http://en.wikipedia.

org/wiki/Catch22
Among other things, Catch-22 is a general critique of bureaucratic operation and reasoning. Resulting from its specific use in the book, the phrase "Catch-22" is common idiomatic usage meaning "a no-win situation" or "a double bind" of any type. Within the book, "Catch-22" is a military rule, the self-contradictory circular logic that, for example, prevents anyone from avoiding combat missions. In Heller's own words: There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a concern for one's safety in the face of dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. Orr would be crazy to fly more missions and sane if he didn't, but if he were sane he had to fly them. If he flew them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful whistle. Everyone in the squadron presumes that Orr is a simpleton, as evidenced by his optimism, despite the increasing numbers of missions, and the fact that when he crashes his plane into the sea, M&M Enterprises has stolen the CO2 cylinders from the life jackets: "Orr hasnt got brains enough to be unhappy." Yossarian says. However, he is eventually revealed to have had the clearest view of the absurdities of their situation through his carefully planned escape to Sweden. Although he has been shot down more times than anyone else in the unit (17), he continues to fly and does not appear afraid of the missions, and he is therefore assumed to be crazy. They do not know that this is part of his plan to escape the war. Doc Daneeka uses Orr as an example, when explaining the grounding of the insane and Catch-22. Orr is insane for not requesting to be grounded, even though he is shot down every mission he flies. If he did request to be grounded he would be considered sane for realizing the risks of continuing to fly. The Catch-22 is that you can only be grounded if you request it, but by requesting it you are considered sane.

The simplicity of humanic sanity is exasperated by the SIC - Satanic Intellectual Complicity of circular logic entertained by the innumerable SEE PIG Satanic Elite Entrepreneur in excruciatingly obtrusive exasperation blanketing the ultimate sanity of the Golden Rule simply due the natural terrorizing effect it would have upon the Satanic if not securely caged by SS - Satanic Sapience, hence everything is legal except HOLSTERED - Humanic Organized Logically Sincere Terrorists Enforcement Renegades as the Struggle of Humankind exists perpetually. The police will complain because witnesses will not come forth crime runs rampant while the witnesses complain crime runs rampant because the police wont come forth
Jesus said onto the masses of dumb bi asses come 4th and did with the Satanic on 1st verily lost over and over again to the Bible as many times.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring_a_Ring_o%27_Roses Ring-a-ring-a-roses, A pocket full of posies; Hush! hush! hush! hush! Were all tumbled down. Circular Logic smells like roses A docket full of posers Hush! Hush! Hush! Hush! Lullaby Good night nurse good by Never smelled the roses dropped By the agin the wind farters Satanic imperialist righteous Christians Gone with the wind smarter

Hush! Hush! Hush! Hush! Speak no more of pathetic fools They spoke bad of us used as tools No Johnny Okay Johnny pee on their graves Not nice in respect, but decidedly right in retrospect

OBLONG SLICED Orwellian Boomerang Lateral Obvious Neutering Gratuitously Satanic Lucid Imperialist Christians Elusive Doublethink www.tko3.com Newspeak every day headlines Naked News Thy Satanic Charlatan to Kingdom come astute convincers of Belief set out to have the meek believe they will inherit the earth. www.McSBIT.com Meek convinced So Beat It Terrorists War on Terrorists declared and now identified for our loyal armed forces and police to take them out. Its the law eh?
In his essay Politics and the English Language (1946), Orwell wrote about the importance of honest and clear language and said that vague writing can be used as a powerful tool of political manipulation. In Nineteen Eighty-Four he described how the state controlled thought by controlling language, making certain ideas literally unthinkable. The adjective Orwellian refers to the frightening world of Nineteen Eighty-Four, in which the state controls thought and misinformation is widespread. Several words and phrases from Nineteen Eighty-Four have entered popular language. Newspeak is a simplified and obfuscatory language designed to make independent thought impossible. Doublethink means holding two contradictory beliefs simultaneously. The Thought Police are those who suppress all dissenting opinion. Prolefeed is homogenised, manufactured superficial literature, film and music, used to control and indoctrinate the populace through docility. Big Brother is a supreme dictator who watches everyone. Mandate Catch-22 Circular logic If we thought the governments were satanic we would be considered crazy! If we Genocided them they would think we were crazy, that begs the question who is crazy? Oops debatable if a Catch -22 Circular logic Okay guys raise the dead assuredly a possibility of the once passive comatose that rose to do the right thing perceived at the time eh? Perhaps before we waste our time on perpetual debates with Circular logic why not take a little time to sip the coffee and smell the roses. Hell we were right in the first place hey look big Dick says Jane Spot the one in the bush Lets call it Bush Lets kill it Jovial idea Jane right after a Spot of tea.

