Deobandi and Ahle Hadith Rivalry and The Saudi Connection: A Look at History

The following is an interesting research by an Indian journalist/freelance writer. It's a bit lengthy but very informative. This document is complied into PDF from following forum. http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/deobandi-ahle-hadith-rivalry-saudi-connectionlook-12597/ Ulema Rivalries and the Saudi Connection Yoginder Sikand

Introduction
Its claim of representing Islamic orthodoxy is the Saudi regimes principal tool of seeking ideological legitimacy. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being, as it calls itself, the only truly Islamic state in the world, although this claim is stiffly disputed by many Muslims. Official Saudi Islam, or what is commonly referred to as Wahhabism by its opponents, is the outcome of the movement led by the eighteenth century puritan Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab (1703-91), who, along with Muhmmad ibn Saud, was the chief architect of the Saudi state. Exporting Wahhabi Islam to Muslims elsewhere in the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major preoccupation of the Saudi regime. This was seen as a vital resource in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabia monarchy. Transnational linkages are thus crucial in the project of contemporary global Wahhabism. Since Wahhabism is seen by its proponents as the single, authentic and normative form of Islam, it has an inherent tendency of expansionism, seeking to impose itself on or replace other ways of understanding and practising Islam. As home to a Muslim population of over 150 million, India has been an important target of Saudi Wahhabi propaganda. Private as well as semi-official Saudi Arabian assistance has made its way to numerous Indian Muslim individuals and organisations. This paper examines the impact of official and unofficial Saudi assistance to Sunni Muslim groups in India. Intra-Sunni Rivalry and the Emergence of the Ahl-i Hadith The establishment of British rule in India had momentous consequences for notions of Muslim and Islamic identity. The widely shared perception of Islam being under threat helped promote a feeling of Muslim unity transcending sectarian and ethnic boundaries.

Yet, at the same time, British rule opened up new spaces for intra-Muslim rivalry. It was in this period that serious differences emerged within the broader Sunni Muslim fold, leading to the development of neatly-defined, and, on numerous issues, mutually opposed, sect-like groups, the principal being the Deobandis, the Barelvis and the Ahl-i Hadith. Each of these groups claimed a monopoly of representing the authentic Sunni tradition, or the Ahl al- Sunnah wal Jamaah, branding rival claimants as aberrant and, in some cases, even as apostates. This brought to the fore the deeply fractured and fiercely contested nature of Sunni orthodoxy. The pioneers of the Ahl-i Hadith saw themselves as struggling to promote what they believed to be the true Islam of Muhammad and his companions. Like most other Sunni ulama, they considered the Shias to be outside the pale of Islam, and, therefore, kafirs. In addition, they believed that the other Sunni groups, too, had strayed from the path of the pious predecessors (salaf). They argued, through their writings and fatwas, that the Hanafis, the dominant section among the Indian Sunnis, erred in blind conformity (taqlid) of the ulama of the Hanafi school even when their prescriptions went against the express commandments of the Quran and the Hadith. They bitterly castigated this as akin to shirk or the sin of associationism. They fiercely opposed popular customs and beliefs, widely shared among the Indian Muslims, such as Sufism and the cults of the saints, insisting that these had no sanction in the sunnah or the practice of the Prophet, and were, therefore, wrongful innovations or bidaah. They decried certain customs widely practised by many Indian Muslims, such as prostrating before graves or praying without uttering the word amin aloud or with the hands folded on the belly instead of on the chest, which they saw as against the practice of the Prophet. They insisted that Muslims must rely solely on the Quran and the Hadith for guidance, offering an extremely literalist understanding of these two primary sources of Islamic law. Overall, they saw their mission as rescuing Muslims from what they saw as the sin of shrik and guiding them to the pure monotheism (khalis tauhid) of the Prophet and his companions. Most of them were inspired by the example of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his companions, particularly appreciating the Wahhabis criticism of popular custom. Yet, they did not identify themselves as such, refusing the label of Wahhabi that their detractors used to dismiss them. Instead, they insisted that they alone represented the Islam of the Prophet, and that, far from setting up a new sect, they were simply reviving what they believed to be true Islam. Hence, they claimed to be muwahhids, or true monotheists, or Ahl-i Hadith or People of the Tradition of the Prophet. Despite their differences with the Hanafis, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama did not go so far as to openly denounce them as infidels, although this seems to have been implied in the writings of some of their scholars who accused their rivals of shirk. On the face of it, they seem to have considered them, in a

restricted sense, fellow Muslims, albeit having been allegedly led astray and hence in urgent need of reform. Some Ahl-i Hadith pioneers, such as Maulana Sanaullah Amritsari (1870-1943), even cooperated with the Deobandi ulama in the formation of the Jamiat ul-Ulama-i Hind (The Union of the Ulama of India), while still bitterly critiquing certain Hanafi practices and beliefs. While most early Ahl-i Hadith ulama admired the efforts of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, not all of them agreed entirely with his views. Thus, not all of them approved of his reported claim that Muslims who did not share his beliefs were kafirs and fit to be killed. Some of them also appear to have held certain views commonly attributed to the Ithna Ashari Shias, whom Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab had, in no uncertain terms, branded as apostates. In marked opposition to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs position on Sufism as wholly un-Islamic, some late nineteenth century pioneers among the Indian Ahl-i Hadith, such as Nazir Ahmad Dehlvi, Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali and Daud Ghaznavi, were Sufis in their own right. An early Ahl-i Hadith scholar, Wahidduzaman Hyderabadi, is said to have believed in the intercession of holy men, both living as well as dead, as well as in the capacity of dead saints to listen to peoples requests. The doyen of the early Ahl-i Hadith, Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali, is said to have been convinced of a mystical light (nur) constantly emanating from his fathers grave.[1] He is even said to have opposed Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab in some of his writings, a charge that later Ahl-i Hadith scholars were quick to deny.[2] This, however, was an exception, for the majority of the early Indian Ahl-i Hadith appear to have warmly supported Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, although this did not mean that some of them did not have differences with him on certain contentious issues. The crystallisation of the Ahl-i Hadith in India as a separate sect (maslak) was a gradual process, given fillip by the setting up of separate mosques and madrasas from the late nineteenth century onwards, which gave the movement the shape of a community separate from the Hanafi majority. This owed, in part, to the fierce opposition that the Ahl-i Hadith encountered from the Hanafis. Many Hanafi ulama saw the Ahl-i Hadith as a hidden front of the Wahhabis, whom they regarded as enemies of Islam for their fierce opposition to the adoration of the Prophet and the saints, their opposition to popular custom and to taqlid, rigid conformity to one or the other of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Further, they also saw the Ahl-i Hadith as directly challenging their own claims of representing normative Islam. Numerous Hanafi ulama issued fatwas branding the Al-i Hadith as virtual heretics, contemptuously referring to them as ghair muqallids for their opposition to taqlid, which they believed to be integral to established Sunni tradition. Hanafi opposition to the Ahl-i Hadith was fierce. In many places Hanafis refused them admittance to their mosques, schools and graveyards. Marital ties with them were forbidden, and in some places followers of the Ahl-i Hadith even faced physical assault.

The notion of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity was given a further boost with the establishment of the All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference in 1906 which brought together ulama from different parts of India who shared a common commitment to the Ahl-i Hadith vision. From then on much scholarly effort was expended by Ahl-i Hadith ulama on seeking to prove rival Muslim groups, Sunni as well as, of course, Shia, as aberrant, stressing points of differences between them and the Ahl-i Hadith in order to argue their own claim of representing the single authentic Islamic tradition and to further fortify the notion of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity. This was reciprocated by their rivals, who took upon themselves the task of fiercely denouncing the Ahl- i Hadith. Yet, despite the bitter relations between the Ahl-i Hadith and others the early Ahl-i Hadith ulama did not go so far as to explicitly brand other Sunni groups as apostates. To have done so would have been dangerous, for the Ahl-i Hadith, at that time, as now, formed only a miniscule minority among the Sunnis. The situation began to change, however, from the 1970s onwards, after access to Saudi funds and links with prestigious Saudi patrons gave numerous Ahl-i Hadith leaders a new aggressive confidence to take on their Hanafi rivals despite their continued minority status among the regions Muslims. This period also saw a marked transformation in Ahl-i Hadith self-identity. While some pioneers among the Ahl-i Hadith did not conceal their differences with the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia on some points, access to Saudi funds led to a gradual erasure of these differences, so much so that the Ahl-i Hadith came to present itself as a carbon copy of Saudi-style Wahhabism, with nothing to distinguish itself from it and upholding this form of Islam as normative. As their Muslim critics saw it, this had only a single explanation: It was simply a clever means to win the favour of generous Saudi benefactors. The Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith Connection: Wahhabism as An External Policy Tool Close links between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi state and Wahhabi ulama go back to the early decades of the twentieth century. The early Ahl-i Hadith, although not a complete replica of the Saudi Wahhabis, did not conceal its support for the Saudi state, which it saw as leading a crusade for what it regarded as a truly Islamic polity. When, in the early 1920s, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman ibn Faisal al-Saud, or Ibn Saud for short, conquered the Hijaz with British help and declared the founding of the second Saudi state, many Muslims in India and elsewhere were incensed, fearing that the fiercely iconoclastic Wahhabis would destroy the tomb of Muhammad and other holy sites in Arabia. Predictably, the conquest of the Hijaz led to heightened acrimony between the Ahl-i Hadith and other, including rival Sunni, Muslim groups in India. Indian Hanafi leaders set up an organisation, the Hizb ul-Ahnaf (The Hanafi Army) to oppose the Saudi rulers and the Ahl-i Hadith, who were seen as their agents. A Muslim Hijaz Conference was organised in Lucknow by the Khuddam al-Haramayn (Servants of the

Two Holy Cities) Society in 1926, which passed a resolution calling for the liberation of the Hijaz from Saudi control and suggesting that Muslims refrain from the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina till the Wahhabis had been overthrown. Massive anti-Wahhabi demonstrations took place in different parts of India, denouncing the Saudi rulers as antiMuslim. At this time, when the Saudi rulers were faced with stiff opposition from many Muslim quarters, the Indian Ahl-i Hadith were quick to rush to their defence. They insisted that the Saudi rulers were genuinely Islamic, and hence argued that they must be defended at all costs. In 1927 some Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars even travelled to Najd to meet Ibn Saud and to attend the Hijaz Conference that he had organised to galvanise worldwide Muslim support for himself. The All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference organised a number of rallies to galvanise support for Ibn Saud and to oppose his detractors among the Indian Muslims. Numerous leading Ahl-i Hadith scholars also penned tracts and books defending the Saudi ruler and Wahhabism, claiming that Ibn Sauds destruction of tombs over graves was fully in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. Echoing the views of many of his fellow Ahl-i Hadith, the founder and president of the All-India Ahli Hadith Conference, Muhammad bin Ibrahim Junagadhi (d.1942), in a pamphlet defending Ibn Saud declared that From every angle, religious as well as political, Ibn Saud most well suited to be the servant [ruler] of the Hijaz. For his part, Ibn Saud dispatched a number of letters to Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders acknowledging his gratitude for their help and expressing his support for their mission. These letters were later published in several Ahl-i Hadith newspapers.[1] The ties that were cemented between the Indian Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi state and its official Wahhabi ulama in the 1920s were to become even closer in the decades that followed. * The 1970s witnessed a growing involvement of certain Arab states, institutions and private donors in sponsoring a number of Islamic organisations and institutions in India. This was a direct outcome of the boom in oil revenues, particularly following the hike in oil prices by OPEC members in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Although the precise magnitude of Arab assistance to Indian Muslim organisations cannot be ascertained, it was certainly significant, although the Indian press routinely exaggerated it, leading to a scare of petrodollars flooding the country as part of an alleged grand conspiracy to convert poor, particularly low caste, Hindus to Islam. In actual fact, few Muslim organisations actually engaged in missionary work among Hindus received such money. Instead, most Arab, including Saudi, financial assistance went to Muslim organisations to establish mosques, madrasas and publishing houses. To a lesser extent, money was channelled to Muslim organisations to set up schools and hospitals in Muslim

localities and to provide scholarships to needy Muslim students. Saudi funds for Muslim institutions in India have come through a range of sources, including the Saudi state, various Saudi-sponsored Islamic organisations such as the Mecca-based Rabita al-Alami al-Islami (World Muslim League) and the Dar ul-Ifta wal Dawat ul-Irshad, as well as private donors, mostly rich shaikhs, some with close links to the Saudi ruling family. Several Indian Muslims working in Saudi Arabia in various capacities also send back money to fund Islamic institutions, mostly based in towns and villages where their families live. In addition, the Saudi embassy in New Delhi is said to be closely linked to a number of Islamic religious scholars, Muslim journalists and managers of Muslim institutions in the country. Although this could not be verified, it is claimed that requests for financial aid are often made to the Embassy from these individuals and institutions, and the Embassy, in turn, forwards these requests to the appropriate authorities in Saudi Arabia itself. It is also claimed that a number of newspapers, Muslim-owned as well as others, receive money from Saudi sources to publish articles in support of the Saudi regime. Furthermore, the Saudi authorities are said to pay the salaries of a number of teachers, known as mabuth, employed in various Indian madrasas, almost all of these being graduates of Saudi universities and mostly associated with the Ahl-i Hadith. Monetary assistance to selected Islamic institutions is only one method through which the Saudis have sought to patronise and influence key Muslim leaders and opinion makers in India. Other forms of assistance include sponsored haj pilgrimages for Muslim leaders, including ulama, patronising of selected publishing houses, scholarships for madrasa students to study in Saudi Islamic universities and jobs for such graduates in both the private as well as public sector within Saudi Arabia. The largest beneficiary of this largesse is believed to be the Ahl-i Hadith, although the Jamaat-i Islami and the Deobandis are also said to have benefited to some extent. The Barelvis and the Shias, both of whom regard Wahhabism as wholly heretical, have received little or no financial support at all from Saudi sources.[2] This itself suggests that Saudi finance to Muslim institutions in India is intended to serve and promote a particular ideological vision of Islam, one that ties in with the interests of the Saudi regime and its official Wahhabi ulama. Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant sponsor of Islamic institutions internationally, including in India, only in the 1970s. This was a period of intense ideological struggle in the Arab world. Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser in Egypt and the Baathists in Syria and Iraq and various communist parties active in numerous Arab states all called for the overthrow of monarchical regimes in the region, which they saw as lackeys of the United States and as helping the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Within

