Employing Joseph Strange CG-CV-CR-CC model to the Malayan Campaign

INTRODUCTION

War is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other1. It is a complex and violent art 2 of organized chaos, typically resulting in immediate bloodshed, destruction and suffering3. Bloodshed, destruction and suffering came to Malaya and Singapore in the early hours of 8th Dec 1941. The Japanese Empire's 25th Army invaded Malaya and rapidly advanced towards Singapore. From the moment the first Japanese

soldier set foot in Malaya, the Allied forces lost the initiative and never regained it throughout the campaign4. In a mere 68 days, the impregnable fortress of Singapore fell, and the manner in which the defeat was dealt to the British Empire led to Winston Churchill calling the fall of Singapore the 'greatest and most humiliating defeat in British history'5.

The Japanese were able to achieve such overwhelming success in the Malayan Campaign for they were acutely aware of the Center of Gravity (CG) and Critical Vulnerabilities (CV) of the allied strategy. The 25th Army systematically

rendered the CGs ineffective by attacking the requirements and support that the CG needed.

The CG-CV concept was theorized by Clausewitz in Vom Kriege, published some 180 years ago. Dr Joseph Strange further refined this and added two other
1 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.3 2 Thomas Gavin. (Mar 2006). Assessing the Joint Pub 5-0 interpretation of Center of Gravity. Will It Help or Confuse Joint Planning?. United States Army, U.S. Army War College. pp.5 3 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.14 4 COL Ong YuLin. (2008). In Search of An Ideal Victory. Bellona Quarterly 1/ 2008 (652). pp.66 5 Masanobu Tsuji. (1997). Japan's Greatest Victory/ Britain's Greatest Defeat, edited by H. V. Howe; translated by Margaret E. Lake. Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount.

elements, Critical Capabilities (CC) and Critical Requirements (CR) in the late twentieth century, giving rise to the CG-CC-CR-CV construct. Although this

construct was not available in World War II, how the eventual campaign plan unravelled itself during the Malayan Campaign seemed to suggest that the Japanese had already understood the inter-related concept.

It is not the intent of this paper to address at length the evolution and definition of Center of Gravity, nor does it seek to dissect and interpret Clausewitz articulation of a CG. Instead, this paper will first establish a common understanding of the term Center of Gravity before exploring Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV model. This construct will then be applied to the only military conflict fought on the soil of Singapore during World War II - the Malayan Campaign.

UNDERSTANDING CG-CC-CR-CV

The study of Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities is becoming increasingly important and relevant in warfare of recent years as economy of effort demands the military to focus their efforts towards some object or factors of decisive importance in order to achieve the greatest effect at the least cost 6. This has

compelled the military to elect a manoeuvrist approach towards the conduct of war to 'circumvent a problem and attack it from a position of advantage rather than to meet it straight on. The goal is to attack the enemy's system - to incapacitate the enemy systematically7.'

6 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1-2: Campaigning. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.41 7 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.37

This is also where Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV model comes in particularly useful for military planners. This model has now become a widely accepted way for staffs to plan military Courses of Action and operations that effectively engage (or protect) centers of gravity8. For one to be able to employ this CG-CC-CR-CV

construct, there is a need to first understand the individual components and how they are intricately inter-related.

Center(s) of Gravity

After Vom Kriege was first published posthumously in 1832, numerous translation followed, and even more interpretations (and misinterpretations!) have emerged. Of interest to many military academics and armed forces is the study of Center(s) of Gravity. One of the more often cited and referenced translations of Vom Kriege was Howard and Paret's On War. In it, they interpreted Clausewitz's

articulation of a CG as 'the hub of all power and movement on which all depends'9.

Military publication across the world have also tried to define what a CG is. Joint Forces Staff College (JFSC) Pub 1 describes a CG as 'the characteristics, capabilities and locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. At the strategic level centers of gravity may include a military force, an alliance, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national

8 CDR Darren E. Anding. (2007). Center of Gravity and the Range of Military Operations: Can An Old Dog Apply to New Tricks?. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.6 9 Carl von Clausewitz, trans. & ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (1984). On War. United States of America: Princeton University Press. pp.595 - 596

strategy itself'10. JFSC's definition acknowledges and differentiates that there exist different CGs at the various levels of war (strategic vis-a-vis operational/ tactical).

