through several laws, decrees and resolutions, but the primary governing principles are definedinLaw142of1994,ortheGeneralPublicUtilitiesorPublicServicesLawanditssubsequent amendments,andDecree1713of2002,whichdefinedandstructuredthepublicservicesofcleanliness andwastemanagement,amongmanyothernormsinlaws,decreesandresolutions,relatingdirectlyor indirectlytowastemanagementandthusthepolicyspaceforwastepickerslivesandtrade.Decree 1713of2002waslateramendedbyDecree1505of2003andcomplementedbyDecree838of2005, whichregulatesnewsanitarylandfills. 2.2.2.LAW142OF1994 Law142regulatesalldomiciliarypublicutilitiesincludingwater,sewage,cleanliness,electricenergy, gas distribution, land telephone services and rural cellular telephone services57 and is, therefore, an extremely complex and comprehensive legislation; anything that touches upon domiciliary public services is regulated under Law 142. To address its broad purview of services, Law 142 defines the institutions that are responsible for promoting competition among service providers or regulating necessarymonopoliesby(a)designingandadoptingcertaintariffformulasthroughwhichthepriceof utilities may be determined, and by (b) inspecting and controlling domiciliary public services. Both functionsareconstitutionalresponsibilitiesofthePresidenttothecitizensthathavebeendelegatedto the institutions defined under Law 142 of 1994.58 In the case of the cleanliness public service, the respectiveauthoritiesaretheRegulatoryCommissionofPotableWaterandBasicSanitationCRA59, and, just as for all other public services, the Superintendent of Domiciliary Public Services SSPD60. Article 162 establishes that the cleanliness development policies are the responsibility of the Vice MinistryofHousing,UrbanDevelopmentandPotablewater61. Article2ofLaw142of1994definestheproceduresforStateinterventionintheprovisionofmunicipal publicservices,i.e.inaccordancewithitsmandateofguaranteeingthatthepublicutilitiesandservices meetandimprovetheirusersqualityoflife.62Article5setstheresponsibilitiesoftheMunicipalitiesin the provision of public services, and Article 6 establishes the occasions on which Municipalities may
57Law142/94,Article2 58Ibid,Article370 59 As with the SSPD, the Regulatory Commissions also depend on the President of the Republic (Article 68) http://www.google.com/search?q=+comision+regulacion+saneamiento&ie=utf8&oe=utf8&aq=t&client=firefox a&rlz=1R1GGLL_en___CO370 60Pleasesee:http://www.superservicios.gov.co/home/web/guest/inicio 61Pleasesee:http://www.minambiente.gov.co/portal/default.aspx 62Law142/94,Article2

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 directly provide publicservices. Article 10 recognizes theexistence of freedom of enterprise,as the right of every person to organize and operate enterprises incorporated for the provision of Public services. And, Article 14 includes a set of definitions. Among many others, Basic Sanitation is understoodastheactivitiesinherenttosewageandcleanliness;andtheCleanlinessPublicService, asamendedbyLaw689of2001,istheserviceofmunicipalcollectionofwaste,mainlysolid.Italso encompasses the complementary activities of transport, treatment, advantageous use (aprovechamiento)andfinaldispositionofsuchwaste.Italsoincludes,amongothers,grasscuttingand pruning of trees on roads and public areas; the washing of these areas and transfer, treatment and advantageoususe(aprovechamiento).63 Under Article 15, there are four types of persons that may provide public services in Colombia: (1) public utilities companies, which as specified in article 17 and 19 must be investor or equity owned companies.64 identified in their name as ESP and with capital from national or foreign investors, (2) natural or juridical persons who produce for themselves as a consequence or complement of their maineconomicactivity,(3)municipalitiesthathavedirectlyassumedtheprovisionofpublicservicesas legallyauthorized,and(4)Law142authorizedorganizationsthatmayprovidepublicutilities/services inminormunicipalitiesofruralzonesandinspecificurbanareasandzones.AsdevelopedbyDecree 421of2000,Article1,potablewaterandbasicsanitation(whichincludesthecleanlinessserviceand thus waste management) may be provided by nonprofit legal persons of organized communities, in minorandruralmunicipalitiesandspecificurbanareas,withoutprejudicetotheprovisionthatother typesofpersonsmayalsocarryoutandprovidetheseservices.AnadditionalparagraphofArticle15of Law142of1994linkscitizenstotheprovisionofpublicservicesbystatingthatwherepublicservices arebeingprovided,theprovidermustbeauserofthosepublicutilities.Otherwise,itisnecessaryto demonstratethatitsalternativeprovisionofpotablewater,sewageandcleanlinessisnotdetrimental tothecommunity. ThenotionofExclusiveAreasofService(ASEAreasdeServicioExclusivo),isdefinedinArticle40ofLaw 14265, as the zone that is awarded exclusively and for a certain period of time to the legal person
63Eselservicioderecoleccinmunicipalderesiduos,principalmenteslidos.Tambinseaplicarestaleyalasactividades complementarias de transporte, tratamiento, aprovechamiento y disposicin final de tales residuos. Igualmente incluye, entreotras,lasactividadescomplementariasdecortedecspedypodaderbolesubicadosenlasvasyreaspblicas;de lavadodeestasreas,transferencia,tratamientoyaprovechamiento. 64Thislegalmarketbarrier,effectivelyrestrictingtheentranceofnonprofitorganizationslikecooperativesofwastepickers inthewastemanagementmarket,thatarenotequityowned,waseventuallyfoundtobeinconsistentwithconstitutional principlesandwaslaterconditionedtoamoreinclusiveinterpretationinconstitutionalrulingC74103. 65Artculo40.REASDESERVICIOEXCLUSIVO.Pormotivosdeinterssocialyconelpropsitodequelacoberturadelos servicios pblicos de acueducto y alcantarillado, saneamientoambiental, distribucindomiciliaria de gas combustible por red y distribucin domiciliaria de energa elctrica, se pueda extender a las personas de menores ingresos, la entidad o entidades territoriales competentes, podrn establecer mediante invitacin pblica, reas de servicio exclusivas, en las cualespodracordarsequeningunaotraempresadeserviciospblicospuedaofrecerlosmismosserviciosenlamismarea duranteuntiempodeterminado.Loscontratosquesesuscribandebernentodocasoprecisarelespaciogeogrficoenel cualseprestarelservicio,losnivelesdecalidadquedebeasegurarelcontratistaylasobligacionesdelmismorespectodel servicio.Tambinpodrnpactarsenuevosaportespblicosparaextenderelservicio.

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 havingwonthemunicipalitysinvitationtopubliclybidfortheprovisionofserviceswithinit.Currently, Bogota has six waste management ASEs and Cali has four nonexclusive concession areas for waste managementservices. Following the industrial and commercial nature of public utilities provision and operation, Article 31 establishesthattheapplicablelawforthecontractsofpublicutilitiescompaniesisprivateinsteadof public law. In other words, the Public Contracting Statute or Law 80 of 199366 is not applicable. However,contractspassedbytheterritorialentitiesoftheStatefortheprovisionofpublicutilitiesor services are subject to the rules contained within the Public Contracting Statute or Law 80 of 1993. Article146ofLaw142of1994establishesthemeasurementofconsumptionandpriceinthecontract, stressingthatconsumptionistheprincipaldeterminantofprice,anddeterminingthatthepriceasked oftheutilitiesuserresultsnotonlyfromcostfactorsencompassedintariffformulas,butalsofromthe frequencyoftheservicesprovidedandthevolumeofwastecollected.Article147,inturn,createsthe obligationofdisaggregatingtheservicesprovidedintobundledbills,withtheexceptionofdomiciliary cleanlinessandotherbasicsanitationservices. Finally,Article30determinesthattheprinciplesofinterpretationoftheapplicablelawwillbesubject tothebestguaranteeoffreedomofcompetitionandimpedingabusesofdominantpositions,soasto favorthecontinuityandqualityinthepublicprovisionofservices. 2.2.3.WASTEMANAGEMENTDECREES1713OF2002AND1505OF2003 The cleanliness public service defined and foreseen by Law 142 of 1994 was further developed by NationalDecree1713of2002,aswellassubsequentamendingandcomplementingdecrees.Article1 of Decree 1713 sets forth various definitions regarding the cleanliness public service. Among many others,thepolicydefinitionsrelevanttorecyclingandwasterecyclingworkincludethefollowing:
Solidwasteorresidue:Isanyobject,material,substanceorsolidelementresultingfromconsumption or use of a good in domestic, industrial, commercial, institutional, or service activities, that the generatorabandons,rejectsorhandsawayandthatmaybeadvantageouslyusedortransformedintoa new good with economic value or finally disposed of. Solid wastes are divided into advantageously usableandnonadvantageouslyusable.Solidwasteincludesthewasteresultingfromthesweepingof publicareas.67 Qualityofthecleanlinesspublicservice:UnderstoodasqualityinDomiciliaryCleanlinessPublicService, theprovisionwithcontinuity,frequencyandefficiencytotheentirepopulationinaccordancewiththe provisions of this decree, with due care program failures and emergencies, a full customer service,

66Law142/94,Article31 67Residuoslidoodesecho.Escualquierobjeto,material,sustanciaoelementoslidoresultantedelconsumoousodeun bienenactividadesdomsticas,industriales,comerciales,institucionales,deservicios,queelgeneradorabandona,rechaza o entrega y que es susceptible de aprovechamiento o transformacin en un nuevo bien, con valor econmico o de disposicin final. Los residuos slidos se dividen en aprovechables y no aprovechables. Igualmente, se consideran como residuosslidosaquellosprovenientesdelbarridodereaspblicas.

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accurateandtimely,anefficientuseandproperdisposalofsolidwastesoastoensurepublichealthand environmentalpreservation,keepingcleantheservicedareas.68 User:Thenaturalorlegalpersonthatbenefitsfromtheprovisionofapublicservice,eitherasownerof thepropertywheretheserviceisdelivered,orasthedirectrecipientoftheservice.69 Largeproducersorgeneratorsofwaste:Nonresidentialusersthatproduceandpresentsolidwastein quantitiesgreaterthanonecubicmeterpermonthforcollection.70 Source separation: Classification of solid waste in the place where they are produced for their subsequentrecovery.71 Collection:Theactionandeffectofcollectingandremovingsolidwastefromoneormoregeneratorsby thepersonprovidingtheservice.72 Management: The set of activities that are carried out from the generation to the elimination of a residue or solid waste. This includes the activities of source separation, presentation, collection, transportation,storage,treatmentand/oreliminationofresiduesorsolidwaste.73 Integrated solid waste management: The set of transactions and arrangements pursuant to giving to wasteproducedthemostappropriatedestinationfromanenvironmentalperspectiveandinaccordance withthewastecharacteristicsofvolume,source,cost,treatment,recoverypossibilities,advantageous use,commercializationandfinaldisposal.74 AdvantageouslyUsableSolidWaste:Anymaterial,object,substanceorsolidelementthathasnovalue fordirectorindirectuseforthepersongeneratingit,butmaybeincorporatedinaproductiveprocess.75 Nonadvantageously UsableSolidWaste:Anymaterialorsubstanceissolidorsemisolidorganicand inorganic origin, putrescent or not, generated from domestic activities, industrial, commercial, institutional, service, which offers no possibility to use, reuse and reenter the productive process.

68 Calidad del servicio de aseo. Se entiende por calidad del servicio pblico domiciliario de aseo, la prestacin con continuidad,frecuenciayeficienciaatodalapoblacindeconformidadconloestablecidoenestedecreto;conundebido programa de atencin de fallas y emergencias, una atencin al usuario completa, precisa y oportuna; un eficiente aprovechamiento y una adecuada disposicin de los residuos slidos; de tal forma que se garantice la salud pblica y la preservacindelmedioambiente,manteniendolimpiaslaszonasatendidas. 69Usuario.Eslapersonanaturalojurdicaquesebeneficiaconlaprestacindeunserviciopblico,biencomopropietario delinmuebleendondeestesepresta,ocomoreceptordirectodelservicio. 70 Grandes generadores o productores. Son los usuarios no residenciales que generan y presentan para la recoleccin residuosslidosenvolumensuperioraunmetrocbicomensual. 71 Separacin en la fuente. Es la clasificacin de los residuos slidos en el sitio donde se generan para su posterior recuperacin. 72Recoleccin.Eslaaccinyefectoderecogeryretirarlosresiduosslidosdeunoovariosgeneradoresefectuadaporla personaprestadoradelservicio. 73Manejo.Eselconjuntodeactividadesqueserealizandesdelageneracinhastalaeliminacindelresiduoodesecho slido. Comprende las actividades de separacin en la fuente, presentacin, recoleccin, transporte, almacenamiento, tratamientoy/olaeliminacindelosresiduosodesechosslidos. 74 Gestin integral de residuos slidos. Es el conjunto de operaciones y disposiciones encaminadas a dar a los residuos producidos el destino ms adecuado desde el punto de vista ambiental, de acuerdo con sus caractersticas, volumen, procedencia,costos,tratamiento,posibilidadesderecuperacin,aprovechamiento,comercializacinydisposicinfinal. 75Residuoslidoaprovechable.Escualquiermaterial,objeto,sustanciaoelementoslidoquenotienevalordeusodirecto oindirectoparaquienlogenere,peroqueessusceptibledeincorporacinaunprocesoproductivo.

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Therefore they have no commercial value, requiring treatment and final disposal and thus generate costsfordisposal.76 Advantageous use of Waste within integrated waste management: The process whereby, through integrated solid waste management, recovered materials are reincorporated to the economic and productivecycle,bymeansofreutilization,recycling,incinerationforpurposesofenergygeneration, compostingoranyanothermodalitythatcarriessanitary,environmentaland/oreconomicbenefits.77 AdvantageoususeofWastewithindomiciliarycleanlinesspublicservice:Thesetofactivitiesthatare directedtothecollection,transportandseparation,whenso,ofthesolidwastethatwillbesubjectto processesofreutilization,recyclingorincinerationwithenergygenerationpurposes,composting,worm farmingoranyothermodalitythatwillcarrysanitary,environmentaland/oreconomicbenefitswithin theIntegratedWasteManagementframework.78 Ordinarycleanlinessservice:Theprovisionofdomiciliarycleanlinesspublicservicesforsolidwasteofa residentialoriginandotherwastethatmaybemanagedbythecapacityofpersonsprovidingthepublic servicesandnotcorrespondingtoanyotherservicesdefinedunderDecree1713,itiscomposedbythe collection, transportation, treatment, final disposition of waste, and encompasses the sweeping and cleanlinessofpublicroadsandareasandthecollection,transport,transfer,treatmentandfinaldisposal ofthesolidwastegeneratedbytheseactivities.79 Special cleanliness service: Related to the activities of collection, transport and treatment of solid wastethatbytheirnature,composition,size,volumeandweightcannotbecollected,handled,treated ornormallydisposedofbythepersonprovidingtheservice,inaccordancewithwhatisestablishedin thisdecree.Itincludesactivitiesofgrasscuttingtreepruningonpublicroadsandareas,thecollection, transport,transfer,treatment,advantageoususeandfinaldisposaloftheresiduesresultingfromthese activities;thewashingoftheareasmentioned,andtheadvantageoususeofresidentialsolidwasteand thewasteresultingfromthesweepingandcleaningofpublicroadsandpublicareas.80

76 Residuo slido no aprovechable. Es todo material o sustancia slida o semislida de origen orgnico e inorgnico, putrescible o no, proveniente de actividades domsticas, industriales, comerciales, institucionales, de servicios, que no ofrece ninguna posibilidad de aprovechamiento, reutilizacin o reincorporacin en un proceso productivo. Son residuos slidos que no tienen ningn valor comercial, requieren tratamiento y disposicin final y por lo tanto generan costos de disposicin. 77Aprovechamiento.Eselprocesomedianteelcual,atravsdeunmanejointegraldelosresiduosslidos,losmateriales recuperadossereincorporanalcicloeconmicoyproductivoenformaeficiente,pormediodelareutilizacin,elreciclaje,la incineracin con fines de generacin de energa, el compostaje o cualquier otra modalidad que conlleve beneficios sanitarios,ambientalesy/oeconmicos. 78 Aprovechamiento en el marco del servicio pblico domiciliario de aseo. Es el conjunto de actividades dirigidas a efectuar la recoleccin, transporte y separacin, cuando a ello haya lugar, de residuos slidos que sern sometidos a procesosdereutilizacin,reciclajeoincineracinconfinesdegeneracindeenerga,compostaje,lombriculturaocualquier otramodalidadqueconllevebeneficiossanitarios,ambientales,socialesy/oeconmicosenelmarcodelaGestinIntegral delosResiduosSlidos. 79Servicioordinariodeaseo.Eslamodalidaddeprestacindeserviciopblicodomiciliariodeaseopararesiduosslidosde origenresidencialyparaotrosresiduosquepuedensermanejadosdeacuerdoconlacapacidaddelapersonaprestadora delserviciodeaseoyquenocorrespondenaningunodelostiposdeserviciosdefinidoscomoespeciales.Estcompuestopor la recoleccin, transporte, transferencia, tratamiento y disposicin final de los residuos slidos originados por estas actividades.Tambincomprendeesteserviciolasactividadesdebarridoylimpiezadevasyreaspblicasylarecoleccin, transporte,transferencia,tratamiento,ydisposicinfinaldelosresiduosslidosoriginadosporestasactividades. 80 Servicio especial de aseo. Es el relacionado con las actividades de recoleccin, transporte y tratamiento de residuos slidos que por su naturaleza, composicin, tamao, volumen y peso no puedan ser recolectados, manejados, tratados o

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Nowaste Culture: The set of customs and values of a community that tend to reduce the amount of wastegeneratedbyitsresidentsespecially,thereductionofnonadvantageouslyusablewasteandthe effectiveadvantageoususeofthewastethatispotentiallyreusable.81 Recovery:Theactionofselectingandremovingsolidwastethatcanbeoffsettoanadvantageoususe processinordertobeconvertedintoacommodityusefulforthecreationofnewproducts.82 Recycling:Theprocessbywhichrecoveredsolidwasteisadvantageouslyusedandtransformedandthe materials potentiality of reincorporating as commodities for the manufacturing of new products is returned. Recycling may consist of several stages: clean technology processes, industrial conversion, separation,selectivecollection,stocking,reutilization,transformationandcommercialization.83 Recycler: The natural or legal person that provides the public service of cleanliness in the activity of advantageoususe.84 Final disposal: The process of isolating and confining solid waste, especially the nonadvantageously usable,inadefinitiveway,inplacesspeciallyselectedanddesignedtopreventpollution,anddamageor injuriestohumanhealthandtheenvironment.85 Work front: The landfill site where the processes of downloading, accommodation, compacting and coveringofsolidthatwastegivenforfinaldisposalaredone.86

TheguidingprinciplesofDecree1713,expressedinArticle3andapplicabletoallservicesunderthe Decree87,are(1)toguaranteequalityservicestotheentirepopulation(universality);(2)toprovidethe
dispuestosnormalmenteporlapersonaprestadoradelservicio,deacuerdoconloestablecidoenestedecreto.Incluyelas actividades de corte de csped y poda de rboles ubicados en las vas y reas pblicas; la recoleccin, transporte, transferencia,tratamiento,aprovechamientoydisposicinfinaldelosresiduosoriginadosporestasactividades;ellavado delasreasenmencin;yelaprovechamientodelosresiduosslidosdeorigenresidencialydeaquellosprovenientesdel barridoylimpiezadevasyreaspblicas. 81 Cultura de la no basura. Es el conjunto de costumbresy valores de una comunidad que tiendana la reduccinde las cantidadesderesiduosgeneradosporsushabitantesenespeciallosnoaprovechablesyalaprovechamientodelosresiduos potencialmentereutilizables. 82 Recuperacin. Es la accin que permite seleccionar y retirar los residuos slidos que pueden someterse a un nuevo procesodeaprovechamiento,paraconvertirlosenmateriaprimatilenlafabricacindenuevosproductos. 83Reciclaje.Eselprocesomedianteelcualseaprovechanytransformanlosresiduosslidosrecuperadosysedevuelvea losmaterialessupotencialidaddereincorporacincomomateriaprimaparalafabricacindenuevosproductos.Elreciclaje puedeconstardevariasetapas:procesosdetecnologaslimpias,reconversinindustrial,separacin,recoleccinselectiva acopio,reutilizacin,transformacinycomercializacin. 84Reciclador.Eslapersonanaturalojurdicaqueprestaelserviciopblicodeaseoenlaactividaddeaprovechamiento. 85Disposicinfinalderesiduos.Eselprocesodeaislaryconfinarlosresiduosslidosenespeciallosnoaprovechables,en formadefinitiva,enlugaresespecialmenteseleccionadosydiseadosparaevitarlacontaminacin,ylosdaosoriesgosa lasaludhumanayalmedioambiente. 86Frentedetrabajo.Sitioenelrellenosanitariodondeserealizanlosprocesosdedescargue,acomodacin,compactacin ycoberturadelosresiduosslidosentregadosparadisposicinfinal. 87 Artculo 3. Principios bsicos para la prestacin del servicio de aseo. En la prestacin del servicio de aseo, se observarn como principios bsicos los siguientes: garantizar la calidad del servicio a toda la poblacin, prestar eficaz y eficientemente el servicio en forma continua e ininterrumpida, obtener economas de escala comprobables, establecer mecanismos que garanticen a los usuarios el acceso al servicio y su participacin en la gestin y fiscalizacin de la prestacin, desarrollar una cultura de la no basura, fomentar el aprovechamiento, minimizar y mitigar el impacto en la

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 serviceswithefficiencyandefficacy,inacontinuous,uninterruptedmanner;(3)toestablisheconomies of scale relating to the services being provided; (4) to establish mechanisms to nurture and grow a cultureofnonwasteamongusers;(5)topromotetheadvantageoususe(aprovechamiento)ofwaste or the transformation of waste to productive or valuable materials, energy and/or fuel; and (6) to minimizeandmitigateanyadverseimpactsofwasteonhealthandtheenvironment.88 Article 8 of Decree 1713 of 2002 creates the policy mechanism for Colombias municipal integrated solidwastemanagement.ThePGIRS(PlandeGestinIntegraldeResiduosSlidos)orIntegratedSolid WasteManagementPlanistobeadoptedbyeachmunicipalityofthecountry.ThePGIRSmustdecide onthecollectionofadvantageoususableandnonadvantageouslyusablewaste.Inthisregard,Decree 1713 recognizes that Colombia must begin its process of creating value out of discarded materials, beginning with the source separation of recyclable materials, and, further, to embed this principle withinitslongtermvisionforintegratedsolidwastemanagementofthecountry.Article126ofthe same Decree establishes the role of the countrys Autonomous Regional Corporations89. These entities, as autonomous environmental authorities, are responsible for advising and orienting municipalitiesinthedesignoftheirPGIRS. Decree1713laterexplainsinarticle70thattheformsfortakingadvantageofsolidwasteare,among others, the reutilization of waste, recycling, composting, worm farming, and biogas and energy recovery. Actually, Chapter 7 of Decree 1713 of 2002 structures Colombias System for the AdvantageoususeofSolidWastecomprehensively,fromtheguidingandimplementingprinciplesup totherequirementsforinfrastructuredesignatedtocreatingvalueoutofsuchwaste. Starting from Article 67, Decree 1713 establishes that the purposes for the recuperation and advantageoususeofsolidwasteare:(1)tomakerationaluseandconsumptionofthecommodities thatoriginatefromnaturalresources;(2)torecuperateanyremainingenergeticandeconomicvalues ofmaterialsthathavebeenalreadyusedinproductiveprocesses;(3)toreducethequantityofwaste requiringfinaldisposition;(4)tolessentheenvironmentalimpactofsolidwasteasmuchbydemand anduseofcommoditiesasbytheproceduresoffinaldispositionofsolidwaste;and(5)toguarantee the participation of waste pickers and the solidarity sector in the activities of recuperation and valorizationofsolidwaste,withtheaimofconsolidatingtheiractivitiesandimprovingtheirlivelihood conditions.90Itisworthnotingthatthisfifthandlastpurposereferringexplicitlytowastepickerswas introduced by an amendment to Decree 1713, Decree 1505 of 2003. Decree 1505 of 2003 clearly showsthatpolicymakersatthetime,followingwastepickersandtheirprofessionalfriendsadvocacy efforts, decided to recognize the existence of the traditional work and contribution of Colombias wastepickersintheprocessoffindingadvantageoususestosolidwasteinthecountryandtheneed forbetteringtheirimpoverishedworkingandlivingconditions.Thepolicymakersintentiontoinclude
saludyenelmedioambiente,ocasionadodesdelageneracinhastalaeliminacindelosresiduosslidos,esdecirentodos loscomponentesdelservicio. 88Decree1713/02 89Pleasesee:http://www.car.gov.co/andhttp://www.cvc.gov.co/vsm38cvc/ 90Article67,Chapter7,Decree1713andDecree1505of2003