Saudi Arabia itself voices of dissent and protest emerged, including from those who had been influenced by socialist trends elsewhere in the region. Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which led to fears of an export of revolutionary, antimonarchical Islam to the Arab world, including to Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denounced the Saudi kingdom, insisting that Islam had no place for monarchical rule. He also bitterly attacked the Saudis for being American stooges and for willingly acquiescing in American support for Israel. In his will, made public in 1989, he denounced the Saudi regime as anti-Islamic, claiming that it was in league with Satanic powers. He argued that Wahhabism represented anti-Quranic ideas and a baseless, superstitious cult, and was aimed at destroying Islam from within.[3] Radical appeals emanating from Tehran, including anti-Wahhabi and anti-Saudi sentiments, soon caught the imagination of Muslims all over the world. The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official Wahhabi form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the Revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat. If the Shah of Iran, Americas closest and strongest ally in the region, could be overthrown as a result of the passionate appeals of a charismatic Imam, the Saudi rulers, it was painfully realised, could well meet the same fate. Consequently, the Saudis, backed by the Americans, began investing heavily in promoting Wahhabi Islam abroad in order to counter the appeal of the Iranian Revolution, both within Saudi Arabia itself and abroad. Stressing the regimes Islamic credentials now came to be relied upon as the principal tool to strengthen it and to stave of challenges from internal as well as external opponents, from Muslims opposed to the regimes corrupt and dictatorial ways and its close alliance with the imperialist powers, principally the United States. Saudi export of Wahhabism was given a further boost with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Saudis, supported by the Americans, pumped in millions of dollars to fund Wahhabi-style schools and organisations in Pakistan in order to train guerrillas to fight the Russians. While such assistance, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was presented as a sign of Saudi Arabias professed commitment to true Islam, it also functioned as a thinly veiled guise for promoting the interests of the Saudi regime. In exporting this brand of Islam abroad, India, home to the second largest Muslim community in the world, received particular importance. The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of correct ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shias and followers of the Sufis as enemies of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely

critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as ploys of the enemies of Islam.[4] Saudi Patronage and the Indian Ahl-i Hadith A hugely disproportionate amount of Saudi aid to Indian Muslim groups in the decades after the Iranian Revolution is said to have gone to institutions run by the Ahl-i Hadith. This is hardly surprising, given the shared ideological tradition and vision of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi Wahhabis. One result of the generous Saudi patronage of the Indian Ahl-i Hadith has been that there has been a growing convergence between the latter and the Saudi Wahhabi ulama so much so that today there is hardly any difference between the two groups. A revealing indication of the effort on the part of the Indian Ahl-i Hadith to identify themselves with their Saudi patrons, a Deobandi critic writes, is the fact that the Ahl-i Hadith now prefer to refer to themselves as Salafis, a term that the Saudi Wahhabis commonly use for themselves.[5] As pointed out earlier, most Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did hail Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab as a great reformer and as a pioneer in reviving true Islam and authentic monotheism, but, despite this, some of them were critical of his extremism and that of his followers. Today, this sort of criticism is completely absent in Indian Ahl-i Hadith circles, and Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama now routinely hail the Wahhabi ulama of Najd as representing the only single saved sect (firqa al-najiya), and the Saudi regime as the only genuinely Islamic regime in the world. Saudi finance to Indian Ahl-i Hadith institutions has heavily influenced the contents of the vast amount of literature that they produce and distribute. In the last two decades there has been a mushroom growth in the number of Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India. Several of them are said to receive Saudi funds, directly or otherwise. Many of them produce low-priced books, and, now, audiotapes, videocassettes and compact disks, and some even operate their own websites. Most of the authors whose works they publish are Indian, and to a lesser extent, Pakistani, Ahl-i Hadith ulama whom have received higher education in various Saudi universities. Several of them are presently working in various official as well as private Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia itself. Their vision and understanding of Islam is indelibly shaped by their own experiences in Saudi Arabia. They see the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and other forms of Islam as deviant. In addition to the works of these writers, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses are now churning out Urdu and, to a lesser extent, Hindi and English, translations of works, including fatwas, by leading Saudi Wahhabi ulama, the most prominent of whom being the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz (d. 1999), chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and the late Shaikh Nasiruddin Albani (d. 1999) professor at the Islamic

University of Medina. This clearly reflects the understanding that local forms of Islam in India need to be stamped out and replaced by the puritanical, literalist Islam of the Saudi Wahhabis. Much of the literature produced by Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses focuses on the minutiae of ritual practises and beliefs. This is a reflection, in part, of the overwhelmingly literalist understanding of Saudi Wahhabi Islam. Scores of books penned by Ahl-i Hadith ulama are devoted to intricate discussion of what they regard as the correct methods of praying, performing ablutions and offering supplications, as well as rules and regulations related to food, dress, marriage, divorce and so on. A principle purpose of these publications is to attack rival Muslim, including Sunni, groups, and to sternly condemn them as aberrant on account of differences in their methods of performing rituals and their rules governing a range of issues related to normative personal and collective behaviour. These elaborate discussions also serve to critique the Hanafi insistence on taqlid, which several Ahl-i Hadith scholars condemn as akin to shirk or associationism, arguing that it logically leads to setting up an authority that rivals God.[6] These and related debates are used to reinforce the claim of the Ahl-i Hadith, as well as the Saudi Wahhabi ulama, being the only group that faithfully abides by the sunnah of the Prophet and to declare all other Muslim groups as deviant. Sometimes, this is taken to the extent of denouncing their rivals as being effectively outside the pale of the Ahl al- Sunnah wal Jamaah, and, hence, for all practical purposes, non-Muslims. Another interesting feature of the literature produced by Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India, and one that is directly linked to the close association between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi Wahhabis, is a fierce hostility to local beliefs and practices. This hostility, while having been a defining feature of the early Ahl-i Hadith, has been further exacerbated with the growing Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith nexus. In recent years Ahl-i Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past. These also includes customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-i Hadith writers see it, these are all wrongful innovations, having no sanction in the Prophets sunnah, and hence must be rooted out. In their place they advocate an adoption of a range of Arab cultural norms and practices which are seen as genuinely Islamic. The publication of Urdu translations of the compendia of fatwas of leading Saudi Wahhabi ulama by Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses is a reflection of this cultural alternative that they seek to provide to take the place of what they see as un-Islamic practices widely prevalent among many Indian Muslims. This has added to the conflict with other Muslim groups, most particularly with the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis. The Saudi Arabisation of Islam and Indian

Muslim culture that the Ahl-i Hadith seeks to promote also inevitably further widens the cultural chasm between Muslims and Hindus. As many Ahl-i Hadith ulama see it, and this is reflected in their writings as well, Hinduism is hardly different from the pagan religion of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic jahiliya period. Although most of them do not advocate conflict with Hindus, some Ahl-i Hadith scholars insist on the need for Muslims to have as little to do with the Hindus as possible, for fear of the deleterious consequences this might have for the Muslims own commitment to and practice of Islam. Like other Muslim groups, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses have also paid particular attention to combating their Muslim rivals. This, as shall be later argued, cannot be understood without taking into account the Saudi connection. Scores of books have been penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama, branding Sufis, Shias and Deobandis as heretical [7]. Sometimes, this charge is stated openly. On other occasions it is articulated indirectly, but in a manner that the reader is driven to the conclusion that other groups who claim to be Sunni are not genuinely so or might not be even Muslim at all.[8] This concern to combat other Muslim groups has been particularly exacerbated as a result of links established with Saudi patrons. This campaign is led by high profile Indian and Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith scholars, who have generally trained in Saudi universities or are based in Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia itself. Heated polemical attacks on other Muslim groups are a means for them to stress the separate identity of the Ahl-i Hadith and to press its claim of representing authentic Islam. It also provides them with positions of authority as spokesmen of true Islam. Moderates among the Ahl-i Hadith do exist, who seek to lessen tensions with other Muslim groups, but they seem to be relatively powerless in the face of leaders who have access to Saudi funds and have a vested interest in stressing and reinforcing differences with other Muslim communities. Tirelessly claiming in their writings to being the sole representatives of normative Islam and, in the process, identifying themselves with the Saudi Wahhabi ulama, enables the Indian Ahl-i Hadith ulama to present themselves as faithful allies of the Saudis, which, in turn, helps earn for them recognition as well as monetary assistance from Saudi sponsors. In addition, such publications also serve the purpose of presenting the Saudi Wahhabi version of Islam as normative, and in putting forward the claim of the Saudi regime being the only one in the world sincerely and seriously committed to genuine Islam. Access to Saudi funds has, therefore, led to heightened conflict between various Muslim sectarian groups in India, as Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses produce and distribute literature on a large scale bitterly attacking their rivals of being Muslim only in name. While earlier Ahl-i Hadith scholars did critique other Muslim groups, this criticism was relatively mild and did not go to the extent of denouncing fellow Sunnis as apostates.

This was probably a tactical move, for the Ahl-i Hadith were a small and beleaguered minority. Now, however, access to new patrons and sources of funds has provided the Ahl-i Hadith with an aggressive confidence to denounce their Muslim rivals, going even beyond the somewhat limited critique of their predecessors. According to Mohammed Zeyaul Haque, an Indian Muslim journalist, while earlier Ahl-i Hadith criticism of Hanafi practices was limited largely to matters of insignificant detail, such as proper ritual practices during prayers, the method of divorce and so on, of late a vicious campaign of slander has been launched by mischief-makers sitting in countries of the Middle East (by which he seems to refer to Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars based in Saudi Arabia) carefully targeting Hanafis of all kinds, and going to the extent of denouncing them as kafirs. Among their targets have been the widely respected and Hanafi-dominated AllIndia Muslim Personal Law Board and the leaders of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat, the largest Islamic movement in the world, which has its global headquarters in India. Haque claims that recently a number of books, originating from South Asian Ahl-i Hadith scholars based in the Middle East and fiercely denouncing the Hanafis (besides the Shias) as disbelievers, have flooded the subcontinent.[9] Heightened intra-Muslim polemics within India are not unrelated to the interests of the Saudi regime. Thus, the virulently anti-Shia and anti-Sufi propaganda material churned out by various Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India, some of this said to be sponsored by Saudi patrons, serves the purpose of denouncing as outside the pale of Islam Muslim groups who are opposed to Wahhabism and the Saudi state, these often being branded as enemies of Islam. In this way the literature produced by several Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi ulama as well as the Saudi state. This function is served more directly through forms of literature that raise political, as opposed to simply theological, issues. As mentioned earlier, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 appeared to the Saudi regime as a major threat to its own survival as its claims for championing Islam were dismissed as hypocritical. Consequently, some Indian Ahl-i Hadith (as well as Deobandi) ulama penned tracts and bookspaid for this by Saudi patrons, their critics allegeto brand the Revolution as a Shia, and, therefore, anti-Islamic, insurrection, Khomeini as an enemy of Islam, and the Shia faith as a Jewish conspiracy to destroy Islam from within. Predictably, the Revolution was painted in the lurid colours. It was explained simply as an anti-Islamic conspiracy hatched by the Shia ulama in order to export Shiism and establish Shia political rule over the Sunnis. In this way, the appeal of the Revolution, its anti-monarchical thrust and its bitter critique of Western imperialism that had led to considerable support for Khomeini among many Sunnis, including in India, was sought to be countered. The attack on the Revolution was deliberately couched in an Islamic form in order to dismiss the Khomeinis legitimacy.

This also served as a means to defend the Saudi regime in Islamic terms, it being routinely described in Ahl-i Hadith literature as the only truly Islamic regime in the world. This claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole authentic Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-i Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial, between several Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders and the Saudi state and its official Wahhabi ulama. Numerous books penned by Indian Ahli Hadith scholars discuss in detail the great contributions of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia to the Islamic cause, inevitably concluding with the claim that Saudi Arabia under its present masters represents the only truly Islamic state in the world today. They also make it a point to call on God to bless the Saudi king and pray for his continued rule. The Saudi monarch is invariably presented as a pious, fully committed Muslim, whose sole concern is, so it is sought to be argued, the protection and promotion of authentic Islam. Support for this authentic Islam and for the Saudi rulers are presented as indivisible. Interestingly, there is no reference at all in Ahl-i Hadith writings to the widespread dissatisfaction within Saudi Arabia itself with the ruling family. Nor is there any reference to the rampant corruption in the country, the lavish lifestyles of the princes, and to Saudi Arabias close links with the United States. Nor, still, is there ever any mention of the claim, put forward by many Muslims, that monarchy is un-Islamic, particularly one like the despotic and corrupt Saudi regime. This is added evidence of the fact that Saudi-sponsored propaganda abroad is tailor-made to suit the interests of its ruling family. A case in point is a book financed by a Saudi professor, published by the apex Ahl-i Hadith madrasa in India and authored by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith writer based in Saudi Arabia, Abul Mukarram Abdul Jalil. The author insists that because the message of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab is based on true (sahih) Islamic beliefs, every Muslim must accept and follow it. At the same time, because the present Saudi regime, allegedly, continues to follow faithfully in the footsteps of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, it is, the author writes, imperative on all Muslims to support the Saudi rulers.[10] Similarly, a booklet penned by the late Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and translated into Urdu and published in India by an Ahl-i Hadith publishing company, hails the Saudi ruling family for allegedly working for the victory of true Islam. The pamphlet ends with a prayer to God to keep the Saudi ruling family on the straight path.[11] A particularly interesting text in this regard is a recent Urdu translation of a voluminous book, running into almost 400 pages, penned by a Saudi scholar devoted to extolling the praises of the Saudi regime for what its title refers to as its impressive Islamic

missionary and educational services. The author of the book, Saleh bin Ghanim alSadlan, is a professor at the Jamia Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, Riyadh, and is associated with a number official Saudi Islamic organisations and institutions. The book is an expanded version of a paper presented by the author at a conference organised by the Department of Religious Affairs and Endowments, Riyadh. The book has been translated into Urdu and published by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith student of his, Abdur Rahman bin Abdul Jabbar Farewai, who runs an Islamic institution in New Delhi.[12] The book provides details of various Islamic organisations set up and funded by the Saudi regime, both inside as well as outside the Kingdom. These institutions, so its author claims, are engaged in what he calls amazing contributions to the cause of Islam, providing peace and satisfaction to the hearts and minds of the followers of Islam. All these efforts are said to be a reflection of the commitment of the Saudi rulers to the Islamic cause. As al-Sadlan tells his readers, this shows that In this period of the decline of the Muslims the existence of Saudi Arabia is a great blessing for the Islamic world.[13] Expectedly, the book reads as a crude piece of undisguised propaganda for the Saudi monarchy. The author claims that Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world that is governed according to the Quran. The rulers and the ulama of Saudi Arabia, he writes, have created a model Islamic government which has raised high the flag of Islam, worked for the spread of true Islam all over the world, and has made immense contributions in the field of Islamic unity and service of humanity. The Saudi government, he says, has always supported human and moral values and is a model of justice, peace, security, love and unity.[14] All its revenue, trade and economic institutions, he claims, are based on the shariah. He describes it newly established, but toothless, consultative committee (nizam-i shura) as having been set up only in order that the country should firmly and strictly follow the path of the shariah and Muhammad, peace be upon him.[15] Predictably, there is no mention at all about Saudi Arabias key role in the Western-dominated global capitalist economy, and of its close financial and political relations with the United States and other Western imperialist powers. For his part, the Saudi king is described by al-Sadlan as the Custodian of the Two Holy Cities (khadim al-harimayn al-sharifayn), and is portrayed as having been appointed by God Himself to serve the cause of Islam. He is described as performing this onerous responsibility with diligence and fervour. He is said to have full faith in the fact that his government must work for the prosperity of Islam. He is said to firmly believe in the supremacy of the Quran and the sunnah[16], and is quoted as declaring that The Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Quran itself, which falsehood cannot touch, from front or from behind.[17] Concluding his book, the author prays that God should protect the Islamic Sultanate of Saudi Arabia in this age of terrorism so that it

can carry on in the service of Islam.[18]

