WIEGOREPORTONTHEPOLICYENVIRONMENTOF ARTISANALMINEWORKERSINPOVERTYINCOLOMBIA

AdrianaRuizRestrepo ShaillyBarnes October2010

THISWIEGOREPORTWASPREPAREDBY:

rra(PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)

attorneys&consultants Ms.AdrianaRuizRestrepo(TeamCoordination&LeadResearcher) Ms.ShaillyBarnes(SeniorResearcher) Mr.SebastianTorres(ResearchAssistant) Mr.CamiloBarrera(ResearchAssistant)

The authors would like to express their gratitude to those who, in the field, through their life stories or through their practitioner knowledgeandinformationinCali,BogotaandNewYorkmadethis reportpossible. Our gratitude extends to colleagues in New Delhi, Pune, Ahmedebad, Patna, Bangalore, Cairo, Buenos Aires, and Belo Horizonte who have allowed us to further our comparative understanding of law, policy and poverty in the global south. Our sincere gratitude to Ms. Marty Chen, Ms. Chris Bonner and the WIEGOnetwork,fortheirtrustandsupport,butespeciallyfortheir important contribution to development and justice through research and advocacy efforts aimed at building a better global understandingoftheinformalworkingpoor. Please cite as: RUIZRESTREPO Adriana, BARNES Shailly, WIEGO ReportonthePolicyEnvironmentofInformalUrbanWastePickers andRuralArtisanalMineWorkersInColombia.


VirtuallyallpoliciesaffecttheinformalEconomy. Inthepast,interestedpolicymakershaveadvocatedsomemixofthefollowing policies for those who work in the informal economy: social policies to improve their health and education; infrastructure and services to improve their housing and living environment; microfinance and enterprise development services to increase the productivity of their enterprises; bureaucratic and legal changes to reduce the barriersand related transaction coststo registering their enterprises; and, more recently, property rights to give them the ability to transformtheirassetsintoliquidcapital.Toofewpolicymakershaveconsidered how other areas of policieseconomic policies, labour legislation, and social protectionschemesaffecttheinformaleconomy. ()Untilrecently,therewasawidespreadassumptionthatmainstreameconomic policiesdonotandcannotreachtheinformaleconomy.()Clearly,areappraisal oftheimpactofexistingeconomicpoliciesandtheneedforsupportiveeconomic policies is called for. This is because economic policies impact the process of redistributionbetweentheformalandinformaleconomy.Policyanalysisneedsto determine whether the informal economy shares in benefits from government expenditureandprocurementpolicies. APolicyResponsetotheInformalEconomy WIEGOBrochure,CambridgeMA

TABLEOFCONTENTS
TABLEOFCONTENTS.............................................................................................................4 ACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS.........................................................................................6 EXECUTIVESUMMARY...........................................................................................................7 1.AUTHORSCONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFORTHISWIEGOREPORT...................................12
1.1.SURVIVINGPOVERTYINTHEINFORMALECONOMY.............................................................................................13 1.1.1.POVERTYASACONSEQUENCEOFBADLAWANDNEGLIGENTPOLICYMAKING.........................................................13 1.1.2.THEINFORMALECONOMYREALM..............................................................................................................................16 1.1.3.OWNACCOUNTWORKERS:ATTHECROSSROADSOFENTREPRENEURSHIPANDLABORRIGHTS.............................21 1.1.4.COLOMBIA,POVERTYANDTHEINFORMALECONOMY..............................................................................................25 1.2.MAINCHALLENGESFORINCLUSIVEPOLICYMAKING............................................................................................29 . 1.2.1.WOMEN ......................................................................................................................................................................29 1.2.2.CHILDREN....................................................................................................................................................................32 1.2.3.ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIESOFINDIGENOUSANDAFRODESCENDANTPEOPLES.................................................34 1.2.4.THESOCIALPROTECTIONISSUE..................................................................................................................................36 1.2.5.DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCEFORINCLUSIVEDEVELOPMENT....................................................................................38 1.3.INTERNATIONALAGENDASONTHEINFORMALITYOFPOVERTYTRAPPEDWORKERS...........................................39 1.3.1.THEDECENTWORKAGENDA ......................................................................................................................................39 . 1.3.2.THELEGALEMPOWERMENTOFTHEPOORAGENDA..................................................................................................41 1.3.3.THEREVISEDFIRSTMILLENNIUMDEVELOPMENTGOAL............................................................................................41

2.NOTE:THEWASTEPICKERSCHAPTERHASBEENEXTRACTEDANDISPARTOFASEPARATE DOCUMENT............................................................................................................................................43 3.COLOMBIASRURALMINEWORKERSINPOVERTY ..........................................................44 .

3.1.PUBLICPOLICYFRAMEWORKOFMINING.............................................................................................................46 3.1.1.THECONSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORK..........................................................................................................................46 3.1.2.THECOLOMBIANMININGCODEOF2001...................................................................................................................49 3.2THETRADECONTEXT............................................................................................................................................53 3.3.LIVELIHOODOFRURALMINEWORKERS...............................................................................................................57 3.3.1ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIES ...................................................................................................................................57 . 3.3.2.THEINDIGENOUSMINEWORKERSHISTORY..............................................................................................................58 3.3.3.THEAFROCOLOMBIANMINEWORKERSHISTORY.....................................................................................................60 3.3.4.INDIGENOUSRESERVATIONSLANDREGIMEORRESGUARDOS.................................................................................62 3.3.5.AFROCOLOMBIANSCOMMUNALLANDSREGIMEORTERRITORIOSCOMUNITARIOS............................................64 3.3.6.LANDISSUESREGARDINGETHNOCULTURALAUTONOMYANDCOLLECTIVEPROPERTY.........................................68 3.3.7. WOMEN RELATED LAND ISSUES: ETHNOCULTURAL COMMUNITIES, CUSTOMARY LAW AND COLLECTIVE PROPERTY .............................................................................................................................................................................73 . 3.4.WOMENMINEWORKERSLIVINGINPOVERTY......................................................................................................75

3.4.1.WOMENINLARGEANDMEDIUMSCALEMININGOPERATIONS.................................................................................76 . 3.4.2.WOMENINMEDIUMSCALE(SOLIDARITYBASED)MININGANDSMALLSCALEMINING ............................................78 3.4.3.WOMENINMICROSCALEMINING............................................................................................................................79 3.5.CHILDRENINMINEWORK....................................................................................................................................81 3.6.HEALTHANDSOCIALPROTECTION.......................................................................................................................84 3.7.ACCESSTOMINEWORK.......................................................................................................................................85 3.7.1.THEORDINARYMININGCONCESSION:ACCESSINGMINERALSTHROUGHACONTRACTFORAMININGTITLE.........86 ON THE GOVERNMENTS OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THE ETHNOCULTURAL COMMUNITIES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CONSULTATION BEFORE GRANTING ANY ORDINARY CONCESSION TO A NATIONAL OR MULTINATIONAL MINING OPERATION...........................................................................................................................................................................93 3.7.2. MINE WORK THROUGH A STATELED SPECIAL MINING PROJECT FOR INFORMAL WORK IN EXISTING TRADITIONAL MINEEXPLOITATIONS.........................................................................................................................................................101 3.8AUTHORIZATIONFORUNTITLEDOCCASIONALMINEWORK................................................................................ 06 1 3.8.1.PERSONALHOUSEBUILDINGANDINSTALLATIONS..................................................................................................106 3.8.2.BAREQUEO:RIVERSANDPANNINGANDEXTRACTIONOFALLUVIALCONSTRUCTIONAGGREGATES......................107 3.9.FROMOWNACCOUNTTOSELFEMPLOYEDMINEWORK:THREEILLUSTRATIVEEXAMPLESOFARTISANALAND SMALLSCALEMINERSPLACEDINPOVERTYTRAPSBYTHELAW................................................................................. 10 1 3.10ILLEGALITYINFORMALITYANDPOVERTYBUILDINGBYTHERULEOFLAW .......................................................... 13 . 1 3.11.ORGANIZATIONANDREPRESENTATIONOFINFORMALPOVERTYTRAPPEDMINEWORKERSTOINCREASE GOVERNANCECAPACITYFORINCLUSIONINMAINSTREAMDEVELOPMENT............................................................... 19 1 4.1.1.SOLIDARITYECONOMYFORASSOCIATEDMINEWORKINMEDIUMANDSMALLSCALEOPERATIONS...................119 4.1.2.MINERSSPACEFORINCLUSIVELAWANDPOLICYMAKING .....................................................................................122 .

ANNEX 3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ARTISANAL AND SMALLSCALE MINING (ASM) IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY DISCOURSE AND THE AUTHORS POSITION AND UNDERSTANDING OFASM................................................................................................................................................. 26 1 ANNEX4.MAPPINGOFMINEWORKERSORGANIZATIONS................................................. 32 1 BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................................... 33 1

ACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS
ANR AsociacinNacionaldeRecicladores ARB AsociacindeRecicladoresdeBogot ASM ArtisanalandSmallScaleMining CEDAWConventionontheEliminationofallformsofDiscriminationagainstWomen CiViSOL FoundationfortheCivicSolidaryBuildingofSystemicChange CLEP/TheCommission TheCommissionontheLegalEmpowermentofthePoor CONES ConsejoNacionaldelaEconomaSolidaria CRA ComisindeRegulacindedeAguaPotableySaneamientoBsico CRC ConventionontheRightsoftheChild CVC CorporationoftheValledeCauca DAGMA DepartamentoAdministrativodeGestindelMedioAmbiente DepartamentoAdministrativodeEconomaSolidaria DANSOCIAL EDIS EmpresaDistritaldeServiciosPblicosdeBogot EMSIRVA EmpresadeServiciosVariosMunicipalesdeCali GERT GrupoEmpresarialdelaRecuperacinyTransformacindematerialesS.AESP GREMIVALLE AsociacionGremialDeMinerosDelValle ICBF InstitutoColombianodeBienestarFamiliar ICCPR InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights ICESCR InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights IDP InternallyDisplacedPeople ILO InternationalLabourOrganization INGEOMINAS InstitutoColombianodeGeologayMinera MDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoal NGO NonGovernmentalOrganization NPO NonprofitOrganization NOVIB OXFAMNOVIBNetherlands PGIRS ElPlandeGestinIntegraldeResiduosSlidosPGIRS POS PlanObligatoriodeSalud ServicioNacionaldeAprendizaje SENA SISBEN SistemadeIdentificacindeBeneficiariosdeSubsidiosSociales SSPD SuperintendenciadeServiciosPblicosDomiciliarios WIEGO WomeninInformalEmploymentGlobalizingandOrganizingGlobalPolicyResearchNetwork UNEP UnitedNationsEnvironmentalProgramme SSPD SuperintendenciadeServiciosPblicosDomiciliariosdeColombia UAESP UnidadAdministrativaEspecialdeServiciosPblicosdelaAlcaldaMayordeBogot MBOP MembershipBasedOrganizationsofthePoor OSEs OrganizationoftheSolidaryEconomy OSDs OrganizationforSolidaryDevelopment CTA CooperativadeTrabajoAsociado

EXECUTIVESUMMARY
ThisdocumentpresentsaresearchandpolicyanalysisencompassedunderWIEGOsGlobalProjecton Law and the Informal Economy. Initiated in India in 2008, WIEGOs project aims to contribute to developinganenablinglaborlawenvironmentforinformalworkers,onethatpromotesdecentwork andeconomicopportunity,laborrights,benefitsandprotection,andactivelyencouragesthegrowthof strong, democratic, sustainable unions or memberbased organizations of informal workers. This document continues WIEGOs Global project and identifies the public policy barriers facing own account workers in two occupational groups of Colombias informal economy urban waste pickers andruralmineworkerslivinginpoverty.Bymakingexplicittherolethatlawandpolicyhaveplayedin shaping the waste and mining sectors of the Colombian economy, this report also reveals the space withinwhichwastepickersandmineworkers,andtheirorganizations,maymaneuvertochallengethe presentregulatoryenvironment,protecttheirconstitutionalrightstolive,workanddevelop,aswellas thetradesthattheyhavecultivatedanddevelopedovertime,andseekopportunitiesforgrowthand progress. ThefirstoccupationalgroupofinformalownaccountworkersconsideredinthisreportisColombias urban recyclers, who are also known as waste pickers. This trade has emerged throughout the developingworldasaresponsetolimitedmunicipalresources,theinabilityoftheformaleconomyto absorbagrowingurbanpopulation,andtheparticularmarketvalueplacedonrecyclablematerialsin the modern globalized economy. Although engaged in the provision of recycling services and contributingtoagreenerenvironment,themen,womenandchildreninthistradedonotworkina welldefined trade environment within the more comprehensive economy for waste management services. Linkedtothecountryshighlevelsofurbanizationandgrowingneedforefficientanduniversalwaste services, Colombias waste management sector has evolved from a municipally ownedandoperated servicedeliverytoonethathasbeenincreasinglyprivatizedsincethe1990s.Yet,andasestablishedby theColombianConstitutionandrelevantpolicymeasures,namelyLaw142of1994andDecree1713of 2003, waste management remains an essential public service in Colombia for which the public administration remains responsible to every Colombian constituent. Included within this set of essentialpublicservicesarethewastemanagementelementsoftheenvironmentalsanitationpublic service,notablywastecollection,transportation,finaldisposal,andtheadvantageoususesofwaste,a category that encompasses, among other things, recycling, and linked to it, the trade of the waste pickers.Theimplicationsofthischaracterizationofthewastepickerstradearesignificantandlieat the heart of the waste pickers body of law, a series of cases in front of the Constitutional and AdministrativeCourtsofColombiathathaveestablishedthestatesobligationtofacilitatethewaste pickersinclusionintotheformalwasteeconomy. The informality of the waste pickers trade is rooted in their history as internally displaced people settling on the margins of urban life by salvaging recyclables from trash heaps. Initially a womens 7

 trade,asincomeopportunitiesdwindledandurbanpopulationsgrew,thetradeexpandedtoinclude itscurrentpopulationofwomenandmen,children,andtheelderly,allofwhommaybefoundgoing fromtrashcantotrashcancollectingbottles,glass,cardboard,andotherrecyclablematerials,orliving andworkinginpublicdumpsdoingthesame.Overthepastseveralyears,andasthemarketvalueof recyclablematerialshasincreasedinColombia,thetradehasgrownbothformallyandinformally,with capitalintensive, private sector companies entering the market, alongside more traditional actors in waste management, such as the State, private concessionaires providing waste collection, transport anddisposalservicesviaconcessioncontract,andotherauthorizedorganizationsunderrelevantwaste lawandpolicy,i.e.,wastepickerscooperativesandothernonprofitorganizations,aswellasthenewly poor,indigentordisplaced. However, and even as the value chain for recyclable materials has extended beyond Colombia into internationalmarkets,Colombiaswastepickersremainatitstailend,dependingonsocietystrashto survivefromdaytoday.Forthem,accesstothistrashisparamounttosurvival.Whenprovisionsin thepublicpolicyofwastemanagementthreatenedtocurtailthataccess,organizedwastepickersand their allies embarked on a decadelong struggle to protect it and create further opportunities for growth in their trade. In 2003, the Asociacion de Recicladores de Bogot (ARB) and their lawyers brought a Constitutional challenge to the terms of reference for the public procurement of waste managementcontractsinBogotthatwasopenonlytoequityownedcorporationsandexcludednon profit, solidarity based organizations of the poor, i.e., waste pickers organizations, from competing. TheCourtsdecisionrecognizingthattheirexclusionwas,indeed,unjustifiedandconstitutional,paved thewayforsubsequentcasesthatincreasinglygrewthepublicpolicyspaceforwastepickersinclusion intheformalwasteeconomy.Laterdecisionshavedeterminedthatthetermsforfutureprocurement processesbereachablebywastepickersorganizationsandrecognizedtheirlegitimaterightstoaccess the trash that is at the heart of their trade. And, in 2009, waste pickers from Cali organized to challenge recent legislation that prohibited characteristic elements of the waste pickers trade, e.g., thetransportationofwasteinnonmotorizedvehicles,andtheirexpulsionfromapublicdumpwithout anyprovisionsforworkorsurvival.InitsdecisionT2912009,theConstitutionalCourtbothaffirmed thetradeidentityofwastepickerswithintheformalwasteeconomyandmandatedtheirinclusionas entrepreneursinrecycling. As highlighted in section 2.6 (Governance: Pursuing Open Democracy and Inclusive Development ThroughOrganizationsofaCivicSolidaristicNature),whileconfrontingthesenumerousandcomplex struggles, from displacement and marginalization to informality and unfair competition, the organizations of the waste pickers primarily in the form of cooperatives, foundations and associationshavebeeninstrumental.Itisintheircollectiveformthattheybargainforbetterpricesin themarketplaceand,withintheruleoflaw,otherwisemitigatetheirhighlyvulnerableandprecarious status as own account workers in the informal economy. Unfortunately, time, space and resource limitations have so far prevented the mass organization of Colombias entire population of waste pickers and organizations of waste pickers in Colombia. The organizational history of waste pickers from the mid1970s to the present, and especially that of ARB and the Cali waste pickers who were 8

 engaged in the most recent Constitutional Court decision favoring waste pickers inclusion in the formal waste economy, show that this process of organization is longstanding and even today in a certaindegreeoffluxasthepolicyenvironmentrelatingtothethirdsectorremainswithoutcertainty forthepoorandtheirorganizations.Giventhelegalchallengesthathavebeenmountedthusfar,the disparatelevelsoforganizationamongwastepickers,andthehistoricallynotedlimitationsofthetrade ofwastepicking,thisreportfinallypresentsthepossibilityofexpandingthewastepickersworkinto waste management so as to broaden their horizon for waste pickers formal inclusion in democracy anddevelopment. The second trade group of informal own account workers explored in this report are rural mine workers, and, more specifically, the mining activities of two ethnocultural minorities that have a specialhistoryvisvistheminingtradeinColombianindigenousandafroColombianmineworkers and their communities. These two minority groups continue to find themselves geographically, culturally,andpoliticallyisolatedfromthechannelsofdemocraticgovernanceinColombiaanddeeply entrenchedincircumstancesofpoverty.Aswithwastepickers,theinformalitycharacteristicoftheir miningactivitiesisinpartattributabletothelawandpolicyenvironmentofthebroader,formalmining sector,andemanatesfromtheConstitution,whichrecognizesStateasthesoleownerofallsubsoiland naturalnonrenewableresourcesinthecountry.Thus,andaspresentedinthisreport,ownaccount mineworkersworkinarealmwheretheColombianStatehasanexplicitmonetaryinterestthatbein tensionwithitsresponsibilitiestoconstituentsinformallyengagedandsurvivingtherein. ThedefinitivelegislationfortheminingindustryinColombiaistheMiningCodeof2001.Whilelauded forminimizinggovernmentbureaucracyandusheringinforeigndirectinvestmentintheminingsector ofthecountryseconomy,theMiningCodeisnotwithoutcontroversy.Mostrelevanthere,theCode hasnotadvancedtheinclusionofmineworkerswholiveandworkinpoverty.Thelimitationsonown accountmineworkersinpovertyrangefrominformationasymmetryduetoaninabilitytoaccessand make sense of the Codes provisions, which are themselves fraught with imprecision and a lack of clarity,toitsintenttoencouragelargescalemininginColombia.Further,theStatesroleinmininghas beenrestrictedbyarecentpolicyreformthatdismountedallpublicindustrialminingandpromotion and left a bare minimum State involvement, i.e., protecting natural parks, ethnic groups rights to certain lands or resources, or State security interests, while creating an enabling environment for considerable amounts of private investment monies in the mining sector. The States increasingly limited role has resulted in an expanded privatization of the mining sector, where the States dual obligationsaslawmakerandsoleownerofallmineralandsubsoilresourcestendtoconflictwiththe rights of those ethnocultural minorities and constituents in poverty who engage in microscale and artisanalminingtosurvive. Microscale and artisanal mining have historical and cultural significance to the ethnocultural minoritiesconsideredinthisreport.Theancestorsofcontemporaryindigenouscommunitieshadbeen mining the wealth of resources found underneath Colombias rich ecological landscape since pre Colombiantimes,whileWestAfricanslaveswerebroughttoColombiatosupporttheSpanishcolonial 9

 administrations largescale extractive operations. The contemporary descendants of these ethno culturalgroupsstillretainstrongtiestominingcultureandthecultural,socialandeconomicintegrity oftheircommunitiescontinuestorelyonthenaturalresourcesfoundontheircommunallands.This relationship is recognized and protected under Colombian Constitutional and legal provisions to protect the communal lands of indigenous or Afrodescendant communities, termed resguardos or territorios comunitarios, respectively. The mining that takes place on these lands today is most commonlyartisanal,performedwithouttheuseofanymechanizedoperations,andonamicroscale, in the same manner that their ancestors once mined the same lands. However, the legislative and policyintentiontoprotecttheethnoculturalheritagesofthesegroupshasalsorestrictedtheveryuse ofthenaturalresourcestheyareConstitutionallyentitledtosoastolimittheircapacitytousemine work or mineral resources to break through the poverty traps that constrict their development. Limitationsonindividualbenefitofcommunalresourcesortheprohibitionofsaleofcommunallands prevent members of these communities to take advantage of their mineral wealth to work out of poverty. At the same time, given the multiple degrees of isolation from the centralized locus of political and democratic engagement that indigenous and AfroColombian communities experience, provisions that are intended to protect these groups mineral resources from private sector mining operators are difficult to enforce. They are, therefore, overprotected from development on one hand,andunderprotectedfromenforcementontheother. Thegenderimplicationsofthisstrugglebetweenrecognizingandprotectingethnoculturalminorities special relationship with mine work and creating the space for the individual or community development,aswellasenforcinglegislativeprovisionstoprotecttheserights,arenotable.Women, whose rights to equality must be considered alongside their cultural and ethnic rights protected by international conventions adopted into domestic State obligations, are found in varying degree throughouttheminingsector,inlarge,mediumandsmallscaleoperations,aswellasmicroscaleand artisanalmining,wheretheyaremoreprevalent.Indeed,duetothelowbarrierstoentry,theprimary place for women in mining is in informal and, particularly, artisanal mining, a fact that renders their livelihood greatly vulnerable and precarious. Yet the Mining Code makes no mention of these mine workers,whosecontributiontotheircommunitiesandthetradegovirtuallyunnoticed. Giventhiscontext,theprovisionsoftheMiningCodethatareparticularlyproblematicforruralown accountmineworkersincludethefollowing:(1)Establishmentoftheconcessioncontractastheonly mechanism for legal, formal exploration, exploitation and development of mineral or natural resources.Thisprovisionabrogatesearlierlegislationthathadallowedalternativestotheconcession contractsuchasgrantingapermissionorlicenseforsmallscaleoperations.Incontrasttothislicense, the concession contract demands a great level of economic and resource investment to procure, consequently, those ethnocultural minorities that continue to mine do so in a State of legally compelled informality. (2) A noted absence in the policy framework recognizing the right to prior consultationforminingactivitiestakingplaceonprotectedlands,anobligationunderinternationallaw that the Colombian government has ratified into domestic law and extensively developed through Constitutional jurisprudence. (3) The 30 day timeframe for exercising the first in right authority extendedtoethnoculturalcommunitiesthatcountersthefirstintime,firstinrightrulethatprivate mining companies rely upon to secure their investments. Rather than the Colombian State affirmatively protecting their first in right authority, ethnocultural communities must defensively take advantage of the provision within just one month. (4) Burdensome mechanisms for formal 10

 authorizationtoworkonstateledconcessioncontractsorengaginginuntitledoccasionalminework, suchasgoldpanning,andotherwiselimitingartisanalextractiontosubsistenceminingonly.(5)The complete absence of any gender framework in the Mining Code, thus, the virtual invisibility of all womenengagedinanyscaleormodeofmining.ThreeillustrativeexamplesinSection3.5(FromOwn Account to SelfEmployment Mine Work: Three Illustrative examples of Artisanal and SmallScale MinersPlacedinPovertyTrapsbytheLaw)providegreaterdepthtotheseissuesandhowtheireffects arecompoundedinthedailyrealityoftheindigenousandAfroColombianminingconstituents. The report therefore recommends the following policy recourses for greater inclusion of rural, own account mine workers: (1) Greater clarity and distinction betweenmining that deliberately seeks to violatethemininglawandminingthatisunabletomeetthelawsloftyconditions,inotherwords,a regulatory distinction between mining illegally (or informally) due to convenience and choice and illegality(orinformality)duetobeingpovertytrapped;(2)Reconsiderationofthelimitationsplacedon artisanal mining restricting it to a subsistence trade, and thus denying the right to development, especially in light of the disparate impact of these limitations on indigenous and afrodescendant constituents;(3)Redressingtheburdensplacedonthesecommunitiestoprotecttheirrightstotheir natural resources, land and trade and appealing for State intervention to address the povertytraps that have been created through the mining policy framework; (4) Above all, the absence of a labor identityforartisanal,microandsmallscaleminersandtheabsenceofanygenderinclusioniswhat veilstheseworkerscontributionsandworkintheminingsector.Theirinclusioncannotoccurwithout theformalrecognitionoftheirworkasalegitimatetradeintheminingsector.Thus,theColombian Statepartimperialownerofallsubsurfacerights,partneoliberalcapitalistinitsprivatizationefforts must reorient the rules of the game in mining to better reflect the reality and needs of its indigenousandafrodescendantcitizenswhoareruralmineworkersandwhohavebeenrelegatedto theinformalsectorthroughlawandpolicydirectedbytheStatesinterestsratherthanaconcernfora marginalizedandisolatedconstituency.

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1.AUTHORSCONCEPTUALFRAMEWORKFORTHISWIEGOREPORT
This chapter situates the analysis of own account urban waste pickers and rural mine workers that follows in chapters two and three within a framework that considers the role of law and policy in contributing to the poverty and exclusion within which these own account workers live and work. Section 1.1 introduces the dominant survival strategy for those living and working in poverty i.e., informalityasinparttheconsequenceofalegalandpolicysystemthatisexclusionaryofthepoor. Thisideaofthelegalimpoverishmentofthepoorisintroducedandlinkedtothestrategyofusinglaw for poverty reduction in section 1.1.1, then considered in its most prevalent realm the informal economyinsection1.1.2.Section1.1.3continuestoconsiderthephenomenonofthemostvulnerable workersintheinformaleconomyownaccountworkersandtheroleoforganizationsoftheworking poor in their lives and livelihoods. The analysis then focuses on the Colombias informal economy in section1.1.4,linkingthepoliticaleconomyofthecountrywiththecircumstancesofitsinformalown accountworkers.Withinthisinternationallypositionedandnationallysituatedframework,Section1.2 thensetsforththevariedchallengesthatarerevealedwhenusinglawasapovertyreductionstrategy, andthat,whenovercome,wouldresultinamoreinclusivepolicymakingenvironmentwithlawsthat workforall,namely,thedisproportionatenumbersofwomenandchildrenwhoareworkinginformally, often as own account workers, the multiple levels of exclusion facing ethnocultural minorities, especially those of indigenous and African descent in Colombia and throughout Latin America, the particular issues of social protection and democratic or participatory governance, and, finally, the relevantinternationalagendasoninformal,povertytrappedworkers,i.e.,theDecentWorkagenda,the agenda on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, and the more recent Target B to Goal 1 of the MillenniumDevelopmentGoals.

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1.1.SURVIVINGPOVERTYINTHEINFORMALECONOMY
1.1.1.POVERTYASACONSEQUENCEOFBADLAWANDNEGLIGENTPOLICYMAKING Withoutdisregardingthenumerousandimportantdefinitionsofthenotionofpovertyinboththe international development and human rights agendas, the authors of this WIEGO report opt for understanding poverty as a socioeconomic circumstance, rather than a human condition1. The intentionofpresentingandrelatingtopovertyasanexternalcircumstanceratherthananinherent condition2 of the person, is first, to stress the direct role that national law and policy makers have, throughtheirpublicdecisionmakingandimplementingtasks,in(a)theprovision,(b)theabsenceor (c) the removal of opportunities to all fellow constituents of the State, whom they directly or indirectly represent, to live a life with dignity and a horizon of development. Second, this understanding introduces a degree of distance between the person and the fact of their living or working in poverty to psychologically create the space within which to maneuver for contingency to happen and for empowerment to take place, and thus increase the possibilities for the person in poverty to operate and realize change. By depersonalizing poverty and trying to root its source in causesthatareexternaltotheindividual,theideaistoallocateenoughauthorityintheimpoverished personforbreaking,orleapingoutof,thepovertytrap.3 Representing poverty as a circumstance rather than a condition also facilitates approaching poverty notasauniformandhomogenouscategoryofanalysis,butasasetofdiversepovertytrapswiththeir ownspecificities4thatarewithoutprejudicetoconflictand/orforeignaggressionsorthedevastating forceofnaturechieflyandregularlycreatedbynationalpublicdecisionsmakers,intentionallyornot. When intentional, poverty traps often stem from political lobbying or criminal pressures on public decisionmakers;whenunintentional,theyresultfromsheertechnicalincompetenceinlawandpolicy makingorthepoliticalindifferencetowardspowerlessconstituentsandthestakesofthosewhoare
1 United Nations Draft Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights: The Rights of the Poor State that Povertyisahumanconditioncharacterizedbysustainedorchronicdeprivationofresources,capabilities,choices,security andpowernecessaryfortheenjoymentofanadequatestandardoflivingandothercivil,cultural,economic,politicaland social rights. A definition borrowed from the Declaration by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on povertyandtheInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights(OfficialRecordsoftheEconomicandSocial Council,2002,SupplementNo.2[E/2002/22E/C.12/2001/17],annexVII),para.8. 2 Besides, poverty as a human condition can eventually end up perversely twisted and presented as a genetic, intellectual,andmoral,psychologicalorphysiologicaldysfunctionofapersonorgivengroupofpersons. 3 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank / LEP LAB; On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Working Document#3,2007(unpublished) 4 The need of understanding or contextualizing within diverse types of poverty was the main crosscutting conclusion arisingfromtwentytwonationalconsultationsthatwereconductedbytheformerCommissiononLegalEmpowermentof thePoor.Areiteratedrecommendationtopolicymakerswastodifferentiatepovertiesinordertogatherbetterknowledge ontheburdens,limitationsandthreatsimposedonthem.Thelegalframeworkaffectingthelivelihoodofaruralfarmeris completelydifferentfromthatofanurbandomesticworkerorwastepicker.Infact,itseemsthattherequestistoapplying adifferentialapproachnotonlybygender,race,etc..butbyoccupationalgroupsofpeoplelivinginpoverty.Inacertain wayitresemblesthedatadisaggregationdemandrecurrentlymadetoeconomists.TheNationalConsultationsanditsjoint analysisshouldbeavailableatUNDP/ILEP.http://www.undp.org/legalempowerment/

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 mostvulnerableandfartoreach.Inanycase,theendresultisthesame:policyandregulatorybarriers andgapsthattranslateintheabsenceofopportunitiesforconstituentsoftheStatetocreate,increase andacquireincomethroughwork. Further,byunderstandingpovertyasacircumstancetheroleoflawasapovertyreductionstrategyis betterperceived,becauseitprovidestheneedtoanalyzetheimpactofpolicyandregulatorydecisions on human development. Concretely, it invites the need to assess the legal output of public decision maker,i.e.,tomonitorandevaluatewhetherthelegallybindingprovisionsgoverningthelivesofallare creating and effectively distributing opportunities for income generation to all or only some of the Statesconstituents,whethertheyarenotprovidinganyincomegenerationopportunitiesoronlynot toaparticularoccupationalgrouporsectorofthepopulation,orwhether,intheworstcase,theyare actuallytakingawayincomegenerationopportunitiestoallorsomepartofthepopulation.Whenthe endresultofapolicyorregulatoryframeworklimitsorrestrictsthespaceorconditionsforincome generation of constituents who are not well off, live in exclusion, discrimination or with limited economicresources,withoutprovidingforasystemicinclusionsolutionoranyotherreasonableand effectivealternativetocontinueensuringtheirsurvivalanddevelopment,thenthelattercasefurther worsens,andbecomes,astheauthorsofthisreportinaveryexplicitmannerchoosetodescribeas thelegalimpoverishmentofthepoor. TheLegalImpoverishmentofthePoorresultsfromobservingtheeffectsofnormsandpolicieswhen theyareimplementedontheground,primarilyincountriesrushingforeconomicgrowth.Itisuseful to describe the impact of the trend in contemporary lawmaking processes in developing countries that,whenenteringintovastliberalizationschemes,havenoconsiderationforensuringanyspacefor development and protection the most vulnerable constituents of that State. The term, proposed by legal practitioners observing the potential impact of several Colombian norms on people living in poverty(Carimagua,AIS,ForestryandCTAslaws),andlaterinothercountriesintheGlobalSouthhas nootherpretenseotherthantoturnthespotlightonthesystemicimpoverishmentresultingfrombad law and negligent policy making. Once issued and codified, these provisions become, due to the principle of legality, binding and enforceable on all and thus reshape the life, livelihood and development space and conditions of all constituents. Preventing the negative impact that impoverishing decisions may have on specific occupational groups like waste pickers, artisanal mine workers, indigenous rural farmers or agricultural workers like sugar cane cutters, is particularly difficult.Peopleinpovertyhavetremendousdifficultyinraisingadeliberativevoiceindemocracyorin beingheardinpublicdecisionmakingcircuits.Besides,theseconstituentsarelivinginasurvivalmode, meaningthatbothtimeandspacearescarce,eventhetimeandspacerequiredtoactuallystepinand engageinactivecitizenryandcollectiveorganization,whichitselfrequiresmeetings,associationsanda constant access to pertinent information and the production of information for substantive participation in democratic deliberation. The legal impoverishment of the poor usually passes inadvertently in the flow of public opinion and is only detected once the enforcement of the law is imposed or the barriers and loopholes are felt by those in poverty, which explains the sprouting of

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 seemingly spontaneous manifestations of frustration that are channeled through the most available antiestablishmentideology. Because public decisions are mediated through policy and regulatory frameworks that also relate to other frameworks, and by doing so create a systemic understanding of institutions, it is often very hard for the nonlegally trained eye to detect impoverishing effects. Furthermore if, like vast populationofpeoplelivinginpoverty,thereiseitheratimeand/orskillrestrictiontoanalyzelawand policy and build arguments for protection and advancement, impoverishing policy and regulatory provisions easily enter the social realm and begin to fashion and refashion the lives of the most vulnerableconstituents.Inanycase,therestrictionoflawfullifeanddevelopmentspacemediatedby thelawandenforcedbyauthoritieswillalwayshavegreaterimpactonconstituentslivinginpoverty, who already live in the smallest survival space available to them, and thus receive the most intense effectsofregulatoryrestrictionsandlimitations. The notion of the Legal Impoverishment of the Poor is descriptive of a law making trend in growth driven economies and the rationale for advocating for (a) the development of sound third sector policyandnonprofitlawthatmayenableandfostercivicsolidaritybasedlegalpersons,asthistypeof organizations, better known as non profits, are more likely to reach those living in poverty to foster their collective inclusion in democracy and development5, (b) the overall strengthening of propoor governance and inclusive policy making, and, chiefly, (c) the acute need of justices, lawyers and communitybasedparalegalsinthethesisandpraxisofthedevelopmentagendatorealizesystemic change, as opposed to legal aid and justice reform initiatives, and, concretely, within the realm of constitutional and administrative law. Their role in detecting, claiming and redressing norms that legallyimpoverishthepoorormaypotentiallydosoisfundamentaltoensurethatjusticeisdelivered throughtheexecutiveandlegislativebranchesofpoliticalpower,andremediallythroughthejudiciary, andalsotocreatedisincentivesforpovertycreation.Inotherwords,usinglawasapovertyreduction strategyandthelawtrainedprofessionalsthatmaycompelsystemicchangeintherulesofthegame bringtheaddedvalueofindividualizingtheresponsibilityofpublicservantswhoareatthesourceof manmadepoverty,asthepolitical,disciplinaryandevenpenalconsequencesoflegallyimpoverishing thepoorarerevealedtothepubliceye. Chapterstwoandthreeofthisreportonthelawandpolicyenvironmentoftheoccupationalgroupsof waste pickers and mine workers living in poverty illustrate the burdens of surviving in informality as own account workers, and the fact that, by doing so, they expose the sophisticated and intricate filigreethatunderliesthelegalimpoverishmentofthepoor.6
5RuizRestrepo,Adriana,NatureJuridiqueetRlePolitiquedesOrganisationsSansButLucratifduTiersSecteur,Document derecherchepourunethsedoctoraleendroitpublicdelUniversitPanthonAssas.2000(Sanspublier) 6RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor:AReadingoftheNationalConsultations fortheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor:http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf

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 1.1.2.THEINFORMALECONOMYREALM When understanding poverty as a circumstance, and, by doing so, assessing the role of law in fashioning in whole or in part the life, livelihood and development environment and conditions of a population, it is possible to observe two dominant ways out of poverty: (1) an upward movement consistingofanextraordinaryeffortofthepersonorgroupinpovertytotransitiontotheformalsector to attain formal opportunities of income generation. This is an effort premised on the general understandingthattheformalorlegalsectorprovidesmorecertaintyandthusfacilitatesplanningfor progress, as well as a broadened sense of trust in navigating the field game beyond the immediate circleoffamilyandfriends,whichinturn,facilitatesexpansionandinnovationforincomeproduction. Thepossibilityofeffectingsuchupwardmovementforleapingoutofapovertytrapdependsnotably onthetopdowneffortsmadebyinclusivelawandpolicymakers.Itispreciselyobjectivelaw,i.e.legal, policyandregulatoryframeworks,andtheeffectivepublicadministrationresponsewhatcreatesand deliverseaseofaccessandtransitorgraduationconditionstothepovertytrappedconstituentswilling toshifttoaformalorlegalmodeofincomegeneration.And(2),adownwardmovementconsistingof fasttrackingoutofpovertybytunnelingoutofthepovertytrapthroughexploitationordelinquencyin a crime driven economy that is capable of ensuring income on a constant basis and/or at rapidly increasing rate. Fast tracked income is created by challenging formality / legality and is done regardless of selfinflicted harm or the risk of harming others. Victimization, selfvictimization and delinquency are evident in a vast array of activities that range from robbery, drugcouriering and moneylaundering,passingbykidnapping,humantraffickingforlabourorsexualexploitation,andup tojoiningillegallyarmedgroupsforconflictorterrorism,amongmanyothers. RealmofFormalStateandlegallygovernedlivesandtransactions RealmofInformallivelihoodsandunlegallyframedlivesandtransactions POVERTYTRAPS Realmofcrimedrivenoccupationsandillegalbusinessestablishmentsandemployment rra (PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)thinktank

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 In between these two, there is a formallawlessland: the everextending realm of informality. This realm has experienced such prolific growth that a recent document of the OECD on the subject, entitledisinformalnormal?recognizedthevastscopeandnearnormalcyofglobalinformality.7 Theinformaleconomyunderstoodaseverycountrysrealmofformallawlessland,iswherethepoor surviveoutsideofthereachandprotectionofthelawoftheinstitutionalizedState8.Ininformality,the povertytrappedliveinacontinuumofsurvivaleffortstryingtoearnameagerincomeforsubsistence and through whatever resource is at hand or whatever opportunity, that is harmless to others, appears.Becauseoftheurgencyofneed,considerationsofformalityorlegalityofaccesstoreachable opportunitiesisirrelevant.Decencyorhonestyistheonlylimitationformanyofthepeoplelivingin povertyintheinformaleconomy.Peoplelivinginpovertywillrathercontinuetodosoasbesttheycan earningorcreatingincomethroughwhatevermeansarereadilyavailabletothem,insteadoftryingto risetotheformaleconomyorfalltothecrimedriveneconomy.9Inmostcases,thepovertytrapped willsurvivebyinvestingtheirworkcapacityinanyinformallyavailablewageopportunity(construction, domestic work, home base production, etc.) or any naturally available material resource (timber, waste,fish,leaves,sand,goldglitter,etc.),bothofwhicharebecominglessandlessavailabletothe powerless in this era of organization and globalization.10 These individuals, who are working for themselves and their families survival, regardless of existing institutions and formalities, do not fall withinthelegalorillegaldichotomy.Theyarebetterdescribedasbeingwithinarealmofunlegality, aspacethathasnotyetbeendulyreachedandorganizedthroughlawanditsinstitutionsandwhere instinct and force of life continue to take precedence over the formality derivative of political representation. Abigpartoftheinformaleconomynotthatwhichisinformalbychoiceorconvenience,suchasthe persons and establishments evading taxes and transactional responsibilities is informal for survival. For a person living in poverty, formality is either an unknown concept11 or the silly sophistication of
7Pleasesee:OECDsreportIsinformalnormal? http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_33935_42024438_1_1_1_1,00.html 8Onthisnotion,pleasereadHernandodeSotosbooksentitledTheOtherPathandTheMysteryofCapital 9 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank, On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, LEP LAB Working Document#3,2007(unpublished) 10 Progress brought by science, technology and mechanization tend to end with jobs that were once important. For instance,watercarriers(aguatero,porterdeau)oncecapitalizedonthehumanneedtoaccesswaterdailyforcookingand hygieneandgavetheopportunitytocreateamarketforthedoortodoordeliveryofwatertothosewhodidnothavea groundwater cisterns.. Nowadays access to water does not create work opportunities as it is now universally functional through aqueducts reaching directly to different rooms in the most homes and legally deemed and claimed as a public service. 11Oneofthemostillustrativecasesofunawarenessofformallawandstateorthelackofaformalitycognitionofmany personslivingandworkingforsurvivalintheinformaleconomyisthatofanoldwastepickerinCaliColombia.Duringa meeting convened by State authorities, and Waste Pickers and the CiViSOL foundation for systemic change in view to discusswaystoimplementCourtsordersofformalizingwastepickersLuisstoodupandactuallyclaimedtotheauthorities betterconditionsforhimasanemployee.Herequestedfromthemunicipalityachangeinthenighthourroutesinwhich

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 whatis,inplainandsimpleterms,thegodgivenrightornaturalhumancapacitytodowork.Ineither case, in the absence of formal opportunities and eschewing the criminal economy, these individuals wouldratherworkinformallythanstarvetodeathinduerespectoflaw. These povertytrapped individuals are more concerned with surviving and providing for themselves andtheirfamiliesthanwithwhetherthemeanstodosoareformalorinformal.Forinstance,astreet vendorknowsthatshemightbeforcedtohidefrompolicepatrollingthestreets,andriskslosingsome merchandiseintheprocess;but,becausethestreetvendorisawareoftheserisks,shemaybearand mitigate them to some degree. The costs, however, of identifying, learning and understanding the applicable law, navigating a sea of everchanging public policy, and producing the necessary documentstopresenttothebureaucracyregulatingformalbusinessventuresarefargreaterforthis streetvendorthanlivinginconstantstressandlosingsomemerchandise,especiallywhenthebenefits offormalizingarenotapparentorevencertain.Asimperfectandinefficientasinformalitymaybe,for the working poor the route to formality is as narrow and intricate as for authorities the realm of informalityisvastandprecarious.

theMajormadethewastepickersrunafterwastecollectiontrucks.Heclaimedthatitrunningbehindtrucksat2amwas very inconsiderate from the employer, that these were very hard and difficult work shifts that he would appreciate, particularlyforoldwastepickerslikehim,ifthemunicipalitycouldsendthewastetrucksatmidday.Headdedthatthose nightly hours also exposed them to being murdered by the so called social cleaning groups. By CiViSOLs request, the authorities had to actually answer the question and explain that they were informal workers living outside the reach of workopportunitiesandprotectiongivenbytheState.Anotherinterestingexampleoflegalunawarenessandirrelevance forthosesurvivinginpovertyisthatprovidedbytheformerASENTIRnonprofitcorporationworkingwithstreethomeless youth.Backinthe90smostofthemendreamtofgoingtothearmyforgettingholdofsomepower,respectandhaving legal papers to then work; women dreamt of being street vendors or establishing a home based micro business after marrying and having a baby. All of them commented night after night that the night before they had seen Colombias Presidenthimselfpatrollingthestreetsandridinghissupermotorbike.Veryinterestinglytheyhaddownsizedthelegaland formalinstitutionstheyhaveheardof,totheirquotidiancontext,oneinwhichalltheStateapparatusisrepresentedbya policeofficer.TheeducationtheylikedthemostwasthatofStatenavigationskillsandEmpowermentinrights,whichthey puttouseimmediatelyintheirrapporttothepoliceonthestreetandsocialexchanges.

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 Peoplesurvivingintheinformaleconomy,asopposed tothosecuttingcostsbyoptingtooperateinit,exert their right to life wherever an income opportunity presentsitself.Infact,theymayendupworkingin(i)a precarious informal employment opportunity, that is tosay,sellingtheirlaborinexchangeforoftenmeager wages and rarely any social protections. Even slave like jobs are widely available for those trapped in poverty, which they will still seize as they represent opportunities to provide some modicum of certainty, stability, and even hope to themselves and their Photoby:ShaillyBarnes families. Another path for income generation for the informalworkingpoor,sometimesbychoice,sometimesbecausethereisjustnootheropportunityto survive,is(ii)selfemployment,i.e.,seekingoutresourcesoropportunitiesthatmaybetransformedor to which value may beadded to create somegood or service for sale in the marketplace. Theymay work through an establishment or as individuals in own account work. Examples of selfemployed peopleinpoverty(asopposedtowelloffselfemployedentrepreneursandindependentconsultants whoareeitherinoroutofformalworkrelationships)are,usually,microandsmallestablishmentsand own account workers. The people in poverty who are selfemployed through establishments will in many occasions rely on nonprofit legal persons of a civicsolidarity nature, defined by WIEGO as MBOPs.12Individualsworkingontheirownaccount,suchasmencollectingsand,gravelandstonesat thebottomofariverforsellingittoconstructioncompanies,womenrecoveringtheglitterleftbehind industrialgoldminingoperationsoralongtheriverbedforsaleittointermediaries,women,menand theirchildrenscavengingtrashtosellasasecondarycommoditytoindustrialbuyers,oroldwomen rollingtenduleavestosellascigarsintheDelhimarketplace,allrepresentthepoorestofthepoor, whoworkandlivejustbeyondthelimitationsofextremepoverty. Forthepurposesofthisreport,theinformaleconomyisunderstoodtoincludealleconomicactivities thatarenotcoveredorareinsufficientlycoveredbyformalarrangementseitherinlaworpractice.13 Workersincludedinthisdefinitionwillusuallybeeither(1)wageworkersininformaljobsor(2)non wage workers (or the selfemployed) in informal enterprises or both.14 The first category includes employees of informal enterprises, casual or day laborers, domestic workers, unregistered or undeclared workers, temporary or parttime workers, and industrial outworkers or homeworkers.15
12 On this notion, please read Chen, Martha Alter et al.: Membership Based Organizations of the Poor: Concepts, ExperiencesandPolicy 13ILO.TheInformalEconomy,NotefromtheCommitteeonEmploymentandSocialPolicy 14Forinstance,paiddomesticworkcanbeincludedinthisdefinition.Unpaidorprecariousdomesticworkorcareactivities that most of the worlds poor women engage in for the better part of their reproductive years still remain formally unacknowledged in many countries. Fortunately, ILO is advancing a standardsetting effort, a Domestic Workers rights ConventiontobedefinedonJune2011. 15Pleaseread:MarthaAlterChen,RethinkingtheInformalEconomy:LinkageswiththeFormalEconomyandtheFormal RegulatoryEnvironment

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 Alongwithownersofinformalenterprises,owneroperatorsofinformalenterprises,andunpaidfamily workers16,ownaccountworkers(bothheadsoffamilyenterprisesandindividualworkers)fallunder the second category, and in all developing regions, the second category of the selfemployed constitutes a greater proportion of the informal employment than wageemployment. The self employedrepresentseventypercentoftheinformalworkinsubSaharanAfrica,sixtytwopercentin NorthAfrica,sixtypercentinLatinAmerica,andfiftyninepercentinAsia.17IfSouthAfricaisexcluded, the share of selfemployment in informal enterprises rises to eightyone percent in subSaharan Africa.18Theglobaleconomiccrisiswillhavecontributedtoaconsiderableincreaseinthesenumbers. InfacttheInternationalLaborOrganizations(ILO)GlobalEmploymentTrendUpdatefortheyear2009 estimated that global unemployment would increase anywhere from 29 to 59 million people since 2007,correspondingtoaglobalunemploymentrateof6.5to7.4percent.19Thenumbersofmenand womenwhowillbeinvulnerableemploymentasownaccountworkersorunpaidfamilyworkers arecauseforparticularconcern,becausetheywillhavenorecourseotherthantocontinueworking forlowerwages,andwillconsequentlyfaceevengreaterthreatstotheirlivingandworkingconditions. The ILO estimates that this group of vulnerable workers will account for 48.9 to 52.8 percent of the globalworkforceorbetween1.49and1.6billionworkersworldwide.20Intheworstpossiblescenario, andinlightoftheemergingimpactofthecrisisonlabormarkets,thenumbersoftheextremeworking poororthoseearninglessthan$1.25perdaymayincreasebyasmuchas233million.21Evenby conservativeestimates,thenumberofadditionalworkerslivinginextremepovertymayswellby122 millionsince2007.22Thus,itispossiblethattherewillbemorethan1.4billionworkerslivingbelow$2 perday,showinganincreaseofmorethan200millionpeoplesince2007.23InLatinAmericaandthe Caribbean, it is projected that unemployment will rise by anywhere from 22 million to nearly 26 million,correspondingtoanunemploymentrateofbetween8.1and9.2percent.Theregionsshareof
16 It is important to highlight that the self employed, the component in which the most defenseless poor may be statisticallyencompassedmaybelinkedtowhatclassanalystswillcallthepetitbourgeoisie,thatisprofessionalsandartists thatworkautonomouslyandareincreasinglyhomebasedandthatwillfallintheinformaleconomywhenoperatinginthe marginsoflawforconveniencereasons. 17ILO,WomenandMenintheInformalEconomy:AStatisticalPicture,p.7. 18ILO,WomenandMenintheInformalEconomy,p.7. 19ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrends,p.4,8 20Ibid,p.14 21Ibid,p.16 22Ibid.p.17 23 Global Employment Trend Update, p. 17; According to the Global Employment Trend Update, the United States and European countries are experiencing an increase in unemployment that was much greater than anticipated the total number of unemployed is estimated at 39.7 to 46.4 million people and will account for 35 to 40 percent of the global increaseinunemployment,despitecomprisinglessthan16percentoftheglobal[labor]force.CentralandSouthEastern Europe(nonEU)andCISregionsareexpectinganincreaseofasmuchas35percentin2009.InEastandSouthEastAsia (andPacific),vulnerableemploymentisanotablechallenge,representing51.8to56.6percentoftotalemploymentinEast Asia and over 60 percent of employment in South east Asia; this could rise to as much as 64 percent of employment in SouthEastAsiain2009.InSouthAsia,thenumberofvulnerableworkersmaygrowbyasmuchas493million,whichwould accountfor79percentoftotalemployment.ItisespeciallyalarminginIndia,wherenearly80percentofworkerswere livingonlessthan$2perdaybeforetheeconomiccrisis.23InSubSaharanAfrica,upwardsofthreequartersofworkers willfacevulnerableemployment.Pleasesee:ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendUpdate,pgs.1720

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 vulnerable workers was expected to increase by as much as 34.5 percent in 2009, forecasting a considerabledropinwageemployment.24 Thesefigures,althoughtroubling,stilldonotshowthattheconditionsofthemostvulnerableofthe workingpoorwilldeteriorateastheirranksincrease.Theseworkerswhethertheyarewageworkers orselfemployedwillbecompetingwitheachotherforthedeflatedwagesdescribedaboveandwith stillnosocialprotectiontorelyuponwhenthosewagesfallshortorwheneventheinformaleconomy cannot accommodate them. Yet, their particular circumstances are not necessarily highlighted by domesticregulations.Indeed,althoughtheworkingpoorandtheirlaborcharacteristicshavebecome morestatisticallyvisibletobothscholarsandpolicymakersasthedefinitionoftheinformaleconomy hasevolved,inmanycountries,theinformaleconomyhasremainedofficiallyunchanged.Intermsof lawandpolicy,theinformaleconomyisstillonlyconsideredtoincludeunincorporatedenterprisesand employers,eventhoughinrealityitscomplexityisinlinewiththemodernconceptionadoptedin1993 andrevisedagainin2003.Thepublicpolicyinthesecountriescontinuestopivotonananachronistic definition that not only excludes informal employment relations, but also lacks a povertybased differentiation of the informal economy, one that would more effectively reach the povertytrapped whoaresurvivingthroughinformalmicrobusinessemploymentand,moreover,throughownaccount work. 1.1.3.OWNACCOUNTWORKERS:ATTHECROSSROADSOFENTREPRENEURSHIPANDLABORRIGHTS Despitebeingawareofthevastdimensionoftheinformaleconomy,andthetwomainpathsthatare available for the povertytrapped to create income, this report narrows its scope to own account workers, possibly the most vulnerable and least studied category within the informal economy. As commissionedbyWIEGO,thisreportanditsnarrowedfocusrepresentamajoropportunityforpoverty reduction through law and policy inclusion into mainstream development. For many occupational groupsoftheinformaleconomy,and,notablythetwoconsideredindepthinChapterstwoandthree, lawisveryrelevant:theStateshapesandcontrolswhomayaccessvaluableresourcessuchaswaste orgold,aswellastheparametersofthataccess. For own account workers specifically, their particular vulnerability may be explained by their lack of connectedness25,directlyorindirectly,toformalmainstreamopportunitiesandprotectionsoftheState and the formal market. By comparison, informal employees working in either a formal or informal business have at least, the possibility of learning in the establishments where they work. Through collectiveexchange,itispossiblefortheseinformalemployeestobuildtheirunderstandingofrights, rules and formal justice and detect opportunities to channel their claims into collective voice and organizationspaces.Theownaccountworker,however,isliterallyonherown.Withoutanimmediate surroundingtofostersomekindofautomaticcooperationorsolidarity,herfellowcolleaguesarealso
24Ibid,p.20 25RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor:AReadingoftheNationalConsultations for the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf

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 ownaccountworkers,usuallyindirectcompetitionforaccesstothesameresourcesthatsheneedsfor herandherfamilyssurvival.Their workisinastateofperpetualdisconnectfromworkandmarket networks,dialoguesand,usually,theoutreachcapacityoftheState.26 Fromajuridicalstandpoint,ownaccountworkersfallunderboth(a)therighttobeentrepreneur,i.e. therighttofreelychooseaprofessionoroccupationandtocreateanenterprise,and(b)therightto labor for someone elses venture. In fact, it is possible to say that in the autonomousentrepreneur capacityoftheirworkactivities,ownaccountworkerscreateworkingopportunitiesbyexertingtheir constitutional right to entrepreneur27 and by developing as much innovation as survival requires. In thissense,manyownaccountworkersaretheultimateentrepreneurs,creatingincomeopportunities wherethelabormarketdoesnot.28Thismicroentrepreneurialismdoesnotinvolvethehiringofothers until necessary, although familial help or support is common. The unpaid contributions of family membersensuresthatallincomegeneratedprovidesforthosewhomtheentrepreneurisresponsible.
hastofind andaccess materialon herown account hasto innovate,use ordevelop knowhow hastoadd valueto material provided hastofollow instructions ofthe material owner IFEXERTINGTHERIGHTTOENTREPRENEUR THEN: IFEXERTINGTHERIGHTTOEMPLOYMENT,THEN:

Autonomous Entrepreneur Effort

O W N A C C O U N T

W O R K E R

Subordinate Employee Effort

rra (PublicLaw+SocialInnovation)thinktank

26 It is important to note that persons working in slave like jobs and bonded labor are in even a higher level of defenselessness because infactthey are victims thecriminal exploitation ofhuman beings and the transnational human trafficking,thatfacilitatesit. 27 On this point see the livelihood and entrepreneurship arguments presented by the CiViSOL Foundation for Systemic Change, to the Constitutional Court of Justice in Colombia accepted and further developed through ruling T29109. https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=Y2l2aXNvbC5vcmd8bGEtYmFzdXJhLWVzLXZpZGF8Z3g6NmViOWZiM TI3NzcwZTYxYw&pli=1 28Notallownaccountworkersareinnovatorsandentrepreneursinthesenseproposed.Actuallymanyseemtobeown accountworkersleanmoretothedependentemployeeside.Delocalizedfromthefactoryorestablishmentandlaboringin theirownpremises,homebasedproducersreceiveallmaterialthatistobetransformed.Theydonthavetoseekaccess andacquireresourcestoaddvalue.