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 waste pickers in the provision of these particular services is clear. Indeed, Article 81, which was includedbyamendmentinDecree1505of2003,establishesthat,asfaraspossible,themunicipality anddistrictshallensure,andnotmerelypromote,theparticipationofwastepickersintheactivitiesof recyclingandtheadvantageoususeofsolidwaste.91Infact,underArticle68ofDecree1713,92waste pickersorganizations,cooperativesandassociationsareincludedaspotentialprovidersofservicesfor the advantageous use of solid waste, alongside public utilities companies and the authorized organizations of Article 15 of Law 142 of 1994. Further, the Decree establishes that any district or municipalitywithmorethan8000usersofthecleanlinesspublicservicemustconsidertheviabilityof developingsustainableprojectsfortheadvantageoususeofsolidwastewhendesigningitsPGIRS,and that the municipality or district is obligated to promote the advantageous uses of solid waste and ensuretheexecutionofsuchprojects93. Articles74and75envisionthecreation,operationandmaintenanceofspecialplantsandbuildingsfor that purpose, and article 73 stresses the need to build municipal programs for developing advantageoususesofsolidwasteprocesswithinthePGIRS.Itisworthnotingthatthatadvantageous useactivitiesarenot,assomehaveinterpreted,limitedtomerelyresidentialwaste.Rather,Article35 expresslyindicatesthatindustrialandcommercialwasteorsolidwasteproducedbyindustrialand commercialactivityalsofallwithinthepurviewoftheDecree,specificallyunderordinarycleanliness services94.
91 Artculo 81. Modificado por el Decreto 1505 de 2003, artculo 8. Participacin de recicladores. Los Municipios y los Distritosasegurarnenlamedidadeloposiblelaparticipacindelosrecicladoresenlasactividadesdeaprovechamiento de los residuos slidos. Una vez se formulen, implementen y entren en ejecucin los programas de aprovechamiento evaluadoscomoviablesysosteniblesenelPGIRS,seentenderqueelaprovechamientodeberserejecutadoenelmarcode dichos programas. Hasta tanto no se elaboren y desarrollen estos Planes, el servicio se prestar en armona con los programasdefinidosporlaentidadterritorialparatalfin. 92 Artculo 68. Personas prestadoras del servicio de aseo que efectan la actividad de aprovechamiento. El aprovechamiento de residuos slidos podr ser realizado por las siguientes personas: 1. Las empresas prestadoras de servicios pblicos. 2. Las personas naturales o jurdicas que produzcan para ellas mismas o como complemento de su actividadprincipal,losbienesyserviciosrelacionadosconelaprovechamientoyvalorizacindelosresiduos,talescomolas organizaciones,cooperativasyasociacionesderecicladores,enlostrminosestablecidosenlanormatividadvigente.3.Las dems personas prestadoras del servicio pblico autorizadas por el artculo 15 de la Ley 142 de 1994 conforme a la normatividad vigente. Pargrafo. Las personas prestadoras del servicio de aseo que efecten la actividad de aprovechamientoincluirnensureglamentolasaccionesymecanismosrequeridosparaeldesarrollodelosprogramasde aprovechamientoquehayansidodefinidosbajosuresponsabilidadenelPGIRS.Sinperjuiciodeloanterior,losprestadores delservicioquenodesarrollenestaactividad,deberncoordinarconlosprestadoresquelaefecten,eldesarrolloarmnico delasactividadesderecoleccin,transporte,transferenciaydisposicinfinalaquehayalugar. 93 Artculo 69. Recuperacin en los PGIRS. Los municipios y distritos superiores a 8.000 usuarios del servicio pblico, al elaborarelrespectivoPlandeGestinIntegraldeResiduosSlidos,estnenlaobligacindeanalizarlaviabilidadderealizar proyectossosteniblesdeaprovechamientoderesiduos;encasodequesedemuestrelaviabilidadysostenibilidaddelos proyectos, elMunicipio y Distrito tendr la obligacinde promoverlos y asegurar su ejecucinacorde con lo previsto en estedecreto. 94Artculo35.Frecuenciasderecoleccin.Lafrecuenciaderecoleccindependerdelanaturalezadelosresiduosydelos programas de aprovechamiento de la zona. Para residuos que contengan material putrescible, la frecuencia mnima del servicio de recoleccin depender de las caractersticas del clima o de la zona y deber incrementarse para prevenir la generacindeoloresylaproliferacindevectoresasociadosconlaacumulacinydescomposicindetalesresiduos.Enel casodeserviciosagrandesgeneradores,lafrecuenciadependerdelascaractersticasdelaproduccin.

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 Article 71 of the same chapter explains that the advantageous uses of waste can be carried out through the collection of solid waste that is already separated at the source, in a separate selective waste collection route, or by means of centers of selection and storage, options that must be duly identifiedintherespectivePGIRS.95Italsodetermineshowmaterialsthatmaybeadvantageouslyused should be collected and transported. For instance, as provided for in each district or municipalitys PGIRS,advantageouslyusablewastemaybecollectedfromsidewalksoutsideofprivateresidences. Article80ofChapter7ofDecree1713indicatesthat,forthepurposeofpromotingandpropounding the advantageous use of solid waste, the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development,withthesupportofthewastemanagementindustry,universities,andresearchcenters, will advance studies on waste and ways to recapture value through recycling, composting, etc.96 It advancesthesespecificactivitieswiththepurposeofpromotingtherecuperationofreusablematerials in waste, diminishing the quantities of disposable waste produced by the public, and to gather technical, economic and entrepreneurial information necessary to incorporate such refuse materials into productive processes.97 For the same purpose, the Decree requires the head of the Regulatory Commission on Potable Water and Basic Sanitation (CRA) to define the relevant criteria and parametersthatareneededforcreatingadditionalincentivesforusersintermsofsourceseparation ofrecyclablestofacilitatetheadvantageoususeofsolidwaste.98 ThisideaisrevisitedinArticle109,whichrelatestotheneedtocreateeconomiesofscaleforpositive reinforcementsonthepricepaidbyusersofthecleanlinessservice.99Theideaofanengagedpublicis carried out further in Article 120100, by which the persons providing the cleanliness services must
95 Artculo 71. Seleccin de residuos slidos. El aprovechamiento de residuos slidos, se puede realizar a partir de la seleccinenlafuenteconrecoleccinselectiva,omedianteelusodecentrosdeseleccinyacopio,opcionesquedeben seridentificadasyevaluadasenelrespectivoPlandeGestinIntegraldeResiduosSlidosdecadaMunicipiooDistrito. 96Decree1713/02,Article80 97Artculo80.Fortalecimientodelaprovechamiento.Conelobjetodefomentaryfortalecerelaprovechamientodelos residuos slidos, en condiciones adecuadas para la salud y el medio ambiente, el Ministerio del Medio Ambiente en coordinacin con el Ministerio de Desarrollo Econmico podr, con apoyo de la industria y la participacin de las universidadesy/oCentrosdeinvestigacin,adelantarestudiosdevaloracinderesiduospotencialmenteaprovechables,con el fin de promocionar la recuperacin de nuevos materiales, disminuir las cantidades de residuos a disponer y reunir la informacintcnica,econmicayempresarialnecesariaparaincorporardichosmaterialesalosprocesosproductivos.Del mismomodo,laComisindeRegulacindeAguaPotableySaneamientoBsico,CRA,acordeconloprevistoenelartculo 12deestedecreto,definirloscriteriosyparmetrosnecesariosparaelotorgamientodeincentivostarifariosadicionalesa losusuarios. 98Ibid,Article80 99 Artculo 109 Economas de escala. El Municipio o Distrito, al adoptar el respectivo Plan de Gestin Integral de los Residuos Slidos, y al desarrollarlo directamente o mediante contrato, debe propender por el aprovechamiento de las economas de escala, en beneficio de los usuarios, a travs de la tarifa. Pargrafo. Para el aprovechamiento de las economas deescala sedeben tener en cuenta variables tales como: Cantidadde residuosa manejar en cada una de las etapas de la gestin, nivel del servicio, calidad del servicio, densidad de las viviendas, innovacin tecnolgica de equipo, gestin administrativa, operativa y de mantenimiento del servicio, la asociacin de municipios, las condiciones y la localizacindeloscomponentesdelsistema. 100Artculo120Relacionesconlacomunidad.Lapersonaprestadoradeberdesarrollarplanesyprogramasorientadosa manteneractivasycercanasrelacionesconlosusuariosdelservicio.Estosplanesdebernatenderlossiguientesobjetivos: 1. Suministrar informacin a los usuarios acerca de los horarios, frecuencias, normas y caractersticas generales de la

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 implement educational programs targeting communities to foster a culture of no waste, expressly linkingcommunitiestopromotingtheadvantageoususeofsolidwastemanagement.Onceagain,and in light of Article 81, which was included by amendment in Decree 1505 of 2003, the lawmakers intendedtoincludewastepickersintheprovisionofthesepublicservices. ForcitizenswhoprefernottousethepubliccleanlinessservicesprovidedunderDecree1713,Article 125 imposes a positive duty to justify that their disposal mechanisms are not detrimental to the communityatlarge;otherwisetheymustbecomeusersoftheservice.101Inthissense,allmembersof thepublicareconsideredusersof themunicipalcleanlinessservice,andareobligatedunderDecree 1713andtheprovisionsabovetoengageintheSystemofAdvantageousUseofSolidWastedelineated therein. 2.2.4.LAWINTHEFIELDORPUBLICPOLICYIMPLEMENTATIONOFWASTEMANAGEMENTDECISIONS Alltheforegoingprovisionsareofparticularimportanceforthewasterecyclingworkofwastepickers, inthatuntilnow,seekingandrecoveringtrashfortheadvantageoususeofwaste(i.e.,wasterecycling) hasbeenperceivedbytheColombiancommunityatlargeassomekindofunregulated,unarticulated wasterelatedactivitycarriedoutbytraditionalwastepickerswho,sadly,havefoundtheironlyincome opportunityinotherpeoplestrash.Legally,however,thecollectionofpotentiallyrecyclablewasteor advantageouslyusablewaste,asinformalasitcurrentlyisandaspovertyrelatedasitislivedonthe streets, is not in the least an unregulated free private market space. On the contrary, as broadly described by the norms cited above, it is a State responsibility and a municipal duty to develop a separateroutefortheselectivecollectionofadvantageouslyusablewaste,separatedbycitizensatthe source,orviaasoleroutethattakesallmixedtrashtoacenterfortheselectionandrecoveryofthe potentiallyrecyclablewastepriortoitsfinaldisposal.Thisisaclearcomponentoftheintegratedpublic serviceofmunicipalcleanliness.Ifthispolicycontinuestobeleftunimplementedandunenforced,then thewasterealmexpandinginandaroundthepubliccleanlinessservicebecomesanunregulatedWild West marketplace of waste. In this scenario, the povertytrapped informal and traditional waste pickerscompetingwiththeinvestordrivenrecyclingcompanieswillnotbeoneswhomakethecut.102 The perception of a free, unregulated, and lawless open market for entrepreneurs in the recycling business103 is supported only by the fact that the Governments constitutional functions regarding
prestacin del servicio. 2. Promover la educacin de la comunidad para la formacin de la cultura de la no basura que vinculealascomunidadesenlasolucindelproblema. 101Decree1713/02,Articles124,125 102OneofthemostcriticizedcompetitorsbywastepickersisResiduosEcoeficiencia. 103 In the waste pickers and CiViSOL case decided favorably by ruling T29109 for instance, the governments defense argumentstriedtoexplain,withregardtotheexclusionofwastepickersworkandtheirrecyclingbusinessresultingfrom theclosureofNavarrowastedumpwithoutprovidingalternatives,thattheadvantageoususeorrecovery[ofsolidwaste] assuchhasnotbeenundertechnicalconditionsbanned,thesepeople[thewastepickers]mayrealizeandexecutetheir jobaseveryoneinColombia,procuringtheirownclients()//laactividaddeaprovechamientoorecuperacincomotal bajo condiciones tcnicas no ha sido prohibida, estas personas pueden realizar y ejecutar su oficio como todos en Colombia,procurndosesuspropiosclientes.Inthesamesense,theyoungsonsofPresidentAlvaroUribewhorecently

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 domiciliarypublicserviceshavenotbeenimplementedorenforcedbythePresidentoftheRepublicor the delegated authorities made responsible for these legal provisions, namely, the Ministry of the Environment,HousingandTerritorialDevelopment,theSuperintendentofDomiciliaryPublicServices, andtheRegulatoryCommissionofPotableWaterandBasicSanitation.104Alloftheprovisionsabove arebasicallyinalegallyrawexistingonlyinplainpaperandink;Colombiassolidwasterecyclingpublic policyiscurrentlyunimplementedandunenforcedlaw. The recycling component of the waste management system has not been fully enforced or implemented through the control and regulation by national authorities as a key component of the publiccleanlinessserviceorsanitationintheleast.105Itisactuallyleftunattendedandthusoperated freely by informal and formal operators, national and international forces present in marketplace of recyclablewaste.Districtandmunicipalmayorshavealsofailedtoimplementthebindingprovisionsof their cities PGIRS. This failure falls implicates the executive branch of government as well, even though it is placed within the local, district and municipal authorities jurisdiction, who remain the implementersofsanitationpolicyintheirlocalities. Inthisvoidofimplementationandenforcement,awildprivatemarkethasflourishedandgrownatan exponentialrate,especiallysincewasteisnolongerunwantedrefusebutahighlyvaluablecommercial good that is sold as a secondary commodity in markets around the world.106 The void also explains why some of the wealthiest powerholders of Colombia have ended up fighting with the most powerless citizens for access to trash. Meanwhile, the waste pickers have been almost exclusively developing the recycling trade for nearly one hundred years in the only niche available to them for ensuringtheirsurvival.Whilerecognizingthenetworkofintermediarywarehouses,politicalandcapital powerholdersarenowtakingtheleadindomesticandinternationalwasterecyclingmarket.Itisalso worth noting that the very dangerous trade interests of illegally armed groups are also seemingly presentinthewasterecyclingmarketplace. At the same time as this void has allowed the private waste market to flourish, some of the more technical provisions of waste policy are effectively implemented, and even enforced, through police action. For instance, the old waste dump of Navarro in city of Cali, where more than 1200 waste pickerslivedandworked,wasfinallyclosedbythecityinJune2008.Citingenvironmentalreasons, the municipal authority created a new sanitary landfill in Yotoco within the normative provisions of
startedtoinvestandoperateinwasterecyclingfornationalandinternationalclients,arguedradioandtvthattheywere justentrepreneursandthatinnowaytheywerebenefitingfromtheirfathersroleaspresidentofthecountry,giventhat recycling,accordingtothem,isacompletelyprivatemarketmatterunrelatedtopubliccontractingoftheState. 104 The level of responsibility and power of the President of the Republic is such that as article 83 of Law 142 of 1993 states, it is the President who has that last word with regard to the conflicts of competence aroused between the authoritiesofregulationandcontrol. 105Forinstance,LaAlqueriawasteseparationplantinBogotahasbeenapilotexperimentformanyyearsnow.Operated by a few Bogota waste pickers it separates a few tons out in a city of more than 7 million people. In Cali there is no separationexperimentevendespitehavingaPGIRSthatcreatedtheobligationofhavingarecyclablesselectiveroutefor by2007. 106Pleasesee:http://www.economist.com/node/13135349?story_id=13135349

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law, which, among other things, prohibit waste pickers from working in front of the new landfill107. Thisclosureandensuingprohibitionofaccesstotrashnaturallycreatedahumanitariancrisisforthe waste pickers of Navarro. They responded first through desperate protest and action,108 including a takeoverofCalismainchurch.Whenmorepromisestothewastepickersremainedunfulfilled,and writs of human rights protection where presented to several judges and later accumulated and selectedforreviewintheConstitutionalCourt,theCiViSOLFoundationforSystemicChangesteppedin through an Amicus Curiae that strategically built a case for requesting not only the immediate protection of, but also the development space for waste pickers by means of a judicial order for formalizationinthewasteeconomyandtherecognitionofwastepickersasentrepreneursinwaste.In ruling T29109, the Colombian Constitutional Court ruled entirely in the waste pickers favor and recognized the traditional work and microentrepreneurial capacity of waste pickers own account work. As requested by CiViSOL, the Court also ordered the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee to develop and implement an all inclusive waste management policy capable of formalizing the citys wasterecyclingworkers,whilealsorespectingandstrengtheningtheirentrepreneurialspiritbymeans oftheirsolidaritybasedeconomyconsistingmainlyofcooperativeenterprises. In its decision T2912009, and while referring to the local government defense arguments on the allegedlyprivatenatureofwastemanagementandtheneedofeachactortoseekclients,theCourt stated obiter dictum that, on this point, it is important to note that contrary to what ESP EMSIRVA notes, the provision of a domiciliary public service, like cleanliness, and encompassed within it, the managementandtheadvantageoususeofsolidwaste,byvirtueoftheConstitutionhasnotbeenleft entirely to the free market realm. Quite on the contrary, and as noted by the Court in Case C615, 2002, in so far as public services are an economic activity that comprise the basic needs of the population, the State intervention in the activity that private actors assume through companies dedicatedtothispurposeisparticularlyintense,andthepublicserviceprovisionissubjecttospecial regulation and control (emphasis away from text). In fact, as the Court has already explained, the Stateinterventionisspeciallyjustified,amongothercircumstances,"togivefullemploymentofhuman resources"and"ensurethatallpersons,particularlythoseofalowerincome,haveeffectiveaccessto basicgoodsandservices.109
107Decree805of2005 108 Please see: http://www.desdeabajo.info/index.php/actualidad/colombia/2852policiapresionaarecicladoresquese tomaronlaermitacalivalledelcauca.html and http://www.elespectador.com/noticias/nacional/articulorecicladoresde calillevandiaymediodentrodeermita 109 Sobre este punto, es importante sealar, que contrario a lo que seala EMSIRVA ESP la prestacin de un servicio pblicodomiciliario,comoloeseldeaseoycomprendidoenl,eldemanejoyaprovechamientoderesiduosslidos,en virtuddelaCarta,nohasidodejadocompletamentealmbitodelibremercado.Muyporelcontrario,comolosealla CorteenlasentenciaC615de2002,entantoquelosserviciospblicossonunaactividadeconmicaquecomprometelas necesidadesbsicasdelapoblacin,laintervencindelEstadoenlaactividaddelosparticularesqueasumenempresas dedicadasaestefinesparticularmenteintensa,ysuprestacinsesometeaespecialregulacinycontrol(subrayasfuera de texto). De hecho, como la Corte lo ha referido, la intervencin estatal, se justifica de manera especial, entre otras circunstancias,paradarplenoempleoalosrecursoshumanosyasegurarquetodaslaspersonas,enparticularlasde menosingresos,tenganaccesoefectivoalosbienesyserviciosbsicos.

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 2.2.5.THENEEDTORECONCEPTUALIZETHENOTIONOFWASTEINTHEXXICENTURYFORSUSTAINABLE ANDINCLUSIVEWASTEMANAGEMENTSYSTEMSINTHEGLOBALSOUTH In recent years, it has become clear that what was once considered worthless refuse has now been repackagedasahighlyvaluablesecondarycommodity,fuelingamultibilliondollarrecyclingindustry and other ancillary industries. New technology has made discarded materials into new products paperisnowcreatedfromrecycledpaper,asaremetals,glassandplasticsthataremelted,pelletized and resold that, in turn, have developed their own consumer niche. These products have found renewedinterestandvalueasthegreenmarketadvancesanenvironmentallyconsciousagendaand enjoysgreaterinternationalpopularityandattentionthaneverbefore,inturncompoundingthevalue ofrecycling.Thisrevaluationoftrashmustbetranslatedintoanewrealitythatisreflectedthrough effectivepolicyontheground.Otherwise,thelackofStateaction,byignoringorpretendingtoignore thatwastetodayhasvalue,thatitsproductioncanonlygrowduetodemographyandconsumerism, and that it drives lucrative national and transnational business, appears as an either a worrisome or suspicioustypeofnegligenceonthepartofpublicauthorities. Although the public cleanliness and waste management service have been highly regulated in Colombia, the governments lack of effective implementation, investment, development110 and enforcement to prevent both the negative environmental impacts of collection and burial of mixed trash,andthenegativesocialimpactsofcuttingthewastepickersaccesstowaste,portrayanurgent necessity to advocate for the reconceptualization of waste. Trash cans today are valuable mines of secondary commodities that have acquired commercial value via recycling science and technology. And,incontrasttoindustrializedcountries,indevelopingcountriestherearepeoplewhohavebeen eating, wearing, working and entrepreneuring in this waste, informally, for decades. Finally, mixing organicandrecyclablerefuseinlandfillsrepresentsnotonlythelossofpotentialcommoditiesthat,if recovered, could save the energy that processing raw material otherwise consumes, but could also reducecarbonemissionsandpreventlargergreenhousegasemissionsresultingfromthelixiviatesand methane gasses of huge landfills, thus minimizing adverse trends and impacts on global climate change.111 Laborintensive waste recycling implemented by traditional waste pickers has a lower carbon print than collecting recyclables on a larger, industrial scale. It is also a powerful poverty reduction strategy for the urban poor, a horizon of organization and progress for this occupational group,andcouldprovetobeaninterestingwaytoengagedevelopingcountriesinpreventingclimate change.Indeed,wastepickersarequintessentiallytheoldestandmostgroundedexampleofanurban greenjob,itisjustamatterofhavingthepoliticalwilltoformalizetheirworkintheglobalsouth. Giventheserealitiesofwastetoday,afailuretoreconceptualizetrashandthepeoplewhoworkwithit will result in inadequate public services that do not sufficiently contribute to contemporary public
110Asforinstancethelackofrecognizingthevalueofrecyclinginthetariffthatdeterminesthepricespaidbyusersand the optional, incentive, that is given to the private concessionaries that beyond ordinary waste collection pursue the advantageoususeofsolidwasteasdecidedinarticle17oftheCRAResolution351. 111AsadvocatedbytheTrashisLifeinitiativeoftheCiViSOLfoundationforsystemicchange.

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 health.Wasteis,simply,notwhatitusedtobe,andbothauthoritiesandcivilsocieties,particularly those of developing countries, should rapidly reconsider waste as a valuable good, recognize its negative impact on the environment and climate, and its importance in social justice and poverty reductionoftraditionalwastepickers.