Hush! Hush! Hush! Hush! No more Wheres our money? Kill the Bilderbergs

And the Humanic lived happily ever after

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question Begging the question (or petitio principii, "assuming the initial point") is a type of logical fallacy in which the proposition to be proven is assumed implicitly or explicitly in the premise. The first known definition in the West is by the Greek philosopher Aristotle around 350 BC, in his book Prior Analytics, where he classified it as a material fallacy. Begging the question is related to the circular argument, circulus in probando (Latin, "circle in proving") or circular reasoning, though these are considered absolutely different by Aristotle.[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regress_argument The argument is usually attributed to Sextus Empiricus, and has been restated by Agrippa as part of what has become known as "Agrippa's Trilemma". The argument can be seen as a response to the suggestion in Plato's Theaetetus that knowledge is justified true belief. [edit]Structure Assuming that knowledge is justified true belief. Then: Suppose that P is some piece of knowledge. Then P is a justified true belief. The only thing that can justify P is another statement let's call it P1; so P1 justifies P. But if P1 is to be a satisfactory justification for P, then we must know that P1. But for P1 to be known, it must also be a justified true belief. That justification will be another statement - let's call it P2; so P2 justifies P1. But if P2 is to be a satisfactory justification for P1, then we must know that P2 is true But for P2 to count as knowledge, it must itself be a justified true belief. That justification will in turn be another statement - let's call it P3; so P3 justifies P2. and so on, ad infinitum. [edit]Responses The above presents us with three possible counter-arguments: some statements do not need justification; the chain of reasoning loops back on itself; or the sequence never finishes. [edit]Foundationalism Perhaps the chain begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Such beliefs are called basic beliefs. In this solution, which is called foundationalism, all beliefs are justified by basic beliefs. Foundationalism seeks to escape the regress argument by claiming that there are some beliefs for which it is improper to ask for a justification. (See also a priori.) This would be a claim that some things (basic beliefs) are true just because. Foundationalism is the belief that a chain of justification begins with a belief that is justified, but which is not justified by another belief. Thus, a belief is justified if and only if: it is a basic/foundational belief, or it is justified by a basic belief it is justified by a chain of beliefs that is ultimately justified by a basic belief or beliefs. Foundationalism can be compared to a building. Ordinary individual beliefs occupy the upper stories of the building; basic, or foundational beliefs are down in the basement, in the foundation of the building, holding everything else up. In a similar way, individual beliefs, say about economics or ethics, rest on more basic beliefs, say about the nature of human beings; and those rest on still more basic beliefs, say

about the mind; and in the end the entire system rests on a set of beliefs, basic beliefs, which are not justified by other beliefs. [edit]Coherentism Alternatively, perhaps the chain loops around on itself, forming a circle. In this case, the justification of any statement is used, after a long chain of reasoning, in justifying itself, and the argument is circular. This is a version of coherentism. Coherentism is the belief that an idea is justified if and only if it is part of a coherent system of mutually supporting beliefs (i.e., beliefs that support each other). In effect Coherentism denies that justification can only take the form of a chain. Coherentism replaces the chain with a holistic web. The most common objection to nave Coherentism is that it relies on the idea that circular justification is acceptable. In this view, P ultimately supports P, begging the question. Coherentists reply that it is not just P that is supporting P, but P along with the totality of the other statements in the whole system of belief. Coherentism accepts any belief that is part of a coherent system of beliefs. In contrast, P can cohere with P1 and P2 without P, P1 or P2 being true. Instead, Coherentists might say that it is very unlikely that the whole system would be both untrue and consistent, and that if some part of the system was untrue, it would almost certainly be inconsistent with some other part of the system. A third objection is that some beliefs arise from experience and not from other beliefs. An example is that one is looking into a room which is totally dark. The lights turn on momentarily and one sees a white canopy bed in the room. The belief that there is a white canopy bed in this room is based entirely on experience and not on any other belief. Of course other possibilities exist, such as that the white canopy bed is entirely an illusion or that one is hallucinating, but the belief remains well-justified. Coherentists might respond that the belief which supports the belief that there is a white canopy bed in this room is that one saw the bed, however briefly. This appears to be an immediate qualifier which does not depend on other beliefs, and thus seems to prove that Coherentism is not true because beliefs can be justified by concepts other than beliefs. But others have argued that the experience of seeing the bed is indeed dependent on other beliefs, about what a bed, a canopy and so on, actually look like. Another objection is that the rule demanding "coherence" in a system of ideas seems to be an unjustified belief. [edit]Infinitism Infinitism argues that the chain can go on forever. Critics argue that this means there is never adequate justification for any statement in the chain. [edit]Skepticism Skeptics reject the three above responses and argue that beliefs cannot be justified as beyond doubt. Note that many skeptics do not deny that things may appear in a certain way. However, such sense impressions cannot, in the skeptical view, be used to find beliefs that cannot be doubted. Also, skeptics may not deny that, for example, many laws of nature give the appearance of working or that doing certain things give the appearance of producing pleasure/pain or even that reason and logic seem to be useful tools. Skepticism is in this view valuable since it encourages continued investigation.[1] [edit]Synthesized approaches [edit]Common sense The method of common sense espoused by such philosophers as Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore points out that whenever we investigate anything at all, whenever we start thinking about some subject, we have to make assumptions. When one tries to support ones assumptions with reasons, one must make yet more assumptions. Since it is inevitable that we will make some assumptions, why not assume those things that are most obvious: the matters of common sense that no one ever seriously doubts. "Common sense" here does not mean old adages like "Chicken soup is good for colds" but statements about the background in which our experiences occur. Examples would be "Human beings typically have two eyes, two ears, two hands, two feet", or "The world has a ground and a sky" or "Plants and animals come in a wide variety of sizes and colors" or "I am conscious and alive right now". These are all the

