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A copyright infringement complaint is before the u.s. Court of appeals, NINTH CIRCUIT. The basis of the Appeal is the illegal ruling of issue preclusion by Federal Judge Gary Allen Feess. The issue preclusion issue in the ruling by Judge Feess, is false and a complete illegal fabrication.
A copyright infringement complaint is before the u.s. Court of appeals, NINTH CIRCUIT. The basis of the Appeal is the illegal ruling of issue preclusion by Federal Judge Gary Allen Feess. The issue preclusion issue in the ruling by Judge Feess, is false and a complete illegal fabrication.
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A copyright infringement complaint is before the u.s. Court of appeals, NINTH CIRCUIT. The basis of the Appeal is the illegal ruling of issue preclusion by Federal Judge Gary Allen Feess. The issue preclusion issue in the ruling by Judge Feess, is false and a complete illegal fabrication.
Copyright:
Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
Verfügbare Formate
Als PDF, TXT herunterladen oder online auf Scribd lesen
There is currently a copyright infringement complaint before the UNTED STATES COURT OF APPEAL, NINTH CIRCUIT, Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc.,, Case No.: CV-10-6062- GAF(SHx), Appeal No. 11-55178, where the basis of the Appeal is the blatant, willful, purposeful, and carefully crafted illegal ruling of issue preclusion by Federal Judge Gary Allen Feess who alters the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text, and changing it to the single word Afrimerican, and where he, Judge Feess alters the 29 word alleged infringing, unauthorized derivative text which Judge Feess also alters to the single word Afrimerican.
The following narrative will detail and point out exactly how Judge Feess alters evidence which results in Obstruction of Justice (Tampering with Evidence), Perjury, Deprivation of Rights under Color of the Law, Judicial Abuse of Discretion, and Judicial Misconduct which involve violation of Constitutional guarantees, and safeguards for the fair administration of justice, and upholding of the laws of the United States,
The basic fact of the matter of concern, outside the prior described methodologies, and steps taken by Judge Feess to create what amounts to an illegal ruling, is Judge Feess Altered Evidence to impede its integrity, and Judge Feess committed Perjury by accusing me of making a claim not being made.
The issue preclusion issue in the ruling by Judge Feess, is false and a complete illegal fabrication.
1. The source of Judge Feesss criminal acts is Judge Feess alters the valid copyright protected text of the Afrimerican copyright protected text copyright infringement claim from,
AFRIMERICAN (AF/RI/Me/RI/CAN) Noun Definition; A member of a race of mankind, Born in the United States, Descended from African Immigrants, Classified and Characterized according physical features such as skin tone, (Lite Brown to Dark Brown), Hair Texture, and Body Skeletal build, (i.e. Nose, Lips, etc). (45 word copyright protected text).
Illegally altering the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text to the single word, Afrimerican.
2. Judge Feesss false and illegal misrepresentation of the copyright infringement claim of text as a copyright infringement claim of the single word Afrimerican evidences one of many acts of alteration of evidence and Perjury because the current copyright infringement claim is not for the single word Afrimerican, but the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text which Judge Feess discards, and fails to properly, legally, and procedurally examine under Ninth Circuit Copyright Infringement Examination Standards as required of the whole 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text registered copyright.
3. Simultaneously, Judge Feess uses a gobbledegook narrative of various methods of logical illogical fallacies in his ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS to falsely make it appear Judge Wilson made a ruling in the previous case to invalidate the valid, registered Afrimerican copyright protected text, which Judge Wilson did not do, thus Judge Feess again engages in alteration of evidence, and perjury by his efforts to infuse aspects from the previous case into the present case that are not true in anyway.
4. Judge Feess then takes the 29 word alleged infringing derivative text, a three-person style committee in one of the authors classes decided that the proper way to refer to people of African descent was to coin a term Afrimerican.
Illegally altering the 29 word alleged infringing derivative text to the single word, Afrimerican.
5. The issue necessarily litigated in the prior case Williams v. Warner/Chappell Music, Case No. 2:07-cv-026382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007), affd 274 Fed. App.601 (9th Cir. 2008), is the claim of copyright protection for the single word Afrimerican and the simultaneous claim of infringement of the single word Afrimerican by the single word Afrimerican.
