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Equity Research

Industrial Portfolio Strategy


February 26, 2003

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle
Inflation has caused every secular bear market in U.S. history, and all inflation cycles have been fostered by extreme debt, wars and social programs. This report is the first in a three-part series in which we address the three catalysts for inflationary policies.
The Achilles' heel of supply-side (tax cut) economics is that the effect of new debt is situation dependent. The supply-side premise is that up-front deficits prime the pump for GDP growth, but we find otherwise. Incremental debt is steadily losing its ability to generate new GDP, and reaches zero in the year 2015. The reason is that since 1979 all new debt created each year has simply gone to service existing debt. Of land, labor and capital, we see capital paying the cost of discharging legacy debt via price inflation. Inflation benefits hard assets and companies serving the commodity industries, such as machinery.
Diminishing Returns from Each $1 of New Debt in the U.S. Economy
$1.00 $0.90
The formula:

(The Dollar Increase In Nominal GDP Per $1.00 Increase In Total U.S. Debt)
The trend line intersects $0 when new debt has zero effect on GDP

$0.80 $0.70 $0.60 $0.50 $0.40 $0.30 $0.20 $0.10 $0.00 1966 1968 1969 1971 1972 1974 1975 1977 1978 1980 1981 1983 1984

Dollar Change y/y in U.S. Nominal GDP divided by Dollar Change y/y in Total U.S. Debt equals The Dollar Increase In GDP Per $1.00 Increase In Total U.S. Debt (We take a 4-quarter average.)

"Zero hour" 2015


When $1.00 of new debt has no incremental positive effect on U.S. GDP growth.

1986

1987

1989

1990

1992

1993

1995

1996

1998

1999

2001

2002

2004

2005

2007

2008

2010

2011

2013

* Four quarter moving average of efficiency.

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Barry B. Bannister, CFA (410) 454-4496 bbbannister@leggmason.com

All relevant disclosures appear on pages 8-10 of this report.

2014

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -2-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

To everything there is a season - Ecclesiastes 3:1, Old Testament


The ability of new debt to generate economic growth was not always in a declining trend, as shown in Exhibit (1).

Exhibit (1) - The incremental GDP associated with each $1 of new aggregate U.S. debt
$1.20

Diminishing Returns from Each $1 of New Debt in the U.S. Economy


The formula: Dollar Change y/y in U.S. Nominal GDP divided by Dollar Change y/y in Total U.S. Debt equals The Dollar Increase In GDP Per $1.00 Increase In Total U.S. Debt
(We take a 4-quarter average.)

$1.00

$0.80

$0.60

$0.40

$0.20

$0.00 1953 1955 1957 1959 1960 1962 1964 1966 1967 1969 1971 1973 1974 1976 1978 1980 1981 1983 1985 1987 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 1997 1999
2001

-$0.20

* Each point plotted is a four-quarter moving average .

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Though some analysts have noted the inability of new debt to stimulate growth, we seek the reason. In Exhibit (2), we show that the cause of diminishing marginal returns from new debt may be the fact that since 1979 in an aggregate sense, all new debt created each year has simply gone to the less productive use of servicing cumulative existing debt.

Exhibit (2) - Annual new U.S. debt divided by monetary interest paid on all outstanding debt
New Debt Created per $1.00 of Monetary Interest on All Outstanding Debt
Since 1979, as a result of falling below $1.00, the annual new debt created has simply been applied to pay the interest tab on the existing debt burden outstanding.

$1.20 New Debt per $1.00 of Interest On All Outstanding Debt $1.10 $1.00 $0.90 $0.80 $0.70 $0.60 $0.50 $0.40 $0.30 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977

1979

1981

1983

1985

1987

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

Annual data, last point is 2001 .

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, NIPA accounts, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

1999

2001

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -3-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

Though it is politically expedient for supply-side advocates to attribute the high level of indebtedness to government borrowing, the facts do not support that contention. The fastest rising sector for debt has been financial debt, shown in Exhibit (3), which rose from last place to first place in total U.S. debt during the Post-WW2 period.

Exhibit (3) - Market share and levels of U.S. debt, by sector the rise of financial sector debt.
Market Share of Total Systemwide U.S. Debt, By Sector, 1Q 1951 to 3Q 2002
100%
State & Local Govts.