absolutely most obvious sorts of claims that one could possibly make; and, said Reid and Moore, these are the claims that make up common sense. This view can be seen as either a version of foundationalism, with common sense statements taking the role of basic statements, or as a version of Coherentism. In this case, common sense statements are statements that are so crucial to keeping the account coherent that they are all but impossible to deny. If the method of common sense is correct, then philosophers may take the principles of common sense for granted. They do not need criteria in order to judge whether a proposition is true or not. They can also take some justifications for granted, according to common sense. They can get around Sextus' problem of the criterion because there is no infinite regress or circle of reasoning, because the buck stops with (see also idiom) the principles of common sense. [edit]Critical philosophy Another escape from the diallelus is critical philosophy, which denies that beliefs should ever be justified at all. Rather, the job of philosophers is to subject all beliefs (including beliefs about truth criteria) to criticism, attempting to discredit them rather than justifying them. Then, these philosophers say, it is rational to act on those beliefs that have best withstood criticism, whether or not they meet any specific criterion of truth. Karl Popper expanded on this idea to include a quantitative measurement he called verisimilitude, or truth-likeness. He showed that even if one could never justify a particular claim, one can compare the verisimilitude of two competing claims by criticism to judge which is superior to the other. [edit]Pragmatism The pragmatist philosopher William James suggests that, ultimately, everyone settles at some level of explanation based on ones personal preferences that fit the particular individual's psychological needs. People select whatever level of explanation fits their needs, and things other than logic and reason determine those needs. In The Sentiment of Rationality, James compares the philosopher, who insists on a high degree of justification, and the boor, who accepts or rejects ideals without much thought: The philosophers logical tranquility is thus in essence no other than the boors. They differ only as to the point at which each refuses to let further considerations upset the absoluteness of the data he assumes. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatism Pragmatism is an American philosophical tradition centered on the linking of practice and theory. It describes a process where theory is extracted from practice, and applied back to practice to form what is called intelligent practice. Important positions characteristic of pragmatism include instrumentalism, radical empiricism, verificationism, conceptual relativity, a denial of the factvalue distinction, a high regard for science, and fallibilism. Charles Sanders Peirce (and his pragmatic maxim) deserves most of the credit for pragmatism,[1] along with later twentieth century contributors William James, John Dewey and George Santayana. Pragmatism enjoyed renewed attention after (W. V. O. Quine and Wilfrid Sellars) used a revised pragmatism to criticize logical positivism in the 1960s. Another brand of pragmatism, known sometimes as neopragmatism, gained influence through Richard Rorty, the most influential of the late 20th-century pragmatists. Contemporary pragmatism may be broadly divided into a strict analytic tradition and "neoclassical" pragmatism (such as Susan Haack) that adheres to the work of Peirce, James, and Dewey. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fallibilism Fallibilism (from medieval Latin fallibilis, "liable to err") is the philosophical principle that human beings could be wrong about their beliefs, expectations, or their understanding of the world. In the most commonly used sense of the term, this consists in being open to new evidence that would disprove some previously held position or belief, and in the recognition that "any claim justied today may need to be revised or withdrawn in light of new evidence, new arguments, and new experiences."[1] This is the taken-for-granted position in the natural sciences.[2]

In another sense, it refers to the consciousness of "the degree to which our interpretations, valuations, our practices, and traditions are temporally indexed" and subject to (possibly arbitrary) historical flux and change. Such "time-responsive" fallibilism consists in an openness to the confirmation of a possibility that one anticipates or expects in the future.[3] Some fallibilists argue that absolute certainty about knowledge is impossible. As a formal doctrine, fallibilism is most strongly associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, John Dewey, and other pragmatists, who use it in their attacks on foundationalism. However, it is already present in the views of some ancient philosophers, including Xenophanes, Socrates, and Plato [citation needed]. Fallibilism is related to Pyrrhonistic Skepticism, in that Pyrrhonists of history are sometimes referred to as fallibilists, and modern fallibilists as Pyrrhonists.[4][5] Another proponent of fallibilism is Karl Popper, who builds his theory of knowledge, critical rationalism, on fallibilistic presuppositions. Fallibilism has been employed by Willard Van Orman Quine to attack, among other things, the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Unlike scepticism, fallibilism does not imply the need to abandon our knowledge - we needn't have logically conclusive justifications for what we know. Rather, it is an admission that, because empirical knowledge can be revised by further observation, any of the things we take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false. Some fallibilists make an exception for things that are axiomatically true (such as mathematical and logical knowledge). Others remain fallibilists about these as well, on the basis that, even if these axiomatic systems are in a sense infallible, we are still capable of error when working with these systems. The critical rationalist Hans Albert argues that it is impossible to prove any truth with certainty, even in logic and mathematics. This argument is called the Mnchhausen Trilemma.