The Joint Reference Publication 1 of the Singapore Armed Forces defined CG as [in a military conflict] the hub of all power and movement upon which everything in the conflict depends. It is that characteristic[s], capability or location from which the military force derive their freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight11.

In both JFSC and SAF definitions, CGs are characteristics, capabilities and localities. This is further reinforced by the Marine Corps, where CGs may be

intangible characteristics such as resolve or morale, or they may be capabilities, such as armoured forces or aviation strength, and that CGs may also be localities such as a critical piece of terrain that anchors an entire defense system12. It may also be the capital of a country, where the seat of the government or the ruling elite13 is located.

Amongst the few literatures presented, one can broadly categorise CGs into two: a tangible element, and an intangible element. Tangible CGs are physical. This is in congruence with Schneider and Izzo's interpretation of Clausewitz's articulation of CGs in Book Six of Vom Kriege14. Tangible CGs are easily seen, such

10 Joint Forces Staff College. (2000). The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>> [18 May 2011] 11 Singapore Armed Forces. (Jul 2009). Joint Reference Publication 1 (JRP-1): Dictionary of Military Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms, Singapore Armed Forces, pp.2-42 12 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.46 13 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>> [14 May 2011] 14 James J. Schneider, Lawrence Izzo. (1987). Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity. Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, Sept 1987. pp46-57

as the military force (as defined by JFSC Pub 1), armoured forces, or aviation power (MCDP-1). It has the ability to resist, react and respond. Intangible CGs, on the other hand, are harder to identify. It can be resolve or morale (MCDP-1), national will (JRP-1), alliances (JFSC Pub 1), or political or military leadership. An intangible CG could also be the national strategy itself (JFSC). In essence, intangible CGs are associated with the cognitive responses of people.

Regardless whether a CG is tangible or intangible, it is clear that CG is a source where strength is drawn from: a strength which allows both the tangible or intangible Centers of Gravity to exhibit Machet15.

Critical Capabilities

In the original version of Vom Kriege, Clausewitz specifically uses Machet [power] in association with Schwerpunkt [center of gravity]16, implying that Clausewitz meant for a CG to exhibit certain elements of power, or in other synonymous terms, force, might or strength. This meant that Clausewitz had

intended for a CG to be represent as a source of strength. This strength should possess some ability (or abilities) that makes it a center of gravity in the context of a given scenario, situation or mission17. In other words, what is within this CG that an opponent fear most? What capability does this CG
15 In Vom Kriege, machet was used in the same breath as power. Clausewitz uses machet in association with Schwerpunkt (Center of Gravity), implying that Clausewitz actually meant for a CG to exhibit elements of power, or strength. 16 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog1.pdf>> [14 May 2011] 17 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

brings to the fight? Strange describes that the Critical Capability (CC) must be able to (1) destroy something, (2) seize an objective or (3) prevent you from achieving the mission18.

In addition to Strange's articulation of the aforementioned trio of capabilities, this paper will offer a forth capability: that (4) a critical capability must also be paramount in facilitating the achievement of a mission or an objective.

This is actually an extension of Strange's articulation of the third capability: If two warring belligerents are trying to impose their wills on each other, and if belligerent A carries a capability that prevents belligerent B in achieving his mission, then it follows that belligerent A possesses a critical capability that facilitates him in achieving his mission.

Critical Requirements

For an object to function, it needs certain resources. Similarly, for a CG to continually exhibit the CC, it needs to be supplied or be provided with certain resources. It is what the CG is dependent on for continual existence. This, in the CG-CC-CR-CV construct, is known as Critical Requirements (CR). Strange

describes CRs as (1) conditions, (2) resources, and (3) means that are essential for a Center of Gravity to achieve its critical capability.19 Typically, CRs could range from the tangibles (logistics, time, line-of-communications, intelligence etc.) to the
18 iBid 19 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

intangibles (such as a certain condition, e.g. maritime or air superiority, weather conditions, political alliances).

