Political Law Review Atty.

Jack Jimenez
Article II Section 1 ACCFA v. ACCFA Supervisors Association November 29, 1969

A collective bargaining agreement was entered into, effective for one year. The Unions started protesting against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. They declared a strike, and filed a case for acts of unfair labor practice: violation of the collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain.. ACCFAs defenses: lack of jurisdiction; illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of the contract, and lack of approval by the OP of the fringe benefits. o Note: During the pendency of the above mentioned case (G.R. No. L-21484), specifically on August 8, 1963, the President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), which among other things required the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) and changed its name to Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA).

CIR: ruled in favor of the unions.

Issue: w/n the respondent court has jurisdiction over this case, which in turn depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary functions. Held: No, because ACCFA exercises governmental functions. The respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of employment, INCLUDING the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L-21824).6 This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875 (Prohibition Against Strike in the Government.)

Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established, among other governmental agencies, to extend credit and similar assistance to agriculture. The implementation of such is found in Sec. 110-118 of the Land Reform Code. Sections 113 to 118, inclusive, invest the ACA with certain rights and powers not accorded to nongovernmental entities (auditing, prosecution of officials, writing off unsecured and outstanding loans, etc.) The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by the Congress may legally exercise. The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function; and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made available for assignment from one agency to another, subject only to Civil Service laws, rules and regulations, position classification and wage structures. The appointing authority in respect of the officials and employees of the ACA is the President of the Philippines When the Agricultural Reform Code was being considered by the Congress: Senator Tolentino: . . . . "The ACA is not going to be a profit making institution. It is supposed to be a public service of the government to the lessees and farmer-owners of the lands that may be

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bought after expropriation from owners. It is the government here that is the lender. The government should not exact a higher interest than what we are telling a private landowner now in his relation to his tenants if we give to their farmers a higher rate of interest . . . ."

Constituent functions:

These functions may not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"),4 such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations.

Under this traditional classification, such constituent exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty, and promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people functions being ministrant he exercise of which is optional the government.

functions are not merely to these letter on the part of

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of principle concerning the promotion of social justice. Purpose: the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. Other factors to be considered: the law itself declares that the ACA is a government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its functions disappears. In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions of

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employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA (G.R. No. L-21824). 6 This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875 (Prohibition Against Strike in the Government.) Issue: w/n the collective bargaining agreements fringe benefits are already enforceable. Held: YES

ACCFAs argument: the fringe benefits have not become enforceable because the condition that they should first be approved by the Office of the President has not been complied with. Unions: no such condition existed in the bargaining contract under Section 3, Article XIV, of the agreement, the same "shall not become effective unless and until the same is duly ratified by the Board of Governors of the Administration." Such approval was given even before the formal execution of the agreement, BUT with the proviso that "the fringe benefits contained therein shall take effect only if approved by the office of the President." The condition is, therefore, deemed to be incorporated into the agreement by reference. The OP signed, provided the salaries are in accord with the laws and are reasonable. The payment of the fringe benefits agreed upon, to our mind, shows that the same were within the financial capability of the ACCFA then, and hence justifies the conclusion that this particular condition imposed by the Office of the President in its approval of the bargaining contract was satisfied.

Separate Opinion: Fernando: , the government is freed from the compulsion exerted by the Bacani doctrine of the "constituent-ministrant" test as a criterion for the type of activity in which it may engage. Its constricting effect is consigned to oblivion.

there is a definite rejection of the "constituent-ministrant" criterion of governmental functions, followed in Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation. Bacani: governmental functions are classified into constituent and ministrant.

Constituent: those which constitute the very bonds of society and are compulsory in nature; (1) The keeping of order and providing for the protection of persons and property from violence and robbery. (2) The fixing of the legal relations between man and wife and between parents and children. (3) The regulation of the holding, transmission, and interchange of property, and the determination of its liabilities for debt or for crime. (4) The determination of contract rights between individuals. (5) The definition and punishment of crime. (6) The administration of justice in civil cases.

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(7) The determination of the political duties, privileges, and relations of citizens. (8) Dealings of the state with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger or encroachment and the advancement of its international interests.' "

Ministrant: those that are undertaken only by way of advancing the general interests of society, and are merely optional. (public works, public education, public charity, health and safety regulations, and regulations of trade and industry.)

principles determining whether or not a government shall exercise certain of these optional functions are: (1) that a government should do for the public welfare those things which private capital would not naturally undertake and (2) that a government should do these things which by its very nature it is better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals."

Rejection of the laissez-faire concept in the Phil.

