North American Free Trade Agreement

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"NAFTA" redirects here. For other uses of the acronym, see Nafta (disambiguation). North American Free Trade Agreement

Administrative center Languages Membership Establishment - Formation Area - Total - Water (%) Population - 2010 estimate - Density

Mexico City, Ottawa, and Washington, D.C. 3[show] Canada Mexico United States January 1, 1994 21,783,850 km2 (1st) 8,410,792 sq mi 7.4 457,284,932 (3rd) 25.1/km2 (195th) 54.3/sq mi 2008 (IMF) estimate $17,153,462 trillion (n/a) $35,491 (n/a) 2008 (IMF) estimate $16,792 trillion (n/a) $35,564 (18th)

GDP (PPP) - Total - Per capita GDP (nominal) - Total - Per capita Website http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org

The North American Free Trade Agreement or NAFTA is an agreement signed by the governments of Canada, Mexico, and the United States, creating a trilateral trade bloc in North America. The agreement came into force on January 1, 1994. It superseded theCanada United States Free Trade Agreement between the U.S. and Canada. In terms of combined purchasing power parity GDP of its members, as of 2007 the trade bloc is the largest in the world and second largest by nominal GDP comparison.

The North Ameri Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has t o supplements, the North Ameri an Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North Ameri an Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).

Contents [hide] 1 Negotiation and U.S. rati i ation 2 Provisions 3 Mechanisms 3.1 Trade 3.2 Industry 3.3 Environment 3.4 Agriculture 3.5 Mobility of persons 4 Criticism and controversies 4.1 Canadian disputes 4.1.1 Change in income trust taxation 4.1.2 Further criticism in Canada 4.2 U.S. deindustrialization 4.3 Impact on Mexican farmers 4.4 Zapatista Uprising in response to NAFTA in Chiapas, Mexico 4.5 Impact of NAFTA on Canada 4.6 Chapter 11 4.7 Chapter 19 4.8 Chapter 14

5 See also 6 References 7 Further reading 8 External links Negotiation and U.S. ratification Following diplomatic negotiations dating back to 1986 among the three nations, the leaders met in San Antonio, Texas, on December 17, 1992, to sign NAFTA. U.S. President George H. W. Bush, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Mexican President Carlos Salinas, each responsible for spearheading and promoting the agreement, c eremonially signed it. The agreement then needed to be ratified by each nation's legislative or parliamentary branch. Before the negotiations were finali ed, Bill Clinton came into office in the U.S. and Kim Campbell in Canada, and before the agreement became law, Jean Chrtien had taken office in Canada. Remarks on the Signing of NAFTA (December 8, 1993)

Bill Clinton's December 8, 1993 remarks Bill Clinton had become president of the U.S. before the agreement came into force, and is seen on the signing of the North American Free here signing the U.S. implementation legislation. Trade Agreement

Problems listening to this file? See media help. The proposed Canada-U.S.trade agreement had been extremely controversial and divisive in Canada, and the 1988 Canadian election was fought almost exclusively on that issue. In that election more Canadians voted for anti-free trade parties (the Liberals and the New Democrats) but more seats in parliament were won by the pro-free trade Progressive Conservatives (PCs). Mulroney and the PCs had a parliamentary majority and were able to easily pass the Canada-U.S. FTA and NAFTA bills. However Mulroney himself had become deeply unpopular and resigned on June 25, 1993. He was replaced as Conservative leader and prime minister by Kim Campbell, who then led the PC party into the 1993 election where they were decimated by the Liberal party under Jean Chrtien. Chrtien had campaigned on a