A simple CG-CC-CR relationship thus far is demonstrated in the following simple illustration. For example, a car is a CG because it offers mobility (CC) from point A to point B. For the car to continue to move, it needs fuel, an operator, good set of tyres (CR). This brings the discussion to the last element in the construct Critical Vulnerabilities.

Critical Vulnerabilities

If CG is equated to a source of strength, then Critical Vulnerability (CV) is translated as a weakness. A vulnerability must satisfy the cardinal requirement of undermining a key strength for it to be considered critical. And the CV should be something that can be attacked effectively20. Again, falling back to Strange's

articulation for consistency, CV are critical requirements, or components thereof, that are deficient, or vulnerable to neutralization or defeat in a way that will contribute to a center of gravity failing to achieve its critical capability21. To neutralise an adversary's strength, one may consider to attack the center of gravity in three fundamental ways: A CG can be defeated by (1) rendering it irrelevant22. This can be achieved by operational art, and attacking the enemy's strategy, as theorized by Sun Tze. Another method is (2) to strip the Center of
20 Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1-2: Campaigning. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. pp.43 21 Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011] 22 iBid

Gravity of the support it needs23:

attack the critical requirements of the CG,

rendering it powerless. A third way of neutralising a CG is (3) to exploit systemic weakness24. The above 3 methods would be explored in detailed in the Malayan Campaign.

THE MALAYAN CAMPAIGN: DEC 1941 FEB 1942

... the fall of Singapore... was.. the worse disaster and largest capitulation of British history ~ Winston Churchill, 1950

The Impregnable Fortress The Singapore Strategy

The British defence policy was to hold the territories of the empire in Asia against all comers25, and the military strategy for the policy was the implementation of what was known as The Singapore Strategy. Central to the strategy was the construction of a modern naval base in Sembawang, and with the main fleet located in the European waters. In time of crisis, a powerful naval squadron would be sent to Asia, and would operate off that base.

In addition, any approach from the North would entail the invading forces to negotiate the dense impassable jungles of Malaya Peninsular. This would buy

sufficient time for British ground reinforcements to arrive from the Middle East. The impassable jungles also meant that armoured tanks were surplus requirements to the overall defence of the British colonies. Approach from the South via the sea, the
23 iBid 24 iBid 25 Brian P. Farrell. (2008), The British Defence of Singapore in the Second World War: Implications for the SAF, Pointer Monograph No. 6: Malayan Campaign 1941-41, Lessons for ONE SAF. Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. pp.4

invading forces would have to content with the 15-in coastal guns that dotted the Southern coastline. The final piece of the puzzle in the Singapore Strategy was the Air Plan that the British had drawn up. The British believed that the Royal Air Force (RAF) fleet of combat aircrafts were ideal against any sea based invasion. By 1941, a total of 11 such air bases were constructed in the Malaya.

Figure 1: The famed 15-inch guns. The gun barrels were 16.5m long. The figure on the left shows British troops pulling through the barrel. The figure on the right shows the guns firing. These guns are capable of engaging targets over 20 miles away (WWII British War Office).

The Road to War

Avoidance of war with the West had been a major tenet of Japanese foreign policy26. However, the USS Panay incident27 and the Nanking Massacre during the second Sino-Japanese war swung Western opinions adversely towards the Japanese Empire. Fearing a growing hegemony of power, western allies, mainly United States, United Kingdom and France, provided war supplies to the Republic of China. Australia also prevented a Japanese government-owned company from

26 LCDR Alan C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.3 27 The incident was an attack on the United States Navy (USN) gunboat USS Panay in the Yangtze River in Dec 1937, outside Nanking. Although the Japanese apologises shortly after the incident, it marked the start of adverse opinions against the Japanese.

taking over an iron mine in Australia, and banned iron ore exports to Japan in 1938 28. In an effort to pressure the Japanese Empire to end hostilities in China, the United States, and the resource-rich British and Dutch East Indies in South East Asia (S.E.A.), began oil and steel embargoes - raw materials essential for the conduct of war - against Japan. Faced with strangulating sanctions by the West, Japan began carrying out plans to secure S.E.A as an intermediate objective in order to complete its conquest of China29.