Total Systemwide U.S. Debt Outstanding, By Category, 1Q 1951 to 3Q 2002


$10,000

Financial sector debt in dollars (red line) went from last place to first place in the post-war period.

To first.

80%
Business Total

$1,000 $ Billions

60%
Household Total

$100

40%
Federal Government

1952Q1

1955Q1

1958Q1

1961Q1

1964Q1

1967Q1

1970Q1

1973Q1

1976Q1

1979Q1

1982Q1

1985Q1

1988Q1

1991Q1

1994Q1

1997Q1

Foreign

Financial Sector

0% 1952Q1 1955Q1 1958Q1 1961Q1 1964Q1 1967Q1 1970Q1 1973Q1 1976Q1 1979Q1 1982Q1 1985Q1 1988Q1 1991Q1 1994Q1 1997Q1 2000Q1

Financial Sector Federal Government Business Total

Foreign Household Total State & Local Govts.

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, NIPA accounts, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

In our view, inflation is no more right or wrong than night is wrong versus day, or winter is wrong versus summer. To everything there is a season, and inflation is a rational economic response to social burdens, debt and war. In Exhibit (4), we show that U.S. debt relative to annual output is currently at a level equal to that which existed in 1933, in the depths of the Great Depression, and just before one of the largest reflations in U.S. history.

Exhibit (4) - Total U.S. debt as a multiple of nominal U.S. GDP (GNP prior to 1946)
Total U.S. Debt In All Sectors of the Economy Divided By U.S. Nominal GDP (GNP Pre-1946)
The Highest Level Since 1933
3.00 2.75 2.50 2.25 2.00 1.75 1.50 1.25 1.00 1916 1919 1922 1925 1928 1931 1934 1937 1940 1943 1946 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (or Office of Business Economics) debt data pre-1952. Federal Reserve Flow of Funds debt data 1952 and onward. 2.87x in 1933, a year before FDR nationalized the domestic monetary gold supply and devalued the U.S. dollar by approximately 40% by re-pegging the amount of gold into which dollars could officially be exchanged (Only foreign dollar holders could exchange dollars for gold, and then only until 1971, when the gold window closed).

3.25

2.93x in the four quarter average through 3Q02; that was the first time debt exceeded the 1933 peak as a multiple of GDP (Was GNP in 1933).

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, NIPA accounts, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.

2000Q1

20%

$10

From last...

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -4-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

The reflation of 1933 to 1951, which contributed to a secular bear market for the S&P stock market composite that had actually begun in 1929, effectively discharged the accumulated legacy debt, as shown in Exhibit (5).

Exhibit (5) - Inflation as a response to excessive U.S. debt the historical record
Total U.S. Debt /GDP (GNP Pre-1946) vs. U.S. Consumer Price Inflation (10 yr. Moving Avg.)

3.00 2.80

10.0%

8.0%
2.60 2.40 2.20 2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40

6.0%

4.0%

2.0%

0.0%

-2.0%
1.20 1.00 1916 1919 1922 1925 1928 1931 1934 1937 1940 1943 1946 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000

-4.0%

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

In the current era, we see a mandate to stimulate the economy to service debt, shown in Exhibit (6). When the rate of nominal economic growth is insufficient to service legacy debt, our view is that the appropriate policy response is overstimulation, similar to the 1960s and 1970s. We see inflationary monetary and fiscal policies in the coming years.

Exhibit (6) - The unsustainable divergence between nominal GDP growth and debt/GDP
3.0x

Inflation

De/Disinflation

17.0% 15.0%

U.S. Total Debt divided by Nominal GDP

2.5x 13.0% 2.0x


(2) Rising debt and falling GDP growth to service that debt = an unsustainable divergence!

11.0% 9.0%

1.5x

7.0% 5.0%

1.0x

(1) Strongly stimulative monetary and fiscal policy that boosted real GDP and inflation. But that did address the debt problem!

(3) Thus, a "mandate to stimulate."