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 On the autonomousentrepreneur side, the own account worker must identify and obtain her own materialstotransformintocommercialcommodities,whilecarryingalltherisksofafailedinvestment withnosafetynet;andonthedependantemployeeside,sheisworkingunderadependencytothe buyersofherproduceormerchandise,asubordinationspringingfromtheurgencyofsurvival. In this train of thought, and on the entrepreneurlike side, many of the own account working poor stronglydependonlawandregulationforhavingarighttoaccessthematerial,beiturbanwasteor alluvialglittergold,toaddvaluetoitbyseparation,classificationoreventransport.Ontheemployee likeside,theownaccountworkingpoorhavevirtuallynoabilitytonegotiatethetermsofsaleandwill acceptwhateverpriceabuyeroffersfortheirwares,regardlessofthelaborinvestedbothinacquiring thematerialandinitstransformationforcommercialization.Asmuchasthemeanstomaterialaccess ofresourcesisdeterminedbylawandregulation,themarketaccessisdeterminedunilaterallybythe buyer and does not necessarily factor in the varied physical capacities or requirements of individual workers. For example, how much an urban waste picker will earn is a function of that individuals strengthandendurance.Theelderly,disabledandincapacitatedfindthemselvesingreatersituations of defenselessness where their product is valued, but their labor is not. Own account workers are, therefore, intensely unfree, tightly bound by both policy and regulatory frameworks and industrial forces.Atthesametime,thisimpliesthattheretwosetsofrights(businessandentrepreneurial)to claimandlegallyempoweroutoftheirpovertytraps. Upon even closer inspection, an own account worker may find herself facing circumstances that are wellbeyondherabilitytocontrol,influenceormitigate,andwhichmaypropelherintoevengreater conditionsofvulnerabilityandimpoverishment.Returningtotheexampleofwastepickers,theimpact oftheglobaleconomiccrisisonbusinessesandproducersofconsumergoods,whohaveexperienced declines in sales and increases in inventory, has translated into considerable drops in prices for salvagedmaterials.Asexportsofrawmaterialshavedropped,entitiesthatwouldnormallybuythese materials from waste pickers have stopped doing so. 29 In their capacity as entrepreneurs, waste pickers will continue to exploit their personal resources, i.e., their physical capacity to recuperate recyclables,theirknowhowdevelopedoveryearsofdoingso,andtheiraccesstoavailablematerials asbestastheycan;andintheircapacityasemployees,theymustacceptthedeflatedpricesoffered for their wares and labor. These workers will, most likely, work longer hours while earning lower wages,inotherwords,workwithlessstabilityandsecurityandliveingreatervulnerability.
29ForinstancetheAsociaciondeRecicladoresdeBogota(ARB),asofJanuary2009,indicatedthat,themarketforhighand lowdensitypolyethylenehascometoastandstillandtheferrousscrapmetalmarkethasseenadeclineofseventypercent inprices,whilenonferroushasdroppednearlysixtypercent.InIndia,theSelfEmployedWomensAssociations(SEWA) estimates show that the prices of steel iron, hard plastic, plastic bags, paper and cloth in India had all been cut from October2008toJanuary2009,somejustonethirdasvaluableastheyonceweremonthsago.InpartsofBrazil,cardboard wastethatoncewasboughtfornearlyhalfofaBrazilianrealinlate2009wasworthaslittleasonecentandasmuchas fourteencents.Onthistopic,seehttp://www.wiego.org/about_ie/ie_news.php#ieNewsWastePickers

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 While this relationship of the own account worker to the buyers of her goods and services can be highlyexploitative,italsoshowsthattheinformaleconomyisnotaseparateanddistinctentityfrom theformaleconomy.Rather,inmanysituations,informalenterprisesmaybelinkedwithformalfirms through different commercial relationships, individual transactions, subsectors or value chains and informalworkersmaybelinkedtoformalfirmsinsituationsofdisguisedemploymentorambiguous employment. The own account worker above must engage with buyers who may be formal or informaltomakeherliving.Sheis,infact,relyingonsomerelationshipwiththeformaleconomy that establishes the market prices for her goods and services. What differentiates the formal and informalelementsoftheeconomyisinlargeparttheabsencenotonlyofapplicableandappropriate regulation,butalsolegalandsocialprotectionsforworkersintheinformaleconomy,which,therefore assumeacentralroleinthepolicydiscussionaroundinformality.30 When organized into cooperatives and associations, individual own account workers acquire a legal personhoodthatenablesthemtobargainforbetterprices.Onoccasion,however,theseorganizations endupbeingnothingmorethanashellgivingtheillusionofanorganizedandformaltrade;withinit the informality of each individuals own account labor, and the precariousness of their work and exploitativeconditions,remainthesame.31Theindividualworkersremainentrenchedintheinformal economy,withoutanydegreeofsocialprotection,regardlessoftheirorganizationandduemainlyto thelackofaworkeridentityandsomelawandpolicyspacetoeffectivelyworkanddevelop.Whatis worseisthattheguiseofformalityshroudingtheseorganizedinformalworkersmaycometomislead policy makers into believing that these workers are choosing informality, rather than actually being excludedfromtheformaleconomy.Asrationalizedabove,forapersonlivinginpovertychoiceisnot anoption.Theyworkwhereverworkistobefound,withwhateverisathand.AWorldBankstudyon informality in Latin America and the Caribbean32 found that approximately onethird of the informal selfemployedinBrazil(45percentamongwomen),40percentoftheinformalselfemployedworkers in Argentina, 25 percent in Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, and nearly 60 percent in Colombia wouldratherbeworkinginsalariedjobswithbenefitsthantheircurrentsituations.33Thesenumbers do not mean that there are not informal selfemployed workers who choose to be informal; they merely indicate that there is a desire among some proportion of the selfemployed who would not chooseinformalityifotheroptionswereavailable.Thissegmentoftheselfemployedaremostlikely
30Heyzer,Noeleen.PresentationonGlobalizationandGenderPerspectivesfortheWomensFederationforWorldPeace http://www.wfwp.org/wfwpi/library/archive/03/NHeyzer03.pdf 31 rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank. On the notion of Legal Empowerment of the Poor, LEP LAB Working Document#3,2007(unpublished) 32 Unless otherwise specified, Latin America is used in this paper to refer to the following countries: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,Paraguay,Peru,Suriname,Uruguay,andVenezuela.Caribbeancountries,whichareonlyreferredtoinsomeof thedatainthisdocument,includeAntiguaandBarbuda,Aruba,theBahamas,Barbados,CaymanIslands,Cuba,Dominican Republic,Grenada,Haiti,Jamaica,PuertoRico,St.KittsandNevis,St.Lucia,St.VincentandtheGrenadines,andTrinidad andTobago. 33Perry,GuillermoE.etal.Informality:ExitandExclusion,p.65

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 tobethoseforwhomselfemploymentcarriesthemostrisksandtheleastbenefits,i.e.,ownaccount workers. Yet,theinformalactorswhohavereceivedthemostattentionfrompolicymakersarethosethatare informal out of convenience, in other words, the businesses of those individuals, usually SMEs, who have chosen to be informal rather than those who are forced into situations of informality. In fact, although the informal economy was discovered in the 1970s, own account work was not even included in the idea of the informal economy until over twenty years later. Instead, the informal economy was a term applied only to unregulated economic enterprises or activities. In 1993, the Resolution Concerning Statistics of Employment in the Informal Sector, adopted by the Fifteenth International Conference of Labor Statisticians, began to recognize unregistered (or unincorporated) enterprisesbelowacertainsize,e.g.,microenterprisesownedbyinformalemployerswhohiredone or more employees on a continuing basis, as well as ownaccount operations owned by individuals whomayemploycontributingfamilyworkersandemployeesonanoccasionalbasis.34In2003,the International Conference expanded the notion again in order to capture not only entrepreneurial relations,butalsoemploymentrelationsfoundintheinformalsector,aswellasinformalemployment thatexistsoutsidetheinformalsector. 1.1.4.COLOMBIA,POVERTYANDTHEINFORMALECONOMY SetinthecornerofSouthAmericawithaccesstoboththeAtlanticandPacificoceans,borderedwith CentralAmericaviaPanama,separatedbydenseAmazonjunglefromEcuador,PeruandBrazilandby the vast oriental llanos or plains from Venezuela, Colombia is a country that has developed predominantly through its cities. Most of them are found along the valleys and hills of the three AndeanmountainrangesthatcrossthroughthecountryanddowntotheCaribbeanSea. From a legal perspective it is worth noting that the Political Constitution of 1991 institutionalizes ColombiaasaSocialStateofRights,whichthusservesasthedemocraticpremiseandprinciplefora socialruleoflaw.Thisruleoflawistobedeliveredthroughlaw,policyandregulationframeworks,but it has also been advanced by the very progressive Constitutional Court and judiciary branch of Colombia. Indeed, the Colombian juridical System stems from the civil family of law and thus has a separateAdministrativeCourt,theCouncilofstate,anditsmainsourceoflawiscodifiedratherthan jurisprudential.Increasingly,thepoliticallylegislateddomesticlawisbeingconstitutionalizedthrough groundbreaking precedents, many of which recurrently draw from international human rights standards. Article 93 of the Colombian Constitution is, in fact, at the source of what is called the bloquedeconstiticionalidadaconstitutionalarticlethatratifiedinternationalhumanrightstreaties thatareconsequentlydirectlyincorporatedinthenationallegalorder.
34WIEGO,AbouttheInformalEconomy,http://www.wiego.org/about_ie/definitionsAndTheories.php

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 Fromapoliticalstandpoint,Colombiaisacentralizedrepublicbasedonawellestablisheddemocratic regime and with decentralized territorial administration. Mayors of Colombian municipalities are elected by universal suffrage just as with the President of the Republic and the Senators and Representatives of the Congress. For many years now Colombia has been leaning towards a Presidentialsystemandaneoliberaltrendingeconomicmodel.JuanManuelSantoswaselectedinas President in August 2010 under the same political affiliation as the preceding eight years under President Alvaro Uribe. Initially characterized as a government focusing on democratic security, and implying a concern over State security rather than Human Security, the new central administration claimstobedevotingalleffortstodemocraticprosperity.Acabinetwithtechnicalexpertiseandopen andfrankdialoguewiththeSupremeCourtandleadersoftheoppositionhavesentmessagesofrelief and optimism to a rather small sector of the population that was concerned with former President Uribes trend towards implementing a so called State of Opinion. President Uribe at one point indicatedsomeintenttorunforofficeathirdtime,andbydoingso,increasinglydeinstitutionalized thecountryandweakenedtheruleoflaw.Itisworthnotingthattheaffectionofthepeoplearound the country, with whom the President met weekly, and the vast support within the business community for his economic policies are reflected in former President Uribes 84 percent approval rating. Because it is still too early to assess the new Santos presidency, and because the policy and regulatoryframeworksadoptedandenforcedinthepastyearsarestilltheonesthatremainvalidand shape society and the market, this section will continue to refer to what has been until now the sociopoliticalsituationofthecountry. OneofthemostglaringconsequencesoftheintenseconflictColombiahasenduredoverthepast50 years and the recent Democratic Security program of the former Uribe government has been the obfuscationofpovertyasbothacoreissueandcrosscuttingconcerninlawandpolicymaking.Infact, Colombia,acountryofmorethan40millionpeople,isrankedasoneofthemostinequitablecountries in Latin America, a region that in turn, is considered as one of the most inequitable regions of the world.LivingfarawayfromBogota,thepoliticalcapitalofthecountry,theruralpeasantpoor(many of whom are afroColombian and indigenous) are the visible face of Colombias conflict. With their children recruited by any one of the several illegally armed groups, working in illicit agriculture with cropsthatarefarbetterpaidthancoffeeorbananas,trappedintrilateralcrossfire(army,guerrillas and paramilitaries) and displaced from their lands and livelihoods, they live in conditions of utter exclusion from the policy decisions that affect their every day survival. Rural women bear extraordinaryeconomicpressureswhenmenleavetoworkinthecitiesorarerecruitedfortheconflict byirregulargroups.Meanwhile,theforceddisplacementofruralfamiliestothecitiestranslatesinto greaterurbanpovertyandamoreexpansiveurbaninformaleconomy. FormanyyearsandlikeothercountriesinLatinAmerica,ColombiahadMarxistguerrillaexpressions (M19,EPL,ELNandFARC)fightingfortherevolutionoftheworkingclassandinstallingacommunist politicalregime.TheFARCandELNguerillagroupsarestillactive,butinthe1980s,itiswellknownthat theybegantolosetheirpoliticalideology,or,moreprecisely,totradeoffabigpartoftheirpolitical legitimacybyenteringintoandbeingsustainedbythedrugtraffickingbusiness.Whilestillactive,the 26

 guerilla groups are hidden in the mountains of Colombia and have been working in cities through urbanmilitiasthatare,supposedly,linkedtolaborunionsandpopuliststudentmovements,aswidely messagedoutbyseveralmembersoftheoutgoing,andevenearlier,governments.Ontheotherside ofthepoliticalspectrumaretheparamilitaryillegalarmedgroupsthatdrawfromtheextremerightof Colombiaspoliticalideologicalspectrumandwerebornoutofdesiretorefraintheexpandingleftist guerrillas as they perceived the State was unable to do. Like leftistguerrillas, rightistparamilitaries have also financed their war with the multinational business of drug trafficking to supply an illegal, globaldemandfornarcoticsubstances. With this background, and although difficult to affirm, it is possible to explain that in Colombia, the broadpublicopinionnotably,thatwhichisorientedbymainstreammedia,thatis,inturn,generally ownedbyindustrialsinvestorsandleadersisonewherelaborunionsareusuallyperceivedasbeing either linked or empathically too close to the leftist guerilla groups in the country. This has had enormousimpactonthespacefororganizingandempoweringonworkrelatedrights,ashavemost economic policies tending towards the opening of markets, competition, free trade and foreign investment.Thisapplicationofneoliberalideologyhas,inturn,translatedintoflexiblelaborpolicies thathaveintenselyburdenedworkersbyextendingworkinghours,reducingpaymentforworkingon Sundaysandholidays,andtheauthorizationofintenseoutsourcingoflaborthatispassedonasservice provision. In many cases, this takes place by softly forcing the creation of cooperatives prior to licensing the individual membership as employees so as to ensure a continuous supply of labor. Indeed, for many years, Colombia has been intensely lobbying for a free trade agreement with the UnitedStates,andhasrecentlymadesubstantiveprogressontheapprovalofaTradeagreementwith theEuropeanUnion. With an unemployment rate of 12.2 percent, and ranking second after the Dominican Republic in terms of unemployment in Latin America, Colombias employment policy is actually resulting in a structural problem. Even though this unemployment rate is considerably less than the 20 percent experiencedin2001orthe14percentin2009,itisfarhigherthantheratesthatacountrywithsuch levelsofnationaldevelopmentshouldhave,forinstance,Brazilsunemploymentwasat8.1percent, Peru 8.4 percent, Morocco 9.9 percent, India 5 percent or Iceland 7.6 percent and that after the financialcrisisof2008.35 ThemostrecentnationalpovertydatashowsthatthepercentageofColombianswholivedbelowthe povertylinein2009was45.5percent,comparedto46percentin2008,andthattheGiniindexslightly narrowedto0.578from0.589ofthepreviousyear.Thismeansthatoutof43.7millionofColombians, almost20million(45.5percent)livebelowthepovertylineand7.2million(16.4percent)areindigent ordestitute,ametricthatmaybebroadlyequatedtoanationallineofextremepovertyatUSD2per day.Forcomparisonpurposes,in1995thepercentageofColombianslivingbelowthepovertylinewas 50.9 percent and 17 percent were in extreme poverty or destitution. According to theNational
35Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/actualidad/economia/retossantoseconomia_73275.aspx

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 AdministrativeDepartmentofStatistics(DANE),Colombiansareconsideredpoorwhentheirmonthly incomeislessthan281,384Colpesos(143USD),andindigentordestitutewhentheyearnlessthan 120,588ColPesos(61USD),slightlyhigherthantheglobalstandardofUSD1.25usedformeasuring extremepoverty. Thelegalminimumwagein2009was556.200COPand576.500COPfor2010,36whichmeansthatan averageColombianhouseholdrelyingononesourceofincomelivedonanequivalentof285USDper monthin2009.37 By 2010, the social expenditure, a constitutionally ranked priority in Colombias public budgeting, amountedto14.41percentoftheGDP;however,muchofthesefundsarelostthroughbothpublicand private corruption. For instance, ithas been recently discovered that,when crossed with fiscal data, beneficiariesofSISBEN,thenationalsystemforidentifyingthepopulationinpovertytoreceivesocial services,includedmorethan250.000people38withincomeshigherthanthenationalpovertyline. In this environment, Colombias economic growth for 2010 has been forecasted to be one of the lowest in the region. This is due to the public investment restrictions caused by a failure to collect taxable income and maintaining sovereign debt.39 Private household consumption for 2010 is expectedtobeaslowasaroundonepercentduetoheavyfinancialburdens,thereductionofformal wageworkandhighunemployment. While immersed in the background research for this report, the most conspicuous aspects of Colombiasinformaleconomyarethat(a)itappearsasaverycloseddomainoftheoreticaleconomic researchandthusaccessingrelevantdataformonitoringtheinformaleconomyandparticipatoryand inclusive governance is extremely difficult; (b) the informal economy is mainly of interest to policy makers seeking growth through the promotion of MSME and very rarely will there be more than a slightreferencetotheinformalMSME;(c)theapproachtotheinformaleconomyisdeterminedmainly aroundthosewhooperateinformallybychoiceratherthanthosewhoareinformalbyneed.This,in turn, translates to channeling most authorities thought and action to improving tax collection and easingbureaucraticcontrolsorredtapesoastofacilitatethetransitioningofinformalestablishments totheformaleconomy.However,generallyspeaking,thepopulationofColombianssurvivingthrough the informal economy receives very little or no attention whatsoever, and that (d) in terms of the public opinion, there is a vast grey zone of activity that is broadly identified as the realm of the informaleconomy,withinthereisnocleardistinctionbetweentheeconomythatislegallybasedfrom theonethatiscriminallydriven.Thisisalsotrueforpolicymakersand,basedontheauthorsresearch andunderstandingandasevidencedinthefollowingchapters,theabsenceofacriteriatodistinguish
36Pleasesee:http://www.businesscol.com/empresarial/tributarios/salario_minimo.htm 37Pleasesee:http://en.mercopress.com/2010/05/04/almosthalfof43.7millioncolombianslivebelowthepovertyline 38Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/actualidad/economia/retossantoseconomia_73275.aspx 39AFedesarrolloeconomicprojection;citedinLaEconomaenBarrena,PeridicoAlmaMater,February2010

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 informality by choice and informality by need aggravates the vulnerability of the povertytrapped constituent.Further,thisgapmakesisverydifficulttoholdpolicymakersaccountableforaprocessof inclusivedevelopment.Itispossiblethatthisgapthisfailuretounderstandthespaceandconditions within economic and development policy where the informal working poor of Colombia operate mightexplainwhythepovertytrappedinColombiatendtoonlyreceiveassistanceandhumanitarian attention,insteadofthelaboridentityandeconomicincentivesneededforsecuringaformalspaceto work and develop, to lift themselves out of poverty and effectively contribute to the economic developmentofthecountry. The DANE 2005 definition of informal economy in Colombia deems as informal, all workers in establishments of up to 10 workers; non remunerated family workers; domestic workers; own account workers excluding professional and independent technicians, employers with 10 or less workers.InarecentnationalpolicydocumentofJune2008,theCONPES3527onCompetivenessand Productivity plans for a redefinition of the informal economy concept and the optimization of its statisticalinformation.Ithasalsoagreed40andaimstopivotalllaborformalizationonthedecentwork principlesandthestrengtheningofprotectionsystemtotheunemployed.Thesamepolicydocument aims for bettering social dialogue, corporate social responsibility in labour matters, strengthening labour law inspection and enforcement and to strengthen entrepreneurship for labour inclusion of vulnerable population such as women, people with handicap, ethnical minorities and the youth. Among others, the CONPES also foresees promoting voluntary savings for old age prevision and bettering occupational health and professional risks, among others. If implemented, this CONPES shouldopenchannelsforstartingtostrategicallyaddresstheinformalityofmanyColombianpoorand followrecommendation195oftheILOontrainingfortheinformaleconomyandthemanyotherILO conventions and recommendations on the informal economy and the fulfillment of economic, social andculturalrightsforall.

1.2.MAINCHALLENGESFORINCLUSIVEPOLICYMAKING
1.2.1.WOMEN Using law as a poverty reduction strategy demands a differential analysis to not only highlight the diversityofpovertiesexperiencedbytheworldsbottombillion,butalsotoilluminatethevariedpaths outoftheircircumstances.Thismaybemostgenerallyapparentwhenanalyzingpovertyintermsof sex: national level data show that the systemic discrimination facing women in terms of education, healthcareandotherresourcestranslatesintomorewomenlivingandworkinginpovertythanmen. These discriminatory practices, often defended by cultural or religious ideology, have multiplicative effects for women in the labor market. Women enter the labor market with fewer marketrelevant skills than men, further limiting their economic opportunities. With formal employment already limitedinitscapacitytoabsorbtheavailablelaborforce,womenarecrowdedintoanarrowrangeof opportunitiesintheformaleconomy,encouragingthemtotakeonwhateverworkisavailable,beit formal or informal.41 These women will accept lowerpaying jobs with increasingly fewer social
40 Republica de Colombia, DNP, Documento CONPES 3527 Poltica nacional de Competitividad y Productividad, Consejo NacionaldePolitiaEconomicaySocial,23deJuniode2008,p.35 41Kabeer,Naila.MainstreamingGenderinSocialProtectionfortheInformalEconomy,p.91.

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 protectionsandsevereblowstotheirinherentdignitytocontinuetoprovidemeagersupportfortheir familiesandchildren.42In2008,womenmadeuplessthanhalfofthegloballaborforce,accountingfor only40.5percentoftheworldsworkers,showingthattheyactuallyhavelessaccesstolabormarkets thanmen.43Ofthesewomen,lessthanhalfwereemployedinwageorsalariedwork(45.5percent), while the percentage of women engaged as own account workers rose over five percentage points from1997to28percentin2008.44Ofthe1.5billionpeoplewhoareownaccountworkersorunpaid family workers worldwide, 51.7 percent were women in 2008.45 The global economic crisis may furtherentrenchwomeninthesecircumstancesofvulnerableemploymentandtheymayaccountfor asmuchas54.7percentofownaccountandunpaidfamilyworkersasthecrisisimpactsettlesintothe worlds labor markets.46 In Latin America, for instance, a more significant impact on vulnerable employmentratecanbeexpectedforwomenthanformen.47Womenare,therefore,amongthemost defenselessoftheworldsworkers.48 Evenintheinformaleconomy,womensworkandcontributionstothehousehold,family,community andcountrygounacknowledgedorunsupported.Forinstance,duetoitsunpaidnature,womensrole inthecareeconomyissimplynotincludedinnationallaborstatisticsoreconomiccalculationsandis insteadcategorizedwithalldomesticwork.Povertytrappedwomen,whousetheirfewfreehoursof thedayweavingmats,makingandsellingfood,cleaningfishorotherwisesupportingtheirmalefamily membersbusinesses,areunderestimatedbotheconomicallyandsocially.Thesewomensworkisnot valuedorrecognizedaswork,whichmeansthenthatthelawdoesntgrantthemalabouridentityon which to build and develop, posing a great challenge to policy makers attempting to address those individualsandfamiliestrappedinpoverty.AccordingtoroughestimatesgaugedbyUNDP,in1995, thevalueofunpaidactivitiesattheprevailingwagetotaledto$16trillionorapproximately70percent of the worlds total output; of this amount, nearly 69 percent $11 trillion was accounted for by womens unpaid work.49 While it is extremely difficult to compare paid and unpaid work, these estimatesindicatethecontributionofwomensworkalbeitunpaidtotheglobaleconomy.50
42Ibid,p.91 43ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsForWomenMarch2009,p.9. 44Ibid,p.9 45Goetz,etal.,WhoAnswerstoWomen,p.118 46ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsforWomen,p.30. 47Ibid 48Thereis,ofcourse,considerableregionalvarietyintermsofwomensvulnerableemployment.Inseveralregionsofthe worldDevelopedEconomiesandEU,CentralandSouthEasternEuropeandLatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanwomen were in less vulnerable jobs than men in 2007. This indicates that access to labor markets does not necessarily provide accesstodecentjobs.Transformingthesejobsintodecentworkrequiresnotonlythatworkerproductivityincrease,but thatthisincreaseinproductivitycorrespondstoanincreaseinwages.Thus,perhapsmoreimportantthantheimpactof thiscrisisisthepersistenceofsocialandculturalbarriersthatwomenexperienceinbothaccessinglabormarketsandonce inthelaborforce. 49Beneria,Lourdes,Gender,DevelopmentandGlobalization:EconomicsasifAllPeopleMattered,p.74,citingUNDP1995 estimates. 50Beneria,p.74,citingUNDP1995estimates;itislikely,ofcourse,thatboththedollarcontributionandthepercentage contributionofwomensunpaidworkhaschangedsince1995.Thisitprovidedjusttounderscoretheextentofwomens

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 Womensrightsare,ofcourse,wellrecognizedundertheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,and other human rights conventions that later determined the specific need of highlighting womens human rights. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),theICESCR,theICCPR,theBeijingDeclarationandPlatformofAction,regionalchartersand protocols, including the UNSC Resolution 1820 recognizing sexual violence against women as a war crime, and others, all recognize the unique position that the worlds women and their economic, political,social,andsexualrightswarrantspecialattention.In2008,poverty,workandgenderwere specifically addressed in the new target under Millennium Development Goal 1 on extreme poverty andhunger.Thenewtargetfocusesonreducingthenumbersofownaccountworkersand,indoing so, encourages countries to begin capturing this element of their labor markets and economics in greater detail and with a disaggregated, differentiated approach, a much needed first step in illuminating the extent of vulnerable work among women and eventually addressing their particular labordemands. Within the category of povertytrapped women there is, however, great complexity, requiring a deliberately designed and executed differential analysis from a law and policy perspective. In Latin America,womenofAfricanorindigenousdescentfaceanaggravateddiscriminatoryexperiencedueto their ethnic origin. In Brazil, for instance, 71 percent of AfroBrazilian women work in the informal economy,whichstandsincontrasttoAfroBrazilianmen(65percent),whitewomen(61percent),and white men (48 percent).51 These women face intersecting forms of disadvantage: as members of a household,theywillhavelessaccesstoeducation,food,healthservicesandvaluableresourcessuchas land;asworkers,thisdiscriminationandtheirgreaterhouseholdresponsibilitiestranslateintolimited opportunities for work in the formal economy, as well as lower incomes in the informal economy; regardless of these conditions, these povertytrapped women must work, and therefore, fall disproportionatelyamongtheranksofthemostvulnerableofworkers. In these circumstances, organization among women workers is crucial to raising their capacity to influence the decisionmaking processes that impact their lives and livelihoods. Womens organizations raise their multiple roles as worker, head of household, mothers, and partners, and express their practical concerns over childcare, safety, sexual harassment and domestic violence, amongotherissues.Whilewomenareoverrepresentedamongownaccountandvulnerableworkers, theirleadershipamongorganizationsoftheseworkersisnotalwaysrepresentativeoftheirnumbers and presence. The waste pickers associations and cooperatives in Colombia present a remarkable exception:whilemenandwomenarenearlyequallynumberedinthisorganizationofwastepickers, womenaremoreorlessequallyrepresentedamongtheirleadership.Thus,theissuesfacingwomen wastepickersasmothers,caretakersofelderlyordisabledfamilymembers,girlsandworkersmay

activitiesthat,althoughhighlyvaluable,remainunvaluedbecausetheyareunpaid. 51Abramo,LuisandValenzuela,MariaElena,WomensLabourForceParticipationRatesinLatinAmerica,p.382

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 beexpressedandmadeexplicit,inthehopesthattheirpublicunveilingwillcompelthepublicdecision makingprocesstotakenoteandveerintheirdirection. 1.2.2.CHILDREN Despite international conventions and norms prohibiting the exploitation of child labor, in particular theConventionontheRightsoftheChild(CRC)andILOConvention182ontheWorstFormsofChild Labor,childrenremainastapleoftheinformaleconomy.Forapovertytrappedfamilywithoneor bothparentsworkingintheinformaleconomytheopportunitiesforformallyeducatingtheirchildren may be virtually nonexistent; and, without resources to provide for child care, these children, especiallywhenyoung,willendupaccompanyingtheirmothers,fathers,andotherfamilymembersto theirplacesofwork,whetherthatbeinatrashdump,riverbed,orforestcollectingleavesandtimber. Inthiscontext,theybecomeincorporatedintotheirparentstrade,atfirstmimickingintheirplaywhat they see as their adult futures and eventually contributing to the familys income to the extent possible. This is the unfortunate reality for these young workers, even though they require special protections safeguarding their rights as human beings, especially when their parents already encumbered with the responsibilities of providing food and shelter as best as they can, with any availablemeanscannotdoso.Yet,whenacountryslaws,regulationsandpoliciesfailtoreflectthe moderncomplexityandrealityofinformallabor,childrenquicklyfallamongtheinvisiblepopulationof workers in the informal economy and, because of their heightened vulnerability, among the more easilyexploited,commoditizedandvictimized. TheCRCandILOConventionexplicitlyplacetheresponsibilityofcaringforthesechildreninthehands oftheStateapparatus.TheCRCstatesthatratifyingmembersareresponsibleforensuringthatevery childachievesastandardoflivingadequateforthechildsphysical,mental,spiritual,moralandsocial development.52And,ratifyingStatepartiesshalltaketheappropriatemeasurestoassistparentsand othercaregiverstoimplementthisrightandincaseofneed,providematerialassistanceandsupport programs, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.53 The rights that are included under the CRC are, among others, the right to be protected from economic exploitation and performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or interfere with the childs education, or be harmfultothechildshealth,physical,mental,spiritual,moralorsocialdevelopment.54Aswithother provisions of the CRC, and while recognizing the role of parents and caregivers, ratifying States are required to take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to ensure the implementation of these provisions, including providing for minimum employment ages, regulated hoursofemploymentandpenaltiesorsanctionsforviolationsoftheseprovisions.55
52ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article27 53Ibid 54ConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Article32 55Ibid

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 ChildrenarefurtherprotectedunderILOConvention182,whichrecognizesthelinkbetweenpoverty and child labor, from the worst forms of labor, which include work that by its nature of the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children.56 And,althoughColombia,whichratifiedthisconventionin2005,isresponsibletotakeeffectiveand timeboundmeasurestopreventtheengagementofchildrenintheworstformsoflabor,providethe necessaryandappropriatedirectassistanceoftheremovalofchildrenfromtheworstformsoflabor, ensure access to free basic education, identify and reach out to children at special risk and take accountofthespecialsituationofgirls,childrencontinuetoplayvisibleandsignificantrolesinboth wastepickingandartisanalandsmallscalemining(ASM).57Thismaybeinpartduetotheinvisibility of poverty in informality; the need of updating the definition of informality58 to include the intersections between the informal and formal economies or the reality of own account work, self employmentandvulnerableemployment. ASM presents a particular challenge for child labor. Child labor in mining is prohibited under most national and international law, therefore it is only in informal mining, which is usually the case with ASM that child labor persists and, in fact, flourishes.59 These young workers are in danger of being completely marginalized and neglected: in many countries like Colombia, ASM does not even constitute formal, that is, recognized, protected and promoted work. Girls face an even greater danger of this marginalization, because they are not even expected to be working in ASM and their presencevirtuallyoverlooked. 60Yet,theinvolvementofgirlchildlaborismuchmorefrequentand farreaching than was previously recognized, in both the operational aspects of mining such as extraction and processing, as well as the ancillary economies that support mine workers based in a given community.61 Indeed, young girls may carry much of the burden of child labor in countries around the world. A national labor force survey conducted in India for 20042005 showed not only that child labor was driven by poverty62 with 96 percent of employed children coming from householdsconsuminglessthan$2perdaybutalsothatgirlsundertheageoffifteenconstitute42 percentofallemployedchildren.63 Thenumbersforchildrenandyouthworkingintheinformaleconomywillmostlikelyswellasaresult oftheeconomiccrisisof2008.In2006,theILOestimatedthatatleast400millionnewjobswouldbe required to reach the full productive potential of the worlds youth, which was not even a realistic possibilityatthattime.64ILOhadalsoestimatedthattheglobaleconomiccrisiswouldincreaseyouth
56ConventionConcerningtheProhibitionandImmediateActionfortheEliminationoftheWorstFormsofChild,Article3 57ILOConvention182,Article7 58CrdenasS.,MauricioandMejiaM.,Carolina,InformalidadenColombia:NuevaEvidencia,p.4 59ILO,GirlsinMining:ResearchFindingsfromGhana,Niger,PeruandUnitedRepublicofTanzania,p.10. 60Ibid,p.8 61Ibid,p.8 62SeeBasuKaushikandHoangVanPham:TheEconomicsofChildLabor. 63ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsforWomen,p.19 64Pleasesee:http://www.cinterfor.org.uy/public/english/region/ampro/cinterfor/news/unemploy.htm.

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unemploymentbyasmanyas17millionin2009.65Whilethisincreasewouldbeinlargepartdueto the increase in youth unemployment in Central and SouthEastern European and CIS countries, the effectsshouldhavebeenfeltinallregionsoftheworld.OntheAfricancontinent,youthnowaccount for37percentoftheworkingagepopulation,but60percentoftheunemployed.66InLatinAmerica andtheCaribbean,theyouthunemploymentratewasexpectedtorisefromanywherefrom1.5to4.3 percentagepointsfrom2008to2009.67Moreandmorechildrenwillbeforcedintotoleratingthemost exploitativeanddangerouscircumstancestoprovideforthemselvesandtheirfamilies,yetwillmost likelyremaininvisibleandunprotectedduetofailuresoflawandpolicy. 1.2.3.ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIESOFINDIGENOUSANDAFRODESCENDANTPEOPLES Alongwithownaccountworkers,womenandchildren,indigenouspeoplesandafrodescendantsare marginalized socially, economically, and politically aroundthe world, resulting in greater numbers of individualswithinthesegroupsbeingpovertytrapped.Indigenouspeoplerepresentonlyfivepercent oftheworldspopulation,butaccountfor15percentoftheworldspoor.68Whiletheprecisefigures varycountrybycountry,theiroverrepresentationamongthepovertytrappedisconsistent.AWorld Bank study reported in 2004 that indigenous people represented 10 percent of Latin Americas population and the largest disadvantaged group in Latin America.69 For instance, in Bolivia and Guatemala, more than half of the total population was living in poverty in 2004, but almost three quartersoftheindigenouspopulationlivedinpovertyduringthissameperiod.70 Atroughly150million,AfrodescendantsconstitutenearlyonethirdofLatinAmericaspopulation,but accountfor40percentoftheregionspopulationlivinginpoverty.71InColombia,whichishometothe second largest population of Afrodescendants in Latin America, key economic indicators showed a prominent racial divide 98 percent of black communities in Colombia lacked basic public utilities, while only 6 percent of white communities lacked these utilities; 97 percent of black communities lacked social security benefits, while only 63 percent of white communities similarly lacked these benefits; and literacy was as high as 45 percent in black communities, but only 14 percent in white communities.72Indeed,thepicturethatemergesfrom()LatinAmericaandtheCaribbeanisnotthat ofaregionadvancingtowardsequalityofopportunitiesforall,independentofsocialorigin().73

65ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsUpdate,p.12 66Pleasesee:http://allafrica.com/stories/200909250137.html 67ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrendsUpdate,p.12 68CommissionontheLegalEmpowermentofthePoor,MakingtheLawWorkforEveryone,p.145 69WorldBank,IndigenousPeoples,PovertyandHumanDevelopmentinLatinAmerica:19942004,(2004). 70Ibid 71 Marquez, Gustavo, et al., IDB 2008 Report Outsiders: The Changing Patterns of Exclusion in Latin America and the Caribbean,p.3 72AfroDescendants,DiscriminationandEconomicExclusioninLatinAmerica,,p.5 73Ibid,p.10

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 Ascitizens,thesetwogroupsinparticularexperienceincrediblypoorpoliticalrepresentation,further isolating their needs, concerns and awareness of political processes, State mechanisms and their identity as constituents of their States. In Brazil, although 45 percent of its population is of African descent,only5percentofthecongressionalrepresentativesclaimthisheritageandinNicaragua,there is not one person in the national assembly of African descent, which accounts for 9 percent of the countryspopulation.74Asworkers,thissociopoliticalexclusiontranslatesintolessemploymentand lessqualitywork.InMexico,indigenousmenearnabout15percentlessthannonindigenousmenin agriculturalwagejobs;countrydatafromBrazilrevealsthatnonAfrodescendantworkersearnmore thandoublethanAfrodescendantworkersinurbanareas.75Theseworkershave,ingeneral,unstable worklivesandoftendropoutoftheworkforcealtogether.Althoughitcanbearguedthatthispattern maybetheresultofindividualpreference,itislikelythatmanyworkersaretrappedinalifeofbad jobs, poor employment opportunities, low and unstable earnings and no social protection.76 Their circumstancesarethenperpetuatedupontheirchildren,who,withoutaccesstobettereducationand health opportunities and while remaining encumbered by work responsibilities to supplement their familys income, will remain in the poverty trap of their ancestors. Without education and in precariousworkconditions,socialmobilityisextraordinarilydifficulttohappen. In1957,theILOrespondedtostudiesonthevulnerabilityofindigenouspeoplesandcalledfortheir integrationintothelifeoftheircountries,approvingILOConventionNo.107.77Thisconventionhada muchmoreindividualemphasis,focusingontherightsofmembersofindigenousgroups,ratherthan the rights of indigenous groups themselves. This Convention was eventually followed by ILO ConventionNo.169,adoptedin1989,whichplacesmuchgreateremphasisonpreservingindigenous culturesandinstitutions,includingtheirrightsofownershipandpossessionovertraditionallyoccupied lands. The 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People goes further to not onlylinkcolonizationwiththedispossessionofthesepopulations,buttoalsolinkthelossoflandwith thelossofculturalrights.Theseinternationalnorms,alongwiththeInterAmericanDeclarationofthe Rights of Indigenous Peoples, protect indigenous peoples rights to their culture, cultural institutions and practices, as well as extending to them their modern rights, including labor rights, recognized under international and domestic law. Land rights warrant special concern in these documents, as they have hold distinctive importance to indigenous peoples lives and livelihoods and have been wrestedfromthembygovernments,multinationalcorporations,andgroupsandindividualsengaged inillicitactivities. WhileafrodescendantsmaytakeadvantageofILOConvention169,aswell,duetothecooptationof communal lands provided to them as refuge from enslavement, and later, an important means of
74Ibid,p.27 75IDB,Outsiders,p.25 76Outsiders,p.83 77Dannenmaier,Eric,BeyondIndigenousPropertyRights:ExploringtheEmergenceofaDistinctiveConnectionDoctrine,p. 18.

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 survival in a socially and economically exclusionary society, afrodescendants in Latin America have beeningeneralmuchlesssuccessfulinobtainingcollectivelandrightsthanindigenouspeoples.78The Brazilian and Colombian constitutions include some normative provisions extending cultural and agrarian land rights to their Afrodescendant citizens; however, in Brazil, these provisions do not extendtoagriculturallandandinColombia,titlesdonoteffectivelyprotectthesecommunitiesfrom the dispossession driven by illegally armed groups like rightist paramilitaries or leftist guerrillas who needthelandforillicitcroppingofcocaforsupplyingmultinationaldemand.79 Whiletherehavebeensomemonumentalsuccessesinthesegroupsattemptstosecuretheirhuman rights, especially their land rights the landmark Awas Tingni case against the State of Nicaragua brought the country to account for treating untitled indigenous lands as State land and granting loggingconcessionstoprivatecompaniesindigenousandafrodescendantsinLatinAmericapersist amongthepoorestmarginsofsociety.80 1.2.4.THESOCIALPROTECTIONISSUE Of critical importance to own account workers, women, children, and ethnic minorities within the informaleconomyisprovidingsocialprotectionstopreventtheirdeclineintofurtherimpoverishment. Conceivedasabenefittobederivedfromlaborthatisboughtandsoldthroughemployeremployee relationships, social protection is usually a set of normative provisions set in place and jointly implementedandpaidforbyboththeemployerandtheemployee.Thisprotectionnotonlyassuresa senseofstabilityinworkers,butalsoisintendedtominimizetheriskthatindividualsfallintopoverty through no fault of their own.81 The provisions usually include basic social security, some kind of contingencybased assistance of the poor, prevention of threats to livelihood security, promotion of livelihoods and labor markets, transformative measures that addresses the cause and symptoms of poverty and vulnerability.82 While providing social protection involves significant transfers from governmentstoitscitizenstotalinguptotwentyfivepercentofGDPindevelopedcountriesthese measures have also contributed to reductions in poverty in developed countries over the past fifty

78IDB2008Report,Outsiders,p.22;AfroDescendants,DiscriminationandEconomicExclusioninLatinAmerica,p.11. 79Ibid 80TheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRightsorderedNicaraguatodemarcateandtitleAwasTingnistraditionallandsin accordance with its customary land and resource tenure patterns, to refrain from any action that might undermine the Communitysinterestsinthoselands,andtoestablishanadequatemechanismtosecurethelandrightsofallindigenous communitiesofthecountry.SeeCaseoftheAwasTingiCommunityv.TheRepublicofNicaragua.InterAm.Ct.,H.R.Series CNo.66.(2001),http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/66ing.html 81 Canagarajah, Sudarshan & S.V. Sethuraman, Social Protection and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries: ChallengesandOpportunities,,p.16. 82Kabeer,MainstreamingGender,p.2526

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years.83 In fact, investments in social protection can () help to ensure that progress in poverty reductionisnotreversed.84 However, social protections have not necessarily been provided to those who are in most need of them.Indeed,thepoorhavegenerallybeenleftoutofformalsocialprotectionprovisionsbecauseof the dispersed nature of their employment, the irregularity of their incomes and their inability to contributetosocialsecurityschemes.85At the same time, international efforts to extend social protection to the povertytrapped tend to organize their strategies around global value chains, focusing their attention on wage workers in the traded sectors of the global economy, virtually ignoringinformalworkers,andthemostdefenselessamongthem.86Indevelopingcountries,whereup toninetypercentoftheworkforceisintheinformaleconomy,thereisarenewedconcernforthese workers who lie beyond the reach of social protection measures typically afforded by the State and formal employers.87 Informal employment has not been able to provide the quality of income and social security characteristic of the formal economy, although the need or social protection has not been eliminated. These workers are arguably in more need of social protection not only are they subject to the same risks of aging, illness and jobrelated injury as other workers, but the circumstancesoftheirworkareoftenmoredangerous. Yet, social protection has traditionally been conceptualized as linked with labor rights, rather than fundamentalhumanrights.88Focusingontheuseoflawforpovertyreductionprovidesamechanism to tackle the complexity of determining the discrete needs of the individuals who are currently excluded from social protection mechanisms. On the supply side, State structures must be made awareofthechallengesofanybiasesthatareinadvertentlycreatedandimplementedinthepolicy making process, including geographical, ethnic, or the social distribution of State services.89 This engageslawfromthetopdown,whenlawandpolicymakersrealizethetrue,livedexperienceoftheir decisionsonthepoorestoftheirconstituentsandwhooftheirconstituentsremainexcluded,outside the reach of their laws, policies and regulations. On the demand side, individuals must be made awareoftheirrightsascitizensandengagetheirpoliticalorientationtoadvocateforandrealizetheir rights to life, work, health and livelihood. Here, law is engaged from the bottomup, as the worker realizesherstatusascitizen.

83 Canagarajah, Sudarshan & S.V. Sethuraman, "Social Protection and the Informal Sector in Developing Countries: ChallengesandOpportunities,"p.16. 84ILO,GlobalEmploymentTrends,p.19,discussingChinasinvestmentinsocialprotectionascurbingtheimpactofthe globaleconomiccrisisonitsworkersandcitizens. 85Kabeer,Naila,SocialProtectionStrategiesforanInclusiveSociety:ACitizenCenteredApproach,p.4. 86Kabeer,MainstreamingGender,p.279 87 88 That is why, the Constitutional Court of Colombia, in order to enforce the social protection rights of the elder, for instance,linkstheserightstothefundamentalrighttolifeandenjoyingavitalminimum. 89Kabeer,MainstreamingGender,p.332

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 1.2.5.DEMOCRATICGOVERNANCEFORINCLUSIVEDEVELOPMENT On her own, the povertytrapped person exists in state of survival, with limited engagement with society or State institutions. Through developing her voice and identity, perhaps through organizing efforts or greateraccess to information, she comes to realize and understand her status as a citizen andherincumbentrightsandresponsibilitiesattachedthereto.Theexclusionarybarriersencirclingher show cracks as she begins to identify as someone more than a poor individual; a povertytrapped constituentofherState.Shemaynowreachoutandgrabontoopportunitiespresentedbyacademia, civilsocietyandmediaoutletstoadvanceherempowermentandaccessherrighttorights.Whenshe accesses the State institutions that are obligated to deliver the rights enshrined under the social contractbetweenthem,shehasnotonlydestroyedtheexclusionarybarriers,buthascompelledher Stateinstitutionstoprovideherwiththetoolstodoso. Forthemostvulnerableoftheworkingpoorlegalpersonsofacivicsolidarynature,betterknownas nonprofitsandrangingfromcharitiestocoopsandmutuals,constituteidealvehiclesforinclusionin both democracy and development.90 The organization enables the individual worker to not only see thestructuralinequalityshefaces,buttochallengeitinunityandsolidaritywithotherslikeher.Her voiceisraisedwithothersimilarvoices.Atthesametime,organizationmayonlyyieldaloudervoice and a more visible presence; it alone cannot guarantee access to the resources and institutions necessarytobeliftedoutofdeprivation.ThisrequiresaresponsiveStateand,inademocracy,itisthe constituent that may elicit a response from her State and all of its institutionalized resources and opportunities. Indeed, the relationship of the individual as a constituent with her State may be her mostvaluableassetintermsofaddressingpoverty,accessingtheStatemechanismandreinvigorating theirsocialcontract.91 Asaconstituent,shemayinsertherselfintothepublicdecisionmakinginademocraticState,butonly so far as she has access to the publicdecision making circuits and mechanisms. If she is isolated geographically, politically, economically, socially or culturally from that locus, then her opportunities andabilitiestoinfluencethatdecisionmakingprocessandtheresultinglaws,policiesandregulations disappear. If, on the other hand, the question is one of the States responses to her raisedvoice, then it is the nature and quality of the State apparatus that is at issue. Thus, governance, and moreover, democratic and participatory governance is absolutely fundamental for ensuring that marginalized members of society, especially those living in poverty traps created, propounded and perpetuated by poor law and policy, may influence the publicdecision making process to work for them,ratherthanagainstthem.92
90 CivicSolidary Organizations is a term proposed to designate nonprofit organizations in positive sense instead of a negativeorresidualone.RuizRestrepo,Adriana,NatureJuridiqueetRlePolitiquedesOrganisationsSansButLucratifdu TiersSecteur,DocumentderecherchepourunethsedoctoraleendroitpublicdelUniversitPanthonAssas.2000(Sans publier) 91RuizRestrepo,Adriana.ALegalEmpowermentStrategyforLatinAmericanPoor,p.3 92Ibid,p.25andAnnexes1and2

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1.3. INTERNATIONAL AGENDAS ON THE INFORMALITY OF POVERTYTRAPPED WORKERS

Duetoavarietyoffactors,therehasbeenapersistentriseininformalityinthedevelopingworld.In 2002,informalemploymentaccountedforonehalftothreefourthsofnonagriculturalemploymentin developingcountries,i.e.,fortyeightpercentofnonagriculturalemploymentinNorthAfrica,fiftyone percent in Latin America, sixtyfive percent in Asia, and seventytwo percent in subSaharan Africa; excluding South Africa, the share of informal employment in nonagricultural employment rises to seventyeight percent in subSaharan Africa.93 In 2007, it was estimated that the informal economy employed up to ninety percent of subSaharan Africas workforce, anywhere from fortyseven to eightyfourpercentofAsiasworkforce,andnearlyseventyfivepercentofLatinAmericasworkforce.94 Asindicatedabove,itisprojectedthat,duetotheglobaleconomiccrisisof2008,therewillbeupto50 millionnewlyunemployedindividualsandthenumbersoftheworkingpoorearninglessthan$2per daywillincreaseby200million,withmostofthemworkingintheinformaleconomy(since2007).95 As the informal economy has grown, its contribution to gross domestic product and job growth likewise increases, swelling to represent over forty percent of the regional GDPs of Africa, Latin AmericaandCentralAsia/EasternEuropein2002200396InLatinAmericanandCaribbeancountries,it isestimatedthattheinformaleconomyhasaccountedfornearlyseventypercentofalljobscreated overthelast15years.97 Indeed,theconsensusisthattheinformaleconomyisagrowing,permanent phenomenonofcapitalistdevelopmentandtraditionaleconomies.98 Thereis,however,greatconcernoverthelowqualityjobsthathavebeencreatedduringthistimeand the changing patterns and demographics of workers, giving greater momentum to the informal economy debate in international policy discussions. The international community has specifically addressedtheneedfortacklingtheprecarioussituationsofownaccountworkerandtheworkingpoor from several different angles. The following international agendas consider these individuals socio economic circumstances through addressing work quality, labor rights, legal empowerment and extremepovertyreduction. 1.3.1.THEDECENTWORKAGENDA
93WomenandMenintheInformalEconomy,p.7 94ILO,CommitteeonEmploymentandSocialPolicy,SocialSecuritystandardsandtheILOcampaignfortheextensionof socialsecurity,Notefordebateandguidance,Geneva2008,GB298/ESP/4 95GlobalEmploymentTrendsReport2009,inGlobalEconomicCrisisandtheInformalEconomy,RealizingRights(2008) 96 World Watch, Vital Signs 20072008, using data from Friederich Schneider, The Size of Shadow Economies of 145 Countriesfrom19992003,IZADiscussionPapers(Bonn:InstitutefortheStudyofLabor,December2004). 97ILO,TheInformalEconomy,NotefromtheCommitteeonEmploymentandSocialPolicy,p.5. 98Chen,RethinkingtheInformalSector,andILO,Chen,Martha,Jhabvala,Renana,&FrancesLund,SupportingWorkersin theInformalEconomy:APolicyFramework,WorkingPaperontheInformalEconomy,No.2,Geneva2002

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 TheILOsagendaondecentworkstressesthatnotanyjobwillprovidetheopportunityforindividuals toavoidorliftthemselvesoutofpoverty;rather,onlyajobthatrealizestheirpotentialasworkersand recognizestheirhumandignitywilldoso.Adecentjobisonethatgivespeopletheopportunityto earn enough for themselves and their families to escape poverty, not just temporarily but permanentit provides social security and ensures protection by labor laws, and a voice at work throughfreelychosenworkersorganizations.99Decentwork,therefore,providesamoreproductive andsatisfyinglabormarketandthejustdistributionofthebenefitsofworkthatarefundamentalto democratic societies that foster human development. The decent work agenda is applicable to all workers,bothformalandinformal.Indeed,theILOhasforseveralyearsinsistedthatitsdecentwork agenda be applicable to both the formal and informal economies and in 2008, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) incorporated the informal economy in its first goal of reducing extreme povertyandhunger.100Yet,howtoimplementthisgoal,extenddecentworktoworkerswhoremain outside the regulatory framework, and to ensure that a regulatory framework that does not in fact furtherimpoverishinformalworkersstillpresentapracticalchallengeforresponsivegovernments. As recognized by the ILO, democratic governance must play a key role in addressing decent work deficits in the informal economy. While political will, specific laws, policies and programs to extend protectiontoallworkersandremovethebarriersofentryintothemainstreameconomywillvaryby countryandcircumstances,theirformulationandimplementationshouldinvolvethesocialpartners andtheintendedbeneficiariesintheinformaleconomy.101Atthesametime,anymeasurestakento address informality should not restrict opportunities for those who have no other means of livelihood...it should not be a job at any price or under any circumstances.102 Further, public authoritiesshouldinclude[membershipbasedorganizationsofthepoor]inpublicpolicydebatesand providethemaccesstotheservicesandinfrastructuretheyneedtooperateeffectivelyandefficiently andprotectthemfromharassmentorunjustifiedordiscriminatoryeviction.103Itisintheirmeaningful participationininclusivepolicymakingthatpublicmeasurestoaddresstheneedsoftheseworkers andthemorevulnerableanddefenselessamongthemthatwillbringthemunderaresponsivelegal andinstitutionalframework,and,eventually,themainstreamlabormarket. A relationship of particular concern in the decent work agenda is that between law, regulation and informality. The ILO has defined three different manifestations of this relationship, each requiring differentpolicyresponses:(1)wherelawissilentwithrespecttoactivitiesorgroupsfallingoutside theregulatoryframework;(2)wherelawsexist,butlackof complianceandenforcementininformal
99ILO,KeyIssuesintheLaborMarket:DecentEmploymentandtheMDGs 100 The first Millennium Development Goal, to eradicate poverty and hunger, has set as Target 1B to achieve full and productive employment anddecent work for all, including women and young people indicators are the growth rate of GDPperpersonemployed;theemploymenttopopulationratio;proportionofemployedpeoplelivingbelow$1(PPP)per day and the proportion of ownaccount and contributing family workers in total employment http://www.mdgmonitor.org/goal1.cfm# 101ILO,Resolutionconcerningdecentworkandtheinformaleconomy,2002,paragraph21 102ILO,Resolutionconcerningdecentworkandtheinformaleconomy,paragraph21 103ILO,Resolutionconcerningdecentworkandtheinformaleconomy,",paragraph24

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 economy is the problem; and (3) where regulatory framework does not provide basic protection or create a level playing field, but acts as an impediment to job creation and a factor contributing to informality.104Indeed,informalworkersandownaccountworkersespeciallyarenotonlyexcluded fromformalregulatoryschemes,buttheyaresometimesimpoverishedthroughlawsandpoliciesthat arenotmerelyunresponsive,butcreateadversecircumstancesforgroupsofinformalworkers. 1.3.2.THELEGALEMPOWERMENTOFTHEPOORAGENDA AsarticulatedbytheformerCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor,povertyandinformality must be approached from four angles access to justice, property rights, business rights, and labor rights to both identify and redress the social, political, legal and economic exclusion that have resultedincircumstancesofdeprivationfortheworldsbottombillionandmore.105Thisagendacuts acrossvariousinternationalhumanrightsinstrumentstoarticulateawaytorealizethoserightsusing the law and the rule of law to lower the exclusionary mechanisms that prohibit povertytrapped individualsandcommunitiesaccesstoStateandmarketinstitutionsandtheresourcestheyrequireto lift themselves out of poverty. Using law for poverty reduction is both a bottomup and topdown processofinclusion106.Thisstrategyprovidesameansfortheseworkerstobegintheirjourneyoutof precariousness and towards greater security by widening the avenues through which these workers mayaccesstheirgovernmentsanddemandtheirrights.Itallowsforinformalworkerstoraisetheir voicesaspersons/constituentsanddemandtheirrightsfromtheirgovernments,whoseresponsibility itistoprovideandprotecttheirrightsatleastoflifewithdignity,anddecentwork107 In an early 2010 resolution the UN General Assembly, based on the normative framework on international human rights, and recognizing the Commissions Final Report as a useful reference: Encourages countries to continue their efforts in the area of legal empowerment of the poor, including access to justice and the realization of rights related to property, labour and business, addressingbothformalandinformalsettingsbytakingintoaccountthosedimensionsintheirnational policiesandstrategies,whilebearinginmindtheimportanceofnationalcircumstances,ownershipand leadership. 1.3.3.THEREVISEDFIRSTMILLENNIUMDEVELOPMENTGOAL Althoughtheworldsbottombillioninclude550millionpeoplewhoareworkingtosurvive,butwho willneverworkthemselvesoutofpoverty,theMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsdidnotaddresswork
104ILO,TheInformalEconomy,2007 105TheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoorconcludedthatoverfourbillionpeopleintheworldliveandwork beyondthereachofthelaw.Pleasesee:MakingtheLawWorkforEveryone,2008 106 On the need of understanding legal empowerment as much more than a normative change in regulation but the appropriationoflawinthemicro,mesoandmacrostructuresofgovernancethatwillclaim,advanceandproducechangein law,withorwithouttheinitiativeandhelpoftheestablishment,pleasesee:RuizRestrepo,Adriana,ALegalEmpowerment StrategyforLatinAmericanPoor. 107Ibid

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 andemploymentletalonedecentworkandemploymentwhentheywereinitiallyconceivedand adoptedbytheUnitedNations.However,in2008,anewtarget(tobeincludedinthesetoftargets thateachoftheeightgoalsencompasses)wascreatedunderthefirstMDGthataddressedthisgap. This target aims to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people, a central objective of our relevant national and international policies and our national development strategies.108 The indicators for this target include measurementsofthemaincategorieswithintheinformaleconomyasdefinedabove,capturedinthe vulnerableemploymentindicatormeasuringthenumbersofindividuals(orpercentageofworkers) who may be categorized as informal wage and salary workers, contributing family workers, self employedemployers,ownaccountworkersandmembersofproducerscooperatives. Compilingcountrylevelstatisticsonthenumbers,ageandsexofownaccountworkerswillnotonly unveil the extent of this sector of the labor economy, it will also inadvertently force policylevel discussionsonwhatownaccountworkis,whereitfitsintotheregulatoryedifice,andhowtoresolve the issues confronting these workers through law and policymaking. In this sense, it is a necessary step in the prelaw phase of the own account workers who have not yet been seen by their State actorsandinstitutions.109Atthesametime,thechallengesincumbentuponthediscoveryofthese workers will be significant; once these workers have captured the attention of their representatives andStateinstitutions,theywillrequireanddemandamoreresponsivereactionfromtheState.Itisat thisphasethatlawonceagainenterstoopenthedoorsofdiscussionamongthesevariousactorsto liftthevoicesoftheworkersastheyrealizetheircitizenshipstatusandtoopentheearsoflawand policymakers to this frequency.110 Implementing the new target for MDG 1 will necessitate strong State action and responsive democratic institutions that are willing to reassess and redress their conceptionsoftheinformaleconomyandlabormarkets.
108ILO,KeyIssuesintheLaborMarket:DecentEmploymentandtheMDGs,p.1 109 (1) Prelaw; (2) Law, and (3) Post law are the three moments in which the rra thinktank divides participatory governance & and policymakers inclusion analysis. RuizRestrepo, Adriana. A Legal Empowerment Strategy for Latin American Poor: A Reading of the National Consultations for the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor: http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf and rra (Public Law + Social Innovation) thinktank/THRDSECTORLAWLAB/WorkingDocument#23,2007(unpublished) 110Ibid

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2.NOTE:THEWASTEPICKERSCHAPTERHASBEENEXTRACTEDANDIS PARTOFASEPARATEDOCUMENT.