South East Asia, brimming with essential raw materials such as iron ore, rubber, aluminium, and petroleum reserves30, would prove to be of great importance to Japan if war came to the Pacific. The seizure of S.E.A, would also free Japan from dependence on Western power for raw materials. However, at that time, many countries in S.E.A were under European colonial rule31. Singapore, a small island located at the Southern tip of Malaya, was a vital part of the British Empire and was touted to be an impregnable fortress. Japan had long coveted the European

Colonies in S.E.A - Malaya and Indonesia being the vital resource region; Singapore being a choke point between the Indian and the Pacific Ocean and also a symbol of British power in Asia. With the sanctions imposed by the West, and to support her own agenda in China, war, inevitably, came to S.E.A on December 1941, and the Malayan Campaign began with the landing of the Japanese in Kota Bahru.

Kirimomi Sakusen Japan Invades

28 J. McEwen (May 1940). 221 Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs, Available from: <<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf(LookupVol NoNumber)/3 ~221>> [14 Jun 11] 29 COL Ong YuLin. (2008). In Search of An Ideal Victory, Bellona Quarterly 1/ 2008 (652). pp.3 30 Masano Tsuji. (1961). Singapore: The Japanese Version. New York: St Martin's Press. pp18-19. 31 Countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam were under French Colony, Indonesia went to the Dutch, Malaya and Singapore came under British Colony.

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Figure 2: Operation Plan of Japanese 25th Army. (Available from http://www.onwar.com/maps/wwii/pacific1/1malaya4142.htm)

The Japanese launched an amphibious assault on the north east coastline of Malaya at 0215 hours (local time), on 8th Dec 1941 - an hour and 20 minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbour32. The landings were largely unopposed and the 25th Army, lead by General Yamashita, continued their advance southwards towards Singapore. In response to the Japanese landings, the British launched Force Z, a strategic naval detachment that arrived in Singapore only on 2nd December. Force Z comprised modern battleship HMS Prince of Wales, battle cruiser HMS Repulse, and four other destroyers33. However, Prince of Wales and Repulse sank on 10th

32 The invasion was a series of coordinated military strikes in the Pacific, that was to take place over a seven hour period in the following order: Pearl Harbour, (7 December US time due to international dateline), Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, and Wake Islands. John Keegan (1989). The Second World War, New York: Penguin Books. pp. 256 - 257 33 HMS Electra, HMS Express, HMS Encounter and HMS Jupiter.

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December enroute to intercept Japanese landings under relentless waves of aerial attacks by Japanese torpedo bombers.

The 25th Army went through what was thought to be the impassable buffer of the dense jungle in Malaya. Using a combination of light tanks and the clever use of Japanese-styled blitzkrieg or Kirimomi Sakusen, the allied troops were no match for the Japanese quick and ferocious advance. Despite having conquered 700 miles of jungle terrain, by 31st January, the Japanese had pushed the allied forces out of Malaya, with General Yamashita sitting in the tower of the Johore Palace, overlooking the coast of Singapore. The 25th Army invaded Singapore on 8th

February and within a week, the allied General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya, Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival, surrendered the impregnable fortress.

ANALYSIS OF THE BRITISH

Strategic Level Analysis of CG-CC-CR-CV

Singapore was a strategic Center of Gravity for the British because of its location and what it offered. This is in congruence with location being a CG as articulated earlier. S.E.A. offered abundant raw materials necessary for the conduct of war (CC#1). In addition, Singapore, sitting astride the Malacca straits, controlled the maritime movement between India and China (CC#2). It would prove to be vital in ensuring unhindered movement of palm oil and other war essential raw materials from S.E.A to Japan. Capture of S.E.A., and eventually China, would offer a

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hegemony of the Far East under the guise of their Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere34.