2.3.INFORMALWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS
Within the waste management sector of the global south, waste pickers living in poverty persist as informalandinvisible,yetcriticalactors.Inmostdevelopingcountries,thereislittletospareinwaste managementbudgetsformunicipalrecyclingservices,noriswasteseparatedintorecyclablesandnon recyclables at their source; instead, all waste is disposed of in one trashcan that is collected by a privateconcessionaireoftheStateandtransportedtoawastedumporsanitarylandfill.Thus,mostof Colombias recycling is taking place in an informal environment, where the waste pickers have been reducing greenhouse gases and preventing climate change by separating recyclables, which would haveotherwiseremainedmixedintothepublicstrashandburiedinlandfillscreatinghighlevelsofair, groundandwatercontamination.Forthepastcentury,theseinformalworkershavebeenworkingfor decadesinColombia,India,Peru,SouthAfrica,Chile,Mongolia,Argentina,Egyptandelsewhere,with virtuallynoattentionfrompublicpolicymakersorthepolicydialogueofthegreenagenda. Amongthepoorestofthepooroftheglobalsouth,thewastepickersarenotprimarilydrivenbythe greenagenda,butratherbytheurgencyoftheirneedsandanabsenceofviablealternatives,andby doingsotheyhavebecomeintenselyawareofandcommittedtothecontributionsoftheirwork.With nootheropportunitiesforwork,andasformallyunskilled,formallyuneducatedlaborers,theycannot find any other honest way to generate incomes in a more dignified, decent and healthy work environment.Consequently,theysurvivebydiggingthroughsocietystrash,everyday,forthemselves andtheirfamilies.Foralmostacentury,thousandsofColombianfamilieshavebeendiggingthrough heapsofoil,food,diapers,cardboard,rottenmeat,clothes,batteries,razorblades,feces,glassbottles, bonesandothertrashtorecuperaterecyclablematerialstouseortoselltoearnaliving.Thenatureof thisjobinvolvesbruising,cuts,andinfectionstoyieldonlyafewpesos,enoughtobuyatablespoonof oil,apieceofbread,maybeapieceofmeattosurviveuntiltomorrow. In Colombia, these men, women and children have been coming to urban centers for many years, seeking refuge from the violence in rural areas. Many of todays waste pickers are the great grandchildren of those displaced in the middle of the 20th century by the National Front period of Colombianviolence.Atthattime,theonlyresourcesavailabletothemwerethecitysdiscardedtrash, so it was from the citys garbage that these displaced rural poor were granted the opportunity to surviveinColombiascities.Amidsocietyswaste,theydevelopedtheirparticulartradeofseparating and selecting recyclable and reusable materials, both for their own consumption and for resale to interested businesses. Before industrial buyers entered the modern recycling economy, drugstores

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andpharmaciesinBogotaboughtbottlesfromwastepickerstopackageandselltheirconcoctions.112 As modern industrial materials, such as plastics, have become more commonly used and thus more commonly found in municipal waste, the waste pickers have continued to develop their trade and identifynewsourcesofincomefromthecitystrash. 2.3.1.WASTEDUMPWASTEPICKERSANDSTREETWASTEPICKERS As urban populations have grown, their trash, too, has grown, eventually necessitating public places wheretocontainit.ThecityofCali,forinstance,createdtheNavarrodumpin1967;itremainedin operation until its closure in June 2008, to be replaced by the interregional Yotoco sanitary landfill. And until June 2008, the Navarro dump was a landscape guarded by vultures, rats and cockroaches, althoughitremainedtheonlylifelineformorethan600familiesinCali.113Thesedumpwastepickers came to be seen as an unique and identifiable group of the citys poor, distinct from other waste pickerswhohavebeenrecoveringandseparatingrecyclablesalongurbanstreets.114Ascomparedto dumpwastepickers,streetwastepickerssalvagewastedirectlyfromgarbagecansandbagsthaturban households, commercial establishments and industries leave outside their premises, on public sidewalksordesignatedwastedepositoriesformunicipalcollection. Unlikethedumpwastepickers,thestreetwastepickersareitinerantandworkindividuallyorinsmall units.Whiletheirhealthriskisnotasgreatasthedumpwastepickers,theirbodiesliterallyshoulder theburdenoftheirimpoverishedconditions,astheywalkfromgarbagecantogarbagecansearching forplasticbottles,cardboards,orplastic,andthencarrywhatevertheysalvageontheirbacksorpush on carts they even have to rent for a few dollars a day.115 The better off among the street waste pickers have access to carts that they rent or sometimes own, which are either pushed manually or pulled by a horse suffering even worse conditions of deprivation. These waste pickers usually live outsidethecity,inslums,andcarrytheweightoftheirlivelihoodlongdistances,alongcitystreetsand amongtheurbanpopulationswhoseconsumptiondrivesthisinformaltrade. Withoutanyspacetocalltheirown,thestreetwastepickersseparatetheirrecuperatedmaterials whichtheywilleventuallyselltointermediarywarehousesorlargeindustrialbuyersinpublicplaces, rapidlymovingtothenextpromisingcan,oftenleavingatrailofdisorderandtrashbehindthem.They dosoonlybecauseeveryeffortandminuteoftheirtimeisdevotedtoincomegenerationforpersonal and family subsistence. This, and the fact that their work with waste results in a public disgust and mistrustofwastepickers,manifestintheirfurthersocioeconomicmarginalization.DuetoDecree805 of2005,wastepickersaccesstosanitarylandfillsisforbidden,andstreetwastepickingisnowtheonly informalrecyclingopportunityforallofColombiaswastepickers.However,eventhisaccesstowaste

112Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 113http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/cali/ARTICULOWEBNEW_NOTA_INTERIOR8310261.html 114LuzAngela,Milena,Helider,Espolito,Alfonso,Marta/rrainterview/2009/TiendafrenteGERT/Cali 115Ibid,andARBandAsociacionCarretillerosdeBogota/2009

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 onthestreetsisatriskthroughtheprivatizationofallwaste,inregulatoryactionstheauthorshere refer to as the legal impoverishment of the poor.116 Privatization of organic and recyclable waste via concessioncontractsforwastecollectionasenvisionedinLaw142of1994,orruleslikethoseofthe alreadyderogatedarticle28ofDecree1713of2002,orthealreadyconstitutionallyreinterpretedLaw 1259of2008constantlyimpactwastepickersaccesstowaste,andconsequently,threatentheirvery survival. 2.3.2.WOMENWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS When the first waste pickers in Colombia arrived in urban centers, they usually settled outside the cities and alongside the large waste dumps that held the cities growing trash heaps. Once settled, albeit informally, this population was forced to confront their new situations as poor, displaced individualswithfamiliestoprovideforandfewmeansavailabletothem.Accordingtosomeleadersof wastepickersstories,whilethemensearchedforwageearningopportunities,thewomenstayedat home, with their children, animals, and whatever else they could salvage and carry from their rural homes. These women were among the first waste pickers in Colombia, scavenging through urban trash heaps looking for food for their animals, which, without land to graze, were in danger of malnourishmentanddeath. Indeed, waste picking dump or street has historically been a womans trade in Colombia. In the course of this search for animal fodder, these women realized that the trash available to and surrounding them may also serve as a supplemental source of income to whatever their husbands were earning. With their child care responsibilities, wage oriented employment opportunities were virtuallyimpossibletomaintainforthesewomen,eventhoughtheirhouseholdsrequiredmorethan what their husbands and fathers could provide. To make ends meet, these women recuperated reusable materials such as glass bottles, newspapers, and metals, which local pharmacies and other businesseswerewillingtobuy,whilerummagingthroughtrashlookingforfeed.Thus,thesewomen became the cities first waste pickers, most of them own account workers, deciding how much and withwhomtheyworked,astheyrecuperatedreusablematerialsfromthecitystrashdumps.117Bythe 1960s and 1970s, raw commodity prices and technology drove industry to take advantage of the availability of recyclable materials, as well as a large supply of poor, displaced workers, willing to recuperatethosematerialsforthem.118Menonlybecameinvolvedinwastepickingatthispoint,when the large steel and paper mills laid off their predominantly male work force, asking the men to look instead for recyclablematerials that could beused as secondary commodities.119 In Colombia today, menandwomenarebothfoundinthewastepickingtrade.AccordingtotheARB,approximately45 116 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank /LEPLAB;OnLawasaPovertyReductionStrategy,WorkingDocument,
2008(unpublished) 117NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 118Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 119SilvioRuiz/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C.

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percentofthewastepickingworkforceinthecountryiswomen.120Thistradecontinuestoprovidea ready alternative for women, especially female heads of household who must take care of their children,elderlyfamilymembersandotherdependents. A remarkable feature of the waste picking trade in Colombia is the strong leadership position that womencontinuetoholdintherelatedtradeassociationsandinspiteofthestrongpresenceofmenin thetrade.Ms.NohraPadillaisthePresidentofboththeNationalWastePickingAssociation(ANR)and theAsociaciondeRecicladoresdeBogota(ARB).ThePresidentofBogotasHorseCartedWastePickers Organization is also a woman, as are the President of the recently formed ARENA, a Navarro waste dumppickersassociation,Ms.LuzAngelaVargas,andthePresidentofthenewstreetwastepickers FUNREP, Ms. Adriana Molina. Women waste pickers like Ms. Gloria Amparo Hernandez, who is the founderanddirectorofFundacionNuevasLuces,arealsopresentinimprovingthelivesofthechildren involvedinwastepicking.Ms.Milena,Martha,AliriaandKarinahavealsoimportantleadingrolesin theCaliWastePickerscommunityandsomewerecrucialforCiViSOLsevidencegatheringefforton the ground for building the T29109 case. Thus, in Colombia, women are not merely present in the tradeofwastepicking,theyarerecognizedandhighlyrespectedleaderswithinit. 2.3.3.CHILDRENINWASTERECYCLINGWORK Asaconsequenceofwomenspresenceinwastepicking,childrenofwastepickersareoftenbornand raisedwithinit.Intheabsenceofneighborsorfamilymemberswhocanaffordtostayathome,many of these women will be found breastfeeding or otherwise accompanied by their children. Leaving their children to watch over each other whether in the dumps or the slums is a less attractiveoptionforthesemothers,especiallyastheyconsiderthe dangersandrisksoftheirlivingconditionsaspoor,excludedand the most vulnerable of society.121 These include, among other things, the very real possibilities of being forced into sex trafficking,drugtraffickingorbeingexploitedinarmedconflict,as wellasthedangersofdomesticaccidentsassociatedwithlivingin makeshift,unregulatedhousingstructures,precariouslyplacedon the edges of eroded mountain ranges. Yet, unlike children working in mines, the children in waste picking do not bring any particular utility as children per se; it is their constant presence CarolinaLaMonty that draws them into the work. Further, since the trade does not require any particular skill or strengthsoastoprecludetheirparticipation,childrenmaybefoundseparatingmaterialbycolorand type,watchingovercollectedorsalvagedmaterials,drivingthehorsepulledcartsorotherwisehelping theirmothersinrelatedactivities.

120NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 121Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C.

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 Byparticipatinginthetrade,thesechildrencontinuethepattern ofexclusionthatcharacterizedtheirparentsexistenceinurban Colombian cities. Their only access to education a means to end their exclusion and marginalization depends on the numbers of positions made available to them in the public education system. And even those children who are fortunate enough to acquire a coveted seat in school must continue to collect trash afterwards to supplement their familys income. Thereis,clearly,adesperateneedtoprovidechildcareoptions to their parents, not only for the men and women involved in waste picking to improve their trade, but also to provide their children healthier, safer environments away from garbage and trash.

AdrianaRuizRestrepo

2.3.4.ELDERLYWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS Ontheotherendoftheagespectrum,therearetheelderlywastepickers,someofwhomhavebeen salvagingrecyclableandreusablematerialsforanywherefromfortytosixtyyears.122Theirworkhas takenasignificanttollontheirphysicalcapacity,yetmanyelderlymenandwomen,someofwhomare over70yearsofage,continuetocollectwaste.Inthat wastepickingcorrespondstotheindividualscapacity to transport collected waste, elderly waste pickers suffer greatly, because their diminished physical capacitytranslatesintosmallerincomes.Olderwaste pickerssometimesonlycollectwhattheycancarryin a small childrens backpack, which cannot generate more than few pesos daily.123 Thus, the elderly find themselves in greater circumstances of poverty. Despite their greater degree of impoverishment, these workers do not have access to retirement RevistaSemana,Photoby:JuanCarlosSierra benefits,pensionsoranysocialsecuritymechanisms, primarilybecauseoftheirinformalownaccountworkerstatus.Theonlyhealthattentiontheyreceive isthroughthesubsidizedhealthregime,whichisgenerallyknowntohavelimitedqualityofmedical care and which depends on the SISBEN system that, in turn, requires a national valid identification. Thisidentificationrequirementwasreportedasaseriouschallengeforelderlywastepickers,someof whomhavelosttheirSISBENIDsduringtheirlongjourneysandharditinerantlifestyles.
122Ricaurte,Salvadora,Edgar,Armando/rrainterview/2009/Cali 123Ibid.

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 2.3.5.ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIESINWASTERECYCLINGWORK Contemporary IDPs continue to find waste picking an amenable and open trade considering their circumstances of displacement and vulnerability, just as other persons who have lost their jobs and havenootherhonestandlegalwaytosurvive.Ethnoculturalnationalminoritieslivingthroughwaste workappearinthesameproportionsasinthegeneralpopulation.InCali,acityintheSouthwestof Colombia, on the Pacific Corridor and close to the Choc region, the waste picking population is predominantly AfroColombian; further, many of Calis waste pickers are women, who carry the multiplicativeburdenofbeingwomenandofAfricandescent.Incontrast,inBogotthepresenceof AfroColombians in the waste trade is minimal. Although indigenous groups often suffer great marginalizationanddiscrimination,theirpresenceinthewastepickingtradeinurbanareasisminimal. 2.3.6.SOCIALPROTECTION According to a Medellin study, waste pickers are exposed to two health risks (1) ergonomically relatedillnesses,duetotheleaning,pushing,pullingandphysicalexertionrequiredfortheirworkand (2)sensorialrelatedillnesses,duetoatomizedwasteparticlesthatentertheirsystems.Theyarealso athighriskofoccupationalhazardsandaccidents,intheformofcuts,infectionsanddiseaseresulting fromtheirexposuretotrashinitsmyriadforms.Wastedumpsposeanadditionalbiohazard,dueto the breaking down of organic and other materials methane and other gases have been known to induce explosions on site, risking physical deformity and even death to those working and living nearby. Giventheseoccupationalhazards,healthisagreatconcernforthosewhoenterthetrade,yetwaste pickersstatusasinformalownaccountworkersprecludesthemfromaccessinganyqualityhealthcare mechanisms,124 despite constitutional guarantees for the same. Article 49 of the Constitution of Colombian states that health is both a human right and a State responsibility.125 This provision
124NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 125PoliticalConstitutionofColombia,Article49.Publichealthandenvironmentalsanitationarepublicservicesforwhichthe Stateisresponsible.Allindividualsareguaranteedaccesstoservicesthatpromote,protect,andrehabilitatepublichealth.Itis theresponsibilityoftheStatetoorganize,direct,andregulatethedeliveryofhealthservicesandofenvironmentalprotection tothepopulationinaccordancewiththeprinciplesofefficiency,universality,andcooperation,andtoestablishpoliciesforthe provisionofhealthservicesbyprivateentitiesandtoexercisesupervisionandcontroloverthem.Intheareaofpublichealth, the State will establish the jurisdiction of the nation, territorial entities, and individuals, and determine the shares of their responsibilities within the limits and under the conditions determined by law. Public health services will be organized in a decentralized manner,inaccordancewithlevelsofresponsibilityandwiththeparticipationofthecommunity.The lawwill determine the limits within which basic care for all the people will be free of chargeandmandatory.Every person has the obligationtoattendtotheintegralcareofhis/herhealthandthatofhis/hercommunity//Artculo49.Laatencindelasalud y el saneamiento ambiental son servicios pblicos a cargo del Estado. Se garantiza a todas las personas el acceso a los servicios de promocin, proteccin y recuperacin de la salud. Corresponde al Estado organizar, dirigir y reglamentar la prestacin de servicios de salud a los habitantes y de saneamiento ambiental conforme a los principios de eficiencia, universalidadysolidaridad.Tambin,establecerlaspolticasparalaprestacindeserviciosdesaludporentidadesprivadas, y ejercer su vigilancia y control. As mismo, establecer las competencias de la Nacin, las entidades territoriales y los particularesydeterminarlosaportesasucargoenlostrminosycondicionessealadosenlaley.Losserviciosdesaludse organizarn en forma descentralizada, por niveles de atencin y con participacin de la comunidad. La ley sealar los

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 indicatesthathealthisarighttobeclaimedbyanyconstituent,aswellasapublicservice;thatis,the State must provide, regulate, and deliver health care to its citizens.126 Health is, in fact, one of the threeentitlementsavailableunderthesocialsecuritymechanismoftheColombianState.Thistrifold system protects Colombians from three risks old age, poor health, and workrelated injury all of whichcompromisetheindividualsabilitytoworkandlivewithdignity.Law100of1993isthemain policyframeworkregulatingtheintegratedsocialprotectionsysteminColombia,mostofitfunctioning throughtheprivatesector.127 Law100of1993createdacontributoryandasubsidizedregimeofhealthprotection.Fallingunderthe contributoryregimeareindividualsearningatleasttheminimumwage,i.e.,thosewhoareengagedin some kind of formal employment relationships. The costs of the Plan Obligatorio de Salud or obligatory health plan are shared by the employer and the employee both; due to the recent privatizationofhealthcare,theemployeenowenjoysachoiceamongseveralhealthcareproviders, eachofwhommustprovidemedicalattentionforofficiallyapprovedillnessesundersystemcoverage. Independentworkerswhoearnatorabovetheminimumwagemayalsocontributetothisregimeand receiveitsbenefits.Wastepickers,whoearntypically7080percentoftheminimumwageremain limited by their earning capacity and may not participate in the contributive health care system;128 theyfallinthesubsidizedregime,whichprovidestherighttohealthforColombianswhodonothave thecapacitytocontributetotheirhealthprotection.Thisregimeistailoredtoaddressandprotectthe poorest and most vulnerable Colombians; however, it suffers from two disadvantages: first, to participateinthesystem,anindividualmustbeidentifiedasaSISBENbeneficiarybythegovernment. This expedites the receipt of an Identification card, which will stand as evidence of the individuals situationof needandgrantstheindividualaccesstoseveralsocialassistanceprograms.TheSISBEN carnetorIDcardistheonlymeanstoensureanindividualsaccesstohealthcare.Thus,peoplewho have misplaced their SISBEN cards, perhaps at work or in moving, or who never received a SISBEN certification in the first place, may end up without the possibility of proving their state of need and ensuringtheirrighttohealth.Second,thesubsidizedhealthcareregimeismuchmorebasicthanthe contributoryregimeanddoesnotcoverthesameillnessesanddiseases;consequently,informalown accountworkerscannotenjoythesamequalityofhealthcareasthosewhoareabletoparticipatein thecontributorysystem.Forwastepickers,whofacehighrisksofillnessandworkrelatedillness,this disparityinthequalityofavailablehealthcaremayresultindireconsequences.129
trminosenloscualeslaatencinbsicaparatodosloshabitantessergratuitayobligatoria.Todapersonatieneeldeber deprocurarelcuidadointegraldesusaludyladesucomunidad. 126Ibid. 127Thislegislationinitiatedahighlycontroversialcourseofaction,manycomplainthatitturnedhealthintoacommercial commodityratherthanafundamentalrighttobeensuredandprovidedforbythegovernment. 128NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 129TheConstitutionalCourtofColombiainrulingT76008orderedtothenationalgovernmenttoredresspolicyandpair upthesubsidizedqualityofhealthcaretothatofacontributivenature.

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 Thisgapinservicequalityandprovisionhascompelledsomewastepickerstoadvocateforaspecial healthcarescheme,similartoonebeingprovidedtoColombiassystemofcommunalparents,who, underLaw599of1999andwithouthavingthecapacityofcontributingtosystemastherestofthose whodo,arestillpartofthecontributorysystem.130Theyare,infact,categorizedaspriorityaffiliatesof the contributory system, and pay only a percentage of the sum received for taking care of children. Waste pickers, who perform and provide an essential public service to urban Colombian citizens, believe that they, too, deserve this kind of health inclusion, especially considering the health risks associatedwiththeirtrade,risksthattheytakeonwhilerenderinganunpaidenvironmentalserviceto city.131 The waste pickers low incomes also preclude their involvement in pension and retirement schemes andworkrelatedinjuryprovisions,allofwhichareincludedinthesocialsecurityprotectionsoffered bytheColombianState.Wastepickersareexcludedbyvirtueoftheirstatusasownaccountworkers: they cannot prove that any injury incurred occurred while at or in the course of work.132 These limitations and exclusions to social security nets provided by the State become relevant when organizing into trade associations, worker cooperatives or other organizational entities, as waste pickers attempt to identify ways in which to receive better health care, pensions, and workrelated injury protections. Indeed, organizing is one way for these workers to access their constitutionally guaranteed social protections especially where nonprofit organizations such as cooperatives and mutuals can act as an organizational link for own account workers, thus providing access to loans, financialservices,aswellasthehigherqualityhealthcareandsocialservicesunderLaw100of1993. CivicSolidaryorganizationsalsoprovideadditionalsupportfortheirmembers;forinstance,inCaliand Bogota, some associations offer childcare, education and health care to waste pickers and their families.133 These, however, are not services derived from responsive public policy, but rather, the privateinitiativeofwastepickersrespondingtotheirownneeds.

2.4.TRADECONTEXTOFWASTEPICKERS
InColombia,asinmostpartsoftheworld,theconcernforenvironmentalsanitationi.e.thehealth and hygiene of households as well as the need for clean air, water and soil in cities eventually resulted in the creation of a cleanliness public service that assumed within it waste management services.Withincreasingurbanization,and,consequently,publicconsumption,thepublicconcernfor efficiencyinwastemanagementandurbancleanlinessbecamemoreacute.Thisconcern,alongwith macrostructural adjustments recommended to the central government in the nineties, translated in the total or partial delegation of the provision of this set of public services to the private sector. Further, and as much as individual communities have long participated in recuperation activities to maximizetheirhouseholdeconomiesandresources,therecyclingmarketowesitsmoderndepthand
130Law599of1999 131KKKPKinIndiamanagedtogetrecognitionoftheirhealthrisksincurredwhileinformallyservingthecity. 132Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 133SeeAnnex3

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 breadth to science and technology and the higher industrial costs of obtaining and transporting raw materials.Thetechnologytoturnwasteintoasecondarycommodityhasservedtocreatevaluewhere there was once nothing but abandoned refuse and, in turn, has completely transformed waste management from a simple public service to one connected to an extremely profitable trade environment.Aservicethatwasoncededicatedtothecollectionanddisposalofwastewasforcedto recognizethatwhatitwascollecting,transportinganddisposinghadgreatenvironmentalimplications andsignificantmarketvalue. Although accomplished informally, recycling remains the main advantageous use of solid waste in Colombia. Yet, there is still no fully implemented policy for the separation of waste at its source, a recyclablesselectiveroute,oranyinfrastructureofplantswhereseparationofwastebymaterialmay addvaluetotheindustry,eventhoughtheseactionshavebeennormativelydecidedandrequiredof the appropriate authorities. Without prejudice to smallscale projects, recycling is neither an operationalpublicpolicynoracomponentofColombiascleanlinesspublicservice. Although the regulatory structure and implementation is lacking, there is a high demand from the publicandprivatesectorsforrecyclablematerials.Thisdemandisdrivenprimarilybytwofactors:(1) recyclable materials are less expensive than raw materials and (2) incorporating recyclable materials intotheindustrialprocessaddsvaluetofinalproductwhenitissoportrayed.Forinstance,producing paper from recyclable materials rather than timber represents a 50 percent savings in energy, a 10 percentsavingsinwater,anda75percentsavingsinpollution.134Theenvironmentalimpactofthis process may be measured by the numbers of untouched trees using recyclable materials saves fifteentwentyyearoldtreespertonofpaperproduced.135Byusingrecuperatedglass,theindustrial process saves 1015 percent on energy and 1200 kilograms of sand are saved per ton of glass recuperatedandused.Thisrepresentsasavingsofmorethan1,000,000kilogramsofsandsavedover timeandaconsiderablereductioninthedeteriorationoflandandsoil.136Asidefromthesesupplyside industrial considerations, the green market which experienced phenomenal growth through globalization and the access to information made available through innovations in information technologyprovidesademanddrivenconsumerinterestinproductsmadeusingrecyclablematerial. Consequently,anddespiteaslowbeginninginthe1970s,therehasbeenaninfluxofcapitalintensive recyclingcompaniesenteringthemarketforwaste. Although President Uribe is no longer in office and Juan Manuel Santos is currently Colombias President, it is worth portraying the political and economic tensions that exist around the waste market and trade. Among other business companies engaged in the waste recycling economy in Colombia, the most controversial has been Residuos Ecoeficiencia Ltda,137 a company that is owned
134AlvarezMaya,MariaEugeniaandTorresDaza,Guillermo,LosRecicladoresyelDesarrolloSostenible:laconstruccindel actorsocial,FundacinSocial3,BogotDCp.61. 135Ibd.,p.61. 136Ibid.,p.61. 137Pleasesee:http://www.ecoeficiencia.com.co/eshtml/suministro%20de%20materias%20primas.html

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 andoperatedbyPresidentUribessons,TomasandJeronimoUribe,whowereandremainattractive businesspartnersfornationalandforeignindustries.In2008,theyoungUribesenteredtherecycling market with intense capital investment and operations. Waste pickers, who reiterate that waste recyclingistheironlynicheforsurvival,resentthisasymmetriccompetitionand,alongwithmanyin thecountry,believethattheUribesshouldworkandinvestincompletelyprivateactivitiesinsteadof thoseactivitiesthat,likethoseinwastemanagement,areprivatebydelegationoftheState.Thefact that their father was President and therefore the responsible authority for fashioning waste managements rules of the game, and for their enforcement and control through the Superintendent,theMinistryandtheCRA,makeResiduosEcoeficienciaallthemoresuspiciousinthe eyesofthewastepickers. Besides the Uribes and other intensive capital companies and evenphilanthropicfoundations,otheractorspresentaroundthe waste trade are homeless and mendicant individuals who rummage for materials for their personal use and, sometimes, forsale.IDPs,recentlydisplacedtourbanzonesfromtheirrural homes,oftenturntowastepicking,justasthegrandparentsof many of todays waste pickers once did, because trash remains oneoftheresourcesthatisreadilyavailabletothosewhohave nothing. These and other povertytrapped individuals, including the recently unemployed, will find themselvesin waste picking: thelowentrytobarriermakesthetradebotheasytoaccessand does not demand many skills or capital investment, although earningaregularincomedoesrequiretradeknowledge.These occasional waste pickers much like the waste pickers who are workinginthetraderegularlyandunlikebigrecyclingbusiness, didnotenterthewastemarketbychoice,butbyalackthereof. WastepickersBanner:ThatsitDaddy,pavemetheway
Photoby:AdrianaRuizRestrepo

Asthemarketforwasteandrecyclingflourishes,andasthenumberandkindofcompetitorsincrease, wastepickersfaceaseriousthreatoflosingtheirtradeandearningcapacity,mostnotablybecauseof thepresenceofthelargescalecorporateactors.Corporationsthatonceonlyfacedwastepickersas buyersoftheirrecyclablematerialsarenowstartingtheirownrecyclingoperations,sidebysidewith Ecoeficiencia. Colombian waste pickers believe that soon all waste will be both recycled by corporationsandsoldtocorporationswithinaclosedintracorporatecircle,eventuallyforcingwaste pickers into delinquency, selfvictimization or even death. As explained by one waste picker, if not evenwasteisanavailableopportunityforthem,thentheywillliterallyhavenootherwaytosurvive. Thevariousactorsfoundinthistradearebrieflyexploredbelow,wheretheyareplacedindescending orderbasedontheircapacitytoaffectthewastepickerstradeandlivelihood:

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 2.4.1.THECOLOMBIANSTATE. Asindicatedinthepolicysectionabove,theColombianStateremainstheprimaryactorresponsiblefor providing public services. With regards to waste management, collection and recycling, the specific actors in the Colombian State belong to the executive national, regional or local branch of public power. They are the President of the Republic, the Minister of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development,theSuperintendentofDomiciliaryPublicServicesSSPD,theRegulatoryCommissionfor Potable Water and Environment Sanitation CAR, the Environmental Regional Autonomous Corporations,forinstance,theCVCfortheValledelCauca,CARforBogota,theMunicipalorDistrict Mayor and her or his secretaries of environment, urban planning and the entity or secretary responsible of the integrated solid waste management plan (PGIRS). In Bogota, this would be the UAESP; in Cali, it is the Secretary of Planning. Without taking into account the legislative branch of power and the Administrative Town halls that produce binding norms in Colombia and within each municipality, this is the public web in which waste pickers, as any other poverty trapped State constituent,mustnavigateanddecipherinordertorevealopportunitiestoparticipateinthedecisions thataffectherlifeandlivelihood. WhethertheStateMunicipalitychoosestoprovidewastemanagementservices(i)directlythrougha publicindustrialandcommercialStatecompany,suchasEDISinthe1970sinBogota,or,until2008, EMSIRVA in Cali, or (ii) indirectly, by delegating the service to forprofit private corporations or nonprofit private civicsolidary138 organizations as authorized under Law 142 of 1994, the State remains, in every case and by constitutional obligation, responsible for providing the full range of wastemanagementservicestoitscitizens.And,whereprivateactorsaretheprimaryprovidersofthe wasterelatedservice,theStatemuststillnormativelyframeandregulatethewasteeconomy,asthe environmentalsanitationdutybearerandasitspublicfunctionforsocietalcommongoodmandates. 2.4.2.BUSINESSCORPORATIONSINTHEWASTEINDUSTRY The private sector entered into the cleanliness and waste management sector by virtue of their investment and economic capacity, competing primarily for two types of contracts in Colombia: (1) doortodoorwastecollectionandtransportand(2)finaldisposalofwastebylandfilling.Bothofthese contractsrequirespeciallydesignedequipment,i.e.,largetruckscapableofcompactingwaste,which enablethetruckstotransportagreaterquantityofwasteandbulldozersforlandfillingwaste,which theprivatesectorwasabletoacquireandprovidetomunicipalities.Theprivatecompaniescurrently engagedinprovidingtheseservicesare,forthemostpart,equityownedcorporations,manyofwhom areinjointventures,consortiumsorallianceswithmultinationalcompanies. A.THEBUSINESSCONTRACTFORTHECOLLECTIONANDTRANSPORTOFWASTE.
138 On the proposed notion of CivicSolidary Organizations: RuizRestrepo, Adriana, Recherches de thse sur la nature juridiqueetlerlepolitiqueduTiersSecteur

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 Thefirstcontractofinteresttoprivateactorsisforthecollectionandtransportationofwaste,whichis asevenyearcontractawardedthroughacompetitivebiddingprocess.InBogota,thereare,infact,six suchcontractsforsixdifferentexclusivezones(ASEs),eachofwhichreceivesitsownproviderforthe collection and transport of its residents waste. The parameters and boundaries for these zones in Bogota were determined by the UAESP, the Districts agency that regulates the provision of these wasteservices. In 2008 in Cali, instead of the municipality, the national government delimited four zones as non exclusiveAreasofServiceandgrantedconcessionsforwastecollectionandtransporttothreeprivate corporations of both national and international origin. The national government, through the Superintendent of Domiciliary Public Services, structured this privatization scheme acting under the umbrella of a financial intervention to Calis municipal waste company EMSIRVA to resolve the companysfinancialcrisis.Infact,atthebeginningofthefinancialinterventiontheSSPDdividedCali intofourzonesanddestinedthreeofthemforprivatizedcleanlinessprovision,whilereservingoneof thezones,theNorthZoneorZone1ofCali,forthepublicserviceprovisionbytheintervenedentity EMSIRVA.However,towardstheendofSSPDsfinancialintervention,theUribeAdministrationdecided to end and liquidate EMSIRVA, very much against the will of the municipal government and Calis general public opinion. The provision of public cleanliness services for Zone 1 was then taken for privatization, as with the other three zones. A public tender process was opened to receive private bidstoselectthecompanythatwouldbedelegatedtoprovidethewastemanagementpublicservices in Zone 1; however, before closing the tender and adjudicating a contract, and by order of the Constitutional Court of Colombia, the SSPD was forced to suspend the tender process. On behalf of Caliswastepickers,theCiViSOLfoundationhadrequestedthepreemptivesuspensionoftheprocess untiltheCourtdecidedthecaseasstructuredandadvancedbyCiViSOLinanAmicusCuriaebrieftothe Court,inwhichtheyrequestedawritofprotectionfortheCaliwastepickersrighttolifeorsurvival, work,entrepreneuringanddevelopment.Theserightswereplacedinperilbytheirlackofaccessto wasteinthecurrentprivatizationscheme,whichnotonlyignoredtherealityofpovertyinCali,butalso legally impoverished the waste pickers. CiViSOL requested survival and work protection, and also advanced arguments for persuading the Court to protect recycling as waste pickers preferential marketnichebyrecognizingthemasentrepreneursandorderingtheirinclusionintheformaleconomy ofwaste.139WeekslatertheCourtadopteditslandmarkdecisioninrulingT2912009andorderedthe SSPDtoredrafttheTermsofReferenceoftheTenderprocessforprivatizingCalisZone1soastomake it inclusive of the waste pickers trade and organizations. In December 2009, the Mexican company Promoambientales,inastrategicalliancewiththewastepickerscooperativeUFPRAME,whichwasin itsturninalliancewithFUNREPwonthetenderforZone1.AccordingtoapublicservantoftheSSPD, the other bidder, a private corporation Interaseo, presented its offer for Zone 1 without having establishedastrategicalliancewithawastepickerssolidarityeconomyorganization.
139PleaseseeAnnex3

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 As mentioned above, and in accordance with Law 142 of 1994, the contract for the door to door collectionandtransportationofwasteinColombiaisbundledwiththreeothercomplementarywaste related activities, i.e., street sweeping, tree pruning and grasscutting, within each of the contracted zones.Paymentfortheseservicesisstructuredaroundthemetersswept,groomedorcut.Thecoreof thecontract,however,isthecollectionandtransportationofwastetoplacesoutsidethecitywhere wasteisfinallydisposed.Thisoperationdependsonadequatelogisticstooperatethevariousroutes that collect waste from households and establishments under the principles of universality and continuity,amongotherprinciplesofpublicservice.Paymentonthesecontractscomesbywayofabi monthly cost imposed on the waste generator that is bundled to the water and sewage bill. The collected monies are held by a fiduciary entity, which then pays the service provider. Although differentfactorsareincludedintheformuladevisedbytheCRAforremuneratingtheconcessionaire,it is possible to say that the kilometers traveled to transport the waste from house to landfill are the determiningfactorsforthepriceofthecontract.Thebusinessofwastecollectionandtransportis, then,andmainly,atruckandkilometerbasedbusiness:thegreaterthedistancetraveledfromwaste source to the final destination, the greater the payment. The waste collection and transport concessionairesarenot,therefore,inclearanddirectcompetitionwithinformalstreetwastepicker, unlesstheconcessionairesarecedingorsellingtheircollectedwastetothirdpartiesontheirwayto thelandfill,whichwouldbe,infact,abreachofcontractandinthemarginsofthepolicyenvisionedin Decree 1713 of 2002. Nevertheless, their contracts include de jure the possibility of operating a selectiveroutefordoortodoorrecyclableswastecollection,althoughdefactoconcessionairescannot effectivelydosoas,ononehand,therearenodestinationpointsforrecyclingand,ontheother,there is no origin point where source separation is taking place. It is worth saying however, that the tariff formuladesigntheNationalGovernmentthroughCRAtreatsrecyclingasanincentive.Asexplainedby wastepickers,thesemeansthenthatwhen,forinstance,Chinabuysscrapmetal,itraisesthemarket priceoftherecyclablematerial,andconcessionaireswilltrytorecyclealso;butifpricesgodown,they will abandon any recycling efforts and continue their normal collection and transport operations, burying all waste, organic or recyclable. In contrast, waste pickers recycle daily and constantly for incomegenerationwhilerenderingaclimateandenvironmentalservicetotheplanetandtheurban population.Asaneconomicincentive,recyclingisthenmerelyanoptionfortheconcessionaire,and allcertaintyandefficacyofcountingonanintegratedwastemanagementpublicserviceandsoundly ensuringenvironmentalsanitationisputatriskbythisincentivebasedmechanismintheformalwaste economy. B.THEBUSINESSCONTRACTFORTHEFINALDISPOSALOFWASTE The second contract of interest to private actors is for the final disposal of a citys collected waste. This contract requires the responsible entity to bury all collected waste in a sanitarylandfilland is a longtermcontractlastingtwentyyears.Inadditiontoitsprimaryresponsibilityoffinaldisposal,this contractsometimesincludesresponsibilitiesassociatedwithtransferstations,wherewastecollected from cities zones are transferred to trucks capable of transporting larger quantities of waste to the designated landfill. There, waste transported from city households and establishments to site is bulldozed,buriedandcoveredforasanitaryfinaldisposal.Paymentforthistypeofcontractsisbased, 80

 mainly, on the weight of the waste buried, proportional to the kilograms of waste that are finally disposed. Since there is normally only one landfill where all collected waste is disposed, there is normally only one final disposal contract available, unlike the plurality of waste collection and transportation contracts usual to large Colombian cities. Recently, however, a trend is emerging to create intermunicipal landfills, operable for a collection of several municipalities. Because this businessremainsakilogrambasedbusiness,anintermunicipalarrangementwillbemoreattractiveto privatecompanieslookingtomaximizetheirprofitsbydisposingofagreaterquantityofwastefora designatedarea.Quitepossibly,itwillalsorepresentanincreaseinkilometerstraveledbyeachofthe waste collection concessionaires, and, therefore, a raise in the bill that is issued to citizens, the end usersofthepublicservice. Of particular concern to dump waste pickers, according to Decree 805 of 2005, Article 24, sanitary landfills may not be accessed by the public.140 This applies to all members of the public, and waste pickers141arenolongerallowedtoworkintheseareaswheretrashisdisposed.Itisimportanttonote thatwhenpublicdumpsareclosedtocreatesanitarylandfillswithoutenvisioninganyalternatives forthepopulationsofwastepickerswhohavebeenlivinginandoffthesedumpstheaffectedwaste pickerssuddenlyfindthemselveshomeless,jobless,andinanimmediateandacutecrisisofsurvival. Indeed, the closures of the Doa Juana dump in Bogota and the Navarro dump in Cali were implementedwithoutforeseeingorprovidingforthesituationsofthethousandsofpeoplelivingand workingthere.Althoughthecreationofsanitarylandfillsinplaceofthesedumpsservesalegitimate publichealthandcleanlinesspurpose,theirclosurespromptedprotestsandpublicinterestlitigationto protect the rights of these informal workers. With respect to the Navarro dump closure, the ConstitutionalCourtsdecisionT2912009foundtheStateresponsibleforclosingthedumpwithout makinganyprovisionforthe1200peoplelivingandworkingthere,and,further,orderedtheStateto address this issue through tailored policy solutions that would include these workers in the formal wastemanagementeconomy.TheCourtrecognizedtheNavarrodumpwastepickersasentrepreneurs inthewastetradewhohadbeencompletelycutofffromtheirlivelihoodbytheState.142

140 Article 10, numeral 8 and 9 of decree 805 of 2005 // Artculo 10. Criterios operacionales. La persona prestadora del serviciopblicodeaseoenlaactividadcomplementariadedisposicinfinal,debergarantizar,entreotras,elcumplimiento de las siguientes condiciones durante la fase de operacin: ( )8. Control del acceso al pblico y prevencin del trfico vehicular no autorizado y de la descarga ilegal de residuos. 9. Prohibicin de la realizacin de reciclaje en los frentes de trabajodelrelleno.() 141 Idem, Artculo 24. Restriccin a la recuperacin en rellenos sanitarios. Se prohbe el desarrollo de las actividades de recicladores en el frente de trabajo de los rellenos sanitarios. Pargrafo transitorio. Esta prohibicin empezar a regir a partirdelapuestaenmarchadelPGIRS.Noobstante,losmunicipiosodistritospodrnhacerefectivaestaprohibicinantes de la elaboracin y desarrollo de los respectivos PGIRS, siempre que en la ejecucin de sus programas de recoleccin y aprovechamiento,comoalternativadetrabajoseconsiderelaparticipacindelosrecicladores. 142Pleasesee:ConstitutionalCourtofColombiaRulingT29109inEnglish: http://www.scribd.com/doc/31696786/CiViSOLsCaseonFormalizingWastePickersConstitutionalRulingT291 09#fullscreen:onandinSpanish: https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=Y2l2aXNvbC5vcmd8bGEtYmFzdXJhLWVzLXZpZGF8Z3g6NmViOWZiM TI3NzcwZTYxYw

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 2.4.3.AUTHORIZEDORGANIZATIONSUNDERLAW142OF1994. UnderLaw142of1994,communityorganizations,typicallycivicsolidarityorganizationsornonprofits are authorized to provide public waste management services in minor municipalities, small specific urban zones and rural zones.143 Thus, foundations, cooperatives, associations, neighborhoodbased charitiesandwastepickersorganizationsareauthorizedbylawtoenterthewasteeconomyofsmall settings.Intheseareas,doortodoorwastecollection,recyclingandthefinaldisposalofwaste,among other services, are commonly performed by members of the local community. In fact, many rural communities and small neighborhood organizations came to rely on these entities participation in waste collection and recycling services as a primary source of income, even as the private sectors involvementandcooptationofthewastemanagementeconomyflourishedinlargecities.But,given thetrendindevelopinginterregionalorintermunicipallandfills,144thesecommunitiesreliancemay bemisplaced.Infact,thistrendtowardinterregionalorintermunicipalcooperationmaythreatenthe community organizations continued participation in the waste economy as small communal operationsareabsorbedbylargerscaleintermunicipaloperations.Indeed,theirdejurespaceinthe municipalwastemanagementeconomy,asauthorizedorganizationsunderLaw142of1994,seemsto beprogressivelydisappearingdefacto. WASTE PICKERS COOPERATIVES AND OTHER NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS AS AUTHORIZED ORGANIZATIONS Lacking investment capital for incorporating as equity owned corporations or as any other typical commercial company such as an LLP or LLC, but quite strong in numbers, labor capacity and cooperation potential, own account waste pickers usually seek to organize, participate and develop through notforindividualprofit organizations,145 and civicsolidary organizations such as cooperatives, charitiesor foundations. In this order of ideas, when waste recycling workers organize and incorporate, they create and populate a legal person that has a nonprofit nature and thereby enter into the idea of authorized organizations enshrined in Law 142 of 1994 that may provide domiciliary public services to Colombian citizens. They, as any other public waste company, must distinguishthemselvesbyaddingtotheirnameE.S.P.,EmpresadeServiciosPublicosorPublicService Enterprise. However, and as with all other authorized organizations by Law 142 of 1994, waste pickers organizations were originally relegated to the less attractive market places of the waste economy: specific urban zones such as slums, minor municipalities and to the harder to reach rural zones. At
143Decree421/2000 144ForexamplethenewinterregionalsanitarylandfillofYotocooperatedbytheprivateconcessionaireInteraseo. 145Althoughorganizationssuchascharitiesandfoundations,shouldnotbechannelsforintrasolidarityamongmembers butintersolidaritytoothersiealtruismandphilanthropy,thelackofdesign,clarityandenforcementinthirdsectorpolicy and studying of civicsolidary or nonprofit law results in people using and populating the legal person shell that is less cumbersomeandcostly,everythingtheyneedisalegalvehicletoinsertthemselvesintodeliberativedemocracyand/or include into mainstream formal development. This is a central hypothesis of PhD research: RuizRestrepo, Adriana, RecherchesdethsesurLanaturejuridiqueetlerlepolitiqueduTiersSecteur,PanthonAssas,Paris2,2005

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 least,thiswasthecaseuntil2003,whenBogotswastepickersweretryingtogrowanddeveloptheir trade by bidding for one of the Bogota District ASEs. While preparing their bid with their forhire lawyers,thewastepickersrealizedtheycouldnotmoveforward,becausetheywerenotorganizedas equity owned corporations as required by law. Regardless of their experience in Bogota, in nearby municipalities,orasarecentjointventure,thenonprofitnatureoftheirorganizationspreventedtheir participationinthelarger,morelucrativewasteeconomiesofColombiasmorepopulatedcities.After realizingtherewasnowayforward,theirlawyersvoluntarilyandinaprobonocapacityteamedwith the waste pickers and filed a plea of unconstitutionality in front of the Constitutional Court of Colombia.InjudicialdecisionC7412003,theConstitutionalCourtreinterpretedtheprovisionofLaw 142of1994:therulecouldnolongerbeunderstoodasamarketbarriertononprofits,andaccepted that nonprofits as acted as vehicles of inclusion for the poverty trapped in the realm of formal development opportunities and work. Waste pickers were then repositioned in the marketplace by the Court so as to be treated equally as forprofit corporations and with at least the capacity to compete beyond the restrictive borders of rural zones, urban slums and minor municipalities. The Constitutional Court of Colombia decided that there was no reason to believe that equity owned, capital driven organizations were more efficient than cooperative solidarityeconomy driven organizations,aswasarguedbythevoluntarylawyersworkingonthewastepickerscase.Thiswas thebeginningofwhatmaybereferredtoasthewastepickersbodyoflawinColombia. 2.4.4.WASTERECYCLINGBUSINESSES ContrarytowhatlawandpolicymakershavedecideddejureinDecree1713of2002,governmental negligenceand/orcorruptionhasdefactoleftopentheoperationalspacerequiredandallowedforthe emergenceofdifferentprivatebusinessinvestorsthatrecyclebychoiceasopposedtoneed.Rather thanensuringthedevelopmentandprovisionofanorganizedandaccountablemunicipalpublicservice for the collection of separated solid waste so as to promote a culture of Zero Waste, sound environmentalsanitationandfindingadvantageoususesandvalueoutofcollectedtrash,theNational Governmenthasleftthewasterecyclingmarkettogrowwildlyinanunregulatedenvironmentwhere thestrongestincapitalorinfluencewins.Nowthatrecyclabletrashhascommercialvalueandthere aresomanystakesthathavegrownstronginandaroundit,Itwillbeextremelydifficulttoreroute andorganizethewastepublicservice.Asinmanycountriesaroundtheworld,privatebusinessesand entities have detected and seized this opportunity to create income for profit, while own account wastepickersarestrugglingtosurviveinwasterecycling. Withinthiscategoryofwasterecyclingbusinessowners,thepredominantsubcategoriesare: (I)NATIONALANDINTERNATIONALINDUSTRIALSECONDARYCOMMODITYORWASTEBUYERS Both in Colombia and abroad, scrap metal, paper/cardboard, plastic and glass buyers acquire recyclable waste collected that is collected for the most part by families of waste pickers living in poverty. Poverty trapped populations have pulled, pushed or carried their trash for miles to the satelliteorindependentwarehousesthatbuythesecollectedmaterials.Thissalvagedwasteservesas 83

 inexpensivesecondarycommoditiesthatbuyersturnintorecycledgoodsforthemarket,e.g.,recycled paper, recycled carton/cardboard, recycled metal and recycled glass.146 As proposed by the CiViSOL Foundation, it would be advisable to trace the origins of recyclablesbased goods, crosscheck with corporate social responsibility commitments and eventually develop a free seal of waste picker non exploitation to certify that the social ethics underlying our recycled good complement their environmentallyinspiredgreenintentions. (II)WAREHOUSESWITHLOCAL,NATIONALANDINTERNATIONALTRANSACTIONSINWASTE Includingformerwastepickerswhohaveprogressedandmanagedtorentorbuysomespacetostock waste, those looking for a nontechnical, noncomplex business opportunity, the licensed industrial employee now running a warehouse to gather solid industry specific waste for a former employer company,147thephilanthropicorganizationsorfoundationsinformallycollecting,stockingandtrading inwasteforadditionalincome(whileratherunphilanthropicallycompetingwiththepovertytrapped informal wastepickers), and the hightech waste recycling plants operating, for example, in taxfree Special Economic Zones (Zona Franca), a constellation of waste warehouses are cropping up all over Colombias unregulated waste market. Some of these are actually individually owned businesses of familiesofformerwastepickers. Waste warehouses either buy waste from own account impoverished waste pickers or their cooperatives,orengagedirectlywithlargeestablishmentsthatgenerateasignificantamountofwaste. Atonepoint,theselargerestablishmentsmighthaveoncegiventheirrecyclablestowastepickers,148 buttheynowprefertoengagewiththeinvestmentdrivencompetitorsofwastepickers.Startingwith Decree1299of2008,everysingleindustryinColombiaisobligatedtohaveaninhouseenvironmental department for taking care of all possible environmental issues, including the disposal of industrial waste.Soastonotcreateanexcessiveburdenontheindustry,theDecreeexpresslystatesthatsuch servicesmaybeoutsourcedorprovidedbyanexternalenvironmentalservicescompany.Thismarket forenvironmentalandwasteservices,amarketmadebydecree,facilitateswasteandenvironmental consulting companies that advise Colombian industry in environmental efficiency matters. Naturally, capitalintensive or otherwise influential companies develop meganetworks of medium, small and microscale warehouses to the point of controlling the secondary commodity business in Colombia. Althoughnottheonlyone,ResiduosEcoeficienciaLtda,thecompanyownedandoperatedbytwosons of former President Uribe, is the recycling competitor that most enrages the waste pickers organizations,149theyclaim,Ecoeficienciahasbeencoincidentallytakingadvantageoftheprovisions
146CiViSOLsTrashisLifeinitiativeiscurrentlyexploringwaystodevelopandadvocateforaCSRlabelthatwillstressthat therecycledgoodforsalelikeofficepaperorglassbottleisaeco&humanfriendlyproductofdignifiedwasterecycling work. 147SilvioRuiz/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 148Itwouldbeworthanalyzingiftheestablishmentsthatusedtogiveawaytheirwastetowastepickersarenowgivingit awaytotheircapitaldrivencompetitorsandstillclaimingbecompanieswithsocialresponsibility. 149Pleasesee:http://www.semana.com/galeriaproblemassociales/marcharecicladores/413.aspx

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forwasteandenvironmentalservices150createdbyDecree1299andissuedin2008veryclosetothe dateofthecreationofthepresidentialfamilycompany. (III)OWNACCOUNTWASTEPICKERS Workingaloneorinfamilyunits,orcooperatingthroughacivicsolidaryorganization,thehardworkof waste recycling in the cities of Colombia is performed by own account workers living in poverty, as describedinthefollowingsection. (IV)ILLEGALLYARMEDGROUPS Not informal but completely illegal in means, cause and object, it is worth noting that, through interviewsandothersources,151itappearsthatillegallyarmedgroupshavedevelopedinterestsinthe waste recycling business. Although it is uncertain whether they are trading in waste, their presence shouldnotcomeasasurprise,becauseanymultimilliondollarbusinesswillbeattractivetofundthe activities of any illegally armed groups of any political orientation. In countries like Colombia, these groupsarealwaysfoundclosetothesourcesofbigandfastcash,whetheritcomesfromillicitcoca crops,goldandemeraldminingorurbanwastemanagement.

2.5.THELABORANDTHEMARKETOFINFORMALWASTERECYCLINGWORKERS
The primary market for waste pickers has and remains to be commercializing recyclable waste, i.e., plastic,glass,scrapmetalandpaper.Untilrecently,theyhadnotattemptedtoenterthecorewaste managementcollectionandtransportbusinessofthiseconomy.Rather,theycontinuedtoearntheir income within the recycling economy, creating value out of the modern commodity that trash had become while they once recuperated materials for households and small establishments like pharmacies use, they now recuperate materials that are bought by national and foreign major industries as secondary commodities for large scale production or construction.152 Waste pickers remaindependentontheavailabilityandaccesstowasteand,moreimportantly,themarketinterest and need in their recuperated materials. Their dependence, in fact, inextricably links them to the moderncommercializedrecyclingeconomy,eventhoughtheylackthecapital,resourcesandvisibility to influence the markets characteristics. Their muted role highlights the fact that, as the recycling economy grows, the waste pickers face the very real risk of being left behind without any due considerations,resources,orsafetynets. 2.5.1.Thelaborofwasterecyclingworkers
150Pleasesee:http://www.ecoeficiencia.com.co/eshtml/consultoria.html 151Pleasesee:http://www.verdadabierta.com/paraeconomia/1469elempresariowilliamvelezsalpicadopormemosde paras 152 Such is the case of the dam construction in China that determined the market price and trade for scrap metal for severalmonths.