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3.COLOMBIASRURALMINEWORKERSINPOVERTY
This chapter engages in a law and policy analysis of own account rural mine workers in Colombia. Whilemineworkersaresusceptibletovulnerabilityintheirtrade,ownaccountruralmineworkersare especially so due to their cultural, geographic and political isolation, most notably the two ethno culturalminoritiesfocusedoninthischapterindigenousandafroColombianmineworkers.Section 3.1 sets forth the public policy framework governing the mining industry, beginning with the Constitutionalprovisionsrelatingtominework,naturalsubsurfaceandnonrenewableresources,and ethnoculturalminorities,thencontinuingontotheseminallegislationcurrentlygoverningthemining sector:theMiningCodeof2001.Section3.2exploresthetradecontextofmineworkers,includingthe history of international mining interests in Colombia and other actors in mine work. Section 3.3 considersspecificallythelivelihoodsofthetwoethnoculturalminoritiesinpovertywhoworkasown accountruralmineworkers,indigenousandafroColombianindividualsandcommunities.Thissection setsforththeircenturieslonghistoryinminework,theroleofcommunallandstotheirhistoryofmine work,aswellasconstitutionalandlegalprotectionsovertheircommunallandsthatimpactthesemine workerstradetoday.Finally,itanalyzestheparticularchallengesfacingtwoadditionalsubgroupsof own account mine workers women who are found in large, medium, small and microscale mining operations and children and issues relating to mine workers overall health and social protection. Section 3.4 continues to analyze the question of own account mine workers access to mine work, especially given the particular scheme of the concession contract as set forth in the Mining Code of 2001anditsprovisionsandimplicationsonindigenousandafroColombianruralmineworkers.Section 3.5presentsthreeexamplesofartisanalandsmallscaleminersplacedinpovertytrapsthroughthelaw that illustrate the range of labor issues impacting own account and selfemployed mine workers in poverty. Section 3.6 follows with a coherent analysis of illegality, informality and poverty for mine workers,emphasizingtheneedtodistinguishbetweeninformalitybychoiceandinformalitybyneedfor mine workers, the impoverishing conditions of the Mining Code on indigenous and afroColombian constituents in mine work, and theabsence ofa legitimate labor identity for artisanal mine workers. Finally, Section 3.7 considers the role of organization among own account mine workers to facilitate inclusion in development and participatory governance, highlighting the particular difficulties facing thisoccupationalgroupgiventheirsociopoliticalisolationandthecompetinginterestsoftheStateas soleownerofallsubsoilrightsandastherulemakerofthecommongood.InaseparateAnnextothis chapter a synthetic explanation of the notion of Artisanal and Small Scale Mining is presented and complementedbytheAuthorsunderstandingbasedontheColombianfieldandpolicycontext. 44

 This chapter of the WIEGO report aims to understand the law and policy framework applicable to workersinpovertywithintheminingsectorinColombia.Withoutprejudicetotheimportanceofthe environmentaldisequilibriumcreatedbyandthroughmininginterventions,thischapterwillfocusonly on the negative economic impacts caused by unregulated or poorly regulated social stakes in the miningindustry.Thefocusofthislawandpolicyanalysisistoestablishthelevelandqualityofformal protection and opportunities that the Colombian State delivers to its povertytrapped constituents workingandlivingintheminingtrade.Inotherwords,bynavigatingthroughtheapplicablelawand policy,thischapterattemptstoappraisetheformalspacethattheStateisgrantingtoitsconstituent mine workers and their rights to life and survival, to work and to entrepreneur, and their right to developwithintheirminingcultureandtraditionalorancestralworkandtrade. As opposed to the extraction of oil and natural gas, where the level of investment required for the necessaryequipmentprecludesindividualsfrominformallyengaginginsmallormicroscaleminingfor oilandgasactivities,theextractionofmineralsfromseasalttosand,clay,gold,platinum,emeralds andmorestillpresentsincomeopportunitiesforpovertytrappedinformalworkers.Mostnotably, accessing these resources is not prohibitively expensive as it does not require any particular or mechanizedequipment.WhilethereisasignificantinformalminingpresenceinColombiancitieslike Cali,MedellinandBogota,thisreportfocusesonthesituationofruralmineworkersforthefollowing reasons: (1) they live in villages far removed from the political and legal capital of Bogota, and are morepoliticallyisolatedforparticipatorygovernancepurposes;(2)asafroColombiansandindigenous people, rural mine workers relationship with natural resources differs remarkably from urban Colombiansandhasspecialrelevanceintermsofmineralextraction;and(3)informalmineworkersin Colombiasruralzoneswillnecessarilyturntoinformalextractiontoearnameagerincomefromthe mountainsandnaturalresourcesaroundthem,whilelackingothersubstantiveincomeopportunities besidesartisanalagriculture,tocreateincomeintheirruralsettings. Becauseofitsfocusonpovertythisreportwillnecessarilyhighlightthedifficultiesofindigenousand afroColombian men, women and children who are involved in mining and who work alone or in proximity to large mining operations in Colombia. Being rural and belonging to ethnocultural minorities,theyareevenmoreexcludedandvulnerablethanothermineworkers.Whilemineworkers engaged in formal employment contracts with industrial mining companies may also be living in poverty,theyareatleastprotectedunderexistingColombianlaborlawprovisionsandthenegotiations of their labor unions. Or, if informallyemployed, they may at leastlawfullyclaim that their informal employment, in light of the principle of reality in labor, is part and parcel of a formal employment relationship. Further, and as grave as the recruiting, transporting, transferring, harboring or receiving of a person throughtheuseofviolence,coercion,manipulationorotherdeceptivemeanstoexploittheminmines is, this report does not focus on the link between mining and human trafficking. As much as this connection is very much deserving of attention, human trafficking pivots around the criminal exploitation1ofthelaborcapacityofhumanbeingsand/ortheirphysicalandsexualintegrity,andthus impliesapersonalandcivilrightsanalysisinlightofcriminallaw,ratherthantheeconomicandsocial rightsanalysisinlightofdevelopmentlawuponwhichthisreportisbased.
1Ondelimitingtheboundariesbetweenthehumanexploitationthatisrelevanttolaborlaw,laborinspectorsandjudges and the exploitation that further implies a criminal reproach and is thus relevant to penal law, prosecutors and criminal judges,andincarcerationasthelegalsanction,pleaseread:UNODC,Nios,NiasyAdolescentesVctimasdeTratade PersonasyExplotacinSexual/Laboralp.48http://www.casacidn.org.ar/media_files/download/ManualAntitrata.pdf

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 MiningisparticularlyrelevantforpeoplelivinginpovertyincountrieslikeColombia,wheretheAndes mountainrangemeetswiththeCaribbean,afterhavingsplitintothreedifferentmountainrangesthat separatetheOrinocoplainstotheEastandthePacificOceantothewest,towardsthenorthwestof Colombias Amazon jungle. The geology of having three mountain ranges and the geographical diversityofacountrypackedwithriversandvalleysexplainthelegendarymineralwealthofColombia, thelandofElDorado,anditsluretothePiratesoftheCaribbean.Foundonthesoilssurface,directly underneath,orevengentlywashedawaybythethousandsofriversthatextendacrossthecountry, Colombiasnaturalwealthanddiversityprovidesaneasyandhandysourceofsurvivaltoitsinhabitants who microextract minerals in an artisanal mode. This is especially relevant for those Colombians living in the countrys rural zones, where mining is still perceived as a legitimate (traditional or ancestral)activityforsubsistenceandcommunitydevelopment.Justasmanyoftheirindigenousor Africanenslavedancestorsworkedwithmineralextractionforcenturies,theseColombianscontinueto mine the countrys wealth, although every day their trade becomes more and more difficult, as informal mining is barely tolerated by law, and sometimes is even plainly branded as illegal by the government.Withoutdevelopingappropriatepolicyandregulatorycriteriacapableofdistinguishing between informality by need or due to poverty from informality by choice or for convenience, poor mineworkersinformalbyneedendupexcessivelyburdenedbylawandwithaveryreducedformal spaceforsurvival,livelihoodanddevelopment.InfactsomeestimatethatinColombia,80percentof mining is informal2. Informality is then such a persistent and widespread reality that to wonder is informalnormal?astheOECDentitledoneofitsrecentreports3,becomesaveryrelevantquestionto ask. In fact, instead of the government seeing an opportunity for widespread and farreaching poverty reductionstrategiesviaorganizedartisanalandsmallscalemining,whichisnotpossibleforoilandgas extraction,thereappearstobesomedegreeofofficialregretfortheabundanceofmineralsandtheir easeofextraction.InaninterviewwithofficialsfromtheformerUribeAdministrationwhoworkedin Colombias Mining Ministry, the interviewees appeared disappointed that mineral resources may be extractedeasilywithoutanyinvestmentinmachinery.Theyseemeddisheartenedthatthedisorderly wayofextraction(actually,andasunderstoodbytheauthorsofthisreport,anexpressionofintense andimmediatesurvivalneedsofmany)exceededtheruleoflaw.Adifferentanalysis,suchasassessing themininglawsnormativepositiveimpactonthegroundand/oritscapacitytoeffectivelyreachthe ruralpoortodeliverandensureformalopportunitiesandprotectionfortheseColombianconstituents also,didnotsurfacetheconversation,asmuchasitshould,inlightofaccountabilitytothepoverty trappedconstituentsoftheState.

3.1.PUBLICPOLICYFRAMEWORKOFMINING
3.1.1.THECONSTITUTIONALFRAMEWORK In Colombia, all policy norms, including those impacting the mining trade, must be developed in accordance with the States Social Rule of Law. With regard to mining, Article 8 of the Constitution establishesthatthedutytoprotecttheculturalandnaturalwealthofthecountrylieswithboththe
2MarcoAurelioHurtadoandEdwardCaicedo/Gremivalle/rrainterview/2009/Cali 3Pleasesee:http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_33935_42024438_1_1_1_1,00.html

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State and persons of Colombia.4 At the sametime, Article 332 establishes that the State is the sole ownerofallsubsoilandnaturalnonrenewableresourcesinColombia.5PursuanttoArticle360,the exploitationoftheseresources,aswellastherightsthatColombianterritorialentitieswillhaveover them,isgovernedunderColombianlaw.6And,assoleowneroftheseenergyandmineresources,the State will receive royalties earned from the exploitation of the countrys nonrenewable natural resources.7DepartmentsandMunicipalities,aswellasallmaritimeandfluvialportsimpactedbythe miningindustryvisvistransportationneeds,alsohavearighttoroyaltiesandcompensationsfrom the exploitation of these resources. For this purpose, the National Royalties Fund was created by Article361,topromotemining,preservationoftheenvironment,andfinancingofregionalinvestment projectsidentifiedasdevelopmentprioritiesbytherelevantterritorialentities. 8Thefundissourced by royalties that are not assigned to the various departments and municipalities where natural resourceexploitationistakingplace.Itisworthnotingthat,currently,adraftbillproposedbyrecently electedPresidentSantosisbeingstudiedintheColombianCongress;itaimsforabetterdistributionof royaltiesthroughoutthecountry9. Other constitutional provisions that are relevant to oil and mineral extraction are those referring to Colombias population of indigenous people. Article 7 establishes the States obligation to recognize and protect Colombias ethnic and cultural diversity; Article 171 defines the existence of additional exclusive indigenous representation in the Senate body, and Article 246 recognizes indigenous jurisdiction and its parameters within their territorial realm, insofar as they do not conflict with the ConstitutionorthelawsoftheState. 10Further,Article329createsindigenousresguardos,atypeof
4Article8ItisanobligationoftheStateandthepersonstoprotecttheculturalrichesandnaturalrichesoftheNation.// Artculo8.EsobligacindelEstadoydelaspersonasprotegerlasriquezasculturalesynaturalesdelaNacin. 5Article332TheStateistheownerofthesubsoilandofthenatural,nonrenewableresources,withoutprejudicetothe rightsacquiredandperfectedinaccordancewithprecedinglaws.//Artculo332.ElEstadoespropietariodelsubsueloyde los recursos naturales no renovables, sin perjuicio de los derechos adquiridos y perfeccionados con arreglo a las leyes preexistentes. 6Article360Thelawwilldeterminetheconditionsfortheexploitationofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesaswellastherights oftheterritorialentitiesoverthem.TheexploitationofanonrenewablenaturalresourcewillproduceinfavoroftheStatean economicrevenueprivilegewithoutprejudicetoanyotherrightorcompensationthatmaybecontracted.Thedepartments and municipalities in whose territory nonrenewable natural resources are exploited as well as maritime and river ports throughwhichsaidresourcesorderivativeproductsareshippedwillbeentitledtoparticipateinthegrantsandcompensations. //Artculo360.Laleydeterminarlascondicionesparalaexplotacindelosrecursosnaturalesnorenovablesascomolos derechosdelasentidadesterritorialessobrelosmismos.Laexplotacindeunrecursonaturalnorenovablecausarafavor delEstado,unacontraprestacineconmicaattuloderegala,sinperjuiciodecualquierotroderechoocompensacinque se pacte. Los departamentos y municipios en cuyo territorio se adelanten explotaciones de recursos naturales no renovables,ascomolospuertosmartimosyfluvialespordondesetransportendichosrecursosoproductosderivadosdelos mismos,tendrnderechoaparticiparenlasregalasycompensaciones. 7Ibid. 8 Article 361 With revenues originating from the royalties that are not allocated to departments and municipalities, a NationalRoyaltiesFundwillbecreatedanditsresourceswillbedestinedtoterritorialentitieswithinthelimitsstipulatedby the law. These funds will be applied to the promotion of mining, the preservation of the environment, and to financing regionalprojectsofinvestmentidentifiedashavingpriorityinthedevelopmentplansoftherespectiveterritorialentities.// Artculo 361. Con los ingresos provenientes de las regalas que no sean asignados a los departamentos y municipios, se crearunFondoNacionaldeRegalascuyosrecursossedestinarnalasentidadesterritorialesenlostrminosquesealela ley. Estos fondos se aplicarn a la promocin de la minera, a la preservacin del ambiente y a financiar proyectos regionalesdeinversindefinidoscomoprioritariosenlosplanesdedesarrollodelasrespectivasentidadesterritoriales. 9Pleasesee:http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3124571720100831 10 Article 7.TheState recognizes and protects the ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian nation. // Artculo 7. El

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 indigenous reservation of collective and nontransferable property for indigenous communities that, forthepurposesofpublicadministration,servesastheequivalentofamunicipality11.Finally,Article 330oftheColombianConstitution12establishesboththeexistenceofIndigenousCouncilsthatgovern theseindigenousterritoriesandtwoconstitutionalrulesapplicabletomininginthoseterritories:the firstreferstotheobligationofexploitingnaturalresourcesinindigenousterritorieswithoutharming thecultural,socialandeconomicintegrityofindigenouscommunities;thesecondestablishesthatthe governmentmustfostertheparticipationoftherespectiveindigenouscommunitiesrepresentativesin decisionsmadewithregardtomineralexploitationontheirterritories.AfroColombianethnocultural communitiesenjoysimilartreatmentasindigenousColombians,asdefinedinLaw70of1993through ProvisionalArticle55oftheConstitution.
EstadoreconoceyprotegeladiversidadtnicayculturaldelaNacincolombiana. 11Article329.Theconfigurationoftheindigenous(Indian)territorialentitieswillbedevelopedsubjecttotheprovisionsofthe OrganicLawofTerritorialPlanning,andtheirdeterminationwillbeeffectedbythenationalgovernmentwiththeparticipation of the representatives of the indigenous communities following, the plan of the Commission of Territorial Planning. The reservations constitute collective property and are inalienable. The law will define the relations and coordination of these entities with those of which they form a part. Paragraph. In the case of an indigenous (Indian) territory that includes the territoryoftwoormoredepartments,itsadministrationwillbeimplementedbyindigenouscouncilsincoordinationwiththe governorsoftherespectivedepartments.Incasethatsuchterritoryshoulddecidetoconstituteitselfasaterritorialentity,this will be done in compliance with the requirements established in the first clause of this article. // Artculo 329. La conformacin de las entidades territoriales indgenas se har con sujecin a lo dispuesto en la Ley Orgnica de OrdenamientoTerritorial,ysudelimitacinseharporelGobiernoNacional,conparticipacindelosrepresentantesde lascomunidadesindgenas,previoconceptodelaComisindeOrdenamientoTerritorial.Losresguardossondepropiedad colectivaynoenajenable.Laleydefinirlasrelacionesylacoordinacindeestasentidadesconaquellasdelascualesformen parte. Pargrafo. En el caso de un territorio indgena que comprenda el territorio de dos o ms departamentos, su administracin se har por los consejos indgenas en coordinacin con los gobernadores de los respectivos departamentos.Encasodequeesteterritoriodecidaconstituirsecomoentidadterritorial,seharconelcumplimientode losrequisitosestablecidosenelincisoprimerodeesteartculo. 12Article330:InaccordancewiththeConstitutionandthelaws,theindigenousterritorieswillbegovernedbycouncils formedandregulatedaccordingtothecustomsoftheircommunitiesandwillexercisethefollowingfunctions:1.Supervise theapplicationofthelegalregulationsconcerningtheusesoflandandsettlementoftheirterritories.2.Designthepolicies, plans, and programs of economic and social development within their territory, in accordance with the National Development Plan. 3. Promote public investments in their territories and supervise their appropriate implementation. 4. Collectanddistributetheirfunds.5.Supervisetheconservationofnaturalresources.6.Coordinatetheprogramsandprojects promotedbythedifferentcommunitiesintheirterritory.7.Cooperatewithtomaintainpublicorderwithintheirterritoryin accordancewiththeinstructionsandprovisionsofthenationalgovernment.8.Representtheterritoriesbeforethenational governmentandtheotherentitieswithinwhichtheyareintegrated;and,9.OthermattersstipulatedbytheConstitutionand the law. Paragraph. Exploitation of natural resources in indigenous territories will be done without detriment to the cultural,social,andeconomicintegrityoftheindigenouscommunities.Inthedecisionsadoptedwithrespecttothesaid exploitation, the government will encourage the participation of the representatives of the respective communities. // Artculo 330. De conformidad con la Constitucin y las leyes, los territorios indgenas estarn gobernados por consejos conformadosyreglamentadossegnlosusosycostumbresdesuscomunidadesyejercernlassiguientesfunciones:1.Velar porlaaplicacindelasnormaslegalessobreusosdelsueloypoblamientodesusterritorios.2.Disearlaspolticasylos planesyprogramasdedesarrolloeconmicoysocialdentrodesuterritorio,enarmonaconelPlanNacionaldeDesarrollo. 3.Promoverlasinversionespblicasensusterritoriosyvelarporsudebidaejecucin.4.Percibirydistribuirsusrecursos.5. Velarporlapreservacindelosrecursosnaturales.6.Coordinarlosprogramasyproyectospromovidosporlasdiferentes comunidadesensuterritorio.7.Colaborarconelmantenimientodelordenpblicodentrodesuterritoriodeacuerdoconlas instruccionesydisposicionesdelGobiernoNacional.8.RepresentaralosterritoriosanteelGobiernoNacionalylasdems entidadesalascualesseintegren,y9.LasquelessealenlaConstitucinylaley.Pargrafo.Laexplotacindelosrecursos naturalesenlosterritoriosindgenasseharsindesmedrodelaintegridadcultural,socialyeconmicadelascomunidades indgenas. En las decisiones que se adopten respecto de dicha explotacin, el Gobierno propiciar la participacin de los representantesdelasrespectivascomunidades.

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 Asexploredintheprecedingchapterofthisreport,theunderlyinginterestoftheStateinaccordance withwastemanagementlawandpolicyistoensureenvironmentalsanitationforallColombians.In contrast, the States underlying interest in mining, according to the relevant law and policy, is the extraction of surface and subsurface wealth for social reinvestment at a later time, assuming, of course,thatcorruptiondoesnotreroutethatwealthawayfromitsintended,legitimatedestination. In very blunt terms, mining may be described as a normative authorization for cashingout as much moneyaspossiblefromthenaturalenvironment;becauseofthetemporarymandateofgovernments, this will bedone by each successive government as fast as legallyand technically possible to do. In otherwords,thelongtermstakeoftheStatesownsurvivalthroughnaturalconservationandsocial development is subordinate to the short term needs of the government in turn of quickly drawing financial resources from the land and soil it governs over. In few domains of civilization are law and regulationascrucialforcontrollingtemporarypoliticalpowerforthelongtermsakeofthecountryand itspeopleasinmining. 3.1.2.THECOLOMBIANMININGCODEOF2001 TheColombianMiningCodedefinesthelawandpolicyframeworkgoverningthelivesandlivelihoods ofColombianmineworkers.ItwasproposedandapprovedasLaw685of2001andisthebasisofall miningregulations,decreesandtechnicalresolutionsdevelopedthereafter.TheCodeisdividedinto eighttitlesandbeginsbyestablishingitspublicinterestmandate,andsettingitsregulatoryobjectives: (a)promotingthetechnicalexplorationandexploitationofthemineralresourcesofStateandprivate ownership,and(b)incentivizingtheseactivitiesinordertosatisfytherequirementsofitsinternaland externaldemands.ToensurethattheCodeiscarriedoutundertheprinciplesandnormsrelatingto therationalexploitationofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesandoftheenvironment,theseobjectives are to be developed within the integrated concept of sustainable development and economic and socialstrengtheningofthecountry.13 ThefirsttitleoftheCodes362articlesregulateseverythingfromtheStatesproprietaryinterestand right in subsoil resources, mining prospecting, and the rights to explore and exploit to the reserved, excludedandrestrictedminingzonesinthecountry.ThesecondtitleoftheCodeisentirelydevoted todeterminingallforeseeableterms,conditionsandeventualitiesoftheconcessioncontractthrough whichminingisofficiallycarriedoutinColombia.Thethirdtitleconcernsspecialregimes,suchasthose referring to the mining of construction materials for public roads, marine mining and mining undertaken by ethnic groups in Colombia. Its fourth title exceptionally authorizes mining without formal title and includes chapters on occasional mining, illicit exploration and exploitation of mines, andtheexternalaspectsofmining,suchastheeaseofaccessrighttoenteringmines,expropriationor
13 Article 1. Objectives The objective of this Code of public interest is to promote the technical exploration and exploitationofthemineralresourcesofStateandprivateownership;toincentivizetheseactivitiesinordertosatisfythe requirementsofitsinternalandexternaldemandsandtoseethatitsuseiscarriedoutinaharmoniousmannerbymaking useofprinciplesandnormsofrationalexploitationofnonrenewablenaturalresourcesandofenvironment,withinthe integral concept of sustainable development and economic and social strengthening of the country. // Artculo 1. Objetivos.ElpresenteCdigotienecomoobjetivosdeinterspblicofomentarlaexploracintcnicaylaexplotacinde losrecursosminerosdepropiedadestatalyprivada;estimularestasactividadesenordenasatisfacerlosrequerimientosde lademandainternayexternadelosmismosyaquesuaprovechamientoserealiceenformaarmnicaconlosprincipiosy normasdeexplotacinracionaldelosrecursosnaturalesnorenovablesydelambiente,dentrodeunconceptointegralde desarrollosostenibleydelfortalecimientoeconmicoysocialdelpas.

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 environmentalissues.Thesixthtitleregulatestheeconomicandsocialaspectsofminingandincludesa chapteronassociationalregimes,taxandeconomicaspects,aswellasachapteronthesocialaspects ofmining.Theseventhtitleregulatestheproceduralaspectsofmining,includingrulesofprocedure, opposition,administrativeprotection,standing,andcreatestheNationalMiningRegister,theNational System of Mining Information, and the Advisory Council on Mining Policy. The eighth and last title containstheprovisionalarticlesoftheCode.14 Whileextensiveandcomprehensive,theMiningCodehasnotbeenwithoutcontroversy.Ontheone hand,miningcompaniesandtheColombiangovernmenthailtheCodeasamodernpieceoflegislation that has reduced red tape and bureaucracy in the mining sector by establishing only one kind of contracttheconcessioncontracttograntallexploration,exploitationanddevelopingrightsover mineralsfoundinupto5000hectaresofwateror10,000hectaresofland.Theseconcessioncontracts enjoya30yearlifetime,areextendabletoupto60years,andallowtheconcessionairetoextractboth themineralthatgaverisetothecontractaswellasallothermineralsassociatedwiththeextractionof the contracted mineral and found on the conceded area. The Code also legally ensures that the principle"firstintime,firstinright"appliesforawardingaminingtitle,andcreatesdifferenttaxand royaltybenefitsandmiscellaneousprerogativesforattractinginvestorsintheminingsector.Inthe Colombiangovernmentsassessment, ThelegalframeworkcreatedbythiscodeestablishesclearlimitstotheState'sinterventionsphereto the extent it is essential, while determining the necessary autonomy that, in terms of economic managementandentrepreneurialinitiative,investorsrequiretodevelopagivenminingproject.Inthis way,amanagementmodelissetupwheretheStateactsasafacilitatoroftheminingoperatorwork belongingtotheprivateinvestor.15 Meanwhile, on the other hand, labor unions, medium and smallscale miners, and national and international nongovernmental organizations have strongly criticized the Code for being regressive andtailoredbyforeignadviceandinterests.16Theyexplainthat,
14Atthetimeofwritingthisreport,thirtyarticlesoftheMiningCodehadbeenrecentlyamendedbytheinitiativeofthe MinistryofMinesandEnergyandaftertwoyearsofcongressionaldebate.(Law1382/2010) 15 Repblica de Colombia, Ministerio de Minas y Energa, UPME Unidad de Planeacin Minero Energtica, Mining an ExcellentChoiceforInvestinginColombia:InvestorsGuide,Bogot,2005,p.7 <http://74.125.47.132/search?q=cache:RA9WN9Vp6ZYJ:www.monaminas.com/InvestorsGuide1.pdf+the+colombian+minin g+code&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&client=firefoxa 16 "We had a fiveyear, $11million project in Colombia, which ran from 1997 to 2002," said a senior official with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), who spoke on condition of anonymity. "Basically, it was to help ColombiastrengthenitsinstitutionalcapacityinboththeMinistryofMinesandEnergyandtheMinistryoftheEnvironment and the regulatory agencies these agencies worked with," said the CIDA official in a phone interview. http://www.britannica.com/bps/additionalcontent/18/27237373/DiggingupCanadianDirtinColombia InCanada,criticismsofCIDA'srolewereraisedin2002byOttawa'sNorthSouthInstitute,anindependentinternational development organization that had been working in Colombia at the time of the CIDA project. Our project partners in Colombia regard CIDA as having played a large role in supporting and promoting a 'regressive' mining code that has weakened rather than strengthened democratic procedures," the institute's president, Roy Culpeper, told a foreign affairscommittee.Theproject"hasleftavitalelementofColombiansocietyfeelingthattheirinterestsareexcludedfrom thenewminingregime,"headded. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0012939 AsexplainedbyaCanadiansource,Fromthebeginning,theaim[oftheMiningCode]wasfarfromaltruistic:Canadian energyandminingsectorcompanieswithaninterestinColombiawillbenefitfromthedevelopmentofastable,consistent and familiar operating environment in this resourcerich developing economy," read CIDA's summary of the project. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0012939

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 Through its Energy, Mining and Environmental Project, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided technical and financial support to redraft Colombian mining legislation. The revised 2001 Mining Code (Law 685/01), which was adopted without consulting with potentially affected indigenous communities, created investment conditions that are extremely favorable to foreigncompanies.TheCodeweakenedanumberofexistingenvironmentalandsocialsafeguardsand created significant financial incentives for companies including dramatically reduced mining royalty and tax rates. This reduces the resources available to the Colombian State for local social and developmental purposes. Indigenous groups in Colombia argue that the lack of consultation on this newlegislationcontravenedInternationalLabourOrganizationConvention169,whichwasratifiedby Colombiaandformallyadoptedintonationallegislationin1991.TheyarguethatthenewMiningCode placeslimitationsoncitizensabilitytoclaimrightstoindigenousterritory,whichareaccordedunder the Colombian Constitution. Moreover, the legislation eliminates prior requirements that local communitiesreceiveeconomicbenefitsderivingfromminingactivity.17 AlthoughcontroversycontinuesandimplicatestheverypurposeoftheMiningCodeitself,thisanalysis focuses on the existing protections and opportunities granted to mine workers in poverty under the Code,asitremainstheapplicablelegalandpolicyframeworkforthistrade,regardlessofitsgenealogy. Whilecomplementedbyregulations,decreesandresolutionsadoptedafter2001,theMiningCodeof 2001governsthelivesofthemenandwomenintheminingtrade.ForColombiaspovertytrapped constituents, it is extremely difficult to achieve an integrated and consolidated understanding of the rulesofthemininggamesoasto,attheveryleast,alwaysbeincompliancewiththeapplicablelaws and regulations, and, at the most ambitious, to make an argumentative analysis to assert their participation in a legal empowermentbased strategy for inclusive development. The possibility that these constituents remain updated on the various law and policy provisions emanating from the Mining Code to facilitate their engagement in actually governing the mining realm is very unlikely. GiventhatinternetconnectivityinColombiasruralzonesisfarlessthanthe35percentconnectivity ratein13ofitscities,evenawidepublicefforttomaketheMiningCodeandrelevantnormsavailable online (www.simco.gov.co) would scarcely reach the men and women mine workers working informallyinthosezones.18 Evenifaccesstoupdatedlegalinformationwasnotabarrier,thetechnicalcomplexityofminingand theCodeanditsdiverseregulationspresentyetanotherchallenge.TheColombiangovernmenthas attempted to bridge this knowledge gap by means of Decree 2191 of 2003, which established and adopted the Mining Glossary that defines the 2222 technical terms found in the Mining Code and related legislation. While knowing these numerous definitions may be one step in acquiring a comprehensiveunderstandingofapplicablelawandpolicyintheminingtrade,itisclearlyinsufficient intermsofparticipatoryandinclusivegovernanceinmining,andraisesquestionsabouttheintrinsic difficultyinmakingtheMiningCodeandrulesunderstandable.Further,theGlossarydoesnotoffer much clarity or certitude for the millions of informal miners working outside the industrially driven worldofbigconcessioncontractsaroundwhichtheentireCodepivots.Indeed,informalmineworkers havemuchworkaheadofthemindisentanglingtheoverlappingideasintheMiningCodetodiscern
17 From the series Dirty Business, Dirty Practice Author Canadian Network on Corporate Accountability : http://www.ccic.ca/_files/en/working_groups/003_apg_20070710_case_studies_mining.pdf 18Only35%ofColombianpopulationcanaccessinternet(mainlythroughinternetcoffeeshops)andthisonlyinthe13 maincitiesofColombia:http://www.gobiernoelectronico.org/node/5056

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 their particular trade identity and niche. Consider, for instance, the different possibilities of mining undertheCode:

Illegal Mining:19 The mining that is carried without having being registered in the National Mining Registerand,therefore,lacksamining title.Theminingthatisdevelopedinanartisanalandinformal manner, outside the law. Includes exploration labor and work without a mining title. Includes mining that is covered by a mining title, but where the collection, or part thereof, is done outside the area grantedbythelicense. LegalMining:20Theminingthatiscoveredbyaminingtitle,whichisthewrittenadministrativeactby whichtherighttoexploreandexploitthemineralsoilandsubsoilofnationalownershipisgranted,in accordancetotheMiningCode.TheminingtitlemustberegisteredintheNationalMiningRegister. Formal Mining:21 Integrated by exploitation units of variable sizes, exploited by legally incorporated entities. Informal Mining:22 Constituted by small and medium exploitation units of individual property without anyaccountingrecords. SubsistenceMining:231.Miningdevelopedbynaturalpersons[asopposedtolegalpersons]whodevote theirforceoflabortotheextractionofsomemineralthroughrudimentarymethods,that,inassociation with some family member or other persons, create subsistence income. 2. This name is given to the exploitation of small alluvial mining, better known as barequeo [panning], and to the occasional extractionofclays,initsvariousforms,andconstructionmaterials. Barequeo:24Theactivitythatisconstricted(sic)tosandwashingbymanualmeansandwithoutanyhelp ofmachineryormechanicalmeansandwiththepurposeofseparatingandcollectingpreciousmetals contained in those sands. The collection of precious and semiprecious stones by similar means is also permitted.

In addition to the difficulty of discerning where mine workers, who are not employees or subcontractorsofindustrialminingconcessions,fallundertheMiningCode,theGlossarysuffersfrom at least one other gap that is worth mentioning in this analysis: the absence of the terms Duty and/orRighttoConsultation.Amongthe2222termsdefinedintheGlossary,thisglaringvoidlooms
19 Minera ilegal: Es la minera desarrollada sin estar inscrita en el Registro Minero Nacional y, por lo tanto, sin ttulo minero.Eslamineradesarrolladademaneraartesanaleinformal,almargendelaley.Tambinincluyetrabajosyobrasde exploracinsinttulominero.Incluyemineraamparadaporunttulominero,perodondelaextraccin,opartedeella,se realizaporfueradelreaotorgadaenlalicencia. 20 Minera legal: Es la mineraamparada por un ttulo minero, que es elacto administrativo escritomediante elcual se otorgaelderechoaexploraryexplotarelsueloyelsubsuelominerosdepropiedadnacional,segnelCdigodeMinas.El titulominerodeberestarinscritoenelRegistroMineroNacional. 21 Minera formal: Conformada por unidades de explotacin de tamao variable, explotadas por empresas legalmente constituidas. 22Minerainformal:Constituidaporlasunidadesdeexplotacinpequeasymedianasdepropiedadindividualysinningn tipoderegistroscontables. 23Mineradesubsistencia:1.Mineradesarrolladaporpersonasnaturalesquededicansufuerzadetrabajoalaextraccin de algn mineral mediante mtodos rudimentarios y que en asocio con algn familiar o con otras personas generan ingresos de subsistencia. 2. Se denomina as a la explotacin de pequea minera de aluvin, ms conocida como barequeo,yalaextraccinocasionaldearcillas,ensusdistintasformas,ylosmaterialesdeconstruccin. 24Barequeo:Elbarequeoseentiendequeeslaactividadquesecontraeallavadodearenaspormediosmanualessin ningunaayudademaquinariaomediosmecnicosyconelobjetodesepararyrecogermetalespreciososcontenidosen dichasarenas.Igualmenteespermitidalarecoleccindepiedraspreciosasysemipreciosaspormediossimilares.

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 largeandillustratesaparticularandsignificantweaknessintheCodeitdoesnotdefineorreferto the fundamental right of minorities within the mining trade following international treaties and standardsoftheICCPR,ICESCR,ILOConvention169,ortheParagraphofArticle330oftheColombian Constitutionthatprotectsademocratic,propoor,inclusiveprocessintheminingsector.Indeed,under the Code and its Glossary, even the definition of Ethnic Minority is desperately lacking, portraying insteadadegreeofnegligenceonbehalfoftheMinistryofMinesandtheColombianGovernmentin relatingtotheindigenousandethnicminoritiesworkinginandaroundtheminingsector.Anethnic minority is not objectively defined under the Code, but referred to as a condition, which, antithetically,recallsinferiorityandsubordination.
Ethnic minority:25 An ethnic community that is constituted as a specific community that occupies a position of subordination or social marginalization. Therefore, the key (sic) for constituting ethnic minoritiesistherapporttheyestablishwiththepopulationsmajority.Inthiscasetheterm"minority" doesnotrefertothenumericalaspect,buttotheconditionofinferiority.

3.2THETRADECONTEXT
Since 2001, and in order to better focus the Colombian States efforts to attract and facilitate investmentinitsnationalmineralresources,theColombiangovernmentandCongresshavedecidedto refrainfromanyStatedrivenminingatanyscale.Thisrestrainthasbeenmoreexplicitinrecentyears, especially since 2006, and, based on the States role as facilitator in the mining sector, the National DevelopmentMiningPlan(PlanNacionaldeDesarrolloMineroPNDM)hasclaimedthat:Bytheyear 2019 the Colombian mining industry will be one of the most important in LatinAmerica and meaningfullyincreaseditsparticipationintheColombianEconomy.26 Thecountrysnaturalabundanceanddiversitylenditselftothisobjective.Colombiasmineralwealth results directly from its varied geological environment and its mineral potential in iron, gold, aluminum, platinum, diamonds, emeralds, rare earths and even uranium. According to the Fraser institute, Colombia could be a great mining economy in Latin American, second only to Brazil.27 In 2005,35,783kgsofgold,1082kgsofplatinum,162,941tonsofrocksalt,311,055tonsofsolarorsea salt,8,814,774kilotonsofcementdestinedlimestone,5800tonsofcopperconcentrates,498,623tons ofironore,52,749tonsofnickel(ferronickel),59,064kilotonsofcoal,and6764kquilofemeraldswere [officially, formally] mined in Colombia.28 Colombias unique geographic location enhances this inherent mining potential it is the only country in South America with port access to both the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean, thus opening up trade and shipping routes to North and South America,EuropeandAsia. Inanefforttoattractforeigncapitalandtechnology,theMinistryofMinesandEnergystressesinits InvestorsGuidetoMininginColombiathatitsmineralpotentialisreadyforuseandprofit29through
25Minoratnica:Comunidadtnicaconstituidacomocomunidadespecfica,queocupaunaposicindesubordinacino marginacin social. Por tanto, la clave para la constitucin de minoras tnicas es la relacin que establecen con la poblacin mayoritaria. En este caso el trmino minora no se refiere al aspecto numrico, sino a la condicin de inferioridad 26Pleasesee:http://www.upme.gov.co/Upme12/Colombia_Minera_PNDM_2019.pdf 27Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/edicionimpresa/caratula/futurominero_49367.aspx 28RepblicadeColombia,MinisteriodeMinasyEnerga,UPMEUnidaddePlaneacinMineroEnergtica,PlanNacional ParaelDesarrolloMineroVisin2019,Bogot,2006,P.20 29MininganExcellentChoiceforInvestinginColombia:InvestorsGuide,p.3,7

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 ForeignDirectInvestment(FDI).Ithighlightstheexistenceofparticularzonesofinterestwherethe countrys mineral resources have yet to be fully exploited and developed.30 Further, the State encourages the reasonable development/exploitation of Stateowned and private mining resources,inpartbyrestrictingStateinterventionunlesswhereessential,i.e.toprotectnatural parks,ethnicgrouprightstocertainlandsorresourcesorStatesecurityinterests.31Followingthese objectivesofrestrainingitspublicinvolvementinminingtothebareminimumandwelcomingprivate investment to the maximum,32 FDI in Colombias mining sector has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years. In 1996, there was virtually no FDI in Colombias mining sector; by 2005, it surpassedUSD$900million.33In2007and2008,FDIinminingincreased92.3%fromUSD$1.1billion to $2.114 billion. By the first quarter of 2009, it had already reached USD $866 million. And, the mining export market grew correspondingly, jumping 17 percent in just one year, from USD $6.399 billionin2007toUSD$7.447billionin2008.34 AsenvisionedanddesiredbytheformerPastranaandUribeGovernments,theroleandpresenceof foreign companies in the exploration, exploitation and development of the mining sector has mushroomed. In October 2007, thirteen foreign companies were awarded mining titles for the explorationofpreciousmetals.Onlyfiveofthesecompaniesactuallypresentedformalproposalsfor exploration. By 2008, there were over 50 foreign companies requesting exploration titles, with a combined total of USD $150 million ready fordirect investment in the industry. In 2008 Colombias miningindustryaccountedfor2.6percentofthecountrysGDP,mainlyduetothecoalminingsector,35 andhasthepotentialtodoubleiftheproductionofothermetals,suchascopper,goldandzinc,grows asforecasted. In December, 2007, Anglo Gold Ashanti the second biggest multinational corporation based in Colombia,whereithasbeenactivesince1999discoveredanaturaldepositof13millionouncesof gold,afterhavinginvestedUSD$70millioninitsLaColosaexploratoryoperationsinCajamarca,Tolima Department.ThismineisnearlyonequarterthesizeoftheYanacochagoldmineinPeru,thebiggest goldmineintheworld.Followingthisdiscovery,AngloGoldmoveditsAmericasheadquartersfrom PerutoColombiawhereitisnowworkingon19differentminingprospectswith900staff,personnel andcontractorsintheregion.Theycover500pointsforgoldandmetalmininginalliancewithother corporations,suchasGlencore,B2GoldandMinerosS.A.36MinerosS.A.,formerlyknownasMineros ColombianosS.A.,isaprivateColombianminingcompanywhoseincometripledinlessthantenyears, fromCOP$25.33billionin1999toCOP$99.937billionin2007.37 The fact that international mining operations dominate the mining industry in Colombia is a long establishedpatternandpracticeinthecountry.SincethelegendofElDoradothatdrewthousandsof EuropeanstoseekforthelosttreasuresoftheGuatavitalagooninBoyac,theemeraldcraftedchallis named the lettuce, or the platinum first found by Spaniards mining for gold in the pacific Choc corridor,foreignershavehadalongandconspicuoushistoryinColombiasminingtrade.And,large
30Ibid,p.3 31Ibid,p.7,9 32Ibid,p.7 33Ibid,p.11 34TextofthespeechoftheMinisterofMinesandEnergyintheVInternationalMiningFairColombiaMinera,Medellin, September9,2009;pleasesee:http://www.minminas.gov.co/minminas/downloads/archivosEventos/5299.pdf 35Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/edicionimpresa/caratula/futurominero_49367.aspx 36Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/edicionimpresa/negocios/mineriacolombianadiamantebruto_45711.aspx 37Pleasesee:http://www.dinero.com/edicionimpresa/caratula/futurominero_49367.aspx

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scaleU.S.andBritishminingcorporationshavebeenoperatinginColombiasincethe19thcentury.They arenoteventhatforeigntoColombiastraditionalmineworkerswhopersistinanincrediblyharsh tradeandpolicyenvironment. ()[an]exampleisthearrivaloftheChocPacificoCompany,whichenteredtheregionin1916by the rivers Condoto, Itsmina, San Juan and Ir and by dredging these rivers obtained very important amountsofgoldandplatinum,whichinnowaycontributedtoprosperityoftheregionorthecountry. On the contrary, the dredging of rivers and monopoly reached there by the company led to intense social conflict. The company prevented people from rowing along those rivers and prevented the exploitation of the mineral deposits. After negotiations in 1974 Mineros Colombianos S.A Colombian MiningSAPacificboughttheChocoPacifico,creatingMinerosdelChocS.Athathadacrisisin1986. ThegovernmentestablishedtheMetalesPreciososdelChocS.Aandliquidatedthepreviousone,by scamming workers and pensioners by compensating their work and pension rights with shares. The liquidatormanagerofthisoperationwasthecurrentpresidentlvaroUribeVlez."Westillhavethe structures,machineryandruinsofwhatwasthatcompany,onethatbycasewasliquidatedtowards the80sbylvaroUribeVlezthePresidentcurrentlyinoffice.Soaroundthisarea,wealreadyknew thissirbeforehebecamepresidentbecausebesidesheisalsooneofthebiggestlandownersofthis department, he has many farms in Nuqu, and Belen de Bajir (Choco limits with Antioquias Uraba) "Aurelinosaid.38 TheColombianStatehasreduceditsowninvestmentsinthesectordowntoonlythoserequiredfor basic soil exploration. Nor does it discriminate between foreign and domestic investors when rewarding mining titles or concessions, although its flexible regulatory environment makes it a particularlyattractiveopportunityforFDI.39Forinstance,FDIintheminingsectorisonlysubjecttothe rules and regulations in the Mining Code and private arrangements between the investor and its contractingpartners.40And,theconcessioncontractistheonlylegalmechanismfordoingminework in Colombia; legal licenses for exploration and exploitation of smaller quantities of minerals were derogated by the 2001 Code. Under these neutral rules in mining policy, the principle first in time, first in right applies equally to big capital intensive global mining companies, small labor intensive Colombiancompanies,andtraditionalornativemine workers seeking to legally explore, exploit and develop their natural resources. Yet, access to information and greater resource capacity translates quickly into wealth in this industry, benefitting the corporateminingoperationoverthetraditionalmine workers, and the largescale foreign investors over the smaller scale domestic investors. This accumulationofwealthiscompoundedbyprovisions such as Article 61 , entitling concessionaires to exploit other minerals found during its exploration Pannedgoldwithassociatedplatinum. Photoby:FundacinOroVerde and exploitation of the mineral found in its concessioncontract,solongasitispossibletoprovethattheseothermineralsareintimatelylinked or associated to the contracted mineral, or, finally, that they are obtained as byproducts in the
38 Please see : http://www.periferiaprensa.org/joomla/index.php/edicionesanteriores/57edicion40/230chocoresiste alsaqueoyalconflicto 39MininganExcellentChoiceforInvestinginColombia:InvestorsGuide,p.13,14. 40Ibid,p.14

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exploitation of the mineral in the contract.41 For instance, in the Pacific Corridor, platinum may be collectedasabyproductofalluvialgoldmining.42 Work contracts for mining operations may be fixed term contracts not longer than three years, contractsforaspecifictaskordurationoftime,orforanindefiniteterm,andconcessionairesmayhire national or foreign workers; however, if both Colombian and nonColombian workers are employed, thelawestablishesthatColombianpersonnelmustreceiveatleast70percentofthetotalpayrollfor specialists, directors or trust and reliance staff, and at least 80 percent of the ordinary workers payroll.43Also,theColombianStateretainsroyaltyrightsovertheestimatedvalueattheedgeofany mine,anobligationthatbeginswhentheexploitationcontractisexecutedandremainsthroughoutthe durationofthecontract.44 TheminingtradeenvironmentinColombiarevealstheexistenceofmanymoreactorsthantheState anditsconcessionaires,theyarethefollowing: TheStateinitsintermingledrolesoflawmakerandsoleownerofallmineralsinColombia; Private landowners of the properties on or under which minerals are found and will be exploited, who must allow the exploration and exploitation of the minerals, as these are ownedbytheState;proprietorsmaycollectarentperhectarethatisexploredintheirland. Amongtheselandowners,therewillbe(a)individualandfamilyownersofprivateproperty, (b) municipal or departmental public property, and (c) afroColombian and indigenous communitiesthatareprivate,butcollectivepropertyowners. Largescalenationalindustrialminingcompanies Largescaleforeignindustrialminingcompanies Emergingmediumscalenationalindustrialminingcompanies Emergingmediumscaleforeignindustrialminingcompanies Thesmallscaleminingoperationsofnationalmineworkingfamiliesandcommunitiesthat persistinthisindustryas(a)atraditionalwayoflivelihoodand/or(b)anancestralethno culturalidentityandwayoflivelihood Individual, family and communities engaged in own account artisanal mining who are (a) exercising their constitutional right to work and entrepreneur for a life with dignity and development and/or (b) exercising their constitutional rights and preserving their ethno culturalidentityandlivelihood. Marketintermediariessuchasindividualsbuyingemeraldsonasmallscaleorgoldshopsin villagesbuyingfrombothinformalandformalmineworkersatanyscale. IndustrialbuyersfromindustrialmineconcessionsinColombiaorabroad Smallandmediumcommercialbuyersanduserslikejewelersandothermanufacturers Theendconsumerofextractedmineralsormetals

41Ibid,p.8 42Jorge/JewelryShopOwner/rrainterview/2010/Cali 43MininganExcellentChoiceforInvestinginColombia:InvestorsGuide,p.19. 44Ibid,p.16

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 In 2007, the Ministry of Mines and Energy developed an administrative strategy to create mining districtsthroughoutthecountry;thisstrategywasfinallyincorporatedintotheMiningCodethrough Law 1382 of 2010.45 Following the strategy, Colombia is divided into 31 mining districts spaced out mainly in the western part of the country around the Andean mountain ranges. These districts are strategiczonesofgeologicalinterestwhereminingconstitutesanimportantsocioeconomicactivity. Inanyminingdistrict,producersandcontractorsinvolvedinlegal,competitiveandsustainablemining businesses(andexcludinginformalbusinesses)amongotherstakeholders,suchasCSOs,CBOs,trade unions,academia,andterritorialinstitutions,suchastherelevantDepartmentsandMunicipalities carry out the planning and management of mining production in the district, as well as act as the sustainable authority of all mining in the production and value chain, all in light of territorial development and focusing on mining businesses, simultaneously with the institutional part, whilst pointingoutthevision,thepoliticaloutlookandtheDevelopmentPlanningoftheCountryitself.46 AMiningDistrictisidentifiedfirstbythepresenceofmineralproductionchains,whichestablishthe characteristicsofeachoftheprocessesdeveloped,thetechnologiesused,thevariablescontrolled,the human talent involved, as well as the markets and institutions that participate in their development andthatimpactthesocial,economicandenvironmentalissuesoftheterritory.Withthisinformation, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, together with the departmental and municipal authorities, the producers,thebusinessowners,theserviceprovidersintheregion,willdeterminethecharacteristics and parameters of the territory forming the Mining District. Parameters must refer to common geologicalfeaturesandbiophysicalaspectsoftheterritory,aswellascommonsocial,cultural,political andeconomicproblemsandopportunities.47 Evidently,thetradeenvironmentformineworkerslivingandworkinginpovertyisdiverseintermsof actorsinvolved,aswellasthemineralsandwealthbeingextracted;evenmore,itisdrivenbyaglobal competitive force and a law and policy framework that only acknowledges and serves the concessionaires,producersandcontractorswhoaredeemedtobeinvolvedinlegal,competitiveand sustainableminingbusinesses.Meanwhile,thelivesandlivelihoodsofmineworkerslivinginpoverty although de jure and de facto48 illegal and thus nonexistent in the policy is, in fact, persistent and comesfromalong,involvedhistoryinColombia.