Continuing to hold Singapore to project the symbol of power, while preserving her Asian interest requires a strong defence, augmented with a credible navy. This was evident in the desire to build a naval base large enough to be seen as a 'naval key to the Far East', where it would serve as a 'deterrence against attacks' or as a 'staging point' for counter offensive operations35. At that point in history, the United States was not involved in World War II. The Japanese Empire, aware that the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbour represented the most serious threat to interdict their operations, conducted pre-emptive destruction of the naval vessels, while at the same time launched a near simultaneous amphibious landing in Kota Bahru. Still reeling from the shock of the pre-emptive attack, the Japanese effectively removed the assistance from the United States out of the equation.

At the strategic level, the Japanese Empire also relied on their alliance with the Axis to keep British occupied in the European theatre and prevented the British from diverting their forces into the Far East. The army defending the Northern

Malayan Peninsular were a non-homogeneous mix of Indians, Malays and Australians, all lacking common training and combat experience. When the

Japanese invaded, friction began to surface and finger pointing were apparent. The experienced and combat-harden soldiers were preserving British's european interest
34 Allen, Raymond W. Jr., William H Roedy, Charles L. Hassmann, John J. Outcalt, Allan F. Clark, Jr., Edmund K. Daley, Thomas Q Donaldson IV, Charley P. Eastburn, John R. Elting, Clayton S. Gates. Ronan C. Grady. Jr., Robert A. Hill, Max S. Johnson, Lawrence J. Lincoln, Alfred D. Starbird, Harrison G. Travis. (1956). A Military History of World War II, Volume II, Operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific Theatres, Edited by T. Dodson Stamps. West Point: United States Military Academy. pp.88. 35 Brian P. Farrell. (2005). The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940 1942, Stroud: Tempus. pp. 76-77, 386.

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in the Middle East, and could not be deployed in time for the defence of the Malayan Peninsular. When the Japanese invaded Singapore, they made Bukit Timah one of the first few objectives to be captured as that was where water and ammunition supplies were kept and stored. That accelerated the capitulation of Singapore as they were seen as essential objectives to defeat the city36. Percival had no choice once Bukit Timah was captured. With less than 24 hours of water left for the allied troops, Percival surrendered and the Malayan Campaign came to a close.

CenterofGravity LocationofSingapore CriticalRequirements Strongdefence >Troopsreinforcements > Coalitionof Australians,Malaysand Indiancontingents

CriticalCapabilities >AccesstonaturalresourcesinMalaya. > Vital maritime access along Malacca Straits. CriticalVulnerabilities > Reinforcements from Middle East to beredeployedtoMalayaintime >NonhomogeneousCoalitionmaybea sourceoffriction. > Lack a common training, language barrier.

> U.S. Pacific Fleet requires time to Naval base large enough to host a arriveinMalaya crediblenavalfleet > ForceZlackscarrierbasedsupport/ Aircover. CommandofSingaporeasasymbolof >BukitTimahholdswaterandsupplies. powertotheBritishEmpire Table 1: CG-CC-CR-CV Analysis at the Strategic Level.

Yamashita attacked the CRs by removing the Pacific Fleet out of the equation. In addition, the capture of Bukit Timah also accelerated the capitulation of Singapore by softening the resolve and will of the allied defence. Yamashita also exploited the systemic weakness of the coalition defending the Northern Malaya by a combination of outflanking manoeuvre while relying of the other axis alliances to keep British troops engaged in the Middle East.
36 LCDR Alan C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.3

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Figure 3: Graphical representation of strategic analysis of Allied CG-CC-CR-CV construct.

Operational Level Analysis of CG-CC-CR-CV

The center of gravity at the operational level was the whole defence system of Singapore. The basis of the defence was that the enemy must be prevented from landing or, if he succeed in landing, he must be stopped near the beaches and destroyed or driven out by counter-attack37. This was evident from how the defences were arrayed and the capabilities that the defence system brings. The defence

system must be capable of (CC#1) intercepting Japanese landing as far out at sea as possible, (CC#2) to interdict the Japanese advance and approach via the air, and also to (CC#3) compel the Japanese to fight a protracted war by holding the Japanese ground forces in the dense jungles of Malaya while waiting for reinforcements from the Middle East for the counter attack. And should an attack come from the South via the sea, other than maritime fleet, (CC#4) the coastal guns that dotted the southern coastline were capable of destroying the invading force's naval ships.