promise to renegotiate or abrogate NAFTA but instead negotiated the two supplemental agreements with the new U.S. president. In the U.S., Bush, who had worked to "fast track" the signing prior to the end of his term, ran out of time and had to pass the required ratification and signing into law to incoming president Bill Clinton. Prior to sending it to the United States Senate, Clinton introduced clauses to protect American workers and allay the concerns of many House members. It also required U.S. partners to adhere to environm ental practices and regulations similar to its own. The ability to enforce these clauses, especially with Mexico, and with much consideration and emotional discussion the House of Representatives approved NAFTA on November 17, 1993, by a vote of 234 to 200 The . agreement's supporters included 132 Republicans and 102 Democrats. NAFTA passed the Senate 61-38. Senate supporters were 34 Republicans and 27 Democrats. Clinton signed it into law on December 8, 1993; it went into effect on January 1, 1994. 1][2] Clinton while [ signing the NAFTA bill stated: "NAFTA means jobs. American jobs, and good-paying American jobs. If I didn't believe that, I wouldn't support this agreement." [3] This section requires expansion. Provisions The goal of NAFTA was to eliminate barriers of trade and investment between the US, Canada and Mexico. The implementation of NAFTA on January 1, 1994, brou the ght immediate elimination of tariffs on more than one half of U.S. imports from Mexico and more than one third of U.S. exports to Mexico. Within 10 years of the implementation of the agreement, all US-Mexico tariffs would be eliminated except for some U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico that were to be phased out in 15 years. Most US-Canada trade was already duty free. NAFTA also seeks to eliminate non-tariff trade barriers. Mechanisms Chapter 20 provides a procedure for the interstate resolution of disputes over the application and interpretation of the NAFTA. It was modeled after Chapter 18 of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement.[4] NAFTA's effects, both positive and negative, have been quantified by several economists, whose findings have been reported in publications such as theWorld Bank's Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean,[5] NAFTA's Impact on North America,[6] and NAFTA Revisited by the Institute for International Economics.[7] Some[who?] argue that NAFTA has been positive for Mexico, which has seen its poverty rates fall and real income rise (in the form of lower prices, especially food), even after accounting for the 1994 1995 economic crisis.[8] Others argue that NAFTA has been beneficial to business owners and elites in all three countries, but has had negative impacts on farmers in Mexico who saw food prices fall based on cheap imports from U.S. agribusiness, and negative impacts on U.S. workers in manufacturing and assembly industries who lost jobs. Critics also argue that NAFTA has contributed to the rising levels of inequality in both the U.S. and Mexico. Some economists believe that NAFTA has not been enough (or worked fast enough) to produce an economic convergence,[9] nor to substantially reduce poverty rates. Some have suggested that in order to fully benefit from the agreement, Mexico must invest more in education and promote innovation in infrastructure and agriculture. Trade

According to Issac (2005), overall, NAFTA has not caused trade diversion, aside from a few industries such as textiles and apparel, in which rules of origin negotiated in the agreement were specifically designed to make U.S. firms prefer Mexican manufacturers. The World Bank also showed that the combined percentage growth of NAFTA imports was accompanied by an almost similar increase of non-NAFTA exports. Industry Maquiladoras (Mexican factories that take in imported raw materials and produce goods for export) have become the landmark of trade in Mexico. These are plants that moved to this region from the United States, hence the debate over the loss of American jobs. Hufbauer's (2005) book shows that income in the maquiladora sector has increased 15.5% since the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. Other sectors now benefit from the free trade agreement, and the share of exports from non-border states has increased in the last five years while the share of exports from maquiladora-border states has decreased. This has allowed for the rapid growth of non-border metropolitan areas, such as Toluca, Len and Puebla; all three larger in population than Tijuana, Ciudad Jurez, and Reynosa. Environment For more details on this topic, see NAFTA's Impact on the Environment. Securing U.S. congressional approval for NAFTA would have been impossible without addressing public concerns about NAFTAs environmental impact. The Clinton administration negotiated a side agreement on the environment with Canada and Mexico, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which led to the creation of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) in 1994. To alleviate concerns that NAFTA, the first regional trade agreement between a developing country and two developed countries, would have negative environmental impacts, the CEC was given a mandate to conduct ongoing ex post environmental assessment of NAFTA.[10] In response to this mandate, the CEC created a framework for conducting environmental analysis of NAFTA, one of the first ex post frameworks for the environmental assessment of trade liberalization. The framework was designed to produce a focused and systematic body of evidence with respect to the initial hypotheses about NAFTA and the environment, such as the concern that NAFTA would create a "race to the bottom" in environmental regulation among the three countries, or the hope that NAFTA would pressure governments to increase their environmental protection mechanisms.[11] The CEC has held four symposia using this framework to evaluate the environmental impacts of NAFTA and has commissioned 47 papers on this subject. In keeping with the CECs overall strategy of transparency and public involvement, the CEC commissioned these papers from leading independent experts.[12] Overall, none of the initial hypotheses was confirmed.[citation needed] NAFTA did not inherently present a systemic threat to the North American environment, as was originally feared, apart from potentially the Investor state dispute settlement provisions of Ch 11. NAFTA-related environmental threats instead occurred in specific areas where government environmental policy, infrastructure, or mechanisms, were unprepared for the increasing scale of production under trade liberalization.[citation needed] In some cases, environmental policy was neglected in the wake of trade liberalization; in other cases, NAFTA's measures for investment protection, such as Chapter 11, and measures against non-tariff trade barriers,