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 According to Nohra Padilla from the ARB, while the human capacity of walking, moving, collecting, carrying/pushing/pulling, separating, gathering and packaging separated waste material varies accordingtoageandstrengthoftheperson,itmaybeapproximatedtoanaverageof30kilogramsper personperday.153ThemembershipoftheARBalonemanagestorecoverapproximately700tonsof recyclable waste per day in Bogota.154 Ms. Padilla explains further that only 10 percent of waste shouldbefinallydisposedofinlandfills,therebyimplyingthat90percentofallwasteisrecyclable.The materials they work with are simply thrown into one trashcan with all other domestic trash and collectedbytheresponsiblewastemanagementauthorities.Occasionally,driversofwastecollection trucks will separate some cardboard or scrap metal in gestures of solidarity with waste pickers, but more often, the waste pickers first appear on the recycling value chain when recuperating waste materialsdirectlyfromtrashbins.155Wastepickersmaybeinvolvedineitherthegeneralcollectionof manykindsofreusablematerials(glass,plastics,metals,etc.)orinthespecializedcollectionofcertain materials (cardboard, etc.). Most likely, there will be great variety in the materials they have recuperatedbothintermsofthekindsofrecyclablescollectedaswellasthequalityoftheparticular categoriesofrecyclablematerials.Tomaximizethevalueofthehoursspentlaboringinrecuperation, collectionandtransportation,wastepickersmustmeticulouslyseparatethesalvagedmaterials.This processoccursinwhateverspaceisavailabletothemmostusuallyinpublicspacelikesidewalksor parks, in the warehouses where buyers will receive and pay for the recuperated stock, and, exceptionally,intheirownhomes. Thisstepintherecyclingvaluechainraisesanimportantpointaboutthenecessityofprivateproperty inthelivesoftheworkingpoor.Spaceisavaluedcommodityforthoselivingandworkinginpoverty. Without private property, the waste pickers must separate their materials in warehouses owned by otherpeople,oftenpayingsomekindofrentthatisdiscountedfromfinalpricepaidinexchange.156 Thus,countingonspaceasamanifestationoftheprivateproperty(thattheydonothave)isnotonly crucial for gathering, communicating and collective cohesion for participatory governance and inclusionitisalsomeanstoenterandscaleupintotheeconomy;premisesarecrucialforbuilding and sustaining work and entrepreneurship for those in poverty.157 Without space of their own, the

153NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 154NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 155CiViSOLFoundation.Tobeclear,thisdescribesthesituationofstreetwastepickers.SinceX%Xdumpwastepickingin sanitarylandfillsisillegalandnolongerexistsinBogotaorCali,thefieldareasforthisreport. 156IntheGERTwarehousecreatedbytheseveralCaliindustriesofplastic,itis20%offtheprice.GERTclosedmonthsago apparentlybecauseofcashflowproblemstopaythewastepickers.Itisworthnotingthat,accordingtoCaliwastepickers, the plastic industry is are obtaining recyclable plastic through an agreement with the new concessionaire of zone 1 (Promoambientales)thatshouldbealliedexclusivelywithUfpramewastepickerscoop(astheywontherecentbid),butvia a temporary job agency for waste pickers and a nonprofit corporation apparently. Apparently there is once again no MunicipalorSSPDcontrolwheninreferstorespectingthelegalentitlementsoftheconstituentpoor.CiViSOLfoundationis currentlyverifyingsuchversionanddecidingacourseofaction. 157 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank / LEP LAB; On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Working Document#3,2007(unpublished)

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 waste pickers cannot stock material, letalonecount on a place to separateand sort their materials, andtherefore,haveevenlessabilitytonegotiatethetermsoftheirwaresinthemarket.158 2.5.2Theentrepreneurialismofwasterecyclingworkers Organizedwastepickersmaybeabletoamasstheresourcesnecessarytoacquiretheirownspacein the form of warehouses; unfortunately, just as it was 10 20 years ago, the vast majority of waste pickersremainunorganized.159Mostwastepickersmust,therefore,engagewithintermediarieswho rent this space to them. The owners of these warehouses are intermediate actors in the waste economy.Warehousesmaybeofvariedsizesmall(100sq.meters),medium(100200sq.meters)or large (over 200 sq. meters)160 and to secure a small warehouse requires approximately 5 million Colombian pesos (approximately 2500 USD), with the price increasing relative to the size of the space.161Warehouseownersmaybeindustryoutsidersenteringthiseconomyasbusinessinvestors, successfulwastepickerswhohavemanagedtosave oracquiremoneyforspaceoftheirown,oran industryownedwarehouseorwarehousesrequiringrecycledmaterial.162 InBogota,someoftheorganizedwastepickerswhohaveformedcooperativesoperateawarehouse under the umbrella of the ARB. They own and manage this warehouse and sell directly to industrial buyers of recyclable materials. As a second degree association, the ARB represents a large membership and has been able to negotiate the following prices for their materials (unless noted otherwise,allpricesareperkilogramandforthefirstquarterof2009) Material Paper Cardboard Print,foldedCardboard Ferrousscraptin Ferrousscraptinrods Ferrousthicktin
158Themajorityofexperiencesforbetteringtheconditionsofbargainingshowtheimportanceofaccumulatingvolume. Inthissense,thecreationofwarehousesconstitutesanimportantstrategy.FundacionSocial,p.45 159NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 160NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 161NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 162Birkbeck,Chris,GarbageIndustryandtheVulturesofCali,p.13

Price (Colombian Pesos) 500 270 100 100 270 400

Final Disposition Materials

of

Placed in clients industrialplant Placed in clients industrialplant Placed in clients industrialplant ARBswarehouse ARBswarehouse ARBswarehouse

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 Nonferrousscrapaluminum Nonferrousscraptin Nonferrous angled aluminum Nonferrouscopper PET Highdensitypolyethylene Lowdensitypolyethylene Polypropylene Flexible plastic (e.g., bags, etc.) ABCandplaster Glass Electric cable, telephone cables Carbatteries Newspaper Glassbottlesorjars Aguardienteorrumbottles (?] 1200 1000 2000 14,000 890 550 550 400 250300 450 110 350 13,000/unit 80 80eachunit 150eachunit ARBswarehouse ARBswarehouse ARBswarehouse ARBswarehouse Placed in clients industrialplant Placed in clients industrialplant Placed in clients industrialplant Placed in clients industrialplant ARBswarehouse ARBswarehouse Placed in clients industrialplant ARBwarehouse ARBwarehouse ARBwarehouse ARBwarehouse ARBwarehouse

ThepricestheARBisabletonegotiateareputintoperspectivewhencomparedtothepricesinCali,as notedbelow.163Thesepricesshowthebuyandsellpricesofamiddlemaninwastepickingwithasmall operationinCali164forthesamequarterin2009,andarelistedperkilogramunlessotherwisenoted. Material Buying Price (Colombian pesos) 200 300 150 7000 3000 300 400 SellingPrice

PVC Paper ScrapMetal Copper Bronze Plasticmixed Clearplastic

450 450 200 10,000 4500 520 600

163NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 164HectorManuelCrdenas/rrainterview/2010/Cali

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 Coloredplastic 300 520 Glassmixed 10 30 Glassbottles 4bottles/100 100each or, 50 per unit Aluminum 1500 2400 Tin and cooking pots and 1300 1800 pans Asindicatedbythepricingstructure,themarketforrecuperatedmaterialsisavolumebasedmarket. More waste means more income; more space to accumulate waste means more income; and more physical ability to carry waste means more income. Consequently, young men have a competitive advantageoverchildren,womenandtheelderly.AnelderlymanfromCaliwearingachildsbackpack wouldnotearnmorethantheequivalentofadollarforhiswork;yet,at82yearsofage,hecannot physicallycarryanymorethanthatbackpacksworthofmaterials.Themostvaluedqualitiesinwaste pickerswillbetheirstrength,capacitytocarryweight,andcapacitytoaccumulatevolume.Here,again, organizationwillyieldgreaterincomethanremaininganindividual,atomizedwastepicker. TheARBduetoitsorganizationalcapacityandresourceshastheleveragetonotonlydeliverthe quantityandqualityofdesirablematerials,butalsotoinfluencetheirmarketprices,atleastamongthe buyerswhoaredirectlyengagedwiththeARB.Forunorganizedwastepickers,thisisnotthecase.In Cali,andwiththesupportoftheCalimunicipality,17ofthelargestactorsintheplasticsindustryofthe citycreatedaconsortiumGERTLLCandboughtawarehousewherewastepickerscouldbringand sorttheirplasticsfortheGERTmembershiptobuy.In exchangeforprovidingthisspace,GERTchargesafee amounting to a 20 percent reduction in the market price for plastics what would have been 100 pesos outsideofGERTswarehouseis80pesosattheGERT warehouse.165 Clearly, GERT through its industrial warehouse retains all market leverage. They only buyfromwastepickerswhoagreetotheirprices,and, since they are comprised of the largest plastic industries in Cali, have cornered the market price for recuperatedplastics.
Photoby:ShaillyBarnes

This relationship between the industrial buyers of recuperated materials and those who spend countlesshoursengagedinthephysicaltaskofidentifying,collecting,transportingandsortingthem, highlights the extraordinary asymmetry in the waste pickers market. As noted by Chris Birkbeck, writingonthepaperandcartonmarketinCaliinthe1970s,thewastepickersareneitherentirelyown
165LuzAngela,Milena,Helider,Espolito,Alfonso,Marta/rrainterview/2009/TiendafrenteGERT/Cali

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 account workers, nor employees. According to Birkbeck, they might be better characterized as informal, disguised employees, who work in the recycling value chain well beyond the formal mechanismofemployment,butcompletelysubordinatedtotheindustrialbuyers.166Astheexample of GERT illustrates, this ambiguous relationship persists for waste pickers in Cali and, most likely, everywhere else where waste pickers remain unorganized. A lack of appropriate and enforced regulationtocreatearecyclingmarket(asacomponentofIntegratedWasteManagement)toprotect itsmostvulnerableactorsthoseattheverybottomofitsvaluechainallowsoligopoliestocontinue imposing their prices on the market, rather than allowing competition to find a more equitable equilibrium. In fact, waste pickers access to waste has been a major challenge in the last decade or more. Law, policyandregulatoryframeworksissuedhavebeen,bynegligenceorcorruption,designedanddrafted in a way that rules are fully dislocated from both the reality lived by constituents in poverty and Colombias Constitutional Social Rule of Law orienting and informing the whole normative order. In otherwords,lawandpublicpolicyhave,sadly,resultedinthelegalimpoverishmentofthepoor.167 2.5.3.THELEGALIMPOVERISHMENTOFTHEPOORPORTRAYEDBYARTICLE28OFDECREE1713OF2002; NOWJUDICIALLYREDRESSED. Withregardtoaccesstowaste,formerArticle28ofDecree1713of2002cededthepropertyofwaste leftbyindividualsandestablishmentsonthesidewalkforcollectiontotheprivateconcessionairesof thepubliccleanlinessservice.Bydoingso,whenstreetwastepickersweresortingandrecuperating recyclablesolidwastefromtrashcans,theywerenolongerinformallyscavengingthroughabandoned property(resderelictae),butillegallytaking,orstealing,privatepropertyoftheconcessionaires,which byextensioncriminalizedtheirlivelihood,laborandtrade. After waste pickers friends intensely advocated against this provision, Article 28 of Decree 1713 of 2002 was derogated by Decree 1505 of 2003. Following a case presented by waste pickers and an administrative attorney, justices of the Administrative State Court (Consejo de Estado), who are responsible for examining the legality of Colombian Decrees, stressed obiter dictum that once the originalprivateownerofagooddiscardsittotallyorpartiallyandleavesitoutonthepublicsidewalk for public service collection, and prior to the direct or indirect waste collection, that waste is an abandoned thing (res derelictae). The abandoned or refused waste belongs to nobody and can thereforebeappropriatedbyanythirdparty. While the waste pickers access to waste was once again possible, this was not the only legally impoverishingbarrierthatthewastepickershadyettosurmount.

166PleasereadChrisBirkbeckonSelfEmployedProletariansinanInformalFactory:TheCaseofCali'sGarbageDumps 167SeeSupra#6

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 2.5.4.THELEGALIMPOVERISHMENTOFTHEPOORPORTRAYEDBYARTICLES6AND14OFLAW1259 OF2008;NOWJUDICIALLYREDRESSED. InDecember2008,Law1259of2008wasenacted.Itcreatedenvironmentalsanctionstoprotectand promoteagreenenvironmentalcultureinColombia.Amongitsmanyrules,Article6,numerals6and 15, imposed a sanction on persons who opened and totally or partially removedcontents of a trash baginpublicspacessuchasstreetsidewalks,andthatwouldmovethosecontentsonnonidealmeans of transport. Considering that there were already existing sanctions in the Police Code for creating messanddisorderwithtrashbagsorusingpublicspaceforsortingwaste,thisnewlegalprohibitionof mereopeningatrashbagwastakenbywastepickersasadirectattackonthetheirlivelihood,labor and trade. Further, and taking into account that according to the law the ideal means of waste transportwasviaamotorized,fullycoveredloadingtruck,thelegalattackonthewastepickerstrade wasconfirmed.WastepickersvoluntaryattorneysandfriendswerecalledinbytheARBand,intwo separate legal actions against Law 1259 of 2008; the provisions were brought to the attention of ColombiasConstitutionalCourt. TheseargumentsonLaw1259of2008werebroughtbytheCiViSOLFoundationintotheirarguments for the Navarro waste pickers loss of access to waste in Cali, which requested the preemptive suspension of the tender in Calis Zone 1 and a writ of protection through a socially inclusive privatizationofwastesolution.BybringinginLaw1259of2008,theCiViSOLFoundationbroughtin arguments relating to all Colombian street waste pickers, so as to argue for an overarching determinationofwastepickersrightsunderColombianlaw.TheargumentsagainstLaw1259were hingedonthehumanrighttosurvival,thedevelopmentofstreetwastepickers,andtheappearanceof protectionorpreferentialtreatmentforcapitalintensivewastebusinessesthatneednotrelyonpublic spacetowork,thatcanaffordprivatepropertyandwasteseparationspaceandthatownedmotorized vehiclesfortransportingwaste.Thewastepickers,ontheotherhand,pushedorpulledornavigated horsedriven wooden carts with their collected materials. In short, it was argued that Law 1259 specificallytargetedthoseworkerswhowerenotonlytraditionallyengagedinrecyclingwork,butwho were also doing so out of conditions of extreme poverty and exclusion. Several journalists in the country to whom the case was presented and explained joined in advocacy efforts to make the law workforallratherthanforjustafew.168 A separate action presented by one of the voluntary attorneys and friends of the waste pickers concentratedontheunconstitutionalityoftheproblematicarticlesinLaw1259inrelationtothewaste pickersrighttowork.CiViSOLadheredtothisseparatelitigationactionthroughanamicuscuriaebrief advancingargumentsonthelegalimpoverishmentofthepoor,dueprocessandevidencegatheringfor imposingsanctions,thenatureandscopeoftheadministrativepolicingoftheStateandtheutilityand budgetingreasonabilityforpolicingtrashinthecountry.
168Forinstance,andamongothers,DanielSamperOspina,DanielSamperPizano,Pirry,RamiroBejarano,RafaelOrduz, Veredicto,TheEconomist,CarlosH.Andrade,JairoAristizabal,amongmanyothers.

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 Ruling T29109 of the Constitutional Court responded to the arguments regarding the Cali case and NavarrowastepickersandauthorizedtheMayorofCalitonotapplythoseprovisionsofLaw1259of 2009,effectivelyleavingitunimplementedontheground.Later,inrulingC79309andfollowingthe separate litigation action, the Constitutional decided to condition the interpretation of Law 1259 of 2009 on a constitutional reading in which the relevant provisions will never have the capacity to impedeinformalrecyclingwork.Twojusticesreservedtheirvotesandexpressedtheirbeliefthatthe articlesshouldhavebeendeclaredplainlyunconstitutionalandremovedfromthejuridicalorder169. The Government developed Law 1259 of 2008 through Decree 3695 of 2009, without substantially reducingorimpedingitsnegativesocialeffectsonwastepickers.OtherthanthefactthattheDecree amends article 77 of Decree 1713, and, therefore, the ideal transport vehicle for waste need not necessarilybemotorized,itstillcreatedaninfractionforthetotalorpartialremovalofwastefroma trashbag.Thesanctionisimposedandjustifiedonwastepickersandothersengagedinthisactivityas an instrument of civil culture to promote good environmental practices. Fortunately, those provisions may also not be applied pursuant to rulings T29109 and C73909 of the Constitutional CourtofColombia

2.6.WASTEPICKERSOWNACCOUNTLABORANDENTREPRENEURIALISM
Itisonlyinconceptualizingandarticulatinghowthewastepickersoperatewithinthismarket,andin light of law, that policy makers and consultants, human rights defenders, public interest litigation attorneys,civilsocietyorganizationsandthewastepickersthemselvesmayadvancetheircapacityto better protect their trade and livelihood on the ground, while at the same time continuing to contribute to environmental sanitation. From a constitutional perspective, every constituent of a democraticStatemustenjoytheguaranteeofhisorherrighttowork.Anyconstituentmayclaimfrom theState,i.e.,thedutybearer,thepossibilityoftherighttolife,aswellasthepossibilityofsustaining that life, in other words, the right to work. The law understands this as the freedom to enterprise and/orthefreedomtosellbothpersonallaborandcapacitytoanemployer;thus,therighttowork manifestsitselfasprotectingtheindividualsabilitytoapplyeitherherentrepreneurialcapacityorher laborcapacitytoproduceincome.170 Anyconstituentmaychoosethekindofworktheywillengageinto supporttheirlivesandthoseof theirfamilies.Thewastepickersareengagedinalaboractivity,mostofthemasregularworkersat thelowestleveloftherecyclingvaluechain,toearnanincomeandlivefromdaytoday.Asworkers, and constituents of the Colombian State, waste pickers are therefore entitled to opportunities and protections created by law. What becomes difficult in this analysis with the waste pickers and in definingthemosteffectiveandrelevantlawandpolicystrategyoragendatopursuewithrespectto
169 On decision C79309, and the two votes saved by Justice Maria Victoria Calle and Justice Jorge Ivan Palacio. Please readhttp://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/comunicados/No.%2048%20Comunicado%2004%20de%20Noviembre%20de%202009.php 170 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank / LEP LAB; On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Working Document#3,2007(unpublished)

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 securing their rights to work is that, as own account workers, they fall in the crossroads between employeesandentrepreneurs.Identifyingwhatcapacity(eitheremployeeorentrepreneur)provides the greatest opportunity for the greatest benefit requires a consideration of their context, i.e., the contextofColombianculture,society,politics,andbusinessenvironment.171 Waste pickers usually hesitate between claiming entrepreneurial rights or labor rights. While they wanttoretaintheirindividualfreedomandcapacityforinvention,theyalsowanttoensurestability andsecurity.172Asownaccountworkerstheyareinthemiddleofboth.Ononehand,theyworkinthe worstoftheentrepreneurialworldwithoutstabilityorsecurity,whilebeingfullyandwhollyliablefor anylossesorgains,aswellastheresponsibilitiesofsecuringresourcesandaddingvaluetothem.And on the other, unless they are extremely well organized, they also suffer the worst part of an employeesworldincomesubordinationtoanotheractorswill,astheyareunabletodictateprices for their salvaged materials. Most of them are also extremely vulnerable in other dimensions, with littletonocapitaltorelyuponincontingencycircumstances.173 Legallyandstrategically,then,itisdifficulttoidentifywhataspectofthewastepickersownaccount worker status to advance: the entrepreneur own account venture or the workers stability side. AccordingtoBirkbeckandFundacionSocial,thecommercializationofwastewillnottakewastepickers far enough in terms of securing an important degree of stability and security. From both scholarly understandingandfieldexperience,theyconcludethatwastepickersmustexpandtheirmarketniche tobothsecuretheiraccesstowasteandincreasetheirabilitytoraisetheirproductivityandnegotiate with the commercial, industrial actors who currently dictate the waste market conditions. Birkbeck furtheranalyzestheconsequencesofsecuringanemployeeemployerrelationshipbetweenthewaste pickers and industrial buyer: if employed, the costs of maintaining that relationship will make their added value, i.e., recuperated materials, more expensive and, therefore, less of a valuable market commodity than primary resources; if they begin to earn higher wages, which employers will be requiredtodounderColombiaslaborandemploymentlaws,therewillbeamigrationintothewaste picker trade and more waste pickers to choose from, thus greater competition among the possible populationofwastepickers,leadingtoadeclineinwages.174 Inthissense,andwhenbuildingthelegalargumentsfortheNavarrowastepickerscaseinCali,the CiViSOL Foundation concluded that employment would, at best, secure an intermittent minimum wage,andthat,too,foronlysomeofCaliswastepickers,especiallygiventhecurrenttrendofthede
171CiViSOLexplainedthatitcannotclaimthatthisconclusionappliestoallColombianwastepickers,butthatitdoesapply forthemajorityofwastepickersinBogotaandCali 172ConversationswithWastePickersinIndia,Colombia,Egypt,Argentina,Brazil,USA,Ecuador,Niger,Venezuela 173Thesecircumstances,exacerbatedbyextremepoverty,inpartexplainwhyreducingthepercentageofworkerswho wereownaccountworkerswasincludedin2008asatargetunderMDG1,reducingextremepoverty. 174Pleaseread:Birkbeck,Chris,SelfEmployedProletariansinanInformalFactory:TheCaseofCali'sGarbageDumps

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 laborizationofworkandthelimitedpublicbudgetfornewjobcreation.Instead,andinlightoftheir entrepreneurialhistoryandskillswastepickershadbeensurvivinginthistradelongbeforeitbecame amajorinternationalbusinessandfollowingtheirclaims,decisionsanddevelopmentaspirations,the CiViSOLFoundationdecidedtoargumentativelyseekandsecureentrepreneurialspaceandrightsfor wastepickers.175Thisdoesnotimplythatwastepickersshouldsomehowdiscardtheirworkerstatus; it only implies that their entrepreneurial capacity as own account workers typically, and conceived within a solidarity based organization or enterprise, might provide a greater possibility of securing a more ample and better future for their dignified life, work and development in Colombia. While structuringthelegalargumentsofthecase,CiViSOLcharacterizedthewastepickersasownaccount workersandhighlightedtheirroleasmicroentrepreneursinalucrativewasteeconomy.176Aswaste wasnowasuccessfulbusiness,andfollowingColombiasSocialRuleofLaw,itwasnecessarytosecure thewastepickersplaceasentrepreneursinthewasteeconomyandtoensuretheiraccesstowasteso as to develop and nurture their traditional entrepreneurial initiative, innovation, organization, waste andrecyclingknowhowandlaborcapacity.

2.7. WASTE PICKERS ORGANIZATIONS FOR ECONOMIC INCLUSION AND PARTICIPATORYGOVERNANCE

In our contemporary and very legally sophisticated environment, organization depends on three resources that are very scarce when living in poverty: time, space and money. The person living in povertyinvestsallavailabletimeseekingsomeincometoensurepersonalandfamilysurvival;lackof landand/orhousingtranslatesto anabsenceofpermanentpremiseswheretoconveneandgather easily, periodically and collectively, in view of communicating to build trust and uniting with like minded workers, citizens or trade partners; any income created is money that is primarily used for satisfying pressing basic needs and, hence, never enough so as to invest in creating and running a businessestablishmentoracivicsolidaryorganization,whoseutilityisstillanunprovenrisk.177Infact, fromfindingthesparetimetowalktoameetingplace,and,intheabsenceofprivatepremises,looking for a public space to collect and work, engaging in organizational discussions and strategizing, navigatingandunderstandingthelegalprocessofincorporationandregistration,findingtrustedhelp and resources for the appropriate type of legal personhood and drafting good bylaws, legally incorporating and registering the organization, managing finances, paying the extraordinarily high costs of banking in Colombia, declaring and or paying monthly taxes to the national and municipal government at the appropriate times, the transactional costs to incorporate a formal and sound organizationisalmostaninsurmountablechallengetopovertytrappedconstituentsoftheStatewho arewillingtoempowercollectively.
175CiViSOL,ArgumentstotheConstitutionalCourtofColombia/JudgmentT29109 176Ibid. 177 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank /LEPLAB;OnthenotionofLegalEmpowermentofthePoor,Working Document#3,2007(unpublished)

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 Precisely due to the lack of capital for ease of legal incorporation and even more so for actually running a capital based organization like an LLC, people living in poverty, and, generally, all citizens who are not organizing in view of an individualreturnofinvestment logic, but for civicsolidary purposes,tendtorelyonnonprofitorganizationsforchannelingtheirgeneralandcollectiveinterests ascitizensindemocracyandfordevelopment.Theseorganizationslargelyandvaguelyknownalsoas civilsocietyorganizations,NGOs,NPOsortheThirdSectorshouldbe,atleastinlightoflawandits underlyingvalueofcertaintyforensuringsocialpeaceandprogress,positivelydefinedascivicsolidary organizationsinsteadofmerelyindicatingwhattheyarenot.Theuseofanegativedefinitionofthese organizationsmerely provide hints on their juridical nature and political role; a powerful reason for theextensivesuspicionofgovernmentswholimittheirspacebasedonthefearofimperialismofones and terrorism the others. Civicness and solidarity based organizations, and the law and policy that frametheirspaceandaccountabilityduties,arealsodefinitiveindemocracyandfordevelopment.As overlooked and understudied as they are in many disciplines, but particularly in law, CivicSolidary Organizationsaredefactopivotalforparticipatorygovernanceandpovertyreductionstrategies.178 When these civicsolidary organizations are chiefly created for producing goods and services, they belongtotherealmofSolidarityEconomics179. 2.7.1.NONPROFITLEGALPERSONSOFSOLIDARITYECONOMYINCOLOMBIA InColombia,SEOsorSolidarityEconomicsOrganizationsareframedbyLaw454/98.Itisonlywhen organicprofitexceedstheoperationandpurposeoftheorganization,anditsdiverseorganiccollective fundsforeducationandprotectionpurposesarecovered,thatoperationalremainders(excedentes) canberedistributedamongtheorganizationsassociatesormembers.Thisisincontrasttotheprofit thatisdistributedaspaymentofdividendstoshareholdersincapitalbasedorganizations.Colombian waste pickers, like most workers in poverty and in need of an organization to strengthen their production and stakes, rely on such organizations180 to advance their development and inclusion in democracy. Despite the socioeconomic obstacles they face, waste pickers in Colombia have very developed organizations to advocate for their advancements. They rely primarily on organizations
178 RuizRestrepo, Adriana, Nature juridique et rle politique des organisations sans but lucratif du Tiers Secteur documentderecherchepourunethsedoctoraleendroitpublicdeluniversitPanthonAssas.2000(Sanspublier) 179 Solidary Economics or Solidarity Economy is not a common expression in English speaking countries, though it is gainingacceptancesuchasU.S.SolidarityEconomyNetwork(SEN)andAsianAllianceforSolidarityEconomy(AA4SE),while incountriesspeakingLatinlanguages(French,Italian,Spanish,Portuguese)itisamottoforthousandsoforganizations, small,mediumandbig,helpingthemtorecognizethemselvesaspartofacommonmovement.Thisshortpapertriesto give the main characteristics of this movement, and an update on its activities as a global movement. http://en.solecopedia.org/index.php?title=Solidarity_Economy 180InColombiathecreationofanonprofitorganizationisfairlysimplewhencomparedwithothercountries:anyonecan createanonprofitorganizationforanypurpose.Since1995,theprocesstakesinthebestcasethreedaysfromstartto finish.Theindividualorgroupfilingtheapplicationmustproduceandregisterbylaws,claimtheappropriatetaxstatus,and establishalegalpersonhood,whichisautomaticallycreatedattheendofthethreedaysorintheworstcase,ifcorrections areneeded,aweekorso.180Thislegalpersonhoodestablishestheresponsibilityoftheorganizationtothelawofthe countryanditsmembership,althoughthereisnorigoronwhatkindofpersonhoodiscreatedorthecontroloroversightof theorganization.