37 Arthur Percival. (1949). The War In Malaya. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. pp. 263.

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Although a naval fleet made it in time before the commencement of the Malayan Campaign, it was not at full strength. The initial composition of Force Z included HMS Indomitable, an aircraft carrier. However, Indomitable ran aground off the Caribbean in November 1941 and was not adequately replaced. When launched to interdict the landings, Force Z was spotted, and under relentless wave of aerial attacks by Japanese bombers, sank on 10th December.

In addition, the RAF also lacked sufficient aircrafts in the theatre to provide adequate response. From the initial assessed 586 aircrafts required to defend

against a major invasion, only 18138 were available in Malaya and Singapore by December 1941. The surprise landings on Kota Bahru caught the Allies by surprise, and towns after towns, and airfields after airfields were swiftly taken. With the

sinking of Force Z, both maritime and air power were lost in the initial phases of the campaign.

The Japanese also made the naval guns redundant by invading from the North. Although some of these 15-inch guns had all round traverse capabilities and would be able to thwart the Japanese invasion from the North, they were supplied with Armoured Piercing (AP) rounds, aimed at piercing the hull of naval ships, and not High-Explosive ammunition39. These guns proved to be ineffective in the

defence of Singapore. Another plan, codenamed MATADOR40, drafted in 1937 to

38 Out of the 181 aircrafts, less than 25% were first line aircrafts, such as the Hudson bombers. The majority of the aircrafts were Amercan-supplied Brewster Buffalos and other torpedoe bomber units that were so obsolete (that) they could make no dent against the overwhelming Japanese airpower. Brian P. Farrell (2008), The British Defence of Singapore in the Second World War: Implications for the SAF, Pointer Monograph No. 6: Malayan Campaign 1941-41, Lessons for ONE SAF. Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. pp.10 39 Mike Bennighof. (Jan 2010). The Guns of Singapore. [online]. Available from: <<http://www.avalanchepress.com/GunsOfSingapore.php >> [30 May 11] 40 Ops MATADOR was a plan by the Malayan Command to pre-position forces in Siam and Malaya to counter Japanese amphibious landing. This was not executed as the British Government did

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prevent the likelihood of an assault from the North was never executed. The British Government did not wish to violate the sovereignty of Siam without a prior declaration of war41. Again, the surprise attack meant that the British had lost the initiative in positioning her forces to prevent an invasion.

Figure 4: Japanese advance through Malaya on bicycles confiscated from the civilians of Malaya (National Archives).

The Japanese Kirimomi Sakusen also saw the 25th Army overcame the dense jungle quickly with outflanking manoeuvres on bicycles, complemented with strong frontal pressure using light tanks. After 55 days, Yamashita had covered 700 miles of the Malaya jungle and was ready to invade Singapore. Despite being numerically inferior42, and running critically low on ammunition, Yamashita continued the intense artillery bombardment and advanced into Singapore. The Malayan Campaign

concluded on 15th February 1942, and for the next 3 years and 8 months, Singapore was known as Syonan-To.

not wish to violate the sovereignty of Siam without a prior declaration of war. 41 LCDR Alan C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. pp.7 42 Some literature have the allied command outnumbering the Japanese as much as 3 : 1. While the number was never ascertained, the allied had approximately 140, 000 troops, while the 25th Army numbered in the region of 70, 000.

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CenterofGravity

CriticalCapabilities
>InterceptJapaneselandingsatsea >InterdictJapaneseadvance/approach fromtheair

DefenceofSingapore

>MalayatotheNorthallowstheAllied Forces to hold Japanese infantry advance while waiting for reinforcements. >Navalgunsfacingsouth.

CriticalRequirements ForceZ

CriticalVulnerabilities >Lackcarrierbasedsupport. >RequiresAirbasestolaunchaircrafts. >totalnumberofaircraftlessthan25% as assessed due to other theatre of battles.