6. The current issue submitted for litigation in the current Williams v McGraw-Hill, Inc. et all case is a claim of copyright infringement of the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text, AFRIMERICAN (AF/RI/Me/RI/CAN) Noun Definition; A member of a race of mankind, Born in the United States, Descended from African Immigrants, Classified and Characterized according physical features such as skin tone, (Lite Brown to Dark Brown), Hair Texture, and Body Skeletal build, (i.e. Nose, Lips, etc). (45 word copyright protected text).
By the 29 word alleged infringing derivative text,
a three-person style committee in one of the authors classes decided that the proper way to refer to people of African descent was to coin a term Afrimerican.
The issues necessarily litigated in the prior case of the single ward Afrimerican being infringed by the single word Afrimerican is not the same issues necessarily litigated in the current case of a 45 word copyright protected text being infringed by a 29 word unauthorized derivative text. Evidencing not only a falsification, and alteration of evidence, but also evidencing a falsification of the ruling based on the falsification of evidence which doesnt match, include, or involve the actual, factual, documented evidence of the current case.
7. The alteration of evidence by the altering of the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text to the single word, Afrimerican, and the simultaneous altering of the 29 word alleged infringing derivative text to the single word, Afrimerican are blatantly, undoubtedly, and obviously two illegal actions because they are not the actual claim being made in the current case. (Judge Feess, as stated above, attempts to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled to invalidate the Afrimerican copyright protected text, which Judge Wilson did not do. Judge Feess does that to give persuasive subliminal credence to his altered evidence, in an effort to infuse the idea in the minds of readers of his ruling through grammatical psychological inferences to influence readers of his ruling to think that even if the single word ruling was challenged, he wants readers to think there isnt a valid copyright at all in an effort to thwart any question of his ruling. The Afrimerican Copyright Protected Text was not ruled invalid by Judge Wilson, and is valid, and validation can be easily verified by calling the current, new Register of Copyrights, Senior Copyright Office Attorney Renee Coe, or Senior Copyright Office Attorney Virginia Giroux)
8. Judge Feess uses his illegal alteration of the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text to the single word, Afrimerican, and his illegal alteration of the 29 word alleged infringing derivative text to the single word, Afrimerican to illegally create an illegal issue preclusion. ruling.
9. The issue Preclusion ruling is illegal because it is not supported by the actual evidence, it is illegally created by illegally altering the evidence of the current case and illegally replacing it with evidence of the previous case that does not apply.
Judge Feesss actions are obviously willful and intentional which is determinable by the convoluted, and carefully crafting of the infusion of words, descriptions, statements and or analogies from the prior case, with statements from the current case which does not include any of the words descriptions, statements, or analogies Judge Feess falsely incorporates from the prior case.
A simple reading of the complaint, or First Amended Complaint for the current case and a reading of Judge Feesss Order Re: Motion to Dismiss will demonstrate the ruling does not coincide or support whats in the current complaint.
Additionally, a reading of Judge Wilsons ruling beginning under his Ownership of Copyright Section, up to the end of his order on page 12, will establish beyond doubt Judge Wilson only concerned himself, his analysis, and his ruling on the single word Afrimerican, not the Afrimerican copyright protected text. This too evidences Judge Feesss alteration of evidence because it demonstrates the text was not at issue in the prior case as it is in the current case.
All of the above support the claim of illegal acts as stated of the issue preclusion issue being a false ruling on the false claim by Judge Feess the current complaint is about the single word Afrimerican, which by now should be obvious to anyone is not, but the greater proof exist in Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES, where Judge Feess alters his own false issue preclusion issue (falsely) being the single word Afrimerican to Judge Feess changing the issue preclusion issue to (falsely) being the Afrimerican copyright protected text
Judge Feess made an illegal ruling of issue preclusion by illegally accusing me of claiming copyright infringement of the single word Afrimerican in his Order Re: Motion to Dismiss.
Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES furthers his illegal acts by altering his own issue preclusion issue from the illegal ruling of the single word Afrimerican he made in his ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS to, in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES, he changes the issue preclusion issue to being the Afrimerican copyright protected text.
The alteration is blatant and readily ascertainable by a side by side comparison of the ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES with the ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS by Judge Feess in this matter.
Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS makes an illegal issue preclusion ruling based on an illegal, false accusation that the single word Afrimerican is whats being claimed as copyright protected, and claimed to be infringed, which is not the actual claim made in the current complaint, and all the evidence provided Judge Feess and the United States Court of Appeals firmly proves there is no issue preclusion based on the single word Afrimerican, now in Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES Judge Feess clearly, and undoubtedly exposes that he is fully aware there is no single word Afrimerican issue by how he changes the issue preclusion issue from the single word Afrimerican, and uses the whole Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES. Judge Feess basically tells on himself.
Judge Feess, in making the Afrimerican copyright protected text the issue preclusion issue in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES, furthers his earlier misrepresentation of facts by attempting to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled to invalidate the Afrimerican copyright protected text, which Judge Wilson did not do. Judge Feess is again falsely, illegally creating an issue preclusion issue that is not only contrary to his earlier ruling, but contrary to all the evidence and facts presented by the Plaintiff in this matter and defense claims to the contrary are wholly, completely, and absolutely unsupported.
Judge Feess is willfully creating this false ruling platform that to be used in future copyright infringement cases which the defense can use to claim issue preclusion based on Afrimerican copyright protected text Judge Feess has falsely claimed as an issue preclusion issue.
The whole of this is carefully crafted, intentional, and obviously designed to commit the crimes stated in order to deny me the full benefits of my copyright now, and in the future, and Judge Feess is reliant on all official channels used to complain being resistant to addressing and correcting the matter.
Judge Feess is committing the crimes under the color of authority, and he relies on a cover-up by officials of the United States District Courts, the United States Court of Appeals who are under obligation to take corrective measures, but who have thus far help facilitate the illegal acts of Judge Feess and engage in a sepreate crime of covering up the crimes noted. This too demonstrates a willful, intentional illegal act that in effect is snowballing and/or encompassing various hinderance to the core aspects of the rights and protections relevant to the Afrimerican copyright protected text. Judge Feess is using the court to negate the Afrimerican copyright text, while it still shows as valid by the U.S. copyright Office. It is a purposeful design and effort, and any denial of that is belayed by the facts, and evidence, and the only way for this to stand is a high level cover-up.
Comparing the following narrative of/from Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES to narrative of/from Judge Feesss ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS will prove the discrepancies as stated as true.
1. In Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES he begins his misrepresentations by falsely, and illegally accusing me of discovering the Afrimerican copyright protected text being used in the song titled Afrimerican in the Williams v. Warner/Chappell Music, Case No. 2:07- cv-026382 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007) case. This is UNTRUE, and a gross misrepresentation of fact because the Original Afrimerican song, discovered in 2005, and the subject of the Williams v Warner Chappell case does not have any words, no lyrics, the song is all instrumental, it does not include any text. Judge Feess basically tells an outright lie.
2. Following the above illegal and false statement regarding the song Afrimerican, Judge Feess in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES describes my current copyright infringement complaint exactly as it was/is presented, but now Judge Feess is falsely, and illegally presenting the Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue, when before, and opposite his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES, Judge Feess, in his ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS, altered various elements of the current complaint, and the copyright protected text, and the infringing text to illegally change them to the single word Afrimerican, which he used to illegally create an issue preclusion ruling based on his false claim that the single word Afrimerican was the issue of the current copyright complaint, which it isnt. He changed the issue preclusion issue from the single word Afrimerican, to the issue preclusion issue being the Afrimerican copyright protected text, both of which are false, and illegal for different reason.
3. From the beginning of the current copyright infringement complaint I have maintained the issue is the Afrimerican copyright protected text being infringed by an unauthorized derivative text. Furthermore, I have also maintained Judge Wilson did not rule to invalidate the Afrimerican copyright protected text, and that the Afrimerican copyright protected text is a valid registered copyright. The proof of the truth of my complaint, and all my claims up to now is evidenced in Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES, with the only exception being the illegal, false presentation by Judge Feess of the Afrimerican copyright protected text being the issue ruled on by Judge Wilson, which Judge Wilson did not do, making Judge Feesss presentation of the issue of the Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue false.