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withinthesolidarityeconomysuchascooperativesandmutuals.(Contrarily,EmployeesThrifts181do not work for them due to the fact that this organizational form depends on an employment relationshipandinstitutesitselfprimarilywithinemployersorganizations.)Scholarsandpractitioners at WIEGO would likely refer to these organizations in the realm of development and the informal economyasthemembershipbasedorganizationsofthepoorMBOPs.182 In Colombia, the promotion of Solidarity Economics is the responsibility of DANSOCIAL, a national technical ministry or Administrative Department. The Consejo Nacional de la Economia Solidaria (CONES) is, in its turn, the national entity responsible for designing and coordinating the national system of the Solidarity Economy. The Superintendent of the Solidarity Economy is the national executive entity responsible for inspecting and controlling the cooperatives active in the real or financial sector,183 i.e. special,multiactive and integrated types of cooperatives providing credit and loanservicestothepublic.Becausethislegalandeconomicdomainisbarelyknown,especiallywhen comparedtoprivatecommercialorpublicadministrativelaw,itisdifficultforanycitizentonavigate this sector; it is even more so for Colombians living in poverty with scarce time, space, and money resourcesandlimitededucationopportunities. AmongthearrayofdiversecooperativetypesavailableinColombia,theAssociatedWorkCooperative or Cooperativa de Trabajo Asociado (CTA) is the ideal legal personhood type for people working in povertyintheinformaleconomy.AccordingtoArticle70ofLaw79of1988,andArticles3and13of Decree4588of2006,aCTAisacooperativethatassociatesindividualstosimultaneouslymanagean enterprise,economicallycontributetoitanddirectlycompromiselaborcapacityforthedevelopment of economic, professional or intellectual activities. In short, a CTA demands reciprocity and mutually advantageousworkforthecommunalproductionofgoods,executionofworksorprovisionofservice toeithersatisfytheirownneedsorprovideforthoseofthecommunityatlarge.Consequently,the objectiveofthistypeofcooperativeistocreateandsustainwork opportunitiesforitsmembers:all members are ownermanagerworkers of an autonomous, autodetermined and autogoverned

181 Understanding by thrift, an organization formed as a depository for primarily consumer savings. Savings and loan associationsandsavingsbanksarethriftinstitutions.http://financialdictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Thrift+Institution 182Onthisnotion,pleasereadMarthaChenetal.:MembershipBasedOrganizationsofthePoor:Concepts,Experiences andPolicy 183Deconformidadconlasleyes454de1998y79de1988ylosdecretos1333,1480,1481y1482de1989,lassiguientes entidadesseencuentranbajolasupervisindelaSuperintendencia:a)Sectorcooperativo.Lascooperativasdebaseode primergrado.Losorganismoscooperativosdesegundoytercergrados.Lasinstitucionesauxiliaresdelcooperativismo. Lasprecooperativas.LasempresasdeserviciosenlasformasdeAdministracionespblicascooperativas.b)Otrasformas asociativas. Fondos de empleados. Asociaciones mutuales. Instituciones auxiliares de la economa solidaria. OrganismosdeintegracindelaeconomasolidariaOtrasformasasociativassolidariasinnominadasquecumplanconlos requisitosprevistosenelCaptuloSegundodelTtuloPrimerodelaLey454de1998.c)Lasorganizacionesdelaeconoma solidariaquemedianteactodecarctergeneraldetermineelGobiernoNacional.Estasentidadessonobjetodesupervisin porpartedelaSuperintendenciadelaEconomaSolidaria,siempreycuandonoseencuentrensometidasalasupervisin especializadadeotroorganismodelEstado,deconformidadconelartculo34delaLey454de1998.

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 organization. Given that an organization cannot be employed, but its products or services may be boughtorhired,CTAsengagewiththirdpartiesonlythroughaservicecontract,ifatall. Whenlegitimateinnatureandpurpose,andwellmanaged,CTAsare,accordingtowastepickers, 184 idealvehiclesforcollectivedevelopment.Clearlyinformalworkers,particularlyownaccountworkers, mayunitebothvoiceandeffortstojointlycontroltradeandbetteridentifyincomeopportunitiesand avenuesforinnovation.Unfortunately,whenmisunderstood,understudiedandthuspoorlyregulated or enforced, CTAs can be grossly distorted. As with any for or notforprofit organization, they may become corrupt, irresponsible or coopted and instrumentalized by more powerful and influential interests. Colombian CTAs have been used by capitaldriven corporations to reduce costs and labor obligations with respect to their employees by forcing them to leave the company to create a cooperative they the corporation would later hire as a service provider. Legal outsourcing or the tertiarization of the Colombian economy has ended up burdening CTAs and excessively restricting theorganizationalspaceforpovertytrappedconstituents. Consequently,anduntilrecently,theCTAenjoyedpreferentialtreatmentforbothtaxpayingandpublic contractingpurposes.185Currently,however,CTAsmustenrolleachandeveryindividualmemberina State pension fund, and provide for workrelated injury insurance, to comply with Colombias integratedSocialSecuritySystem.CTAsmustalsomakeparafiscalcontributionstotheStatethatwill gotosupporttheColombianchildwelfareagency(ICBF),aswellthenationalagencyforvocationaland technicaleducationandtraining(SENA),andtheFamilyCompensationFunds(CajasdeCompensacin Familiar). Theseobligations,imposedbyDecrees2996and3555of2004,werebroughtdownbyarulingofthe ColombiasStateCouncil(ConsejodeEstado).However,Law1233of2008,intendingtosettletheCTA crisis,,insteadburdenedtheCTAsbyrevivingthepreviouslyderogatedparafiscalcontributions.The official solution was then to treat both capital and solidarity economics organizations the same and imposeequalobligationsonboth.ThishadadetrimentaleffectonCTAs,throughwhichmanypoverty trapped constituents like waste pickers had been channeling informal initiatives into mainstream developmenttoamplifytheirvoiceindemocraticdeliberations. In response, organized waste pickers migrated to form different types of nonprofit organizations concretely, foundations and charities. They do so to avoid the fiscal burdens out of necessity, not choice: on average, waste pickers earn approximately 7080 percent of the minimum wage and cannotmeetthefinancialflooruponwhichalloftheseStateburdens,frompensiontoparafiscalsare calculated.186WhatisparadoxicalisthatCTAsthatreceivelessthantheequivalentof475minimumin
184 Silvio, Dario, Nohra, Maria Eugenia, Ingeniero / rra interview / 2009 / Bogot D.C. And Espolito, Omar, Edgar, Luz Angela,/rrainterview/2010/Cali 185 See Article 19 of the Colombian Tax Code, and Decree 777/92 on the law framework applicable to civil society organizationsofacivicsolidarynature. 186NohraPadilla/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C.

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 legalwagesareexemptedfromthiscontributoryburden.Thosethat donotevenreachtheflooron which all legal and formal existence and operation is premised are not even thought of, they are outsidersoftheformallawrealm. BecausethenonprofitsectorinColombiaisnotwellunderstoodand,further,poorlyregulated,inthe praxisthereislittlesubstantivedifferenceandminimalcontroltomaintainrigor,orderandregularity among the different nonprofit organizational types. The upside of this is that people in poverty, alwaysadaptingforsurvival,willtakeadvantageofsuchflexibilityandmigratewhennecessaryform one type to another; the downside is national lack of certainty, planning, progressing and inclusive development for the poverty trapped constituents. Seeking to protect their very much required nonprofit tax prerogatives, waste pickers organizations will rapidly shift from a cooperative a foundation.Suchisthecaseofparttimerand/orinformallyemployeddomesticworkerswhohadto shift a few years ago from their mutuales (mutual associations) organizations to cooperative organizations when by Decree policy makers imposed an operational minimum budget of several millionsofpesos. Such intrasector migration from one type of legal organization to another to avoid legal impoverishment effects results in an absence of pertinence and utility of the legal person on the ground. It also explains why in Colombia there are many de jure philanthropic foundations, cooperatives and charities that are actually de fact commercial forprofit organizations merely incorporated as non profits organizations and taking advantage of the poor regulation and enforcementofthesector.187 2.7.2.EVOLUTIONOFWASTEPICKERSORGANIZATIONSANDLEGALEMPOWERMENTOFCOLOMBIAN WASTEPICKERS AlthoughColombiaishometotheARB,oneofthestrongestandwellknownorganizationsofwaste pickers in the world, most of the countrys waste pickers remain unorganized. In 1995, less than 10 percent of the waste pickers population was organized; today, this number may be as high as 20 percent, but still hardly representative of the waste pickers conditions in the country.188 While the majority of Colombias waste pickers remain unorganized, the organizational history of Colombias waste pickers is notable and may be divided into four distinct periods: pre mideighties or the unorganized waste pickers phase; mideighties to mid nineties or the organization and capacity building phase of waste pickers; midnineties until 2003 or partnering for the fighting the legal impoverishment of the poor; and, 2008 and forward or the empowerment of waste pickers as entrepreneursintheColombianwasteeconomy.

187Pleasesee:http://www.wmd.org/documents/DCS/09ColSP.pdf 188LosRecicladoresyelDesarrolloSostenible:laconstruccindelactorsocial,p.28.

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 2.7.2.1.PREMIDEIGHTIESORTHEUNORGANIZEDWASTEPICKERSPHASE: During this first period, waste pickers organizing efforts were driven mainly by local charitable organizationsorresultedaspointedandreactionarysocialmovements.InCaliduringthemid1970s,it becameincreasinglydifficultforwastepickerstoworkintheCarmelowastedumpoutsidethecityand organization was called for to band together in protest. As reported by Birckbek, a Junta of waste pickerswascreatedtoprotectthewastepickerscontinuedaccesstotheCarmelodumpanditstrash. Thiswasnotaneffortaimedtoincreasetheireconomicstatusororganizedproduction,butessentially tosecuretheirfundamentalrighttoworkinthesameconditionsinwhichtheyhavebeenworkingfor years. In fact, at this time the waste pickers did not even share a collective identity either within or outsideoftheirtrade.Publicly,theywerecalleddisposablesorvultures,bothofwhichfostereda feeling of shame and low selfesteem among the waste picker population, who had no reason for wantingtostandup,claimandestablishanygarbagerelatedsocialidentity,naturallydampeningany organizationaleffort.. 2.7.2.2.MIDEIGHTIESTOMIDNINETIESORTHEORGANIZATIONANDCAPACITYBUILDINGPHASEOF WASTEPICKERS: Starting in the mid1980s and until the closure of its project in the nineties, Fundacion Social, a ColombianfaithbasedJesuitorientedfoundation,engagedinsupportingthewastepickersworkby promotingtheirorganization.WhileFundacionSocialwantedtoreducethewastepickersconditions ofpoverty,theybegantheirengagementbyaffirmingthewastepickersselfesteemandsocialidentity and advancing them towards establishing a collective trade identity. From 1986 1990, Fundacion Social initiated this process and then slowly transitioned the waste pickers to a position where they couldbegintonegotiateformoreeconomicstabilitywiththerecyclablebuyersintheindustry. From 1986 1990, Fundacion Social initiated this process and then slowly transitioned the waste pickers to a position where they could begin to negotiate for more economic stability. This process peaked in 1990, when Fundacion Social sponsored the first meeting of Colombian waste pickers, bringing together individuals and organizations from across the country. Over 27 organizations attended,representing20differentcitiesinColombia,aswellasarepresentativefromtheMinistryof Health, relevant industries and academia.189 The Asociacion Nacional de Recicladores (ANR) was createdafterthismeetingandfrom1990onwards,theANRbegantosupportandbuildseconddegree organizations around the country to better articulate local and regional needs to the national movement.AsANRanditsmembershipgrew,andasitreceivedgreaterattentionfromthepublicand State authorities, waste pickers began to build their organizational legitimacy, as well as their trade identity and selfesteem. At the same time, this growth attracted the international attention of bilateral cooperation agencies, as well as from the national private sector, all of which ended up fostering the creation of regional and local organizations capable of entering into contracts with the privatesector,mostnotablyintheglassandpaperindustries.Thechallengeatthispointinthewaste pickers organizational history was that they lacked both teamwork and strategic capacity to take advantageofopportunitiesmadeavailableviatheprivatesector.Ontheonehand,thewastepickers workhasalwaysbeencharacterizedasindividuallabor:itisownaccountworkpaidinpiecemealand thushighlycompetitive.Thisdoesnotmeanthatindividualsorfamiliesareorwereinconflict,butit
189TheMinistryofHealthattendedthemeetingbecauseatthistime,wastewasmoreofapublichealthconcernrather thanasaspectofaninternationalenvironmentalagenda.

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 certainlydoesmeanthat,ingeneral,wastepickerswerenotworkingincooperation.This,combined with the excessive accumulation of power in some of their organizational leadership, led to internal strife in some organizations during the mid1990s. On the other hand, contracts with the industrial sector that had been secured by the waste pickers leadership in the 1990s could not be executed. Sometimestheirleadershipofferedmorethanwhattheirmembershipcouldcollect,sometimesthey facedadministrativecomplications,buttheheartoftheissuewasthatduringtheinitialgrowthperiod ofthewastepickersorganizations,theylackedinstalledcapacitytocollectivelybuildtheirtrade. Nonetheless an important event happened during the years 199496: the government decided to terminate Bogotas cleaning and waste management public company EDIS and its public workers went on strike. The Bogota Administration of Jaime Castro turned to waste pickers in the ARB to mitigatethesanitaryimpactofthisstrikeonthepublichealthandsanitation.Withtheacquiescenceof the public servants on strike, waste pickers stepped in and organized themselves in response to the city'spleatoredresswhatcouldhavebeenamajorsanitaryproblem.Whilethewastepickerswanted toseizethisopportunityandremainaspublicwasteserviceproviders,themunicipalityagreedonlyif Fundacion Social participated in a joint arrangement, which was impossible for several reasons. However, this experience allowed the waste recyclers to realize their business and public service provision capacity and potential. They knew how to fully take care of the activities of collection, transport,processingandofcoursetherecyclingofsolidwaste.FollowingthedispositionsofLaw142 of 1994, the ARB became an authorized organization for public service provision, an E.S.P., and was determinedtoprogressivelyentertheformalbusinessofpublicwastemanagementinColombia.190By 1995theorganizationofwastepickers,whichwasmoreorlessfragileinsomewaysoranother,wasin process around the country, and some were even working as public service providers in smaller municipalitiessuchasLaPlataandChiquinquira.191 By1996,FundacionSocialscloseditsprojectonwastepickerscommunityandcapacitybuilding;some wastepickerswelcomedthisdecisioninviewoftheirownautonomy,whileothersfeltabandonedby the organization. Even though they continued to receive some support from the State and other actorsforaperiodoftime,i.e.NOVIB,from1996onwards,thewastepickerswerebasicallyontheir own. Unfortunately, the movement suffered some setbacks, especially where there was greater organizationaldependenceonFundacionSocial,aswiththeregionalorganizationFERESURCOinCali. The ARB, however, continued to be very active and became a leading organization among waste pickersorganizationsinthecountry.Wastepickerseventuallybecamerecognizedasasocialgroup and as more relevant, respected and visible actors in society, even earning international attention; secondandthirdlevelorganizationsmostnotablytheARBandtheANRbecameknownassomeof the strongest waste pickers organizations in the region. This attention advanced the process of building internal cohesion and trust and consolidating the overall organizational landscape of the wastepickersinthecountry. 2.7.2.3.MidNinetiesuntil2003orPartneringToFightagainsttheLegalImpoverishmentofthePoor
190ColombianconsultantsonbehalfoftheMckinseyFoundation. 191Silvio,Dario,Nohra,MariaEugenia,Ingeniero/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C.

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 Between 1996 to 2003, with more consolidated organizations and a clear occupational identity and trade, Colombian waste pickers began meeting with their peers abroad and approaching the formal economyasactorswiththeirownplace.Inotherwords,itisduringthisthirdphasethatwastepickers begantheirprocessoflegalempowerment.In1998,theFirstInternationalLatinAmericanCongress tookplaceinEcuadorand,aftertheinfamousmurdersofdisposablepeoplesuchaswastepickers took place in Barranquilla, national indignation and the waste pickers public outcry resulted in Law 511of1999.Thislawwasthefirststeptotheincreasedlegalrecognitionoftheirsocialidentityand trade.ItestablishedMarch1stasColombiasNationalDayofWastePickers,whileextendingcertain housingbenefits,which,amongotherpromisedbenefits,havebarelybeenimplemented. Withtheexperienceof1994inBogotaandothermunicipalities,anestablishedidentityandthefirst recognition in law of their labour and contribution to society, wastepickers were convinced of their business potential and the need to expand from their trash recycling niche to the broader waste managementindustry.Seekingtosecuremoreincomeformorewastepickers,theARBdecidedtostep intotheformaleconomyofwastebypreparingtobidforoneoftheASEsinwhichBogotawasgoingto dividetheprovisionofaprivatizedcleanlinessservice.ThebarrierstheARBfacedandregulatoryvoids theydiscoveredalongtheirwayrevealedtothemtheimportanceofparticipatorygovernanceandthe impact of law on their livelihoods and trade. This effort spearheaded in 2003 by a group of professionals teaming voluntarily with the ARB, which was and continues to be led by Nohra Padilla and Silvio Ruiz began to legally pave the way for their participation in the waste management economyofColombia. Between 2002 and 2003 the ARB and its voluntary professional advisers and friends ensured (i) the right of waste pickers cooperatives to compete and therefore bid in a waste tender process by buildingacaseonnonprofitdiscriminationandobtainingafavorablerulingoftheConstitutionalCourt (C74103);(ii)theclarificationofthelegalnatureofthewastethatisleftonthesidewalkforpublic collectionandtransport,whetherdirectlyorindirectlydelegatedtoprivatewasteoperatorsandthe correspondingrightofwastepickerstoaccessthattrash,aswellasaheightenedlegalrecognitionbya Council of State ruling by Decree 1505 of 2003; and (iii) the right to formally access waste through publiccontractingthroughacasearguingfortheconstitutionalrighttosurvivalatavitalminimum, whichwasjeopardizedbywasteprivatizationschemesthatrestricted(byanexclusivitycontracttoa privateoperator)theaccesstothewastematerialonwhichpoorconstituentswork,tradeandsurvive, in ruling T72403. A synthesis of these achievements attaining policy reform, from the bottomup throughthejudiciarybranchofpoliticalpower,followsbelow: Colombian Constitutional Court Ruling C7412003: Protecting povertytrapped constituents right to competeinthemarket In2002/2003,wastepickersorganizationsinBogotattemptedtoenterthepublictenderprocessto competeforoneofthesixwastecollectionandtransportationcontractsofthecity,whichwasopening upthemunicipalserviceofwastecollectiontoprivateoperators.Thewastepickers,however,were 101

 precludedfromcompetingforthesecontractsbecausetheywerenotequityownedcorporations,but rather,nonprofitandsolidaritybasedorganizationsoftheworkingpoor,suchascooperatives.The Constitutional Court agreed with the waste pickers and their lawyers that the public tender process couldnotexcludewastepickerscooperativesfromcompetingforthesecontracts. Colombian Constitutional Court Ruling T7242003: Protecting povertytrapped constituents right to enterthemarket The terms of the tender that came out after C7412003 formally allowed the waste pickers to compete;however,theconditionsissuedbythemunicipalityofBogotweresonarrowastoexclude organizedwastepickersfrommateriallycompeting.TheCourtagainacceptedwastepickersandtheir lawyers arguments. However, before any preemptive measures could be taken by the Court with respecttothetermsofthetenderthathadalreadybeenissued,themunicipalityofBogotclosedthe tenderprocess.Nonetheless,initsdecision,theCourtrequiredanaffirmativeactionfortheinclusion of waste pickers organizations in future public tender processes related to the cleanliness public service,giventhattheiractivitiesfallwithintherealmofpubliccleanliness,and,infact,includewaste management.Further,basedontherighttoequalitywithinArticle13oftheColombianConstitution of1991,theCourtalsoexhortedthemunicipalitytoincludeaffirmativeactionsformarginalizedand discriminated groups (nonprofit organizations of disadvantaged populations) in the administrative procurementprocessesofthisterritorialentity. Administrative Supreme Court Ruling (Consejo de Estado) of November 13, 2003 Administrative ContentiousChamber,Firstsection:Protectingwastepickerslegalaccesstotrash The third challenge facing the waste pickers in 2002 was Article 28 of Decree 1713 of 2002, which cededthepropertyrightsinwastetothemunicipalityoncethewastewaspresentedforcollectionon public sidewalks; further, unless otherwise determined by the municipality, this property right was cededbythemunicipalitytotheprivatewasteoperatororconcessionaire.Theeffectofthisprovision wouldhavebeentorenderthewastepickersinviolationofprivatewasteoperatorspropertyrights while recuperating recyclables from waste that was awaiting collection. Although the Court did not accept the argument that Article 28 amounted to a double payment for the single service being provided to the public, i.e., a monetary payment from the waste contract rewarded to the private wasteoperatorandtheinkindvalueofthecededwaste,nowvaluedasasecondarycommodity,the Court clarified that when trash was presented on public sidewalks for collection by the Stateor its concessionaires, the waste contained therein was abandoned property. The waste pickers could, therefore, legally appropriate that trash, and through parallel advocacy efforts by waste pickers and theirprofessionalfriends,Article28wasderogatedbyArticle10ofDecree1505of2003. Although establishing a de jure space for inclusion in the public procurement process for waste management contracts, this opportunity to develop did not materialize de facto. The municipality accelerated and closed the tender before the affirmative action was established by ruling T72403, 102

 and, in fact, the foreseen and contractually included second selective route to collect door to door recyclablematerialsperASEwasneverimplemented.WiththeexceptionofasmallpilotprojectinLa Alqueria, no formal recycling routes or waste separation plants were established and, thus, most or practically all of Colombias recycling has continued to happen informally through waste pickers. Realizing this would be a longterm process of empowerment, and with the legal path paved by the Court, Colombian waste pickers, and concretely those of Bogot organized around the ARB, started preparingforthefollowingwastetenderof2010. 2.7.2.4.2008ANDFORWARD:THEEMPOWERMENTOFWASTEPICKERSASENTREPRENEURSINTHE COLOMBIANWASTEECONOMY Theyearsbeforetheopeningofthenewtenderin2010revealedatrendintheglobalizationofwaste pickersvoicesandtheestablishmentofwastepickersrightsandthestruggletoenforcethem.There hasbeenastrongdegreeofinternationalizationoftheARBanditsleadershipthroughtheInclusive CitiesglobalprojectandtheARBisnowamemberoftheLatinAmericansecretariatofwastepickers createdunderthisproject,arefurbishednetworkofwastepickersintheregionandaroundtheworld. ThistrendbeganwiththeLatinAmericancongressofwastepickers,sponsoredbyWIEGO,AVINA,the FordFoundationandNaturaCosmetics,amongothers,whichbecamealsothefirstglobalcongressof wastepickersinBogotain2008.JoinedbyGaiaandotherorganizations,theInclusiveCitiesprojecthas helped raise the voice of waste pickers in international forums as well,such as those relating to the climate change and the Kyoto Protocol, in Copenhagen and elsewhere. It also fosters global and regional meetings that reunite waste pickers and other informal leaders to learn via exchange and emulation. Atthenationallevel,theCiViSOLFoundationforSystemicChange192broughtastrategiclitigationcase throughAmicusCuriaeinfrontoftheConstitutionalCourtofColombiain2009.Whilereferringtothe waste privatization process in Cali and the Navarro Dump waste pickers expulsion, it built on the previousargumentsandrulinginT72403andwasstrategicallydesignedtoclaimprotectionforthe survivalandworkofwastepickersthroughaccesstowasteandtoproactivelyproposepathsfortheir entrepreneurial inclusion in the waste economy. Through this case, CiViSOL intended to obtain clarification,onceandforall,ofthescopeandbreadthofallwastepickersrightsinColombia,whether inCaliorinBogota,whethersurvivingthroughrecyclinginawastedumporbystreetcollection,andto shift waste management policy towards becoming an inclusive waste management policy in accordancewiththerealityofthewastepickerspovertyandtradeinColombia.

