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Introduction
Diffusion=adoption of innovation(s) Technology transfer=much broader [Diffusion plus] Accumulation of knowledge takes place with the interaction among actors.[this process builds on investment decisions and allocation of resources compare that to the technological capabilities approach] Useful line of research for better understanding of the supply side of innovation dynamics and the structure of R&D systems. [increasingly relevant to industrializing countries with indigenous R&D systems] Availability of data for empirical research and well established methodologies [sectoral linkages, stocks of knowledge, trade flows, data on innovation dynamics]. An emerging field of research in Developing Countries with dynamic export oriented, high-tech sectors Relevant to several policy issues: FDI, IPR, Public policies supporting R&D.
Theories of Diffusion
Up to this point, we have focused on the development of new knowledge. However, technology can only have a wider impact on the economy if it is used by a large population of firms/comsumers. Thus, the picture is incomplete. Now, we look at the adoption of new innovation. This is the study of diffusion. Today we look at models of diffusion, to see how economists model the decision to adopt technology. Well also look at some empirical results. Next, we' discuss policies that encourage diffusion within a ll country. Finally, well look at international technology diffusion.
What is the rate of adoption and innovation? What variables affect this rate? How does policy affect diffusion?
Key questions:
The acceptance problem what explains variation in adoption rates within a region. The availability problem what explained the timing of the development of hybrid corn for specific areas.
Griliches did this by fitting an S-shaped logistic trend diffusion curve to data on the percentage of corn area planted with hybrid seed. Key features of the curve:
Origin: the starting point. Griliches defines as date at which 10% of a regions corn was hybrid. This is meant to indicate commercial availability of hybrid corn. Average lag between technical availability and commercial availability was 2 years. Agricultural stations did more work on hybrid corn in regions where corn was important (e.g. Iowa, Wisconsin). The date of origin is earlier here. Slope: indicates the rate of acceptance Ceiling: measures the percentage of acceptance when usage stabilizes
Interpretation: differences in rate of acceptance (slope) and level of acceptance (ceiling) can be explained by differences in how profitable it is to shift to hybrid corn.
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Environmental technologies
Recent work in environmental economics shows that environmental regulations do lead to faster diffusion of environmental technologies. However, rates of adoption are slow. Cost-effective technologies diffuse very slowly. Why might that be? Potential market failures include:
Inadequate information Agency problems The person installing the technology might not be rewarded for doing so (e.g. landlord/tenant relationship) Consumers have high discount rates. Thus, they place little weight on potential benefits. Lack of access to credit markets
Subsidies have been found to be more effective increasing diffusion than higher prices, suggesting that access to credit is important -people will adopt when they can afford to.
Recent work on diffusion has focused on trying to explain the prevalence of the S-shaped diffusion curve - The epidemic model
The epidemic model considers information to be the key to diffusion. As more people adopt the technology, information of it spreads quickly, leading to a period of rapid adoption. The epidemic model models technology as a contagious disease. Adoption occurs as potential adopters learn about the new technology. Adoption is slow at first, as few people (or firms) know about the technology. The more people infected (that is, those that have adopted), the more likely others will also be infected. Thus, as information spreads, a period of rapid adoption follows. Shortcoming Implications
This model assumes that, once potential adopters learn of a technology, they will use it. This model assumes the quality of the technology is the same over time. Adoption includes a positive externality. The decision to adopt makes it more likely that others will also learn about the innovation. This suggests that gradual diffusion is the result of a market failure. It also suggests that, until market saturation is reached, the economy is in disequilibrium.
Recent modifications focus on equilibrium. These models assume there is perfect information on the technology, so that the epidemic model is not relevant. Rather, there are differences among users that explain gradual diffusion. Firms must pay a cost, ct, to adopt the technology at any time t. This price changes over time. Each firm weighs the benefits of adoption at time t against the cost of adoption at time t. As the costs or benefits of adoption change, the number of adopters changes. Implication:
Gradual diffusion is rational. It is the result of profit-maximizing behavior, rather than a market failure.
This approach allows the researcher to capture the magnitude of each effect. Indeed, these recent results suggest the firm-specific effects are more important.