Airforce

>SupplyofAProundsonly. Armoured Piercing rounds to engage >LackH.E.Rounds. warships. >Notallgunspossessallroundtraverse capability. > no support due to commitment in othertheatres. > Avoidance of protracted war to Impassablejunglestofightalongbattle prevent deployment of reinforcements whileawaitforreinforcements fromMiddleEast. > Lack of armoured tanks in jungle terrain. Table 2: CG-CC-CR-CV Analysis at the Operational Level

At the operational level, Yamashita neutralised the CG by stripping it of the support it needed: It sank Force Z and rendered the airforce ineffective without proper air bases to operate from. The CC of naval guns were also neutralised with the approach from the North, and the Japanese Army, exploited the systemic weakness of the lack of AP rounds within the coastal guns arsenal. In addition, Yamashita exploited the British's reluctance in executing Ops MATADOR and the Japanese-style blitzkrieg also prevented the long, protracted conflict that the British had hoped for. Singapore. All these led to the neutralisation of the CG in the defence of

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Figure 5: Graphical representation of strategic analysis of Allied CG-CC-CR-CV construct.

CONCLUSION

It is clear that a CG is a source of strength, while a CV is a weakness. It is also clear that CG and CV are not separate dichotomies and are intricately linked by Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV construct. This construct has provided military planners of recent times to develop a systematic approach in identifying the CG and exploiting the CV of a warring opposition. Although Strange's CG-CC-CR-CV construct was not developed until the late twentieth century, the Japanese Army's understanding of Clauswitzian CG in the Malayan Campaign and how they seek to render the CG ineffective by exploiting allied CV were manifested in the campaign plans.

Despite having covered a vast amount of land in a short span of time, and juxtaposing that fatigue with low ammunition and being numerically inferior, Yamashita carefully and systematically stripped the allied CG of the support it needed and exploited systemic weakness within the British defence. The pre-

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emptive attack on Pearl Harbour and the surprise landing in Kota Bahru, coupled with neutralising of Force Z, Yamashita had maritime and aerial superiority throughout the campaign. The British never managed to recover from the opening blow of the campaign.

One need not look further than the Malayan Campaign to see how the analysis and application of the CG-CC-CR-CV construct can help military planners in achieving the objective with the minimal resources.

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REFERENCE Books/ Articles/ Periodicals

Allen, Raymond W. Jr., William H Roedy, Charles L. Hassmann, John J. Outcalt, Allan F. Clark, Jr., Edmund K. Daley, Thomas Q Donaldson IV, Charley P. Eastburn, John R. Elting, Clayton S. Gates. Ronan C. Grady. Jr., Robert A. Hill, Max S. Johnson, Lawrence J. Lincoln, Alfred D. Starbird, Harrison G. Travis. (1956). A Military History of World War II, Volume II, Operations in the Mediterranean and Pacific Theatres, Edited by T. Dodson Stamps. West Point: United States Military Academy. CDR Anding, D. E. (2007). Center of Gravity and the Range of Military Operations: Can An Old Dog Apply to New Tricks?. United States Navy, Naval War College. Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1: Warfighting. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. Department of Navy, United States Marines Corps. (June 1997). MCDP 1-2: Campaigning. United States of America: US Government Printing Office. Farrell, B. P. (2008). The British Defence of Singapore in the Second World War: Implications for the SAF, Pointer Monograph No. 6: Malayan Campaign 1941-41, Lessons for ONE SAF. Pointer, Journal of the Singapore Armed Forces. Farrell, B. P. (2005). The Defence and Fall of Singapore 1940 1942. Stroud: Tempus. Gavin, Thomas. (Mar 2006). Assessing the Joint Pub 5-0 interpretation of Center of Gravity. Will It Help or Confuse Joint Planning?. United States Army, U.S. Army War College. LCDR Headrick, A. C. Headrick, A. C. (Feb 1994). Bicycle Blitzkrieg: The Malayan Campaign and the Fall of Singapore. United States Navy, Naval War College. JFSC Pub 1. (2000). The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 2000, pp 3-8. COL Ong Y. L., (2008). In Search of An Ideal Victory. Bellona Quarterly 1/ 2008 (652). Percival, A. (1949). The War In Malaya. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. Schneider, J., Izzo, L. (1987). Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity. Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, September 1987.