The Wilson classification reflected the primacy of the dominant laissez-faire concept carried into the sphere of governmentFor a long time, legislation tending to reduce economic inequality foundered on the rock that was the due process clause, enshrining as it did the liberty of contract. , the laissez-faire principle resulted in the contraction of the sphere where governmental entry was permissible. The object was to protect property even if thereby the needs of the general public would be left unsatisfied. The influence exerted by American constitutional doctrines unavoidable when the Philippines was still under American rule notwithstanding, an influence that has not altogether vanished even after independence, the laissez-faire principle never found full acceptance in this jurisdiction, even during the period of its full flowering in the United States. Moreover, to erase any doubts, the Constitutional Convention saw to it that our fundamental law embodies a policy of the responsibility thrust on government to cope with social and economic problems and an earnest and sincere commitment to the promotion of the general welfare through state action. It must be made clear that the objection to the "constituent-ministrant" classification of governmental functions is not to its formulation as such. From the standpoint of law as logic, it is not without merit. But It must not be lost sight of though that logic and jural symmetry while undoubtedly desirable are not the prime consideration. This is especially so in the field of public law. What was said by Holmes, almost nine decades ago, carry greater conviction now. "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The Constitution is distinguished precisely by a contrary philosophy. The regime of liberty if provided for, with the realization that under the then prevalent social and economic conditions, it may be attained only through a government with its sphere of activity ranging far and wide, not excluding matters hitherto left to the operation of free enterprise. As rightfully stressed in our decision today in line with what was earlier expressed by Justice Laurel, the government that we have established has as a fundamental principle the promotion of social justice. With the decision reached by us today, the government is freed from the compulsion exerted by the Bacani doctrine of the "constituent-ministrant" test as a criterion for the type of activity in which it may engage. Its constricting effect is consigned to oblivion.

Rep. v. Presiding Judge

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Political Law Review Atty. Jack Jimenez

Sept. 11, 1980

Respondent Sison filed a complaint against the Rice and Corn Administration (RCA for short) for a sum of money. RCA filed a motion to dismiss the said complaint on the ground of nonsuability of the RCA as a mere governmental agency of the Republic of the Philippines. Then, Sison filed a motion to amend the complaint for the purpose of showing his actionable interest as assignee of the purchase price of unpaid deliveries of corn grains to the RCA. TC: in favor of SIson

RCA appealed, but failed to pay the legal fees and appeal bond. The Judge held that the RCA, being a mere instrumentality of the Government of the Philippines, is not exempt from the payment of legal fees as well as the posting of an appeal bond, and dismissing the RCA's appeal for its failure to file the required appeal bond.

Issue: w/n the RCA is exempt from paying the legal fees and from posting an appeal bond. (Preliminary: Is RCA a governmental agency without a separate, distinct and independent legal personality from the latter?)

Held: Yes, it being a governmental agency, as declared in Ramos v. CIR.

Not for profit: RA 3452: the policy of the Government that in order to stabilize the price of palay, rice and corn, it shall engage in the 'purchase of these basic foods' directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their produce at a price that will afford them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment and whenever circumstances brought about by any cause, natural or artificial, should so require, shall sell and dispose of these commodities to the consumers at areas of consumption at a price that is within their reach. By law, RCA depends for its continuous operation on appropriations yearly set aside by the General Appropriations Act. So says Section 14 of Republic Act 3452 not possessed of a separate and distinct corporate existence: by the law of its creation, it is an office directly under the Office of the President of the Philippines. As to Sisons argument that the RCA has been created to succeed to the corporate assets, liabilities, functions and powers of the abolished National Rice & Corn Corporation which is a government-owned and controlled corporation separate and distinct from the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, AND that the RCA, being a duly capitalized entity doing mercantile activity engaged in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn cannot be the same as the Republic of the Philippines; rather, it is an entity separate and distinct from the Republic of the Philippines. Only incident to its primary function o The mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn is only incident to its primary governmental function which is to carry out its declared policy of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in order to make it well within the reach of average consumers, an object obviously Identified with the primary function of government to serve the well-being of the people.