4. Judge Feess alters evidence, commits perjury by changing a 45 word copyright protected text to the single word Afrimerican, changing the 29 word unauthorized infringing derivative text to the single word Afrimerican, making an illegal issue preclusion ruling based on the alteration in his ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS, then Judge Feess basically exposes the criminality of his ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS by illegally changing the issue preclusion issue from the single word Afrimerican to the Afrimerican copyright protected text in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES. His alteration of the issue preclusion issue from the single word Afrimerican is illegal in itself by how it was created, and because it is false, and it is exposed as being illegal by how Judge Feess alters the issue preclusion issue to the Afrimerican copyright protected text which is also illegal because judge Wilson did not rule against the Afrimerican copyright protected text making the Afrimerican copyright protected text exempt from being a valid issue preclusion. The criminal nature of this is evident by Judge Feesss own writings,as compared to each other, and as compared to the evidence submitted by me to the court
Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES is, in itself, evidence of Judge Feess altering evidence, and his misrepresentations of facts, and his, illegal issue preclusion ruling falsely being the single word Afrimerican because in the ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES Judge Feess lies again by illegally, and falsely presenting the Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue and ruling which is easily provable by comparing it to Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS.
Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES is proof of the alteration of evidence of the Afrimerican copyright protected text to the single word Afrimerican in Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ORDER TO DISMISS, and its proof there is no real, actual issue preclusion, because the Afrimerican copyright protected text is not what Judge Wilson, or Judge Feess ruled on in order to dismiss either the prior or current lawsuit.
All thats described above also evidences a willful, intentional effort by Judge Feess, and it demonstrates his full knowledge and awareness of his wrongdoing.
While I reserved this matter to the violation of ;
1. 18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(B) Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant. 2. 18 USC 1519 Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy 3. 18 USC 1621. Perjury 4. 18 USC 242 Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law
There are other law violations encompassing this matter that involve several variation of the laws that govern Obstruction of Justice, and there are several civil rights and constitutional legal violations that the FBI, the DOJ, the U. S Attorney Generals are better equipped to identify, investigate and prosecute, and this is a request you forward this matter to those agencies with a Senatorial Order, or Senatorial Request that they investigate this matter and prosecute Judge Feess for his criminal actions.
The civil rights violations are evident by how Judge Feess is acting in a manner to deprive me of the legal copyright rights I have as the owner of the valid copyright protected text that is the subject of this whole matter.
Additionally, while civil rights protections, and violations have been grossly altered, and or diluted from the defending of Black people against racial discriminatory motives and actions that deprive Black people because they are Black people, that strongly appears to be the motivating factor in/of/behind Judge Feesss behaviour. Its like when Lindsay Lohan got arrested after her high speed chase of her assistant and she immediately told the police the Black guy was driving the car when there was proof it was her. Or when Susan Smith killed her kids and said the black guy did it, or when Charles Stuart killed his wife and said the Black guy did it but it was him. It is true Blacks have done this also, but it is a long term, almost White traditional trait for Whites to Blame a Black person of a wrong just because they know their white skin tone will give them credence above and beyond the black person protestations, and the actions by Judge Gary Allen Feess follows the thread of that motivation and reliance. He is engaged in race based deprivation of rights in the veign of Plessy v Ferguson, and Dred Scott v Sanford, and that is in addition to the described criminal acts as they relate to the current copyright lawsuit.
I am submitting this letter with a copy of the exhibits that prove everything I claim, and I am available to answer any and all questions that may arise.
Bruce Ameil Williams
EXHIBIT A
Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint does not contain a claim for a word, or a phrase, or a term as Judge Feess claims in his November 16, 2010, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS. (See Exhibit D)
Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended complaint issue to be litigated is the copyright protected text, AFRIMERICAN (AF/RI/Me/RI/CAN) Noun Definition; A member of a race of mankind, Born in the United States, Descended from African Immigrants, Classified and Characterized according physical features such as skin tone, (Lite Brown to Dark Brown), Hair Texture, and Body Skeletal build, (i.e. Nose, Lips, etc), which Judge Feess illegally alters and reduces to the single word Afrimerican, and discarding 44 words of evidenced text, and Judge Gary Allen Feess also illegally alters the evidence of the infringing derivative text, a three-person style committee in one of the authors classes decided that the proper way to refer to people of African descent was to coin a term Afrimerican, reducing it to the single word Afrimerican, and discarding 28 words of evidenced unauthorized infringing text
What legal authority, law, rule, procedure, authorizes the alteration of evidence as Judge Feess did by altering actual evidence and misrepresentation of facts as he did as described above, and as he did in alering FAC 15, 15. Plaintiff is the Copyright owner of the text, Afrimerican, officially registered with the United States Copyright Office as of December 26, 1989, registration number TXu 399-322, and as such, is entitled to all protections and exclusive rights relative to the federal copyright laws as granted per 17 USC 106. To, Because the court in Williams [Williams v Warner Chappell] already addressed whether the term Afrimerican was entitled to copyright protection, Williams is essentially seeking to relitigate this same issue. Thus, the first element for issue preclusion is met in this case.