3.3.LIVELIHOODOFRURALMINEWORKERS
3.3.1ETHNOCULTURALMINORITIES WithoutprejudicetotheimportantmineworkofColombianmestizoes49(whoareunidentifiableasa specificethnoculturalcommunity)andwhomayalsocarryownaccountmineworkasatraditional
45Law1382de2010 46RepblicadeColombia,DistritosMinerosCD/cartilla 47Ibid 48Pleasesee:http://www.imcportal.com/contenido.php?option=shownews&newsid=5695&render=page 49 () probably more than any other LatinAmerican people, Colombians remained consciousof their Spanishheritage. ThepersistentsupremacyandrelativepurityoftheSpanishheritagewasbroughtaboutbyacombinationoffactors.The indigenouspopulationwassparse,heterogeneous,andthusrelativelyeasilysubdued,drivenintolessaccessibleandless

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 occupation, it is Colombias indigenous and afrodescendant constituents who have the higher and more direct stakes in the publicdecision making processes related to mining. This is due to the fact thattheirlivelihoodandreligiousbeliefsstronglydependontheirterritorialancestrallands,whichis oftenwherevaluablemineralsmaybefound.Thesegroupsaremademorevulnerableintermsoftheir capacity for governance, due to their distance from the decisionmaking circuits in Bogota and the possibility for ethnocultural discrimination and even of selfdiscrimination. At the same time and throughout Colombian history, it is in their labor identity that indigenous and afrodescendant Colombianshaveheldhigherstakesinthelegalandpoliticalframework.Thousandsofgenerationsof indigenous communities working in goldsmithing and later in Spaniardowned mines, and five centuries of Africans and afroColombians doing the same, have created an identity in the mining culture that is historically justifiable. Indeed, when analyzing ethnocultural rapports with the livelihoodsofinformalmineworkersinpoverty,Colombiasindigenousandafrocommunitiesholda placeoftheirown. 3.3.2.THEINDIGENOUSMINEWORKERSHISTORY After Columbus arrival to the Americas, two arguments were advanced to support Spanish colonizationintheregion,synthesizedfrankly:(1)thelandwasemptyandfirstdiscoveredbythem, because(2)theindigenousfoundlivingonthoselandswerenotpersons50Thisformallyauthorizedthe taking of that land and turning its inhabitants into Catholics i.e. servants for the glory of both the SpanishcrownandtheCatholicChurch.WithintheMesoAmericanPreHispanicChibchaculture(also known as the Muiscas) there were many organized communities and tribes living in agricultural economies;theirpoliticalorganizationwasthatofthecacicazgo,astheywereruledbythecacique, andhadawellestablishedsocialhierarchy.Infact,thediscoveredlandwasnot,,discovered;ithad just been unknown to the Europeans. The Chibchas or Muiscas were linguistically, culturally and politicallyorganizedandtradedwithotherautochthonouscommunitiesuptotheMayananddownto theIncanempiresnorthandsouthofwhatisnowknownasColombia..Amongotheroccupationsand skills,Chibchasperformedsalt,emeraldsandgoldmining.Salt,whichwasaveryvaluablecommodity (tothepointthatitisattheoriginofthewordsalaryfromtheLatinsalarium)wasusedfortrade, while silver, emeralds and gold were collected end extracted for crafting objects that were usually associatedwithpoliticalpower51Gold,infact,representedthesun,andsilverthelightofthemoon,
desirable areas or absorbed by the Spanish population during the colonial era. Blacks, viewed as slaves until the mid nineteenth century and as manual laborers thereafter, remained segregated economically, geographically, and socially. AlthoughIndiansandblacksoutnumberedwhitesandpeopleofmixedbloodincertainregions,theyremainedminorities without shared identity or cohesion on the national level. The lack of immigrants from other European nations and the emphasis on traditional Spanish institutionsparticularly Roman Catholicism helped white Colombians retain their Hispanicidentification.Finally,adiversegeographyandresultantregionalismexacerbatedthelackofcommunalfeelings amongthemassesandprovidedlittlebasisfornationalcohesionwithinanygroupexceptthetightlyknitwhiteelite.As Colombiansocietydeveloped,therewaslittlechangeinitsrigidstratification.Variousintellectuals,clergy,andpoliticians unsuccessfullyattemptedtodebatethestatusofIndiansandblacksandtopreventdiscriminationagainstthem.Beinga recognizedmemberofthenationalsocietyandtherebyeligibleforitsbenefitsandachanceatupwardmobilityrequired allegiance to a culture and a behavioral pattern based almost entirely on traditional Spanish values. () http://www.countrystudies.com/colombia/raceandethnicity.html 50RobertoCarlosVidal/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C. 51ThesaltandemeraldminesofthecazicazgothatwerelocatedaroundwhereBogotaexiststodayplayedsignificantroles intheseMesoamericancommunities.Theseasaltmines/extensionsoftheWayuuscommunityintheGuajiraDepartment, are still active today and under the rule of the Colombian Statethat currently has an exceptional type of publicprivate concessionforoperatingthemthroughartisanalminework.(ConcessionSalinas)

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 both of which were linked to these communities and peoples religious beliefs, traditions and practices.Althoughtheprimaryemphasisongoldandsilver,andperhapsotherminerals,wassocio politicalratherthaneconomic,theextractionofgoldwascommon.Goldsmithingreacheditspinnacle intheAmericasamongtheQuimbayas,whosepiecesweresoappreciatedthattheyhavebeenfound asfarasPeruandMexico52.Duringcolonialtimes,Colombiaproduced40percentoftheworldsgold.53 In the early 16th century, the Spanish enteredColombia by way of the Caribbean coast and founded theirfirstcitiesUrabaandDarienin1509.Later,astheirneedforconqueringgreaterlandsgrew, along with evidence of Colombias abundant gold and the legend of El Dorado, these conquerors moved inland. Modern Bogota was, in fact, the Spanish pronunciation of the Chibcha word Bacata, andwasfoundedasthecapitalofthekingdomofNewGranada(adirectallusiontotheprovinceof GrenadeinthesouthofSpain)inthequestforaroutetoElDorado,whichwassupposedlyfoundat thebottomoftheGuatavitalagoon.Becausetheyusedgoldforartisticreligiouspurposesandnotasa commodity,theEuropeansthoughttheindigenouspeoplewereprofoundlyuncivilized:
"Sogreatarethetreasuresthatinthesepartsarelost,andwhathasbeenhad,iftheSpanishhadnot havehadit,certainlythemajorityofallofitwillbeofferedtothedevilandtheirtemplesandtombs, wheretheyburiedtheirdead,becausethesedonotevenwantitnorseekitforanythingelse(..)."54

Although tightly and culturally linked to minerals and with theirtraditionofminework,thebeliefsofindigenouspeoples even today relate differently to minerals than other cultures in Colombia. Grosso modo it is possible to say that opening Mother Nature to extract and exploit minerals on a massive scale for profit accumulation is against their beliefs and cosmology;howevertherespectfulcollectionandextraction of minerals for spiritualartistic purposes is possible and justifiable. The Spaniards expansive mining operations for producing and exporting commodities created then a tremendous physical and cultural shock; the indigenous peoplesbodieswerenotfitforintensiveminelaborandthe aggression to their autonomy and beliefs explained why manycommittedmasssuicide.Despitethegoodintentionsof the Spanish Law of Burgos, which intended to respect and was aimed to protect the natives of the Americas,indigenouspeoplesbecameenslavedintheirownancestralterritories,puttoworkmining goldandproducinggoldcoinsandingotsthatwerelatershippedfromCartagenatoSevilleandLisbon via the Atlantic Ocean. Meanwhile, the legend of El Dorado and its extraordinary wealth spread throughoutEurope,beckoningthousandsofEuropeanpiratestotheCaribbeancoastsofColombiaand theAmericas.TheseEuropeaninvadersgrewwealthyoffthesweatandlaborofindigenousworkers, whominedthegoldtreasuredbytheSpanishandcovetedbytheFrench,DutchandEnglishpirates. TherushforgoldwassuchthatinFebruary1586,SirFrancisDrake,enjoyingtheprotectionofQueen
52TheQuimbayasmostfamoussymbolisthepoporo,adeviceusedbyindigenousculturesinpresentandpreColumbian SouthAmericaforstorageofsmallamountsoflime(mineral).Itisconstitutedbytwopieces:therecipientandthelidthat includesapinthatisusedtocarrythelimetothemouthwhilechewingcocaleaves.Sincethechewingofcocaissacredfor the indigenous people, the poporos are also attributed with mystical powers and social status. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poporo 53JavierOcampoLopez,TesorosLegendariosdeColombiayelMundo,Plaza&Janes,Bogot2004,p.13 54PedroCiezadeLen,CrnicadelPer,inTesorosLegendariosdeColombiayelMundo,p.72

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 ElizabethI,attackedandsitedthecityofCartagenadeIndiaswith19blackflaggedshipsfornearly twomonths. InColombia,colonizationadvancedthroughthreeSpanishinstitutionsthatallowedtheexploitationof indigenous people for agricultural and mining activities: the encomienda, the mita and the resguardos.55 The encomienda was intended to develop the land, civilize the people and spread the Catholicfaith.Intheencomienda,whichwasakindoflandassignmentorconcessionundertheLawof Burgos, the Spaniards who had sufficient economic capacity and knowledge of land distribution and managementwereentitledtoIndiansworkingfortheminexchangeforaccommodationandfood. While in theory the law of Burgos recognized the property and respect due to indigenous people in their capacity as loyal subjects of the crown, in practice the law was twisted and the encomenderos endedupowningthelandoftheindigenousandexploitingtheirfreelabor.Theencomenderoswere senttoinhospitableareas,whereeventheCatholicChurchmissionswouldnotgo,anditwaspossible for several thousand indigenous people to be living under one single Spanish encomienda. These Spanishterritorialorganizationseventuallyturnedintosettledvillages.Theindigenousbecamevassals under the encomiendas, which eventually became the backbone of the Spanish economic administrationofagriculturalandminingactivitiesinitsAmericancolonies.Annexedtoencomiendas, mines and imposed mine work on indigenous people were a separate and distinct socioeconomic organizationdevelopedundertheformofmitas.And,finally,theresguardoorshelterwasaself governedindigenousspacecreatedbythecolonialauthoritieswhereindigenouscommunitiesworking inthemitaweretosleepandrest.Resguardos,althoughadministeredbytheindigenouspeople,were stillsubordinatetotheencomiendaandtoitsSpaniardencomenderoruler. As mining became an economic institutional practice of the Spanish colonial administration, the indigenous mining practices, which had been developed over centuries for religious, artistic and politicalpurposes,wereforciblytranslatedintohardcoremineworkforexploitationandcommodity export. The related preColombian arts and crafts, such as goldsmithing, soon disappeared as indigenous communities and culture were destroyed. The indigenous population itself diminished drasticallyduetotheirresistancetotheconquerors,theirenslavedworkintheminesandtheillnesses introduced by the Europeans. In short, the Spanish managed to master a quantitatively important group, that of the Chibcha [Culture] and established their dominance at the expense of a further decline of the indigenous group but without destroying it altogether in territories of the indigenous PastosandQuillacingasandsomepartsoftheupperValledelCauca.Inalmostallotherregionsthe groupsdisappearedundertheprocessofdomination().56 3.3.3.THEAFROCOLOMBIANMINEWORKERSHISTORY Facingadiminishingpopulationofindigenousworkers,theSpanishbegantohuntandtrafficAfricans toColombia,whowerebelievedtobephysicallystrongerthantheindigenous.Thispracticebeganin 1533,peakedinthe17thcenturyandendedin181057withtheabolitionofhumantraffickinginthe
55 Please see http://www.colombialink.com/01_INDEX/index_historia/02_la_conquista/0_0003_indigenas_epoca_conquista.html 56Pleasesee: http://www.colombialink.com/01_INDEX/index_historia/02_la_conquista/0_0003_indigenas_epoca_conquista.html 57Pleasesee:http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/marzo2010/antioquia.htm http://www.todacolombia.com/etnias/afrocolombianos/manumision.html :

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 19thcenturyundertheeffortsofJoseFelixRestrepoandJoseManuelRestrepo.WhiletheBritishand otherEuropeancountriesweretraffickingAfricanstotheAmericas,theSpanishandPortuguesemade theColombianportofCartagenathemainHispanictradeportforAfricanslavesinthe17thcentury. Lusitania (Portugal) had been annexed to the Spanish empire in 1580 and, subsequently, Spain strengthened its trafficking capacity with human resources, naval capacity and knowledge based on whatthePortuguesehaddevelopedonAfricasWestcoast.TheminingcultureoftheseWestAfrican peoples who had been extracting gold thatwas sent to Europe viaancient Saharan traderoutes madethemespeciallyattractivehumancapitalfortheSpanishandPortuguesecolonialoperationsin theAmericas.SpanishKingFelipeIIdecidedtocomplementthediminishingindigenouslaborforcein his American colonies with this African labor force,58 one that was quite possibly already well experiencedinmining.ThisWestAfricanpopulationwaseventuallybroughttotheminesandsugar millsofmodernColombiaandotherregionsoftheKingdomofNewGranada.59 The first Africans that arrived to Colombia were mainly from the Guinean river zone, Cape Verde and the lands betweenSenegalandSierraLeone.Inlateryears,Africans were enslaved and trafficked from the Volta river region aroundwhatareknowntodayasthecountriesofGhana, Togo,andBenin;and,laterstill,Africansfromtheislandof Tome, and the countries of Congo, Angola, and the old kingdom of Kongo, were brought to work in Colombia.60 Their presence grew significantly over time. In 1618, the
PaintingofSanPedroClaverinCartagenadeIndias. Jesuit Carlos de Orta described to his father his first Photoby:AdrianaRuizRestrepo impressionswhenarrivingtoCartagenadeIndias: "Theseplacesaresohot,thatrightnowbeinginthemiddleofwinter,itfeelshotterthanin summerheat.Blackslavesarearound1,400andtheygoaroundthecityalmostnaked.Human bodiesareconstantlybathedinsweat.Foodsarecoarseandinsipid.Thereisasevereshortage offreshwater,anddrinkingwaterisalwayswarm...Asforforeigners,nocityinAmerica,to

58IntroducingAfricanlaborforceintheAmericaswasevenconsideredbyFrayBartolomdelasCasas,apriestbasedat whatisnowknownasMexico,whoinitsdesperationforprotectingthediminishingindigenous,supportedtheintroduction ofAfricanlaborforce.Howeverwhenhelaterlearntin1540ofthesufferingofthetraffickedGuineaslavesthroughthe FranciscanpriestsinSpain,hethenturnedintoanenemyofanytypeofslavery.InhisHistoryoftheIndieshedeeply regrets his mistake: No and one thousand times no, peace everywhere and for every man, peacewithout difference of race!ThereisonlyoneGod,uniqueandtruetoallthepeoples,indigenously,pagan,Greeksandbarbariansforallofwhom hesufferedanddied.Youcanbesurethattheconquestoftheseterritoriesoverseaswasaninjustice,youactastyrans! You have proceeded with violence and have covered all with blood and fire, you have made slaves, you have taken treasures and taken the life and land of men who lived here pacifically. Do you think that God has preferences for one people over the others? Do you think that he has favored you with something additional that that generous nature concedestoall?Woulditbeatallfairthatallthegracesofheavenandallthetreasuresintheearthwouldbedestinedonly toyou?()IthoughtthatblacksweremoreresistantthantheindigenousthatIsawdyingalongthestreetsandpretended to prevent a bigger suffering with a lesser one..[my thought] has been a mistake and is an unforgivable guilt, that was contrarytoalllawandallfaith,asitinfactdeservedallcondemnationtohunttheblacksinthecoastsof Guineaasifthey werewildanimals,puttheminships,transportthemtothewesternindiesandsellthemthereasitisdoneeverydayand ineverymoment(Translationoftheauthors)http://mgar.net/var/lascasas.htmand http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/bib_autor/bartolomedelascasas/pcuartonivel.jsp?conten=autor 59Pleasesee:http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/ayudadetareas/geografia/geo101.htm 60Pleasesee:http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/geografia/afro/demograf.htm,and http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/geografia/geofraf1/huellas.htm

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 whatissaid,hassomanyasthis,itisanemporiumofalmostallnations;fromheretheypart tonegotiatetoQuito,Mexico,Peru,andotherkingdoms,thereisgoldandsilver.Butthemost common merchandise is black slaves. Merchants go to buy them at most vile prices to the coastsofAngolaandGuinea,bringtheminoverloadedshipstothisport,wheretheymakethe firstsaleswithincredibleprofit;thosewhoarenotsoldarereembarked."61 InCartagena,Africansweresoldtothoseinneedofworkersfortheirsugarcaneplantations,domestic servants,ormineworkers,inotherwords,totheownersofthelandsthataredemarcatedtodayasthe departments of Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Antioquia and Choc. There was, however, a considerable volumeofillegalhumantraffickingcarriedoutininformalportsalongthecoastsofColombia. More than 500 years later, and after the departure of the Spaniards following Colombias independencein1810,mostofthedescendentsoftheseindigenousandAfricanslaves,togetherwith the European race of the Spaniards, became mestizoes. Others, who are more pure in their ethno culturalorigin,remainidentifiedasmembersofindigenousorAfroColombiancommunities.Ineither case,allareconstituentsofthecontemporaryColombianState.Asmuchastheircultureandheritage wasmergedintothenowpredominantmestizorace62ofColombians,stronganddistinctindigenous and African languages, cultures and religions are still found in Colombia. The descendants of indigenous communities that moved far away from the encomiendas centuries ago and the descendants of former slaves that sought refuge or turned inland to Colombias humid jungles are today fully and legally entitled constituents of the Colombian state, and constitutionally protected ethnoculturalcommunities.Inlightofmininglaw,itshouldthenbeexpectedtoseeclearandsolid formal opportunities and protection for the mine work of these communities, especially considering theirstrongandlonghistoryandidentitywithminework.Whetherforartandreligionorenslavedfor satisfyingthegreedofslavemasters,Colombianindigenousandafrodescendantsarealllinkednot onlytothelandstheyoriginallyownedorweredraggedtobytheSpanishconquistadors,butalsoto mineworkasaformoflivelihood. Infact,thenandnow,andforanygivencommunity,landgrantsbothindividualsandcommunitiesa spaceforliving,developingalivelihood,earningincomeandcreatingwealthandwelfare,aswellasthe possibilityofnurturingacollectiveculturalidentity.Thisisespeciallytruewhenacommunityssocial, economic and cultural traditions are intrinsically linked to land, as is the case with many indigenous and afrodescendant communities in Colombia. Indeed, throughout Colombian history and its numerous political administrations, these two ethnocultural communities of Colombia have claimed recognitionoftheirancestralandcommunallandrights.TheColombianPoliticalConstitutionof1991 affirmsthattheirclaimsarelegitimateandaddressestwodifferentcommunallandregimes,onefor indigenouspeopleandtheotherforafrodescendantcommunitiesorafroColombians.63 3.3.4.INDIGENOUSRESERVATIONSLANDREGIMEORRESGUARDOS Severalarticlesofthe1991Constitutionestablishindigenouspeoplesrighttoland.Articles329and 330 are worthy of special mention Article 329 establishes the indigenous territories, known as
61Pleasesee:http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/geografia/afro/demograf.htm 62ColombianmestizoesareacombinationofSpaniard,IndigenousandAfricanblood. 63ThePoliticalConstitutionof1991andpursuantlegislationreferstoAfrodescendantorAfroColombiancommunitiesas blackcommunities.Inthisreport,referencestoblackcommunitiesareonlyusedtoindicatetheexactwordingofthe 1991Constitution;otherwise,weusethetermsAfrodescendantorAfroColombianinsubstitutethereof.

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 resguardos,andArticle330clarifieshowtheseterritorieswillbegoverned;Article330alsoestablishes otherprotectionsforindigenousrightsovertheresguardos,including,forinstance,therighttoprior consultation, whichis discussed in greater detail below.64 Inaddition to theseconstitutional norms, Article2ofDecree2164of1995furtherdefinesresguardoswithinthelaw,whileDecree2164of1995 and Chapter 6 of Law 1152 of 2007 also regulate these communal indigenous lands (see paragraph 231).TheseresguardosarehometoalargenumberofColombianconstituents:thereareover567 resguardos covering approximately 36.500.416 hectares in Colombia, where 67,503 families live, totalingjustlessthanamillionpeople.IntheAmazondepartment,thereare120resguardoswhere56 indigenouspeoplescommunitieslive65.AndinthePacificregion,thereare104resguardosinChoc, 37inAntioquia,36inCauca,34inNarioand17inValledelCauca,totalingover20,000indigenous familiesinthisregionalone.66 For the purposes of this report, Law 21 of 1991 is worthy of great attention, as it is the domestic legislationratifyingILOConvention169regardingtherightsofindigenouspeople,includingtheirright tocollectiveproperty.Article13ofLaw21of1991explainsthatthegovernmentmustacknowledge the special importance that indigenous people, in accordance with their cultural and spiritual traditions, give to land.67 And, Article 14 of Law 21 of 1991 places governments under an explicit obligation to recognize indigenous communities right to property and possession over land and territoriesthattheyhavebeentraditionallyoccupying.68Article14alsoprovidesforindigenousaccess tolandthathasnotevenbeenexclusivelyandtraditionallyoccupiedbythem.69Article15definestheir right to prior consultation with regard to decisions concerning natural resources on their lands; in Colombia,thisrighthasbeenraisedtothestatusofafundamentalrightunderthejurisprudenceofthe Constitutional Court, which has also extended this right to afroColombian ethnocultural communities.70
64Articles329and300,PoliticalConstitutionofColombiaof1991 65Pleasesee:http://www.corpoamazonia.gov.co/Region/Jur_resguardos.htm 66Pleasesee:http://www.colombiabuena.com/colombia/tag/resguardosindigenas 67Article13,Law21of1991isarticle13oftheILOconventionthatestablishesthat:1.Inapplyingtheprovisionsofthis PartoftheConventiongovernmentsshallrespectthespecialimportancefortheculturesandspiritualvaluesofthepeoples concernedoftheirrelationshipwiththelandsorterritories,orbothasapplicable,whichtheyoccupyorotherwiseuse,and inparticularthecollectiveaspectsofthisrelationship.2.TheuseofthetermlandsinArticles15and16shallincludethe conceptofterritories,whichcoversthetotalenvironmentoftheareaswhichthepeoplesconcernedoccupyorotherwise use. 68 Article 14, Law 21 of 1991 is article 14 of the ILO convention that establishes that: 1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized. In addition, measuresshallbetakeninappropriatecasestosafeguardtherightofthepeoplesconcernedtouselandsnotexclusively occupiedbythem,buttowhichtheyhavetraditionallyhadaccessfortheirsubsistenceandtraditionalactivities.Particular attentionshallbepaidtothesituationofnomadicpeoplesandshiftingcultivatorsinthisrespect.2.Governmentsshalltake steps as necessary to identify the lands which the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective protectionoftheirrightsofownershipandpossession.3.Adequateproceduresshallbeestablishedwithinthenationallegal systemtoresolvelandclaimsbythepeoplesconcerned. 69Ibid,Article14 70Article15,ILO169andLaw21of1991:1.Therightsofthepeoplesconcernedtothenaturalresourcespertainingto their lands shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to participate in the use, managementandconservationoftheseresources.2.IncasesinwhichtheStateretainstheownershipofmineralorsub surface resources or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests wouldbeprejudiced,beforeundertakingorpermittinganyprogramsfortheexplorationorexploitationofsuchresources

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 3.3.5.AFROCOLOMBIANSCOMMUNALLANDSREGIMEORTERRITORIOSCOMUNITARIOS Although the Constitutional Court has extended certain provisions of Law 21 to afroColombian communitiesrightstoland,thereisanentirelyseparatelegalframeworkunderColombianlawthatis designedtoprotectthelandrightsofthesecommunitiesinparticular.Thislegalframeworkemanates from the Constitution, specifically; Provisional Article 55 of the Constitution establishes a legislative obligation to create a special law relevant for afroColombian territories. This Article states that by 1993,orwithinatwoyearperiodfromthetimetheConstitutionwaspromulgated,theCongressshall create a law recognizing the collective property rights of black communities that have been occupyingnonprivateStatelandintheruralzonesandrivershoresofColombiasPacificbasinorother zones with similar conditions.71 Under Article 55, the communities collective property rights are linkedtotheirtraditionalproductionpractices,inotherwords,theirlivelihoodsarerecognizedasbeing related to their cultural identity, which enjoys a special relationship to the land and territories they occupy, own and access. Article 55 evidences the constitutional will to create a special body of law recognizing the property and land rights of afroColombian communities, with the intention of promoting their socioeconomic development, while safeguarding their own cultures and traditions, justasitwasdecidedforethnoculturalindigenouspeoples ProvisionalArticle55oftheColombianConstitutionwaspromulgatedthroughLaw70of1993,which appliesbroadlytothePacificbasinregionofColombia.72UnderLaw70,Article1,blackcommunities who have been occupying State lands in rural zones in the Pacific basin, following their traditional means of production, enjoy a right to collective property over these lands.73 Article 1 establishes certain mechanisms protecting these communities cultural identities and promoting their socio economic development, so that these communities may enjoy equality in terms of access to opportunities for development that have been made available to other segments of Colombian society.74 The land subject to the protections and measures in Law 70 are termed territorios comunitarios or communal territories. These territorios comunitarios are the equivalent of the resguardosinthattheyarethelandsworthyofspecialprotectionsunderColombianlawduetotheir sociocultural, economic and traditional importance to a group of people, i.e., afroColombians or indigenous people, respectively. And, as with resguardos, the territorios comunitarios may not be mortgagedorsold,preciselybecauseoftherelationshipbetweenthelandandtheculturalidentityof afroColombiancommunitiesandthecollectivenatureofpropertyland.75
pertainingtotheirlands.Thepeoplesconcernedshallwhereverpossibleparticipateinthebenefitsofsuchactivities,and shallreceivefaircompensationforanydamageswhichtheymaysustainasaresultofsuchactivities. 71PoliticalConstitutionofColombia,Article55:Withinthetwoyearsfollowingtheenteringintoeffectofthepresent Constitution, Congress will issue, following a study by a special commission that the government will create for that purpose, a law which will recognize the right to collective property of the black communities which occupy uncultivated [nonprivateStateland]intheruralzonesadjoiningtheriversofthePacificbasininaccordancewiththeirtraditionalmeans of production. This law will apply to the area stipulated there in () property that will be recognized will only be transferable within the limits stipulated by the law ().The same law will create mechanisms to protect the cultural identitiesandtherightsofthesecommunitiestofostertheireconomicandsocialdevelopment. 72ThedepartmentofChoc,isoneofthemostbiodiverseplacesintheworld,islocatedinthisregionandishometoX%X millionofColombiasAfrodescendantpopulation.Duetoitsbiodiversityandvastnaturalresources,thisregionhasalso been the focus of intense mineral extraction and exploitation, prompting some Colombian legislators (Senator .Odin Sanchez) to present a bill pursuant to declare the Biogeographic Choc Region in an environmental crisis warranting additionalofficialgovernmentprotection. 73Law70of1993,Article1 74Ibid 75Ibid,Article7

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 Under Article 3 of Law 70, the lands that were collectively occupied or occupied historically as ancestral settlements of afrodescendant communities within Colombia, used collectively as their habitatandwherethesecommunitiesdevelopedandcontinuedtopracticetheirtraditionaleconomic means of production warrant special protection.76 These lands are where communities of afro Colombians developed and practiced economic activities and techniques for agriculture, mining, timber and forest extraction, animal farming, hunting, fishing, and gathering natural resources to preservetheirwayoflife.77Relatingtheimportanceofworkandlivelihoodtotheseoccupiedlands clarifies that, as portrayed by Law 70, Colombian lawmakers understand that the survival of afro Colombian communities is related to their traditional sociocultural economic activities, including, among other things, mining. In other words, mining is one of the traditional economic activities (livelihoods)ofafroColombiancommunitiesthatistiedtotheirculturalidentity.Thelawestablishes thatwithintheseterritorioscomunitarios,therewillbelegallyrecognizedcommunitycouncils,which will work as internal administrative organs of the people living within the designated lands.78 These councilswillhave,amongotherfunctions,theabilityandresponsibilitytodemarcatedifferentareas withinthecommunallandtofacilitate,forinstance,theuseofthecommunallandforfamilyfarming units and other economic activities taking place within the territorios comunitarios.79 Of particular importance is that although this provision does not create individual land titling regimes within the territorioscomunitarios,itdoesauthorizethedemarcationofcommunalland,therebyrecognizingthe discreteeconomicneedsanddiverseeconomicactivitiesthatwillbetakingplaceinternally. Asmaybeexpected,therearevariousprovisionswithinArticle70relatingtotheresourcesfoundon territorios comunitarios. Article 6 clarifies that whatever rights may be extended to afroColombian communitiesvisvistheircommunallands,therenewableandnonrenewableresourcesexistingor found on that land are NOT encompassed within those rights, excepting topsoil and forest timber.80 TheColombiangovernmentretainssoleownershipovertheothernaturalresources,eveniflocatedon thecommunallandsofafroColombians. Atthesametime,Chapter4ofLaw70recognizesthatafroColombianshavebeenusingtheirnatural resourcesandtheirterritorialenvironmentstosustainanddeveloptheirsocial,culturalandeconomic traditions. Article19ofChapter4,forinstance,referstothetraditionalpracticesexercisedbyafro Colombiancommunitiesonthewaters,beachesandshoresofthePacificbasinandtheflora,fruitsand faunaoftheforestsandwatersforfood,housing,domesticorworkrelatedconstruction(e.g.,canoes, tools,etc.).81Becausetheseusesarerecognizedunderlaw,theydonotrequireanyofficialpermission orlicensesfromthecentraladministrationfortheircontinuedpractice.Thesenaturalresourcesmay beusedinthesediscretewayssoastoguaranteetheirpersistenceinquantityandqualityovertime,as well as to preserve the economic and cultural traditions of the communities living in the territorios comunitarios. In fact, hunting, fishing and the gathering of produce and fauna for subsistence purposes are given preference over any other commercial, semiindustrial or industrial use of the naturalresourcesfoundonthesedesignatedlands.82Despiteitsintention,thisempoweringprovision
76Ibid,Article3,Definition6 77Law70of1993,Article3,Definition7 78Ibid,Article5 79Ibid 80Ibid,Article6 81Ibid,Article19 82Ibid

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 ofLaw70is,unfortunately,notpracticedinreality,especiallyconsideringtheMiningCodeof2001and the persistent violence in the Pacific basin. Indeed, one of the consequences of this violence is the displacementofcommunitiesandthelargeswathsoflandleftunoccupiedintheirwake.Evenifthis land is technically designated as territorios comunitarios, few afroColombian inhabitants remain to takeadvantageoftheprotectionsgrantedbyArticle19ofChapter4ofLaw70;manyhavemigratedto citieslikeCaliseekingbetteropportunitiesandprotection. Law70containsseveralprovisionsrelatingspecificallytominingonterritorioscomunitarios.Article26 of Chapter 5 of Law 70 says that the Ministry of Mines and Energy may, on its own initiative or by petition, identify mining zones within these communal lands.83 These mining zones will be for the exploration and exploitation of natural nonrenewable resources, which will occur under special conditionstoensuretheprotectionandparticipationofafroColombiancommunitiesinthesemining operationsand,aboveall,topreservetheculturalandeconomiccharacteristicsofthesecommunities, withoutprejudicetoanyrightsacquiredbythirdpartiesthereto.84Thisarticleineffectsaysthatthe Ministry of Mines and Energy may impose certain conditions for mining operations on territorios comunitarios, and these conditions may be specifically aimed at preserving the social, cultural and economictraditionsoftheafroColombianslivingonthoselands.ThatthisconcernisexpressedinLaw 70thecomprehensivelawcreatedpursuanttotheConstitutionalwillexpressedinprovisionArticle 55ofthe1991ConstitutiontoprotectafrodescendantcommunitiesinColombiaillustratesthatthe connection between land, mining and these ethnocultural minorities was not only well known to policy makers, but recognized as necessary for their cultural identity and their survival as a distinct people.Article27ofChapter5ofLaw70,infact,statesthatafroColombiancommunitieswillenjoy the preferential right to special licenses for mineral exploration and exploitation on their territorios comunitarios.85 Eight years after Law 70 was published, the Colombian Mining Code was entered into effect by Law 691 of 2001. Not only did it amend existing laws, legislation and regulation applicable the mining industry,iteliminatedtheprovisionforpreferentiallicensesgrantedtoAfroColombiansunderLaw70. Under the Mining Code of 2001, there is now only one legal contract for mining the concession contract and licenses for exploration and exploitation no longer exist. A concession creates a completelydifferentrelationshipthanalicense;theconcessionisabilateralcontract,inwhicheachof thecontractingpartiesgivesandreceivesanequivalenceofeffort,goodsorwealth.Thelicense,onthe contrary,isaunilateralpermissionthatbenefitsonlyoneparty,thattowhichthepermitorlicenseis awarded. This means then that the overall conception of new Colombian Mining Code is that of formallyorlegallyadvancingandprotectingthemineworkthatcreatesgain(asopposedtobenefit) for the State, i.e., that primarily creates material or financial profit for the State. Mine work that is developed in view of Colombians cultural and material survival at the ground work that develops theirlivesandlivelihoodsthroughspecificallymineworkbypermittoworkorlicensetomine,and even if the royalties for the State are minimal, is not even a subsidiary concern of the State; it is actually prohibited. Concession contracts are the only legal way to develop mine work for any Colombian at any scale in any part of the territory. The State in its role as sole mineralowner subsumed its role as rulerforthecommongood. The old legal framework reserved contracting for onlythosemediumandlargemineraldepositsthatjustifiedtheclearparticipationandcontrolofthe State,assoleownerofallsubsoilrightsandfiduciaryactinginthenationsinterests,whilestillallowing
83Ibid,Article26 84Ibid 85Ibid,Article27

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 or licensing mine workers explorations and extraction of small deposits that did not hold any justifiable business interest for the State86. However, under the 2001 Mining Code, any mining contractisinthebusinessinterestsoftheState,regardlessofwhetheritreferstoasmall,mediumor largemineraldeposit. OtherrelevantprovisionsofChapter5ofLaw70includeArticle28,whichacknowledgesthatthereare (i)indigenousminingzones,(ii)afroColombianminingzones,and(iii)mixedminingzoneswherethe rights of both these groups are equally respected.87 The respect for these groups rights is also reflectedintheautonomygrantedtoafroColombiancommunitiestodevelopaccordingtotheirown traditions and standards. Article 47 States that the Colombian government shall grant certain measures to afroColombian communities guaranteeing their right to develop socially and economicallyaccordingtotheirautonomouscultures.88Thisarticleindicatesthatthesecommunities may develop along a separate trajectory than mainstream Colombian culture, and, in this way, recognizes the cultural autonomy of afroColombian communities to develop as they believe is best suitedtopreservetheirculturalidentity. At the same time, the Colombian State remains under certain obligations to encourage the participatory socioeconomic development of afroColombian communities. Article 49 states that representatives of afroColombian communities must be included in development programs and projectsplannedbythegovernmentandactingwithinternationalcooperation;oneofthestatedgoals of this participation is that poverty reduction programs and projects respect the social and cultural identities of the targeted population.89 Likewise, under Article 52, the government is obligated to design special financial and credit mechanisms that will facilitate the creation of associations and solidaritybased organizations within afroColombian communities.90 Having recognized that these associations are useful in engaging with the private sector and, subsequently, in bringing in greater resources and access to opportunities to communities, Article 52 places an affirmative obligation on
86ThelegalframeworkthatprecededthecurrentMiningCodeissuedunderthePastranaandUribeAdministrationwere Decrees 2655, 2656 and 2657 of 1988;issued under President Virgilio Barcos Government. The rules reflect a more balancedrolebetweentheStateAssetInvestorandtheStateArbiterfortheCommonGood;concessioncontractsgave waytoaformaltitleforbigandmediumminingandalicenseorpermitgavewaytoaformaltitlesmallscaleminework of Colombians. In fact, Article 6 of Decree 2655/88 (Abrogated) established: ACQUIRED OR ESTABLISHED RIGHTS AND MERE EXPECTATIONS. For the purposes of this Code, the following are acquired and established rights only: 1. The concessioncontractssignedanddulysolemnizedbyapublicdeed,whichhavebeenpublishedintheOFFICIALGAZETTE.2. Permits and licenses granted by order duly executed, to retain their full force and effect from the date of issue of this Code.3.ThecontributionsgiventoentitiesboundtotheMinistryandthecontractsbasedonthemhavebeenconcluded.4. Toexistingrightsunderarticles3and5ofAct20of1969andotherspecialprovisions,asexpressedinresolutionsofthe Ministrydulyexecuted.Otherlegalsituationscontainedinpendingapplicationsembodiedinexternalarrangements,will be deemed for all purposes as simple expectations. // Artculo 6 del Decreto 2655/88 (Abrogado): DERECHOS ADQUIRIDOS O CONSTITUIDOS Y MERAS EXPECTATIVAS. Para efectos del presente Cdigo, son derechos adquiridos y constituidos solamente: 1. Los contratos de concesin suscritos y debidamente solemnizados por escritura pblica, que hayan sido publicados en el DIARIO OFICIAL.2. Los permisos y licencias otorgadas mediante resolucin debidamente ejecutoriada, que conserven su vigencia y validez a la fecha de expedicin de este Cdigo.3. Los aportes otorgados a organismosadscritosovinculadosalMinisterioyloscontratosqueconbaseenellossehayancelebrado.4.Losderechos vigentes al tenor de los artculos 3 y 5 de la Ley 20 de 1969 y las dems disposiciones especiales, que consten en resoluciones del Ministerio debidamente ejecutoriadas. Las dems situaciones jurdicas contenidas en solicitudes en trmiteconsagradasendisposicionesexteriores,seconsiderarnparatodoslosefectoscomosimplesexpectativas. 87Law70of1993,Article28 88Ibid,Article47 89Ibid,Article49 90Ibid,Article52

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 thegovernmenttofindinnovativefinancialmechanismstoensurethatafroColombiancommunities mayparticipateinthesekindofentrepreneurialtransactionsandventureswithprivateactors.91And, inanefforttoprotectanyinnovationsthatafroColombiancommunitiesandindividualshavecreated or cultivated in different vegetable varieties or otherwise relating to crop production, Article 54 protectstheintellectualpropertyofafroColombianswithrespecttomedicinal,alimentary,artisanal, animalorindustrialinnovationsanduse.92ThesearticlesmustbereadinconjunctionwithArticle55, which requires the government to allocate the appropriate financial and technical assistance to addresstheparticularenvironmentalandsocioeconomicconditionsofafroColombiancommunities thatistosay,thegovernmentmaynotmerelyapplyitsurbandevelopmentprogramsandprojectsto these communities, rather, it must design contextualized programs and projects that keep the characteristics of the communities living in Choc, Antioquia, Nario, Cauca and Valle de Cauca in mind.93 Perhaps recognizing that these characteristics may be difficult to discern from a distance, and that engagingtheleadershipofafroColombiancommunitiesinthedevelopmentoftheseprogramswillnot be easy toachieve due to geographical distance,Articles57 and 61 require the governmentto both create a development plan for afroColombian communities as well as to appropriate the necessary economicresourcestodevelopandinstituteLaw70.94Thesearticlesrequirethegovernmentto,once again,affirmativelyreachoutandincludetheremote,geographicallyisolatedcommunitiesofitsafro Colombian constituents and attempt to bridge the distance between them through infrastructure development.95Attheveryleast,thetownsofthePacificbasinwilltherebyenjoyphysicalaccessto therestofthecountryand,moreimportantly,itspoliticalandadministrativecenterinBogota. 3.3.6.LANDISSUESREGARDINGETHNOCULTURALAUTONOMYANDCOLLECTIVEPROPERTY Historically, indigenous and afrodescendant communities have engaged in mine work for both their survivalanddevelopment,aswellasthroughtheirculturalidentityinColombia.Inthissense,ethno culturalcommunitiesrightstotheircollectivelandseitherasresguardosorterritorioscomunitarios andtheresourcesavailableandpotentiallyminedonthemrelatebackseveralgenerationsandhave greatsignificancetotheirsurvivalasapeople.But,andevenifconstitutionallygranted,therealityof collectivepropertyisverycontroversial. One source of conflict throughout Latin America, and especially with the indigenous people in Peru, Ecuador,BoliviaandColombia,isthattheircollectivelandsmaynotbeusedascollateralorsoldfor profit.InColombia,neithertheresguardosnortheterritorioscomunitariosmaybeleveragedforcredit or financial gain. While they may use these lands and resources for hunting, mining, and other traditional means of production, their inhabitants are restricted from using them to participate in contemporary banking mechanisms that have been used by other segments of society to facilitate socioeconomic development. Thus, rather than serving as pathways out of poverty traps, and for development,thesecommunallandsfurtherentrenchindigenousandafroColombiansinsubsistence driven modes of existence. This conflict highlights the problem with implementing the current law andpolicyregimesregulatingcommunallandsforindigenousandafroColombiancommunities.For
91Ibid,Article52 92Ibid,Article54 93IbidArticle55 94IbidArticle57 95IbidArticle57

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 instance,withrespecttoafroColombiancommunities,Law70aimstoprotecttheirsocial,culturaland economictraditionswhichareunderstoodasbeinglinkedtolandbypreventingthemfromselling thisland.Yet,thegovernmentisalsoobligatedunderArticle52ofLaw70tomakefinancialservices available to afroColombian communities. And, Article 47 of Chapter 5 of Law 70 says that afro Colombiancommunitiesmayfollowadifferenttrajectoryfordevelopment.Thetensionswithinthese different provisions are exacerbated when they are applied in reality, off the paper of law in theory andintherealityoflawontheground. Second,andasmuchasthelawintendstoprotectandpreservethesecommunallands,enforcingthe lawremainsdifficulttodo,inpartduetothesociocultural,politicalandgeographicdistancebetween the communities living on these lands and the central government. The people living on the resguardosandterritorioscomunitarioswillmostlikelybelivinginaworldthatisverymuchremoved from contemporary Colombian society. This distance from mainstream society makes them very vulnerable when external third parties such as national and multinational corporations operating separately or in joint ventures at a large scale, or even illegal midsize operations owned by foreigners96enterthescene.Drivenbytheirowneconomicambitionsandfeedingoffthewealthof resourcesmadeavailableunderglobalizationandneoliberaleconomicpolicy,thesecorporateentities bringingreatcapitalandresourcestotheregion.Theinfluxofforeigninvestmentinmininghastripled overthepastfewyears.Unfortunately,illegaloperationsandlegalcorporationsoperateontheirown profitmotivesandareonlyasaccountabletothepeopleandcommunitieslivingontheresguardosand territorios comunitarios as the government requires them to be. Some of them actually come to indigenous and afroColombian lands and begin their operations without any legal permission or legitimaterightswhatsoever.Whilethepeoplelivingtheremayraisesomekindofresistance,without theforceofgovernmentbehindthemthesepowerfulcorporateorillegalactorswillmoreoftenthan not impose their ambitions on these communities, even if they are operating extralegally in constitutionallyprotectedcommunallands. A third complication arises when considering the nuanced relationship of the cultural identity of an ethnocultural community between the individuals and families comprising that community. On the onehand,thecommunityactsasasingularunit,whosemembershavetogetherdecidedtopreserve their social, cultural and economic traditions. Communal lands, both resguardos and territorios comunitarios, offer a means by which these communities may preserve their collective identities; indeed,andasrecognizedundertherelevantlegalandpolicyframework,itisabsolutelycriticalthat thesecommunallandsbeheldcollectively,otherwise,individualpropertyownersmaychoosetosell theirlandsand,inthisway,placethecollectiveculturalidentityofthegroupinjeopardy.Yet,onthe other hand, within their communal lands there is a considerable degree of individual autonomy. As mentioned above, the internal administrative authority of the communal lands the community or communalcouncilswillactuallydemarcatepropertywithintheterritoryforfamilybasedproduction andthevariedeconomicactivitiestakingplaceinthecommunity97.AsexplainedbytheFundacinOro Verde(GreenGoldFoundation)andanthropologists,inAfroColombianterritoriesinparticular,these divisionsareoftenassociatedwithfamilylinesthatdatebacktotimesofslavery.98Whentraffickedto Colombia, African slaves had to necessarily reconstitute their social and family groups, and being
96 Please see, for instance: http://www.caracol.com.co/nota.aspx?id=690124, http://www.semana.com/noticiasmedio ambiente/incautan24dragasorochoco/123118.aspx 97PoliticalandCivilLeadersofTad,Choc/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C. 98ClaraHidrn,FundacionOroVerde/rrainterview/2010/Skype

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 enslavedinminework,theydidsoaroundtheonlyspacetheyoccupied,thatis,themineswherethey lived and worked most of their lives. The clear boundaries established around these mines became ancestralfamilytrunksthatareinscribedinthecommunitiescollectiveknowledgeoftheterritory; overtime,asfamiliesmultiplied,thesetrunksgrewbranches,andnowhaveleaves.Accesstoand rightsoverthislandaretraceableinwhatmightbedescribedasminegenealogy.Thecontemporary relatives of those former slaves have customary access to the lands of mines where their ancestors were enslaved generations ago, and their ancestral African names remain tied to these same mines eventoday.TheLucum,Macondo99andMinaareexamplesofplacesandsurnamesthatbelongedto communities and tribes from Africa who were brought to Colombia. It is, in fact, through their association with the mineral extraction from those lands, the mines, that they remember and preservetheircollectivehistoryandsocialidentity.AnafroColombianindividualwholeftherancestral villageandsettledinoneofColombiascitiesmaystillreturntohervillageandtieherselfonceagainto herancestralfamilytrunk,formineworkpurposes.Shemayevencontinuetoworkinthesamemine thatherancestorsworkedgenerationsago. The complication is that, although the internal authority has demarcated the land within the communalterritorytofamilies,andindividualsofthosefamiliesexerciseadegreeofautonomyover theseidentifiedplots,theydonotfullyenjoyindividualpropertyrightsthatallowapersontoownand disposeofaplotoflandastheyseefit.Infact,thelandisstillpartoftheterritorioscomunitariosand is collectively owned, even if individuals retain some culturally legitimate authority over their family plots.EvenafroColombiansvoluntarilyorforcefullydisplacedfromtheircommunitiestourbancities mayretainanintuitivesenseofindividualorfamilialownershipovertheirlandsandresourcesonthe territorioscomunitarios.Actingonthissenseofauthorityandownership,someurbanafroColombian believethattheyhavearighttolegitimatelytransactandcedeherorhisrighttoaccessandpursue minework to third parties. Yet, this is not the case under either the formal laws of the Republic or formalcustomaryrules.100Theseinformalleasesonfamilyplotswithinthecommunallandscontribute to the further breakdown of the ethnocultural groups collective identity that gave rise to their constitutionallyrecognizedrighttocommunalpropertyinthefirstplace.101 A fourth complication facing the people from rural zones of Colombia is the continuing violence propagated by irregular armed forces. This violence will have touched the lives of indigenous communities, afroColombian communities, and nonindigenous, nonafroColombian peasant communities, all of whom have been subject to considerable internal displacement. Separated from their land and, as a consequence, unable to access the natural resources found on that land, these
99()PorqueantesdesercapturadoscondestinoaAmrica,losafricanosseconocanunosaotrosconlosnombresde susetnias:Biohos,Cabindos,Mandingos,Balantas,Macondos,KimbundusoBasongos(FriedemannyArocha1.995:64).() Peroenelmundocontemporneo,elvocabloafricanoquehonraaColombiacomoemblemadenacionalidadesMacondo elnombrequeGabrielGarcaMrquez(1967)escogicomoescenarioparasuobra"Cienaosdesoledad",premioNobel. Makondo, es un lugar en Angola y un fitnimo bant (De Granda 1978) que designa al pltano y conlleva significados mgicoreligiosos. Es preciso anotar que la obra se desenvuelve en tierras de pltano y ganado del Caribe continental colombiano donde durante varios siglos muchos descendientes de africanos se arraigaron como cimarrones, criollos o libres.:http://www.lablaa.org/blaavirtual/geografia/geofraf1/huellas.htm 100PoliticalandCivilLeadersofTad,Choc/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C.andClaraHidrn,GreenGoldFoundation /rrainterview/2010/Skype 101Ofcourse,notallmininginColombiaistakingplaceinresguardosorterritorioscomunitarios.Whatisuniqueabout theselandsisthatethnoculturalcommunitiesthatownthislandincommonarenotindividuallandowners,evenifthey retainsomeancestralclaimtoworkoraccessspecificareaswithinthecommunalterritories.Alternatively,nonindigenous andnonAfroColombianpeopleengagedinminingactivitieswillnotretaincollectiverightsovertheirlandorresources; theywill,infact,requireindividualtitlestothelandtheyaremining.

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 people often flee to Colombias urban zones, conveniently leaving acres upon acres of unoccupied, resourcerichlandbehind. Thissituationoflandsabandonedduetointernalviolenceplacesanethicalburdenonthelargescale extractive industries and timber concessionaires whose entrepreneurial ventures in mining are supported through international investment law. These companies and their mining operations may verywellbetakingadvantageoftheprinciplefirstintime,firstinright,onlandsthathavebeenleft vacant due to violent or forced internal displacement. To relieve any suspicions arising out of their profitableminingoperations,i.e.,thebeliefthattheymaybebenefittingfromthisdisplacementand the violence that caused it or, at the very least, that they are not discouraging the irregular armed forces who have cleared the region of its ancestral and traditional indigenous, afroColombian and rural peasant inhabitants, these companies should act with great human rights caution and social responsibility.Unfortunately,therearemanywhofailtodoso.Infact,someacademics102andsocial activistsininternaldisplacementhaveexpressedtheviewthatsomedegreeofdisplacementisoften tolerated, and even sponsored, by private investors who proceed to then take advantage of the clearedterritories.AnOped,forinstance,denouncesthat: Greatlandextensions,includingthosetakenfromthenowmorethanthreemilliondisplaced people,arepartofthemacroprojectthataimstodestroyColombianpeasants,indigenousand afroColombian[communities],relegatingthemtobroadentheslumsinthecitiesbecausetheir presence in the rural zones is more a hindrance than an inconvenience. The map of displacement in Colombia is also the map of big business: the oil palm, sugarcane, oil, mines and coca plantations are behind the great waves of violent evictions. [The] victims [of these evictions are victims] of an economic rather than a political conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising that national and transnational economic groups, drug traffickers, political military andtheparamilitariesconcurredtopromoteastrategyofterritorialcontrolundertheguiseof fighting guerrillas. For some time now and turning its back to the country's interests, our government has forgotten agriculture as a food source and is instead turning it into green deserts destined to meet the energy needs of the great powers and feed the enormous businessofmultinationalsandafewnationalentrepreneurs.Inthisnew[place]forColombia intheinternationalorder,peasantshavenoplace.()103
102Forinstance,ProfessorRobertoCarlosVidal,UniversidadJaveriana. 103Lasgrandesextensionesdetierras,incluidaslasqueselesarrebatoaloshoymsdetresmillonesdedesplazados,hacenpartedel macroproyectoquepretendedestruiralcampesinadocolombianoyalascomunidadesindgenasyafroColombianas,relegndolasa engordarloscinturonesdemiseriaenlasciudadesporquesupresenciaenelcampomsqueincomodar,estorba.Poresto,elmapadel desplazamientoenColombiaestambinelmapadelosgrandesnegocios:lapalmaafricana,lacaadeazcar,elpetrleo,lasminasy el mismo narcotrfico, estn detrs de las grandes olas de desalojos violentos que han sufrido nuestras vctimas. Vctimas de un conflictomseconmicoquepoltico.Poresto,noesextraoquegruposeconmicosnacionalesytransnacionales,narcotraficantes, polticos y militares concurrieran a impulsar el paramilitarismo como estrategia de control territorial bajo la excusa de la lucha contraguerrillera.Desdehaceuntiempoyaespaldasdelosinteresesdelpas,nuestrogobiernoharenunciadoalagrocomodespensa alimentaria y pretende convertirlo en un desierto verde destinado a suplir las necesidades energticas de las grandes potencias y alimentarlosenormesnegociosdelastransnacionalesyunospocosempresariosnacionales.EnestanuevavocacinparaColombia dentrodelordeninternacionalloscampesinosnotienencabida.Ycomosonestoslosquemayornmerodevctimasaportananuestro infameconflicto,unaleyquepretendarepararlosintegralmente,empezandoporladevolucindelastierras,esunabsurdoounbarril sinfondocomolomencionHolguneldaquepidihundirelproyectoenlaplenariadelSenadodelaRepblica.Contrarioalas recomendacionesdeorganismosinternacionalesdederechoshumanos,alaspeticionesdeentidadescomolaProcuraduraGeneralde laNacin,alasexigenciasdelasorganizacionessociales,alllamadodelasvctimas,eincluso,oponindosealapoyo,quealproyectode ley han dado los partidos polticos, incluidos los uribistas, el gobierno insiste en no permitir que se apruebe y ha elevado sesenta objecionesalmismo.Porestava,yalogrqueseeliminaraelconceptodevctimasdelconflictoarmadoyconestoledioun

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 Itisimportanttohighlightthat,becauseunderthecurrentpolicyframeworkofthe2001MiningCode mineral exploitation may only be realized through concession contracts, ethnocultural minorities willingtoworkinminingthenaturalresourcesfoundonorundertheircollectivepropertymustalso requestaconcessiontodoso.Actuallyarticle125oftheCodespecificallystatesthattheconcession requestedforexploitingmineralwithinaspecificafroColombian,indigenousormixedminingzone,is acommunalconcessiongrantedtothecollectivityandnottoitsindividualmembers.
Article 125. Concession. The concession will be granted at request of the community or Indigenous group and in its favor and not of the individuals that form part of it. The manner in which they participateintheminingworksandinitsproductsandyieldsandtheconditionsofhowthosecanbe substitutedinsuchworkswithinthesamecommunity,willbeestablishedbytheIndigenousauthority thatgovernsthem.Thisconcessionwillnotbetransferableinanycase.