Marquerra v. Borra

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Political Law Review Atty. Jack Jimenez

Sept. 7, 1965

RA. 4421 requires "all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office;" COMELEC required the candidates for Pres, VP, Senator and Cong. To file a surety bond. Thus, every candidate has to pay the premium charged by bonding companies, and, to offer thereto, either his own properties, worth, at least, the amount of the surety bond, or properties of the same worth, belonging to other persons willing to accommodate him, by way of counter-bond in favor of said bonding companies

Issue: w/n RA 4421, which requires the posting of a bond in order to run for office, is constitutional Held: No, for it imposes property qualifications. This is inconsistent with the Republican system.

the effect of said Republic Act No. 4421 is, therefore, to prevent or disqualify from running for President, Vice-President, Senator or Member of the House of Representatives those persons who, although having the qualifications prescribed by the Constitution therefore, cannot file the surety bond aforementioned, owing to failure to pay the premium charged by the bonding company and/or lack of the property necessary for said counter-bond. It has the effect of imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for a public office and that the people could validly vote for him;

This is inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn, implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly, no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to public office;

The requirement of the bond is arbitrary and oppressive, it being not predicated upon the necessity of defraying certain expenses or of compensating services given in connection with elections

Bengzon, Concurring:

A democratic form of government requires that political rights be enjoyed by the citizens regardless of social or economic distinctions. Among the political rights of a Filipino citizen is the right to vote and be voted for a public office. The Constitution has given the right of suffrage It is within the power of Congress, however, to prescribe the manner of exercising political rights so long as it does not run counter to the Constitution. The avowed purpose of Republic

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Act 4421 in requiring a candidate to post a bond equal to a year's salary of the office for which he will run is to curb the practice of so-called nuisance candidates.

Such an objective is indeed within the competence of the legislature to provide for. Nonetheless, the purpose alone does not resolve the constitutionality of a statute. It must also be asked whether the effect of said law is or is not to transgress the fundamental law. The question is: Does the law, it may then be asked, operate to bar bona fide candidates from running for office because of their financial inability to meet the bond required? Depends on the amount o Where it is fixed at an amount that will impose no hardship on any person for whom there should be any desire to vote as a nominee for an office, and yet enough to prevent the filing of certificates of candidates by anyone, regardless of whether or not he is a desirable candidate, it is a reasonable means to regulate elections. On the otherhand, if it puts a real barrier that would stop many suitable men and women from presenting themselves as prospective candidates, it becomes unjustifiable, for it would defeat its very objective of securing the right of honest candidates to run for public office.

in the foregoing the deposits or fees are based on or constitute a certain percentage of the yearly salary. The amount of the bond required by RA 4421 is equal to the one-year salary or emolument of the office. It is quite evident that several or a considerable number of deserving, honest and sincere prospective candidates for that office would be prevented from running in the election solely due to their being less endowed with the material things in life. Thus, the amount of a one-year salary is considered by the law itself to be substantial enough to finance the entire election campaign of the candidate. For Congress, therefore, to require such amount to be posted in the form of surety bond, with the danger of forfeiting the same in the event of failure to obtain the required percentage of votes, unless there are more than four candidates, places a financial burden on honest candidates that will in effect disqualify some of them who would otherwise have been qualified and bona fide candidates.

Republic Act 4421, moreover, relates a person's right to run for office to the degree of success he will show at the polls.

A candidate, however, has no less a right to run when he faces prospects of defeat as when he is expected to win. Consequently, for the law to impose on said candidate should he lose by the fatal margin a financial penalty not imposed on others would unreasonably deny him equal protection of the law.

Section 12

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Hill Military Academy

These appeals are from decrees, based upon undenied allegations, which granted preliminary orders restraining [268 U.S. 510, 530] appellants from threatening or attempting to enforce the Compulsory Education Act1 adopted November 7, 1922 The challenged act, effective September 1, 1926, requires every parent, guardian, or other person having control or charge or custody of a child between 8 and 16 years to send him 'to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year' in the district where the child resides; and failure so to do is declared a misdemeanor. o There areexemptions-not specially important here-for children who are not normal,

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or who have completed the eighth grade, or whose parents or private teachers reside at considerable distances from any public school, or who hold special permits from the county superintendent. o The manifest purpose is to compel general attendance at public schools by normal children, between 8 and 16, who have not completed the eight grade. And without doubt enforcement of the statute would seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable features of appellees' business and greatly diminish the value of their property.

the Society of Sisters is an Oregon corporation, with power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and maintain academies or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal property. It has long devoted its property and effort to the secular and religious education and care of children, and has acquired the valuable good will of many parents and guardians. It conducts interdependent primary and high schools and junior colleges, and maintains orphanages for the custody and control of children between 8 and 16. o In its primary schools many children between those ages are taught the subjects usually pursued in Oregon public schools during the first eight years. Systematic religious instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church are also regularly provided. All courses of study, both temporal and religious, contemplate continuity of training under appellee's charge; the primary schools are essential to the system and the most profitable. The Compulsory Education Act of 1922 has already caused the withdrawal from its schools of children who would otherwise continue, and their income has steadily declined. The appellants, public officers, have proclaimed their purpose strictly to enforce the statute.