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Singapore Armed Forces. (Jul 2009). Joint Reference Publication 1 (JRP-1): Dictionary of Military Terms, Abbreviations and Acronyms, Singapore Armed Forces. Tsuji, Masano. (1961). Singapore: The Japanese Version. New York: St Martin's Press. Tsuji, Masanobu. (1997). Japan's Greatest Victory/ Britain's Greatest Defeat, edited by H. V. Howe; translated by Margaret E. Lake. Staplehurst, Kent: Spellmount.

Online Resource

Bennighof, Mike. (Jan 2010) The Guns of Singapore. [online]. Available from:<<http://www.avalanchepress.com/GunsOfSingapore.php>> [30 May 11] McEwen, J. (May 1940). 221 Memorandum by Mr J. McEwen, Minister for External Affairs. [online]. Available from: <<http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf(LookupVol NoNumber)/3~221>> [14 Jun 11] Strange, J., Iron, R. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 1: What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity. [online]. Available from:<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/ cog1.pdf>> [14 May 2011] Joseph Strange, Richard Iron. (Dec 2010). Understanding Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities. Part 2: The CG-CC-CR-CV Construct: A Useful Tool to Understand and Analyze the Relationship between Centers of Gravity and their Critical Vulnerabilities. [online]. Available from: <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cog2.pdf>> [14 May 2011]

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BIBLOGRAPHY Books/ Articles/ Periodicals

Bassford, Christopher. (2008).Clausewitz and His Works. US Army War College. Echevarria, Antulio J. (Sept 2002), Clausewitz's Center of Gravity: Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine- Again!. US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute. Fowler, Christopher W. (2002), Center of Gravity Still Relevant After All These Years, United States Army, US Army War College Lee, Seow Hiang. (Apr 1999). Center of Gravity or Center of Confusion: Understanding the Mystique. US Air Force, Air Command and Staff College Mollahan, David J., DeVine, Thomas J. Victor, Ross A., Mayer Edward. (2002). The Japanese Campaign in Malaya: December 1941 February 1942 - A study in Joint Fighting, Joint Forces Staff College.

Online Resource

Blodgett, Brian. Clausewitz and the Theory of Center of Gravity as it applies to Current Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels of Operation, [online] Available from: <<http://sites.google.com/site/blodgetthistoricalconsulting/clausewitz-and-thetheory-of-center-of-gravity-as-it-applies-to-current-strategic-operational-andtactical-levels-of-operation>> Columbia University, East Asian Curriculum Project. (2005). Japan's Quest for Power and World War II in Asia. [online]. Available from: <<http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/japan/japanworkbook/modernhist/wwii.html#e ssay2 >> Eikmeier, Dale C. (2004). Center of Gravity Analysis, Military Review JulyAugust 04. [online]. Available from :<<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ milreview/eikmeier.pdf>> History learning Site (2011), The Fall of Singapore. [online]. Available from: <<http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/fall_of_singapore.htm>> Iron, R. (2001). Viewpoint What Clausewitz (Really) Meant by Center of Gravity', Defence Studies, Volume 1, Issue 3 [online]. Available from:<<http:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/714000041>> Johnson, David Alan. (Jan 2010), Singapore 1941: Fall of the Gibraltar of the East, [online]. Available from:<<http://www.historynet.com/singapore-1941fall-of-the-gibraltar-of-the-east.htm>>

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Stenger Historica. (2002). Clausewitz and Absolute War, [online]. Available from: <<stengerhostorica.com/History/Ehrenrettung/AbsoluteWar.htm>> Wood, Jason D. (Mar 2008). Clausewitz in the Caliphate: Center of Gravity in the Post 9/11 Security Environment, Comparative Strategy, Volume 27, Issue 1 [online]. Available from: <<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495930701839696 >>

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