threatened to discourage more vigorous environmental policy.[13] The most serious overall increases in pollution due to NAFTA were found in the base metals sector, the Mexican petroleum sector, and the transportation equipment sector in the United States and Mexico, but not in Canada.[14] Agriculture From the earliest negotiation, agriculture was (and still remains) a controversial topic within NAFTA, as it has been with almost all free trade agreements that have been signed within the WTO framework. Agriculture is the only section that was not negotiated trilaterally; instead, three separate agreements were signed between each pair of parties. The CanadaU.S. agreement contains significant restrictions and tariff quotas on agricultural products (mainly sugar, dairy, and poultry products), whereas the MexicoU.S. pact allows for a wider liberalization within a framework of phase-out periods (it was the first NorthSouth FTA on agriculture to be signed). The overall effect of the MexicoU.S. agricultural agreement is a matter of dispute. Mexico did not invest in the infrastructure necessary for competition, such as efficient railroads and highways, creating more difficult living conditions for the country's poor. Still, the causes of rural poverty cannot be directly attributed to NAFTA[citation needed]; in fact, Mexico's agricultural exports increased 9.4 percent annually between 1994 and 2001, while imports increased by only 6.9 percent a year during the same period.[15] One of the most affected agricultural sectors is the meat industry. Mexico has gone from a small-key player in the pre-1994 U.S. export market to the 2nd largest importer of U.S. agricultural products in 2004, and NAFTA may be credited as a major catalyst for this change. The allowance of free trade removed the hurdles that impeded business between the two countries. As a result, Mexico has provided a growing meat market for the U.S., leading to an increase in sales and profits for the U.S. meat industry. This coincides with a noticeable increase in Mexican per capita GDP that has created large changes in meat consumption patterns, implying that Mexicans can now afford to buy more meat and thus per capita meat consumption has grown.[16] Production of corn in Mexico has increased since NAFTA's implementation. However, internal corn demand has increased beyond Mexico's sufficiency, and imports have become necessary, far beyond the quotas Mexico had originally negotiated.[17] Zahniser & Coyle have also pointed out that corn prices in Mexico, adjusted for international prices, have drastically decreased, yet through a program of subsidies expanded by former president Vicente Fox, production has remained stable since 2000.[18] The logical result of a lower commodity price is that more use of it is made downstream. Unfortunately, many of the same rural people who would have been likely to produce highermargin value-added products in Mexico have instead emigrated. The rise in corn prices due to increased ethanol demand may improve the situation of corn farmers in Mexico. In a study published in the August 2008 issue of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, NAFTA has increased U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico and Canada even though most of this increase occurred a decade after its ratification. The study focused on the effects that gradual "phase-in" periods in regional trade agreements, including NAFTA, have on trade flows. Most of the increase in members agricultural trade, which was only recently

brought under the purview of the World Trade Organi ation, was due to very high trade barriers before NAFTA or other regional trade agreements.[19] Mobility of persons According to the Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, during fiscal year 2006 (i.e., October 2005 through September 2006), 73,880 foreign professionals (64,633 Canadians and 9,247 Mexicans) were admitted into the United States for temporary employment under NAFTA (i.e., in the TN status). Additionally, 17,321 of their family members (13,136 Canadians, 2,904 Mexicans, as well as a number of third country nationals married to Canadians and Mexicans) en tered the U.S. in the treaty national's dependent (TD) status.[20] Because DHS counts the number of the new I-94 arrival records filled at the border, and the TN-1 admission is valid for three years, the number of non-immigrants in TN status present in the U.S. at the end of the fiscal year is approximately equal to the number of admissions during the year. (A discrepancy may be caused by some TN entrants leaving the country or changing status before their three -year admission period has expired, while other immigrants admitted earlier may change their status to TN or TD, or extend TN status granted earlier). Canadian authorities estimated that, as of December 1, 2006, a total of 24,830 U.S. citi ens and 15,219 Mexican citi ens were present in Canada as "foreign workers". These numbers include both entrants under the NAFTA agreement and those who have entered under other provisions of the Canadian immigration law.[21] New entries of foreign workers in 2006 were 16,841 (U.S. citi ens) and 13,933 (Mexicans).[22] Criticism and controversies Canadian disputes This article is outdated. Please update this article to reflect recent events or newly available information. Please see the talk page for more information. (August 2009)

Garment workers assemble suits in a Toronto factory in 1901 There is much concern in Canada over the provision that if something is sold even once as a commodity, the government cannot stop its sale in the future.[23] This applies to the water from Canada's lakes and rivers, fueling fears over the possible des truction of Canadian ecosystems and water supply.