192TheCiViSOLFoundationforSystemicChangewasfoundedbyoneoftheattorneyfriendsofthewastepickerssince 2002 and now, with additional members, funnels and advances, the higher need for civism and solidarity to operate bottomupsystemicchangebyredressingexclusionaryorimpoverishinglegalrulesorculturalnorms.

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 With evidence and arguments, CiViSOL proved to the Court that that there had been a legal impoverishmentofthepoor193,i.e.,thepoorwerepoorerafteranarrayofpublicdecisionscreatedby badpublicpolicyandcontracting.CiViSOLsbriefstatedthataccesstowasteequatedwiththewaste pickersaccesstosurvivalandthatlaw1259of2008,whichprohibitedtheopeningofatrashbagor can on the streets and moving trash through non motorized vehicles, the privatization of all waste, including potentially recyclable material that was ceded to private waste operators, and the prohibition of waste pickers work in sanitary landfills, were, regardless of necessity and efficacy considerations,negligentandperverseinthattheydidnotconsidertheeffectsofthesedecisionson those who continue to survive from trash. It also stated that the recycling business of the Uribe presidential family represented extreme competition between the powerful with the powerless. In terms of relief, CiViSOL requested not only protection by preventing adverse action or operation in terms of these policy decisions, but also respectfully suggested solutions that would incentivize the inclusionofwastepickersintotheformalwasteeconomyandtheprovisionofpublicwasteservices. Thesolutionswereorientedtorecognizethewastepickersentrepreneurialworkinatraditionaland customarynicheofthewastemarketandtopromotesociallyinclusivecompetitionamongcorporate bidders, without prejudice to the possibility of organized waste pickers competingin their own right and through their own organizations. Constitutional Court ruling T29109 found in favor of these arguments, declared waste pickers to be entrepreneurs in waste and ordered their inclusion in the formal economy through the terms of reference of waste management tenders, the facilitation of wastepickersbiddinginwastemanagementtendersandthroughpolicyreforminthecityofCalito effectivelyincludewastepickersinthecleanlinessorwastemanagementprovision.Thislastorderwas to be implemented via an Ad hoc Committee that included national, regional and local government representativesaswellaswastepickerscoops,andbyinvitationoftheCourt,CiViSOL.InSeptember 2009,theinclusivewastemanagementpolicywasagreedtobyconsensus,butthemayorofCali,Mr. JorgeIvanOspina,andhiscabinethavedivertedthepolicyfromrealizingitsagreeduponscopeand impact.Further,manyNGOscontractedbyalllevelsofpublicauthorityhavesteppedintoprovidean arrayoftrainingcourses,brochuresandprogramsthathavealsodetouredandfracturedthecohesive baseofwastepickersthatwasdevelopedduringthebuildingoftheCiViSOLargumentsfortheNavarro wastepickerscase.TheCiViSOLFoundationhasremaineddeliberatelyatthemarginsofwhatthey describeasthefairoflocalNGOcontractsandthecooptingofalandmarkhumanrightsrulingon inclusionandpovertyreductionbypoliticalideologyandprojectsofthemayorandhisstaff;CiViSOL andseveralwastepickersmayevenrequestallauthoritiestobefoundincontemptofcourtandruling T2912009. In Bogota, the new waste management tender process under Major Samuel Moreno for the privatizationofBogotsDoaJuanaSanitaryLandfillignoredtherelevantjurisprudence,justasitdid
193Thelegalimpoverishmentofthepoornotion,advancedbytherrathinktankinitseffortofpropoundingfortheuseof lawasapovertyreductionstrategy,wastestedbytheCiViSOLfoundationinthiscase.TheCiViSOLfoundationforsystemic changeisastrategicallyofrra(publiclaw+socialinnovation)thinktankandmanyoftheprivateconsultantsofrraare either members or funnel their pro bono work through CiViSOL and other partnering civicsolidary organizations of the consultancythinktank

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 inCali.Consequently,thenowlegallyempoweredwastepickersfromBogot,i.e.,theARB,andafter seekinglegalstrategyadviceoftheCiViSOLFoundation,challengedtheBogotadministration'sfailure toimplementtheinclusionordersgivensevenyearsagoinrulingT7242003inthisnewcompetitive bidding process. Anchoring their arguments in what had been reiterated and further developed in rulingT2912009,theARBfiledforacontempthearingbeforetheConstitutionalCourtofColombia. ThecourtfoundinfavoroftheARBanddeterminedthattheadministrationhad,infact,failedtomeet theinclusionstandardarticulatedinT7242003andsuspendedthetenderuntilitstermsofreference wereamendedtobeeffectivelyinclusiveofwastepickers.Sincethenthewastepickers,anddiverse new and old lawyers and interveners of both private and public nature, have initiated litigation (in somecasesstrategicallyandinothersfrivolously)tomakethetenderreflectexactlywhatthewaste pickerswant.However,theCiViSOLFoundationisconcernedthattheConstitutionalCourtwilllimitits supportofthewastepickers,inpartaresponsetotheexcessivelitigationaimingtosupersedethewill of the Court.194 Other than suggesting the original strategy that waste pickers claim the bidding authority recognized within ruling T72403 for the Doa Juana tenders terms of reference, CiViSOL hasremainedonthesidelinesduringthisepisodeofthewastepickerslegalefforts.Itmayreengage in2011inthecaseinBogottoensurethatthenewtenderforwastecollectionreflectsthesocialrule oflawestablishedbytheColombianconstitution,whichhasbeenimposedbytheCourtandwhichthe wastepickerssodesperatelyneed. Two final annotations are relevant to conclude this section on participatory governance and legal empowerment. First, it is necessary to note the extraordinary dislocation of the executive branch fromestablishedConstitutionalprecedents,atleastwithregardtoESCR.Seemingly,acaselostbythe authorities in front of the Court is believed and felt by the State as nothing more than a reproach, ratherthanabindinglegaldecision.Thesameattitudeapplieswithrespecttojudicialwrits,whichare interpretedas suggestions. This unitary action by the State to diminish these decisions grounded in the Constitution of Colombia effectively restricts their meaning and the impact of law on poor constituentsoftheState.NeithertheSSPDatthelevelofthenationalgovernment,whendraftingthe termsofreferencefortheCalitender,northemayorsofCaliandBogotintheirrespectivemunicipal jurisdictions have acknowledged the existence of constitutional precedents before engaging in their procurement processes. As true as it is that in the civil law tradition judicial systems are more legislated than jurisprudential, rulings are nonetheless a source of law and should be fully enforced, particularlywhen theyare in favor of poverty trapped and vulnerableconstituents of the State; it is surprising to observe the negligence, unawareness, or lack of respectful of the executive branch of power, both nationally and locally, towards judicial precedent, strict peremptory Court orders and eventheCourtsunderstandingofsuchconductand/orhabits.EventhehighestlevelNationalPolicy Documentissuedonwastemanagementandandvariousothercriticalissues,theCONPES3530,does not even consider the binding effects of jurisprudence ordering wastepicekrs inclusion and the normative reinterpretation on waste recycling and poverty. In fact, the National CONPES 3530 on recyclingdoesnotmentiontheCourtsorderstoadvancetowardsinclusivewastemanagement.Quite
194 Please see: http://www.vanguardia.com/bucaramangaregion/barrancabermeja/76783confederacionmineracrea buenaexpectativaenpequenosext

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 possibly,thelackofcarefulstudyoftheConstitutionandthejurisprudencethatrefinesandadvances lawinitshighestconstitutionalsense,aretherootcauseforsomanyproblemsandcasesthatmight havebeenpreventedifpolicymakingwereawareofandactedinlightoftherelationshipbetweenthe three branches of public power, and therefore also supported in the normative and jurisprudential studyofthecomplexityofhumanexperienceontheground. Onamoreoptimisticnote,itisworthhighlightingthatsincetheCiViSOLcaseforCaliswastepickers and ruling T2912009, the waste market in Colombia has changed remarkably, as was originally intendedbythelegalaction.Currently,multinationalwastemanagementcompaniesarerequiredby thewastetendertermsofreferencetoreachouttowastepickers'nonprofitorganizationsandseek strategicallianceswiththem.Sinceallprivatizationshavetobeinclusiveornonimpoverishing.InCali, inDecember2009,theMexicancompanyPromoambientaleswonthecontractforwastecollectionin Zone 1 in a strategic alliance with the UFPRAME cooperative of former waste dump pickers from Navarro.AndinBogot,withregardtothetermsofreferencefortheDoaJuanaLandfilltender,all interested bidders, including those from Korea, Brazil and Spain, were required to seek out, and are nowenteringinto,allianceswithwastepickercoopsinordertobeabletobidforandwinmultimillion dollarwastecontracts. MoreinformationontheorganizationsofwastepickersandtheirconstituenciesisfoundinAnnex2

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3.NOTE:THEARTISANALMINERSCHAPTERHASBEENEXTRACTED ANDISPARTOFASEPARATEDOCUMENT

ANNEX 1. THE CIVISOL CASE ON CALIS WASTE PICKERS: FROM MARGINALIZEDWASTEPICKERSTOENTREPRENEURSINRECYCLING1

OnApril23,2009,thewastepickersofCali,Colombiainformalworkerswhosesoleearningscome fromrecyclablematerialsthattheysalvagefromurbantrashandwhoareamongthepoorestofthe urbanpoorinColombiawonanhistoricvictoryinfrontoftheConstitutionalCourtofColombia.In decisionT2912009,respondingtoanamicuscuriaesubmittedbytheCiViSOLFoundationinsupport of25writsofhumanrightsprotectionfiledbyindividualwastepickersfromCali,theCourtorderedthe waste pickers inclusion into the formal waste management economy as entrepreneurs in recycling. This was the fifth in a line of cases in Colombia that has steadily increased the space for the waste pickersinclusionintheformaleconomyofwastemanagementinthecountry.Whileimplementation continuestoprovedifficult,thislegalhistoryprovidesavividillustrationoftheabilityoflawtocompel systemic change in favor of the poor, following an approach that may be referred to as the legal empowermentofthepoor. Whoarethewastepickersandwhatdotheydo? Waste pickers or informal recyclers are men, women and children who collect glass, paper, cardboard,plastic,bottles,metals,i.e.,recyclablematerialswithmarketvalue,fromtrashheapstosell as secondary commodities to industrial buyers. Paper mills, for instance, will be interested in cardboard for creating mulch to be used in their products. By using cardboard provided by waste pickers,papermillssaveoncoststhecostsofobtainingandprocessingraworprimarymaterialsis muchhigherandtheycanthencreateitemthatmaybesoldinthegreenmarketforearthfriendly products. With the phenomenon of increasing urbanization and the capital limitations of most municipalwastemanagementpublicagenciestheservicesthatwastepickersprovideareincredibly valuable.Theyarenotonlyreducingthequantityoftrashthatisbeingdumpedandburiedinlandfills, theyareinfactreducingthequantityofgreenhousegasesbeingreleasedintotheairandaccelerating climate warming, they are preventing leacheate from contaminating ground water, preventing the destruction of primary resources by providing recyclable materials to industry, and otherwise contributingtoagreenerenvironment,allatvirtuallynocosttopublicadministrationintermsofthe servicestheyareproviding. Most of these workers have fallen into this trade by circumstance in Colombia, many of todays waste pickers are the descendants of rural individuals who were internally displaced due to conflict backinthemidXXthcentury.Theycametothecities,oftenwiththeiranimalsandotherhousehold assets in tow, and settled on the margins of Bogota, Cali and other urban centers. While the men searchedforwagelabor,thewomencaredfortheirchildrenandanimals,scouringthesetrashheaps forfodderandwhateverelsetheymightfind.Induecourse,thesewomen(andtheirchildren)became the first waste pickers in Colombia, selling, for instance, salvaged glass bottles to pharmacists.
1ThisAnnexisaworkingdocumentoftherrathinktankbasedoninformationandjointanalysiswiththeCiViSOL FoundationforSystemicChange. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=explorer&chrome=true&srcid=0B5pUmay0b4vAYjdiN2YxMjMtMjRmNS00MDE4L WI0YmMtMDdlOWQ3MzUwMzQ0&hl=en

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 Eventually, as wage opportunities became scarcer, men also entered this trade and thus grew the presence of waste pickers in the informal waste economy. Despite the fact that they amount to severalthousandinColombia,anditisestimatedthatupto2percentofthepopulationinthirdworld cities engage in waste picking activity, their trade remains informal and most waste pickers live and workincircumstancesofpoverty. WhatisthehistoryofthewastepickerslegalstruggleinColombia? Under the Constitution of Colombia, municipal waste management is one of the public services encompassedundertheumbrellaofenvironmentalsanitation,asetofpublicutilitiesorservicesthat areessentialtothelifeofcitizens.Environmentalsanitationincludeswithinitpublicservicesrelated towater,sewageand,ofcourse,trashcollectionanddisposal.Whiletheprivatesectoriswelcomedto provide this and other public services, the Stateand public administration never abdicate their mandate to deliver this essential public service to residents and citizens, even if they are being providedbytheprivatesector.Wheretheprivatesectorisprovidingtheseservices,thepublicsector stillhastheresponsibilitytooverseeorregulateitinawaythatensurestheefficient,continuousand universaldeliveryoftheservice. The waste pickers legal struggle in Colombia has its roots in the privatization of the waste management public service under Law 142 of 1994. Law 142 was passed to reform the provision of public services including waste management to address the inefficiency of the public entity that had beenresponsible for providing these services. It created the space for the private sector in the waste management realm and private sector operators would actually receive exclusive service contracts for waste management: after having obtained a contract through a public procurement process, they would be the exclusive waste management service providers in their particular geographic slice of the city. These are very lucrative contracts based mainly on distance traveled fromwastecollectiontofinaldisposalandontheweightofwastethatisburiedorlandfilledforfinal disposal and over the course of the next several years, private waste management operators flourished within the countrys waste management economy; meanwhile, waste pickers persisted in themarginsofformalwastemanagementeconomy. In 2002/2003, in an attempt to improve their conditions, and as Bogota was preparing its public procurement process for the private provision of waste management services, waste pickers organizationsattemptedtoenterthebiddingprocesstocompeteforoneofthe6wastecollectionand transportationcontractsforBogota.Specifically,theAssociationofRecyclersfromBogotaortheARB, which serves as an umbrella organization for more than 20 different waste pickers cooperatives throughout the city and over 2300 families ofrecyclers, attempted to submit a bid and compete for oneofthesecontracts.Whengettingadviceandpreparingforbidding,theyrealizedthat,eventhough theyqualifiedasauthorizedprovidersofthepublicwastemanagementservice,underLaw142they asnonprofit,solidaritybasedorganizationsofthepoorwereonlyabletoprovidetheseservicesin small and rural municipalities. Only equityowned corporations could compete for the larger, more lucrativecontractsforwastemanagementinlargecities.Thisiswherethelawofthewastepickers began in Colombia when the waste pickers organizations turned to a small group of voluntary lawyers who had been working with them on the bidding process, to challenge their exclusion from thisbiddingprocessandfromthefinancialopportunitythatwasbeinggrantedtoprivateequityowned corporations exclusively. In decision C741 of 2003, the Constitutional Court determined that there wasnolegitimatereasontoexcludenonprofitsorcommunitybasedorganizationsfromenteringthe 109

 urbanmarketforwasteservices,theARBmustbegivenequalityofopportunitytocompeteforoneof thecontractsforBogota,andthefirstlegalbarriertothewastepickersinclusionintheformalwaste economywasresolvedintheirfavor. Ofcourse,thiswasonlythebeginningoftheirstruggle.Whenthetermsofthetenderprocesscame outaftertheCourtsdecisionandallowingcoopsbiddingtoo,theconditionsissuedbythemunicipality ofBogotaweresonarrowastoeffectivelyexcludeorganizedwastepickersfrommateriallycompeting requiring, for instance, that winning contractors have experience in directly operating waste managementservicesforverylargecitiesforanotableamountoftime.Buildingahumanrightscase outofapublicprocurementtenderprocesstotakeinfrontoftheConstitutionalCourtwasacomplex matter, but there was an real lifeordeath need to persuade the Justices that the tension between privatizationofwasteandsurvivalofthepoorwastepickerswasnotanadministrativematterbuta constitutional and human rights protection matter. The Constitutional Court accepted the case and concludedthatthetermsofreferenceforthewastemanagementbiddingprocessdidnotincorporate anyeffectivemeasuretoincludetheparticipationoftheARBand,infact,continuedorperpetuated theircircumstancesofmarginalization.IndecisionT7242003,theCourtconfirmedthatiftherightof wastepickerstocompete,andfollowingRulingC64103,wasrespecteddejurebyBogotasMajor, theconditionsofthetenderpresentweresonarrowthatwastepickersrealpossibilitytocompete and bid for a contract that would give them access to waste was inexistent de facto, and thus Bogotas total privatization of all (recyclables included) threatened the waste pickers fundamental right to life or survival , their vital minimum, by lack of access to the waste they work and create income from. It is worth noting that before any tender suspension measures could be taken by the Courtforanorderofredress,themunicipalityofBogotaclosedthetenderprocessandsignedwaste managementcontractswith6operatorsfor6exclusivewastemanagementzonesinBogota.Atthis point, the Court could have declared the issue moot, but in its decision, the Court required an affirmativeactionfortheinclusionofwastepickersorganizationsinallfuturepublictenderprocesses ofBogotathatarerelatedtothecleanlinesspublicservicei.e.,wastemanagement. Around this same time, Colombian waste pickers were facing an additional and very different challenge:theirveryaccesstothetrashthattheyrelieduponwasbeingthreatenedbyDecree1713of 2002.Article28ofthisdecreeextendedaprivatepropertyrighttotheconcessionairesofdoortodoor wastecollection.Thatis,assoonasgarbagewasplacedonthecurbforcollection,andevenbeforeit wasactuallycollected,itwasdeemedtheprivatepropertyofthewastemanagementoperatorforthat geographicarea,makinganywastepickerdejureathief.Thisprovisionwaseventuallyderogatedbya subsequent decree, Decree 1505 of 2003 with the lobbying of waste pickers and their professional friends. And, the State Council (Administrative Court) to which this argument was presented stated obiterdictumthatwhentrashwasbeingpresentedforcollection(intrashcans)onpublicsidewalksfor the State or its concessionaires to collect, the waste contained therein constituted abandoned propertyresderelictaeuntilthemomentitwascollected;thus,itcouldbelegitimatelyappropriatedby wastepickersduringthistime. For the next several years, the waste pickers continued in their trade, while the private waste managementoperatorswhoprocuredcontractsviapublicprocurementprocesscontinuedtoexpand andgrow. Six years later, by 2009, not only Bogota began preparing for the 2010 new round of public procurementforwastemanagement,butthesouthwesterncityofCalimovedtowardsprivatizationof 110

 itswasteeconomyfollowingthefinancialinterventionoftheNationalGovernment(Superintendence of Domiciliary Public Services) to the Calis municipal public company EMSIRVA, which finally was orderedbytheNationalGovernmenttobedissolvedandterminated. WhatpromptedtheCaliwastepickerscasein2009? CaliisoneofthefourlargestcitiesinColombia,amongBogota,MedellinandBarranquilla.Likeinmost ofthecitiesaroundthedevelopingworld,therehavehistoricallybeentwogroupsofwastepickersin Cali: street waste pickers or urban waste pickers, who collect recyclables from trash that has been placed on the curb or sidewalk for collection by formal waste management operations, and waste dumpwastepickerswhosalvagetrashfrompublicwastedumps,oftenlivingonornearthepremises withtheirfamilies. ThefirstchallengefacingCalisandinfactallColombianwastepickerswasLaw1259of2008,which prohibited the opening of trash from bags or cans in public space and the transportation of trash in nonmotorized vehicles. Because most waste pickers are poor and do not have their own premises wheretheymaylegallyopenandextractwaste,andsincemostofthemusehorseorhandpulledcarts to move their recyclables from the point of collection to separation to sale, Law1259 had a specific anddisparateimpactonthisgroupofmarginalizedanddiscriminatedworkers. ThesecondchallengeconcernedspecificallythewastepickerslivingintheNavarrowastedump,Calis primarypublicwastedumpsince1967andhometoabout600familiesofwastepickers(atleast1200 individuals). In 2009 the city of Cali ordered its closure, claiming legitimate environmental concerns about leacheate and water and soil safety; however, in its plans to close the dump and create a sanitarylandfill,theYotocolandfill,therewereneitheranyrealprovisionsmadeforthepopulationof 1200individualswhowerecurrentlylivingattheNavarrodumpandsurvivingfromthetrashthere,nor was the authorities plan to transition them into other livelihood alternatives ever implemented. Besides the National Government, acting through its Superintendence of Domiciliary Public Services advancedthewasteprivatizationof3out4zonesofCali,disregardingthejurisprudenceoftheCourt thathadinT72403unequivocallyrequestedtheinclusionofwastepickersinallwasteprocurement processesforensuringthemspacetoworkandensuretheirsurvivalorvitalminimum. Earlier in 2008, one of the voluntary lawyers who had been with the waste pickers since 2002 Adriana RuizRestrepo founded the CiViSOL Foundation, which, from this point on, assumed the waste pickers case. The 2009 Cali waste pickers is, a good example of a litigation victory that was deliberately built not only for protection but for proactively advancing development solutions, using lawforpovertyreductionorsystemicchange. After being evicted from Navarro and realizing that both the national and local governments twice failed to fulfill their promises of protection, 25 individual waste pickers from the Navarro dump requestedtutelaorwritsofhumanrightsprotectionfromtheConstitutionalCourt.Inthisfirststage, they were assisted by a voluntary lawyer of Senator Alexander Lopez team. Most of the cases and petitions were either denied by some judges or received but didnt grant an effective protection in both first and second instance. Due to the gravity of the waste pickers situation, the Constitutional Courtdetectedtheneedofreviewingthepreviousrulingsandthusselectedandaccumulatedallthe casesinonesingletutelaorpleaforimmediatehumanrightsprotectionInMarch2009,TheCiViSOL 111