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Assumptions Full info/limited info Necessarily limited info Infinite rationality Bounded rationality Equilibrium mechanism Disequilibrium mechanism Exogenous/endogenous Necessarily endogenous Continuous & quantitative Continuous & quantitative, or Discontinuous & qualitative Characteristics of the diffusion process Predictable Unpredictable A-historical Path-dependent (historicity) Efficient Efficient, or (possibly) Inefficient
Economic determinants
The adoption decision will depend on the factors that usually affect investment decisions:
Benefits Costs Risk and uncertainty/information Environment and institutions market and/or regulatory
Benefits depend on
Closeness of substitute technologies
Mobile and landline telephones
Costs depend on
Price of new technology Complementary investments
Infrastructure and other capital equipment Training/skills
Scale
Due to fixed cost nature of adoption in many cases
Cost of finance
Large body of literature on innovation investment where there is uncertainty
Uncertainty/information
New technology less understood, more uncertainty about how well it works Uncertainty about whether it will be successful (standards) Benefits are a flow, costs are upfront => benefits may be more uncertain The option to delay decision in order to acquire more information may cause delay in adoption
Accelerates diffusion [Sponsoring a standard (e.g., IBM and Delays diffusion [Higher prices, Less fear of market share
Environment - regulatory
Accelerates adoption
mandates pollution or safety standards solves coordination problems in network industries
Delays adoption
Safety regulation, e.g., new pharmaceuticals and medical instruments. Standard-setting process telecommunications lighting innovation?
Technology
Observations Factors
1997 Kennickell/kwast electronic banking US consumers Majumdar/Vankatara 1998 man elec switching tech US telecomms 1998 Gray/Shadbegian new tech in paper US paper plants 1998 Hubbard 2000 Stoneman/Toivanen 2001 Caselli/Coleman on-board IT robot technology computers US trucking firms crosscountry
real options; volatility in uncertain investments? education level of workers;openness;overall investment OECD countries rate European consumers concentration of providers;tech improvements
Government plays an active role in technology transfer. Has received more attention recently [think of Taiwan in lecture 4].
Example: patent citations from government labs. Jaffe, Banks, and Fogerty (1998) look at patent citations received by NASA patents. NASA patents are more general (that is, cited by patents in more patent classes) and more important (that is, cited more often) than other patents
However, more RJVs have some participation from government or universities. Varies by industry: from 1985-2001, 30% of RJVs in electronics had at least one university member. 12% of RJVs have a government laboratory member. Size of RJVs:
Two-thirds of partnerships in electric equipment, computers, chemicals, or transportation. Largest: Oil and gas RJVs had a median of 8 members. Chemicals: median of 5 Electronics: median of 6 Alleviate the spillover problem by internalizing leakage of R&D Improve coordination of R&D efforts to avoid wasteful duplication Spread the risks associated with large-scale projects Assure access to complementary knowledge Take advantage of scale economies 15% of RJVs have a university member
Motivation:
However, unintended transfer of technologies is a concern of industry When are they likely to be effective?
When spillovers are only moderately high; If spillovers are too high, there is no incentive to join. Being a free rider makes more sense; If they are too low, there is no reason to internalize them ; When overall IP protection is weak; If IP protection is strong, the costs of sharing information are greater (you give up more of your private benefits by sharing).
Government Laboratories
In the US, of the $93.3 billion government funded R&D in 2004, 26% was performed by the government. Types of research done at government laboratories Research in support of agency activities. This contributes to technologies purchased by the government. Data collection (e.g. Department of Commerce, NSF) Basic and applied science in areas with a public interest, such as: Biomedical research at NIH Basic physics research at DOE Meteorology research at NIST Agricultural research at Agricultural Research Stations Supporting the commercial activities of firms Unlike the above three (mission research), this type of research focuses on technology transfer.
The rationale for Government laboratories Scale some research projects rely on large capital expenditures (e.g. medical institutes, large telescopes) Security some projects require direct government supervision [DOD is in charge of a large share R&D]. Mission and regulatory requirements agencies such as FDA are required to perform a certain amount of R&D Knowledge management Long-term R&D kept in house to preserve control of projects and keep close connections with sponsors
Technology diffusion across countries An important consideration is the ability of a country to absorb new knowledge. Trade can provide the elements of technology, but these other elements must also be in place for technology transfer to be successful.