Ahl-i Hadith-Deobandi Polemics and the Saudi Nexus Central to Wahhabism is the understanding that it alone represents normative Islam, and that other understandings of the faith are, by definition, false. One might argue that the Wahhabis are not unique in this, and that, in fact, all Muslim sectarian groups do share this conviction. While that may well be true, Wahhabi attitudes towards other Muslim groups have historically been characterised by a fierce extremism quite unparalleled in the case of other contemporary Muslim sects. This is another feature that Saudi-style Wahhabism shares with the Ahl-i Hadith. As a claimant to Sunni orthodoxy, the Ahl-i Hadith is not alone in denouncing the Shias as heretics, and, therefore, outside the pale of Islam. In fact, many Deobandi and Barelvi ulama share the same opinion. Hence, the virulent opposition to the Shias on the part of the Ahl-i Hadith is hardly surprising. Given its commitment to what it sees as pure monotheism and its fierce opposition to wrongful innovations, its denunciation of the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis, is also understandable. What seems particularly intriguing, however, is the fact that, of late, Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India have been devoting particular attention to denouncing the Deobandis, who, while being muqallids as well as proponents of a reformed Sufism, share with the Ahl-i Hadith a commitment to strict compliance with the shariah and the extirpation of what they describe as bidaah. In that sense, the Ahl-i Hadith are closer in doctrinal terms to the Deobandis than to any other Indian Sunni group. Despite this, it appears that in recent years Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars have been focussing considerably more attention to combating the Deobandis than to critiquing their Barelvi and Shia rivals. This seemingly puzzling development begs an explanation. One possible reason for this is that the Deobandis in India are far more organised and influential than the Barelvis. The Deobandis manage a number of influential organisations, madrasas and publishing houses all over India. Consequently, they have probably been more effective in critiquing the Ahl-i Hadith than their other rivals, which, in turn, has forced the Ahl-i Hadith to pay particular attention to the challenge they face from the Deobandi front. In addition to this factor are other developments, related to struggles over money, influence and authority, which have made for a sharp intensification of rivalries between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years. The Saudi connection seems to have played a major role in abetting these conflicts. Relations between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in India have, since their

inception, been strained. Seeing the Ahl-i Hadith as a potent challenge to their own authority, early Deobandi ulama bitterly critiqued and denounced them. Some even wrote boldly against Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, arguing that his movement had nothing at all to do with Islam. Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), rector of the Deoband madrasa, penned a polemical tract, al-Shahab al-Shaqab, where he claimed that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab preached patent falsehood (aqaid-i batila), killed numerous Sunni Muslims and forced many others to accept his false creed (aqaid-i fasida). He referred to him as a tyrant (zalim), traitor (baghi), and despicable (khabis), and labelled him and his followers as the despicable Wahhabis (wahhabiya khabisia).[19] He wrote that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab had declared the wealth of all Muslims, including Sunnis, who did not follow him as property that could be rightfully looted (mal-i ghanimat), and their slaughter as a cause of merit (sawab), considering all but his own followers as apostates. This is why, he claimed, the Arabs detested Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers, their hatred for them exceeding their hatred for Jews, Christians, Magians and Hindus. Undoubtedly, Madani asserted, Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab had committed such heinous crimes that such hatred for him is a must.[20] Other Deobandis seem to have displayed similar views on the Saudi Wahhabis, although there were exceptions. A leading Deobandi scholar, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, insisted that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab was stupid (bewaquf) and had little knowledge (kam ilm), because of which he was quick to declare other Muslims as kafirs. On the other hand, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, teacher and spiritual master of Husain Ahmad Madani, issued a fatwa laying down that the Wahhabis beliefs were good (umdah) and that they were good people, although he added that Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs views were extreme (shiddat) and that when his followers transcended the limits it lead to considerable strife (fasad).[21] Gangohis views were contradicted by some of his own students. Thus, Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri considered the Wahhabis as deviant, and claimed, referring to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, that neither he nor any of his followers and clan are among our teachers in any of our chains of transmission in Islamic knowledge, whether in jurisprudence, Hadith, Quranic commentary or Sufism.[22] Likewise, Husain Ahmad Madani, also a student of Gangohi, dissented from his teachers opinion. Gangohi, he said, did not have a proper, complete and first-hand knowledge of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs beliefs.[23] The opposition of the early Deobandis to the Ahl-i Hadith and to the Saudi Wahhabis stemmed, in part, from the Wahhabi critique of rigid taqlid and Sufism, which the Deobandis upheld but which the Wahhabis branded as heretical. Deobandi opposition to the Wahhabi label might also have been motivated, in large measure, by fear of British reprisal. Wahhabis, as the British Indian authorities saw them, were Muslim groups

who sought to challenge colonial rule, and who were, therefore, regarded as deadly enemies of the Raj. Furthermore, it appears that Deobandi efforts to clearly distance themselves from the Wahhabis had also to do with Deobandi-Barelvi rivalries. Thus, for instance, Husain Ahmad Madani undertook to write his al-Shahab al-Shaqab against the Wahhabis as a response to a book, Husam al-Harmayn, written by Ahmad Raza Khan, leader of the Barelvis. In his book Khan culled out statements from the writings of numerous Deobandi elders which proved, so he argued, that the Deobandis were Wahhabis and, therefore, kafirs, adding that those who doubted their being kafirs were kafirs themselves. In order to gain support for his stand he travelled to the Hijaz and had his claims against the Deobandis endorsed by several anti-Wahhabi ulama of Mecca and Medina, whose statements he reproduced in his book. Alarmed that the book would turn Indian Muslim opinion against the Deobandis, Madani, it is said, was forced to pen his polemical tract, wherein he claimed that the Deobandis had nothing at all to do with the Wahhabis at all, effectively declaring Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers as outside the Sunni fold.[24] Although several early Deobandi leaders sought to distance themselves from the Saudi Wahhabis, on the whole a distinct ambiguity seems to have characterised their response to the charge of being Wahhabis themselves. This owed to the ambiguity of the term Wahhabi as it was commonly understood and used in India. While the Deobandis were careful to insist that they were not Wahhabis in the sense of being followers of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, some Deobandis, recognising the commitment that they shared with the Saudi Wahhabis to the extirpation of what they regarded as bidaah, accepted the label Wahhabi in that limited sense. Thus, for instance, Muhammad Zakariya, chief ideologue of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat, is said to have proudly announced before his followers, I am a more staunch Wahhabi than all of you. Likewise, Yusuf Kandhalavi, son and successor of the founder of the Tablighi Jamaat, Ilyas Kandhalavi, declared, We are staunch Wahhabis. Given the shared vision, albeit limited in extent, of the Saudi Wahhabis and the Deobandis, it was possible for the two groups to seek to work together for common purposes. Thus, Ilyas Kandhalavi and a group of his followers met the Saudi ruler in 1938, and discussed with him and the Saudi Wahhabi ulama plans for allowing the Tablighi Jamaat to function in the country.[25] Yet, although it is claimed that the Saudi monarch and several of his ulama welcomed the prospect, the movement was not allowed to establish a presence in Saudi Arabia. The situation remains the same today. It appears that the fact that the movements Deobandi links were a major cause for concern on the part of numerous Saudi Wahhabi ulama, who regarded the Deobandi tradition as bidaah and as promoting shirk. Further, it might also be that the Saudi authorities viewed with concern the possibility of any independent, particularly foreign-based, Islamic movement, such as the Tablighi Jamaat, being active in their own country, fearing that it might work to undermine their own legitimacy.

The Deobandis, by and large, seem to have maintained the somewhat ambiguous attitude of their elders towards the Ahl-i Hadith and the Wahhabis till at least the late 1970s, when the situation began to change with new access to Saudi funding. In the course of the Afghan war against the Soviets the Saudis recognised that the Deobandis were far more influential and had a far larger presence than the Ahl-i Hadith, in both Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Consequently, much Saudi funding began making its way to Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan in order to train guerrilla fighters armed with a passion for jihad against the Russians. A shared commitment to a shariah-centric Islam made such assistance acceptable to both parties. The Pakistani Deobandis were, on the whole, not reluctant to accept such assistance, despite the views of their own elders about the Wahhabis. Over time, in India, too, several Deobandi ulama are said to have begun receiving Saudi aid, in some form or the other, for their madrasas and other religious institutions. It is said that several Deobandi leaders sort to court prospective Saudi patrons by claiming to be fellow defenders of authentic monotheism, adducing their fierce and unremitting critiques of the Barelvis as evidence. Naturally, the newly established links with Saudi patrons forced them to reconsider their own position on Wahhabism and the Saudi state. A clear indication of the flexibility that the Deobandis were willing to display in their relations with the Saudi Wahhabis was the publication in 1978 of a book revealingly titled Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab Ke Khilaf Propaganda Aur Hindustan Ke Ulama-i Haq Par Uske Asrat (The Propaganda Against Shaikh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and Its Impact on the True Ulama).[26] The timing of the publication was significant. It came at a time when the Deobandis, in both India and Pakistan, were increasingly turning to Saudi patrons, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This necessitated a thorough revision of the Deobandi understanding and presentation of Saudi Wahhabism and of its founder. As earlier pointed out, several Deobandi elders had bitterly critiqued Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, going so far as to declare him, for all practical terms, as anti-Muslim. Now, however, the increasingly close relations between certain Deobandis and Saudi patrons called for both an apology and an explanation for the bitter critique of the founding-father of Wahhabism by the elders of Deoband. This is precisely what this book set out to do. The author of the book, the late Manzur Numani (d.1997), was one of the leading Indian Deobandi ulama, having served as member of the governing council (majlis-i shura) of the Deoband madrasa for many years. He had dozens of books to his credit and was the founder and editor of the widely circulated Urdu magazine al-Furqan. A fiercely committed Deobandi, he wrote extensively against the Barelvis and the Shias and in defence of Deobandi doctrines. His book in praise of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab has

gone into numerous editions, a sign of its considerable popularity in Deobandi circles. He described the book as the outcome of a dream of the then rector of the Deoband madrasa, the late Qari Muhammad Tayyeb, who, he wrote, had repeatedly requested him to write a full-fledged book to bridge the gulf and remove the misunderstandings between the Deobandis and the followers of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, both of whom he is said to have regarded as servants of the faith and as upholders of monotheism and the sunnah. The book appears to have received the official approval of several leading Deobandi ulama, concerned as they were about improving relations with the Saudis, including, probably, prospective Saudi patrons. In fact, in the concluding section Numani explicitly stated that the book laid out the position of the ulama of Deoband. He backed this claim by including the testimonies of two leading Deobandi ulama, the late Muhammad Zakariya Kandhalavi, chief ideologue of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaat movement, and Qari Muhammad Tayyeb. Zakariyas statement declared the book to be very good.[27] For his part, Tayyeb heaped praises on the book, and claimed that it finally proved that there is actually no difference of principle (usuli ikhtilaf) between the Deobandis and the Wahhabis, and that to a very great extent they are united. He also advised that the book be translated into Arabic as soon as possible.[28] The book was later rendered into Arabic in order to convince Arab readers, including possible patrons, that the Deobandis were not opposed to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers. Numani begins his book by claiming that because of the wave of virulent propaganda unleashed by the religious and political enemies of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, numerous true ulama (ulama-i haq) (by which Numani probably means the ulama of Deoband) unwittingly opposed his message. He stresses the point that the Deobandi elders were not alone in this. Numerous Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders, he points out, also shared the same opinion, and one of them, Siddiq Hasan Khan, even penned a tract condemning him. He seeks to suggest that the initial opposition to Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab on the part of some Deobandi elders might have stemmed, in part, from the influence of Khans writings. This point is crucial, for it enables him to counter the Ahl-i Hadith claim of always and unanimously having being supportive of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his mission, an argument which the Ahl-i Hadith generally use in order to gain Saudi support. He then hastens to add that when the truth of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs mission and message dawned on them the Deobandi elders did not hesitate to retract their statements against him and to express support for him and his mission.[29] Numani takes, as a case in point, the views of the rector of the Deoband madrasa, Husain Ahmad Madani, who, as noted earlier, penned a book bitterly attacking Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. As a child, Numani writes, Madani was brought up to understand that

Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and the Wahhabis generally were fierce enemies of Islam. This was, he says, a result of a massive propaganda campaign conducted in India and elsewhere against the Wahhabis by their enemies, who regarded the Wahhabi movement as a major challenge to their own authority and privileges as custodians of Sufi shrines. Numani probably makes this point deliberately to stress the Barelvi opposition to Wahhabism and to deny any Deobandi involvement in the matter. Because in his early years Madani did not have access to the truth about the Wahhabis, and because of the influence of the anti-Wahhabi campaign, Madani, Numani admits, did write against Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab. In 1910 he penned a tract, al-Shahab al-Shaqib, fiercely denouncing him and his followers. However, later on, when he read the books of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab for himself, he is said to have realised that his message was actually one of pure monotheism and a bitter, and, therefore, legitimate, critique of bidaah. After this apparent change of views, he is said to have heaped praises on Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab for launching a jihad against those who bow before graves, ask the dead for help, construct domes over graves and engage in other such polytheistic practices.[30] The reference here is to groups like the Barelvi opponents of the Deobandis. The point is probably deliberately made in order to stress the common commitment of both the Deobandis and the Saudi Wahhabis to the extirpation of what they regard as bidaah. In order to argue the case for a radical change in Madanis views about Wahhabism Numani argues that after recognising the reality and alleged legitimacy of Wahhabism Madani worked closely with several Wahhabi ulama, particularly in the governing council of the Saudi-based World Muslim League, of which he was appointed a member in 1965. His involvement in the work of the League is said to have brought him in close touch with two prominent Saudi Wahhabi scholars, Shaikh Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah bin Baz, chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and Shaikh Abdullah bin Humid, a senior official Saudi religious leader. Numani hastens to add that these two scholars were very pious Muslims and good models of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs message and movement.[31] The same radical change of views, Numani claims, occurred in the case of another leading Deobandi scholar, Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri. Under the influence of the antiWahhabi propaganda, Saharanpuri declared the Wahhabis to be outside the Sunni fold. In his al-Tasdiqat he went so far as to brand Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and his followers as kafirs and traitors (baghi). However, like Madani, after he read the books of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab for himself he is said to have realised the error of his earlier views. He then recanted from them and wrote in favour of the Wahhabi movement, and even went to the extent of claiming that there was not even a grain of difference between the Wahhabis and the other Sunnis. Further, he is said to have come out in support of the Saudi government at a time when it was being fiercely criticised by the Barelvis and Shias, by claiming that it was truly religious.[32]

After struggling to defend his Deobandi elders from the charge of being anti-Wahhabi, Numani shifts to discussing the present Saudi regime and the question of its Islamic legitimacy. Since the underlying aim of his book seems to be to prove the similarities between the Deobandism and Wahhabism and to encourage greater cooperation between the Deobandis and the Saudis, it is hardly surprising that Numani presents the Saudi regime in glowing terms. Thus, he proclaims that the Saudi state is based on Islam, obedience of the shariah and the sunnah, and is the true heir of the pure Islamic state established by Ibn Saud. He even goes so far as to declare that, as far as he is aware, Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world that is governed strictly according to the prescriptions of the Quran and the sunnah. In support of this claim he cites the fact that in Saudi Arabia thieves are punished with their hands being chopped off, unmarried adulteresses are whipped and male adulterers are stoned to death, all in accordance with Islamic law. Added evidence for this assertion is the alleged piety of Saudi Arabias rulers. Numani describes the Saudi king as a model Muslim monarch. The Saudi ruler is, he says, praise be to God, strictly observant of the fasts, prayers and religious duties, and insists that his subjects follow in the same path. This, Numani says, is the result of the great blessings of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhabs movement. Aware of the enormous influence of the al-Shaikh family, descendants of Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, Numani also refers to them in laudable terms. The family, he says, has produced numerous illustrious Islamic scholars, and this, Numani claims, is undoubtedly an immense blessing from God. [33] Numanis presentation of the Wahhabi doctrine and the Saudi state appears to have been carefully calculated to minimise points of difference between Wahhabism and the Deobandi understanding of Islam and to focus only on issues on which they are agreed, in order to argue that there were no fundamental differences between the two, particularly on the question of pure monotheism and opposition to bidaah. Thus, the fact that, in contrast to the Wahhabis, the Deobandis believe in the legitimacy of Sufism, although of a shariah-minded sort, and that they insist on the need for taqlid of one of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence, was conveniently ignored. This can be said to be a reflection of a growing Wahhabisation of Deobandism under Arab influence. This explanation is only partially valid, however. It appears that Numani was, in fact, deliberately seeking to conceal the major differences between the Deobandis and the Saudi Wahhabis. Critics accused Numani of doing so simply in order to win the favour of prospective Arab donors. This charge was levelled by several Ahl-i Hadith scholars, probably angered at the prospect of growing links between their Deobandi rivals and patrons in Saudi Arabia.

NumanisbookwasmetwithaswiftrebuttalbynumerousAhliHadithscholars,whoaccused himofdeliberatelydistortingtherealityofHusainAhmadMadanisviews,andthatofthe Deobandisgenerally,onMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabinordertowinSaudisupport.In1986, theJamiaSalafiya,Varanasi,themainAhliHadithmadrasainIndia,publishedalengthy diatribeagainstNumanisbookpennedbyanIndianAhliHadithscholar,MahfuzurRahman Faizi.[34]Inhisprefacetothebook,SafiurRahmanMubarakpuri,aleadingIndianAhliHadith alim,quotedatlengthfromMadanisalShahabalShaqib,pointingoutthatMadanihad fiercelycondemnedMuhammadbinAbdulWahhab,reservingthechoicestepithetsforhim.He claimedthatMadanihadleftnostoneunturnedtovilifytheSaudirulers.Headdedthateven atthepresenttimetheDeobandisweresecretlycarryingoninthattradition,whilecunningly seekingtobrandtheSaudigovernmentstruewellwishers(bywhichhemeanttheAhli Hadith)asitsenemies.Numanisbook,heclaimed,waspartofthissinisterplot.[35] Developingthisargumentfurther,FaiziclaimedthatNumanihadunfairlyaccusedcertain pioneersoftheAhliHadithinIndia,mostnotablySiddiqHasanKhan,ofhavingbeenopposed toMuhammadbinAbdulWahhab.HehadgonesofarastowronglyclaimthatMadanisinitial oppositiontoMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabowedtotheinfluenceofKhansallegedanti Wahhabiwritings.FaizistoutlydefendedKhanfromthechargeofhavingbeenopposedto MuhammadbinAbdulWahhab.HequotedprofuselyfromKhansvariouswritingstoshowthat heconsideredMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabtohavebeenatrueSunniandastaunchand passionatedefenderoftheQuranandthesunnah.Headmittedthatinsomeminormatters KhanandcertainotherearlierAhliHadithhaddifferenceswiththeWahhabisbutthisdidnot mean,hesaid,that,asNumanihadtriedtoargue,theywereopposedtothem.Numanihad, heclaimed,deliberatelyignoredthepraisethatKhanandotherearlyIndianAhliHadith scholarshadshoweredonMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabinordertoprovethattheearly Deobandiswerenotaloneinopposinghim,andthat,likethem,someAhliHadithulamahad alsoexpressedtheirhostilitytowardshismovement.IfMadanihadbeeninfluencedbythe allegedwritingsofKhanagainsttheWahhabis,howwasit,Faiziasked,thathehadcompletely ignoredKhansotherwritingsthatportrayedtheminglowingterms?Thisitselfproved,Faizi insisted,thatMadanisoppositiontotheWahhabiswasnotaresultoftheinfluenceofKhans writings. FaizialsodismissedNumanisargumentthatMadaniwassimplyaninnocentvictimofthe massiveantiWahhabipropagandathattheenemiesofMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabhad unleashed.HepointedoutthatMadanihadspentmorethanadozenyearsintheHijaz,where hecouldhavegainedatrueunderstandingofWahhabismifhehadcaredto.Further,atthe timeofwritinghisbookagainstMuhammadbinAbdulWahhab,aconsiderabledealofpro Wahhabiliterature,purportingtopresentatrueimageofthemovement,wasavailablein IndiaandArabia,inbothUrduandArabic.Giventhis,howwasit,Faiziasked,thatMadanidid notcaretoconsulttheseauthenticsourceswhilewritinghisbook?ThefactthatMadanidid notrefertothesebooksitselfshowedthathewasnotsimplyaninnocentvictimofanti Wahhabipropaganda,contrarytowhatNumanihadclaimed,Faiziinsisted.

 NumanisclaimthatMadanilaterretractedhisantiWahhabiviewswasalsodismissedby Faizi,whoarguedthathisnotedisclaiminghisearlierstancewaspublishedinthecolumnsofan antiDeobandinewspaper,andwasnotwidelyknownamongtheDeobandisthemselves.If MadanihadgenuinelychangedhispositiononMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabandhis followers,Faiziasked,howwasitthatthisclarificatorynotedidnotappearinsubsequent editionsofhisalShahabalShaqib,which,heclaimed,continuedtobepublishedunamended? AsfurtherevidenceofhisclaimthatMadanihadnotactuallychangedhisviewsonthe Wahhabis,FaiziquotedfromMadanisautobiography,publishedalmostthreedecadesafterhe wrotealShahabalShaqib,whereheissaidtohaverepeatedthesamechargesagainstthe Wahhabisthathemadeinhisearlierwork,brandingthemasextremists(sakhtghali),andas havinggivenimmensetroubletotheiropponents,becauseofwhich,Madaniwrote,the peopleofMeccaandMedinahatethemandtheHijazisdetestWahhabismmorethan ChristianityandJudaism.InhisautobiographyMadanialsoallegedlychargedtheWahhabis withblasphemy(gustakhanakalimat)againsttheProphet,andclaimedthattheDeobandishad noteventheremotestrelationswithWahhabibeliefs.Asfurtherconfirmationofthefact thatMadanihadneverchangedhisantiWahhabiviews,FaiziquotedMadanihashaving writteninanarticlepublishedintheDeobandijournalalJamiatin1952thatMuhammadbin AbdulWahhabandhisfollowershadgoneastray(gumrah)and,hence,weretobecounted amongtheKharijites,implying,therefore,thattheycouldnotbeconsideredpartoftheSunni fold.[36] * Thecontroversythateruptedinthe1980soverNumanisbookillustratedthefactthatSaudi assistancetoselectedDeobandiulamaandtheirschoolsinIndiaandPakistanwasseenbyAhli Hadithscholarsandleadersasamajorchallenge,fearing,criticsclaim,thatthiswouldmeana diminutionintheirownearningsfromgenerousArabpatrons.This,atleast,ishowseveral DeobandisexplainthefiercediatribemountedbysomeAhliHadithscholarsagainstthemin recentyears.Inadditiontothis,SaudipressureissaidtohavebeenbehindtheescalationofAhl iHadithpolemicalattacksontheDeobandis.Thus,aleadingIndianBarelvischolar,YasinAkhtar Misbahi,writesthatalthoughsomeearlyDeobandiswerevehementlyopposedtoMuhammad binAbdulWahhabandhismovement,later,inordertoingratiatethemselveswithoilrich Saudis,theDeobandissoughttocomeclosertotheWahhabisandeventoidentifywiththem. This,hesays,continuedtill1991,thatistilltheoutbreakofthefirstGulfWar,whentheSaudis, fearinganIraqiinvasion,calledinAmericantroopsandallowedthemtobestationedinthe country.NotasingleMusliminIndiaandPakistan,Misbahiwrites,approvedofthisstep,not eventheDeobandiswhohadearlierreceivedconsiderablefinancialassistancefromtheSaudis. Thisiswhy,heargues,relationsbetweentheDeobandisandtheSaudisbegantosharply deteriorate,resultinginamassivepropagandacampaignconductedbytheNajdisagainstthe DeobandisofSouthAsia.[37]

AturningpointinAhliHadithDeobandirelationswasthepublicationinthelate1990sofa booktitledadDeobandiyah,pennedbyacertainSayyedTaliburRahman,aPakistaniAhli HadithscholarbasedinSaudiArabiawhoissaidtoworkforanofficialSaudiIslamic organisation.ThebookwaspublishedbyaPakistaniAhliHadithinstitution,theDarulKitab walSunnahinKarachi,and,acriticalleges,wasdelivered,inawellplannedmanner,tothe shaikhsoftheHijazandNajdandto[Saudi]governmentoffices.Probablydeliberately,thebook waswritteninArabicandwidelydistributedinSaudiArabiaitself,inordertoturnSaudiopinion, includingthatoftheSaudistateandrichSaudipatrons,againsttheDeobandis.Thebookissaid tohaveopenlydeclaredtheDeobandisasapostatesandmushriks(polytheists),andtohave evenarguedthatmanyDeobandishadgoneevenfurther[intheirinfidelity]thanthe polytheistsofMecca.ItwasallegedthatthebookclaimedthattheDeobandiulamawere totallybereftoffaithinmonotheism,andthatsomeleadingDeobandisattributedliestoGod, tamperedwiththeQuranandentertainedsternhatredfortheupholdersofmonotheismand thesunnahoftheProphet.[38]AlongwiththeirfellowBarelviHanafistheyweredescribedas quburin(graveworshippers)fortheirvenerationofprophetsandsaintsandfortheirpracticeof offeringfatiha(theopeningverseoftheQuran)atthegravesofthedead.[39] ShortlyafterthepublicationofadDeobandiyah,aseriesofsimilarbooks,makingsomewhatthe samesortofarguments,begantoappearinArabicandUrduinIndiaandPakistan,aswellasin SaudiArabiaitself.Severalofthese,itisalleged,weresponsored,directlyorotherwise,byrich Saudipatrons.MostofthemwereauthoredbyIndianandPakistaniAhliHadithscholars, althoughafewwerepennedbySaudishaikhs.Onesuchbook,publishedinbothArabicand UrdubytheRiyadhbasedMaktabalTawunialDawahwalIrshad,anddistributedinlarge quantitiestoMuslimpilgrimsduringtheHajseason,allegedlydeclaredtheDeobandistobe effectivelyoutsidetheSunnifold,and,hence,implicitly,outsidethepaleofIslamitself.A secondbook,writteninArabicbyaSaudimufti,ShaikhHamudbinAbdullah,referredtothe DeobandisandtheTablighiJamaataswrongfulinnovators(bidaati)andashavinggone astray(gumrah)andevenasbeingaSatanicsect(shaitanijamaat).Itclaimedthatthe foremosteffortoftheTablighiswastospreadinnovationsinGodsreligionandtoopposethe sunnahoftheProphet.[40]Anothersimilarbook,pennedbyacertainShamsuddinSalafi,a SouthAsiangraduateoftheMeccabasedIslamicUniversity,referredtotheDeobandisasthe sectofgraveworshippers(firqaalquburiya),andhence,forallpracticalpurposes,asoutside thepaleofIslam.[41]SalafiissaidtohavedescribedtheHanafiulamaaspolytheistsand dwellersofhell.[42]Athirdbook,publishedin2001,boretheprovocativetitleofArethe UlamaofDeobandSunnis?.Itscoverflapproudlyproclaimedthatthousandsofcopiesofthe bookhadbeenpublishedinSaudiArabia.Thebookconsistedofavirulentdiatribeagainstthe Deobandis,accusingthemofallmannerofunIslamicbeliefsandpractices.Asevidenceforthis claim,theauthorarguedthattheDeobandisallegedinsistenceontaqlidevenifthe prescriptionsoftheschoolsoffiqhviolatetheQuranandHadithwentagainstthepracticeof Muhammadscompanions.[43]TheDeobandis,heclaimed,liketheirfellowHanafiBarelvis, followvariousSufipracticesandenrolindifferentSufiorders,whereasthiswasunknownatthe timeoftheProphet.UnlikeMuhammadscompanions,theDeobandis,aswellastheBarelvis,