Not surprisingly, this constitutes a tremendous challenge for communities that are economically vulnerableandisolated,especiallyafterformerPresidentUribesminingsectorreforms.Afterthese reforms,therearenolongeranypublicindustrialorcommercialenterprisesorminingagenciesofthe Statetopromote,invest,leverorpartnerwithtraditionalorancestralmineworkersinpovertywhoare ofamestizoorethnoculturalorigin.TheUribeminingreformsclosedallinstitutionsengagedinfield mining development and focused all efforts on developing contractual relationships for largescale extraction and income generation. These reforms have left no formal place for the ancestral indigenous and afroColombian mine workers, who have no capacity to plan, request and operate a miningconcessioncontractontheirown. It is worth noting that as much as the Mining Code, its glossary and the recent Law 1382 of 2010 modifyingtheCodeaffectsmallscaleandartisanalmineworkers,thenormsdonotaddress,recognize ortrytoprotectandframetheirworkintheleast.Theauthorsofthisreportbelievethatunderthe Colombianpolicyframeworktheindigenous,blackandmixedminingzonesprovisionsandchapters couldbebetteridentifiedasprovisionsrelatedtoancestralmining.Andthatwhatisreferredtoas traditionalminingwouldbeatypeofnonethnoculturalminingthatisalsopovertyrelated,smallin scale and thus informal, but this labor is not connected to the history or inherited livelihood of enslaved Africans or indigenous ancestors mining for art and religion. Thus the mining of Colombian mestizoesorpeasantsinruralandperiurbanareasisjustamatterofinformalmineworkthathave been traditionally exploited over time and not of a cultural heritage. In fact, article 31 referring to informal mining work in areas that justify theState declaration of a Special Mining Project has been further developed by Law 1382 of 2010, which finally attempts to define what traditional mining means104. As revealed by the definition set forth therein, there is no ethnocultural factor that has
durogolpealafinalidaddelproyectodevelarporelrespetoylasgarantasdelasvctimasdentrodelderechointernacional humanitario,queeselqueregulaelrespetodelosderechoshumanosenmediodelconflicto.Yalmismotiempo,insisteen darlestatusdedelincuentespolticosalosgruposparamilitares,parapoderplantearunprocesodeamnistaeindulto(ley depuntofinal)enelmarcodeunconflictoarmadoanteelfracasodelaleydejusticiaypaz. http://pastoaldia.com/index.php?opcion=ampliar_noticia&id_noticia_relacionada=&idn=635&fechaindex=20091114 104 ARTCULO 1, Adicionase el artculo 16 de la Ley 685 de 2001 Cdigo de Minas con el siguiente pargrafo. Pargrafo Primero.Lossolicitantesdepropuestadecontratodeconcesindebernsealarsidentrodelreasolicitadaexistealgn tipodeexplotacinminera,indicandosuubicacinymetodologautilizadaparaconocerlaexistenciaonodedichaminera. LaAutoridadMineraenunplazonomayoratres(3)mesesdebercertificar,silahubiere,eltipodeminera.Sihubiere mineratradicional,sedaraplicacinaloprevistoenlosartculos31y248YlasdemsdisposicionesaplicablesdelCdigo deMinasyensudefectoaponerenconocimientodelasdemsautoridadescompetentesdelasramasejecutivayjudicial paraqueseadelantenlasaccionesadministrativasypenalesprevistasenlosartculos159y164delCdigodeMinasylas

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 beenconsidered.Thereareatleastthreereasonstodistinguishtheminingbymestizomineworkers inpovertyorinformalitywhoareusuallyfoundinurbanorperiurbanareasandethnoculturalmine workersinpovertyorinformalitywhocontinuetheirancestralmineworklegacy:first,andunderthe MiningCodeof2001,aconcessionairemustnotifytheauthoritiesifthereissomekindoftraditional mininggoingonintheconcessionedterritory(aconcessionwouldnototherwisebegrantedifthereis no prior information and safeguarding of the collective property of indigenous or afroColombian communities engaged in traditional mine work); second, the Code always names and identifies the ethnocultural communities as being specifically indigenous, afro or mixed instead of just plainly mentioningthecommunities;and,third,theprovisionfortraditionalminingdoesnotrecallorrefer to any prerogative or right to prior consultation of ethnocultural communities, which these communitiesareconstitutionallyandlegallyentitled.Therefore,theauthorsofthisreportbelievethat itissafetounderstandthatthattraditionalminingisadistinctnotionfromthatofAfroorindigenous ancestralminework105. 3.3.7.WOMENRELATEDLANDISSUES:ETHNOCULTURALCOMMUNITIES,CUSTOMARYLAWAND COLLECTIVEPROPERTY One complicated aspect of communal land rights whether in the context of the indigenous resguardos or territorios comunitarios is womens access to, control over and use of land and the natural resources available on that land. Land regimes in every corner of the world are often dominated by androcentric or patriarchal cultural characteristics where womens ownership or accessrightstolandarerarelyasfirmlydesignatedasthatofmen106Inthecaseofindividuallyheld private property, women may be, among other things, excluded from inheritance mechanisms, not listedasthejointownerofanypropertyacquiredduringmarriage,orsimplynotrecognizedasthede factoheadofhouseholdandthusunabletoaccesslegalprotectionsoverhouseholdlandandproperty. Asisoftenthecaseofcommunallandsgrantedtoethnoculturalminoritiesaroundtheworld,women withinthosegroupsmaynotbeabletoexerciserightsoverthatlandunlesstheyareincorporatedinto apatriarchalsocialstructure,i.e.,amaleheadedhousehold.Womenmayalsobeunderrepresented inthedecisionmakingprocessofindigenousorethnoculturalbodiesofgovernment.
demsdisposicionesaplicablesdelCdigoPenal.Encasoqueelsolicitantedecontratodeconcesinnoinformesobrela existenciademinera,darlugaralrechazodelasolicitud,omultaenelcasodecontarconcontratodeconcesin,sila AutoridadMineradetectaqueexisteminerayqueelconcesionarionohaprocedido,enelltimocaso,deacuerdoconlos artculos306,307YsiguientesdelCdigodeMinas.DeexistirmineratradicionalconstatadaporlaAutoridadMinerayde no haber sido informada por el solicitante y encontrndose en ejecucin el contrato de concesin, se suspender el contrato por el trmino de seis meses para el rea en discusin, dentro de los cuales las partes procedern a hacer acuerdos. De no llegar a acuerdos se acudir a mecanismos de arbitramiento tcnico previsto en el artculo 294 del presentecdigo,cuyoscostossernacargodelaspartes.Eltribunaldearbitramientodefinirculeselmejoracuerdoque serdeobligatoriocumplimiento.Seentiendepormineratradicionalaquellasquerealizanpersonasogruposdepersonas ocomunidadesqueexplotenminasdepropiedadestatalsinttuloinscritoenelRegistroMineroNacionalyqueacrediten que los trabajos mineros se vienen adelantando en forma continua durante cinco (5) aos, a travs de documentacin comercialytcnica,yunaexistenciamnimadediez(10)aosanterioresalavigenciadeestaley.PargrafoSegundo:El tiempo mximo paraque laautoridad minera resuelva la solicituddecontratodeconcesin ser de ciento ochentadas (180) calendarios, entendidos stos como aquellos atribuibles a la institucionalidad minera. En caso de incumplimiento, dichamorasercausaldemalaconductaparaelfuncionarioresponsable. 105 This understanding was verified through: Oficina Ingeominas Cali / rra phone interview / 2010 / Cali, and Marco Aurelio Hurtado / Gremivalle / rra interview / 2010 / Cali, although it was not possible to refer to a legal provision concludingso,thatwouldgiveenoughcertaintytosuchinterpretation. 106Pea,Nuria,Maiques,MarandCastillo,GinaE.,Usingrightsbasedandgenderanalysisargumentsforlandrightsfor women:someinitialreflectionsfromNicaragua,Gender&Development,2008,16:1,p.5571

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 Atthispointoftheanalysisitisimportanttohighlightthatinpolicymaking,respectingcommunalland rights must not come at the expense of womens rights to equality, both of which are enshrined in international and domestic law and policy as well under the human rights principles of non discrimination,interdependenceanduniversality.UnderCEDAW,thefollowingarticlesareofspecific relevance: Article 14 states the governments obligations to ensure that rural women enjoy equal treatmentinlandandagrarianreform,andhighlightswomensaccesstoagriculturalcreditandloans, technology and basic social services; Article 16 requires states to establish equal property rights for women in relation to marriage, divorce and death; and, although nonbinding, General Recommendation21oftheCEDAWCommitteeemphasizestheinterdependenceofwomensrightto property with their rights to earn a livelihood, right to housing and food security, health and labor rights.Atthesametime,agovernmentmustrespectindigenousandotherethnoculturalminorities culturalandlandrightsundervariousinternationalnormsadoptedandratifiedunderdomesticlaw. The balance that a government chooses to adopt between these sometimes conflicting bundles of rightswillbeinformedbylocal,nationalandinternationallawandpolicy,aswellasthepredominant political culture at the time of the decision. For instance, in the 1999 Magaya v. Magaya case, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe ruled on the side of customary rights, deferring to the ethnocultural communitystraditionoffavoringmaleinheritanceoverfemaleinheritance.107There,awomanhad been evicted by her brother from their fathers land after his death. The Court affirmed the Community Courts decision in favor of the applicable customary laws, even though the Court had broaddiscretiontodecidemattersinvolvingcustomarylawandconstitutionallaw.Thepetitioner, ZaniaMagaya,wasleftwithnofurtherrecourseandendeduplivinginashackonherneighborsback yard. While there was much outcry following the Magaya decision within the indigenous group, domestically and internationally the conflict between communal/indigenous rights and womens rights remained unresolved from a policy perspective, because the Zimbabwean Statecontinued to espousetwosetsoflegalnorms. Reconcilingthesecompetingbundlesofrights,or,attheveryleast,developingtheprinciplesofnon discrimination, interdependence and universality within a communitys social, cultural and economic traditions may best be advanced from its own membership.108 Nonindigenous, nonnational and internationalwomensmovementsspeakingintermsofindividualrightswillnotnecessarilyarticulate thepreciseconcernsofindigenouswomen,whowilloftenattempttotheorizeaboutwomensrights withoutabandoningtheircollectiveandcommunalinterests.109Womenmembersofethnocultural communitiesexperienceanamalgamofgender,race,ethnocultural,national,andclassdiscrimination inawaythatcompoundstheirmarginalizationandtheymustbetheoneswhosevoicesaresolicited andincludedtoaddressthismarginalization.110Byrelyingon[anindigenous]worldviewandtheirday to day experiences, [indigenous] women are able both to theorize what makes their rights different from womens rights and to articulate demands for changes in their own communities, in part by
107 Bigge, David M., von Briesen, Amelie, Conflict in the Zimbabwean Courts: Womens Rights and Indigenous Self DeterminationinMagayav.Magaya,p.289313;http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/hrj/iss13/bigge.shtml 108 It is important to note that a communitys social, cultural and economic traditions are not necessarily static over time;rathertheyreflectwhatthecommunityvalues,whichmaychangeasthecommunitysneedschangeandmayeven reflectshiftingsocialparadigmsofalargercollective. 109 Richards, Patricia, The Politics of Gender, Human Rights, and Being Indigenous in Chile, p. 199220. Richards writes aboutthestrugglesofMapucheindigenouswomeninChileandtheirparticularchallengesinassertingtheirrightswithin thelargermovementforindigenouscollectiverights. 110Ibid

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emphasizingtheirculturalandcollectiverights.111Inthisway,womensrightsandindigenousrights maybereinterpretedtosimultaneouslyrespectculturaldifferenceandhonoruniversalprinciples.112 Regardless of the spokesperson, there is very little official data on the extent and practices of indigenouswomensownership,accessandcontroloverlandandnaturalresourcesingeneral.Tothis end,andrecognizingtheimportanceoflandasalivelihood,foodsecurity,socialcapitalandfinancial asset,somewomensrightsgroupshaveadvocatedforacquiringgreaterinformationonlandtenure andestablishingabaselineforthelandrightsofwomen,withanemphasisonethnoculturaloriginand dalitwomen,asoneofthetargetsoftheMDGsgoalsandtargetsforeradicatingpovertyandreducing gender inequality.113 Of course, these groups must act with the cooperation, leadership and participationoftheindigenouswomenwhoselivestheyareattemptingtoimprove.

3.4.WOMENMINEWORKERSLIVINGINPOVERTY
Without disregarding that women are victimized in the mine industry in various ways e.g., enslaved for mine work, forced into prostitution around mines and mining operations, or into bonded labor through familial ties thisreportfocusesonthewomeninminingwhoworkin near invisibility due to their poverty and informality and own account status. It will not consider the situation of womenwhoareformallyengagedintheminingsectoror the migration of women who are lured to mining communities to provide goods and services to the men livingandworkingthere.Instead,ithighlightsthecaseof
RevistaSemana ,PhotoByJuanCarlosSierra women whose work in mining is virtually unknown, a knowledge gap that results from the lack of considerable research in this field and the underrepresentationofmineworkingwomeninnationalstatistics. Theanonymityofthesewomensworkinminingisexplainedinpartbygenderdiscrimination,butalso bytheirrurallivelihoodandethnoculturalorigins.Womenwhofallundertheseminoritygroupswill be found in small and micro scale mining operations, carried out by either mestizoes in traditional mining,i.e.,peasantsinruralorperiurbanareas,orethnoculturalmineworkersinColombiasrural zones.114 In other words these women will be found in the informal mining sector rather than the largescaleminingoperations,althoughtheywillbepresentinthissectortoamuchlargerdegree.In contrast to largescale mining, where women may constitute only five to ten percent of the mining workforce, the involvement of women in smallscale mining activities is generally much higher, amounting to approximately thirty percent of the worlds artisanal and smallscale miners.115 In Guinea, women comprise seventyfive percent of those involved in the sector, while in Madagascar,

111Ibid 112Ibid 113Pleasesee;http://www.hicnet.org/articles.php?pid=1731, http://www.corpoamazonia.gov.co/Noticias/2010/Febrero/Minero.htmland http://www.corpoamazonia.gov.co/Noticias/2010/Febrero/Minero.html 115Jennings,AddressingLaborandSocialIssues,SSMinDevelopingcountries,Hilson,p.154;Hintonetal,p.196.

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Mali and Zimbabwe the figure is around fifty percent, and in Bolivia forty percent;116 as far as the authors of this report know there are no figures for Colombia. According to ILO estimates, about twentypercentofsmallscaleminersinLatinAmericanarewomen.117Yet,whenaskedaboutwomen mineworkers, union leaders or public servants answer that there are none or, if acknowledged to exist,thattheywillbepanninggoldwiththeirfamiliesinChoc. Throughtheinformationgatheredforthisreport,itbecameclearthatwomenemergeinthemining value chain at all levels of industrial, smallscale and microscale mining. Generally the bigger the miningoperation,thesmallertheproportionofwomenintheminingtrade,withwomenspresencein microminingbeingsignificantandconsiderable.Asthistypeistheminingisusuallypracticedinan artisanal fashion, it is the least capital intensive of all mining operations. Yet, women are virtually ignored in all mining regulation. For instance, although women make, very clear, albeit small, contributions to the gold and platinum exports from Colombia the Colombian mining code does not include a single gender oriented provision in any of its 362 articles, nor was it possible to detect an officialplanorinitiativespecializedforwomenmineworkers.Itis,therefore,logicaltoconcludethat the Colombian State may be remiss in the protections and opportunities afforded to women mine workersandthoseimpoverishedwomenworkingaroundindustrialminingoperations.

3.4.1.WOMENINLARGEANDMEDIUMSCALEMININGOPERATIONS The women found working around industrial mining operations in Colombia include internally displacedwomen,womenheadsofhousehold,andyoungandoldwomenlivinginpovertynearthe countrys mountain mines. In the gold mining towns of Segovia and Zaragoza in the department of Antioquia, after man or machine has cleared the way for tunnels reaching into the rich mountain resources,womenworkthroughthepilesofdiscardedrockssearchingfortracesofgold,hammering away at the hardened, mineral waste. These women, known as chatarreras, work in harsh and extenuatingconditionsaroundthewasteoflargeandmediumscaleminingoperations.Asfarasthe authors of this report are aware, their labor and marginal work conditions remain undocumented in Colombia;however,throughcomparativeresearch,theauthorswereabletodiscernthatthislaboris performedbyasignificantproportionofwomeninColombiaandthroughouttheregion.Menwhoare engagedinthisparticularkindofworkareeitherveryyoungorelderly,bothlookingforsomemeans ofsurvivalincome.118 In Peru, the chatarreras are better known as pallaqueras, who work doing pallaqueo, or identifying and selecting valuable minerals from rocks and ore that are piled outside mines. These mineralsarerecovered,processedandsoldinlocalmarketsforcashincomes.Womenpredominatein this mining activity, some as heads of household and others to supplement their familys household income.Theworkopportunitypresentedbypallaqueoissignificant.InasurveyconductedinPeru,60 percent of women explained that they were living in the mountain mining town for the work (i.e, pallaqueo);25percentweretheretobewiththeirhusbands;and11percentforboththeirhusbands andtheirwork.Peruvianpallaqueoworkmaybeofapermanentnature,organizedbygroupswho workinshifts,oritmaybedonebyitinerantwomenwholookforworkopportunitiesontheirown.In
116 Hentschel, Thomas, Hruschka, Felix, and Priester, Michael, Global Report on Artisanal and SmallScale Mining,p.21 117 Tallichet, Suzanne, Redlin, Meredith, and Harris, Rosalind P., What's a Woman to do? Globalized Gender InequalityinSmallScaleMining,p.209 118SintraminerosdeSegovia,FrontinoGoldMine,Antioquia/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C.

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 general,pallaquerasarenewtotheminingindustryinthesamesurveycitedabove,58percenthad beeninvolvedinthisworkfor1to4yearsand22percentfrom4to8years;onaverage,theyworked5 days per week and 7 hours per day.119 In Bolivia, palliris perform the same kind of informal, own accountwork. The chatarreras of Colombia, the pallequeras of Peru and the palliris of Bolivia all suffer from occupationalhealthandsafetyhazards,aswellasthetraderelatedcostsofprocessingandsellingthe smallquantitiesofgoldtheyareabletoamassthroughtheirlabor.Arecentpressaccountnotedthat: Poorandsickwithrheumatism,inBoliviamorethanthreethousandwomensearchmountainsofmine wastelookingforrockswithsomevalue.Theyarethepalliris,ortheseekersinQuechualanguage,in acountryinwhichmininghaditsgoldenagecenturiesago.APalliriisawomanminingtohelpthe economyofherhome,scratchingamongthethousandsoftonsofrockdebrisinsearchofafewkilos oforethatcanbesoldtothesamecompanythatletsheraccesstheminingcamp. In Bolivia, there are some 5000 miners working for the State and private mines, while more than 50.000 workers are members of the mining cooperatives in the country. Within these figures, a minorityofwomenendinthistypeofsubworkbecausetheywanttohelptheirhusbands.Inaddition, manyarepallirisbecausetheirhusbandsareillordiedandtheymustfeedsonsanddaughters.()The husbandofMargaritaissickduetoamineaccidentthatdamagedhisspine;shehasreplacedhimfor manyyearsnowtosupporthimandtheirfourchildren. Ihaveworkedindesmontes(pilesofminerefuse)scavengingforlead,silverandagglomeratesofzinc andstain,andIhavealsohadtobeintheinteriorofaminebynecessitysheexplains.()Hammeris themostutilizedtoolbythesewomen.()120 Inadditiontothiskindofminework,121womenmayalsobefoundrequestingpermissiontowashthe sacks used by men to carry ore out of the tunnels built into the mountains for largescale mining operations. Specifically, at the Frontino Gold Mine in Antioquia, women have been known to ask to recover trace amounts of valuable ore from the fibers of these sacks.122 The Superintendent of CommercialSocietiesinColombia,whohasbeeninterveningandcontrollingtheFrontinoGoldMine operation,hasgrantedthesewomenpermissiontocontinueinthisactivity. While mining has been traditionally a maleoriented job, women are also entering industrial mining through operational jobs, especially now that mining is highly mechanized (and less demanding in terms of physical strength)123 even though womens presence in underground mining activities is
119Pleasesee:http://mineriartesanalperu.pe/MUJERES.html 120Pleasesee:http://www.mundosolidario.org/mon.php?var=75andhttp://www.ens.org.co/fotos.htm?x=20151617 121 Besides the gold chatarreras in large scale mining as raised in: Gustavo, Cundinamarca / rra interview / 2010 / Ubat, apparently there is also work for women in separating carbon mines, separating coal from pea (rock) within medium scale mines the Cundiboyacense region of Colombia. It coincides with the coleros work mentioned in Marco AurelioHurtado/Gremivalle/rrainterview/2009/Cali 122SintraminerosdeSegovia,FrontinoGoldMine,Antioquia/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C. 123Pleasesee,forChile:http://www.paritarios.cl/actualidad_mujeres_manejan_camiones.htmand http://www.aminera.com/index.php?Itemid=5&id=10343&option=com_content&task=view;andforArgentina: http://rse.larepublica.com.co/archivos/TENDENCIAS/20071115/mujeresconducenpesadoscamionesmineroscon

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 expresslyprohibitedunderColombianlaw.Article4ofDecree1335of1987explicitlystatesthatthe presence of women of all ages and men under 18 in underground work related to mining is forbidden.124Theonlyexceptiontothisruleiswomenworkinginsupervisorypositions.Itisworth noting,however,thatwomenarenowclaimingtheirequalrighttowork.Someofthemare,infact, arguing that provisions such as Article 4 of Decree 1335 of 1987 for gender protection is actually detrimentalforthem,asitexcludesandpreventsthemfromenteringintoformalminingoperations and,thus,relegatesthemtoinformalmineworkancillarytotheformalminingsector. 3.4.2.WOMENINMEDIUMSCALE(SOLIDARITYBASED)MININGANDSMALLSCALEMINING Althoughunverifiablewithoutpreviouslyconductingafieldcensus,itisstillpossibletosaythat,based ontheinformationgatheredandtheunderstandingbuiltthroughtheresearchforthisreport,women family members of small scale mining operations or members of wives, sisters and daughters of miners cooperatives are directly engaged in their predominantly male family members work125. In smallscalecoal126orsandriverminingoperations,127womenareverymuchinvolvedintheminework of the household, although their work is not formally considered labor, but part of their natural responsibility and duties of women to their families. 128 Consequently, cooking for a selfemployed minerhusbandandhisinformalemployees,orforthesmallminerscooperativeseekingcoalorriver sand,willnotbeconsideredwork,butfamilialduty.Whilethisdutyisusuallycompensatedwithsome kindoftip,itdoesnotreceivethesamequalityorquantityofremunerationandprotectionasother minework.TheseancillaryrolesofColombianwomenprovidingfood,drink,toolsandotherservices arecommontowomenallovertheworld. The traderelatedservicesprovidedtosupportthe mine workers are, in many cases, integral to the functionality of the mine work taking place in a small miners household or around the middle miners cooperative operation. Yet, because the work is designatedasdutyorhelp,andsodeeplyembeddedinpatriarchalculture,thesewomenseconomic contributiontotheminingvaluechainiscompletelydisregardedandoftenremainsunacknowledged intheirhouseholds,theircommunitiesandbytheState.129 Ofparticularinterestinthissubsectionisanorganizationthatrepresentswomensstakesasancillary actors in medium and smallscale cooperative based mining. According to the Bolivian press, CONACMIN,theConfederationofHouseWomenintheMiningSector(ConfederacindeMujeresAmas deCasadelsectorminero)attendedthetenthmeetingoftheRIMMheldinBolivia.Thepresidentof the Bolivian Network, Ms. Rosario Layme, from Potosi, expressed the need to recognize the role of
suavidad_12481.php;Colombia:www.eltiempo.com/.../minerosyaprendicesdeaceriaspazdelrioyacuentanconuna escuela_48467791;andhttp://rse.larepublica.com.co/archivos/TENDENCIAS/20071115/mujeresconducenpesados camionesminerosconsuavidad_12481.php;Spain: http://www.elpais.com/articulo/reportajes/igualdad/mujer/llega/mina/elpepusocdmg/20060514elpdmgrep_6/Tes?print=1 124Decree1335of1987.Article.InChileasimilarorientedprovisionwasderogatedin1993. 125 Gobernacin del Valle Asunto Mineros / rra interview / 2009 / Cali; Marco Aurelio Hurtado/ Gremivalle / rra interview/2010/Cali;Noelioandfamily/rrainterview/2009/Juanchito;Gustavo,Cundinamarca/rrainterview/ 2010/Ubat,ClaraHidrn,FundacionOroVerde/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C 126Gustavo,Cundinamarca/rrainterview/2010/Ubat 127MarcoAurelioHurtadoandEdwardCaicedo/Gremivalle/rrainterview/2009/Cali 128Noelioandfamily/rrainterview/2009/Juanchito 129InthemininginspectionscarriedbytheStatetomineexploitations,anappraisalofthelaborrecognitionofwomens workcouldbeimplemented.

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 womeninthehousesofminersandintheminesthemselves,aswellastheirimportantcontributionin mineralproductionandBolivianGDP.130 Itisalsoworthnotingthat,asinNicaragua,itispossiblethatwomenheadedhouseholdsinColombian that are living in poverty will, in the absence of alternative labor opportunities, descend the deep tunnelstoworkinformallyinsmallscaleminingoperations.131 3.4.3.WOMENINMICROSCALEMINING For the purposes of this report, artisanal mining is defined as nonindustrial mining carried out primarily in micromining operations. Although not exclusively, in many cases the artisanal mining mode and techniques originate in an ancestral knowhow linked to indigenous or afroColombian communities livelihoods. Artisanal mining also takes place outside of these ethnocultural parameters, sometimes around large and mediumscale mining operations, where mestizo, afro Colombianorindigenouswomenaresearchingforsomeadditionalsourcesofincome.Indeed,while mestizomineworkingwomen(e.g.,chatarreras)shouldbeanalyzedundertherubricofnationaland multinationallargescaleminingoperationsfortheirinclusionintothevaluechainanddevelopmentof their labor identity, the work they are engaged in, their access to the market and available legal opportunitiesandprotectionsarethesameasthoseavailabletoanartisanalmineworker. Artisanal mining requires little to no capital investment and provides ample opportunity for women with limited means, capacity and resources to find some additional source of income, even if this income is meager in comparison to the labor required and the work does not offer any social protections.Indeed, the extent of womens involvement in small scale mining has been steadily increasing,andisinverselyrelatedtothesizeoftheminingoperation.132Boththedirectandindirect involvementofwomeninartisanalandsmallscalemining(ASM)isbelievedtobeontherise,dueto theescalationofruralpoverty,theincreaseinopportunityintheartisanalsectorasmaleminersleave toworkatlargescalemines,andthelackofotheremploymentopportunitiesinothersectors.InLatin American countries, where there is limited social mobility,133it is not surprising to find that the continents afrodescendant and indigenous people remain outsiders to mainstream development, includingmining,andworkasamatterofsurvivalratherthanforeconomicprogress. InColombiasremoteruralregionsandwhereitsrichmineralresourcesarefound,largenumbersof womenminersworkinartisanalmining,manyofwhomareafroColombianorindigenous.134Whether panningforgoldandplatinum,miningforemeraldsastheirMuiscaancestorsorforsaltaswiththe wayuus indigenous community in the Caribbean Guajira department135, these women rely on their artisanalminingknowledgeasaprimaryassetandsurvivalskillforthemselvesandtheirfamilies.Out of the several traditions and cultures of the women engaged in this work, AfroColombian women
130Pleasesee:http://www.lapatriaenlinea.com/?nota=21218 131Pleasesee:http://www.radiolaprimerisima.com/noticias/7815 132Tallichetetal.,p.206. 133IDBoutsidersquoteonlimitedsocialmobility 134Pleaseseephotosin:http://lacomunidad.elpais.com/latinamerica/2009/9/2/lasmujeresminerascolombia 135 Paradoxically the Salinas or salt mines in Manaure are artisanal mining done mostly by women but in a large scale operationtailoredanddrivenbytheState.UnderthenewMinerColombiavisioninwhichtheStatecannotdirectlydevelop the mining industry but only concession it through third parties, the State is willing to terminate the agreement. The WayuusarecurrentlycontestingthisdecisioninfrontoftheCourts.

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 livinginpovertyrepresentthemajorityofwomenartisanalminersinColombia,mostnotablyinChoc, thepoorestdepartmentofColombia. AfroColombianwomenworkinthesameorslightlyhigherproportionasafroColombianmeninmany differentlivelihoods,fromfishing,industrialmining,andtimberexploitationorinurbancenters.When panningforgoldandplatinuminorneartheChocRivers,136thesewomenworkinfamilyunitsand areusuallyaccompaniedbymenfamilymembersandtheirchildren. Already,aroundtheyear1890,ascholardescribedthat:

()alongtherivers()crowdsofworkerswithpaninhandgotothemiddleoftheriverandwashout thesand()despitethecurrentcrashinginvainagainsttheirback.Whatismostparticularaboutthisis that although this is one of the hardest works in mining, it has lagged as a tacit agreement to be generally left to women. The robust and courageous black Antioquia women are able to compete successfully in this and other exercises, with more than one man to whom nature has not given very strongconstitution.

Generally,goldpanningconsistsofbendingover,fillingandthenspinningapanwithsandandsome watersothatlightermaterialwillbeflattenedandpushedtowardstheouterborderofthepan,while theheaviergoldandplatinumnuggetsremaininitscenter.Thisminingmethodiscarriedoutinlarge part by AfroColombian women,137 who will work to amass gold and platinum from river beds while carryingtheweightoftheirbabiestiedtotheirbacks.138 Although women artisanal miners are in great need of organization, the characteristics of artisanal miningmakesthisdifficultandeffortstoorganizeartisanalandsmallscaleminersarenascentatbest and nonexistent at worst. Despite this gap in organizational capacity for artisanal mining, there are internationalnetworksofmineworkersthatdoprovidesomeforumfortheseminers.Amongthese networks is the International Women in Mining Network (Red Internacional de Mujeres y Mineria RIMM),whichsupportsthestrugglesofindigenouscommunities,womenworkersandactivistsinthe miningsectorofmembercountries.AccordingtoaRIMMassessment,theonlylaborspaceofferedto women in the mining sector is in informal mining, where legislative protections do not exist and organizational efforts are near impossible, especially for women in artisanal mining who may be workingaspartofinformalfamilyoperations.Tothisend,andtoprotectwomenmineworkersform furtherexposuretoharmfultoxins,disease,exploitation,andvulnerability,RIMMsupportstherights demandsthat:(1)miningcompaniesimmediatelyceasethemarginalizationofwomenmineworkers and end contract labor for women; (2) women mine workers be granted formal employment opportunities,withlaborprotectionstosafeguardtheirdignityfromexploitationandspecialprotective equipment especially designed for women; (3) equal pay for equal work and a safe, healthy work environment(4)womenmineworkersbegrantedaccesstoeducationopportunitiesonpartwithmen
136ClaraHidrn,FundacionOroVerde/rrainterview/2010/BogotaD.C;MarcoAurelioHurtadoandEdwardCaicedo/ Gremivalle / rra interview / 2009 / Cali; Gustavo, Cundinamarca / rra interview / 2010 / Ubat; Luz di Nora / rra interview/2010/Skype;SenatorOdinSanchez/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C;ClaraHidrn,FundacionOroVerde/ rrainterview/2010/BogotaD.CSenatorJorgeRobledosStaff/rrainterview/2009/BogotD.C.;PoliticalandCivil LeadersofTad,Choc/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C. 137LuzdiNora/rrainterview/2010/Skype 138()Simn,elviejo,consus87bienvividos,habasidomineroenelroNegu.Mazamorrero,quizelnico,porque ahoraelmazamorreooelbarequeoesasuntodemujeres.()http://www.soho.com.co/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=8067 andhttp://www.imcportal.com/contenido.php?option=shownews&newsid=4203&render=page

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 inmineengineeringandrelatedfields;(5)prohibitionsonchildlaborinallminingactivitiesbeenacted andenforced,recognizingthelinkbetweeneconomicinsecurityandchildlabor;and(6)womenmine workers be granted the right to association and organization and adequate maternity and child care benefits. RIMMalsoemphasizestheexperienceofindigenouspeopleinmininganddemandsthatgovernments, the mining industry, international financial institutions and existing international laws recognize indigenous people's citizenship and the individual and collective rights of indigenous people and women to selfdetermination, to ownership and control over their lands, natural resources and territories.RIMMdemandsthattheirrightstothelandtheyliveonnotbecompromisedbypublicor privateminingactivities.RIMMspecificallydemandsthatartisanal,traditionalandcommunitymining whereindigenouswomenaremoreprominentreceiveeconomicsupport,developmentfacilities, technologicalsupport,safetymeasures,trainingandmarketlinkages. What remains unaddressed, however, is the specific situation of violence plaguing many Colombian womenlivingandworkinginminingtownsandvillagesinthemostviolentregionsofthecountry.In thesezones,indigenousandafroColombianruralinhabitantsconfrontcombatfromtheextremeleft armedillegalgroups,extremerightarmedillegalgroups,andtransnationaldrugcrimedrivenbyillicit coca crop production, as well as the tensions and conflicts discussed above relating to aggressive mineral exploration and exploitation carried out by large and medium national and multinational corporations.Thelayersofconflict,violence,privatization,patriarchy,andexclusion,combinedwith theStatesutterabsenceandenforcementoflaw,havemultiplicativeeffectsonthewomenworkingin artisanal mining. As recognized in the Declaration of the Departmental Encounter of Women for Peace,InterethnicForumChocSolidarity139: () exclusion, discrimination and marginalization of women in public spaces, and private organizations,thedifferentformsofviolenceagainstwomen()byallarmedgroups,legalandillegal, thedeepeningandexpandingformsofdomesticviolence()influencedby()thoseinvolvedinarmed conflict,thepracticesofdiscriminationagainstindigenouspeopleandparticularlyindigenouswomen, theexistenceofgovernmentprograms()whichdonotincludeadifferentialapproachtogender,the absence of public policies that protect womens rights, the suicide and suicide attempts of the indigenousgirls,theminingpracticesthatpolluteriversandaffectthehealthofthewomen,men,girls and boysthe sexual abuse of girls by members of mining companies[all] demand respect for women.toparticipateintraining,mobilization,andconstructionofbetterlifeandpeace. 3.5.CHILDRENINMINEWORK In addition to representing free unpaid work and being in great supply, poor children are also in demand for mine work because of their vulnerability and size. Ideal for human traffickers and convenient for mining companies in violation of human rights and mining regulation, the small thin bodies of children living in poverty are very useful for accessing tight spaces in mines and quarries. Most of the attention on illegal child labor in mining focuses on small and microscale mining or artisanal mining. The discussion about child labor in smallscale mining started some years ago,
139Pleasesee:http://www.aecid.org.co/2008/uploads/declaracionmujereschoco.pdfand http://www.fischoco.org/noticias_content.html

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instigatedbyinternationalpressreportsaboutchildlaborinColombiancoalmines.140Despiteregional andcountryspecificvariations,therearecertainconditionsofanartisanalminingmodethat,chiefly, althoughnotexclusively,giverisetochildlaborintheminingsector:

Thelackorlimiteduseofmechanizationandtheuseofphysicallydemandingwork,forwhichchildren areemployed; Low occupational safety and health standards, accompanied with high safety and health risks, which poseevengreaterriskstochildreninmining; Low qualifications for personnel at all operational levels, allowing for employers, parents and family memberstousechildrentoperformneededwork; Lowrecoveryvalueandtheinefficiencyofexploitationandprocessingtherecoveredminerals,forcing familiestoemploytheirchildrentosaveonoperationalcosts; Mininginregionsthatarenotexploitablebymechanized mining,inpartbecauseoftheirmarginalor smallanticipatedrecoverythelowreturntotheinvestmentwilloftenmeanthatthetunnelstoaccess themineralresourceswillbesosmallthatonlychildrenmayfitthroughthem; Lowproductivityrelativetoanticipatedreturn,thusemployingchildrensavesonoperationalcosts; Low income and salaries, sometimes less than $US 1 per family member per day, convincing family memberstoincreasethehouseholdincomebyemployingtheirchildren; Periodicratherthancontinuousoperations,contributingtothemigrationoffamiliesandthepullingof childrenoutofschoolsandsocialnetworks; Lack of social security and health care benefits, which, in the case of accident or injury, may result in adultincapacitation,forcingchildrentoworkintheirstead; Insufficient knowledge or concern about environmental hazards common in mining zones, exposing childrenworkinginminesandlivinginminingcampstoenvironmental,socialandhealthhazards;and, Chronic lack of working and investment capital, compensated by using unskilled workers, including children.

Anotherconsiderationisthat,aswithurbanwastepickers,povertytrappedartisanalmineworkersare usually selfemployed or own account workers. The absence of childcare services or formal educationalopportunitiesexplainsinpartwhychildrenaccompanytheirparentsandfamilymembers to the workplace.141 While it is regrettable that these children will consequently become involved in
140GlobalreportonASM,p.23 141Itisnotthattherearenoschoolsbutthattheschoolsandlibrariesifso,aremanyhoursfarawaytogowalkingalone orfortheworkingparentstotaketheminsteadofworkingforbreadwinning.Inotheroccasionstheregionsaresofaror setinconflictzonesthatiftheremightbeabuildingbutnoteachers.Preciselyontheproblemofchildcareandeducation publicpolicieswithlackorweakreachoutcapacitytoruralpovertytrappedconstituents,aMexicanvoiceraisedwithin theglobalnationalconsultationsexerciseoftheCommissionontheLegalEmpowermentofthePoorexplainedthatthere isananecdoteillustratingtherelationshipbetweenbasicskillsandpovertytraps.[Inaninterview]toXochitlGalvez,an architect of Indigenous origin, when she received an international award for her design of intelligent buildings. The interviewerpraisedsayingitmustbeverydifficultforawomanandinparticularforanindigenouswomanarrivingtoearna doctorate.Theansweroftheinterviewwasenlightening.Shesaidthatno,thatwasreallyhardforherwashavingtostudy

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 their parents mining activities, this situation is one that is in many ways imposed upon poverty trapped families who cannot access greater opportunities or protections for themselves or their children.142 Accordingtothestudiesassessedforthisreport,childrenmay beginworkinginmineworkasearlyattheageofthree,when they may begin washing gold; from six years on they can be seenbreakingrockswithhammersorwashingore.Childrenas young as nine can be observed underground, and at twelve, boys are widespread working underground in many countries, doing the same work than adults. In the Cerro Rico in Potosi, Boliviahalfofthetotalamountof8000minersischildrenand adolescents.143And,ingeneral144,theaveragetimededicated to mine work increases as children age. In Colombia, children RevistaSemana ,PhotoByJuanCarlos Sierra betweentheagesoffiveandsevenworkabout11.6hoursper week; this increases to 21.7 hours per week for adolescents overfourteenyearsofage.145Further,manychildrenworkinginminingalsohaveresponsibilitiesat home, bringing the total number of hours dedicated to mine and house work over more than thirty hoursperweek.146Thisworkloadwillhavedetrimentaleffectsontheirperformanceinschool,ifthey arefortunateenoughtobeenrolled. In addition to the variation by age, the work that children will be doing in mining will also vary according to the kind of mining activity that is taking place. In underground mining, the only mining wherethepopulationofchildrenwillbealmostexclusivelyboys,147theymaybefounddoinganyofthe followingactivities:oreextraction(byhammerandchisel,pickandshovel,etc.),assistingindrilling, haulingore,pushingcarts,cleaninggalleries,andpilingminedore.Inopencasemines,bothboysand girlsmaybefounddiggingpits,removingexcessmaterialsandpushingcarts.Inalluvial/rivermining, they will be found digging for sediment, assisting in diving for sediment, sieving ore and sediment, washing and drying collected minerals, and pushing carts and transporting collected sediment. In mineral concentration and stone crushing, they may be involved in piling ore and crushed stones, millingore,carryingstonesfromtheminesorrivers,crushingrocks,pickingoutgemstones,washing gold,amalgamatinggold,orfetchingwaterforprocessingtheore.Inclayextractionandbrickmaking,
inprimaryschoolbecausehehadtowalkseveralhourstothevillagewheretheschoolwasfound.Inaverymagicrealist approachtosolvingproblems,thebiblioburroordonkbraryisthewayaColombianpeasantteacherfoundtotakebooks closertotheruralpoor.http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/20/world/americas/20iht20burro.17088328.html.Ontheissue ofhigherwagesforparentsinordertoreducechildlaborasuggestedreadingistheeconomicsofchildlaborbyKaushik BasuandPhamHoangVananddebatesthatfollowedthereon. 142Itisalsoworthnotingthattherearedifferencesonchildraisingintheethnoculturalcommunitieswherechildrenare participating in artisanal mining (see ILO extensive research on this topic). In part because of limited educational opportunities,inpartbecauseofahistoryofpovertyandexclusiongenerationupongeneration,itisnotsurprisingtofind parents training their children as apprentices in their own trades, even if this is contrary to the norms espoused in contemporaryinternationalanddomesticnormsrelatingtohumanandchildrensrights. 143GlobalreportonASM,p.23 144Theactualnumberofchildrenworkingintheminingareasisonlyestablishedforsmallandstableminingcenters.In mostcasesfiguresonthechildrenemployedwereonlyindicativeorbaseduponestimates. 145ILO/IPECILO/SECTORThematicEvaluationonChildLabourinSmallScaleMining&Quarrying,May2004 146Ibid 147Ibid;Otherthaninundergroundmining,theproportionsofboysandgirlsinmininginColombiaisvirtuallyequal.

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 theymaybedryinggreenbricks,turningbrickssotheydryevenly,stackingbricks,transportinggreen andfiredbricks,andstackingandunloadingkilns.And,ingeneral,inaminingenvironmentandinthe household, children may be involved in preparing and providing food for miners, washing clothes, sellingfoodtominers,fetchingdrinkingwaterandfood,workinginbarsandrestaurantsservingthe miningcommunity,fetchingfirewood,andforcedprostitution. Unfortunately, because there is little governmental interest and attention with regard to small and artisanal mining, there is little reliable data on the extent of child labor and, more importantly, accidentsandinjuriesthattheseyoungworkersexperience.Childrenthemselvesregardminingtobe averydifficult,riskyandfrighteningoccupation148,butwhereverpovertyandminingcoincide,children willbepresentandactive.

3.6.HEALTHANDSOCIALPROTECTION
Miningisoneofthemostdangerousactivitiesthatmen,women,andchildrenengageinforaliving. Artisanalmininginparticular,which,duetotheminersscareresourcesisperformedwithoutmodern, standardizedequipment,149letaloneadequatesafetyequipment,resultsinseveralergonomicillnesses duetotheintenseforceandeffortexpended.Thechatarrerascontinuousbendingovertobreakore bysmashingherhandswiththehammerthataccompaniesher,thealluvialgoldminersskindisease brought on by mercury contamination in river water, the lung and respiratory damage due to long hoursspentdivinginriversareallcommontotheseinformalmineworkers.Theyarealsoatconstant risk death by miscalculating land and resource capacity in removal, wrongly wired explosives, or inhalingtoxicgasesunderground. Despite these health risks, Colombian artisanal miners working mainly in microscale mining operations fall outside the traditional employeremployee relationship that would otherwise ensure them access to the contributory scheme and grant them health, occupational accident and pensions protection. Artisanal mine workers may qualify for the subsidized health care program, which, although it is not as good quality as the contributory regime, does provide some degree of social protection.150 As with the urban poor, access to the subsidized health system is contingent upon a formalpovertyassessmentandSISBENcertificationandrequiresaSISBENbeneficiaryIDcard.While ruralartisanalmineworkersmayobtaintheseSISBENcardsandcertifications,itisdifficulttodiscern theirabilitytousethehealthcoveragetheyenjoy,particularlyifmanyofthemfearthatclaimingany
148Pleasesee:http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2004/104B09_399_engl.pdf 149Re.Goldpanning.Itisworthnotingthatifequipmentsaretobeintroducedtomakeworklessriskyandhard,thelegal presumptionadoptedbytheCodeisthatthepersonisnolongerminingforsubsistenceandthusunderatolerancepermit but is now some kind of industrialized miner abusing of the tolerance permit and is illegal as it should be thus under a concessioncontract.Ifyoudontbreakyourcolumnthenyouarenotartisanal.Thehousevacuumcleanermachineused byanoldAfroColombianminerforunderwatersandextractionfromtheriverbedinsteadofdivingupanddowncarrying sand, would make him then an industrial miner? Tambin minero: tuvo una draguita construida con un motor de aspiradora.Yfuebuzotambin,loqueequivaleadecir"dragashumanas":Ellossemetenenlosrosconunpitillitoenla bocaconectadoalaireyunaaspiradoraensusmanos,escarbanenlaprofundidaddelroyponenlaaspiradora.Loquese succionallegaaunacanoaendondelavanaverququeda.Perolosbuzosseentierranyseentierran:hacenprofundos huecosbajoelaguay,enocasiones,nosalennuncams.Selesvienelatierraencimaenesascuevassubacuticasypunto http://www.soho.com.co/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?IdArt=8067. 150HowevertheColombianConstitutionalCourtorderedrecentlyinrulingT76008theunificationofthesubsidizedand contributivehealthsystems.ReadexcerptsoftheCourtstranslateddecisioninhttp://www.cmi.no/file/?964

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 legalentitlementsfromtheStatewouldmakethemmorevulnerabletobeingbrandedasillegalmine workers.

3.7.ACCESSTOMINEWORK
RuralColombiansrelyonaccesstonatureforthelives,workandlivelihoods.And,Colombiasthree Andean mountain ranges, vast waterways and systems, and rich natural and mineral resources continue to support the lives and livelihoods of those people and communities. Indigenous, afro Colombian and mestizo communities cut timber, collect fruits, fish, farm and extract and collect mineralslikegold,clays,saltsandstones.Mineralextractionisnotonlyanindustrialactivity,itisalso anartisanalactivitysupportingatradeonwhichmanyofthepeoplelivinginColombiasruralzones rely. These individuals work on smallscale and micromining operations as either selfemployed or ownaccountminers. Certainmineralsmostnotablyalluvialgoldandplatinuminruralriverbedsandshores,saltmining andothersandriverminingofferworkopportunitiesforpeoplelivinginpovertywhoseonlymining skillscomefromtheirartisanalknowledgeandmanuallabor.Theseminersworkprimarilyinmicro miningoperations(authorsterm).151Mininginornearwaterbodiesgrantstheseworkersaccessto sandtobesoldtotheconstructionindustry,marinesaltforthefoodindustryandforexport,andgold and platinum for intermediaries who sell to industrial buyers or export to the international commodities market. Since the returns to this labor are relatively small, this work is primarily done throughownaccountworkorselfemployment,withthenumberofhandsandbodiesavailablebeing theonlytoolsofthetrade.Incontrast,hardrocksurfaceminingandundergroundmining(forcoal, saltandgold)isnearlyimpossiblewithouttheappropriatemachinerytoclearthearea,opentunnels foraccess,andperformtheminingextractionandcollection. Itisimportanttonotethat,forthepurposesofunderstandingthelegalconditionsofmineworkersin poverty, a distinction must be made between the size and the mechanisms or tools of mining operations.Toindicatethesizeorscaleoroperations,theauthorsusethecategoriesoflarge,medium and smallscale mining, and introduce the notion of micromining operations to describe minimal extractive operations that are performed by individuals or microwork units. When describing the waystoextractmineralsandresources,theauthorswillonlyrefertotwomechanisms(1)industrial mining,wheretheworkisperformedasasetofoperationsofanindustrytoobtain,transform,and transportoneormorenaturalproducts,and(2)artisanalmining,wheretheworkisperformedwith the understanding of art as the virtue, disposition and ability to do something.152 Mining, in large, medium,smallormicroscaleoperationshasthepotentialtopollutetheair,contaminatetherivers, degradethefloraandthefauna,and,bysodoing,negativelyimpacttheenvironment,andthisimpact itselfcorrespondstothesizeorscaleoftheminingoperation.
151 This doesnt mean that because the ease of access favors the povertytrapped, industrial mining for alluvial gold, platinum sand or salt will not happen, it is quite the contrary. Colluvial extraction which is connected or fingeredfrom alluvialdepositsinriversisalsoofeasyaccessandthusagoodworkoptionforthemineworkersinpovertywithlittleorno investmentcapital.Forinstance,intheChocBiogeographicregion,goldisextractedbothfromlandandwater:thereis mineradeaguacorrida(runningwatermining)andmineriadezambullidero(inwatermining)whichincludesplunginginto theriver. 152DefinitiontakenfromtheRealAcademiadelaLengua

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 In terms of the policy framework impacting Colombian mine workers in poverty, it is important to recall that land rights are not necessary to pursue and carry out mine work. Article 332 of the Colombianconstitutionretainsallsurfaceandsubsurfacenonrenewableandnaturalresourcerights fortheState.Asthesolemineralowner,itisonlybythewilloftheColombianStatethatanyoneor anyentitymayenteranddevelopminework. The legal provisions governing mine work in any scale or mode, and applicable to ancestral Afro descendantandindigenousmineworkers,arecitedbelow.ThesegrantformalaccesstoStateowned mineralsthroughconcessioncontractsinitiatedbyprivateorpublicactors,and,exceptionally,bythe authorityoftheState. 3.7.1.THEORDINARYMININGCONCESSION:ACCESSINGMINERALSTHROUGHACONTRACTFORA MININGTITLE Chapter 2 of Law 685 of 2001 (the Mining Code) regulates the right to explore and exploit mineral resourcesthroughthefollowingprovisionsandsubsequentarticles.
Article14.Miningtitle153.FromthecomingintoforceofthisCode,itcanonlybeconstituted,declared orprovedtherighttoexploreandexploittheminesofStatesownershipbymeansofacontractfor miningconcession,dulyawardedandregisteredattheNationalMiningRegister. The rights coming from the exploration licenses exploitation permits or licenses, concession contracts and contracts celebrated on mining contribution areas, prevailing when this Code enters into effect, maintain their validity by disposition of this Article. Also the individual, subjective and concrete legal situationsrelatedtotheprivateminingownership,prevailingbeforethisstatutecomesinforce. Article 15. Nature of the Rights of the Beneficiary154 The concession contract and all other titles emanatingfromtheStatewhicharereferredtointheaboveArticle,donottransfertothebeneficiary therightofownershipovermineralsinsitubutestablish,inanexclusiveandtemporalmannerwithin the area granted, the existence of minerals in a quantity and quality that can be usable, and take possessionbymeansofitsextractionorcaptureofthem,andimposeonthirdpartiespropertieswith necessaryeasementsforanefficientexerciseofsuchactivities. Article16.ValidityoftheProposal155Thefirstapplicationorproposalforaconcession,whileinprocess, doesnotconferinitself,beforetheState,therighttocelebrateaconcessioncontract.Withregardto

153Artculo14.Ttulominero.ApartirdelavigenciadeesteCdigo,nicamentesepodrconstituir,declararyprobarel derechoaexploraryexplotarminasdepropiedadestatal,medianteelcontratodeconcesinminera,debidamenteotorgado einscritoenelRegistroMineroNacional.Lodispuestoenelpresenteartculodejaasalvolosderechosprovenientesdelas licenciasdeexploracin,permisosolicenciasdeexplotacin,contratosdeexplotacinycontratoscelebradossobrereasde aporte,vigentesalentrararegiresteCdigo.Igualmentequedanasalvolassituacionesjurdicasindividuales,subjetivasy concretasprovenientesdettulosdepropiedadprivadademinasperfeccionadasantesdelavigenciadelpresenteestatuto. 154Artculo15.Naturalezadelderechodelbeneficiario.ElcontratodeconcesinylosdemsttulosemanadosdelEstado dequetrataelartculoanterior,notransfierenalbeneficiariounderechodepropiedaddelosminerales"insitu"sinoelde establecer, en forma exclusiva y temporal dentro del rea otorgada, la existencia de minerales en cantidad y calidad aprovechables,aapropirselosmediantesuextraccinocaptacinyagravarlosprediosdetercerosconlasservidumbres necesariasparaelejercicioeficientededichasactividades. 155Artculo16.Validezdelapropuesta.Laprimerasolicitudopropuestadeconcesin,mientrassehalleentrmite,no confiere,porssola,frentealEstado,derechoalacelebracindelcontratodeconcesin.Frenteaotrassolicitudesofrentea terceros, sloconfiere al interesado, un derecho de prelacin o preferencia para obtener dicha concesinsireneparael efecto,losrequisitoslegales.

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other proposals or third parties, it only grants to the interested party a right in time or preference to obtainsuchconcession,ifitcompliesforthateffect,withalllegalrequirements. Article 17. Legal Capacity.156 The legal capacity for submitting a proposal for getting a mining concessionandtocelebratetherespectivecontractisregulatedbyStateContractinggeneralprovisions. If such capacity refers to legal persons, public or private, it is necessary that they expressly and specificallyhaveincludedwithinitsobjectminingexplorationandexploitationactivities. When joint ventures are granted concessions, they shall incorporate as a society Company, with the samesharedistributionasthatofthesubmittedproposal. Consortiumsmay also present proposals and celebrate concession contracts, in which case their memberswillrespondtoliabilitiesinsolidum. Article18.Foreigners157Thenaturalandlegalforeignpersonsactingasproponentsorcontractorsof miningconcessionswillhavethesamerightsandobligationsasColombiannationals.Theminingand environmental authorities cannot, in their field of competence, request from them any additional or differentrequirements,conditionsandformalities,besidesthoseexpresslyestablishedinthisCode. Article 251. National Human Resource158 The title holders of concession contracts will prefer the national individual persons in the execution of studies, mining and environmental works and installations,aslongassuchpeoplearequalifiedworkers.Theseobligationswillcoveralsopeoplehired byindependentcontractors.Thelaborauthorities,aswellastheMayors,shouldrestrainminorsfrom workinginmininglaborsandworks,asisstatedinthedispositionsonthismatter. (Itisworthnotingthat,followingarticle9oftherecentamendingLaw1382of2010,Article112ofthe Mining Code shall now include a new cause for declaring the lapse of the concession contract () (k) [w]hencompaniesornaturalpersonsintheexerciseofminingactivities,hirepersonsyoungerthan18 yearsoldtorealizeopenorundergroundmininglabors.159) Article252.UseofNationalGoods160 In the execution of mining projects, the concessionaires will preferinitsacquisitions ofgoodsandservicesthoseofnationalindustry,aslongastheyoffersimilar conditionsinqualityaswellasinopportunityandsecurityintheirdeliveries.