Judge Fess illegally alters the claim of copyright infringement of the actual 21 year old, valid, registered, Afrimerican copyright protected text to a claim for a word, and is Illegally creating an issue preclusion issue that does not correspond with the evidentiary claim, and the actual evidence in Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint for infringement of the properly identified valid registered text.
What legal authority, law, rule, procedure, authorizes alteration of a 45 word text to one word, and changing a 29 word text to one word in order to create false facts to create a false issue preclusion ruling contrary to the actual facts in and of Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint as Judge Feess does in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS dismissing Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint. This is a crime by Judge Gary Allen Feess EXHIBIT A Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 1 of 11 Page ID #:37 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 2 of 11 Page ID #:38 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 3 of 11 Page ID #:39 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 4 of 11 Page ID #:40 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 5 of 11 Page ID #:41 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 6 of 11 Page ID #:42 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 7 of 11 Page ID #:43 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 8 of 11 Page ID #:44 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 9 of 11 Page ID #:45 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 10 of 11 Page ID #:46 Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 6 Filed 09/03/10 Page 11 of 11 Page ID #:47
EXHIBIT B
EXHIBIT B Appellant/Plaintiff has a valid, registered copyright protected text, registered December 26, 1989, registration number TXu 399-322. Judge Feesss ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS creates a false narrative of Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint Afrimerican copyright protected text, to make it appear Judge Wilson in the Williams v. Warner Chappell case ruled to invalidate the Afrimerican Copyright protected text, which Judge Wilson did not do. (See Exhibit C, page 8/9, page 12). The procedure when a copyright is ruled invalid is for the court to send a notice to the U. S. Copyright Office informing them of the invalidation, and the U.S. Copyright Office removes the invalidated copyright registration from their public records. The Afrimerican Copyright Protected text is valid and remains publicly listed by the U.S. Copyright Office as a valid copyright evidencing Appellants/Plaintiffs valid copyright of the Afrimerican copyright protected text Judge Feess misrepresents facts in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled against the whole copyright text, but Judge Wilson actually ruled that any claims/or defense in regard to the Afrimerican copyright protected text as a whole were inapplicable. Judge Wilson only ruled on, and in sole reference to the single word Afrimerican. Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint issue is the copyright text, not the single term Afrimerican as Judge Feess illegally created, to support his illegal ruling. Judge Feess includes the fallacious narrative regarding the Afrimerican copyright text in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled to invalidate it, but then, contrary to the fallacious Afrimerican copyright text narrative Judge Feess, does not rule on the text, Judge Feess instead rules only on the single word Afrimerican, as Judge Wilson did. Judge Feess uses the false narrative regarding the Afrimerican copyright text in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS to confuse the issues, which he later uses
EXHIBIT B
to further his alteration of evidence, and misrepresentation of fact later in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES where Judge Feess describes Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint precisely as Appellant/Plaintiff presented it but, Judge Feess in the ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES alters evidence, and misrepresents evidence and describes the text as the issue preclusion issue, contrary to his own prior ruling where he ruled the single word Afrimerican as the issue preclusion issue. The issue preclusion issue Judge Feess presents in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES is the Afrimerican copyright text, which is opposite of Judge Wilsons ruling in Williams v Warner Chappell, and more importantly, it is opposite Judge Fesss own ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS ruling where he had ruled the issue preclusion issue was the single word Afrimerican. This evidences Judge Feess knows Appellant/Plaintiff has a valid copyright. This evidences Judge Feess is well aware Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint is about the Afrimerican copyright text, not the single word Afrimerican. This evidences Judge Feess is intentionally altering evidence, misrepresenting facts, committing perjury, and violating several federal laws. This evidences most importantly that Judge Feesss ruling to dismiss Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint for issue preclusion issue based on the single word Afrimerican is false, and illegal.