believethattheProphetisstillalive.Hence,theauthorconcluded,manyDeobandiulama cannotbeconsideredtobeSunnisorMuslimsatall.[44]Theassumption,aswellasconclusion, probablyisthattheAhliHadith,whoarepresentedasidenticalwiththeWahhabisofSaudi Arabia,alonecanclaimtorepresentgenuineSunnism,thesinglesavedsect.Anevenmore hardhittingattackontheDeobandis,andontheHanafisgenerally,wasabookwhichappeared in1999,authoredbyanIndianAhliHadithscholar,AbuIqbalSalafi.Itboretheprovocativetitle MazhabiHanafiKaMazhabiIslamSeIkhtliaf(TheOppositionoftheHanafiReligiontothe ReligionofIslam),thusclearlyannouncingtheauthorsconvictionthattheHanafis,including bothDeobandisaswellasBarelvis,werenotMuslimsatall.Thebookwentontodeclareinno uncertaintermsthattheHanafireligionhadnorelationwhatsoeverwithIslam,which,the authorargued,wassynonymouswiththeAhliHadith.Thus,theauthorclaimedthattheHanafis regardedImamAbuHanifa,andnotAllah,astheirdeity(rab),andthattheyworshipped him.[45]TheHanafireligion,heargued,wastotallyopposedtoIslamandfullyagainstthe QuranandtheHadith,andwas,infact,inventedbyIslamsenemiestoundermineit.The Hanafiswere,hesaid,identicaltotheJews,who,heclaimed,wereinveterateenemiesof Islam.Becauseofthis,hewenton,theHanafisdidnotrecognisetheQuranandtheHadith, andinfact,boreenmityagainsttheIslamicscriptures.HealsochargedtheHanafiswith abusingthecompanionsoftheProphetandforallegedlygivingahigherstatustotheirImam thantoMuhammad.[46]Hemadenoexceptionsinthisregard,effectivelybrandingallHanafis asinfidels.Thus,heinsisted,AllHanafisfollowtheHanafireligion(mazhabihanafi)andnotthe religionofIslam(mazhabiislam),claimingthatthetwowerecompletelydifferent.[47] AspartoftheircampaignagainsttheDeobandis,SouthAsianAhliHadithscholarsappearto havepaidconsiderableattentiontoconveyingtovariousArabWahhabishaikhs,mostly residentinSaudiArabia,KuwaitandtheUnitedArabEmirates,informationaboutthefalseand unIslamicbeliefsoftheirDeobandirivals.Thisisillustratedinthenumberofarticlespenned andfatwasdeliveredbyleadingArabWahhabiulamaagainsttheDeobandisinrecentyears,a fairlynewdevelopment.Thesewritingsandpronouncementshavebeengivenconsiderable publicitybyAhliHadithwebsitesandpublishinghouses,awareastheyareoftheprestigeand authoritythattheviewsandstatementsofArabulamacarryamongmanySouthAsianMuslims. AninterestingcaseinpointisanAhliHadithwebsite,probablybasedinIndia,www. allahuakbar.net.ThissitehostsnumerousfatwasagainsttheDeobandisandtheTablighiJamaat (inadditiontogroupsliketheBarelvis,ShiasandtheJamaatiIslami)deliveredbyimportant ArabWahhabischolars.Oneofthefatwas,deliveredbyShaikhAbdulAzizbinAbdullahbin Baz,declarestheTablighiJamaatascontainingmanydeviations,includingaspectsofbidaah andshirk.Accordingly,binBazarguesthatitisnotpermissibleforaMuslimtojointhe movementunlesshehasknowledgeandaccompaniestheTablighissimplytodisapproveof themandinordertoteachthem[thetruth]sothattheyleavetheirfalsehoodandembrace thewayoftheAhlusSunnahwalJamaah.[48]Theimplicitmessagecontainedinthis statementis,therefore,thattheTablighiscannotbesaidtofollowtheSunniway.Inasecond fatwahostedonthewebsitebinBazisquotedashavingexplicitlydeclaredtheTablighisoutside theSunnifold.[49]Thewebsitecarriesyetanotherfatwa,issuedbythelateSaudibased WahhabischolarShaikhMuhammadNasiruddinalAlbani,condemningtheTablighisfornot

uphold[ing]themanjah(method)oftheBookofAllahandthesunnahofHisMessengerand forbeingassociationwithSufism.alAlbanithengoontodeclareitimpermissiblefortrue Muslimstojointhemovement.[50]Thewebsitehostsseveralsimilararticlesandfatwasagainst theTablighisbyotherleadingArabWahhabischolars,includingShaikhAbuAbdurRahman MuqbilbinHadialWadi,ShaikhRabibinHadialMadkhali,ShaikhSalihbinFouzanalFouzan, ShaikhMuhammadbinIbrahimalShaikhandShaikhAbdurRazzaqAfifi.[51]Thewebsitealso carriesseveralarticlesbybothArabandSouthAsianWahhabischolarsagainsttheDeobandis ingeneral,accusingthemofshirkandbidaah,and,hence,implyingthattheycannotbe consideredtobegenuineSunnisorevenasproperMuslimsatall.[52] EffortsbytheAhliHadithtowinsupportamongtheArabWahhabiulamafortheircampaign againsttheDeobandisseemtohavemetwithconsiderablesuccess.Aclearindicationofthisis thefactthatleadingSouthAsianAhliHadithscholarshavemanagedtoprevailupontheSaudi managedIslamicUniversityofMedinatobanthepublicationoftheTafsiriUsmani,anUrdu translationoftheQuranbyMahmudulHasan(d.1920),formanyyearstherectorofthe Deobandmadrasa,andacommentaryonitbyanotherleadingDeobandi,ShabbirAhmad Usmani.ThisbookhadreportedlybeenpublishedformanyyearsbyanofficialSaudipublishing house,theMedinabasedKingFahdComplexforPrintingtheHolyQuran,formassdistribution. ItspublicationissaidtohavebeenstoppedafterAhliHadithactivistsclaimedthatit propagatedantiIslamicbeliefssuchasappealingtothepeopleofthegrave(ahliqubur)for help.ByarguingthattheDeobandiswerenottrueorfullMuslims,theAhliHadithmanagedto convincetheSaudiauthoritiestoreplaceMahmudulHasanstranslationoftheQuranbyone writtenbyaleadingIndianAhliHadithscholar,MaulanaMuhammadJunagadhi.[53] ThesuccessoftheAhliHadithintheircampaignagainsttheDeobandiswasnotlimitedto winningthesupportofkeySaudiulama.SomeDeobandisthemselves,soAhliHadithsoures claim,arealsosaidtohavebeenwonovertotheAhliHadithfoldinthewakeoftheheated polemicalexchangesbetweenthetwogroups.Themostdramaticsuchconversionwasthatof MuhammadAnas,proprietoroftheIdaraiIshaatiDiniyat,aNewDelhibasedIslamic publishinghouseassociatedwiththeDeobandirelatedTablighiJamaat.Thisstorywaswidely toutedaboutbytheAhliHadithasproofofthefalsityofDeobandibeliefsandoftheclaimof theAhliHadithasbeingthesolegenuineSunnisect.Theinterviewwasreproducedinfull,in UrduandinEnglishtranslation,intheformofabooklet,onaudiocassettesandonAhliHadith websites.[54]MuhammadAqil,theSaudibasededitorofthebooklet,termedAnasdecisionto jointheAhliHadithasrepentance(tauba)andclaimedthatbyabandoningtheTablighi JamaatAnashadturnedhisbackonpolytheismandwrongfulinnovationandhadentered thefoldofmonotheism,therebysuggestingthattheDeobandisandTablighiswerenot monotheistsorMuslimsthemselves.[55]HeattackedtheTablighiJamaat,andtheDeobandisin general,forallegedlybeingagroupdevotedtospreadingpolytheisticbeliefsandwrongful practices,fortamperingwith(tahrif)theQuranandHadith,andforallegedlystoppingtheir followersfromreadingtheQuranandHadithandthusofwronglyclaimingtobegenuine Sunnis.[56]TheTablighimessage,hedeclared,wasanopeninvitationtodistortioninthetrue religion.Forhispart,Anasannouncedthatfollowinghisconversionhehaddecidedtostopthe publishingandsaleofseveraldozenbooks,mainlytextspennedbyreveredDeobandielders,

which,heclaimed,containednumerouswrongbeliefsthatwereclearlyagainsttheQuranand Hadith.HealsorevealedthathewasreplacingnumerousbooksbyDeobandischolarsbytexts preparedbyAhliHadithulama.[57]Itwasurgent,Anasargued,thatthetruthoftheAhli HadithpositionbeputforwardagainsttheclaimsoftheDeobandis,because,heinsisted,the DeobandisdidnotproperlyfollowtheQuranandtheHadith.ReferringtotheTablighis,hesaid, VeryfewoftheirpracticesareinaccordancewiththeQuranandsunnah.Eventheirprayers arenotinconformitywiththePropheticpractice,heclaimed,referringtotheDeobandi methodofprayingthatdiffersinsomewaysfromthatoftheAhliHadith.[58]Prayersarethe mostimportantthing,hestressed,probablysuggestingthatiftheDeobandi,orHanafimore generally,methodofworshipwaswrong,itwashardlysurprisingthatinotherrespects,too, theyhadgonefarastrayfromthepracticeoftheProphet. * ThepublicationofadDeobandiyahandsimilarliteratureandthebanningofMahmudul HasanstranslationoftheQurancameasasummonsforbattlefortheDeobandis.Being brandedaspolytheists,and,therefore,effectivelyasapostates,wastakenasamajorinsult.It wasalsoprobablyfearedthatsuchvirulentantiDeobandipropaganda,particularlywhen conductedinsideSaudiArabiaitself,couldleadtoacompletelossofvaluableSaudiaswellas otherArabpatronage,besidesgreatlytarnishingtheimageoftheDeobandisthroughoutthe Muslimworld.TheDeobandiswere,therefore,notslowinreacting.Theyrespondedwitha powerfulcounterattack,churningoutmassivequantitiesofliteraturetoprovethattheAhli Hadithhad,inactualfact,nolikingatallfortheWahhabisofSaudiArabiaandthattheir professionofbeingfollowersofMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabwasjustacleverrusetoattract Saudimoney,thusrepeatingtheAhliHadithchargesagainstthem.Inadditiontoclaimingto representtheWahhabitraditionthemselvesanddenyingtheclaimsoftheAhliHadithinthis regard,someDeobandischolarspennedtractsbrandingtheAhliHadithasbeingfiercelyanti Islamic.Thus,forinstance,aDeobandialimfromGhazipurpreparedasetoffivebooksto denouncetheAhliHadithandevenlaunchedanewjournal,ZamZam,devotedsolelyto rebuttingAhliHadithdoctrines.InorderprobablytocurryfavourwiththeSaudis,hepublished abookinArabic,possiblymeantforprospectiveArabpatrons,arguingthattheAhliHadith wereactuallyenemiesofMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabbutfalselyclaimedtobehis followerssimplyinordertoattractArabfunds.[59]NumerousotherDeobandisfollowedwith theirowntractsandbooksfiercelyopposingtheAhliHadith.Manyofthesebookswerepenned inArabic,directedatanArab,particularlySaudi,audience,damningtheAhliHadithasanti Islamic.TheywerecondemnedforallegedlyabusingthecompanionsoftheProphet,the reveredImamsofthefourgenerallyacceptedschoolsofSunnijurisprudence,andtheSufisand otherpiouselders,andfordefyingtheijmaorjurisprudentialconsensusoftheulama.[60] Consequently,numerousDeobandischolarssoughttoargue,theAhliHadithcouldhardlybe regardedasproperSunnisorMuslimsatall.MuhammadJamalBulandshahri,ateacheratthe Deobandmadrasa,argued,expressingtheviewsofmanyofhisfellowDeobandis,that,given theirfalsebeliefs,theAhliHadithcouldnotbeconsideredtobetrueSunnis.Theirclaimtothe contrary,andtheirassertionthattheyrepresentedtrueSalafism,was,heinsisted,simplya