156 Artculo 17. Capacidad legal. La capacidad legal para formular propuesta de concesin minera y para celebrar el correspondientecontrato,seregulaporlasdisposicionesgeneralessobrecontratacinestatal.Dichacapacidad,siserefiere a personas jurdicas, pblicas o privadas, requiere que en su objeto se hallen incluidas, expresa y especficamente, la exploracin y explotacin mineras. Cuando Uniones Temporales reciban concesiones debern constituirse en figura societaria,conla mismaparticipacinquesederivedela propuestapresentada. Tambin podrn presentar propuestas y celebrar contratos de concesin los consorcios, caso en el cual sus integrantes respondern solidariamente de las obligacionesconsiguientes. 157Artculo18.Personasextranjeras.Laspersonasnaturalesyjurdicasextranjeras,comoproponentesocontratistasde concesionesmineras,tendrnlosmismosderechosyobligacionesquelosnacionalescolombianos.Lasautoridadesminera yambientalnopodrn,enelmbitodesuscompetencias,exigirlesrequisitos,condicionesyformalidadesadicionaleso diferentes,salvolasexpresamentesealadasenesteCdigo. 158 Artculo 251. Recurso humano nacional. Los titulares de contratos de concesin, preferirn a personas naturales nacionales, en la ejecucin de estudios, obras y trabajos mineros y ambientales siempre que dichas personas tengan la calificacinlaboral requerida. Esta obligacin cobijar igualmentealpersonal vinculado por contratistasindependientes. Lasautoridadeslaboralesascomolosalcaldesdebernimpedireltrabajodemenoresdeedadenlostrabajosyobrasdela minera,talcomoloprevnlasdisposicionessobrelamateria. 159()(k)Cuandoempresasopersonasnaturalesenejerciciodeactividadesmineras,contratenapersonasmenoresde18 aosparadesempearseenlaboresdemineratantodecieloabiertocomosubterrneas 160Artculo252.UtilizacindeBienesNacionales.Enlaejecucindeproyectosmineros,losconcesionariospreferirnen

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Intheacquisitions,whicharereferredinthisArticle,duesegregationwilltakeplaceinordertofacilitate theconcurrenceofthenationalindustry. Article253. ParticipationoftheNationalWorkers.161SubjecttotheobligationsindicatedinArticles 74and75oftheSubstantiveCodeofLabor,theminingconcessionairesshouldpaytheColombianstaff, as a whole, not less that seventy percent (70%) of the total value of payroll of qualified or of skilled personnel,ofuppermanagementorseniorlevelstaff,andnolessthaneightypercent(80%)ofthevalue ofpayrollofthesubordinates. Thepreviousconceptoftheminingauthority,theMinistryofLaborandSocialSecurity,mayauthorize, attherequestoftheinterestedparty,thatthemaximumtimelimitpermittedmaybesurpassed,forthe timestrictlynecessarytogiveasuitabletrainingtoColombianpersonnel. For the granting of this authorization it will be necessary that the interested party agree with the MinistryincontributingorparticipatinginspecializedtrainingofColombianpersonnel. Article254.LocalLaborForce.162Intheminingandenvironmentalworksoftheminingconcessionaire, oncetheinterestedpartyhasbeenheard,theminingauthoritywillappointtheminimumpercentages ofworkersoriginatedfromtherespectiveregionanddomiciledintheareaofinfluenceoftheprojects thatshouldbehired.Periodically,thesepercentageswillbechecked. Article256.MiningandCommunityWorksandInstallations.163The instructions and installations differentfromthoserequiredfortheextractingoperationsandorestoragemaybelocatedoutsidethe area of the contract. The works the concessionaire carries out in the municipality or municipalities

susadquisicionesdebienesyserviciosalaindustrianacionalsiemprequelosmismosofrezcansimilarescondicionestanto en la calidad como en la oportunidad y seguridad de las entregas. Se estimar que hay igualdad de condiciones para la industrianacionalencuantoalprecio,sieldelosbienesdeproduccinnacionalnoexcedealdelosdeproduccinextranjera en un quince por ciento (15%). En las adquisiciones de que trata este artculo se proceder a efectuar la debida desagregacinquefacilitelaconcurrenciadelaindustrianacional. 161Artculo253.Participacindetrabajadoresnacionales.Sinperjuiciodelasobligacionessealadasenlosartculos74 y75delCdigoSustantivodelTrabajo,losconcesionariosdeminasdebernpagaralpersonalcolombianoenconjunto,no menos del setenta por ciento (70%) del valor total de la nmina del personal calificado o de especialistas, de direccin o confianza, y no menos del ochenta por ciento (80%) del valor de la nmina de trabajadores ordinarios. El Ministerio del Trabajo y Seguridad Social, odo el concepto de la autoridad minera, podr autorizar, a solicitud del interesado y por el tiempo estrictamente indispensable para la preparacin idnea de personal colombiano, se sobrepasen los lmites mximos permitidos. Para el otorgamiento de esta autorizacin ser necesario que dicho interesado convenga con el Ministerioencontribuiroparticiparenlaenseanzaespecializadadepersonalcolombiano. 162Artculo254.Manodeobraregional.Enlostrabajosminerosyambientalesdelconcesionariodeminaslaautoridad minera, odos los interesados, sealar los porcentajes mnimos de trabajadores oriundos de la respectiva regin y domiciliadosenelreadeinfluenciadelosproyectosquedebernsercontratados.Peridicamenteestosporcentajessern revisables. 163 Artculo 256. Obras e instalaciones mineras y comunitarias. Las construcciones e instalaciones distintas a las requeridasparalaoperacindeextraccinocaptacindelosminerales,podrnestarubicadasfueradelreadelcontrato. Igualmentepodrnubicarsefueradelreadelcontratolasobrasdestinadaspreferencialmentealasalud,laeducacinyel saneamientobsico,queelconcesionariorealiceenelmunicipioomunicipiosdondeselocaliceelproyectominerodurante elperododeconstruccinymontaje.Lanaturalezaycaractersticasdelasobrasdebeneficiocomnantesmencionadasse debern acordar entre el concesionario y las autoridades municipales, quedando entendido que la cuanta de las inversionesrequeridas,quenopodrexcederdelcincoporciento(5%)delainversinenlainfraestructuradestinadaala extraccin de minerales, se imputar como anticipo o deduccin de los impuestos municipales a cargo del concesionario, previaautorizacindelasentidadescompetentes.Larealizacindelainversinenlasobrasdebeneficiocomndequetrata esteartculosercondicinparadisfrutar,porpartedelconcesionario,deladeduccinporagotamientocontempladaenel artculo234deesteCdigo.

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where the mining project is taking place during the period of construction and building and that are mainlydestinedtowelfare,educationandbasicsanitationcanalsobelocatedoutsidetheareaofthe contract. The nature and characteristics of the works of common benefit previously mentioned, will be agreed uponbetweentheconcessionaireandthemunicipalauthorities,beingunderstoodthattheamountof theinvestmentsrequired,whichcannotexceedtofivepercent(5%)oftheinvestmentininfrastructure destinedtotheextractionofminerals,willbeconsideredasaprepaymentordeductionofthemunicipal taxesonaccountoftheconcessionaire,previousauthorizationofthecompetentagencies.

As simple as it may seem to establish that the only way to access mining is through a concession contract,itisworthnotingthattheprocessofrequestingandacquiringsuchacontractinthepractice oflawandintherealityonthegroundisneithereasynorinexpensive.Allintervieweesagreedthatit such condition is, de facto, unattainable, for Colombians living in poverty, especially for those who have been ancestrally or traditionally mining in the informal economy, that it is to say that the concessioncontractasatitlegrantingmodalityisaninsurmountablebarriertomineworkerswithout capitalresources.Formanyworkers,thisisthelegallysophisticatedwayofendingallsmallandmicro level mine work and mine culture in Colombia and reserving it only for largescale national and multinational investment operations. For the State to act only in its capacity as mine proprietor and investor, and not in balance with its role as the rulemaker for the common good, is a breach of its authority, particularly in a State that is subject to a Social Rule of Law by virtue of its Political Constitution. Overall,andamongmanyotherprerequisites,formalities,andconditionstobefulfilledinpersonand overtheinternet,anoninvestororpoormineworkerwillingtogetaconcessioncontractinorderto legally work in mineral exploration and exploitation, must perform the following tasks.164 First, assumingthatthemineworkerortheethnoculturalmineworkercommunityhasalreadyassessedhis, herortheircapacitytopaythepriceofsurfacerentperhectareofexploration,itisnecessarytoalso hireprofessionals(topographers,miningengineers,etc.)capableofestablishingtheexactcoordinates fortheproposedmineralextraction.Aninexpensiveprofessionalservicewillnotbeanoptionforthe concessionrequester,becauseifthecoordinatesareincorrectorlackinginanywaythentheywillhave notonlylosttheopportunityoftheconcessioncontracttheyappliedforandneedtoamend,butthey will also have disclosed the positioning of the mineral deposit they were interested in exploiting. Consideringthattheprincipleoffirstintime,firstinrightappliestoallmininginColombia,topay high quality professional services is an important investment, especially for the powerless poverty trappedtryingtolandaminingconcession.165Second,afterhavingdraftedexplorationblueprints,and settingacostandtimescheduleforeachminingphase,themineworker/communitymust,ifwilling, requesttheconcessionremotelythroughinternetandpurchaseapersonalidentificationnumber(PIN) for597.400pesos($USD300)fromaspecificbank(BancodeBogota).Ifpersonalorientationissought for preparing the solicitation, the concession requestor might need to travel to one of the seven regional Ingeominas offices in the country, not one of which is in the Choc region. (This is an impressive paradox considering that Choc is both the poorest department and one of the richest mineral deposits in the world.) If the mine worker person, company or community requesting the
164IngeominasCali/rraphoneinterview/2010/Cali;Gustavo,Cundinamarca/rrainterview/2010/Ubat;Politicaland CivilLeadersofTad,Choc/rrainterview/2010/BogotD.C. 165Apparentlythecorruption affectingmineworkerslivinginpovertyisintense,vast,andnotdocumented.Themineral deposit information seems to be not only abusive and corrupt but exploitative as much as the power of controlling the queueonwhichthefirstintime,firstinrightsminingprinciplepivots.

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 concession cannot afford these travel expenses, they will invest in the services of yet another professional to take care of orienting and navigating clients through all the complex and diverse procedures,conditions,formalitiesandtechnicalitiesneededtobecomealegalandformalminer,one whoisaformalrightholderofaminingtitle.166 Third, after having established these parameters and conditions, they must be relayed via internet, withaccessgrantedbythePINnumberacquiredearlier(aPDFhandbookforfacilitatingtheinternet registrationoftheconcessionproposalisofferedbythegovernment167).Threedayslater,aprinted copy of the internet submission for a concession contract proposal must be presented personally, alongwiththemapsandblueprints,signedbythetechnicalprofessionalauthorandaccompaniedbya photocopyofhisprofessionallicense,tothecentralorregionalIngeominasoffice.UnderLaw1382of 2010,thisconcessionrequestwillbedecidedwithin180days,168aconsiderableimprovementinthe5 10yearsthattheaveragetimehasbeenforeffectivelyreceivingaminingconcessiontitle.169 Iftheconcessionisnotrejectedforreasonsestablishedinarticle274that,sincelaw1382of2010,also include a lack of evidence of having paid the first year of the surface rents in advance170, and the proposalisaccepted,thiswillindicatethattheconcessiondoesnotoverlapwithanindigenousorafro Colombian mining zone, or, if it does fall in an ethnocultural mining zone, that the community has decidedtonotuseitsfirstinrightpreferentialminingprerogative. Then, with an accepted concession proposal, it will now be necessary to initiate the request for an environmentallicense,whichhasitsownsetsofdifficultconditionstofulfill,especiallyforthoseliving in poverty who cannot afford unnecessary time or expense. The license must be presented to the mining authority, along with the definitive work and mining management plan, to finally begin the exploitationphaseoftheminingoperation.
Article84. WorksandinstallationsProgram171.Asaresultofthestudiesandworksofexploration, before the overdue date the concessionaire will present for approval of the granting authority or the

166InthecaseofGustavo,hehadtocooperateandjoineffortswithotherfellowmineworkerstogatherthe300.000.000 pesos(150.000USD)thatwerenecessarytogetaformalminingconcessioncontract,atitleforcoalmining. 167Pleasesee:http://www.ingeominas.gov.co/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_view/gid,6731/ 168Law1382of2010,Article1,secondparagraph 169MarcoAurelioHurtadoandEdwardCaicedo/Gremivalle/rrainterview/2009/Cali;Noelioandfamily/rrainterview /2009/Juanchito 170Artculo274.ModificadoporlaLey1382de2010,Artculo20.Rechazodelapropuesta.Lapropuestaserrechazada enlossiguientescasos:1.Sielreapedidaensutotalidadsehallareubicadaenloslugaresyzonassealadasenelartculo 34deesteCdigosiemprequenohubiereobtenidolasautorizacionesyconceptosquelanormaexige.2.Sisesuperpone totalmenteapropuestasocontratosanteriores.3.Sinocumpleconlapresentacindetodoslosrequisitosestablecidosen elartculo271delpresenteCdigo.4.Sinosecumpleelrequerimientodesubsanarlasdeficienciasdelapropuesta.5.Si noseacreditaelpagodelaprimeraanualidaddelcanonsuperficiario. 171Artculo84.Programadetrabajosyobras.Comoresultadodelosestudiosytrabajosdeexploracin,elconcesionario, antesdelvencimientodefinitivodeesteperodo,presentarparalaaprobacindelaautoridadconcedenteoelauditor,el ProgramadeTrabajosyObrasdeExplotacinqueseanexaralcontratocomopartedelasobligaciones.Esteprograma deber contener los siguientes elementos y documentos: 1. Delimitacin definitiva del rea de explotacin. 2. Mapa topogrficodedicharea.3.Detalladainformacincartogrficadelreay,sisetrataredemineramarinaespecificaciones batimtricas.4.Ubicacin,clculoycaractersticasdelasreservasquehabrndeserexplotadasendesarrollodelproyecto.5. Descripcinylocalizacindelasinstalacionesyobrasdeminera,depsitodeminerales,beneficioytransportey,siesdel caso,detransformacin.6.PlanMinerodeExplotacin,queincluirlaindicacindelasguastcnicasquesernutilizadas.7. Plan de Obras de Recuperacin geomorfolgica paisajstica y forestal del sistema alterado. 8. Escala y duracin de la produccinesperada.9.Caractersticasfsicasyqumicasdelosmineralesporexplotarse.10.Descripcinylocalizacindelas

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auditor, the Program of Works and Installations of exploitation, which should be attached to the contractaspartoftheobligations.ThisPlanshouldcontainthefollowingelementsanddocuments: Definitedelimitationoftheareaofexploitation. Topographicalmapofthementionedarea. Detailed cartographic information of the area and, when if it deals with marine mining, the bathymetricalspecifications. Location, estimate and characteristics of the reserves that should be exploited in development of the project. Description and localization of the installations and mining works, mineral storage, beneficiation and transportation,andifitmightbethecase,thetransformationfacilities. MiningPlanofexploitation,whichwillincludeindicationofthetechnicalguidesthatwillbeused. Worksplanforthegeomorphologicrecuperation,landscapingandrevegetationofthealteredsystem. Scaleanddurationoftheexpectedproduction. Physicalandchemicalcharacteristicsofthemineralstobeexploited. Description and localization of the necessary installations and works for the exercise of the rights correspondingtotheminingoperations. Plan of closure of the exploitation and abandonment of the assemblies and installations and of the infrastructure.(Added by Law 1382 of 2010, article 7) The Ministry of Mines shall design a special templatefortheelaborationoftheWorkandInstallationProgramforEmeraldSector,astheseminerals arenotquantifiableasalltherest. Article 85. Study on the Environmental Impact172. Simultaneously with the Plan of Works and Installations, the study that demonstrates the environmental feasibility of such program should be presented. Without the express approval of this study and the issuing of the corresponding EnvironmentalLicense,theinitiationoftheinstallationsofworksoftheminingexploitationcannotstart. Theworksofgeomorphologicrecuperation,landscapingandrevegetationofthealteredecosystemwill beexecuted byexpertsineachoneoftheselabors.Suchlicensewith therestrictionsandconditions imposedbytheconcessionairewillmakepartofthecontractualobligations.

obraseinstalacionesnecesariasparaelejerciciodelasservidumbresinherentesalasoperacionesmineras.11.Plandecierre delaexplotacinyabandonodelosmontajesydelainfraestructura.Pargrafo.AdicionadoporlaLey1382de2010,artculo 7.ElMinisteriodeMinasdeberdisearunformularioespecialparalaelaboracindelosprogramasdetrabajoyobras (PTO)paraelsectordelasesmeraldas,todavezqueestosmineralesnosoncuantificablescomolosdems. 172 Artculo 85. Estudio de Impacto Ambiental. Simultneamente con el Programa de Trabajos y Obras deber presentarse el estudio que demuestre la factibilidad ambiental de dicho programa. Sin la aprobacin expresa de este estudio y la expedicindelaLicenciaAmbientalcorrespondientenohabrlugaralainiciacindelostrabajosyobrasde explotacin minera. Las obras de recuperacin geomorfolgica, paisajstica y forestal del ecosistema alterado sern ejecutadosporprofesionalesafinesacadaunadeestaslabores.Dichalicenciaconlasrestriccionesycondicionamientos queimpongaalconcesionario,formarnpartedesusobligacionescontractuales

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Article 86. Corrections.173 If the granting authority finds great deficiencies or omissions in the Plan of WorksandInstallationsortheenvironmentalauthorityintheEnvironmentalImpactStudythatcannot becorrectedoraddedofficiously,theconcessionairewillhavetocorrectthem.Theobservationsand correctionsshouldbedetailedcompletelyonlyonce. Thecorrectionsoradditionsinsimpleformcannottakeplace,orthosethatdonotfullyinfluencethe requirementsandsubstantialelementsofthePlanofWorksandInstallationsandoftheEnvironmental ImpactStudyorthatmightnotpreventtoestablishorevaluateitscomponents.

AllofthecomplexityandexpensenecessarytoobtainaminingtitleunderColombianlawexplainstoa largedegreewhyeightypercentofColombianminingworkisinformal. Thechallengesinobtainingaformalconcessioncontractareevengreaterforancestralandtraditional mineworkerslivinginremoteareas,someofwhomlivewithlanguagebarriers,aswellasformestizo ruralandurbanworkersengagedintraditionalminingactivitieswhoarewillingtoformalize.Without granting aneasy, navigable, developmentoriented contractor license (such as oneeven recognizing thepresenceofsmallandmicroscaleminingoperations)theMiningCodeof2001createsanethno culturaladjustedtypeofconcessiononly,exploredinfurtherdetailbelow.Asmuchasitintendstobe awareandrespectfulofethnicspecificity,thisprovisionisneitheradjustednorproportionatetothe economiclevelorvulnerabilityofindigenousandafroColombianconstituentsoftheState. Law685of2001ortheMiningCodealsocreatestheinstitutionofSpecialReservestodevelopState ledinitiativesforencompassingallinformalworkerswhohavebeenminingaroundtraditionaldeposits of minerals under Special Mining Projects. In more of a permission state of authority, the Code concedesanauthorizationfortheoccasionalextractionactivitiesofclays,gravelandrocksforbuilding personalhomesorrepairingthehomesoflandownerswhoarelivingonthelandwherethemineralor material is found. The Code also concedes an authorization to afroColombians in the Choc bio geographicregionoftheColombianPacifictopursueoccasionalriversandwashing(barequeo)forgold andplatinumcollectionasaformofsubsistencemining. Prior to the 2001 Mining Code, a concession contract was not the only legal opportunity to live and develop through mine work. The previous law and policy framework granted exploration and exploitation licenses to mine workers who had less producer capacity than large and medium scale industrialmineoperations.174Inotherwords,earliermineregulationrecognizedthatsmallandmicro scale mine workers would not have the investment or resource capacity to enter into privatization schemes(norprofitmakingwastheonlyinterestoftheState),butwho,nevertheless,retainedthe righttoliveanddevelopthroughancestralortraditionalminework.WhenthecontroversialMining Code was passed in 2001 under the Pastrana administration, and following institutional reform and legalamendmentsundertheUribeAdministration,theselicenseswerenolongergrantedandthusall lawfulaccesstopursuemineworkwasconditionedonwinningaprivateconcessioncontractfromthe State.
173Artculo86.Correcciones.SilaautoridadconcedenteencontraredeficienciasuomisionesdefondoenelProgramade TrabajoyObrasolaautoridadambientalenelEstudiodeImpactoAmbiental,quenopudierecorregirseoadicionarsede oficio,seordenarnhacerloalconcesionario.Lasobservacionesycorreccionesdebernpuntualizarseenformacompletay por una sola vez. No habr lugar a pedir correcciones o adiciones de simple forma o que no incidan en el lleno de los requisitosyelementossustancialesdelProgramadeTrabajoyObrasydelEstudiodeImpactoAmbientaloquenoimpidan estableceryvalorarsuscomponentes. 174PleaseseeSupra:footnote86

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 ON THE GOVERNMENTS OBLIGATION TO ENSURE THE ETHNOCULTURAL COMMUNITIES FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CONSULTATION BEFORE GRANTING ANY ORDINARY CONCESSION TO A NATIONALORMULTINATIONALMININGOPERATION AsmuchastheCodebarelystressesinarticle259175theobligationofthegovernmenttoensurethe right of consultation to indigenous an afroColombian peoples prior to the development of any nationalormultinationalminingoperationwithintheircollectiveproperties,thisreportincludesthis obligationundertheordinaryconcessionsectioninordertoStatethat,inColombia,anyconcessions forminingactivitieswithinethnoculturallandsaresubjecttopriorconsultation.And,ifnecessary, theseconcessionsmustbeadjustedtotheconditionsrequiredbythoseethnoculturalcommunities. This is a particularly relevant obligation for national and multinational corporations interested in developingmediumandlargescaleminingoperationsinaconstitutional,legalandlegitimatemanner. The right to prior consultation is both a constitutional obligation required of the government under Article33O,andalsoaninternationalobligationfollowingtheratificationofILOConvention169byLaw 21 of 1991, as well as a domestic obligation the country under Article 92 of the Colombian Constitution,whichgivespreeminencetointernationaltreatiesonhumanrights.Therelevanceofland to indigenous and afroColombian communities, the history of mining as a traditional livelihood in thesecommunities,andthefactthatmostminingColombiaistakingplaceinthecountrysruralzones, requires a discussion of both ILO Convention 169 and Law 21 of 1991 that ratified this convention underColombiannationallaw. UnderArticle6ofILOConvention169,allgovernmentsshallconsultwithindigenouspeoplethatare affected by any legislative or administrative measures such as mining concessions within their collective properties, by using the appropriate procedures and the indigenous communities representative institutions. This same article also states that the State is obliged to establish the meansbywhichallindigenouspeoplemayfreelyparticipateinanequalwayasothersectorsofthe population,atalllevelsofdecisionmakinginelectiveinstitutionsandadministrativeandotherbodies responsible for policies and programs which concern them.176 In Colombia, for instance, the Constitutional Court of Colombia has reiterated jurisprudence on the fundamental177 right to prior
175 Article 259. Audience and Participation of Third Parties. In the cases that within the procedure previous to the concessioncontract,thethirdparties,communityrepresentativesandsocialgroupsshouldbeheard,itwillbenecessary thattheyreceiverealandeffectivelyacallorcommunication,throughappropriatemeans,tomakeanappearancewithin the terms indicated by law.// Artculo 259. Audiencia y participacin de terceros. En los casos en que dentro del procedimientoqueantecedealcontratodeconcesindebaorsepreviamenteaterceros,arepresentantesdelacomunidad y a grupos o estamentos sociales, se buscar que estos reciban real y efectivamente, por los medios apropiados, el llamamientoocomunicacindecomparecenciadentrodelostrminossealadosenlaley. Article260.PublicCharacter.Thegovernmentalprocedureprevioustothecelebrationofthecontractispublicandanyperson mayhaveaccesstoitattheofficesofthecompetentorcommissionedauthority.Copiesofallthepartsandproceedings can be issued to anyone that requests it. // Artculo 260. Carcter pblico. El procedimiento gubernativo previo a la celebracin del contrato espblico y a l tendracceso todapersonaen las dependencias de laautoridad competente o comisionada.Detodaslaspiezasydiligenciaspodrnexpedirse,deplano,copiasaquienlassolicite. 176ILOConvention169,Article6 177AsarticulatedbytheConstitutionalCourtintheunificationrulingSU039/97:()Inthissense,thefundamentalright of the community to preserve its integrity, is guaranteed and becomes effective through another right, that is also fundamental in itscharacter, is the right of thecommunitytoparticipate in the adoption of thereferred decisions. The participation of indigenous communities in decisions that may affect them in relation to the exploitation of natural

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 consultationandhasevensystematizedtherulesonitscontentandscope;further,ithasestablished twolevelsofanalysis178,thefirstreferringtothedifferentiationofthegeneralandparticularlevelsof the right to participation of ethnocultural groups, and the second relating to the conditions and procedural requirements that must be accomplished in order to make their prior consultations adequate and effective mechanisms for the protection of their constitutional rights and the consequencesthatfollowinthecaseoftheStatesfailuretoabidebyitsduties. Thus, the lack of an explicit right to prior consultation in the legislation affecting ethnocultural communitiesandminingexplainsthepartialunconstitutionalityorconditionedconstitutionalityofthe forestrylaw,theruraldevelopmentstatuteandtheNationalDevelopmentPlaninColombia.Besides, incomplete,unsubstantialandsuperficialpriorconsultationstominingthathavebeencarriedoutin manyethnoculturalcommunitieshaveendedupinthesuspensionofalreadygrantedenvironmental licensesforoildrilling,hydroelectricdamconstructionsandminingoperations,viawritsofprotection offundamentalhumanrights.Themostrecentconsultationthatoccurredinthiswaywasaresultof Constitutional ruling T7692009, which ordered the immediate suspension of the Muriel Mining CorporationsactivitiesundertheMandNorteoperation.MurielMininghadbeengranteda30year concessioninFebruary2005thatwaspotentiallyextendableforother30yearsasestablishedunder the 2001 Mining Code.179 As per the Court, it is necessary that the community, represented by its authoritiesanddistinctiveinstitution,getsfullknowledgeontheprojects,thisinthesense,thatitshall betotallyinformedandillustratedonthemannerinwhichtheexecutionofthesemayaffectitsrights, tradition or habitat and the communication shall open, opportune, free and without any strange interferences, ensuring that attention is given to at all concerns and observations of the community180.Forinstance,theCourtfoundthatinthiscase,theethnoculturalcommunityhadnot beeninformedontheminingoperationsimpactontheirancestrallysacredCareperromountain.181

resources has the particularity that the participation in question, through the mechanism of consultation, acquires the connotationofafundamentalright,asitstandsasaninstrumentthatisessentialtopreservetheethnic,social,economic and cultural development of indigenous communities and to ensure, therefore, its survival as a social group. Thus participationisnotlimitedmerelytoaninterventioninadministrativeactionsaimedatsecuringtherighttodefendthose who are to be affected with the approval of the environmental permit, but has a deeper significancesuch as those pertaining to the definition of fate and livelihood security of those communities.) // De este modo, el derecho fundamentaldelacomunidadapreservarlaintegridadsegarantizayefectivizaatravsdelejerciciodeotroderechoque tambin tiene el carcter de fundamental, como es el derecho de participacin de la comunidad en la adopcin de las referidasdecisiones.Laparticipacindelascomunidadesindgenasenlasdecisionesquepuedenafectarlasenrelacincon laexplotacindelosrecursosnaturalesofrececomoparticularidadelhechodequelareferidaparticipacin,atravsdel mecanismodelaconsulta,adquierelaconnotacindederechofundamental,puesseerigeenuninstrumentoqueesbsico parapreservarlaintegridadtnica,social,econmicayculturaldelascomunidadesdeindgenasyparaasegurar,porende, susubsistenciacomogruposocial. 178RulingC17509oftheConstitutionalCourtofColombia 179 Please 7502673.html see : http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/forolectores/ARTICULOWEBPLANTILLA_NOTA_INTERIOR

180 Resulta indispensable que la comunidad, representada por sus autoridades e instituciones distintivas, tenga conocimientoplenosobrelosproyectos,enelsentidodequeseaenteradaeilustradaacabalidadsobrelamaneracomola ejecucindelosmismospuedeafectarsusderechos,tradicionesosuhbitat,yquelacomunicacinseaabierta,oportuna, libreysininterferenciasextraas,propendiendoporquelasinquietudesyobservacionesdelacomunidadseanatendidas. 181 A similar situation is lived in many places around the world, for India, please see: http://censat.org/noticias/2010/2/15/Dontmineusoutofexistence/

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It is also worth noting that InterAmerican jurisprudence182 has also protected the right to prior consultation as with the Saramaka decision. The Saramaka decision was, in fact, later used by the African Commission on Human Rights in its decision in favor of the Endorois peoples in Kenya with regard to a ruby mining operation183, clearly illustrating the important migration of constitutional argumentation and global law in efforts to address and reduce poverty among ethnocultural minorities. THEETHNOCULTURALSPECIALCONCESSION:AFROCOLOMBIAN,INDIGENOUSANDMIXEDMINING ZONES

182TheCaseoftheSaramakaPeoplev.Suriname,decidedintheInterAmericanCourtofHumanRightsonNovember28, 2007, was a landmark case for the rights of tribal communities to communal property. The Saramaka people, who had beenenslavedinthe17thcenturyandbroughttoSurinameduringitscolonialperiod,hadpreservedtheirsocial,cultural and economic traditions, many of which were associated with the territory they had occupied since their freedom from slavery. The prominent role that this ancestral territory played in the Saramakas tradition compelled the Court to acknowledgethattheSaramakapeoplewereatribalpeoplewhoenjoyedacollectivepropertyrightovertheirlandand that this right warranted special protection under the American Convention on Human Rights, specifically Article 21 concerning the right to property. In its earlier decisions, the Court had interpreted this article as protecting not only indigenouspeoplesrightstocommunalproperty,butalsotribalpeoplesrightsthereto,becausethefundamentalbasisof theircultures,spirituallife,integrityandeconomicsurvivalreliedonland.182Thissharedcharacteristicappliedequallyto theSaramaka.Consequently,thegovernmentofSurinamewasunderanobligationtoabidebythreesafeguardstoensure theprotectionof,andpreventtheviolationof,thisright.First,thegovernmentmust,ensuretheeffectiveparticipationof the members of the Saramaka people, in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment,explorationorextractionplanwithinSaramakaterritory.Thisrequiresthegovernmentto(a)consultwith theSaramakapeopleregularlyandbeginningintheearlystagesofanydevelopmentproject,throughculturallyappropriate procedures,withtheobjectiveofreachingandagreementand(b)obtainthecommunitysfree,priorandinformedconsent to proceed with the project in consideration.182 Second, the government must engage in a reasonable benefitsharing schemeforanyprojectordevelopmentontheirterritory.182Andthird,thegovernmentmustengageinenvironmental andsocialimpactassessmentsbeforeanyconcessionsareissuedforworkontheSaramakasterritory.Inapplyingthese standardstosmallscalegoldminingconcessionsthathadbeenissuedbythegovernmentofSuriname,theCourtfoundthe governmentinviolationoftheSaramakascommunalpropertyrights.ThiswastrueeventhoughtheSaramakadidnotuse goldintheirsocial,culturaloreconomictraditions.TheCourtreasonedthatbecausetheextractionofgoldwouldhave, andinfactdid,impactothernaturalresourcesthatwerenecessaryfortheSaramakassurvival,suchaswaterwaysfound ontheirancestralterritory,thegovernmentofSurinamewasrequiredtoabidebythethreesafeguardslistedabove. 183 This particular analysis was later applied in the African Commission on Human Rights 2010 decision in favor of the EndoroisindigenouspeoplescaseagainstthegovernmentofKenya.There,thegovernmenthadissuedminingconcessions toextractrubiesfoundontheEndoroisterritory.183TheAfricanCommissionreliedheavilyontheInteramericanCourts Saramaka decision to conclude that, although rubies did not play a significant social, cultural or economic role in the Endoroistraditions,theextractionofrubieshadimpactedtheEndoroisaccesstowatersourcesthatwerenecessaryfor their survival; thus, the Kenyan government must abide by certain safeguards to protect the indigenous communitys communallandrights. Theimplicationsofthisinternationaljurisprudenceonminingoperationsaresignificant.Notonlyaregovernmentsentitled to abide by certain protections and safeguards created under international law and adopted by domestic legislation including the right to prior consultation, they must do so even when the resources in question are not those that the communitiesinquestiontraditionallyused.Thesecaseseffectivelyextendtherightsofindigenousandtribalcommunities tocommunallandsandthenaturalresourcesfoundonthatlandto,infact,restrictStaterightstosubsoilandminerals,as wellascommissionsorconcessionsgrantedbasedonthoseStaterights.Iftheextractionofthoseresourcesinanyway adversely impacts indigenous or tribal peoples access to resources that they have traditionally relied upon, e.g., waterways,thentheStatemustabidebycertainsafeguardscreatedtoprotectthecommunallandrightsofthesepeople. (Both the Saramaka and Endorois cases appealed to their access to waterways found on their lands which had been traditionallyusedbythesecommunities.TheSaramakacasealsoconsideredtheuseoftimberandtheissuanceoflogging concessionsgrantedbythegovernmentofSuriname.)Thisistrueevenwhenthecommunityitselfchoosestoexploreand exploititsownresources.

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 The majority of work in the mining sector from exploration to exploitation occurs on rural land. Inclusive policy makers must consider how to prevent, or at the very least mitigate, the negative impactthatminingwillhaveonthelives,livelihoodsanddevelopmentoftheruralpoorlivingonthose lands.Whilethegovernmentsneedtogenerateincomethroughroyaltiesfrommineralextractionisa legitimateStateobjective,itisalsonecessaryfortheStatetoconsidertheimpactoftheseactivitieson bothsmallprivatepropertylandownersinruralColombiaaswellasthelargecollectiveterritoriesof Colombians two primary ethnocultural communities, whose social identity and livelihood are intrinsicallytiedtoland.Asthelawandpolicycurrentlystand,theinterestsofboththesmallprivate property owner and of the indigenous or afroColombian communities must yield to the income generation interests of the Colombian State, which has the authority to exploit its exclusive mineral andsubsoilrightsandhasdecidedtodosoonlythroughthemechanismsoftheconcessioncontract. The policy framework introduces a distinction between private and collective land owners: ethno culturalcommunitieswithcommunallandrightsenjoyafirstrighttominingprerogativetoexploit subsurfacemineralsfoundontheirlandunderaconcessioncontract.Thefirstrighttominingrule introducesanexceptiontotheminingprinciplefirstintime,firstinright,orcolloquiallyfirstcome, firstserve,whichtendstoadvantagethemostpowerfulstakeholdersandactorsinmining.Thefact thattheMiningCodeof2001acknowledgesethnoculturalgroupsfirstrighttominingwithintheir communal territories shows that there is a persistent State objective to preserve the link between indigenous and afroColombian communities social, cultural and economic traditions and their ancestrallands.Yet,ifthatpreferentialrightisnotexecutedwithintheestablishedtimeframe30 daysaccordingtoArticle275oftheCode184(insteadofthe60daysgrantedbyabrogatedprovisions) the State is still within its authority to contract the zone away to third parties or outsiders to the resguardos or territorios comunitarios of the indigenous and afroColombian communities, respectively. Once that right is granted to a third party, the ethnocultural community living on the lands being mined may claim surface rents from the third party per hectare during the mining exploratory phase. These surface rents, however, expire when the third party begins the mineral exploitationphase.FromthispointonroyaltiesmustbepaidbythethirdpartytotheColombianState. In this train of thought it is possible, to conclude that Colombian ethnocultural groups rights to collective land entitle them only to surface land rights in Colombia. They cannot sell or use land as collateralandtheymuststillseekpermissionfromtheStatetotakeadvantageofthemineralriches foundintheirancestrallands. TheThirdtitleoftheMiningCode,inChapter14,referringtoSpecialRegimesregulatesinthemining activitiesrelatingtoethnicgroups,thatis,miningactivitiesframedwithinethnoculturalcommunities
184 Artculo 275. Comunicacin de la propuesta. Si la propuesta no ha sido objetada por la autoridad minera, en un trminoquenosuperelosquince(15)dascontadosapartirdelapresentacindelamisma,dentrodeloscinco(5)das siguientes,secomunicar,porintermediodelMinisteriodelInterior,alosrepresentantesdelosgrupostnicosocupantes delrea.Lacomunicacinalosgrupostnicostendrporobjetonotificarlosconelfindequecomparezcanparahacervaler supreferenciaeneltrminodetreinta(30)dascontadosapartirdelanotificacin,sielreaestuviereubicadaenzonas minerasindgenas,decomunidadesnegrasomixtas.Artculo276.Resolucindeoposiciones.Vencidoeltrminodetreinta (30)dasdequetrataelartculoanterior,enunasolaprovidenciaseresolvernlasoposicionespresentadasysedefinirnlas reassobrelascualessehubiereejercidoelderechodepreferenciadelosgrupostnicos.Silasoposicionesysuperposiciones que fueren aceptadas comprendieren solo parte del rea pedida, se restringir la propuesta a la parte libre y si la comprendierenensutotalidad,seordenarsuarchivo.Artculo279.Celebracindelcontrato.Dentrodeltrminodediez(10) dasdespusdehabersidoresueltaslasoposicioneseintervencionesdeterceros,secelebrarelcontratodeconcesinyse procederasuinscripcinenelRegistroMineroNacional.Delcontratoseremitircopiaalaautoridadambientalparael seguimientoyvigilanciadelagestinambientalparalaexploracin.

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lands of Colombia. Article 123 defines the notion of indigenous territories,185 and later articles establishthattheMinistryofMinesandEnergywilldetermineanddemarcateindigenousminingzones within those indigenous territories. These indigenous mining zones are afforded special protections andrequireparticipatorymeasuresonbehalfoftheminingoperatorwithinthatzone.Forinstance,all mine explorers and exploiters must perform their work in a way that does not weaken the social, cultural or economic values of the ethnocultural community where the mining is taking place.186 Further, all proposals for mineral exploration and exploitation must show that they included the participationoftheindigenouscommunities[whowouldbeimpactedbytheminingactivity],without any prejudice to their firstinright/preferentialmining prerogative on their communal lands.187 This right is established in Article 124 as the derecho de prelacion in indigenous mining zones and may extendoveroneormoremineralsfoundinthosezones.188 Topreservethecommunityidentity,Article125establishesthatwhateverconcessionsaregiventoan indigenouscommunitymustbenefitthatcommunityasawholeandnotonlysomeoftheindividuals whoconstitutethatcommunity,normaythatconcessionbetransferredtoanotheractor.189Indeed,
185Article123TerritoryandIndigenousCommunitiesFortheeffectsforeseeninthepreviousArticle,itisunderstoodfor Indianterritoriestheareasownedinaregularandpermanentmannerbythecommunity,partisanshiporIndiangroup, according to dispositions in Act 21 of 1991 and other acts that modify, extend or substitute them. // Artculo 123. TerritorioyComunidadIndgenas.Paralosefectosprevistosenelartculoanterior,seentiendenporterritoriosindgenas lasreasposedasenformaregularypermanenteporunacomunidad,parcialidadogrupoindgenadeconformidadconlo dispuestoenlaLey21de1991ydemsleyesquelamodifiquen,amplenoconstituyan.(Nota:Esteartculofuedeclarado exequibleporlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891de2002,enrelacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma) 186 Article 121. Cultural Integrity Every mining explorer or exploiter is in the obligation to carry out his activities in a mannerthatmightnotaffectcultural,socialandeconomicvaluesofcommunitiesorethnicgroups,realandtraditionally occupantsoftheareaobjectofconcessionsoroftitlesofsoilsprivateownership.//Artculo121IntegridadCultural.Todo exploradoroexplotadordeminasestenlaobligacinderealizarsusactividadesdemaneraquenovayanendesmedrode losvaloresculturales,socialesyeconmicosdelascomunidadesygrupostnicosocupantesrealytradicionalmentedelrea objetodelasconcesionesodettulosdepropiedadprivadadelsubsuelo.(Nota:Esteartculofuedeclaradoexequibleporla CorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891de2002,enrelacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma.) 187Article122IndigenousMiningZones.Theminingauthoritywillindicateanddelimit,basedontechnicalandsocial studies,withintheIndianterritory,Indianminingzonesinwhichexplorationandexploitationoftheminingsoilandsubsoil shouldbeadjustedtospecialdispositionsofthepresentChapteronprotectionandparticipationofIndiancommunitiesand groups established in such territories. Every proposalof private persons to explore and exploit minerals within Indian miningzoneswillbesolvedwiththeparticipationofrepresentativesoftherespectiveIndiancommunitiesandsubjectto their right of privilege consecrated in Article 124 of this Code. // Artculo 122. Zonas Mineras Indgenas. La autoridad minera sealar y delimitar, con base en estudios tcnicos y sociales, dentro de los territorios indgenas, zonas mineras indgenas en las cuales la exploracin y explotacin del suelo y subsuelo mineros debern ajustarse a las disposiciones especiales del presente Captulo sobre proteccin y participacin de las comunidades y grupos indgenas asentados en dichosterritorios.(Nota:EsteincisofuedeclaradoexequiblecondicionalmenteporlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC 418de2002.)Todapropuestadeparticularesparaexploraryexplotarmineralesdentrodelaszonasminerasindgenasser resueltaconlaparticipacindelosrepresentantesdelasrespectivascomunidadesindgenasysinperjuiciodelderechode prelacin que se consagra en el artculo 124 de este Cdigo. (Nota: Este artculo fue declarado exequible por la Corte ConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891de2002,enrelacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma.). 188Article124.FirstRighttominingofindigenousgroups.Thecommunitiesandindigenousgroupswill,withregardto the mining authority, have preference in being awarded a concession over the ore bodies and deposits found in an indigenousminingzone.Thecontractmayencompassoneorseveralminerals.//Artculo124.Derechodeprelacinde grupos indgenas. Las comunidades y grupos indgenas tendrn prelacin para que la autoridad minera les otorgue concesin sobre los yacimientos y depsitos mineros ubicados en una zona minera indgena. Este contrato podr comprenderunoovariosminerales.(Nota:EsteartculofuedeclaradoexequibleporlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentencia C891de2002,enrelacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma.) 189Article125. Concession.TheconcessionwillbegrantedatrequestofthecommunityorIndigenousgroupandin itsfavorandnotoftheindividualsthatformpartofit.Themannerinwhichtheyparticipateintheminingworksandinits productsandyieldsandtheconditionsofhowthosecanbesubstitutedinsuchworkswithinthesamecommunity,willbe

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 all participation in the mining work under the concession will be established by the indigenous authority,whichpresumablyactswiththebestinterestsofthecommunityinmind.Atthesametime, theindigenousauthoritymayhirethirdpartiestocompletetheworkrequiredundertheconcession, either totally or in part.190 Article 128 determines that in those cases where outside parties have obtained a concession to mine or explore within an indigenous mining zone, those third parties will givetheindigenouscommunitymemberspreferentialtreatmentintermsofbeinghiredtoworkon that concession.191 In addition to determining who will be working on an indigenous mining concession in mining zones on the resguardos, the responsibilities of the indigenous authority also includeidentifyingwhereminingexplorationandexploitationmaynottakeplacewithintheresguardo. Article127requirestheindigenousauthoritytodistinguishterritoriesorareaswithintheindigenous communallandsthatmaynotbeminedduetotheircultural,social,oreconomicsignificancetothe community.192 Article 129 establishes that the Municipalities receiving royalties from mining exploitationareobligatedtoreturnadirectbenefittotheindigenouspeoplelivinginthemunicipalitys territory,intheformofworksandservices.193 ThearticlesregulatingminingintheafroColombianterritorioscomunitariosfollowasimilarscheme as those for mining in indigenous resguardos. Article 130 of the 2001 Mining Code includes black communitiesundertheumbrellaofethnicgroupswhoseethnoculturalidentitywarrantsrespectand
establishedbytheIndigenousauthoritythatgovernsthem.Thisconcessionwillnotbetransferableinanycase.//Artculo 125. Concesin. La concesin se otorgar a solicitud de la comunidad o grupo indgena y en favor de sta y no de las personasquelaintegran.Laformacomostasparticipenenlostrabajosminerosyensusproductosyrendimientosylas condiciones como puedan ser sustituidas en dichos trabajos dentro de la misma comunidad, se establecern por la autoridadindgenaquelosgobierne.Estaconcesinnosertransferibleenningncaso.(Nota:Esteartculofuedeclarado exequibleporlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891de2002,enrelacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma.) 190Article126.Agreementswiththirdparties.ThecommunitiesorIndigenousgroupsthatpossessesaconcessionwithin the indigenous mining zone, can make contracts of all or part of the corresponding works and installations, with alien people.//Artculo126.Acuerdosconterceros.Lascomunidadesogruposindgenasquegocendeunaconcesindentrode la zona minera indgena, podrn contratar la totalidad o parte de las obras y trabajos correspondientes, con personas ajenasaellos.(Nota:EsteartculofuedeclaradoexequibleporlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891de2002,en relacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma.) 191 Article128. TitlesofThirdParties.IncasepeoplealientothecommunityorIndigenousgroupmightobtainatitlein ordertoexploreandexploitwithintheminingIndigenouszones,delimitedaccordingtoArticle122,theyshouldpreferable be associated to such community or group, to his works and installations and to train its members in order to make effectivethispriority.//Artculo128.Ttulosdeterceros.Encasodequepersonasajenasalacomunidadogrupoindgena obtengan ttulo para explorar y explotar dentro de las zonas mineras indgenas delimitadas conforme al artculo 122, debernvincularpreferentementeadichacomunidadogrupo,asustrabajosyobrasycapacitarasusmiembrosparahacer efectivaesapreferencia.(Nota:EsteartculofuedeclaradoexequibleporlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891de 2002,enrelacinconloscargosanalizadosenlamisma.) 192 Article127.RestrictedIndigenousAreas.TheIndigenousauthoritywillpointout,withintheIndigenousminingzone, placesthatannotbeobjectofminingexplorationorexploitationduetospecialcultural,socialandeconomicalmeaningfor the community or aboriginal group, according to their believes, uses and practices. // Artculo 127. Areas indgenas restringidas.Laautoridadindgenasealar,dentrodelazonamineraindgena,loslugaresquenopuedenserobjetode exploracionesoexplotacionesminerasportenerespecialsignificadocultural,socialyeconmicoparalacomunidadogrupo aborigen,deacuerdoconsuscreencias,usosycostumbres.(Nota:Esteartculofuedeclaradoexequiblecondicionalmente porlaCorteConstitucionalenlaSentenciaC891del22deoctubrede2002 193Article129.EconomicParticipation.Themunicipalitiesthatreceiveroyaltiesorparticipationsproceedingfromthe mining exploitation located in the Indigenous territories, mentioned in Article 123, should assign their corresponding earnings to works and services that might benefit directly the communities and aboriginal groups established in such territories.//Artculo129.Participacineconmica.Losmunicipiosquepercibanregalasoparticipacionesprovenientesde explotaciones mineras ubicadas en los territorios indgenas de que trata el artculo 123, debern destinar los correspondientesingresosaobrasyserviciosquebeneficiendirectamentealascomunidadesygruposaborgenesasentados entalesterritorios.

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protection.194 Article 130, in fact, recognizes that black communities in Colombia have traditional miningpracticesthataretiedtotheirculturalandethnicvalues,and,thus,extendsthesameprinciple of protection and respect as that afforded to indigenous communities sharing the same link with mineralsandresourcesfoundontheircommunallands.AblackcommunityisdefinedunderArticle 132 as one where afroColombian descendants who share a history and who enjoy their own traditionsandcustomssoastoestablishauniqueculturalidentitythatdistinguishesthemfromother culturalgroupsareliving.195 Itisinterestingtonotethat,aswiththeindigenouscommunities,theMiningCodeplacestheburden upon afroColombian communities to establish special mining zones within their communal lands. UnderArticle131,theMinistryofMinesmayestablishthesezonesonlywhendemandedtobyafro Colombiancommunities.196TheStatewillnotidentifywherethesezonesareonitsowninitiativeand based on its significantly greater ability to access geological information on mineral deposits in the country;thus,ifanafroColombiancommunityisunawareofArticle131,itmaynotrealizethatthey beartheburdenofprotectingtheresourcesfoundontheirownterritorioscomunitarios,eventhough theyretainthefirstrighttomineintheircommunities.197Wherethesezonesareestablished,andas
194WhentheauthorsofthisreportusethewordblacktodescribeAfroColombiansitisonlytoremainfaithfultothe exactwordingoftheColombianslawsandnorms. Article130.TheBlackCommunities.TheblackcommunitiesreferredtoinLaw70of1993orallotherLawsthatmodify, extend or substitute them, for the effects of this Code, are also ethnic groups in relation to which mining works and installations should be carried out, respecting and protecting the values that constitute its cultural identity and its traditional manners of mining production. This principle will be applied to any area of the national territory where the worksofthebeneficiariesoftheminingtitlearebeingcarriedout,aslongastheseareashasbeenownedinaregularand permanentmannerbyacommunityorablackgroup.//Artculo130.LasComunidadesNegras.Lascomunidadesnegrasa queserefierelaLey70de1993odemsleyesquelamodifiquen,amplenosustituyan,paralosefectosdeesteCdigo,son tambin grupos tnicos en relacin con los cuales, las obras y trabajos mineros se debern ejecutar respetando y protegiendolosvaloresqueconstituyensuidentidadculturalysusformastradicionalesdeproduccinminera.Esteprincipio seaplicarencualquierzonadelterritorionacionaldondeserealicenlostrabajosdelosbeneficiariosdeunttulominero, siempreycuandoestasreashubierensidoposedasenformaregularypermanenteporunacomunidadogruponegro. 195Article132.ConformationofBlackCommunities.TheblackcommunitieswhicharereferredtointhepreviousArticle, are a set/a joint group of families of AfroColombianAfroColombian ascendance that have their own culture, share a history, and have their own traditions and customs within their rapport as a settlement, that reveal and conserve anr identitywhichdistinguishesthemfromotherethnicalgroups.//Artculo132.ConformacindelasComunidadesNegras. LascomunidadesnegrasdequetrataelartculoanteriorsonelconjuntodefamiliasdeascendenciaAfroColombianaque poseenunaculturapropia,compartenunahistoriaytienensuspropiastradicionesycostumbresdentrodelarelacincomo poblado,querevelanyconservanidentidadquelasdistinguendeotrosgrupostnicos. 196Article131.MiningAreasofBlackCommunities. Withinthefallowlandofriverbanks,awardedbytheColombian Institute for the Agrarian Reform INCORA as common property of a black community, at their request, the mining authoritymayestablishspecialminingareasandwillestablishtheextensionandboundarylimitsofthementionedareas. Withinthoseareas,thegrantingauthorityatrequestofthecommunityauthority,willgranttothementionedcommunitya concessionasitsholder,butnottoitsmembersindividuallyconsidered.//Artculo131.ZonasMinerasdeComunidades Negras. Dentro de los terrenos baldos ribereos, adjudicados por el Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria como propiedad colectiva de una comunidad negra, a solicitud de sta, la autoridad minera podr establecer zonas mineras especiales;establecerlaextensinylinderosdedichaszonas.Dentrodeestaszonaslaautoridadconcedenteasolicitudde laautoridadcomunitariaotorgarconcesincomotitularalaaludidacomunidadynoasusintegrantesindividualmente considerados. 197Article133. BlackCommunitiesfirstrighttominingprerogative.Theblackcommunitieswillhaveprivilegesin orderthattheminingauthoritymightgrantthemaconcessionovertheminingdepositsandbedslocatedinaminingarea of a black community. This concession can include one or several minerals and will be applied the dispositions of the present Chapter. // Artculo 133. Derecho de prelacin de las Comunidades Negras. Las comunidades negras tendrn prelacinparaquelaautoridadmineralesotorgueconcesinsobrelosyacimientosydepsitosminerosubicadosenuna zona minera de comunidad negra. Esta concesin podr comprender uno o varios minerales y le sern aplicables las

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 with indigenous mining zones, any mining concessions granted in those zones will be for the communityatlarge,ratherthantheindividualswhocomprisethatcommunity.And,asunderArticle 127, an afroColombian community may seek the help of third parties to work under the mining concessionsgrantedtothecommunity.198 TheColombianState,infact,carriesaverylightburdenintermsofaffirmativelyprotectingtherights of both indigenous and afroColombian communities to the mineral resources and wealth found on theirlands.Forinstance,underArticle134,theMinistryofMinesandEnergywillonlyestablishmixed miningcommunitiesonterritorieswherebothindigenousandafroColombiancommunitiesareliving whenthesemixedminingcommunitiesaredemandedbythepeoplelivingthere.199Again,thetaskor public burden remains on the minority group to seek protection under their minority status. And under Article 136, the Ministry of Mines may provide technical assistance for extractive exploration and development on indigenous and afroColombian territories only insofar as these projects are advancedbythecommunitiesthemselves.200 ThelastarticlerelevanttoethnoculturalcommunitiesminingactivitiesisfoundinArticle158,which addresses panning (barequeo) in afroColombian communities. This Article states that panning in alluvial areas in the territorios comunitarios may be practiced only by individuals who have received authorization from the mayor of the relevant municipality, who belong to the afroColombian community (not indigenous), and in whose benefit the mining zone of the communal territory was established.201 Thus, once again, the idea is that the benefits of the mining zone of the territorios comunitarios extend to all individuals living in the territorios comunitarios, even if they are not necessarilylivingintheparticularareademarcatedastheminingzoneofthecollectiveland.
disposicionesdelpresenteCaptulo. 198 Article135.Agreements withThird Parties. The community orblack groupsthathave beengranted aconcession within the black communities mining zone can contract all or part of the corresponding works and installations with personsalientothem.//Artculo135.Acuerdoconterceros.Lacomunidadogruposnegrosquegocendeunaconcesin dentro de la zona minera de comunidades negras, podrn contratar la totalidad o parte de las obras y trabajos correspondientesconpersonasajenasaellos. 199Article134.MixedMiningZones. Theminingauthoritywillestablishwithintheterritoriesindistinctlyoccupiedbythe Indigenousandblackcommunities,mixedminingareasinajointorsharedbenefitoftheseminorities,atrequestofoneor bothethnicgroups.Intheseareas,thedispositionsofthepresentChapterwillbeapplied.//Artculo134.ZonasMineras Mixtas. La autoridad minera dentro de los territorios ocupados indistintamente por pueblos indgenas y comunidades negras,establecerzonasminerasmixtasenbeneficioconjuntoocompartidodeestasminorasasolicituddeunoolosdos grupostnicos.EnestaszonassernaplicableslasdisposicionesdelpresenteCaptulo. 200Article136.PromotionandMiningAuthority. Theminingauthority,withregardtothedesignanddevelopment ofminingprojectsinindigenousandblackcommunitieszones,canprovidetechnicalassistanceinexploration,elaboration ofminingplansandtheirdevelopment,aslongassuchprojectsarecarriedoutbysuchcommunities.Also,theycangive thecorrespondingsupportforpromotionandlegalizationoftheareas.//Artculo136.Promocinyautoridadminera.La autoridadmineracuandosetratedeformulacinydesarrollodeproyectosminerosenzonasindgenasydecomunidades negraspodrprestarasistenciatcnicaenmateriadeexploracin,elaboracindelosplanesminerosydesarrollodeestos, siempre y cuando dichos proyectos sean adelantados por dichas comunidades. De igual manera, podr prestar el apoyo correspondienteenmateriadepromocinylegalizacindelasreas. 201Article158.BlackCommunitiesZones.Inthealluvialplotsoflanddeclaredasminingzonesofblackcommunities,in accordancetoArticle131,panningcaronlybepracticedbytheneighborsoftheplacewhoareauthorizedbytheMayor whobelongwhobelongtothecommunityinbenefitofwhichthezonehasbeenconstituted.Inthesecases,theMayor willactincoordinationwithcommunalauthoritiesbeneficiariesoftheminingzone.//Artculo158.ZonasdeComunidades Negras.Enlosterrenosaluvialesdeclaradoscomozonasminerasdecomunidadesnegrasdeacuerdoalartculo131,slo podrn practicar el barequeo los vecinos del lugar autorizados por el alcalde, que pertenezcan a la comunidad en cuyo beneficio se hubiere constituido dicha zona. En estos casos, el alcalde obrar en coordinacin con las autoridades de las comunidadesbeneficiariasdelazonaminera.