Hill Military Academy is a private corporation organized in 1908 under the laws of Oregon, engaged in owning, operating, and conducting for profit an elementary, college preparatory, and military training school for boys between the ages of 5 and 21 years. The average attendance is 100, and the annual fees received for each student amount to some $800. The elementary department is divided into eight grades, as in the public schools; the college preparatory department has four grades, similar to those of the public high schools; the courses of study conform to the requirements of the state board of education. Military instruction and training are also given, under the supervision of an army officer. The business and incident good will are very valuable. In order to conduct its affairs, long time contracts must be made Society of Sisters arguments: o that the enactment conflicts with the right of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents' choice of a school, the right of schools and teachers therein to engage in a useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the Constitution and void. that unless enforcement of the measure is enjoined the corporation's business and property will suffer irreparable injury.

Hill Academys argument: that the challenged act contravenes the corporation's rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and that unless appellants are restrained from proclaiming its validity and threatening to enforce it irreparable injury will result

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Political Law Review Atty. Jack Jimenez

Issue: w/n the Act contravenes with the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children Held: Yes

Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of under their control. Rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the state. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. But they have business and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such action. o Appellees asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and property. Their interest is clear and immediate The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere possibility in the remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the act, the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful action is a well-recognized function of courts of equity.

Sec. 16

Oposa v. Factoran

July 30, 1993

The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala. The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit. Petitioners argue that 25 yrs ago, the Phil. Had 16M hectares of rainforests, but satellite images in 1987 sow that only about 1.2M hectares remained. Also, a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2 of the entire land mass of the Philippine

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archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults. (the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect.") Thus, petitioners sought for: o The cancellation of the existing timber license agreements in the country Cease and desist order from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.

Issue: w/n this is a class suit: Held: Yes

The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,

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wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

Issue: w/n the said petitioners have a cause of action seek the cancellation of the TLAs and prevent further processing thereof.

Petitioners argument: that it has proven its cause of action as its complaint contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. Factoran: that they have no cause of action against him. o Pet: issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Resp: petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. Plus, the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government.

Held: Yes.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right: the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: o Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. o Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. o Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its

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framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. EO 192: mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." The policy is restated in the Admin. Code of 1987. It stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." There are other laws paying special attention to the environmental right: P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

Issue: w/n the issue on the TLAs raises a political question. Held: No

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. nonetheless, the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. o the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.

Issue: w/n the prayer sought for is violative of the non-impairment clause

Pet: It does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires. Resp: the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found,

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.

Political Law Review Atty. Jack Jimenez

after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.

Held: No, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.

If the Sec. had invoked this in the MTD, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. Sec. 20 of the Forestry Reform Code must be read in every TLA: That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . . all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. o A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Further, even if it was a law, etc, it could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. The nonimpairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.

Political Law Review Atty. Jack Jimenez

Section 19

Garcia vs. BOI (1990) Facts: 1. This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the BOI approving the transfer of the site of the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas. (sequel to the Garcia vs BOI of 1989) He claims that the law abdicates all regulation of foreign enterprises in this country and gives them unfair advantages over local investments which are practically elbowed out in their own land with the complicity of their own government. Petitioner further claims that the transitory provisions of RA 7042, which allow practically unlimited entry of foreign investments for three years, subject only to a supposed Transitory Foreign Investment Negative List, not only completely deregulates foreign investments but would place Filipino enterprises at a fatal disadvantage in their own country.

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Issue: W/N the BOI committed committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding.

Held: THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION 1. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest. Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to Batangas. Naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the approval of RA 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG. I f the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government. In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute

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Political Law Review Atty. Jack Jimenez

discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least. Dissenting Opinion of Melencio-Herrera:

It is true that the judicial power embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the duty of Courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. By no means, however, does it vest in the Courts the power to enter the realm of policy considerations under the guise of the commission of grave abuse of discretion. Consistent with my dissent in the first case, I concur in the dissent herein of Justice Aquino and merely wish to add that in its Decision, the majority has actually imposed its own views on matters falling within the competence of a policy-making body of the Government. It decided upon the wisdom of the transfer of the site of the proposed project; the reasonableness of the feedstock to be used; the undesirability of the capitalization aspect of the project, and injected its own concept of the national interest as regards the establishment of a basic industry of strategic importance to the country.

Fel. Jill. Lauren. Mon. Tara.