rusetocheattheSaudisandgarnertheirwealth.[61] Commentingonthebitterwranglingbetweenthetwogroups,aleadingIndianBarelvischolar, MuftiMuhammadAkhtarYasinQadri,causticallywrote: Todayhereisgreatstrifebetweentheghairmuqallids(AhliHadith)andtheDeobandis,bothof themlustingfortheoilwealthofArabia.Hence,botharenowfightingtoclaimbeforetheArabs thateachofthemalonerepresentsthetrueWahhabitraditionandthattheotheriswrong.[62] Matterscametoaheadinmid2001,whenheightenedpolemicsbetweentheDeobandisand theAhliHadithandtheeffortsofAhliHadithleaderstodiscredittheDeobandisinSaudiArabia aspolytheistsledtheDeobandidominatedJamiatulUlamaiHindtoorganiseamammoth twodayconventioninDelhi.TheconventionwaswidelyadvertisedastheSavetheSunnah (tahaffuzisunnah)Conference,andwasaddressedbyleadingIndianDeobandiulama.The messagethatwassoughttobeconveyed,asthetitleoftheconferenceitselfsuggested,was thatitwastheDeobandisalonewhorepresentedtheauthenticsunnahorpracticeofthe Prophet,andthat,therefore,theyhadtherightandthedutyofprotectingit.Thefocusofthe impassionedspeechesdeliveredattheconferencewasthedenunciationoftheAhliHadith, which,speakerafterspeakerclaimed,hademergedasthesinglemajorthreattothesunnahof theProphet. Inhisinauguraladdresstotheconference,theheadoftheJamiatandinfluentialDeobandi leader,SayyedAsadMadani(styledbyhimselfandhisfollowersasimamalhindortheImam ofIndia),denouncedtheAhliHadithastheproductofasinisterimperialistconspiracyto divideMuslims.HebitterlyharanguedtheAhliHadithfortheirbeliefthattheyalonewere trueMuslimsandforallegedlyconsideringallotherMuslimsaskafirsandpolytheists.He accusedthemoffalselyinterpretingtheQuranandtheHadithinordertostresstheirown claimsofrepresentingauthenticIslam,andforinsultingtheSufisandlearnedeldersandeven thecompanionsoftheProphet.HedescribedtheantiDeobandipropagandaunleashedbythe AhliHadithastheresultofasinisterantiIslamicplot,stemmingfromanacuterealisationthat theDeobandiulamahadmadegreatsacrificesforandimmensecontributionstoIslam. Consequently,hesaid,asthecaseofthecontroversialbookadDeobandiyahsuggested,some AhliHadithleadershadgonesofarastodeclaretheDeobandisoutsidetheSunnifoldandhad evenclaimedthatDeobandwasaninstitutionthathaddeclaredwarontheProphetandhad thrownasidehismethod(tariqa).Theyhadalsofalselyallegedthattheveryfoundationsof DeobandwerebasedondisobedienceoftheProphet.[63] Interestingly,MadanididnotmincewordsincritiquingtheSaudigovernmentforwhathesaw asitsroleinfanningantiDeobandisentimentsthroughtheAhliHadith.Thisrepresenteda majorshiftinDeobandistrategy,anindicationthatmanyDeobandiswerenowseekingto consciouslydistancethemselvesfromtheirearliereffortsofappeasingtheSaudiregime.Noting thatmanyantiDeobandibookshadbeenpennedbyAhliHadithscholarswhohadstudiedin

Saudiuniversities,someofthesebookshavingbeenbroughtoutbyleadingSaudiIslamic publishinghouses,heexclaimed,Itisamatterofgreatsorrowthattheseinstitutionsthathad beenestablishedtopromotetheQuranandHadithandotherIslamicsciencesaretoday workingtoleadMuslimsoutsidethepathofthetruefaith.Heevenwentsofarastochargethe SaudiregimeofabettingtheAhlIHadithintheircampaignagainsttheDeobandis,statingthat hesuspectedthatconsciouslyorotherwiseitappearsthattheSaudikingdomwasengaged,or evenleading,thebaselesscampaignagainsttheulamaofDeoband.[64]Concludinghisspeech, MadaniwarnedMuslimstostayawayfromthestrife(fitna)oftheghayrmuqallids, reiteratinghisassertionthattheAhliHadithhadmountedaconcertedcampaignagainstthe Muslimsfaithandulama.Thehiddenmessagecontainedinthatstatement,probably,was thattheAhliHadithcouldnotbeconsideredasgenuineMuslimsatall.Madanialsoadvisedhis followerstoreduce,asfaraspossible,theirrelationswiththeghairmuqallids,soastoremain protectedfromwhathecalledastheirevilinfluence.[65] Thespeechesandpapersdeliveredattheconferencewerelaterpublishedintheformoflow pricedpamphletsmeantformassdistribution.Thebasicintentionofallthesepamphletswasto arguethecasethattheAhliHadithdidnotrepresentIslamatall,despitetheirclaimstodoso. Thus,theauthorofonepamphlet,MaulanaSayyedMahdiHasanShahjahanpuri,formerchief muftioftheDeobandmadrasa,producedalistoffiftypointsonwhich,heargued,theAhli HadithviolatedtheQuranandtheHadith.Hence,heinsisted,theclaimoftheAhliHadithof followingtheQuranandtheHadith,andthusofbeingtrueMuslims,wasbogus.[66]Asecond pamphlet,pennedbyMahmudulHasanBulandshahri,muftiattheDeobandmadrasa,wentso farastoclaimtheexistenceofaglobalconspiracyhatchedbyantiIslamicforcestoattackthe protectorsofthefortsofIslam,insistingthattheAhliHadithweredeliberatelyorotherwise partofthissinisterplotbydenouncingallotherMuslimgroupsasoutsidethepaleofIslam.[67] Anotherpamphlet,writtenbyMuhammadJamalBulandshahri,teacherattheDeoband madrasa,arguedthattheAhliHadithwereidentical,inseveralrespects,withtheShias,whom hebrandedastheproductofwhathedescribedasaJewishconspiracytodestroyIslamfrom withinbycreatingdissensionsamongMuslims.HeclaimedthattheBritishhadsponsoredthe emergenceandgrowthoftheAhliHadithtosetMuslimsagainsteachother.[68]Inother words,heappearedtoarguethattheAhliHadithcouldnotbeconsideredpartoftheSunni, thatis,Muslim,fold,despitetheirclaimstothecontrary.Yetanotherpamphlet,authoredby MuftiSayyedMuhammadSalmanMansurpuri,aleadingDeobandiandateacherattheMadrasa Shahi,Moradabad,wentsofarastodeclaretheghairmuqallidinasthemostdangerous threattoMuslimunityandasadangeroussourceofchaos(fitna),suggestingthatitwasa majorplayerinagrandconspiracyhatchedbytheenemiesofIslamtosetMuslimsagainst eachotherbyprojectingminorissuesofdifferencebetweenMuslimgroupsasquestionsof faithversusinfidelity.Significantly,hedirectlyandexplicitlyaccusedthegovernmentofSaudi ArabiaandleadingSaudiWahhabiulamaofprovidingmoralandmaterialhelptotheAhli Hadithintheircampaignagainstthemuqallids,followersofoneortheotherofthefour generallyacceptedschoolsofSunnijurisprudence.HepointedoutwithconcernthattheAhli HadithhadestablishedastrongpresenceinvariousofficialIslamicorganisationsinSaudiArabia,

singlingouttheDepartmentofReligiousPreachinginMeccaandMedinainparticular,which,he said,AhliHadithscholarswereusingtoheapabusesonthepiousulamaandtheImamsof theschoolsofSunnijurisprudence.Iftheghairmuqallidsweretogounchallenged,inSaudi Arabiaandelsewhere,theymighteventhreatenthepeaceandsecurityofMeccaandMedina, hewarned.MansurpurilefthisreadersinnodoubtabouthisactualopinionontheAhliHadith. Thus,heappealedtotheulamatoriseupandopposetheminthesamewayastheyhad respondedtothechallengeoftheQadianireligionandothersuchfalse(batil)forces,thus seemingtosuggestthatheconsideredthemas,inasense,akintotheAhmadiyyasorQadianis, whommostMuslimsregardashereticsandapostates.[69] ImpactofRecentDevelopmentsonSaudiLinkswithIndianMuslimGroups The1990swerecharacterisedbyfiercepolemicalbattlesbetweentheAhliHadithandthe DeobandisinIndia,witheachgroupchargingtheotherofbeingantiIslamicandashidden frontsoftheenemiesofIslam.Althoughthetwogroupscontinuetoregardeachotheras fiercerivals,thesharppolemicalexchangesbetweenthemnowseemtohavedampened somewhat.OnefactorforthisisprobablythestrongneedthatmanyMuslimsfeeltopresenta unitedfronttocombatthechallengeofaggressiveHindugroupsinthecountry.Inadditionto thisisthewidespreadfeelingamongmanyIndianMuslimsthattheDeobandiAhliHadith rivalrywassimplyyetanothercaseoftheulamasquabblingamongthemselvestopromote theirownvestedinterests,andhenceofnotpressingrelevancetothecommunityatlarge. AnotherimportantfactorfortheapparentdeclineinovertstrifebetweentheAhliHadithand theDeobandisinrecentyearsiswhatseemstobeasignificantshiftinSaudistrategy.Following theattacksbyeventsofSeptember,2001,SaudiArabiacameundertremendouspressurefrom theUnitedStatestoclampdownonWahhabimilitantsathomeandabroad.TheSaudistrategy ofsponsoringradicalWahhabismseemedtohaveboomeranged,asanewgenerationof IslamistradicalsemergedwithinSaudiArabiaitself,critiquingtheSaudiregimeforitscorruption andforitscloselinkswiththeUnitedStates.Conseqeuntly,theSaudisArabiawasforcedtotake actionagainsttheirowninternalradicalIslamistopponents,realisingthemajorchallengethat theyposedtotheSaudimonarchy.Simultaneously,andbecauseofthesedevelopments,Saudi aidtoWahhabigroupsabroad,includingIndia,issaidtohavedeclinedsomewhat.Thiswill naturallyhaveamajorimpactonrelationsbetweendifferentMuslimgroupsinIndia,andwill mostnotablyimpactontheexpansionoftheAhliHadith,whohavebeenthemajorrecipientof Saudiassistanceinrecentyears.AnindicationoftheimpactoftheAmericanaswellasdomestic pressureontheSaudiregimetodayistheclaimthatSaudiauthoritiesarenowadvisingtheir AhliHadithcontactsinIndiatoexerciserestraintintheirbitterpolemicalwaragainstthe Deobandis.Thismightwellbehappening,beingfurtherpromotedbyconsiderable disenchantmentamongmanyMuslims,includingmoderateDeobandisandAhliHadith,with intraMuslimrivalriesatatimewhenMuslimsinIndiaseethemselvesfacedwiththegrowing challengeofHindumilitancy.

AnotherpossibleindicationoftheshiftinSaudistrategyisthefactthatoflatecertainAhli HadithpublishinghousesinIndiahavebroughtoutbookspraisingtheSaudistateandcritiquing whattheydescribeastheterroristswhowishtoweakenit.Thesebooksarguethatthe correctmethodofthepoliticalreformthatIslamistopponentsoftheregimeseekisnot throughviolence,but,rather,throughguidingthepoliticalauthoritiestofollowthepathof GodbyprovidingthemwithIslamicadvice.Asbefore,thissortofpropagandaiscarefully craftedtosuittheinterestsoftheincreasinglybeleagueredSaudiregime,whichtodayfinds itselffacedbythechallengeofradicalIslamism,which,forseveralyears,ithadsoheavily investedin. AgoodillustrationofthepoliticaldirectioninwhichtheSaudiWahhabiswanttosteertheir IndianAhliHadithcounterpartsistherecentpublicationofalengthydiatribebytwoleading officialSaudiulamaagainstIslamistgroupsinsideandoutsideSaudiArabiathatareallegedly plottingtooverthrowthepresentSaudiregime,principallybecauseofitsclosenexuswiththe UnitedStates.Thebookconsistsoftwoessays,onebythelateShaikhAbdulAzizbinAbdullah binBazandtheotherbyShaikhSalehbinAbdulAzizalShaikh,theSaudiMinisterofReligious AffairsandEndowments.ThebookhasbeenrenderedintoUrduandpublishedinIndiaby AbdurRahimbinAbdulJabbarFarewai,anIndianAhliHadithscholarwhoteachesattheImam MuhammadibnSaudIslamicUniversityinRiyadh.[70]Thatthebookisintendedtopropagate theofficialSaudilineinordertodefendSaudiArabiasalliancewiththeUnitedStatesisevident fromthesubtitlethatappearsinsidethebook,ThePathtoSalvationFromChaos:TheGulf CrisisandLessonsFromtheIraqiStrife(FitnoseNijatkaRasta:KhalijiBahranAurIraqiFitnase IbratoMuazatkePehlu). Inhisintroduction,Farewaiexplainsthebackgroundofthebookandthereasonsforpublishing it,clearlyindicatingitspoliticalimport.HewritesthatintheaftermathofthefirstGulfWarin 199091,whenpassionswerearousedallovertheMuslimworld(thereferencehereisprobably totheangerfeltbymanyMuslimsagainsttheSaudiregimeforsupportingAmericaagainstIraq andforallowingAmericantroopstobestationedinSaudiArabia),itwasfeltbythetwoauthors thatMuslims,includingthoselivinginSouthAsia,wereinurgentneedofguidance.Inshort, thebookwasintendedtopresentbeforetheMuslimsoftheworldwhattheofficialSaudi Wahhabiulamafeltshouldbetheirappropriatereactiontothepoliticaldevelopmentsin whichSaudiArabiahademergedasakeyplayer,andaboutwhichtherewasconsiderable resentmentamongmanyMuslims.[71] Inhisessay,binBazwritesthatstrifeorchaos(fitna)canonlybecounteredbyfollowingthe Quranandthesunnah.Inturn,thisrequiresMuslimstofollowtheguidanceandinstructionof whathedescribesasthetrueulama.AfterthuswarningMuslimsnottoreacttothepresence ofstrifeontheirown,but,instead,todoastheyaretoldbythetrueulama(bywhichis probablymeantBinBazandulamaofhisownpersuasion),hewritesthatthosewhowreck violenceoninnocentpeopleinthenameofIslamandIslamicjihadcannotbeconsideredtobe true,practisingMuslims.Infact,suchactionsreflecthypocrisy(nifaq),openinfidelity(kufri