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 FinallyitisworthnotingthattheCode,whileaimingtoprotectethnoculturalcollectivepropertiesand preserve communities autonomy, in fact restricts mining exploration and exploitation activities, as wellasfreeprospectinginColombia,inarticles35202andarticle39203,respectively. 3.7.2. MINE WORK THROUGH A STATELED SPECIAL MINING PROJECT FOR INFORMAL WORK IN EXISTINGTRADITIONALMINEEXPLOITATIONS Article31ofthe2001MiningCodeestablishesthat,forsocialoreconomicreasonsand,autonomously orbypetition,thegovernmentmaydemarcateanareaofSpecialReserveforreasonablydeveloping theminingindustrywiththecommunityofminersinformallyminingintraditionallyexploitedmineral deposits.Newconcessionrequestsorproposalswillnolongerbeadmittedontheareareserved,but thegovernmentwillinterveneinthecommunityofinformalmineworkerstoeitherdevelopaSpecial MiningProjectviathecompetentStateagenciesandtodevelopformalminingwithinit,orotherwise startalaborreconversionprojectwiththeinformalmineworkerslaboringonthatspecialreserve.
Article 31. Special Reserves.204Due to social or economic reasons, determined in each case, by notification or by express request of the mining community, the National Government in the areas in

202Artculo35.Zonasdeminerarestringida.Podrnefectuarsetrabajosyobrasdeexploracinydeexplotacindeminas en las siguientes zonas y lugares, con las restricciones que se expresan a continuacin: () (f) En las zonas constituidas como zonas mineras indgenas zonas mineras de comunidades negras zonas mineras mixtas siempre y cuando las correspondientes autoridades comunitarias, dentro del plazo que se les seale, no hubieren ejercitado su derecho preferencialaobtenerelttulomineroparaexploraryexplotar,conarregloalodispuestoporelCaptuloXIVdeesteCdigo; Unavezconsultadaslasentidadesaqueserefiereesteartculo,losfuncionariosaquienesseformulelacorrespondiente solicitud debern resolverla en el trmino improrrogable de treinta (30) das, so pena de incurrir en falta disciplinaria. Pasadoestetrminolaautoridadcompetenteresolverlopertinente. 203 Artculo39. Prospeccin deminas. La prospeccin de minases libre, exceptoen los territorios definidos como zonas minerasparaminorastnicastalcomolocontemplaelCaptuloXIVdeesteCdigo.Cuandohayadeefectuarseenterrenos depropiedadparticular,serequerirdaravisoprevioaldueo,poseedor,tenedoroadministrador,directamenteoatravs delalcalde.CuandohayadeefectuarseenbienesdeusopblicobajolajurisdiccindelaDireccinGeneralMartima,de conformidadconloprevistoenelartculo2delDecretoley2324de1984ydemsnormasquelomodifiquen,sustituyano deroguen,serequerirsuconceptotcnicofavorable. 204Artculo31.Reservasespeciales.ElGobiernoNacionalpormotivosdeordensocialoeconmicodeterminadosencada caso, de oficio o por solicitud expresa de la comunidad minera, en aquellas reas en donde existan explotaciones tradicionalesdeminerainformal,delimitarzonasenlascualestemporalmentenoseadmitirnnuevaspropuestas,sobre todos o algunos minerales. Su objeto ser adelantar estudios geolgicomineros y desarrollar proyectos mineros estratgicosparaelpasdestinadosadeterminarlasclasesdeproyectosminerosespecialesysupuestaenmarcha.Entodo caso,estosestudiosgeolgicominerosylainiciacindelosrespectivosproyectosnopodrntardarmsdedos(2)aos.La concesin slo se otorgar a las mismas comunidades que hayan ejercido las explotaciones mineras tradicionales, as hubieresolicituddeterceros.Todoloanteriorsinperjuiciodelosttulosminerosvigentes,otorgadosoreconocidos.Inciso adicionadoporlaLey1382de2010,artculo2.LaAutoridadMineratambinpodrdelimitarotrasreasespecialesquese encuentrenlibres,sobrelascuales,deconformidadconlainformacingeolgicaexistente,sepuedeadelantarunproyecto minerodegranimportanciaparaelpas,conelobjetodeotorgarlasencontratodeconcesinatravsdeunprocesode seleccin objetiva, a quien ofrezca mejores condiciones tcnicas, econmicas, sociales y ambientales para el aprovechamientodelrecurso.DentrodeestosprocesoslaAutoridadMineraestablecerlascontraprestacioneseconmicas, ademsdelasregalasprevistasporlaley,quelosproponentesdebanofrecer.Lasreasquenohubierensidootorgadas dentrodeltrminodetres(3)aoscontadosapartirdeladelimitacindelrea,quedarnlibresparaserotorgadasbajoel rgimen de concesin regulado por este Cdigo. La Autoridad Minera sealar el procedimiento general, as como las condicionesyrequisitosparaescogeraltitularmineroencadacaso.IncisoadicionadoporlaLey1382de2010,artculo2. La Autoridad Minera a travs de los medios de comunicacin hablado y escrito informar a los interesados sobre las concesionesalicitardequehablaelpresenteartculo.IncisoadicionadoporlaLey1382de2010,artculo2.Ingeominas como Autoridad Geolgica en minera podr delimitar reas especiales, que se encuentren libres sobre las cuales no se recibirn ni se otorgarn ttulos mineros, pero se respetarn los existentes, con el fin de que se adelanten procesos para

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whichtraditionalexploringofinformalminingexists,willdelimitareasinwhichnewproposalsoverall or some minerals will not be temporarily admitted. Its object will be to carry on mininggeological studiesandtodevelopspecialminingprojectsanditssettingup.Inanycase,thesemininggeological studies and the initiation of the respective projects cannot take longer than two (2) years. The concession will be awarded only to the same communities that have realized the traditional mining exploiting, even if there is a request of a thirdparty. All the above, notwithstanding current mining titles,awardedorrecognized. SubparagraphaddedbyLaw1382of2010,Article2.TheMiningAuthorityalsomaydefineotherspecial areasthatarefree,onwhich,inaccordancewiththeexistinggeologicalinformation;onecanovertakea mining project of great importance for the country, in order to grant them in concession contract through an objective selection process, who provide better technical, economic, social and environmentalresourceuse.WithintheseprocessestheMiningAuthorityshallestablishtheeconomic considerations,plustheroyaltiesprovidedforbylaw,proponentsarerequiredtoextend.Theareasthat havenotbeengrantedwithinaperiodofthree(3)yearsfromthedelimitationoftheareawillbefreeto begrantedundertheconcessionsystemregulatedbythisCode.TheMiningAuthoritywillindicatethe generalprocedureandtheconditionsandrequirementstochoosetheownerminingineachcase.205 Subparagraph added by Law 1382 of 2010, Article 2. The Mining Authority will, through the media, communicatebyspeechandwrittenreports,tostakeholdersonhowtotenderconcessionsunderthis article.206 Subparagraphaddedby Law1382of 2010,Article2.Ingeominas,astheminingGeologicalAuthority, maydefinespecialareasthatarefreeonwhichnograntwillbereceivedormining,butexistingones willberespected,sothatevaluationprocessestodelivertheareaforuptofive(5)yearswhooffera better program of geological technical assessment of the area under the terms and conditions established by the Mining Authority. Who gets a contract Technical Assessment when completed has the first option to contract with the Mining Authority on the area under concession contract in the termsprovidedunderthisCode.207

entregarelreahastaporcinco(5)aosaquienofrezcaunmejorprogramadeevaluacintcnicageolgicadedicharea bajolostrminosycondicionesqueestablezcalaAutoridadMinera.QuienobtengauncontratodeEvaluacinTcnicauna vezterminado,tienelaprimeraopcinparacontratarconlaAutoridadMineraelreabajocontratodeconcesinenlos trminos que prev este Cdigo. Inciso adicionado por la Ley 1382 de 2010, artculo 2. Las empresas que hayan sido objeto de incumplimiento de obligaciones del contrato original, declarado el incumplimiento por la Autoridad Minera, no tendrnlacapacidadparacompetirenloscontratosmineros,dequetrataesteartculo.IncisoadicionadoporlaLey1382 de 2010, artculo 2. La delimitacin de la que habla el presente artculo ser reglamentada de manera previa por la AutoridadMinera. 205 Inciso adicionado por la Ley 1382 de 2010, artculo 2. La Autoridad Minera tambin podr delimitar otras reas especiales que se encuentren libres, sobre las cuales, de conformidad con la informacin geolgica existente, se puede adelantar un proyecto minero de gran importancia para el pas, con el objeto de otorgarlas en contrato de concesin a travsdeunprocesodeseleccinobjetiva,aquienofrezcamejorescondicionestcnicas,econmicas,socialesyambientales para el aprovechamiento del recurso. Dentro de estos procesos la Autoridad Minera establecer las contraprestaciones econmicas,ademsdelasregalasprevistasporlaley,quelosproponentesdebanofrecer.Lasreasquenohubierensido otorgadas dentro del trmino de tres (3) aos contados a partir de la delimitacin del rea, quedarn libres para ser otorgadasbajoelrgimendeconcesinreguladoporesteCdigo.LaAutoridadMinerasealarelprocedimientogeneral, ascomolascondicionesyrequisitosparaescogeraltitularmineroencadacaso. 206IncisoadicionadoporlaLey1382de2010,artculo2.LaAutoridadMineraatravsdelosmediosdecomunicacin habladoyescritoinformaralosinteresadossobrelasconcesionesalicitardequehablaelpresenteartculo. 207 Inciso adicionado por la Ley 1382 de 2010, artculo 2. Ingeominas como Autoridad Geolgica en minera podr delimitarreasespeciales,queseencuentrenlibressobrelascualesnoserecibirnniseotorgarnttulosmineros,perose respetarnlosexistentes,conelfindequeseadelantenprocesosparaentregarelreahastaporcinco(5)aosaquien ofrezcaunmejorprogramadeevaluacintcnicageolgicadedichareabajolostrminosycondicionesqueestablezcala

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SubparagraphaddedbyLaw1382of2010,Article2.Companieswhohavebeeninbreachofobligations undertheoriginalcontract,theMiningAuthority,willhavetheabilitytocompeteinminingcontracts forsaidfailures,underthisarticle.208 SubparagraphaddedbyLaw1382of2010,Article2.Thedelimitationofthisarticleshallberegulated bythepreviousmanneroftheMiningAuthority.209 Article 32. Free Areas.210 The areas, object of special reserves, which have not been linked to community mining programs and projects, will be free to be awarded to the thirdparty proponents, undertheordinaryregimeofconcession,regulatedbythisCode. Article248. SpecialMiningProjects.211 The National Government, based in the results of mininggeological studies indicated in Article 31 of this Code, through the governments agencies adheredorlinkedwiththeMiningandEnergysector,willorganizewithintheareasdeclaredasspecial reserves,miningprojectsorientedtowardstherationalutilizationofexistingmineralresources,which maybeoftwotypes: 1. SpecialMiningProjects. Thoseare community miningprojects thatdue toitsgeologicmining characteristicsmakeitpossibletheshort,mediumandlongtermmineralusefulness. In these cases, theStatewillintervene,throughthegovernmentscompetentagency,intraining,promotion,transfer of technology, environmental handling, structure, development of mining projects and business development of informal miners already attested, of companies of solidarity economy and of those

Autoridad Minera. Quien obtenga un contrato de Evaluacin Tcnica una vez terminado, tiene la primera opcin para contratarconlaAutoridadMineraelreabajocontratodeconcesinenlostrminosqueprevesteCdigo. 208 Inciso adicionado por la Ley 1382 de 2010, artculo 2. Las empresas que hayan sido objeto de incumplimiento de obligaciones del contrato original, declarado el incumplimiento por la Autoridad Minera, no tendrn la capacidad para competirenloscontratosmineros,dequetrataesteartculo. 209 Inciso adicionado por la Ley 1382 de 2010, artculo 2. La delimitacin de la que habla el presente artculo ser reglamentadademanerapreviaporlaAutoridadMinera. 210 Artculo 32. Las reas libres. Las reas objeto de las reservas especiales que no hubieren quedado vinculadas a los programas y proyectos mineros comunitarios, quedarn libres para ser otorgadas a los terceros proponentes, bajo el rgimenordinariodeconcesinreguladoporesteCdigo. 211Artculo248.ProyectosMinerosEspeciales.ElGobiernoNacional,conbaseenlosresultadosdelosestudiosgeolgico minerosdequetrataelartculo31deesteCdigo,atravsdelasentidadesestatalesadscritasovinculadasalsectorde Minas y Energa, organizar dentro de las zonas que hubieren sido declaradas reservas especiales, proyectos mineros orientados al aprovechamiento racional de los recursos mineros all existentes, los cuales podrn ser de dos clases: (1) Proyectosdemineraespecial.Sonproyectosmineroscomunitariosqueporsuscaractersticasgeolgicominerasposibilitan unaprovechamientodecorto,medianoylargoplazo.Enestoscasos,elEstadointervendr,atravsdelaentidadestatal competente, en la capacitacin, fomento, transferencia de tecnologa, manejo ambiental, estructuracin, desarrollo del proyectomineroydesarrolloempresarialdelosminerosinformalesyalegalizados,delasempresasdeeconomasolidariay de las asociaciones comunitarias de mineros que all laboren; en la asesora de alianzas estratgicas, consorcios o compaas con el sector privado para las actividades de exploracin, explotacin, beneficio, transporte, transformacin y comercializacin de los minerales existentes. (2) Proyectos de reconversin. Son proyectos en los cuales, dadas las caractersticas geolgicomineras y la problemtica econmica, social y ambiental, no es posible llevar a cabo el aprovechamiento del recurso minero. Estos proyectos se orientarn en el mediano plazo a la reconversin laboral de los minerosyalareadecuacinambientalysocialdelasreasdeinfluenciadelasexplotaciones.LaaccindelGobiernoestar orientadaalacapacitacindenuevasactividadeseconmicas,ocomplementariasalaactividadminera,asufinanciaciny almanejosocial.Todaslasaccionesaqueserefiereelnumeral1anterior,sedesarrollarnmediantecontratosespeciales de concesin, cuyos trminos y caractersticas sern sealadas por el Gobierno.Dichas acciones, igualmente, se podrn ejecutaratravsdelosdepartamentosymunicipiossiaslodisponeelGobierno,conlaprovisindeloscorrespondientes recursos.(Nota1:ArtculoreglamentadoporelDecreto2809de2009.Nota2:VerLey1382de2010,artculo26.)

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communityassociationsofminersthatworkthere;inthecounselingofstrategicalliances,consortiums or companies with the private sector for the activities of exploration, exploitation, ore dressing, transportationandcommercializationoftheexistingminerals. 2. ReconversionProjects. Arethoseprojectsinwhich,giventhemininggeologicalcharacteristics andtheeconomic,socialandenvironmentproblems,itisnotpossibletocarryoutthedevelopmentof themineralresource.Theseprojectswillbeaimedonamediumtermtotheminerslaborrestructuring andtheenvironmentandsocialreadaptingofareasofinfluenceoftheexploitingactivity.Thisactionof the Government will be aimed towards the training of new economic activities, or complementary to theminingactivity,toisfinancingandthesocialmanagement. All the actions, to which the previous number 1 is referred, will be developed by means of special concessioncontracts,whichtermsandcharacteristicswillbeindicatedbytheGovernment. Equally such actions can be executed through the departments and municipals if the Government so decides,withtheprovisionofthecorrespondingfunds. Article249.TheCommunityDevelopments.212Aspartofspecificplansofdevelopmentandofspecial mining projects, the State, through the governments organisms adhered or linked to the Mining and Energy sector, or through the departments and municipals, should carry out the following actions in relationwiththeminingexplorationandexploitation: Topromotethelegalization,organizationandtrainingofminingcontractorsoftheregionorlocalityin communityassociationsorcooperativesofexploitationandbeneficiationofminerals; Counseling in the technical, economical and legal studies that they may deem necessary for the exploration, the rational exploitation, the beneficiation and development of mineral resources within theplansofcommunitydevelopment; Tograntwithinthespecialreservedareas,totheassociatedminers,concessioncontractsunderspecial conditions. These concessions may be granted to cooperatives or associations or, in an individual manner,totheminersentailedwiththecommunityplans. Article250.MiningCommunityAssociations.213Theminersthatareidentifiedwithinpoliciesofsocial supportoftheGovernmentmaybeorganizedincommunityassociationsofminerswhichmainobject will be to participate in agreements and projects of promotion of investigation and its application,

212 Artculo 249. Los desarrollos comunitarios. Como parte de los planes especficos de desarrollo y de los proyectos minerosespeciales,elGobierno,atravsdeorganismosestatalesadscritosovinculadosdelsectordeMinasyEnerga,oa travs de los departamentos y municipios, deber adelantar las siguientes acciones en relacin con la exploracin y explotacin de minas: a) Promover la legalizacin, organizacin y capacitacin de empresarios mineros de la regin o localidad en asociaciones comunitarias o cooperativas de explotacin y beneficio de minerales; b) Asesorarlos en los estudiostcnicos,econmicosylegalesquefuerennecesariosparalaexploracin,laracionalexplotacin,elbeneficioyel aprovechamiento de los recursos mineros dentro de los planes de desarrollo comunitario; c) Otorgar dentro de las zonas reservadas especiales, a los mineros asociados o cooperados, contratos de concesin bajo condiciones especiales. Estas concesionespodrnotorgarsealascooperativasoasociacioneso,enformaindividual,alosminerosvinculadosalosplanes comunitarios.(Nota:VerLey1382de2010,artculo26.) 213Artculo250.AsociacionesComunitariasdeMineros.Losminerosqueseidentifiquendentrodelaspolticasdeapoyo socialdelEstado,podrnorganizarseenasociacionescomunitariasdeminerosquetendrncomoobjetoprincipalparticipar en convenios y proyectos de fomento y promocin de la investigacin y su aplicacin, la transferencia de tecnologa, la comercializacin, el desarrollo de valor agregado, la creacin y el manejo de fondos rotatorios. Estas asociaciones comunitarias tambin sern beneficiarias de las prerrogativas especiales previstas en el presente Cdigo. (Nota: Ver Ley 1382de2010,artculo26.)

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transfer of technology, commercialization, development of added value, creation and handling of revolvingfunds. ThesecommunityassociationswillalsobebeneficiariesofspecialprerogativessetforthinthisCode. Article257.TraditionalExploitations.214Themeasuresandgovernmentsactionsonthespecialmining projects, common developments and common associations of miners, referred to in the previous Articles248,249and250,willbecarriedoutalsointhoseareasinwhichtherearedepositsofminerals thatarebeingexploitedtraditionallybynumerousneighboringpersonsofsuchplaceandthat,duetoits characteristicsandsocioeconomiclocation,arethe onlysourceofregionalprovisionoftheextracted minerals.

Inthesecases,theminingauthoritywilldelimitthementionedareasandwithinthose,apreferencewill be given to grant the concession contract to the common and/or solidarity associations that the traditional exploiters constitute for such effect. All the above will be executed without prejudice to existingminingtitles,granted,recognizedorinprocess.

ItisworthnotingthattheimplementationoftheSpecialMiningAgenciesandtheirProjectsmaynot be developed as originally envisioned by the Congress; all State industrial and commercial mineral development and support agencies were dissolved and terminated under former President Alvaro UribeVelez.TheUribeadministrationclosedallStateminingpubliccompaniesoragenciestofocusthe Statesattentionsonattractingforeigninvestmentforprivatemineralproductiontobegrantedunder concessioncontracts.215ActuallyDecree2200of2001,whichwassignedthreemonthsafterthe2001 MiningCodewaspassed,createdtenreservesinthreedifferentdepartmentsfortheseSpecialMining Projects;theirpurposewouldhavebeentoformalizeanddevelopthesmallscaleandsolidaritybased medium scale informal hardrock mine work that had been taking place around traditional coal and gold deposits (rock encased gold, not alluvial) in those departments216. Later, Decree 1494 of 2003
214 Artculo 257. Explotaciones tradicionales. Las medidas y acciones estatales sobre proyectos mineros especiales, desarrolloscomunitariosyasociacionescomunitariasdeminerosaqueserefierenlosartculos248,249y250anteriores,se adelantarn tambin en aquellas reas en las cuales haya yacimientos de minerales que vengan siendo explotados tradicionalmentepornumerosaspersonasvecinasdellugaryque,porsuscaractersticasyubicacinsocioeconmicas,sean la nica fuente de abastecimiento regional de los minerales extrados. En estos casos la autoridad minera delimitar las mencionadasreasydentrodeellasdarprelacinparaotorgarcontratodeconcesinalasasociacionescomunitariasy/o solidarias que los explotadores tradicionales formen para tal efecto. Todo lo anterior sin perjuicio de los ttulos mineros vigentes,otorgados,reconocidosoentrmite.(Nota:VerLey1382de2010,artculo26.) 215 In Former President Uribes own words: Our concept of Communitarian State aims for all government institutions abidetothemissionofbuildinganequitableandinclusivesociety.Minercolsliquidationispartofadministrativereformled by this government and which has brought significant savings to the budget, has simplified procedures and has freed resourcesforsocialinvestment.IrepeatthatStateentitiesshouldnotbeintheserviceofpoliticsorunionprivileges,butto servethecommunity.TheliquidationofMinercolispartoftheMinistryofMinesreform.Thereformtransferredthepower to Ingeominas, and also involves Carbocol,the IFISalt concession and the Directorateof Mines. Before the reform, these entitieshadanannualcostof$83,431millionpesos,thankstothereform;theannualcostisnow$18.352million,ie,the savingsisover$65,000millionperyear.Iunderstandthattheburdenofformalitieshasbeenreducedtolessthanathird. MinercolwastheresultofthemergerbetweenEcocarbonandMineralco.Itwasnecessarytorecognizetoallworkersthe mostfavorableconvention,thusincreasingthedifficultiesintermsofcostsandoperationalexpenses.Therewasduplication between the functions of Minercol and the Ministry. The above considerations and many others that the Honorable Representatives shall learn from the Minister of Mines led this Government to order the liquidation of the company, a process that has been respectful of the Social checkpoint built by this administration, and also protects the mothers householder with no economic alternatives, who are close to pensioners and the disabled. http://oacp.presidencia.gov.co/snerss/detalleNota1.aspx?id=1975 216Pleasesee:http://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa_new/decretoslinea/2001/octubre/19/dec2200192001.pdf

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added other zones and derogated three of the reserves that had already been created217. One was derogated because it overlapped with an existing mining title and the others could no longer be considered reserved zones, because the communities of informal miners working in the poverty conditionsdescribedinthedecreeshadbeendisplacedfromtheirterritoriesbytheexistingviolence around the zone. Having been thus abandoned, the special reserves had to be derogated. Possibly, andinaccordancewithArticle32,thosezonesbecameareasfreeandreadyforthirdpartyproponents toexplore,exploitanddevelopviaprivateinvestmentconcessioncontracts. What is important to highlight is that all the approximation of informal mine working communities aroundtraditionallyexploitedmineraldepositswasexecutedbytheStateownedMinercolCompany and territorial entities. Yet, neither Minercol nor Carbocol exist anymore. In this sense, the developmentofStateMiningProjectsisnowanabandonedprojectoftheState,astheonlypossibility fordeveloping,leveragingandformalizingtheinformalmineworkerlaborandoperationswouldhave been in the hands of the Mining Districts; these, however, are now only available for formal, legal miningoperations.MaybesomeresourcesoftheNationalRoyaltiesFundwillbedesignatedtoprotect therighttoworkandtoentrepreneurofinformalmineworkers,eveniftheyaretheleastattractive partnersforthenewinvestmentorientedColombianState.Article2oftherecentlypassedlaw1382of February 2010, establishes that the State may also reserve areas of mineral deposits as special economic interest zones, furthering the investment logic of the Colombian State. The concession contractstoexplore,exploitanddevelopthesezoneswouldbegrantedthroughcompetitivebidding processes,ratherthanthroughtherequestmechanismthatiscurrentlyinoperation.

3.8AUTHORIZATIONFORUNTITLEDOCCASIONALMINEWORK
3.8.1.PERSONALHOUSEBUILDINGANDINSTALLATIONS UnderArticle152ofthe2001MiningCodeandtwosubsequentprovisions,landownersaregranted permissiontoengageinsmallscalesurfaceextractionofindustrialminerals218 suchasclaysandsand for their personal consumption, i.e. house building and repairs, without requiring a concession contract.219 Thisextractionmustbecarriedoutusinghumanstrengthandmanualtoolsonly,anditis
217Pleasesee:http://www.avancejuridico.com/actualidad/documentosoficiales/2003/45208/d1494003.html 218 Article 11. Construction materials. For all legal effects construction materials are considered to be the petreous extractioninminesandquarries,usedintheconstructionindustryasaggregatesinthefabricationofconcretepieces, mortars,pavements,groundworksandothersimilarproducts.Also,forthesameeffects,draggingmaterialssuchassand, gravel and stones laying in running water beds and shores, flood plains and other alluvial terrains. Materials above mentionedarecalledconstructionmaterialsalthough,onceexploited,theymightnotbedestinedforthisindustry.The exertion,awardingandtermoftherighttoexploreandexploitconstructionmaterialsreferredinthisArticle,areentirely regulated by this Code and are of the exclusive competence of the mining authority. // Artculo 11. Materiales de construccin.Paratodoslosefectoslegalesseconsideranmaterialesdeconstruccin,losproductosptreosexplotadosen minasycanterasusados,generalmente,enlaindustriadelaconstruccincomoagregadosenlafabricacindepiezasde concreto, morteros, pavimentos, obras de tierra y otros productos similares. Tambin, para los mismos efectos, son materialesdeconstruccin,losmaterialesdearrastretalescomoarenas,gravasylaspiedrasyacentesenelcauceyorillas delascorrientesdeagua,vegasdeinundacinyotrosterrenosaluviales.Losmaterialesantesmencionados,sedenominan materialesdeconstruccinaunque,unavezexplotados,nosedestinenaestaindustria.Elotorgamiento,vigenciayejercicio delderechoaexploraryexplotarlosmaterialesdeconstruccindequetrataesteartculo,seregulanntegramenteporeste Cdigoysondelacompetenciaexclusivadelaautoridadminera. 219 Article 152. Occasional Extraction. The occasional and transitory extraction of industrial minerals in the open pit mining,thatiscarriedoutbytheownersofthesurface,insmallamountsandnotmuchdepthandbymanualwork,will notrequireofaconcessionoftheState.Thisoccasionalexploitationcanbedestinedonlytobeconsumedbytheownersin

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 forbiddenfortocommercializethemineralsthataretherebyextracted.Finally,theextractionitself mustbedoneinaresponsiblewaythatrepairs,mitigatesandsubstitutesallnegativeenvironmental effects. 3.8.2.BAREQUEO:RIVERSANDPANNINGANDEXTRACTIONOFALLUVIALCONSTRUCTION AGGREGATES Definedinarticle155220oftheCodeasapopularactivityofalluvialregionsinhabitants,thepanning articleisessentiallyalegalprovisionattemptingtorecognizetheculturalmininginheritanceofrural afroColombian constituents who continue to live on the same river shores where they were once taken for enslaved mine work by Spaniards. Their mining technique has been described by a North Americangoldpanner(whopansasahobbyratherthanforsurvival)inthefollowingpassage:
()goldpanningisbasicallysimple,onceyourealizethatyouaredoingthesamethingthattheriver doeswhenitcausesgoldtoconcentrateanddepositduringfloodstorms.Theprocessbasicallyconsists ofplacingthematerialthatyouwanttoprocessintoyourpanandshakingitinalefttorightmotion underwatertocausethegold,whichisheavy,toworkitswaydowntowardthebottomofyourpan.At thesametime,thelightermaterials,whichareworthless,areworkeduptothesurfaceofthegoldpan wheretheycanbesweptaway.Theprocessofshakingandsweepingisrepeateduntilonlytheheaviest ofmaterialsareleftnamelythegoldandheaviestblacksand.()itisveryeffectiveasagoldcatching device; it can only process a limited volume of streambed material. For this reason, the gold pan is normally not used as a production tool in commercial use, other than in the most remote locations where it would be very difficult to haul large pieces of equipment, and where there is only a small

works and repairs of their homes and installations, previous authorization of the owner of the properties. Any other industrialorcommercialdestinationgiventotheextractedminerals,coveredbythisArticle,isprohibited.Inuseofthe authorization set forth in this Article, owners are in the obligation to preserve, repair, and substitute the negative environmental effects that might be caused and to the readapting of the explored land. // Artculo 152. Extraccin ocasional.Laextraccinocasionalytransitoriademineralesindustrialesacieloabierto,querealicenlospropietariosdela superficie,encantidadespequeasyapocaprofundidadypormediosmanuales,norequerirdeconcesindelEstado.Esta explotacinocasionalsolamentepodrtenercomodestinoelconsumodelosmismospropietarios,enobrasyreparaciones desusviviendaseinstalaciones,previaautorizacindeldueodelpredio.Todootrodestinoindustrialocomercialqueleden a los minerales extrados, al amparo de este artculo, les est prohibido. En uso de la autorizacin contemplada en el presenteartculo,lospropietariosestnobligadosaconservar,reparar,mitigarysustituirlosefectosambientalesnegativos quepuedancausaryalareadecuacindelterrenoexplotado. Article153.Restrictions.TheoccasionalandtransitoryexploitationgivenintheaboveArticle,isnotauthorizedtooppose the proposals to third parties, nor to establish any type of servitudes or easements in its benefit.// Artculo 153. Restricciones. La explotacin ocasional y transitoria consagrada en el artculo anterior, no autoriza para oponerse a las propuestasdeterceros,niaestablecerservidumbrealgunaensubeneficio. Article154.IndustrialMinerals.FortheeffectsoftheaboveArticles,theindustrialmineralsaretheclaysinitsmanyforms andtheconstructionmaterialsdefinedinthisCode.Areconsideredsmallexploitationsandofnotmuchdepth,thosethat arecarriedoutwithasetofsimpletoolsorimplementsofmanualuse,operatedbyhumanstrength,andwhichextracted amount does not surpass in any case two hundred and fifty (250) tons of material per year. // Artculo 154. Minerales industriales.Paralosefectosdelosartculosanteriores,losmineralesindustrialessonlasarcillasensusdistintasformasylos materialesdeconstruccindefinidosenesteCdigo.Seconsideranexplotacionespequeasydepocaprofundidad,lasquese realicenconherramientaseimplementossimplesdeusomanual,accionadosporlafuerzahumana,ycuyacantidadextrada nosobrepaseenningncasoalasdoscientascincuenta(250)toneladasanualesdematerial. 220 Artculo 155. Barequeo. El barequeo, como actividad popular de los habitantes de terrenos aluviales actuales, ser permitida,conlasrestriccionesquesesealanenlosartculossiguientes.Seentiendequeestaactividadsecontraeallavado dearenaspormediosmanualessinningunaayudademaquinariaomediosmecnicosyconelobjetodesepararyrecoger metales preciosos contenidos en dichas arenas. Igualmente, ser permitida la recoleccin de piedras preciosas y semipreciosaspormediossimilaresalosqueserefiereelpresenteartculo.

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amount of streambed material present which is paying well enough to make the panning worthwhile.()221

Legally authorized panning in Colombia is a practice restricted to washing sand by manual means only;nomachineryormechanicaltoolsareallowedtoseparateandcollectthepreciousmetalsfound inthesesands.Thecollectionofpreciousandsemipreciousstonesbywashingsandsisalsopermitted bylaw. Authorized panning activities are presumed to take place in the communal lands of ethnocultural communities,i.e.,theindigenousandafroColombiancommunities.Article156222Statesthatifthe panning is to be done on private property, then the land owners authorization is required. Article 158223thenestablishesthatonlytheneighborsofthecommunityinwhosebenefitanafroColombian miningzonewasauthorizedcanlawfullycarryoutpanningactivities.Thesearticlesactasconcrete restrictionsforafroColombianswhoareincludedinthegeneralrulethatisimposeduponinhabitants whocarryoutthispractice,andwhomustbevillagersorneighborsoftheplacewherethepanning activityistakingplace.Infact,thelawcreatesanobligationonafroColombianstoregisterwiththe mayor of the municipality, who is also the designated arbiter under the Code of conflicts between pannersorbarequerosandminetitleholders,aswellaslandownersandlandtenants.Asmuchas barequeomaytakeplaceinafroColombian,indigenousandmixedminingzones,Article157224ofthe Code prohibits anyone from engaging in this practice within 300 meters of the machinery and installations of the concessionaires,225 or in forest reserves and National parks226, within the urban
221Pleasesee:http://www.goldgold.com/panninginstructions.htm 222 Artculo 156. Requisito para el barequeo. Para ejercitar el barequeo ser necesario inscribirse ante el alcalde, como vecinodellugarenqueserealiceysiseefectuareenterrenosdepropiedadprivada,deberobtenerselaautorizacindel propietario. Corresponde al alcalde resolver los conflictos que se presenten entre los barequeros y los de stos con los beneficiariosdettulosminerosyconlospropietariosyocupantesdeterrenos. 223Artculo158.ZonasdeComunidadesNegras.Enlosterrenosaluvialesdeclaradoscomozonasminerasdecomunidades negras de acuerdo al artculo 131, slo podrn practicar el barequeo los vecinos del lugar autorizados por el alcalde, que pertenezcan a la comunidad en cuyo beneficio se hubiere constituido dicha zona. En estos casos, el alcalde obrar en coordinacinconlasautoridadesdelascomunidadesbeneficiariasdelazonaminera. 224Article157.PlacesnotAllowed.Panningwillnotbeallowedinthefollowingplaces:a.Inthosewherethemining laborcannotbedone,accordingtoArticle34andnumeralsa),b),c),dande)ofArticle35ofthisCode;b.Inplaces wheretheTerritorialOrdinancePlanforbids,forreasonsofpeace,publicsecurity,ornamentandurbandevelopment;c. In places where machinery and installations of concessionaires of mines operate, plus an encircling distance of three hundred(300)meters.//Artculo157.Lugaresnopermitidos.Nosepermitirelbarequeoenlossiguienteslugares:a)En losquenopuedenrealizarselaboresminerasdeacuerdoconelartculo34ylosnumeralesa),b),c),d)ye)delartculo35de esteCdigo;b)EnloslugaresqueloprohbanelPlandeOrdenamientoTerritorial,porrazonesdetranquilidad,seguridad pblica,ornatoydesarrollourbano;c)Enloslugaresdondeoperenlasmaquinariaseinstalacionesdelosconcesionariosde minas,msunadistanciacircundantedetrescientos(300)metros. 225 The relevant provision establishes a distance of 300 metres : c) En los lugares donde operen las maquinarias e instalacionesdelosconcesionariosdeminas,msunadistanciacircundantedetrescientos(300)metros 226Artculo34.Zonasexcluiblesdelaminera.Nopodrnejecutarsetrabajosyobrasdeexploracinyexplotacinmineras en zonas declaradas y delimitadas conforme a la normatividad vigente como de proteccin y desarrollo de los recursos naturales renovables o del ambiente y que, de acuerdo con las disposiciones legales sobre la materia, expresamente excluyan dichos trabajos y obras. Las zonas de exclusin mencionadas sern las que se constituyan conforme a las disposicionesvigentes,comoreasqueintegranelsistemadeparquesnacionalesnaturales,parquesnaturalesdecarcter regionalyzonasdereservaforestales.Estaszonas para producir estosefectos,debern ser delimitadas geogrficamente por la autoridad ambiental con base en estudios tcnicos, sociales y ambientales con la colaboracin de la autoridad minera, en aquellas reas de inters minero. Para que puedan excluirse o restringirse trabajos y obras de exploracin y explotacinminerasenlaszonasdeproteccinydesarrollodelosrecursosnaturalesrenovablesodelambiente,elactoque lasdeclaredeberestarexpresamentemotivadoenestudiosquedeterminenlaincompatibilidadorestriccinenrelacin

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perimeterofvillagesandcities,227ruralhousesandtheirgardensandorchards(unlessauthorized),228 archeological, historic or cultural places (again, unless authorized),229 in beaches, lowsea areas and fluvialtransportroutes(unlessexceptionallyregulatedbythecompetentauthority),230inpublicworks or public service affected areas,231 and in those places that that for public safety, urban development,embellishmentandtranquilityareforbiddenbytheTerritorialOrganizingPlan.232 Itisimportanttonotethatthetermpanningorbarequeohasbecomecommonlyusedtodescribe mining that is performed by untitled mine workers in poverty, and that, although originally and intrinsically linked to alluvial or sand washing, the term has been extended to include the micro extractionofbuildingmaterialaggregatesfromrivers,again,mostoftenperformedbypovertytrapped families; however, there is no legal provision within the Code officially and formally identifying it as such.Nonetheless,andaddingtothegapinpolicyandthelegaldisempowermentofthesecitizens, the Mining Glossary includes and explains Artisanal River Sand And Gravel Extraction233 as a mining (extractive)activitythatiscarriedoutbytwoorthreepeople(generallymembersofthesamefamilyof sanders)onthebeach,bankorbedofariver,whouseshovelsfordepositingthematerialinacanoe ordirectlyonthebeach,wherethematerialiscollectedforlatersievingandseparationofthefiner sands. Recently enacted Law 1382 of 2010234 recognizes this activity and, in fact, grants it an untitled authorization, thereby formally encompassing it under the notion of barequeo or panning, although notlinkingittothebarequeoprovisionsalreadyinforce.Thus,amidtheseconflictingandoverlapping provisions, barequeo/panning no longer legally means sand washing for gold, platinum and stones only,butalsotheextractionofconstructionaggregates(sandandgravelmainly)fromrivers,insofar
con las actividades mineras.No obstante, la autoridad minera previo acto administrativo fundamentado de la autoridad ambiental que decrete la sustraccin del rea requerida, podr autorizar que en las zonas mencionadas en el presente artculo, con excepcin de los parques, puedan adelantarse actividades mineras en forma restringida o slo por determinadosmtodosysistemasdeextraccinquenoafectenlosobjetivosdelazonadeexclusin.Paratalefecto,el interesadoenelContratodeConcesindeberpresentarlosestudiosquedemuestrenlacompatibilidaddelasactividades minerascontalesobjetivos. 227 a) Dentro del permetro urbano de las ciudades o poblados, sealado por los acuerdos municipales adoptados de conformidad con las normas legales sobre rgimen municipal, salvo en las reas en las cuales estn prohibidas las actividadesminerasdeacuerdocondichasnormas; 228 Artculo 35 b) En las reas ocupadas por construcciones rurales, incluyendo sus huertas, jardines y solares anexos, siempreycuandosecuenteconelconsentimientodesudueooposeedorynohayapeligroparalasaludeintegridaddesus moradores; 229c)Enlaszonasdefinidascomodeespecialintersarqueolgico,histricooculturalsiempreycuandosecuenteconla autorizacindelaautoridadcompetente; 230 d) En las playas, zonas de bajamar y en los trayectos fluviales servidos por empresas pblicas de transporte y cuya utilizacin continua haya sido establecida por la autoridad competente, si esta autoridad, bajo ciertas condiciones tcnicasyoperativas,queellamismaseale,permitepreviamentequetalesactividadesserealicenendichostrayectos; 231e)Enlasreasocupadasporunaobrapblicaoadscritasaunserviciopblico 232b)EnloslugaresqueloprohbanelPlandeOrdenamientoTerritorial,porrazonesdetranquilidad,seguridadpblica, ornatoydesarrollourbano; 233Extraccinartesanaldepiedrayarenadero:Extraccinrealizadapordosotrespersonas(generalmentemiembrosde una misma familia de "areneros") en la playa, la ribera o el lecho de un ro, y que utiliza para ello una pala, con la que deposita el material en una canoa, o si est cerca de la playa directamente en ella, donde el material es "arrumado" (acopiado) para ser posteriormente clasificado, al hacerlo pasar por una malla (zaranda) con el fin de separar la arena msfina.Laextraccinartesanalserealiza,generalmente,enrosdepocaturbulencia. 234Article12,Secondparagraph,:Seconsiderarlegalelbarequeoconsistenteenextraccindematerialesdearrastre, siempreycuandoserealiceconherramientasnomecanizadasyconunaextraccinquenosupereunvolumende10metros cbicosporda,porlongitudderiverade200metrosdelargo.

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 as the extraction is done with nonmechanical tools and the volume extracted is less than 10 cubic metersper200metershore.

3.9. FROM OWN ACCOUNT TO SELF EMPLOYED MINE WORK: THREE ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLESOFARTISANALANDSMALLSCALEMINERSPLACEDINPOVERTYTRAPSBY THELAW
Lupeisayoungmotherandheadofhousehold.Sheis,likemostColombians,mestizo.Shefellinlove witha20yearoldsoldierwhowasstationedinthenexttown.Withherdreamsofstartingafamily, neitherLupenorhersoldiertookappropriateprecautions;shebecamepregnantandhadalittlegirl. Herlover,however,wassentintoacombatzoneandLupehasnotheardfromhiminoveroneyear. FollowingtheadviceofhercousinsfromAntioquia,Lupelefthertownwithherdaughtertoworkasa chatarrera.Herbabystayswithaneighbor,whoalsoactsasacommunitymother,whilesheandher cousins go to mine ore waste that is piled outside mountain tunnels. She has learned from an old miner,Antonio,howtoscanforgoodrocks,andhercousinshavetoldherwhopaysthebestratesfor theoreinthetownwheresheisnowliving. Lupe knows that, although she is not a miner and that nobody in her family has ever worked in anythingotherthanagriculture,whatsheisdoingisminework.Shewouldliketo,oneday,workina less difficult and painful trade, but her parents tomato plantation is simply not doing well. The tomatoes they grow are tasty, but less beautiful than the ones that are favored on the market, the ones that her father claims are not real tomatoes. In any case, they are not paid well enough to supportLupeorherdaughter.Withnofarmingopportunities,Lupewasforcedtolookforotherwork options. Even if she breaks her back mining ore, she does not want to follow the path of another woman, a neighbor who went to Spain this woman may send money back to her family, but she never came back home, and there are rumors that she might be working in prostitution (human trafficking). Nor does Lupe want to work at a bar or as a domestic worker; in fact, because she is a youngmother,theseoptionsmaynotevenbeavailabletoher,asshewouldneverleaveherdaughter behind.Becomingachatarreradidnotrequirealicenseoraninterview.Shewasjustintroducedto theworkplacebyhercousins.Whilethestabilityofworkinginaminewouldbeadreamcometruefor Lupe,itisonlymenwhoworkinmines,eventhoughwhatsheisdoingisjustasdifficultasmensmine work.Shewonderswhyshecouldnotperformsimilarworkbutinaformalworkenvironment.And shedreamsofonedayoperatingabulldozer Luperepresentstheinformalownaccountmineworkerwhoisusinganartisanalmechanismtomine operationalwastearoundalargescaleindustrialminingconcession. Noelioisgrowingoldonthesameplotoflandinwhichhewasbornandraisedandwherehenow liveswithhisfamilyandgrandchildren.TheyareallColombianmestizoesandofapeasantorigin.He liveswithhiswife,daughter,soninlawandgrandson,twoparrotsandthreedogs,onaplotofland facingthedarkyellowriverwaters,surroundedbyallkindsoftrees,orchardplants,andtwomedium sizedmountainsofsand.Hesellshissandtopeoplewhothenuseitforconstructionpurposes.Noel inheritedhislandfromhisfatherwhowas,accordingtoNoel,aninformalworkerinsandextraction fromtheriver,justlikehisneighbors.Theywerealltraditionalsandminers.Heandhisfatherhave worked as artisanal sand miners shoveling sand from the river with the help of a rudimentary mechanizedplatform.Noelexplainsthathehasgrownintoabusinessmanandhasevenhiredsome (informal)employeestooperatetheplatformboats(malacate)thattheyusetoextractsandfromthe 110

 riverbed. He pays them each the equivalent of five dollars per day per day worked. His wife and daughterwhoonceoperatedtheplumamachinenolongerworkinthefamilybusiness,buttheydo supportitthroughtheircooking,sellingsandandaccountingforthebusiness.Hisdaughterismarried tooneofNoelsworkers,whoactuallyleftsandminingtoworkasanurbanwastepickersinCali.He envisionshavingapelletizedplasticbusinessoneday. Noel represents the smallscale unincorporated selfemployed miner working with no title, but operatinglegallyunderaprovisionarypermitthathehasbeingrenewingeverytwomonthsforthelast fiveyears,whilehewaitsforapprovalforaconcessiontitle. Maria is an AfroColombian woman living in the communal lands of an afrocollective territory. She andherfamilyliveandworkinthefjordfoundwheretheblackandyellowriverscross.AnyoneinKad will tell you where this parcel of land is her family, the Lucumi family, has been mining there for centuriesandtheirancestralminingtrunkrunsdeep.Sheproudlysaysthatsheinheritedthesame sharp eye as her greatgrandfather Silverio, who is said to have found a gold nugget the size of a mandarininthesandsofthatsamefjord.Sheadmits,however,thathercousins,wholiveinthecityof Cali,exaggeratethelegendofSilverio.Infact,threeweeksagowhenhercousinAliriacamefromCali topangoldduringtheweekend,shesaidthatthenuggettheirgreatgrandfatherfoundwasthesizeof acoconut.Aliriaworkedhardthatweekend,butshestillcouldnotcomeupwiththetwogramsofgold sheneededtocollect;shewill,therefore,beforcedtoborrowmoneytobuysomemedicationsthat hersonneedsandthatthesubsidizedhealthregimedoesnotprovide.ThehardpartisthatifAliria hadfoundjusttwograms,shewouldhavebeenabletogetmoremoneyforthatgoldthanwhatshe willnowhavetoborrow. StreetvendingmangoandchontadurofruitinCaliisjustnotagoodbusiness,butMariaexplainsthat Aliriacouldnotcopewiththeanxietyofhavingindustrialminerswanderingaroundtheirland,andthe guerrilla and paramilitary crisscrossing the territory asking questions of the people who lived there. The truth is that the Bojay massacre affected her very deeply, and the illegally armed groups wanderingandgivingawaycocaseedsmakehernervous;Aliriahasnothingagainstthecocaplant,she isusedtoseeingitchewedbytheindigenouscommunitiesnearby,butitisthatjustasValenciano235 said:withcocaplantations,violenceandbloodfollowthisplant. Maria,however,wantstoremainamineworker.ShehasacousininPereirawhotoldherthathecan gethersomekindofvacuumcleanerformoreeffectivesandwashingtohelphermineforalluvialgold, buttheotherdayshecrossedpathswiththemayor,whoremindedherthatifsheusedthismachine, she would actually become an informal, and thus illegal, mine worker. Apparently, Maria says, the governmentwantstokeepherandotherslikeherinmanualwork,liketheirenslavedancestors.For reallydevelopinginmining,shemustwaitandseeiftheCommunitarianCouncilisfastenoughtoplan anddecidein30dayswhethertheyareeconomicallyandadministrativelycapableofusingtheirfirst inrightpreferentialminingprerogativeandmoveforwardwhileforcingthemultinationalsoutoftheir territories.Mariawondershowshecangrowanddevelopasaminerwhensheisneitheragringonor millionaire; she comforts herself by saying that at least someone (the Civil Societys Oro Verde Program)acknowledgesherworkandthefactthatsomeartisanalminersprefernottopoisontheriver withmercuryanddiesel.Forinstance,illegalminersalmostkilledthepeopleinAmadwithalltheir
235Pleasesee:http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS4465439

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 dredges and diesel and if it was not for Valenciano and the press, the government might not have closed the illegal operations. Maria thinks again of the vacuum cleaner offered by her cousin. However,ifshebuysthatmachine,themayorisreadytotreatherlikeanillegalworkerandshedoes not want to have problems with the police or live in intimidation, as if she were a threat to her environmentandcommunity.ItisasifBogotaisunawarethatwomenmineworkers236arethemost stablesourceofsurvivalandincomeforchildren.Atthesametime,thepoisonedwatermeanslessfish anddrinkingwaterforherfamilymovingtothebigcityofCaliwithhercousinAliriadoesnotsound sobad,afterall. Mariarepresentsaformalownaccountmineworkeronamicroscaleminingoperationlaboringinan artisanal fashion and in an environmentally responsible way, who is limited in her right to work and developformallythroughartisanalwork237. Gustavostartedworkinginmineworkwhenhewas 10yearsold,hehaslivedallhislifeinCundinamarca. Helearnedthistradefromhisfather,whowasalsoa coal miner who died when a mining tunnel collapsed and trapped him in the mountain. It has been a long journeyforGustavotogetaminingtitleandformalize hiswork.Actuallyhehadtojoineffortswithtwoother informalminers.Hesaysthatiftheydidnotraisethe 200 million pesos that were necessary to pay for the titling process, he would remain informal and vulnerable. They also had to pay 3 million pesos for theenvironmentallicenseandanother2millionpesos for a certification of infrastructure and gases granted HardRockCarbonMiningPhotoby:LinaArbelaez by an engineer, who does so the moment he is paid, without even having to go and in fact verify the conditions in the mine. Gustavo, however, resents formalizing because it is so expensive and takes so long they had to wait for seven years for the entireprocess;atthesametime,hesaysthatifitwasnotfortherequestforminingtitle,itispossible thatminesafetywouldnotgetenoughattentionandinvestmentformitsowners. OnceGustavoandthetwootherminersobtainedtheminingtitle,theyallsplittheconcessionedzone intothreeportionsandstartedtoworkseparately,Gustavostartedhisowncooperative.Hehaseight children,theyoungeroftwogirlsisfinishingschoolandtheoldestisinBogotaworkingasadomestic worker.Therestofhischildrenareyoungmenworkinginthemine.Hetakesprideinsayingthathis youngest boy has not even set foot in the mine. His eldest is the mine manager. His wife helps the securityguardswifewithcookingbreakfastandlunchforalltheminers.Gustavoprovidesbasicsocial protectiontoallworkersandpayseverytwoweekswagesbasedontheamountofcoalcarsthatare packedduringtheday.Thisisapiecemealsystemofpaymentandnobasicsalaryisamassed.Asmall minecancollect from 50 to 100 tons per week, and one ton of coal maycost approximately 70.000 Colombian pesos (350 USD);an average salary might be around one million pesos per month, 236Pleasesee:http://www.jansochor.com/photoessay/womenminers.html,and

http://www.flickr.com/photos/alejocock/3029377361/in/set72157594347088246/ 237 It is possible to develop artisanal work in a medium scale not only in small and micromining scales, The Wayuu indigenousinartisanalsaltminingintheGuajiraDepartmentconstitutedanorganization,it/wasleveredbytheState,IFI concessionSalinas,nowalsounderliquidationandthusinacommunitydispute.X%Xextraerdeldecreto2200lascifrasde contribucindeinformalidadalaeconoma

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 representingalmosttwicetheminimumlegalwage.Workinghoursmatchtheobligatoryeighthours workingday.Gustavosaysthatthebigcompanyintheregionistheonethatbuyscoalfromallothers, and that women working in the region are engaged in big mining establishments;they havewomen outsidetheminesseparatingwhatispea(arockwithsimilarcharacteristicsofcoal)fromthecoal itself..Gustavosbiggestfearisthemanyminingtitlesthatbigcompaniesaregettingaroundhimand closertohisregioninUbate,asheknowshecannotcompetewiththemandwilleventuallybeforced to sell to them, ending up himself or his children as employees after all the years of work and investmentinhisentrepreneurialeffortsandworkingformally. Gustavo represents the traditional mestizo peasant or periurban mine worker that, although in poverty,managedtotransitiontoformalmineworkthroughcooperationandsolidarity.

3.10ILLEGALITYINFORMALITYANDPOVERTYBUILDINGBYTHERULEOFLAW
Twoconclusionsmaybemadeabouttheconceptualproximityofinformalityandillegalityinminingin Colombia: 1. There appears to be a need within the law and policy framework to introduce an unequivocal, certitudegrantingcriteriontodistinguishactsandconductsthatviolatethemininglawfromactsand conductsthatareincapableofmeetingthelawsloftyconditions.Ratherthanillegal,thissecondset ofactionsisbetterdescribedasunlegalorinformal,inthattheyfallshortofthelawsobligationsby virtueoftheextraordinarydifficultiesofmeetingsthoserequirements.Legaltheoryandpolicywould benefit greatly from a distinction separating informality for convenience from informality due to necessityandbeingpovertytrapped. Itisworthnoting,also,thatlargeandmediumscaleminingoperationsworkinginanindustrialmode, aswellassmallandmicroscaleminingoperationsandactors,mayviolateColombianpenallawifthey engageinanyofthefollowingactions:
Article 329. Violation of boundaries for natural resource exploitation238. An alien within the country carriesout,unauthorizedactofexploitationofnaturalresourcesshallbeliabletofour(4)toeight(8) yearsandafineof100to30,000timesthelegalminimummonthlywage Article 331. Damage to natural resources.239 The failure to comply with existing norms that destroy, disable, then disappear or otherwise damage the natural resources referred to in this title, causing heavy damage or they are associated with them or are affected specially protected areas shall be punishablewithtwo(2)tosix(6)yearsandafineofonehundred(100)totenthousand(10,000)legal minimummonthlywages.

238ARTCULO329.Violacindefronterasparalaexplotacinderecursosnaturales.Elextranjeroquerealizaredentrodel territorionacionalactonoautorizadodeexplotacinderecursosnaturales,incurrirenprisindecuatro(4)aocho(8)aos ymultade100a30.000salariosmnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes. 239 ARTCULO 331. Daos en los recursos naturales. El que con incumplimiento de la normatividad existente destruya, inutilice,hagadesaparecerodecualquierotromododaelosrecursosnaturalesaqueserefiereestettulo,causndoles unagraveafectacinoalosqueestnasociadosconstososeafectenreasespecialmenteprotegidasincurrirenprisin dedos(2)aseis(6)aosymultadecien(100)adiezmil(10.000)salariosmnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes.