weovoyage Kecor<l V1ew 1 bttp:/!cocatalog. loc.gov/cgi-binfPwebrecon.cgi?Search _Arg=Afi _ _ United States Copyright Office Public Catalog Copyright Catalog (1978 to present) Search Request: Left Anchored Title = Afrimerican Search Results: Displaying 1 of 1 entries ow._ - I pn:vious II next Labeled Vi w Afrimerican Type -GfWork: Text Registration Number I Date: TXu000399322 I 1989-12-26 Application Title: Afrimerican Title: Afrimerican Description: 1 p. Copyright Claimant: Bruce Ameil Williams Date of Creation: 1989 Authorship on Application: Bruce Arneil Williams. Names: Williams, Bruce Arneil, 1960- previous II next Save, Print and Email (Help Page) !Select Download Format Full Record Format for Print/Save ! Enter your email address: Email --- - - __ , 1 of2 5/31/2011 3
EXHIBIT C
EXHIBIT C The ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12 (B) (6) dismissing Appellants/Plaintiffs Complaint against Warner/Chappell in regard to Appellants/Plaintiffs whole copyright protected text states on page 8 &9 The registration of a copyright by the Copyright Office simply creates prima facie evidence of copyrightability, evidence that can be rebutted by the defendant demonstrating why the work is not copyrightableThe Copyright Act also provides for this presumption by stating that a certificate of registration "made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright .17 U.S.C. 410(c). Plaintiff appears to admit that he has not published the work, which would make the presumption inapplicable under 410(c). (See Pltf. opp. 5.} Even assuming, however, that there was some form of publication alleged, Defendant Warner/Chappell has overcome any prima facie evidence of copyrightability by demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot copyright the term Afrimerican.
Judge Wilsons analysis of the whole Afrimerican copyright protected text was not relevant to his examination of the claim at large regarding the claim of copyright protection for the single word Afrimerican, in short, Judge Wilson basically disregarded the whole Afrimerican copyright protected text in his overall analysis and ruling. Judge Wilsons actual ruling in his ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC, INC.S MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12 (B) (6) was, Page 12, IV. CONCLUSION As Plaintiff cannot assert a valid copyright in the term Afrimerican, his claim for copyright infringement should be dismissed. The prior claim in Williams v Warner Chappell was for copyright recognition, and protection of the single word Afrimerican, being infringed by the single word Afrimerican which is what Judge Wilson addressed, and ruled on exclusively.
EXHIBIT C
The current claim in Williams v McGraw-Hill, Inc. et al is a claim for copyright infringement of the 45 word Afrimerican copyright protected text being infringed by a 29 word unauthorized derivative text, which Judge Feess illegally alters, and reduces to the single word Afrimerican, to create an illegal, false issue preclusion issue ruling.
Judge Feess alters the analysis by Judge Wilson by leaving out the part , the term Afrimerican. Judge Feess alters evidence to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled against the Afrimerican copyright protected text, when Judge Wilsons majority, and final concern, and ruling was on the single word Afrimerican, not the Afrimerican copyright protected text.