 FoundationforSystemicChangelearntaboutthis25wastepickersaccumulatedforCourtreviewand decidedtointervenethroughanamicuscuriaeaimedatrestructuringtheNavarrowastepickerscase around (i) a legal impoverishment of the poor argumentative strategy and (ii) an inclusive developmentsetofproposaltotheCourtassystemicsolutionsforamendingandbetteringthewaste pickers legal space for life, livelihood and development. Due to the urgency of protecting space for inclusioninthecontractualprocessthatwastakingplace,CiViSOLrequestedthesuspensionofthe tenderprocessofZone1inCali,asapreemptivemeasure;theCourtagreedandsuspendedtheonly bidding process that had not yet been closed and awarded by the national Government (SSPD) to a privateoperator. Onemonthlater,onApril23,2009,theCourtconfirmedthesuspensionofthetenderprocessforZone 1.ItfoundentirelyinfavorofwastepickersandtheprotectionandinclusionargumentsofCiViSOL from the premise that public policies and contract processes must also be guided by constitutional valuesandprovisionssoastoprotectallconstituentsequally,andtoinlightofasocialruleoflaw eradicatepresentinjusticesinColombiansocietywhilerefrainingfromexacerbatingtheimpoverished conditionsofthepoor.TheCourtheldthefollowing: (1)WithregardtotheNavarrowastepickersimpendingimpoverishment,theCourtrecognizedthat their fundamentalrights to a life with dignity in connection with their right to work, as well as their rightstohealth,education,food,anddignifiedhousing,andequaltreatmentweremateriallyharmed duetoimpoverishingpolicyandprivatecontractingschemesandthereforeorderedthemunicipalityof Cali to immediately adopt urgent measures to ensure the effective enjoyment of the constitutional rightstofoodandhousingoftheformerNavarrodumpwastepickers. (2)TheCourttooknoteofargumentsandevidencepresentedonwastepickershistoryinthewaste trade and public service context, their recycling knowhow, their solidarity production capacity through nonprofit organizations and collective participation efforts, their vast recycling activity in wastedumpsandurbaninformalrouteswhichrepresentedacontributiontosocietyalbeitinformally and under incredibly adverse circumstances, and thus the Constitutional Court decided to protect them in policymaking and the marketplace by recognizing them as entrepreneurs in waste in both wasteprivatizationprocessesandmunicipalcleanlinesspolicy. This means that their survival options would not be any longer restricted to work in precarious jobs aroundpublicorsemipublicwastecompaniesorinitiativesnorasemployeesoftherecentlyappeared capital intensive recycling companies and having to cede their tradition, knowledge, labor and innovation and reduce to basic labor for third parties in view of survival. In other words, the waste pickersconstitutionalentitlementtolivelihoodandentrepreneurshipi.e.enteringthewasteeconomy as entrepreneurs in their own right was confirmed by the Court. Thus, on one hand the National governments (SSPD) pending tender process was suspended for a period of three months, during whichtimeitwasrequiredtoredraftthetermsofreferencetomakethemwastepickerinclusiveand in their capacity as entrepreneurs and not only by requesting a few jobs for waste pickers to the bidders.And,ontheother,CalislocalGovernmentleadbytheMayorofCaliwasorderedtoreform the municipal waste policy of Cali in view of formalizing the entrepreneurs in waste within Calis publicserviceprovisionwithintheAdHocCommitteethatwascreatedbytheCourtforsuchpurpose. WithregardtotheSSPDdecisionofwasteprivatizationinCali,theCourt,inordertoensureeffective inclusionestablishedthatthetermsofreferenceoftheWastetenderforprivatizationneededto(a) 112

 ensure the effective and real participation of waste pickers organizations in the competitive bid for public cleanliness contracts making it reachable, (b) make the public tender procurement process reachabletoorganizedwastepickerswillingtocompeteintheprocurement,and(c)includeascoring criterionthatwouldincentivizelargescalecorporatebiddersinclusionefforts,i.e.thetendertermsof reference would have to provoke substantial and permanent social waste pickers inclusion in the private waste management operations. Terms of Reference must now reflect through contracting conditionspreferenceforthoseprivateoperatorsthat,alignedwiththeStateininclusivedevelopment efforts, enter into strategic alliances or partnerships with waste pickers organizations for waste management rather than just giving them a few individual jobs. The intention both of CiViSOL in presenting arguments and of the Court accepting them and developing them to full extent was to strengthen the right to livelihood, the efforts of collective organization of waste pickers and to protectingtheircustomaryspaceintherecyclingwastemarketplacenowthattrashisbecomingvery profitable. WithregardtoCaliswastemanagementpolicy,theCourtprohibitedtheexclusionofthewastepickers from any public procurement for contracts regarding the design or implementation of the advantageoususesofwaste,whichincludes,amongotherthings,recyclingandcomposting,thatis tosay,theCourtrecognizedthewastepickersaspreferentialactorsinthewasterecyclingcomponent ofthecleanlinesspublicserviceormunicipalwastemanagement.Inaccordancewiththisobjective, theCourtorderedtheformalizationofallwastepickersinCaliwithinthepubliccleanlinesseconomy and requested an adhoc committee that would work on redesigning and implementing a socially inclusivewastemanagementpolicyforthecityofCaliwithinsixmonths,dueNovember23,2009.The committeeincludedsevenseatsforpublicservants,fourwastepickersrepresentatives,and,bydirect invitation of the Court, the CiViSOL Foundation. (4) Finally, the Court authorized the authorities to unapply the provisions of Law 1259 that made the waste pickers trade legally impossible, later confirmedinrulingC793of2009. (3)TheCourtalsoinvitedCaliscivilsocietytostepinandpromotewasteseparationandtocedetheir recyclable trash to waste pickers so they would continue to have income for survival and until the Municipal Government and the Ad hoc Committee would have within six months the new inclusive wastemanagementpolicyreadyandsetinplace. This one decision (1) situated a propoor, povertyreducing recycling niche firmly within the waste managementpublicserviceandonethatwas,thus,dulyabletoberegulatedbytheStatesoastobe inclusiveofwastepickers,(2)addressedtheinformalityofthewastepickersworkingconditions,and (3)securedthespacewithintheformalwasteeconomyforthemtodeveloptheirrecyclingactivities even further. In doing so, the decision created the opportunity for CivicSolidary2 organizations of waste pickers to engage in the formal waste economy in a capacity equal to large capitalintensive waste management operators. This market and private driven inclusion created by the States regulation capacity, was a deliberate objective of CiViSOL and given (a) the clear noncompliance of inclusionrulesandrulingbyallStateauthoritiesand(b)priorknowledgeandexperienceofcorporate instumentalizationofthepoorthatonlysoughtasocialcoatingoftheirbusinessinsteadofengagingin
CivicSolidary Organizations is a term proposed to designate nonprofit organizations in positive sense instead of a negativeorresidualone.RuizRestrepo,Adriana,NatureJuridiqueetRlePolitiquedesOrganisationsSansButLucratifdu TiersSecteur,DocumentderecherchepourunethsedoctoraleendroitpublicdelUniversitPanthonAssas.2000(Sans publier)
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 realsystemicsocialinclusionanddevelopmentimpact.3CiViSOLhadbeendeliberatelyaimingforthe creation of a market driven incentives structure that would provoke market competition for social inclusion,asortofrecognitionofhumanrightsandcorporatesocialresponsibilitytothosebiddersthat wereaimingorwerereadytosubstantiallyadvancethesocialinclusionofthepoorintheirindustry andoperation. LegalEmpowermentandLegalImpoverishmentofthePoor The approach that CiViSOL used to develop and craft its arguments may be called a legal empowermentofthepoorapproach.Itaimedtocreateformallyrecognizedandprotectedspacefor thelives,livelihoodanddevelopmentofpovertytrappedwastepickerswhileteamingwiththeminthe processofreplacingemotionsofanger,frustrationanddespairfueledbyideologicalrevindicationsfor arguments of systemic change, reasons for inclusion and evidence on the urgent need of judiciary protection based on the text of the Constitution and the rule of law. Borrowing the term form the former commission on the legal empowerment of the poor the actual empowerment of the poor process is based on the rra thinktanks understanding of legal empowerment of the poor4; rra understandsitasanimprovementon.Overallitisaboutusingtousetheconstituencystatusofthe poor to compel State authorities to be made accountable to them, to the individuals who, although living and working in poverty, are equally constituents of the State and thus deserving of State attention, action, and accountability. When a person has no capital resources, work opportunities, socialsecurityorsafetynetstorelyupon,itisinthismomentthatshemustreclaimherconstituency status and demand that the State focus its attention on her and her condition and the condition of otherslikeher.Indeed,inlightoflaw,povertyisaboveallalackofinterconnectednessbetweenan individual and the State and the rights that follow, to live unplugged from the mainstream of public decisions, but nonetheless to be forced to comply and cope with what others have decided.5 This governancegap,orthisdistancebetweenthepoorconstituentandthedecisionmakingmechanisms oftheState,contributestohercircumstancesofpoverty.AnditisinbridgingthatgapthattheState mayberedirectedtoaddressthegrievancesofthepoor. Yet, before the legal empowerment of povertytrapped constituents may be fully realized, it is importantalsotorecognizethattheremaybeimpoverishingconditionsthatmustfirstbeaddressed. The rra think tank refers to these conditions of bad law and negligent policy making as the legal impoverishmentofthepoor,recognizingthatapoorlyinformedordistancedgoverningauthoritymay negligently,orsometimesevendeliberately,institutelaws,regulationsandpoliciesthatexacerbatethe circumstances of poverty within which some constituents live and work. For instance, Law 142s provision that the only entities that could compete in the public procurement process for large municipalities were equity owned corporations; or the provision of Decree 1713 that extended to these corporations a property right in the trash left out curbside for collection; or, Law 1259 that prohibitedeventheopeningoftrashcanstopartiallyextractfoodleftoversorplasticbottlesforsaleas well as the transportation of trash in manually pushed or horsepulled carts. These laws actually
On incentives and opportunities for business community and civil society alliances for social innovation aiming for inclusivedevelopmentwithinazerowasteculture:rra(PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)thinktank/SOCIALINNOLAB;CSR & CSOs for Poverty Reduction through Inclusive Waste Management Policy and Public Cleanliness Choices , Working Document,2006(unpublished) 4idem 5idem
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 impoverished the waste pickers further or would have, if implemented as conceived and unchallenged.Consequently,identifying,dismantlingandredressingthelegalimpoverishmentofthe poor, must be the first phase of a legal empowerment approach to poverty reduction and inclusive development. TheimplementationofInclusiveWasteManagementPolicyordersoftheCourtintheCityofCali. After the historic legalvictory came the challenges of implementation, which persist to this day. As mentioned earlier, the Court required the city of Cali to design and begin implementation of an inclusivewastepolicybymidNovember2009.AnAdHocCommitteewasconvenedtothiseffectand, althoughontracktomeetthisobligation,itwasderailedbybothpoliticalandsocialforces,possibly wellintentionedbutwithaveryreducedcapacitytorespecttheruleoflaw,understandtheleitmotif of policy reform and empowering waste pickers in the waste and recycling market place and complyingtoordersofthejudiciary. The meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee were extraordinarily tense. Not only they began later than orderedbytheCourt,inJuly2009,andwiththeMayorandlocalauthoritiestryingtoexcludeCiViSOL fromtheCommittee,towhichithadbeenexpresslyinvitedbytheCourtinrulingT29109toensure thatthewastepickersstakescontinuedtoenjoysupportandtechnicaldefensefromCiViSOLbutalso tooverseeandreporttotheCourtontheimplementationofthepolicyreformforinclusionandthe impact of other orders given in the judgment. Although, Mayor Jorge Ivan Ospina was and still is subjecttothedirectorderoftheCourtbyvirtueofrulingT29109andthushadtoconvenetheAd hocCommitteemeetingstheMayor,wasalwaystoobusytoattend,andfurthermoredelegatedhis one seat in the Committee, after splitting it in three seats, a decision that substantially affected the equilibriumoftheCommitteesmeetings.Besides,the3Mayorsdelegates,andtheothermunicipal agencies delegates to the Committee, rotated their presence in each meeting which broke the continuumofdiscussionandpolicyelaboration,aseverymeetinghadnewCommitteememberswith newideasandresistancestoreform,whichcreatedagreatdegreeoftensionwiththewastepickers andCiViSOL. Inaddition,wastepickerswerefightingbetweenthemselvestodeterminewhoshouldbereplacedasa representative,whowouldattendtheCommitteemeetingsonbehalf ofall;therewereonly4seats available and predesignated by the Court based on what appeared on the files. Some desperately sought out participation to voice their frustrations and dreams, others were seeking positions of leadershipandrecognition,andothersjustwantedtobesurethattheywouldnotbebetrayedorsold out by colleagues they didnt trust. CiViSOLs work then extended way after the Committee preparation or meetings as it had to try to educate the waste pickers as fast as possible on representativity, communication, and trust and union or group cohesion, to effectively seize the opportunityandmaterializeitontheground.Notbreakingapartandstrengtheningtheirpositionvis vis the government was crucial for the implementation phase. CiViSOL and waste pickers would often meet until late in the night in the open, in the municipal park in front of City Hall. These meetingswereconvenedbywordofmouth.Duringthistime,oneoftheconclusionsmadebeCiViSOL wastheutmostimportanceofhavingaplacewheretoconductmeetingsanddeliberationsandwhere to promote social dialogue, nurture trust and attain social cohesion and unify stakes and priorities amongwastepickers.CiViSOLrepeatedlyrequestedtheMayortolendatemporarymeetingplace, anoldhouseforholdingwastepickersmeetings,anotherrequestthatnevermaterialized;theMayors 115

 officefoundoneexcuseafteranother.Itispreciselythelackofmeetingpremisesforwastepickers communicationforcohesion,towhichCiViSOLattributesthebeginningofallderailment,manipulation andcooptationoftheimplementationprocessforrulingT29109.6 From the first months of the Committee, it became clear that there was no unified response of the State: the rightistoriented national government and the leftistoriented local government were in political tension and additionally amidst an electoral season. At the personal level, the advisors and public servants of the Mayors office were tacitly organized in two groups competing for personal reputation, public image (for potential votes or endorsement in the future) and for winning the politicalfavorofMayorOspina.Thistranslatedintoadispersedenvironmentoftensionanddifficulty ofnegotiationbecausethecommongoodandsocialinclusionswerethelastconcernsofmanyofthe public servants. Waste pickers and CiViSOL faced in the Committee a multifaceted political arena ratherthanasingleunified,coordinatedexchangewitharesponsiveState.Itisworthnotingthatthe highest obstacle faced by CiViSOL was to keep cohesion and focus of waste pickers as there were competing underthetable contracts and income opportunities offered by public agencies and servantstocurrythefavorofafewwastepickerstomakethemlookgoodinfrontoftheirsuperiors and in the public opinion. This had a devastating effect on waste pickers, who themselves started breakingapartintosmallerfactionsthat,inturn,directlycontractedworkopportunitiesorotherfavors witheachofthesevenagenciesthatwererepresentedintheCommittee. WiththemountingpressureofthetimelimitimposedbytheConstitutionalCourttofinalizeandbegin implementationofaninclusivewastemanagementpolicyforCali,andamidstsuchunorganizationand alignmentfordevisinganinclusivewastemanagementpolicythatwouldpositivelyimpactonthecity andthelivesofmorethan2500wastepickersinthecity,thepublicservantsseatingattheCommittee table requested CiViSOL to facilitate a one day policymaking workshop in September 2009. Having built collectively a deliberation framework in an earlier preparatory meeting, CiViSOL facilitated a workshopforlegallyandtechnicallyguidingtheefficient,sustainableandscalableinclusionofwaste pickers in Cali. The Committee reached consensus on the principles, contents, budgets, core tasks, responsibleagendaandscopeonthe23ofSeptemberat10pm. Themainagreementsreachedbyconsensusatthatsession,i.e.thedraftinclusivewastemanagement policyforthecityofCali,arethefollowing:
ThemainobjectiveofthepolicywastheinclusionofformerNavarrodumpwastepickersand urban/streetwastepickersintheprovisionofpubliccleanlinessservicesorwastemanagementofCali, as decided and oriented by ruling T2912009. The policy would, however, be made progressive and scalable until the inclusive policy was fully operational and capable of including all. It owul begin by whatwasdeemedahumanitarianmeasurefortheformerNavarrodumpwastepickerswhowereina desperateconditionwithnoaccesstowasteandincomeafterthewastedumpclosure.Forpreserving peace they would not attempt ot access waste and thus compete with the street pickers on their existinginformalroutes,insteadthemorethan600familieswouldreceiveminimalsubsistenceincome inexchangeoftheiractivitiesofcleaningriverbanks,preventingmountainfiresandeducatingthecitys populationontheimportanceofwasteseparationforrecyclingandeducatingalsoonentrepreneurial skillsfortheirupcomingroleascooperativeserviceprovidersofrecyclingservicesandtrade.

6ItisworthnotingthatCiViSOLworksgratis,relyingonlyonthevoluntarytimeandcontributionsofitsmembersandhas received no national or international funding through grants, nor any remuneration of services through governmental publiccontractssoastoensureindependenceandstrategiclegalmaneuverability.

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Havingensuredtherequisitebudgetaryneedsforthishumanitarianmeasureandprogrammed budgetfor2010anduntilthefullinclusivepolicywassetinplacesocialpeaceamongthetwolarge groupings of waste pickers was established and the humanitarian crisis of the Navarro waste pickers temporarilyresolved.Morethan600familiesstartedreceivingandequivalentof250USDinexchange forlearningandcivicteachingonwasterecyclingandmountainandriverpreventivecleaning. BecauseinCalitherewerenoexistingformalrecyclingroutesdefactoanddespitehavingthem awardeddejureintheTermsofReferenceforWastePrivatizationandsubsequent7yearscontracts,it was agreed in the Ad hoc Committee that the National Government (SSPD) would request the new private waste operators to renounce or cede their de jure right to potentially operate an additional selectiverouteforwasterecyclablesinfavoroforganizedwastepickersofCali.Thisagreementwas possiblebecauseformalrecyclinghadneverbeenimplementedand,thus,carriednoeconomicharmto the private waste concessionaires. Alternatively, and if the social responsibility justification was not strong enough to support this request, the State would utilize its public contracting prerogatives to unilaterally modifytheexisting publicservicecontractandtakeawayfromtheconcessionariesthede facto idle selective recyclable route and cede it to the organized waste pickers of Cali as a poverty reductionandmunicipalzerowastestrategy. In line with this agreement, the suspended tender process for Zone 1 would be amended to excludeasecondselectiverecyclablerouteinitsTermsofReferenceorprocurementcontractlikeithad previouslydone.FromnowonthatroutewillbeoperatedbytheorganizedwastepickersofCali.The National Government (SSPD) agreed to exclude the selective route for recyclables of Zone 1 and only openthebiddingforanordinaryrouteforcollectionoforganics(nonrecyclables)totransportforburial atthelandfill,whichitdidinDecember2009. Infact,intheamendedversionoftheToRS7,allbiddershadtopresenttheiroffersinastrategic alliance or partnership with a waste picker cooperative or similar nonprofit, for waste management. Besidesimposingsocialinclusiononcorporatebiddersforenteringthetender,theToRsalsopromoted inclusion by establishing that in case of a tie position8 it would award the contract to the bidder that wouldattainthehighestsocialimpactinthevitalminimumofindividualwastepickers. Itwasalsoagreedthatoncerecovered,allthedejurecreatedroutesforcollectingthetrashof thecityinZones1,2,3and4ofCali,wouldbeunifiedandprivatizedundera5thpublicservicecontract forwasterecycling.Onlythatthisonewouldbeawarded(a)bydirectadjudicationinsteadofanopen competitiveprocessand(b)toaprivateoperatorofasolidarityeconomicsnature,insteadofacapital economics one, that would be created by union and cooperation of all waste pickers organizations. Otherwise, waste recycling contracts for the 4 zones would be awarded in a closed tender or competitive bid among waste pickers cooperatives or other nonprofits, only. These measures were inclusiondevicesinlightoftheaffirmativeactionandthenewpreferentialstatusofwastepickersas formalentrepreneurstobe.Insynthesis,allthatthepolicyreformandamendedtenderweregoingto

7Theamendmentofthetenderprocesswasacomplexonealso.TheSSPDsamendedtenderopenedonlyfor10daysfor presentingbids.ThisdidnotmaketheToRsreachableforanyoneandparticularlyforthepovertytrappedwastepickers. DuetothisirregularityapoliticalcontrolsessionofthetoPresidentUribesSuperintendentEvaMariaXX,wasconducted intheSenatebySenatorRodrigoLaraRestrepowhichhelpedtopostponeandredresstheprocessinlinewiththeCourts ordersinrulingT29109. 8Onlybecausewastepickerstimeandpreparationwasnotidealandinthisoccasiontheywerenotgoingtousetheir newlyacquiredrighttocompetebybiddingforthewastemanagementofzone1,wastepickersandCiViSOLdidntfight back SSPDs decision to reduce the incentive ordered to the most inclusive private operator from giving extra points to breakingatiepositioninfavorofthemostwastepickerinclusiveoffer.

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do was to recognize and organize formally, the vast waste recycling routes and efforts that had been already operating informally; it would benefit the city, better their recycling work, dignify their livelihoodandpreservetheirrighttoentrepreneurshipinsteadofnecessarilysubordinatingthemto the capitaland/orpoliticalpowerholderswhohad neverentrepreneuredin wastebut haddetecteda multimillionwasterecyclingbusinessrecently. It is worth noting that the waste pickers poverty and vulnerability triggered special constitutional protections and granted the Ad hoc Committee and the Municipal Administration the authority(andresponsibility)toaffirmativelyactinthewastepickersfavor.Thus,itwasagreedbythe Committee in the draft public policy that waste pickers would not only operate the waste recycling routesofCaliasnewformalpublicserviceproviders,theywouldalsohavearighttotherecyclablesthey collect from trash, akin to a property right: they would rightfully own whatever recyclables that they collected,therebyallowingthemtheabilitytobothearnincomefrom(1)therecyclingservice,i.e.,door todoorcollectionofrecyclabletrashandtheirseparationofrecyclablesinarecyclingplantormunicipal warehouse,and(2)fromthesecondarysaleorprovisionofrecyclablestoindustrialbuyersinCali,soas toencouragetheirentrepreneurialinitiative. Toensurethewastepickerssenseofautonomy,andthebusinessandentrepreneurialrightsof the povertytrapped, ruling T2912009 declared the waste pickers entrepreneurs in waste (as opposed to subordinate employees or semiemployees) in order to facilitate that process and ensure efficiencyinserviceprovisiontothecity,theAdHocCommitteeagreedtopromotethecreationofan umbrellaorganizationofwastepickers,temporarilynamedARCA(Ark)orAssociationofRecyclersof Cali. Under ARCA, and pivoting on the principles of solidarity economics, all existing waste pickers organizationsandindividualswouldorganize,cooperateandevenreceivetraining,pluschildcareand othersocialsafetynets.Itwasagreedthatwithexternalmanagementadviseandcapitalinvestment, ARCAwouldfunctionasanumbrellacooperativeandwouldbeinthepositiontoformallyoperatethe newly created and privatized waste recycling route that the over 2000 waste pickers were already operatinginformallyandatomizedinCali. OnlybyformallycedingtowastepickerstheentiretyoftherecyclingroutesofCali,andgiving propertyrightstothecollectedrecyclablewaste,couldtheAdHocCommitteeensurethattherewould be enough income and redistribution for the more than 2000 waste pickers in Cali. ARCAs bylaws would be tailored to create an umbrella cooperative capable of redistributing income among all cooperatives and waste pickers assumed therein. Special attention would be paid to balancing the internal power distribution among leaders, protecting ARCA from external political influence or corruption, and devising mechanisms for enhanced representation and protection of the elderly, the handicappedandwomenheadsofhousehold. The draft public policy agreed to by consensus also envisioned the need to conduct a waste pickers' census, providing some premises for meetings, building a municipal plant for waste recycling thatwouldbeconcessioneddirectlytoARCAandtheconstructionofatleastfourwarehousestostock materialsforrecyclingattheplant.TheMayorsrepresentativesagreedonplotoflandintheLaCorbata neighborhoodfortherecyclingplantandprovidedalistofmunicipalplotswherethewarehousesmight bebuilt,allowingforbudgetaryrestrictionslimitingthenumberofwarehousestotwoduringthefirst phaseofimplementation.

Following the unanimous consensus at the policymaking workshop, the office of Mayor Ospina had onlytopassthepreliminaryversionofthedraftpolicytoallmembersoftheCommitteetodetailplans ofactionandprepareitforsignatureandsubmissiontotheCourtbeforetheNovember2009deadline. Itwasthentobeadoptedbeforeyearend2009.DespiterepeateddemandsbyCiViSOLandthewaste 118

 pickers,thisneverhappened.DaysaftertheCourtimposeddeadlinehadexpiredMayorOspinaand hisadvisor,Mr.Millan,sentalegaladvisortoinformtheCommitteethatanewpolicycreatedbya consultant hired by the Mayor and his advisors would substitute the agreedupon draft policy. It becameclearthatwhattheMayorwantedwasfullcontroloverthewasterecyclingtradeand,thus, the livelihood of thousands of poor waste pickers, rather than having an autonomous population of waste pickers, independent of political power and capable of enjoying and realizing their own livelihoodandentrepreneurialrights.CiViSOLandwastepickersprotestedthattheMayorrespectthe contentsoftheagreeduponinclusivepolicy,withnoluck. ReplacementoftheagreeduponpolicybytheMayorsunilaterallycreatedpolicyviolatednotonlythe Courtsorderandterms,butalsotheprinciplesofcivilsocietyparticipationandgoodfaith.Initsplace, theMayorspolicywascompletelycontrarytodemocracy,thelawandthesenseoftheCourtrulingin every dimension. In its capacity as overseer of the implementation of ruling T29109, granted by rulingT29109,CiViSOLhassubmittedfivereportstotheCourtmonitoringthisprocessandrequesting urgent intervention to protect both the ruling and the waste pickers. The waste pickers have also submittedseveralletterstothissameeffect.However,thesepleashavebeeninsufficienttoprovoke actionorreactionbytheCourt,visvisderailmentoftheimplementationofrulingT29109andthe policymakingprocess,tothedetrimenttothewastepickersrights. Oneyearlater,theinitialdraftpolicyhasstillnotbeenenforced,articulatedorimplemented.There has been, sadly, a great absence by the Court to see that its ruling was, in fact, implemented. RecognizingtheextraordinaryburdenofworkthattheninejusticesontheCourtareresponsiblefor, thishasbeenadisappointmentforthewastepickers,theirnewlyacquiredfaithintheruleoflaw,and CiViSOLseffortsinusinglawforpovertyreduction.WhiletheCourtwastheretocreatethehistoric opportunity for the waste pickers, up until this point, it has not been capable of finding the time or mechanisms to ensure its application and realization, nor did it necessarily have the resources or capacitytodoso. Mayor Ospina of Cali and his advisor David Millan have managed to twist a fasttracked poverty reductionandhumanrightscasetoadvancetheirownideologyandredresspreviouspoliticallosses imposed upon them by the national government. Calis municipal waste public company, EMSIRVA, had been intervened and liquidated by the national government, as represented by the Superintendent of the Domiciliary Public Services of Colombia, due to its financial insolvency and inefficiency.FreeridingonrulingT29109,MayorOspina andAdvisorMillandecidedtoresuscitate thedefunctEMSIRVAmunicipalcompanybychangingitsnametoGirasol,rehiringitsoldpersonnel, andcreatingwithinitarecyclingbusinessunit,throughwhichtheywillbringinwastepickerswork.(It isnotclearif,atleast,theywillbecreatingmorethan2000decentjobs)Thisis,intheirinterpretation, is due compliance with the Courts ruling, a decision that specifically recognized waste pickers as entrepreneursinwaste,forwhomtheCourtsupposedthatemployeestatuswouldnotbesufficientfor further development and growth in the trade they had been cultivating for generations. Indeed, the horizon of inclusion for the poor into mainstream development, by recognition of their right to livelihood, entrepreneurialism and development has been reduced the Mayors policy to what has always been the perception of many: the poor, unlike other constituents of the State, cannot entrepreneur. They are entitled to, at most, the right to survive through a precarious job and a minimumwage,nomore.Theyarenotentitledtogrowbeyondthatminimumlevelofexistence,to entrepreneurcollectivelyortodeveloptheirknowledge,livelihoodandtrade.Thepoormustremain small. 119

ANNEX2.MAPPINGOFWASTEPICKERSORGANIZATIONS
PleaserefertoaseparateExcelDocumentwiththesametitleattachedtothisdocument.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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