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Article 332. Environmental pollution.240 Anyone who, in violation of existing norms, pollute the air, atmosphereorothercomponentsofairspace,soil,subsoil,waterorothernaturalresourcesinsucha way that endangers human health or wildlife resources, forest, aquatic flora or will incur, subject to administrative sanctions that may be due, in prison for three (3) to six (6) years and a fine of one hundred(100)totwentyfivethousand(25,000)legalminimummonthlywages. Whentheactionsabovearecarriedoutforterroristpurposes,thepenaltyisincreasedbyonethirdto onehalf of the 50,000 (Colombian pesos) fine that is normally imposed. Article 333. Environmental pollution by negligent operation of mining or hydrocarbon reservoir.241 Whonegligentlyexplores,exploitsorextractsmineraldeposits,hydrocarbons,contaminatedwater,soil, subsoilorair,maybeimprisonedfortwo(2)tofive(5)yearsandafineofonehundred(100)tofifty thousand(50,000)legalminimummonthlywages. Article 337. Invasion of areas of special ecological importance.242 The invading forest reserve, reservations or Indian reservations, land owned collectively by the black communities, regional park, areaorecosystemofstrategicinterestorprotectedareaasdefinedbylaworregulation,shallbeliable toimprisonmentfortwo(2)toeight(8)yearsandafineofonehundred(100)tofiftythousand(50,000) legalminimummonthlywages. ThepenaltyprescribedinthisArticleshallbeincreasedbyonethirdwhentheinvasionseriouslyaffects the natural components that served as the basis for the classification of the territory concerned; otherwisethepenaltyissetat50,000ofthelegalminimummonthlywages. Anyonewhopromotesfinancesormanagesaninvasionoreconomicuseofitshallbeliabletothree(3) toten(10)yearsandafineofonehundredfifty(150)tofiftythousand(50,000)legalminimummonthly wages. Article338.Illegalexploitationofmineraldepositsandothermaterials.243Theindividualwhowithout

240ARTCULO33.Contaminacinambiental.Elque,conincumplimientodelanormatividadexistente,contamine el aire, la atmsfera o dems componentes del espacio areo, el suelo, el subsuelo, las aguas o dems recursos naturales en tal forma que pongan en peligro la salud humana o los recursos fanicos, forestales, florsticos o hidrobiolgicos,incurrir,sinperjuiciodelassancionesadministrativasaquehubierelugar,enprisindetres(3)a seis(6)aosymultadecien(100)aveinticincomil(25.000)salariosmnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes.Lapenase aumentar de una tercera parte a la mitad cuando la conducta se realice con fines terroristas, sin que la multa supereelequivalenteacincuentamilsalariosmnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes. 241ARTCULO333.Contaminacinambientalculposaporexplotacindeyacimientomineroohidrocarburo.Elque porculpaalexplorar,explotaroextraeryacimientomineroodehidrocarburos,contamineaguas,suelo,subsueloo atmsfera, incurrir en prisin de dos (2) a cinco (5) aos, y multa de cien (100) a cincuenta mil (50.000) salarios mnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes. 242ARTCULO337.Invasindereasdeespecialimportanciaecolgica.Elqueinvadareservaforestal,resguardos oreservasindgenas,terrenosdepropiedadcolectivadelascomunidadesnegras,parqueregional,reaoecosistema de inters estratgico o rea protegida, definidos en la ley o reglamento, incurrir en prisin de dos (2) a ocho (8) aosymultadecien(100)acincuentamil(50.000)salariosmnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes.Lapenasealadaen este Artculo se aumentar hasta en una tercera parte cuando como consecuencia de la invasin, se afecten gravemente los componentes naturales que sirvieron de base para efectuar la calificacin del territorio correspondiente,sinquelamultasupereelequivalenteacincuentamil(50.000)salariosmnimoslegalesmensuales vigentes.Elquepromueva,financieodirijalainvasinoseaprovecheeconmicamentedeella,incurrirenprisin de tres (3) a diez (10) aos y multa de ciento cincuenta (150) a cincuenta mil (50.000) salarios mnimos legales mensualesvigentes. 243 ARTCULO 338. Explotacin ilcita de yacimiento minero y otros materiales. El que sin permiso de autoridad competente o con incumplimiento de la normatividad existente explote, explore o extraiga yacimiento minero, o explotearena,materialptreoodearrastredeloscaucesyorillasdelosriospormedioscapacesdecausargraves

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permission of competent authority or failure to existing norms, exploits, explores or extracts mineral deposit, or sand, stone material for construction or trawling the channels and river banks by means capable of causing severe damage to natural resources or the environment shall be liable to imprisonmentfortwo(2)toeight(8)yearsandafineofonehundred(100)tofiftythousand(50,000) legalminimummonthlywages.

As much as these provisions of the penal code regulate illegal conduct of mine workers, the Mining CodeanditsdecreesmostnotablythedecreeadoptingtheMiningGlossarycreateambiguitiesand contradictions on what exactly is legal, illegal, formal, informal, irregular, traditional, subsistence, panning, artisanal and de facto mining. This broad level of imprecision creates avast grey area for humanrightsviolationsforthepopulationsofColombianmineworkerswhoarelivingandworkingin poverty. In a country where the rural population is almost entirely steeped in poverty, and highly representative of the indigenous and afroColombian minority populations, this situation translates into the impossibility of these constituents who also have reduced connectivity, may not speak Spanish,andaregeographicallydistancedfromBogotatoknowwithcertaintywhethertheirwayof life is lawful or not. It certainly makes it extremely difficult for these constituents to appraise their rightsanddutiestoadvance,changeorconfronttheirlegallaborrelatedlimbo. Thus, law and policy makers should assess and determine whether, for instance, dredging rivers or bulldozingforminingpurposeswithoutanytitleor permitorextractingandexportingsandasanon specifiable mineral material244 are illegal acts in a differentwaythantheactionsofawomanheadof household who extracted some mountain clay to sell in the market, the Wayuu indigenous family who dried sea salt in a small parcel, the gold pannerwhointroducedapumptobetterwashthe riverbed sand or the woman who uses oxygen to prevent lung damage from diving into the rivers for sand. When informal mining is equated with traditionalmining,whentheonlyforeseeablelegal conduct of a mine worker is to enter into a RevistaSemana ,PhotoBy:xxxxx contract, and when the Stateexpresses that all thoseunwillingorincapableofdoingsomaynotexercisetheirtraderegardlessoftheirlivelihood, cultural traditions or ancestral legacies the Stateis not appraising the reality of poverty within the norms.And,thelawisnotforeseeingthatitiscriminalizingitsmostvulnerableconstituents,andthat itisactuallylegallyimpoverishingthepoor245.Forinstance,itisworthrecallingthattheMiningCode Glossarydefinesillegalminingas:

daos a los recursos naturales o al medio ambiente, incurrir en prisin de dos(2) aocho (8)aos y multade cien (100)acincuentamil(50.000)salariosmnimoslegalesmensualesvigentes. 244 In interviews it was noted that there is enriched sand exportation that leaves the country as sand and in the countryabroadamineralisextracted. 245 RuizRestrepo, Adriana. A Legal Empowerment Strategy for Latin American Poor: A Reading of the National ConsultationsfortheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor:http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/fall09/materials/Ruiz Restrepo_Adriana_166_AR10451028166_CLEMaterials_sysID_1649_733_0.pdf

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 IllegalMining:246miningthatiscarriedwithouthavingbeingregisteredintheNationalMiningRegister and, therefore, lacks a mining title. It is the mining that is developed in an artisanal and informal manner,outsidethelaw.Italsoincludesexplorationlaborandworkwithoutaminingtitle.Itincludes miningthatiscoveredbyaminingtitle,butwherethecollection,orpartthereof,isdoneoutsidethe areagrantedbythelicense. This equivocal treatment of illegality and informality, with the rural and semirural mine workers in povertyoscillatingbetweenthesetwonotions,endsupbeingamplifiedbythemedia,whichcreates,in turn,anegativeimpactonthegovernancemicrostructuresofcultureandeducation247Citizensliving inpovertymightexperiencegreaterselfdiscriminationbyresigningthemselvestothebeliefthattheir activityisinherentlyillegal,yet,withouttheluxuryofchoice,theymustpersistinthatillegalcondition. Theirfearofbeingdetectedinthisillegalconditionmaycontributetolimitedcitizenengagementfrom theseconstituents,lessofacivicpresence,lessvoiceviavotingorpublicactions,andconsequently, lessparticipationingovernancepursuanttoinclusiveandequitablelaw. Asecondissuereferringtotheillegalityinformalitypovertyequationisthatthemininglawandpolicy frameworkrestrictsmineworkersinpovertywhoworkinanartisanalmodetoasubsistencelevelof labor both in the Glossary (artisanal being encompassed in subsistence mining) and by normatively limiting them to manual work. This has a disparate impact on indigenous and afroColombian constituentsinparticular,giventherelevanceofminingasatraditionallivelihoodintheircommunities andculturalidentity.TheMiningCodedidawaywiththelicensingregimeforexploringandexploiting mineralsinproportiontothesizeorscaleoftheminingoperationthatexistedbeforetheCode.Under thecurrentregulatoryenvironment,mineworkerswithlittleorreducedcapitalmaynotdeveloptheir operational capacity. Consequently, a sand miner who does not have the capital to enter into a concession contract may never expand his operations beyond ten cubic meters of stone or sand; otherwise,herisksbeingcategorizedasanillegalminer,subjecttolegalsanctionsandprosecution. Inafarmorelimitingandburdensomeway,anafroColombianwomanwhopansforgoldmaynottake advantage of any machinery or technology, notwithstanding the question of whether the machine complieswithenvironmentalstandards,andmustlimitherselftothemanualextractionofsandand minerals. This restrains her capacity to progress economically and effectively enjoy her right to development,andforceshertoassumeallthehealthconsequencesofmanuallaborusingatechnique thatpredatesmechanizationwhilestillcontributingtothecountriesmineralproductionandeconomic growth.248 The laws exceptional permission to mine is only intended for this gold panners subsistence,notherdevelopment.249
246 Minera ilegal: Es la minera desarrollada sin estar inscrita en el Registro Minero Nacional y, por lo tanto, sin ttulominero.Eslamineradesarrolladademaneraartesanaleinformal,almargendelaley.Tambinincluyetrabajosy obrasdeexploracinsinttulominero.Incluyemineraamparadaporunttulominero,perodondelaextraccin,opartede ella,serealizaporfueradelreaotorgadaenlalicencia. 247 RuizRestrepo, Adriana. A Legal Empowerment Strategy for Latin American Poor: A Reading of the National ConsultationsfortheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor 248Muscularstrainandtraumaduetocontinuoususeofstrength,dermatologicalillnessesbyexcessivewatercontactand ergonomicalrelatedaffectionsduetorepetitivemovementsamongothers 249Mineradesubsistencia(MiningCodeGlossary):1.Mineradesarrolladaporpersonasnaturalesquededicansufuerza detrabajoalaextraccindealgnmineralmediantemtodosrudimentariosyqueenasocioconalgnfamiliaroconotras personas generan ingresos de subsistencia. 2. Se denomina as a la explotacin de pequea minera de aluvin, ms

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 Inlightofconstitutionallaw,itmaybepossibletoconcludethat,sinceColombianminingpublicpolicy limits the right to develop of certain constituents, and limits their labor to subsistence levels, then these constituents may only exercise their rights to life and survival, but not their rights to progress and development. The mining policy is thereby placing an excessive burden on these constituents, while trying to ensure the States investment interests, thus imposing unequal treatment. This is particularlytrueforafroColombians,whobelongtoanethnoculturalminoritythathappenedtobe historically organized around mine work, and who therefore live and understand mine work as an integral part of their culture and livelihood. Beyond the constitutional concern of the right to life, work, entrepreneur, freely choose and follow an occupation or profession, and to develop, it is not difficulttoconcludethatcompellingmineworkerstoeitherenterintoaconcessioncontractwiththe Stateorliveininformalityandassumeanillegalconditionfurtherimpoverishestheseworkerswithin theirtrade.250 It is also worth noting that, indigenous and AfroColombian communities collective and communal lands, as already explained, are intrinsically linked to mineral extraction and mining operations. But they,too,haveanimpoverishingeffectonindividualsbelongingtothesecommunities.Indigenousand afroColombianindividualsperformingformalownaccountworkontheircommunallands,resguardos, orterritorioscomunitariosmaynotdeveloptheiroperationswithoutbreakingthelaw.Theymaynot advancebeyondsubsistencelevelsintheirtradewithoutrequestingtheMiningAuthoritytodeclarea mining zone (mixed or otherwise) to receive a concession from the State to mine within their own lands.Theconcessionistheonlywaytheymayexercisetheirrighttodevelop.Thisisinpartdueto the fact that the Colombian State is the sole owner of all subsurface mineral rights251 and awards exploration and exploitation rights only by concession, and in part because all concessions in ethno cultural territories must be awarded to the community only. In other words, members of the communitymay not receive individual benefit from the concession on their communal lands, which,
conocidacomobarequeo,yalaextraccinocasionaldearcillas,ensusdistintasformas,ylosmaterialesdeconstruccin. Bateo (Mining Code Glossary): Operacin manual de lavar las arenas superficiales de los lechos y playas de los ros y corrientes de uso pblico y, en general, en otros terrenos aluviales para separar y recoger los metales preciosos que contienen.Seconocetambincomobarequeo,mazamorreoolavaderodepobres.DeacuerdoconelCdigodeMinas,el bateoespornaturalezaunaactividadpermitidacomounmediopopulardesubsistenciadeloshabitantesdelasregiones aurferas;elcualslopuedepracticarseenlasreasquesealeelMinisteriodeMinasyEnerga,ypreviainscripcinantela correspondientealcalda. Mtodo de explotacin por apiques (Mining Code Glossary): Mtodo utilizado en pequea minera y minera de subsistencia de oro de aluvin en la explotacin de oro, que consiste en la elaboracin de pequeos pozos o apiques medianteloscualessetieneaccesoalaluvin,yprocederconlaextraccinenformaradial.Estemtodo,enalgunaszonas de Colombia, se denomina tambin explotacin por "guaches", como en el Departamento del Choc; en Bolvar se le denominaexplotacinpor"cbicos". Microminera (Mining Code Glossary): Actividad que se desarrolla en una mina, que no alcanza niveles de produccin superiores a 2.000 (dos mil) toneladas por ao; genera rendimientos de 0,5 toneladas/hombre turno; ocupa un nmero mximo de 20 personas que alterna las labores mineras con otra clase de actividades; carece de una organizacin empresarialyconstituyeunaactividaddeexplotacinminerabsicamentedesubsistenciarealizadasinningunadireccin tcnicauoperacional. 250 251 RuizRestrepo, Adriana. A Legal Empowerment Strategy for Latin American Poor: A Reading of the National ConsultationsfortheCommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthePoor

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 according to the intent of the policy, will protect the identity and autonomy of Colombian ethno culturalcommunities. WithregardtothemineconcessionsgrantedtoColombianethnoculturalcommunities,thefactthat they must request the declaration of a mining zone within their own territories, and that this declaration will only be granted upon their initiative and not by the States, imposes a tremendous burdenonthesecommunities.Notonlymusttheyinvestinmineralprospection,professionalmining servicestoidentifytheareasforextractionandpreparingtheproposal,theymustalsoprocuremining insurance policies andassume other related costs once the State declares the demarcatedareaasa indigenous/afroColombianminingzone.Atthesametime,theColombianConstitutionobligatesthe Statetoactaffirmativelyinthesecommunitiesinterests,astheyareminoritycommunities. However, the most unexplainable costs imposed on these communities are the surface rents per hectare of exploration. These rents must be paid even though it is the ethnocultural communities themselveswhoaretheconstitutionalcollectiveproprietorsoftheircommunallands,yetwhodonot havesubsurfacemineralrightstowhatliesbeneaththeirterritorieswhowouldpursueminework withintheirownlands.Theenvironmentallicense,whichinturndependsonaformalminingtitle,is notonlyacomplexconditionbutalsoanalmostprohibitivecostfortheformaldevelopmentofmine workofsmallandmicromineworkofpovertytrappedColombianconstituents.Thus,inreality,the notion of collective property ownership itself appears to be void of any surface or subsurface entitlements for these communities with regard to mining. If the collective land owners may not exploit their subsurface rights, and must pay surface rents per hectare of mineral exploration and royaltieswhenintheexploitationphase,thentheonlyprerogativethatthecollectivepropertyregime appearstogranttoconstitutionallyprotectedethnoculturalcommunitiesinColombiaistherightto occupysomespacewithinthenationalterritory. Inlightoftheaboveconclusions,andasexplainedinchapteroneofthisreport,itismoreappropriate torefertothesecommunitiesandindividualsaspovertytrapped,ratherthanpoor.Peoplewholive inpovertyduetotheirowncapabilitiesmaybefarfewerthanthosewhohavereducedopportunities for development and thus remainentrenchedin legal poverty traps. Some of the more illustrative examplesofthisphenomenonare: The 30 days period252 for an indigenous or AfroColombian ethnocultural community to manifest to thegovernmentwhethertheywillusetheirfirstinrightprerogativetoexploitadeclaredminingzone intheircommunitiesisalsoproblematic.Aproposalforaconcessionusuallybeginsthe30dayterm forthecommunitytoactonitsprerogative.Ifnotexercisedwithinthe30dayperiod,thegovernment may continue, for instance, the concession request of a large or mediumscale national or multinationalcompany.The30daysperiodwas,infact,a60dayperiodbeforethe2001MiningCode cutthisterminhalf. The failure to acknowledge the work done by own account mine workers, even if with formal permission,andthelackofalaboridentityandensuingrights,rulesandjustice.Thisappliestoown accountmineworkers,aswellassmallscaleminerswhoareworkinginanartisanalmodeduetotheir limited economic resources and/or theircultural traditions. Indeed, the absenceof an artisanal and smallscale miner labor identity in Colombian mining policy explains the vulnerability and
252ColombianMiningCode,Article275

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 impoverishmentofownaccountandselfemployedmineworkersofAfroColombian,indigenous,and peasant/mestizooriginwhoarelivinginpoverty. While the Colombian State253 has retained subsurface mineral and oil rights, this fact implies a dichotomyofoverlappingobligationsandresponsibilities:ontheonehand,traditionalcommongood oriented decisions and actions that the State must envision and pursue, and on the other, the legitimatemaximizationofprofitslogicthattheStatemaypursuebyexploitingthemineralrichesof the country as their sole owner. These riches may only be exploited to their maximum capacity by large and medium scale operations and, in theinterest of the existingadministration, whichmay be willingtotakeadvantageofthisauthorityasquicklyandasextensivelyaspossiblewithinitsfouryear termasheadoftheexecutivepower.TheStatesincentivetomaximizeitsshorttermgainthrough miningroyaltiesexplainstheprogressivelossofspacethatsmallandmicroscalemininghassuffered, evenasthepolicyframeworkgrantslargerandbroaderspacetothemorelucrativemediumandlarge scaleminingoperationsemanatingfromnationalandmultinationalactors. As portrayed by the Colombia Miner vision for 2019 and the mining policy reforms recently implemented, the State remains driven by its profit maximization logic more than commongood development logic. There is, therefore, less public interest in encouraging and promoting the less lucrative mining operations of smalland microscale miners, who are operating in an artisanal or traditionalmoderatherthananindustrialone.Placingasubsistenceorpersonalconsumptioncapon thesemineworkerswho,intheabsenceofaconcessioncontractandtitle,mayonlypracticemining inthislimitedcapacityandnotrecognizingtheirlaborasworkorprotectingitassuch,allowsthe authors of this report to conclude that the main reason for the persistent poverty in this sector in Colombiaisthelackofalaboridentityforpovertytrappedmineworkers.Thesesmallandmicroscale miners who, due to a lack of capital, their rural environment settings, and ancestral histories or traditionalworkinanarudimentarilymechanizedorartisanalmodeenduprelegatedtothebottom echelonsoftheStatespriorities,andthus,withtheleastprotectionsunderlawandpolicy.Unless they are legally empowered and raise their stakes and voices for inclusive mining policy, they will remainastheyare:povertytrapped.

3.11.ORGANIZATIONANDREPRESENTATIONOFINFORMALPOVERTYTRAPPEDMINE WORKERS TO INCREASE GOVERNANCE CAPACITY FOR INCLUSION IN MAINSTREAM DEVELOPMENT

4.1.1. SOLIDARITY ECONOMY FOR ASSOCIATED MINE WORK IN MEDIUM AND SMALLSCALE OPERATIONS Due to the capitalintensive operations and required level of mechanization, underground mining is almostimpossibletopursueasownaccountwork.And,becauseofthealreadymentioneddifficulties ofrequestingandreceivingaconcessionformineralexplorationandextraction,the2001MiningCode recognizesthatalegalspaceforcooperativesandassociationsisnecessaryforminework254. Other
253 The State being only an abstract perennial political representation that is actually materialized and driven by a sequenceoffouryeargovernmenttermsofpoliticiansthatwonelections. 254Pleasesee: http://www.gobant.gov.co/organismos/scompetividad/doc_estudios/practicasparaelmejoramientodelaproductividaddela mineria/capitulo2.pdf;

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 than the social interest implied therein, cooperatives and associations are used in the Code around Special Mining Projects, i.e., converting informal mine workers who are active in the traditional exploitation(mainlyofhardrockgoldandcoal)intoamorereasonableminingoperationbydelimiting itwithinaspecialreserve.Throughspecialcontracts,theSpecialMiningProjectsdevelopthemining community within the identified area. Solidarity based work within cooperatives, associations and mutuals is also important in the Code as it authorizes large scale mining operations to partner with thesegroupsofworkerswithintheareathatisunderacontractofassociation.255Oncooperatedmine work,theMiningCodeestablishesthat:
Article 222. Solidarity Economy Organizations.256 The solidarity economy organizations already constitutedorthatwillbeconstituted,withtheobjectofcarryingoutminingactivitiesaccordingwith thedispositionsherebyestablished,andallotherprovisionsapplicabletothistypeofentitiesinreason of its solidarity economy, may obtain mining titles and overtake mining and commercial activities in order to satisfy the needs of its associates and of the community. The balance or profits that can be reimbursedtotheassociatesshallbeallottedaccordingtolegislationthatrulesfortheseentities.The NationalGovernmentwilldrawuptherespectiveregulationsinordertogivethempreference. Article 223. Object of Mining Solidarity Economy Organizations257 The mining solidarity economy organizations should favor the organized commercialization of products exploited by them; allow its associates to work in a joint and participative manner and develop their administrative capacities, promotingthesearchforsolutionstocommonproblems. Thewayinwhichmembersofanorganizationmayparticipateinworksofexplorationandexploitation, theamountsoftheirsalariesandeconomicbenefitsaccrued,theconditionsandmethodsastheycanbe withdrawnandreplacedbyotherassociates,willbethoseindicatedittheirownstatutes.Onfailureof theseprovisions,thecorrespondingregulationswillbeadoptedintheassociate'sassemblies.

http://www.crc.gov.co/files/ConocimientoAmbiental/mineria/MINERIA%20SUAREZ/DIAGNOSTICO%20%20MINERO.pdf; andhttp://www.crc.gov.co/files/ConocimientoAmbiental/mineria/MINERIA%20SUAREZ/DIAGNOSTICO%20SOCIAL.pdf 255 For instance, the Mutual Association El gape in the Frontino Gold Mine, Antioquia Artculo 221. Contratos de Asociacin y Operacin. Los titulares de concesiones mineras podrn celebrar contratos de asociacin y operacin cuyo objetoseaexploraryexplotarlasreasconcesionadas,sinqueserequieraformarparaelefectounasociedadcomercial. Los ingresos y egresos que se originaren en las obras y trabajos se registrarn en una cuenta conjunta y en el contrato correspondiente,quedebeconstarendocumentopblicooprivado,seestablecernlaformadeadministraryrealizarlas operaciones y de manejar la mencionada cuenta. http://www.monografias.com/trabajospdf2/diagnosticopequena mineria/diagnosticopequenamineria.pdf 256Artculo222.OrganizacionesdeEconomaSolidaria.Lasorganizacionesdeeconomasolidariaconstituidasoquese constituyanconelobjetodedesarrollaractividadesdeminera,deconformidadconlasdisposicionesqueaquseestablecen ylasdemsnormasaplicablesaestaclasedeentidadesenrazndesunaturalezasolidaria,podrnobtenerttulosmineros y adelantar actividades mineras y comerciales para satisfacer las necesidades de sus asociados y de la comunidad. Los excedentesogananciasreintegrablesalosasociados,serepartirnconsujecinalalegislacinquerijaestasentidades.El GobiernoNacionalharlareglamentacinrespectivaparadarlesuntratopreferencial. 257Artculo223.Finesdelasorganizacionessolidariasmineras.Lasorganizacionessolidariasminerasdebernfavorecer lacomercializacinorganizadadelosproductosexplotadosporellas;permitirasusasociadostrabajarenformasolidariay participativaydesarrollarsusaptitudesadministrativas,promoviendolabsquedadesolucionesalosproblemascolectivos. Laformacomolosmiembrosdelaorganizacinpuedanparticiparenlostrabajosdeexploracinyexplotacin,lacuantade las remuneraciones y beneficios econmicos que deriven, las condiciones y modalidades cmo pueden retirarse y ser reemplazadosporotrossocios,sernlosquesealensuspropiosestatutos.Afaltadeestasprevisiones,seadoptarnlas correspondientesregulacionesenAsambleasdeasociados.

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Article 224. Special Prerogatives258 The mining solidarity economy organizations and the miners community associationswill have, within others, the following special prerogatives on part ofthenationalpublicagenciesoftheminingsector: Priorityinprogramsoftechnicalassistanceandtrainingaimedtowardstheminingsector; Specialcreditprograms; Rights,exemptionsandprerogativesthatmighthavebeenestablishedorthatwillbeestablishedin favorofsolidarityeconomyorganizationsthatcarryonminingactivities; Support and technical, legal, financial assistance and organizational training, for the development of integrationprojectsofminingareas. Article 225. Promotion and Support259. The mining authority, in coordination with the National Administrative Department of the Solidarity Economy or who might assume its duties, and in developmentofitsprogramsofpromotion,willpromoteandsupportthecreationofsolidarityeconomy organizations, which object is the exploration and exploitation of mines, ore dressing, transformation and provision of materials, equipment and implements corresponding to the mining industry. In the budgetsandcreditprogramsthatmightbeapprovedfortheminingindustry,apreferencewillbegiven tothefinancingofsolidarityeconomyorganizations.

Communalandcivicunderstandingofdemocracyanddevelopmentisveryimportantforinformalmine workersasitconstitutestheirprimaryhorizonforinclusion.Cooperativeshaveevenbeencreatedto addressthelaborreconversionofyoungchildrenminers,andminersmutualassociationstoprovide funeral assistance for its members. Unfortunately the same importance that informal mine workers givethisaspectoftheirtradehasnotbeengrantedbythePastranaorUribeAdministrationspublic miningpolicyefforts.ThePastranaAdministrationproducedthe2001MiningCode,whichdidaway withallofthecooperativeinstitutionalbuildingandlegalsupportofearliercodesanddismantledall the State agencies that studied and leveraged mining cooperatives in medium and small mining operations.AllsupporttosuchminingisbyvirtueofthepublicpolicydelegatedtoDANSOCIAL,which, as far as possible, is responsible for the SEOs of the country, but does not have all the specialized mininginformation,knowledge,skillsandcapacity,orbudgettomakethemcompetitiveinmining.260 (ThisdoesnotincludethetransfersfromtheNationalRoyaltiesFund(FondoNacionaldeRegalas)that
258 Artculo 224. Prerrogativas especiales. Las organizaciones solidarias mineras y las asociaciones comunitarias de minerosgozarn,entreotras,delassiguientesprerrogativasespecialesporpartedelasentidadespblicasnacionalesdel sectorminero:1.Prelacinenlosprogramasdeasistenciatcnicaydecapacitacindirigidosalsectorminero.2.Programas decrditosespeciales.3.Derechos,exencionesyprerrogativasquesehayanestablecidooqueseestablezcanafavordelas entidadessolidariasquedesarrollenactividadesmineras.4.Apoyoyasistenciatcnica,jurdica,financieraydecapacitacin empresarial,paraeldesarrollodeproyectosdeintegracindereasmineras. 259Artculo225.Promocinyapoyo.LaautoridadmineraencoordinacinconelDepartamentoAdministrativoNacional de Economa Solidaria o quien haga sus veces, y en desarrollo de sus programas de fomento, promover y apoyar la constitucin de organizaciones solidarias, cuyo objeto sea la exploracin y explotacin de minas, el beneficio, la transformacinylaprovisindemateriales,equiposeimplementospropiosdeestaindustriaminera.Enlospresupuestosy programasdecrditoqueseapruebenparalaminera,sedarpreferenciaalafinanciacindelasempresasdeeconoma solidaria 260GobernacindelValleAsuntoMineros/rrainterview/2009/Cali;MarcoAurelioHurtadoandEdwardCaicedo/ Gremivalle/rrainterview/2009/Cali;MarcoAurelioHurtadoandEdwardCaicedo/Gremivalle/rrainterview/2009/ Cali

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 aredestinedforminingingeneral.Indeed,giventhedearthoffunding,theonlypossibilityforaviable projectwouldbethroughfundingfromtheNRF.) Finally, and perhaps most critically, there is no labor identity in the Mining Code for Artisanal and SmallScaleMining.Thismininginstitutiondoesnotpromoteminingineitherthisscaleorthroughthis modeofproduction,asneitheroneislegallyderogated,noristhereanyminingdevelopmentagency remainingundertheStateinstitution,whichhasessentiallymorphedintoadomesticinvestorinthe countrysminingeconomy. 4.1.2.MINERSSPACEFORINCLUSIVELAWANDPOLICYMAKING Inmanydevelopingcountries,publicpolicyisdrivenbyafinancialobjective,including,andasindicated inthisreport,inColombiasminingsector.Attemptingtobalancethevariedinterestsintheextraction ofoil,gasandmineralresourcesisdifficulttosaytheleastandwouldbedeterminedbythefollowing: (1) those actors/stakeholders who are interested in accessing wealth immediately; (2) those who would prefer accessing wealth over a period of time; (3) government actors who are interested in mining while they are still in the seats of political power; (4) foreign investors with the capital and resourcestoexploitmineralandsubsoilresourcesandwhoenjoypoliticalsupport,evenwhilethevast majorityofitswealthisexportedoutofColombia;(5)advocatesforthenaturalwealthinmountains and rivers that is endangered by irresponsible and shortsighted mining operations that do not considerthelongevityofhumanorecologicallife;(6)thosewhocannotprovidefortheirbasicneeds and who, without access to reliable infrastructure or opportunities, rely on the quick and easy availability of mineral resources, even if they come at the expense of longterm sustainable development;(7)thosewhoprefertoreservetheirnaturalresourcesfortimesofscarcity;(8)those whoagreetominingactivities,butonlyifitincludestheirminingnicheandprovidesfortheirfamilies; (9) those who have been living on the territories where these resources have been found for generations,solongsothatthelanditselfcarriesasacrosanctcharacternecessaryforthesurvivalof theirsocial,culturalandeconomictraditions;and(10),finally,thosewhoaremerelyaskingfortheir minimum right to life and survival, which, by virtue of their ethnic identity, geographic and political circumstance,andcultureisinextricablylinkedtothelandtheyarelivingonandtheresourcesthe freshwaterfish,andtimberfoundtherein.Theseconflictinginterestsaremagnifiedwhentheissue of wealth is presented as a zerosum game, where some actors will only benefit at the expense of others, instead of envisioning new rules that are tailored to ensure justice for all actors and stakeholdersbymaintainingequilibriumandpreventingcrisisfromdevelopingoutofunattendedrisks orunidentifiedneeds. Therefore,andunlikeotherStatedrivenactivitiesregulatedbylawandpolicy,miningisanextremely complexdomainfromalawandpovertyperspective.Itdemandsahigherlevelofgovernanceinthe prelaw261 making phase to ensure a realityadjusted and competent normative engineering and technical drafting, without prejudice to the very much needed accountability, monitoring and evaluationofimpactinthefieldandonthelivelihoodsofpovertytrappedconstituents.Thisiseven morerelevantinColombia,where80percentofitsminingisrelegatedtotheinformaleconomy,anda vastpresenceofethnoculturalcommunities(whoaresimultaneouslylandownersandancestralmine workers) persist. Evidently the executive branch of power and the Congress are not sufficiently
261 (1) Prelaw; (2) Law, and (3) Post law are the three moments in which the rra thinktank divides participatory governance&andpolicymakersinclusionanalysis.

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 engaged in what the authors of this report identify as the prelaw phase of inclusive policy making whichnaturallyincludestherighttopriorconsultationasreiteratedanddevelopedinextensobythe jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. The Court has repeatedly concluded that there is a fundamental right in mining for certain constituents, which require prior consultation. Underpinning the Courts decisions is the understanding that all State actions are, in fact, emanating from the developmentorexecutionofpublicpolicy,andthusminingconcessions,justlikewasteconcessions, are policy implementation from the State authority. Given the Social Rule of Law of Colombia, the progressiveness of the Constitutional Courts jurisprudence, and the reticence on the side of the executive and legislative branches, in Colombia inclusive (propoor) governance is happening mainly throughconstitutionallitigationandjudicialordersofConstitutionaljudgesconcedingwritsofhuman rights protection or abstract constitutional review of the existing laws, rather than through inclusive governmentalorparliamentarydutiesandengagements. Thetechnicalitiesofminingmakegovernanceinmininganevenmorechallengingtask,inpartbecause the technical implementation is occurring in places geographically removed from the administrative centerofthecountryandoflittleinterestorknowledgeinthepublicopinion.Asopposedtowaste management,miningisnotapublicservicetobedeliveredtoallcitizens,andthus,whichallcitizens will be aware of, involved in or exposed to. The direct stakeholders in mining are involved in this sectorbyvirtueoftheirworkandrelationshipswithotheractorsinthetrade,ratherthanascitizensin needofessentialpublicservices.And,becausemostofthedirectstakeholdersofmininginterventions arelivingintheruralzonesofColombia,unlesstheideasofdemocracyandconstituencyareveryclear tothem,participatorygovernancebecomesonlywishfulthinkingorisderogativelytaggedassocialor legalactivism.Socialprotestbythesestakeholdersmaybefurtherweakenedbycharacterizingitas puppeteered by illegal leftist guerilla armed movements, rather than legitimate civic action for inclusivegovernance. AnotherverydelicateissuewithregardtopolicymakinginminingishowtheStatessoleownershipof subsoil and mineral rights translates in reality; the conceptual idea of the State acts through a concrete,politicaladministrationthatwillonlyoccupythatpositionforasetperiodoftime.Theacting administration may not have an interest in pursuing a longterm vision of State duties or in making decisionsonmineralandnaturalresourcesforsustainable,longtermdevelopmentandconservation. Infact,andunlikeotherrealmsofStateactionthataregovernedexclusivelybyalogicofthecommon good, mining may create tensions within the notion of the States obligations and duties, especially giventheStatesinterestsinallsubsoilandmineralrights.OverlappingStateinterestsincludeitsstatus asbusinessmaker,soleownerofallassets,andthecommongoodrulemakerofaStateguidedbya SocialRuleofLaw. From a grassroots bottom up perspective, the Mineral StateOwner appears to be so absolute and almost imperial that itends up, at the very least, discouraging civic participationand empowerment within the constituents working or willing to work in the mining trade, especially those who are attemptingtopreserveandpursuetheirancestralmininglegacyandculture.Indeed,itisdifficultto imagineforruralcitizenslivinginthefieldthattheStateasthesoleproprietoroftheseresourcesis boundtoasocialruleoflawthatshouldgrantthemopportunitiesandprotectionsasconstituents.Itis easiertoconceiveoftheStateasabiased,discretionaryrulesetterratherthanasaregulatorofthe common good. It is next to impossible for them to imagine that they are the Stateand that the mineralstheStateownsactuallybelongtothenationofColombiaandtoitsconstituents. 123

 TheStatesexclusiveproprietorship,combinedwiththepowerofbeingtheonlyrulemakerandentity entitled to exert legitimate force, is a trifold combination of power in one single interested actor, embodied in a single political minister of the government. This is not encouraging in terms of developing or engaging in a participatory process for an active and engaged citizenry in the mining realm.Moreover,whentheColombiangovernmentcaneasilytagminingrelatedprotestsasillegalor terroristguerrilla oriented, selfcensorship and communal revolts are extremely common. The internet and greater connectivity have started to open a virtual space for the rural press, blogs and newsletters, especially to small and medium scale operations of selfemployed mine workers via solidarity economy cooperatives. Unfortunately, the voices of rural, indigenous or afroColombian women in own account mine work or ancillary mining roles, and self employed mine workers in independentinformalwork,arebarelyexistent,astheycarrythestigmaofillegality.Inthisconcrete realm,theworkoftheNGOsFBOsandODAareextremelyrelevantforawarenessraising,grassroots organizing, building argument articulation capacity, and advocacy strategies for inclusion in development and democracy. Fortunately enough, during the writing of this report the authors learnedthatanorganizationofartisanalminerswasbeingformedandincorporatedinColombia.262 An additional policy challenge related, once again, to the States role as owner and proprietor of subsoilandmineralrights,isthatthecurrentpurposeofpublicpolicyinminingisnottobetterprovide oradministerapublicservice,buttoaccessanduseasourceofwealthownedbytheState.Asmuch as all Colombians are constituents of that Stateand, thus, the legitimate rightholders of thewealth buried in the land, it is only the executive branch of the central government that has the most completeaccesstogeologicalinformationonthenonrenewableresourcesitsoil,naturalgas,and mineralsofthecountry.ThetemporaloccupiersoftheexecutivebranchoftheStatetherebyhave an effective and legitimate monopoly over this information. The President, his Mining Minister and subordinate public authorities of the executive branch exert this monopoly for the duration of their fouryear term limit. While they may use this period in a frugal or lavish manner, the State they representstillenjoysunlimitedrightstoexploitation. Accountability in mining must, therefore, be initiated by demands of the citizenry itself. However, because most mining occurs in territories geographically removed from the central authority and administration in Bogota, and because Colombias rural constituents are further isolated from the publicdecisionmakingprocessandmainstreammedia,theinformationnecessarytoformandshape publicopiniononminingmayalsobemonopolizedbythecentralgovernment.Consequently,public opinionwhichwillultimatelybetheonlymechanismtodemandinclusionandaccountabilityofthe State,is,infact,sufferingfromgrosslyasymmetricinformationemanatingalmostexclusivelyfromthe actormostlikelytobenefitfromminingactivities.Thepossibilityforafairandsocialorientedmining sectorinColombiathusremainsanactoffaithfaiththatthegovernmentwillestablishinclusiveand responsive mining regulations to protect its most vulnerable citizens, despite its financial interest in maximizingthewealthderivedfrommining. GiventheparticularhistoryofmininginColombia,andthecontemporaryStatesinvestmentandprofit driveninterestsinthecountrysminingsector,whatisevidentisthatthepovertytrappedconstituent whoselifeandlivelihooddependsonmineworkoperateswithinarealmofnormsdominatedbytwo
262Pleasesee:http://www.vanguardia.com/bucaramangaregion/barrancabermeja/76783confederacionmineracrea buenaexpectativaenpequenosext

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 kindsofimperiallogics.Ontheonehand,thereistheSpanishcoloniallogicofbeingsoleownerofall land, including subsurface rights underneath land owned by legitimate private property owners; and ontheother,thereistheneoliberalcapitalistlogicdrivenbyanAngloAmericanculturelookingfor businessopportunitieswherevertheymaybefound.UndertheEuropeancoloniallogic,everything land,surfaceandsubsoilmineralsandresources,oil,andevenwaterandairbelongtothegoverning authority or State. Under the neoliberal capitalist logic of many contemporary states the owner of anyresourceisentitledtoexploititmaximumprofitpotential. In the middle of these two logics of the Colombian state, which appears to have effectively merged theminitssoleownershipandprivatizinginitiatives,liesthepovertytrappedconstituent,trappedby legally impoverishing decisions and norms. People living in poverty neither own the mineral subsoil rights nor have the resources necessary for acquiring a mining concession contract that will grant access to legal, formal mining work. Crosssector partnerships for catalyzing inclusive governance mightbetheonlypossibilityforchangingapolicyframeworkthatcreatesmorepovertyforitsmost vulnerable constituents than the reality in which they were born and live.

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ANNEX 3. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ARTISANAL AND SMALLSCALE MINING (ASM)ININTERNATIONALPOLICYDISCOURSEANDTHEAUTHORSPOSITION ANDUNDERSTANDINGOFASM

ThenotionofArtisanalandSmallScaleMiningorASMwasfirstidentifiedinternationallyin1972,when theUnitedNationsobservedthatsomeofitscharacteristicswarranteddistinctionamongothermining practicesandoperations. Inmostcountries,legaldefinitionsofASMincludesomeorallofthefollowingelements: (1)Itislimitedtothecitizensofthecountryconcerned,therebyexcludingminingoperationsinwhich thereisparticipationofforeignnationalsandcompanies; (2)ThekindsofmachineryorequipmentusedtoperformASMarelimited,namelyonlysimplemeans andtechniquesareallowedtoqualifyasASM;and (3)TheoutputofmineralextractedandthecapitalusedtoperformASMarelimited,althoughthese limitsnotonlydifferfromcountrytocountry,butalsoamongdifferentmineralproducts.1 Distinctions between the two definitional components of ASM artisanal mining and smallscale mining have been less developed. In general, artisanal mining is distinguished from smallscale miningbythenumberofindividualsparticipatingintheactivityandthetoolsusedtodothemining activity. Under these commonly accepted definitional elements, it is estimated that there are 13 million peopleinabout30countriesdirectlyengagedinsmallscalemining,asignificantproportionofwhom arewomenandchildren.Afurther80to100millionpeopleacrossthedevelopingworldcoulddepend onsmallscaleminingforsomeaspectsortheirlivelihoods.2Infact,ithasbeenconcludedrecently thatmorepeopleareemployedinASMworldwidethanintheformalminingindustry3.InAfrica,for instance, it is estimated that up to four million participate in ASM directly and that it affects the livelihoods of another 16 28 million people; in Latin America, there are approximately 3 million people who work in ASM directly, with several million impacted indirectly.4 These numbers are expected to multiply due to the continued underperformance of many national economies and the limitations of formal employment. In fact, this economic activity has increased by an estimated 20 percent since the late 1990s and, with the impact of the economic crisis of 2008, will likelyincrease evenmoreinthenearfuture.5
1.Bugnosen,SmallScaleMiningLegislation:AGeneralreviewandanattempttoapplylessonslearned,Hilson,p.12. 2.Hentschel,HruschkaandPriesterArtisanalandSmallscaleminingchallengesandopportunities,Internationalinstitute forenvironmentanddevelopmentandWBCSD,London,2003pg.vii 3.Pleasesee:http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/2004/104B09_399_engl.pdf 4.DSouza,ArtisanalandSmallScaleMininginAfrica. 5.Tallichet,Hilson,p.207.

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 Becauseruralpopulationswillworkwiththeresourcesavailabletothemincludingmineralresources found on, underneath, or within the lands, waters, and forests where they live, which are, in many cases the most valuable resources with which they may find sources of income ASM is naturally linkedwithpopulationlivinginpoverty.Further,andbecausetheruralpoormoreoftensurvivevia informalworkopportunities,ASMhasbecomeassociatedwiththeinformalminingeconomy.Thus, ASMhasprimarilybeenaddressedbythedomesticlegislationofvariouscountriesthrougheffortsto formalize existing informal mining practices. Some countries, such as Zimbabwe, Ghana and the Philippines, have introduced legislation especially intended to cover ASM, while others have incorporatedASMintoexistingminingcodes,lawsandregulations. Few countries, however, have distinguished between artisanal and smallscale mining. Brazil distinguishes artisanal mining as individual work performed by panners with rudimentary forms of miningusingmanualorportableequipment,andappliedonlytoalluvia,colluvialandeluvialdeposits, whilesmallscaleminingmaybe(1)individualorcollective,(2)usingrudimentarytools,manualdevices or simple portable machinery, (3) for immediate exploitation of a mineral deposit which, (4) by its nature, dimension, location and economic use, can be worked, independent of previous exploration work.Ghana,ontheotherhand,hasnoformaldefinitionforartisanalmining,butdefinessmallscale miningasoperationsofindividualsororganizedgroupsofGhanaians(48individuals),oracooperative of ten or more individuals entirely financed by Ghanaian resources (and not to exceed a certain amount),carriedoutonafulltimebasisusingsimpleequipmentandtools.[x] Yet most small scale miners remain informal, suggesting that the enacting legislation and regulatory measures are not perceived as advantageous, the provisions of the legislation are inappropriate, and/or there is a lack of institutional and administrative capacity and capability to implement the legislation.[ix]Indeed,andasproposedinthereconceptualizedvisionofminingasproposedbythe authorsofthisreport,governmentmotivationtolegislateASMdoesnotnecessarilycorrespondtothe reality of small scale miners or miners working in an artisanal mode, thus creating the potential for largegapsingovernance.ASMisinfactthenotionthatencompassestheunincorporated,individually driven mine workers of the mining industry. Naturally the poverty of these small and microscale mine workers orients the ASM notion towards the informal economy; however, since ASM is not necessarily a juridical category, the notion of ASM in fact functions primarily as a socioeconomic descriptionofthesmalltimeplayersintheminingsector. In this order of ideas, it is the work and trade of these smalltime players that best describe the informalsectoroftheminingeconomy.Informality,withregardtothelargeandmediumscalemining actors,wouldbeinterpretedastheabsenceofformalizationinminingoperations,whereformalization refers to the incorporation of the operating entity and the corresponding compliance of all legal conditionsforrunningafunctionalbusinessentity,fromobtainingenvironmentallicensesandmining titlestocomplyingwithlaborandtaxobligations.Smallandmicroscaleminersinpovertywouldnot beincompliancewithwhateverconditionslawandpolicyhaveadoptedfortheformaloperationsof anyminingoperations,includingindustrial,rudimentary,orartisanalandtraditionalmining. To address the reality of smallscale miners, it has been proposed that the definition of smallscale mining include alluvial mining, artisanal and other forms of mining enterprise which involve small numbersofpeopleonasitebysitebasis,andlittleinthewayofexpensiveormoderntechnology.In addition,ithastobenotedthatwhatmaybeconsideredasmallscaleminingoperationinonecountry 127

 maywellbeconsideredalargescaleminingoperationinanothercountry.HencetheUnitedNations definition,whichwasacceptedandadoptedafterreviewingthevariedfactorsinvolved,seemsmore appropriate. It is the lack of universality in the definition of small scale mining that focus must be drawn on the general characteristics of small scale mining rather than attempting to define the concept.6.Forpurposesofinclusivepolicymaking,artisanalandsmallscaleminingshouldbebetter understoodasaincludingthoseminingactivitiestypicallypracticedinthepoorestandmostremote rural areas by largely itinerant, poorly educated populace, men and women with few employment alternatives.7 Artisanal and small scale mine workers thus lie at the intersection of human rights, environmentalpolicy,indigenouspeoplesrights,governance,decentwork,andinformality.8 Therefore, and as much as the authors of this report acknowledge the importance of the notion of ASMintermsofitssocioeconomicrelevanceandinportrayingitsneedforpolicyattention,theyhave realizedthatthenotionofASMispersenotveryusefulforlegalanalysisandpossiblyforthedrafting ofrules,regulationsorpolicy.Instead,forensuringthatASMmaybecomeaworkidentitynotionanda potential labor protection statute within mining law and policy, the authors of this report commissioned by WIEGO believe that it must be portrayed as the most vulnerable sector within a categoricalunderstandingofminework.Onethatdifferentiates(1)thesizeoftheminingoperation and(2)themodeofproduction,(ASMcrossesthemboth). In fact, ASM, by virtue of weaving historical, social, anthropological and economic information conflatescategoriesoflegalanalysisandasaresult,legalandpolicydraftingmaybefrustratedbya lack of clarity on the types of operations and modes of production that need to be regulated, protected,promotedanddevelopedbylawandpolicy.Theurgentneedtolegallyrecognize,promote andprotecttheworkcarriedoutthroughsmallandmicrominingoperationsthatareundertakeninan artisanal or rudimentary mode, so as to complement the industrial mining conducted in large and mediumscaleoperationsinagivencountry,istheprecisereasonwhyASMhascarriedsomuchweight asanidea,albeitpoorlytranslatedintonormativelegalandpolicyprovisions. A differentiation and reconceptualization of mining of the povertytrapped in two distinct analytical categories enables a more conducive analysis along additional policy vectors or classifications. For instance, an environmentally safe agenda concerned with natural conservation, public health and climatechangewillbemaderelevantforallminework,regardlessofthesizeoftheoperation(large, mediumorsmall)orthemodeofproductioninwhichitiscarriedout(industrialorartisanal).Inthis sameway,policymakersmayfindthatforthepurposesofstrengtheningtheminingindustryofthe country,aclearunderstandingofdevelopmentthroughlegalpersonhoodsororganizationalstrategies may upscale mining production, labor protection and strengthen compliance on the decent work agenda,ESCRinternationalobligationsandachievingthetargetsforMDG1andMDG3.

6MMasialeti,SmallScaleMininginZambia,DepartmentofMiningEngineering,UniversityofZambia, http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache:R66Jlx8TFNAJ:www.casmchina.org/attach_view.asp%3FID%3D49+Small+Scale+Mini ng+in+Zambia+M+Masialeti,+Department+of+Mining+Engineering,+University+of+Zambia,+Lusaka,+Zambia&cd=1&hl=es& ct=clnk&gl=co&client=firefoxa 7HilsonGavin,TheSocioEconomicImpactofSmallScaleMininginDevelopingCountires,Introudction,Part1,p.1 8Ibid,p.2.

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 Such an categorization will serve to distinguish the situations where an independent worker (own accountorselfemployed),mightbebetterpromotedandprotectedif,forinstance,scaledupthrough associatedworkinasolidaritybasedlegalpersonlikeacooperative. Miningproductionmodecriterion: Miningoperationsizecriterion: A. Industrialmechanizedmode 1. Largescaleoperations B. Basicrudimentarysemi 2. Mediumscaleoperations mechanicalhelp 3. Smallscaleoperations C. Artisanalmode 4. Microscaleoperations Potential ways of scaling mining Environmentalclassificationofmining production: operationsapplicabletoallsizesand modesofproduction: i. Joint ventures and Consortiums of industrial miners for higher impact Environmentallyconscious operations operations: ii. CooperativeOrganizations Nondegrading mineral for associating explorationandexploitation rudimentary mechanized mining and for Environmentallyunconscious industrializingoperations operations: indifferent or iii. CooperativeOrganizations aggressive to the for associating own environment causing account work and degradation through mineral clustering production for explorationandexploitation the development of minersinartisanalmode Aimingforinclusioninmininglawandpolicy,themultifacetedunderstandingofminingdescribedin thetablebelow,withonedimensionrelatingtothesizeoftheminingoperation(andintroducingthe conceptofmicroscalemining)andtheseconddimensionrelatingtothemodeormechanismofthe mining activities (and highlighting the artisanal option of production) allows a better appraisal of whetherASM(orwhateverconceptisintendedtoaddressandincludetheworkingpoor)isusefulfor theinformalworkingpoorintheminingeconomy. Inthissensethefollowingquestionsmightalsoproveinstructive:(1)istheASMnotiondefinedinthe countryandusedinthatcountrysminingindustry?(2)Ifyes,thenhasthedescribednotionofASM translatedintolegislationandpolicy?(3)Dosuchprovision(s)entitlemicroandsmallscaleminingas well as cooperative medium sized mine workers producing in an artisanal or rudimentary fashion to obtaincertainrightsandopportunitiestoensuretheirlives,livelihoods,andtheirrightstolife,work andentrepreneurorisitjustanotioninpoliticaldiscourseoradefinitioninaminingglossary?Itisin answeringthesequestionsthatthefunctionalityandrelevanceofthenormativelegal,regulatoryand 129

 policyprovisionsintheminingsectorwillberevealed,aswellastheirabilitytoeffectivelyaddressthe needsandrequirementsofthoseworkerswhoremaininformal,excluded,andunabletoaccesstheir rightsandopportunitiesviatheirculture,tradeandworkinmining. SIZE LARGE MODE

INDUSTRIAL
National and multinational corporations (anglo gold, muriel, mineros s.a etc..)

RUDIMENTARY

ARTISANAL

Nonexistent

Nonexistent

Cooperatives of mine workers(gustavo) Self employed mine workers settled and extracting around traditional mineral deposits Illegal operations of business miners of a national or foreign origin Mainly family driven operations of mine workers Illegal operations of business miners of a national or foreign origin Mainly family driven operations of mine workers(noel) Ethnoculturalmining relating to ancestral culture Concentration of own account female workers (Lupe and maria) Ethnoculturalmining relating to ancestral culture

MEDIUM

National and multinational corporations (frontino gold mine)

Indigenous Wayuu saltconcession

SMALL

Nonexistent

MICRO

Impossible

Forbidden

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 FollowingtheseparationofthesizefactorfromthemodefactorthatareintrinsictotheASMnotion, thetableaboveallowsabetteridentificationoftheactorspresentinanyminingeconomy,soasto identifytherightsandstakeholdersfor(1)tailoringinclusivepolicyresponsesinsteadofmakingone rulefitsallsolutions,asisthecasewithColombianconcessioncontractsintendedtogovernallwork situations and livelihoods in the vast and rich mining industry and heritage and (2) for outreach capacitystrategiesandfosteringofparticipatoryorpropoorgovernance.Thisdifferentiatedapproach to mining in policy and lawmaking processes may also contribute to target and dismantle false premisesintheindustry,suchasthosethatartisanalminingisalwaysdetrimentaltotheenvironment, and that industrial mining is always safe (re. Chile case). It should also raise the visibility and the existenceofmicroscaleminingoperationsofruralafro,indigenous,andpeasantsandtheirimperative need to access natural resources and minerals not only for ensuring their survival, which is the very leastofalegitimatedemocraticstate,butmoreoverforformallyentitlingthemalsototheirrightto developandnotmerelytosubsist.Thisispossiblebyclusteringlikemicroscaleminingproductionof artisanalmineworkersuptomediumscaleoperations(Re.Wayuussaltconcession)andecolabeling andfairtradebrandingforenvironmentalandethicalmodesofproduction(Re.Oroverde),among othersocialinnovationstrategies.

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ANNEX4.MAPPINGOFMINEWORKERSORGANIZATIONS
PleaserefertoaseparateExcelDocumentwiththesametitleattachedtothisdocument.

132

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