Production capabilities Investment capabilities: does the country have the ability to expand production facilities and build new ones. Invention capabilities: the ability of the local efforts to adapt, improve, and develop technology. Very similar ideas to technological Capabilities. However, they elaborate further with concepts yielding empirical results
The first basic mechanisms of technological diffusion - direct learning (active spillovers)
Direct learning about foreign technological knowledge. This means learning about the blueprint of the technology, so that the recipient country can reproduce the technology. If the cost of obtaining the knowledge is less than the cost of invention, a spillover has occurred. Such spillovers should increase the productivity of domestic inventive activity. It becomes part of the domestic knowledge stock off which inventors build. No purchase is necessary for active spillovers. They can simply be transferred via blueprints. Such transfer can be low-cost. However, without licensing agreements, the inventor may choose to keep the blueprints secret. Although no direct purchase is required, activities such as trade or FDI can help create and maintain communication channels.
Direct learning-2
Active technology transfer refers to tacit knowledge also. Tacit knowledge can be transferred by:
Demonstrations Personal instruction Provision of expert services Hiring workers away from the innovating firm.
Rent Spillovers
Inputs
Country i
Investment goods
Capital
Output Patent flows Knowledge Knowledge Technological proximity Knowledge spillovers R&D
Four different channels through which economic transactions can result in spillovers: input-related spillovers (P); investment-related spillovers (P); Knowledge spillovers; and patent-related spillovers (A)
Coe & Helpman (1995) estimate the effect of both domestic and foreign R&D on TFP growth for 22 countries. Domestic R&D more important for larger countries, foreign R&D more important for smaller countries in the sample. Competition may play a role here. There are two competing possibilities. Foreign knowledge: Increases productivity through spillovers. Competes with domestic products. For a technology leader, competition is likely to be more important. Domestic R&D elasticity. 0.08 for smaller countries, 0.23 for G7 countries. Foreign R&D elasticity: 0.12 for smaller countries, 0.06 for G-7 countries.
Role of trade
Blyde (2001) finds OECD imports have a stronger effect on TFP than Latin American imports. Explanation: more R&D is embodied in OECD imports.
F it
=
ji
F it
m ijt m it
jt
[variable]_td"
(1)
where K
m m
ijt t
country j in country is imports, and Kjt is the knowledge stock of country j. The weights sum to one. Their preferred specification scales equation (1) by country is import intensity on the assumption that a countrys level of imports relative to its GDP affects the benefits a country receives from foreign R&D:
K
where
F it
m it y it
m
ji
ijt it
jt
[variable]_tch
(2)
m it y it
Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1998) identify two problems with equations (1) and (2):
the specifications are not invariant to the level of data aggregation combining any two countrys stocks in (1) would always increase the stock of foreign R&D; and the addition of the term
into indexes and taking logs, results in equation (F2) being misspecified. They propose the alternative formulation:
F it
=
j
m ijt y
jt
jt
[variable]_ti
(3)
where yjt is country js GDP. In this formulation, the stock of R&D that country i receives from country j is country js R&D stock times the fraction of country js output that is exported to country i.
Source: Coe and Helpman (1995); Lichtenberg and van Pottelsberghe (1998).
Export vs. Production Abroad [Empirical evidence suggests these are complementary processes. Likely because intermediate goods must be exported to subsidiaries] FDI vs. Licensing
Empirical findings
FDI does not necessarily lead to strong positive spillovers. Firms choose to operate through a fully-owned subsidiary (FDI) rather than through joint ventures or technology licensing because FDI helps keep the private returns of technology internal to the firm. Overseas R&D activity is still the least globalized of MNEs activities, largely concentrated in developed countries 91% of overseas R&D activity of US MNEs is located in other developed countries. The rest is concentrated in a handful of relatively advanced developing countries
Sources: Blomstrom and Kokko (1998); Grg and Greenaway (2001); Grg and Strobl (2002); Grg and Greenaway (2003).
FDI.]
Readimgs
Read Hall, Cort, Saggi Branstetter replaces Keller Forbes [on Moday] Rogers (general reading)