In 1999, Sun Belt Water Inc., a company out of Santa Barbara, California, filed an Arbitration Claim under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA claiming $105 million as a result of Canada's prohibition on the export of bulk water by marine tanker, a move that destroyed the Sun Belt business venture. The claim sent shock waves through Canadian governments that scrambled to update water legislation and remains unresolved. Other fears come from the effects NAFTA has had on Canadian lawmaking. In 1996, the gasoline additive MMT was brought into Canada by an American company. At the time, the Canadian federal government banned the importation of the additive. The American company brought a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11 seeking US$201 million,[24] and by Canadian provinces under the Agreement on Internal Trade ("AIT"). The American company argue d that their additive had not been conclusively linked to any health dangers, and that the prohibition was damaging to their company. Following a finding that the ban was a violation of the AIT,[25] the Canadian federal government repealed the ban and settled with the American company for US$13 million.[26] Studies by Health and Welfare Canada (now Health Canada) on the health effects of MMT in fuel found no significant health effects associated with exposure to these exhaust emissions. Other Canadian researchers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency disagree with Health Canada, and cite studies that include possible nerve damage.[27]

Ponderosa Pine logs taken from Malheur National Forest, Grant County, Oregon. The United States and Canada had been arguing for years over the United States' decision to impose a 27 percent duty on Canadian softwood lumber imports, until new Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper compromised with the United States and reached a settlement on July 1, 2006.[28] The settlement has not yet been ratified by either country, in part due to domestic opposition in Canada. Canada had filed numerous motions to have the duty eliminated and the collected duties returned to Canada.[29] After the United States lost an appeal from a NAFTA panel, it responded by saying "We are, of course, disappointed with the [NAFTA panel's] decision, but it will have no impact on the anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders." (Nick Lifton, spokesman for U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman)[30] On July 21, 2006, the United States Court of International Trade found that imposition of the duties was contrary to U.S. law.[31][32] Change in income trust taxation On October 30, 2007, American citi ens Marvin and Elaine Gottlieb filed a Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under NAFTA. The couple claims thousands of U.S. investors lost a total of $5 billion dollars in the fall-out from the Conservative Government's decision the previous year to change the tax rate on income trusts in the energy sector. On April 29, 2009, a determination was made that this change in tax law was not expropriation.[33] Further criticism in Canada

A book written by Mel Hurtig published in 2002 called The Vanishing Country charged that since NAFTA's ratification more than 10,000 Canadian companies had been taken over by foreigners, and that 98% of all foreign direct investments in Canada were for fo reign takeovers.[34] The term "the Double Yu(c)k Alliance aka NAFTA from Yukon to Yucatn" was first used in 1994 by Miodrag Kojadinovi in his article "Friends and Neighbours: Dear Prime Minister of Canada, Kindly Join the EU Next Thursday".[35] U.S. deindustriali ation For more details on this topic, see NAFTA's effect on United States employment.

Studies done by Kate Bronfenbrenner at Cornell University showed the adverse effect of plants threatening to move to Mexico because of NAFTA.[36] An increase in domestic manufacturing output and a proportionally greater domestic investment in manufacturing does not nece ssarily mean an increase in domestic manufacturing jobs; this increase may simply reflect greater automation and higher productivity. Although the U.S. total civilian employment may have grown by almost 15 million in between 1993 and 2001, manufacturing jo only increased by 476,000 in the same bs time period.[37] Furthermore from 1994 to 2007, net manufacturing employment has declined by 3,654,000, and during this period several other free trade agreements have been concluded or expanded.[37] Impact on Mexican farmers In 2000, U.S. government subsidies to the corn sector totaled $10.1 billion. These subsidies have led to charges of dumping, which jeopardi es Mexican farms and the country's food self-sufficiency. Other studies reject NAFTA as the force responsible for depressing the incomes of poor corn farmers, citing the trend's existence more than a decade before NAFTA's existence, an increase in mai e production after NAFTA went into effect in 1994, and the lack of a measurable impact on the price of Mexican corn due to subsidi ed corn coming into Mexico from the United States, though they agree that the abolition of U.S. agricultural subsidies would benefit Mexican farmers.[38] According to Graham Purchase in Anarchism and Environmental Survival, NAFTA could cause "the destruction of the ejidos (peasant