3.0% 1.0%

0.5x 1962 1964 1965 1967 1968 1970 1971 1973 1974 1976 1977 1979 1980 1982 1983 1985 1986 1988 1989 1991 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 2000 2001

U.S. Total Debt Divided By Nominal GDP (Left)

Y/Y Change U.S. Nominal GDP (Right)

Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

U.S. Nominal GDP Yr./Yr. % Change

U.S. Consumer Price Inflation, 10-year Moving Average

Total U.S. Debt / GDP (GNP pre-1946)

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -5-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

The relative price strength of the S&P stock market composite (stocks) versus the Producer Price Index for All Commodities (commodities) is shown in Exhibit (7). The machinery stocks outperformed the S&P stock market composite most frequently and strongly during the falling (blue) bar periods in which stocks under-performed commodities. In our view, the returns accruing to commodities were not just relative, but were also attractive in an absolute sense. In the three periods of commodity outperformance, which were 1906-1920, 1929-1948 and 19681982, commodities rose at an average annual rate of 7.0%, 3.0% and 7.7%, respectively, and stocks in the same periods rose at an average rate of only 0.0%, 1.7% and 2.5%, respectively. Conversely, in the three periods of equity out-performance versus commodities 1921-1929, 1949-1968 and 1983-2000, stocks rose at an average annual rate of 17.1%, 10.9% and 14.2%, respectively, and commodities rose at an average rate of only (0.2)%, 1.4% and 1.6%, respectively. For the 2002 to 2015 period, we see the S&P 500 achieving an average annual price return of only 1.8%, and the PPI Commodities index average annual return at a level of 6.9%.

Exhibit (7) - The relative strength of the stock market versus commodities conforms to inflation
100

U.S. Stock Market Relative to The Commodity Market, 1870 to 2015E


Rising green bars = Stocks beat commodity returns, inflation eventually falls. Falling blue bars = Commodities beat stock returns, inflation eventually rises. Stocks & commodities alternated seven times for periods averaging 18 years.
LBJ's War on Poverty + Vietnam 1960s; "Go-Go" Wall Street Ends, Nixon closed gold window 1971. Yom Kippur War, OPEC '73 embargo ; Iran fell '79. Tech Bubble bursts, U.S. $ weakens, commodity strength begins, 2000-02.

10
Panic of 1907, a bank crisis & stock market crash.

Gold nationalized, US$ devalued in 1933-34. FDR's "New Deal" & inflation begins. Crash of 1929
World War One in 1914 to 1918.

MidEast wars, Asian energy demand, U.S. twin deficits, rangebound market, inflation, easy Fed policy.

World War Two 1939 to 1945

Post-Civil War Reconstruction occupation ends in 1877, post-war disinflationary boom in U.S. industry, bull market.

Post-WW 1 commodity bubble bursts, deflation ensues in 1920, bull market begins.

Post-WW 2 & Korea commodity & inflation bubble bursts in 1951, disinflation ensues, "Happy Days" bull market begins.

OPEC overplays hand and oil collapses 1981, Volcker stops inflation 198182, then Reagan tax cuts, disinflation & bull market begin.

2002 to 2015 are Legg Mason Estimates

0 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010E

U.S. Stock Market Composite Price index divided by the PPI Commodities Price Index, years 1871 to 2015E

Source: National Bureau of Economic Research Macro-Economic database, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Legg Mason format and Legg Mason estimates for 2003 to 2015.

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -6-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

In Exhibit (8) we show the PPI Commodities index on a log scale, denoting inflation cycles in the boxes. Note that the S&P Machinery group outperforms during commodity (and consumer price) inflation, shown in Exhibit (9).

Exhibit (8) - Producer Price Index for All Commodities, 1870 to 2015E, log scale
1000 C 2 B 100 A +166% 1
+4% 1981 to 2002 +31%

+134%

+204%
LM Ests. 1965 to 1981 2003 to 2015E

(50)%

+219%

(58)%

10
1872 to 1897 1898 to 1920 1920 to 1932 1933 to 1951

1951 to 1964

1 2010E
1.60
1933 to 1951 1951 to 1964 1965 to 1981 1981 to 2002 2003 to 2015E

1870

1880

1890

1900

1910

1920

1930

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990
C

PPI- All Commodities Index


Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Legg Mason estimates for 2002 to 2015.

Exhibit (9) - Machinery stocks outperform during periods of commodity (and CPI) inflation
A 1 B 2

1000

2000
2012E

1.40 1.20

100

1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40


Inflation DisInflation Inflation DisInflation Inflation

10

0.20 0.00

1 2007E 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002

PPI- All Commodities Index (Left axis)

Machinery Stock Index Relative To S&P 500

Source: Standard & Poors Compustat (Factset Research Systems Inc.), U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Legg Mason format and Legg Mason estimates for 2003 to 2015.