sarih),evil(dajl)anddeceit(fareb).Presumably,binBazisherereferringtoIslamistgroups responsibleforawaveofviolentattackswithinSaudiArabiainordertodestabilisetheSaudi regime.ThereferencealsoseemstobetoSaddamHusain,who,ironically,wasearlierheavily backedastheswordofIslambytheSaudisinhiswaragainstIran. Intimesofstrife,suchasthese,binBazcontinues,itislegitimateforMuslimrulerstoseekthe helpofnonMuslimsinordertoeliminatethetyrant(zalim).Thisstatementprobablyrefersto theassistancesoughtbytheSaudisfromtheAmericansinthewakeofSaddamsinvasionof Kuwait.Suchhelpcanbeprocured,binBazsays,ifthenonMuslimpowerhasthecapacityto endthestrifeofthetyrant.Thereisnoreligiousbarinvolvedhere.Assistancecanbetaken fromanyquarter,fromJews,Christiansandevenfromidolators.Tobackhisargument,binBaz referstotheProphethavingreceivedthehelpofpaganArabsoncertainoccasionswhenthere wasnoothercourseopentohim.Itisthuspermissible,binBazsays,forMuslimstoseekthe helpoflesserenemiesinordertofightagreaterenemy.HeendshisarticlebyseekingGods protectionfromthestrifeofSaddamHusain,whomhenamesexplicitly.Notonceinhislong diatribedoeshecritiquetheUnitedStatesforitswaronIraq,foritskillingofthousandsofIraqi innocentciviliansthroughitssanctionsagainstthecountryandthroughitsinvasionofthe country.AlsoabsentisevenahintofcriticismoftheSaudiregime.Likewise,thereisnomention ofSaudiArabiasownearlierpassionatesupportforSaddamHusainforhisinvasionofandwar againstIran.[72] ThearticlebyShaikhSalehbinAbdulAzizalShaikh,follows,predictablyenough,onidentical lines,butisarguedinconsiderablymoredetail.alShaikhbeginsbyreferringtotheGulfWar, which,hesays,ledtoimmensedivisionsamongMuslimsworldwide.Hence,hewrites,he deemsitisdutytostatethecorrectIslamicperspectiveonthematter.ThecorrectIslamic perspectivethatheproceedstosetout,is,notsurprisingly,theofficialSaudiline.Praisebeto God,heexclaims,inSaudiArabiawearewitnesstotrueIslamicawakeningandarespreading thetruemessage,whilethemissionariesofthistruemessagearenotvisibleelsewhere.His advicetotheMuslimsoftheworldis,toputitbluntly,tosimplyfollowandacquiesceinofficial Saudipolicy.Inthefaceofstrife,heexplains,Muslimsmustexercisepatientrestraint(sabr) andtolerance(tahammul),followingstrictlythecommandmentsoftheQuranandthesunnah asunderstoodandinterpretedbywhathecallsastheacceptedSunniulama.Theseulama,he tellshisreaders,havelaiddownthatintimesofstrifeMuslimsmustrefrainfrom impulsiveness(jaldbazi),andshould,instead,displaygentleness(naramravi)andmust carefullyexaminemattersintheirentiretyandcomplexitybeforetakinganyaction.Hequotes twostatementsattributedtotheProphettoarguethatineverymatterandforeverydecision Muslimsmustactinthismanner,refrainfromimpulsiveactionsandstayawayfromthosewho actcontrarily.[73] Tolerance,avirtuethatisotherwisegenerallymissinginWahhabipropaganda,isrepeatedly stressedbyalShaikhinhisappealtoopponentsoftheSaudiregime.Toleranceisavery praiseworthyvirtueandnopraiseissufficienttoexpressitsloftiness,hewrites,recommending

thatitmustbedisplayedevenattimesofgreatstrife.Inthefaceofstrifeoneshouldremain composedandnotreactinahurry,headvises,quotingahadithtopresstheargument. AdducingQuranicsupportforthisclaim,hesaysthatinsuchsituationsMuslimsmustnoteven talkaboutmattersrelatedtostrife,but,instead,mustsimplydoastheyaretoldbythepious MuslimrulerandthedoctorsofIslamiclaw.Totalkabouttheprevailingstrifemightthreaten tomaketheproblemevenmoreintractable,hecautions.Noactionmustbetakenthatwould leadtodivisionsamongtheMuslims,hewarns,probablysuggestingthatopposingtheSaudi rulerswouldbetantamounttosettingMuslimsagainsteachother.Allformsofdissensions,he announces,beitbecauseofdifferenceofviews,wordsordeeds,areacurse(azab)that wouldbepunishedbyGod,andwouldinevitablyleadonetostrayfromtheSunnifoldand fromthetruthitself.Hence,onalloccasions,particularlyintimesofstrife,Muslimsmustseek topreserveMuslimunity,refrainfromactingontheirown,and,instead,mustfollowthetrue ulama,whoaresaidtopossessproperknowledgeofIslam,incontrasttoothers.alShaikhhere refersexplicitlytotheSaudicase,claimingthatsinceagenuineIslamicjudicialsystemexistsin thecountry,Muslimstheremustabidestrictlybytheopinionsofthejudgesappointedbythe state,whoseviewsonthecurrentsituationofstrifealShaikhpresumablyrepresents.[74] IncontrasttobinBaz,alShaikhappearstoadmit,albeitindirectly,theexistenceofcertain legitimategroundsfordisaffectionwiththeSaudiregime.Yet,likebinBaz,herulesoutthe legitimacyanyformofvocaloreffectiveoppositiontotheregime.TrueSunnis,heargues, alwaysstresstheunityofthecommunity,andarewellwishersoftheirrulersandconstantly praytoGodforthem,eveniftheywitnessintheirrulersthingsthattheyfinddistasteful.If thispointsitsfirminourhearts,headds,wewillbecountedamongtheSunnis.Thisassertion probablyisprobablyintendedtosuggesttheillegitimacy,onIslamicgrounds,ofoppositionto theSaudiregimedespitetheregimespossibledistastefuldeeds.SuitableIslamicarguments aremarshalledforthisclaim.Muhammadissaidtohaveinsistedthatrulersandtheruledrelate toeachotherinaspiritofcompassion(khairkhwahi),andthetrueSunniulamaaresaidto haveinsistedontheunityofrulersandtheirsubjects.alShaikhadmitsthatsubjectscanadvise theirrulers,butinsiststhatinthistheymustfollowtheruleslaiddownbytheQuranand sunnahandexplainedbythetrueSunniulama.Hequotesahadithtotheeffectthatsuch advicemustnotbedoneopenlyorexplicitly(khullamkhulla).Rather,itmustbedonein private.Further,therulerisnotboundtoaccepttheadvicerenderedtohim.IfMuslimsdonot actinthismannerinrelatingtotheirrulers,alShaikhwarns,theywillbecountedamongthe sinnersforgoingagainstthemethodoftheSunnis.[75] DirectoppositiontoestablishedrulersisagrossviolationofGodswill,alShaikhwrites,forGod issaidtohaveappointedtherulersintheirplace.Itisthus,hesays,arightthattherulerhas overhissubjectsthattheyshouldprayforhim.InthisregardalShaikhquotesanunnamed source,whomhedescribesasalearned,piousSunnischolar,assaying,Whenyousee someoneprayingforhisrulerthenyoushouldknowthathisbeliefsarecorrect.Ifyousee someonecursinghisrulerthenknowthatheisaninnovator(bidaati).Itisincumbenton subjectstoprayfortheirrulersevenifthelatterareimpious,alShaikhadds,tofurtherbuttress

hisargument.ThisstatementisperhapsdirectedattheIslamistoppositiontotheSaudiregime angeredatthecorruptionandlicentiousnessoftheSaudirulersandfortheiralliancewiththe UnitedStates.Oppositiontotherulersisthusequatedwithstrife,evenifsuchoppositionis seenbyitsproponentsasameanstocounterstrife.Hence,revolt(baghawat)againstrulersis presentedaswhollyunIslamic.alShaikhhereapprovinglyreferstoImamAhmadbinHanbal, whoissaidtohavedeclaredthatthereisnobenefitinopposingestablishedrulers.[76] InalShaikhsschemeofthingsthemonarchappearsasallpowerful,althoughinsomesensehe isdependentonthetrueulamaforadvice.Thisadvisoryroleissaidtobetheprerogativeof theseulamabecausetheyaloneareallegedlyqualifiedtodecideonissuesinthelightofIslamic teachings,giventheirowntraining.Theyare,becauseoftheirknowledge,theheirsofthe Prophet.Nooneelse,alShaikhsays,hastherightofmarjiyat,ofdecidingbetweenfaithand infidelity,IslamandnonIslam,inrelationtoanymatter.Explainingthetruth(haqkabayan) is,heasserts,arightthatbelongstotheseulamaalone.Independentactionagainsttherulersis thusruledout.OrdinaryMuslimscanonlyconveytheirviews(inthiscontext,aboutstrife)to theseulama,anditisuptothemtoacceptortorejectthem.Inshort,alShaikhappearsto arguethatanyvocaloppositiontotheSaudiregimeisunIslamicandthat,therefore, opponentsoftheSaudiregimewhoseekitsoverthrowhavedeviatedfromtrueIslam.[77] RecognisingthefactthattheSaudiregimescloselinkswiththeUnitedStates,particularlyits supportfortheAmericanledwaronIraq,hasincensedmanyMuslims,alShaikhseeksto providesuitableIslamiclegitimacyfortheSaudiAmericanalliance.HequotestheQuranic verse,regularlyinvokedbymanyradicalIslamists,thatforbidsMuslimsfrombefriendingJews andChristiansonthegroundsthattheyarefriendsofeachother.IfaMuslimweretobefriend them,alShaikhsays,hewouldbecountedamongthemandwouldbeconsideredan oppressor.HealsowarnsthatMuslimsmustnothaveexcessive(bharpur)loveforkafirs,and normusttheyhelpkafirsagainstMuslims.Yet,inthesamebreath,inordertoarguethatthe SaudiregimehasnotviolatedtheQuraninthisregardinitsalliancewiththeUnitedStates,he saysthatitispermissibleinIslamforMuslimstoworkalongwithkafirsforworldly advancement.[78] alShaikhslengthyandconvolutedessay,whichinitsUrdutranslationrunsintomorethanforty pages,isthuscarefullycraftedtodenythelegitimacyofinternalopponents,Islamistaswellas other,totheSaudiregime.Thereis,asinbinBazspresentation,noexplicitrecognitionatallof therealgrievancesoftheopponentsoftheSaudiregimeandnoranysignofcritiqueofthe regimeforitsinternalandexternalpolicies,inparticularforitsroleinabettingtheAmerican invasionofafellowMuslimcountry.Likeseveralothersuchbooksandtractsthathavebeen broughtoutanddisseminatedbyIndianAhliHadithpublishinghousesinrecentyears,itis intendedasanapologyforanddefenceoftheSaudiregime.ItstranslationintoUrduandits publicationanddistributioninIndiaisaclearindicationoftheimportancethattheSaudiregime anditsclientulamaplaceontheurgentneedtocounteroppositiontotheregimespolicies amongMuslimcommunitiesabroad.IthighlightsthefactthatseveralAhliHadithinstitutionsin

IndiahavebeenwillingtoworkalongwiththeSaudisinpursuanceofthisagenda.Italso indicateshowIslamisconvenientlymarshalled,andinterpretedinoftendiametricallyopposing ways,bytheSaudiregimetosuititsownstrategicandideologicalpurposesabroad.Saudi ArabiaissaidtohavebeenthelargestfinancerofradicalIslamistgroupsabroad,someofwhom, asinthePhilippines,Chechenya,BosniaandKashmir,havetakentoarmedstruggleand terrorismagainstnonMuslimstates.Saudifundedliteratureroutinelyextolssuchgroupsas mujahidsengagedinalegitimateIslamicjihad.Yet,facednowwithitsowninternaland increasinglyvocalIslamistopposition,itconsiderssimilarmovementswithinSaudiArabiaas majorsourcesofstrifeandasclearlyunIslamic.Whether,asaresultofincreasing internationalpressure,theSaudiswillbewillingtoextendthesamelogictoIslamistgroups abroadwhomtheyhavebeenpatronisingformanyyearsisamootpoint. Conclusion Transnationallinksandsupport,asthispaperhassoughttoshow,havebeencentraltothe Saudistrategyofgaininglegitimacy,bothathomeandabroad.Thishastakentheformof aggressivepromotionoftheSaudiformofWahhabiIslam,whichispresentedasthesoleform ofauthenticIslam.InherentinthisclaimistheassumptionthatallotherformsofIslamare,by definition,aberrantorevenantiIslamic.ThepropagationofWahhabismhasbeenakey instrumentforpromotingtheimageoftheSaudiregimeathomeandabroad,forWahhabi propagandaisinextricablylinkedwiththeclaimofSaudiArabiaunderitspresentrulersbeing theonlystateintheworldallegedlyfirmlycommittedtoimplementingIslam. AspartoftheglobalexpansionofWahhabism,numerousIndianMuslimorganisationsand individualshavebeentherecipientofdifferentformsofSaudiassistance,frombothunofficial andofficialsources.SharingmuchincommonwiththeSaudiWahhabis,theAhliHadith, althoughasmallminorityamongthecountrysMuslims,havebeenthelargestbeneficiaryof thislargesse.ThishaspromotedanincreasingaggressivenessonthepartoftheAhliHadith, whohavebeenledtotakeontheirSunni,particularlyDeobandi,rivalswithanewsenseof aggression.ThisclearlyillustratesthefactthatSunniorthodoxy,towhichdifferentMuslim groupslayclaim,isadeeplyfracturedaswellasafiercelycontestednotion.AhliHadithattacks ontheDeobandis,virtuallydismissingthemfromtheSunnifold,havebeenreciprocatedfrom theDeobandisidewithequalpassionandvigour,resultinginheatedpolemicaldebates,with eachsideclaimingtorepresentthesingleauthenticandnormativeIslamictradition,branding theotherasaberrantorworse.Interestingly,Saudifundinghasalsomadeforthenarrowing downand,indeed,eclipsingofdifferencesbetweentheSaudiWahhabisandtheAhliHadithas thelatterseektopresentthemselvesasidenticalwiththeformer.Thishas,althoughtoa limitedextent,alsobeenthecasewiththeDeobandis,whohavesoughttopresentanalternate readingofthelegacyoftheireldersinordertowincrucialSaudisupport.Thus,whileatone leveltheSaudiconnectionhashelpedtopromoteintraSunnidifferences,atanotherlevelithas alsoworkedtopromoteandreinforcetheimageofSaudiArabiaandofitsofficialformof WahhabiIslamastheultimatearbiteroftheIslamicityofdiverseunderstandingsofthefaith