cooperative village holdings) by corporate interests, and threatens to completely reverse the gains made by rural peoples in the Mexican Revolution."[39] Zapatista Uprising in response to NAFTA in Chiapas, Mexico The preparations for NAFTA included cancellation of Article 27 of Mexico's constitution, the cornerstone of Emiliano Zapata's revolution of 1910-1919. Under the historic Article 27, Indian communal landholdings were protected from sale or privatization. But under NAFTA this guarantee was defined as a barrier to investment. With the removal of Article 27, Indian farmers would be threatened with loss of their remaining lands, and also flooded with cheap imports (substitutes) from the US. Thus, the Zapatistas labeled NAFTA as a "death sentence" to Indian communities all over Mexico. Then EZLN declared war on the Mexican state on January 1, 1994 the day NAFTA came into force. [40] Impact of NAFTA on Canada Canada gained the most from NAFTA with Canada's GDP rate at 3.6%, growing faster than the United States at 3.3% and Mexico at 2.7%. Canadian employment levels have also shown steady gains in recent years, with overall employment rising from 14.9 million to 15.7 million in the early 2000s. Even Canadian manufacturing employment held steady. One of NAFTA's biggest economic effects on U.S.-Canada trade has been to boost bilateral agricultural flows.[41] In the year 2008 alone, Canada exports to the United States and Mexico was at CAN$381.3 Billion Dollars and imports from NAFTA was at CAN$245.1 Billion Dollars.[42] The Canadian mainstream has been so unanimous in its recognition of NAFTA's advantages despite a few odd detractors that even former NDP Gary Doer of Manitoba openly praises the benefits of NAFTA.[43] Chapter 11 Another contentious issue is the impact of the Investor state dispute settlement obligations contained in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.[44] Chapter 11 allows corporations or individuals to sue Mexico, Canada or the United States for compensation when actions taken by those governments (or by those for whom they are responsible at international law, such as provincial, state, or municipal governments) have adversely affected their investments. This chapter has been invoked in cases where governments have passed laws or regulations with intent to protect their constituents and their resident businesses' profits. Language in the chapter defining its scope states that it cannot be used to "prevent a Party from providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter."[45] This chapter has been criticized by groups in the U.S.,[46] Mexico,[47] and Canada[48] for a variety of reasons, including not taking into account important social and environmental[49] considerations. In Canada, several groups, including the Council of Canadians, challenged the constitutionality of Chapter 11. They lost at the trial level,[50] and have subsequently appealed. Methanex Corporation, a Canadian corporation, filed a US$970 million suit against the United States, claiming that a California ban on Methyl tert-butyl ether (MTBE), a substance

that had found its way into many wells in the state, was hurtful to the corporation's sales of methanol. However, the claim was rejected, and the company was ordered to pay US$3 million to the U.S. government in costs.[51] In another case, Metalclad, an American corporation, was awarded US$15.6 million from Mexico after a Mexican municipality refused a construction permit for the hazardous waste landfill it intended to construct in Guadalczar, San Luis Potos. The construction had already been approved by the federal government with various environmental requirements imposed (see paragraph 48 of the tribunal decision). The NAFTA panel found that the municipality did not have the authority to ban construction on the basis of the environmental concerns.[52]

Chapter 19 Also contended is NAFTA's Chapter 19, which subjects antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) determinations with binational panel review instead of, or in addition to, conventional judicial review. For example, in the United States, review of agency decisions imposing antidumping and countervailing duties are normally heard before the U.S. Court of International Trade, an Article III court. NAFTA parties, however, have the option of appealing the decisions to binational panels composed of five citizens from the two relevant NAFTA countries. The panelists are generally lawyers experienced in international trade law. Since the NAFTA does not include substantive provisions concerning AD/CVD, the panel is charged with determining whether final agency determinations involving AD/CVD conform with the country's domestic law. Chapter 19 can be considered as somewhat of an anomaly in international dispute settlement since it does not apply international law, but requires a panel composed of individuals from many countries to reexamine the application of one country's domestic law. A Chapter 19 panel is expected to examine whether the agency's determination is supported by "substantial evidence." This standard assumes significant deference to the domestic agency. Some of the most controversial trade disputes in recent years, such as the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute, have been litigated before Chapter 19 panels. Decisions by Chapter 19 panels can be challenged before a NAFTA extraordinary challenge committee. However, an extraordinary challenge committee does not function as an ordinary appeal. Under the NAFTA, it will only vacate or remand a decision if the decision involves a significant and material error that threatens the integrity of the NAFTA dispute settlement system. Since January 2006, no NAFTA party has successfully challenged a Chapter 19 panel's decision before an extraordinary challenge committee. Chapter 14 The neutrality of this section is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. (August 2009)

"This chapter dealing with Financial Services provides for the same procedure as Chapter 20, except that the members of the panel shall be selected from a roster of fifteen persons who "have expertise in financial services law or practice..." The roster has never been made public and no dispute has yet occurred under this chapter."[53] The provining a roster of 15 available people to form a committee for dispute resolution is shown, quite clearly, in Article 1414