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -7-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

Our view is that of the three factors of production, which are land, labor and capital, it is capital et al. that is most likely to pay the piper for inflation in the 2002 to 2015 period. We believe that the burden of deflation must be borne by one or more of the factors of production to stave off the credit risk associated with servicing a high level of indebtedness. For example, commodities (i.e., land) may be cheapened to lower input costs and magnify profit margins in order to facilitate debt service. Or, labors wages may be cheapened to lower costs and enhance profits for the same purpose. Lastly, capital as a whole especially instruments of debt may fall in value (deflate) in order to relieve the burden of indebtedness. Examining each factor of production and our reasoning: (1) Land and the commodities under the land are unlikely to absorb the deflation necessary to mitigate the burden of debt. Industries producing commodities have already suffered from critically low levels of investment as a result of poor returns (i.e., no pricing power) for commodity producers since about 1980, and we believe land itself is unlikely to be allowed to deflate since so much of the financial debt in the system is underpinned by residential and commercial land as collateral (ex., the Fannie Mae effect in the residential sector). (2) Labor is unlikely to pay the piper, in our view, since people vote on a per capita not a pro rata wealth basis, and we perceive that politicians of all stripes are especially keen to avoid charges of money politics in this era of populist campaign finance reform. (3) Capital has benefited the most from disinflationary policies via the bull markets associated with P/E expansion (equities) and declining real and nominal interest rates (bonds). We believe that capital has few friends in this era of deflated 401Ks and dashed investor confidence. To make matters worse, we perceive a widespread belief among investors that inflation the second greatest enemy of capital (the first being expropriation, in our view) is dead. Given inflations Lazarus-like history of revival, we are on guard for the possibility that unprotected, unhedged capital may pay the price for discharging new and legacy debt via inflation. As we have stated, inflation has been the root cause of every secular bear market for financial assets in U.S. history, and all inflation cycles have been fostered by government social programs, extreme debt, and wars. It is our intention to focus on those three drivers of inflation in three separate reports. This report has focused on new and legacy debt as one reason why policymakers may choose inflation as a remedy. We expect the next report in this series to focus on prolonged wars (even ones of low intensity, such as Vietnam or the War on Terrorism) as a source of inflation. The last report in our series is expected to address high-cost, government-sponsored social programs such as FDRs New Deal, LBJs Great Society, and, for this generation, the underfunded Baby Boom Medicare and Social Security liabilities. Since chance does favor the prepared mind, we recommend owning a long-term hedge position in hard assets, commodity producers, and companies such as Caterpillar Inc. (CAT $45.82 Buy), Deere & Company (DE $41.75 Buy), and Joy Global Inc. (JOYG $10.72 Buy) which serve the commodity-producing company and country markets. We expect the S&P 500 index relative to commodity prices to fluctuate widely around a declining trend that began in 2000, and we do not see a sustained change in direction that consistently favors equities until around 2015.

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -8-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc. makes a market in the shares of Joy Global Inc. (JOYG). Legg Mason Wood Walker Inc. or an affiliate expects to receive or intends to seek compensation for investment banking services from Joy Global Inc. in the next three months. Joy Global Inc. is a Legg Mason Select List compelling idea.

Source: Blue Matrix, Legg Mason

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -9-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

Source: Blue Matrix, Legg Mason

Source: Blue Matrix, Legg Mason

Zero Hour 2015: Diminishing Returns from New Debt, and the Inevitability of a U.S. Inflation Cycle February 26, 2003 -10-

Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

Additional information is available upon request

The information contained herein has been prepared from sources believed reliable but is not guaranteed by us and is not a complete summary or statement of all available data, nor is it considered an offer to buy or sell any securities referred to herein. Opinions expressed are subject to change without notice and do not take into account the particular investment objectives, financial situation or needs of individual investors. Employees of Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. or its affiliates may, at times, release written or oral commentary, technical analysis or trading strategies that differ from the opinions expressed within. No investments or services mentioned are available in the European Economic Area to private customers or to anyone in Canada other than a Designated Institution. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc. is a multidisciplined financial services firm that regularly seeks investment banking assignments and compensation from issuers for services including, but not limited to, acting as an underwriter in an offering or financial advisor in a merger or acquisition, or serving as a placement agent for private transactions. Of the securities we rate, 47% are rated Buy, 49% are rated Hold, and 4% are rated Sell. Within the last 12 months, our firm has provided investment banking services for 27%, 18% and 19% of the companies whose shares are rated Buy, Hold and Sell, respectively. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.'s research analysts receive compensation that is based upon (among other factors) Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.'s overall investment banking revenues. Our investment rating system is three tiered, defined as follows: BUY - We expect this stock to outperform the S&P 500 by more than 10% over the next 12 months. For higher-yielding equities such as REITs and Utilities, we expect a total return in excess of 12% over the next 12 months. HOLD - We expect this stock to perform within 10% (plus or minus) of the S&P 500 over the next 12 months. A Hold rating is also used for those higher-yielding securities where we are comfortable with the safety of the dividend, but believe that upside in the share price is limited. SELL - We expect this stock to underperform the S&P 500 by more than 10% over the next 12 months and believe the stock could decline in value. We also use a Risk rating for each security. The Risk ratings are Low, Average, and High and are based primarily on the strength of the balance sheet and the predictability of earnings.

Copyright 2003 Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc.

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410 + 454 + extension
Ira H. Malis, Director of Research, x4144 Richard E. Cripps, CFA, Equity Strategy & Marketing, x4472

Financial Services
Banks & Thrifts 8046985979 Adam C. Barkstrom, CFA x5247 David J. Bishop, CFA 8046985948 Bryce W. Rowe x5883 Marie-Louise Watson, CFA Non-Bank Financials x5505 Christopher C. Brendler, CFA x4546 Timothy Ferriter Regional Banks x5668 Christopher M. Mutascio x4661 Ben Ram Property/Casualty Insurance 2129720240 Michael G. Paisan 2129721426 Marisol Myung Life Insurance 2129720859 Thomas Gallagher, CFA 2129721012 Kevin Feder

Business & Consumer Services


Information Processing & Employment Services x4098 Matthew V. Roswell, CFA x5867 Eric G. Thompson, CFA Hardlines Retail x5539 David A. Schick Softlines Retail x5147 Holly R. Gustafson, CFA x5895 Maureen Caldaro x4834 Thomas D. Shaw Education and e-Learning 2164301733 Robert L. Craig 2164301734 Jerry R. Herman, CFA 2164301726 Drew Crum Food & Beverage 7038366253 George I. Askew 7038361744 Anthony T. Borck 2129721422 Mark Swartzberg 2129721937 Eric Cheng Internet Consumer Services 7033662282 Thomas S. Underwood, CFA x4317 Brian Zabora

Technology
Information Technology Services x5093 William R. Loomis, CFA x5906 George A. Price, Jr. x5940 Glenn M. Guard x5610 Shlomo H. Rosenbaum Financial Technology x4807 Daniel R. Perlin, CFA x4662 David E. Saunders Data Storage Technology 7038360156 Clay Sumner 7038361744 Anthony T. Borck Infrastructure Software x4316 Todd C. Weller, CFA x5173 Christopher D. Wright Semiconductors 2146473516 Cody G. Acree, CFA 2146473514 Blake Fischer

Real Estate
Retail REITs x5018 David M. Fick, CPA x5520 Elizabeth Watson, CPA x4143 Nathan Isbee Office/Industrial REITs x5018 David M. Fick, CPA x5175 Kenneth S. Weinberg, CFA x5896 Rick Rubin, CFA, CPA x4143 Nathan Isbee Health Care x5142 Jerry L. Doctrow x5896 Rick Rubin, CFA, CPA Multifamily x4131 Rod Petrik x5873 Tamara J. Fique Lodging x4131 Rod Petrik x5862 David Rosenberg, CPA Real Estate Strategy x5149 Glenn R. Mueller, Ph.D.

Telecommunications
Telecom/ILECs x4842 Michael J. Balhoff, CFA x5775 Christopher C. King x5662 Bradley P. Williams Telecom & Media/Regulatory 2027781595 Blair Levin 2027781978 Rebecca Arbogast 2027784341 David Kaut Telecom/Competitive x4333 Daniel Zito x5138 Bradley J. Wilson Wireless Services 2027781975 Craig A. Mallitz x5917 Sean P. Butson, CFA x5669 Tahmin Clarke Broadband Equipment x5176 Timm P. Bechter, CFA

Health Care
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