andofSunniorthodoxy.Asthispaperhastriedtoshow,asaresultoftheSaudiconnection, boththeAhlHadithandtheDeobandishaveattempted,intheirownwaysandtovarying degrees,topresentthemselvesassynonymouswith(inthecaseoftheformer)ortoagreat extentsimilarto(inthecaseofthelatter)theWahhabisofSaudiArabia.Thiscompetitive Wahhabisationofbothtraditionshasoccurredinasharplychargedpolemicalcontextandover accesstogenerousSaudipatronage.Inturn,andperhapsunwittingly,thishasledtothe emergenceofabroadconvergencebetweenthetworivalgroupsonthecontentandcontours ofnormativeIslam,asdefinedbySaudiWahhabism,andacommoncommitment,despite theirotherdifferences,toopposingformsofIslamthatbothseeasaberrant. Inthesecomplexways,linkswithSaudipatronsandinstitutionshaveworkedtopromotethe imageandinfluenceoftheSaudiWahhabiulamaandtheSaudiregime.Competitionbetween theDeobandisandtheAhliHadithforSaudipatronagehasresultedinboththesegroups seekingtostresstheirclosenesstoSaudiWahhabiIslamandtotheSaudiregime. Consequently,completelyabsentintheongoingDeobandiAhliHadithpolemicalwarandinthe writingsandspeechesofAhliHadithandDeobandiulamahasbeenanycritiqueofthepolicies oftheSaudiregime,despitewidespreaddissatisfactionamongMuslimsoveritsclosenexuswith theUnitedStates.ThelureofSaudiaidhasmeantthatneithertheAhliHadithnorthe Deobandishavebeenwilling,atleastpublicly,toexpressanycriticismoftheSaudis.This explainswhySaudipolicies,particularlySaudiArabiasassociationwiththeUnitedStates,are nevermentionedintheheatedpolemicaldebatesbetweentheAhliHadithandtheDeobandis, whichremainrestrictedsimplytoissuingchargesandcounterchargesofdisbelief,oftenover minorpointsofritualpractice.ThecontrastwiththeIndianBarelvisandShiasinthisregardis remarkable.NotreceivinganySaudiassistance,theyhavebeenvocalintheiroppositionto SaudiArabia,particularlyforitsalliancewiththeUnitedStates,whichtheyregardaspursuing policiesinimicaltoMusliminterests. Recentevents,particularlytheattacksofSeptember2001,haveresultedingrowingpressureon theSaudistoreigninradicalIslamistgroupsradicalswhomithasgenerouslypatronisedfor severaldecades.ToaddtothisisthefactthatwithinSaudiArabiaitselfagrowingIslamist movementthreatenstochallengetheregimeonitsownterms,critiquingitfornotbeing Islamicenoughandforitsnexuswithimperialistpowers.Thistwinchallenge,fromwithinand without,isboundtoimpactonSaudiArabiasrelationswithvariousMuslimgroupsinIndiaand elsewhere,althoughwhatdirectionthiswilltakeremainstobeseen. [1]Fordetails,seeAbulMukarramAbdulJalil,ImamMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabKiDawat AurUlamaiAhliHadithKiMasai,Varanasi:IdaraalBahuthalIslamiya,2001,pp.37159. [2]ForanIndianShiacritiqueofWahhabism,seeFaroghKazmi,FitnaiWahhabiyat,Lucknow: IdaraiTahzibiAdab,1998. [3]StephenSchwartz,TheTwoFacesofIslam:SaudiFundamentalismandItsRoleinTerrorism, NewYork:AnchorBooks,p.179.

[4]ForaninterestingdiscussionofthepoliticaleconomyofSaudiforeignaidandthepromotion ofSaudiWahhabismabroad,seeAbdulQayyum,AmrikiKhalijiFarsPalisiAurSaudiArab, publishedbytheauthor,Hyderabad,2004. [5]MuhammadJamalBulandshahri,op.cit.,p.10. [6]Fordetails,seeAbdullahBahawalpuri,IkhtilafiMasailMaiHaqoInsafKiRah,Delhi:Darul KutubalSalafiyah,2004. [7]ForAhliHadithattacksagainstthesegroups,seevariousarticlesonwww.ahya.org.Thisisa MumbaibasedAhliHadithwebsite,whichhasclearSaudiconnections,andcarriesnumerous articlespennedbycontemporarySaudiWahhabiulama. http://www.ahya.org/amm/modules.php?...rticles&cid=14 [8]Thus,forinstance,ShakilAhmadMeeruthi,aDelhibasedAhliHadithscholar,claimsthat themuqallids,whoadvocatestrictcompliancewithoneofthefourgenerallyacceptedschools ofSunnifiqh,concoctstatementswhichtheywronglyattributetotheProphet,andinsiststhat thepunishmentforthiscrimeispunishmentinhell(ShakilAhmadMeeruthi,Introduction,in SalahuddinYusuf,TehrikiJihad:JamaatiAhliHadithAurUlamaiAhnaf,Delhi:DarulKitabal Islamiya,2000,p.3). [9]MohammedZeyaulHaque,TheDangerousDivide, htttp://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15072001/sign.htm [10]AbulMukarramAbdulJalil,op.cit.,p.37.TheauthormentionsthathisSauditeacher. AbdurRahmanbinAbdulLatifalShaikhwasinstrumentalingettinghimtowritethebook,and paidtheJamiaSalafiya,Varanasi,theapexmadrasaoftheIndianAhliHadithtopublishten thousandcopiesofthebook(p.12). [11]AbdulAzizbinAbdullahbinBaz,SiratiShaikhMuhammadbinAbdulWahhab,alKitab International,NewDelhi,n.d.,pp.4748. [12]SalehbinGhanimalSadlan,SaudiArabiaKiDawatioTalimiSargarmiyanAurUnkeNataij (translatedbyAbdurRahmanbinAbdulJabbarFarewai),NewDelhi:FarewaiAcademy,2004. [13]Ibid.,pp.1314. [14]Ibid.,p.17.Also,p.82. [15]ibid.,p.81. [16]Ibid.,p.46. [17]Ibid.,p.81. [18]Ibid.,p.17. [19]CitedinMahfuzurRahmanFaizi,ShaikhMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabKeBareMaiDo MutazidNazren,Varanasi:JamiaSalafiya,1986,p.i. [20]CitedinQadri,op.cit.,p.136. [21]CitedinFaizi,op.cit.,p.20. [22]GangohiFatwasonWahhabism,http://www.mail archive.com/msa_ec@l.../msg02780.html [23]Faizi,op.cit.,43.

[24]Faizi,p.37. [25]GangohiFatwasonWahhabism,http://www.mail archive.com/msa_ec@l.../msg02780.html [26]Numani,op.cit.. [27]Interestinglyenough,despiteZakariyasapprovalhereoftheWahhabis,hisFazailiAmal, acompilationofstorieswidelyusedintheTablighiJamaat,isbannedinSaudiArabia.So,too, aretheactivitiesoftheTablighiJamaat,whichisofficiallynotallowedtofunctioninthe Kingdom. [28]Numani,op.cit.,pp.14143. [29]Numani,op.cit.,pp.517. [30]Numani,op.cit.,p.34. [31]Numani,op.cit.,pp.73102 [32]Numani,op.cit.,pp.3747. [33]Numani,op.cit.,pp.10407. [34]Faizi,op.cit. [35]Faizi,op.cit.,pp.iii. [36]Faizi,op.cit.,pp.1039. [37]YasinAkhtarMisbahi,inAbdulSattarRizvi,TablighiJamaatSaudiMuftiKiNazarMai, Delhi:MaktabaNaimiya,n.d.,pp.56. [38]SayyedAsadMadani,KhutbaiSadarat,NewDelhi:FaridBookDepot,2001,pp.620. [39]MohammedZeyaulHaque,op.cit..AnabridgedUrduversionofthebookwaslater publishedinIndiaandPakistan,makingsomewhatthesamearguments.Quotingfromthe booksofnumerousDeobandielders,theauthorclaimedthattheDeobandisheldnumerous beliefsthatwereclearlyunIslamic.Theseincludedbeliefinpantheism(wahdatalwujud),faith intheintercessionarypowersofthedead,andseveralotherSufisticbeliefsthat,theauthor argued,madetheDeobandisgoevenfurther[intheirdisbelief]thanthepolytheistsofMecca (SayyedTaliburRahman,DeobandiAqaidKaTahqiqiJaiza:QuranoHadithKiRoshniMai, Delhi:alHamdPublications,1997).TheauthorissaidtohavealsowrittenabookinArabic againsttheDeobandirelatedTablighiJamaatmovement. [40]AbdulSattarRizvi,op.cit.,pp.810. [41]SayyedHusainAhmadMadani,op.cit.,p.18.Salafisbookappearedintheformofthree volumes,andwasbasedontheauthorsdoctoralthesissubmittedtotheIslamicUniversityof Medina. [42]AhmadIrfani,MuslimScholarsBattleOverQuran,http://www.mail archive.com/msa_ec@l.../msg03381.html [43]Inhisintroduction,ShakilAhmadMeeruthi,theowneroftheDelhibasedpublishinghouse whichpublishedtheIndianeditionofthebook,writesthatthebookwasfirstissuedbythe MaktabalDawahwalIrshadwaTawiyaalJaliyat,theSaudiOfficefortheInvitationand GuidanceofExpatriates,asaresponsetoallegedwrongpropagandabytheDeobandisagainst theAhliHadith. [44]SayyedYusufurRahmanRashid,KyaUlamaAhliSunnatWalJamaatHai?,Delhi:Darul KutubalIslamiya,2001.Asacautionarynotetheauthoraddsthathedoesnotclaimthatall

Deobandisarekafirsandpolytheists.Yet,hesays,theyneedtoberescuedfromtheir ignorance,butadvisesthatthetemptationtoissuefatwasagainstthemmustberesisted. However,headdsthatMuslimsshouldnotpraybehindDeobandiulamawhoholdfalsebeliefs (p.95).Healsodeclaresthatworshippersofthesaints)(pirpujari)andfollowersofpantheism (wahdatalwujud)areapostates(murtads)and,therefore,fittobekilled(wajibulqatl)(p.97). [45]AbuIqbalSalafi,MazhabiHanafiKaMazhabiIslamSeIkhtilaf,Mumbai:IdaraDawatul Islam,1999,pp.67. [46]Ibid.,pp.1620. [47]Ibid.,p.78. [48]http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi...h_bin_baaz.htm [49]http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi...e_72_sects.htm [50]http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi...ykh_albani.htm [51]Thesearticlescanbeaccessedonhttp://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi_jamaat/ [52]http://www.allaahuakbar.net/deobandism/index.htm [53]AhmadIrfani,op.cit. [54]Theinterviewcanbereadandlistenedtoonwww.ahya.org,anIndianAhlIHadithwebsite probablybasedinMumbai,whichseemstohavestrongSaudiWahhabiconnections. [55]MuhammadAqil,FazailiAmalKeNashirKiTauba,Delhi:DarulKutubalIslamiya,n.d., p.35. [56]Ibid.,pp.410. [57]AmongthebooksbyDeobandiulamathatAnaspublishinghousehasnowceased publishingisthesecondvolumeoftheFazailiAmal,animmenselypopularbookamongthe Tablighispennedbythechiefideologueofthemovement,MuhammadZakariya.ItwasAnas father,thefounderoftheIdaraiIshaatiDiniyat,whohadgiventhebookitsnameandwho hadfirstpublishedit.Infact,thepublishinghouserakedinimmenseprofitsfromthisbook, bringingitoutinfourlanguages,Urdu,Arabic,EnglishandFrench.Anasaddedthatheplanned toceasepublishingthefirstvolumeofthebookshortly,confessingthathecoulddonotdoso immediatelyasthatmightbadlyaffecttheprofitsofhispublishinghouse. [58]Ibid.,pp.2035. [59]MuhammadIshaqZahid,MaslaiTaqlid,FatihaKhalfalImam,TalaqiThalitha,Namazi TarawihKeMutaliqAhliHadithAurUlamaiHarimainKaIttifaqiRai,Delhi:DarulKutubal Islamia,n.d.,p.13. [60]See,forinstance,MuhammadJamalBulandshahri,op.cit.. [61]MuhammadJamalBulandshahri,op.cit.,p.40. [62]MuhammadAkhtarYasinQadri,op.cit.,p.119. [63]SayyedAsadMadani,op.cit.,pp.1617. [64]SayyedAsadMadani,op.cit.,pp.1617. [65]SayyedAsadMadani,op.cit.,p.20. [66]SayyedMahdiHasanShahjahanpuri,QuranoHadithKeKhilafGhayrMuqallidinKePachas Masail,NewDelhi:FaridBookDepot,n.d. [67]MahmudHasanBulandshahri,TawassuloIsteghasiyaBaghayrAllahAurGhayrMuqallidin KaMazhab,NewDelhi:FaridBookDepot,n.d.,p.2.

[68]MuhammadJamalBulandshahri,op.cit.,pp.15. [69]SayyedMuhammadSalmanMansurpuri,TehrikiLaMazhabiyat,NewDelhi:FaridBook Depot,pp.115. [70]AbdurRahmanbinAbdulJabbarFarewai(ed.),FitnaSeNijat,Delhi:DarulKitabal Islamiya,2004. [71]Ibid.,pp.110. [72]Ibid.,pp.1026. [73]Ibid.,pp.3545. [74]Ibid.,pp.5057. [75]Ibid.,pp.5065. [76]Ibid.,pp.6267. [77]Ibid.,pp.6163. [78]Ibid.,pp.6879. [1]MuhammadAkhtarYasinQadri,IzalaiFareb:BaJawabTaqlidiShaksiKeAsib,Delhi:Kutub KhanaAmjadiya,2001,pp.82118. [2]ManzurNumani,ShaikhMuhammadbinAbdulWahhabKeKhilafPropagandaAur HindustanKeUlamaiHaqParUskeAsrat,Lucknow:alFurqanBookDepot,1998,p.19.