Judge Feess mis states and misrepresents the facts to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled against the whole copyright text when Judge Wilson only ruled on the single word Afrimerican. Judge Feess alters the evidence of the copyright text, and the infringing text, extracting the word Afrimerican from each, to create an illegal issue preclusion ruling in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS falsely claiming Appellant/Plaintiff is making a claim for the single word Afrimerican, when in truth the claim is for the Afrimerican copyright protected text, and Judge Feesss ruling that the single word Afrimerican is the issue preclusion issue is illegal, and contrary to evidence. Later Judge Feess in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEY FEES, he describes the whole Afrimerican copyright protected text and the whole infringing text, and falsely, and illegally describes the Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue. This is in direct opposition to his prior ruling of the single word Afrimerican being the issue preclusion issue, and it evidences Judge Feess knows the true aspects of Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint, and evidences Judge Feess prior single word Afrimerican issue preclusion ruling is false, and that there is actually no issue preclusion making Judge Feesss dismissal ruling false. Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:13 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:14 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 3 of 12 Page ID #:15 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 4 of 12 Page ID #:16 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 5 of 12 Page ID #:17 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 6 of 12 Page ID #:18 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 7 of 12 Page ID #:19 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 8 of 12 Page ID #:20 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 9 of 12 Page ID #:21 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 10 of 12 Page ID #:22 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 11 of 12 Page ID #:23 Case 2:07-cv-02683-SVW -CT Document 20 Filed 09/26/07 Page 12 of 12 Page ID #:24 EXHIBIT D
EXHIBIT D Judge Feesss November 16, 2010, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS First Judge Feess breaks the law by reclassifying the Afrimerican copyright protected text as a single word. Second, Judge Feess makes a series of circular statements combining a sentence about the text, then following it up with a sentence about the term Afrimerican, making it appear they are one and the same when they are not. Third in Judge Feesss actual analysis regarding the first standard of issue preclusion, he writes, Here, similar to the prior proceeding, Williams is seeking copyright protection for the phrase Afrimerican and its accompanying definition.(FAC 15.).
That is a proven lie by Exhibit B which shows (FAC 15.) states, 15. Plaintiff is the Copyright owner of the text, Afrimerican, officially registered with the United States Copyright Office as of December 26, 1989, registration number TXu 399-322, and as such, is entitled to all protections and exclusive rights relative to the federal copyright laws as granted per 17 USC 106.. FAC15 describes what Appellant/Plaintiff already has, and has had for 21 years. It is identification of Appellants/Plaintiffs 21 year copyright protected text, Judge Feess illegally alters the facts illegally accusing Appellant/Plaintiff of seeking protection for the phrase Afrimerican and its accompanying definition, which FAC 15 does not do. Judge Feess fails to specifically identify where a specific claim for protection is made for a phrase or a definition is made by Appellant/Plaintiff because no such claim is made in Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint or FAC. The next falsehood by Judge Feess in November 16, 2010, ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS is, Williams, however, argues that the Williams case only addressed whether the term Afrimerican is entitled to protection and not the entire text. (Docket No. 38, Opp. at 4.) This argument is without merit.. Here Judge Feess again infuses a misrepresentation of facts. EXHIBIT D
The prior case looked at both the whole copyright, and the claim for protection of the single word Afrimerican, and determined on page 9 of Judge Wilsons ruling that, Defendant Warner/Chappell has overcome any prima facie evidence of copyrightability by demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot copyright the term Afrimerican. Judge Wilson did look at the whole text, but actually disregarded the whole copyrighted text, focusing only on the claim for copyright protectionfor the single word Afrimerican in the prior case. Judge Wilson did not apply the whole copyright text to the claim being made in the prior case, therefore, Appellants/Plaintiff claim has merit, and Judge Feess alters, and misrepresents the fact described to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled on the copyright protected text which he didnt.
Again, Judge Feess makes nearly the same statement made earlier with, First, similar to his FAC, Williams alleged in the prior case that he was entitled to protection for both the term Afrimerican and its definition.. Judge Feess starts the Falsehood with , First, similar to his FAC,, but he does not identify where in Appellants/Plaintiffs FAC, then Judge Feess uses claims made in the prior complaint, Williams alleged in the prior case that he was entitled to protection for both the term Afrimerican and its definition.. and falsely, illegally accuses Appellant/Plaintiff of making that claim in the current complaint, and that claim does not appear anywhere in Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint. Judge Feess again misrepresents facts, and infuses false statements into his ruling, altering evidence.
Judge Feess furthers his acts of misrepresentation of fact with the statement, As such, the Court considered this entire text when resolving the copyright issue.. Judge Wilson did consider the entire text, but basically deemed it inapplicable to the claim for protection of the single word, and concerned his analysis, and his ruling on the term [the single word] Afrimerican. Judge Feess, with this statement, combined with the previous statements by Judge Feess is a deliberate act to make it appear Judge Wilson ruled against the text and against the word and Judge Wilson only ruled on the word Afrimerican, not the text. Again Judge Feess alters evidence.
Lastly, Judge Feess disregards the copyright text he repeatedly misconstrued in his earlier statements, and then indirectly evidences altering evidence by acknowledging the infringing text, and describing he only considered the single word Afrimerican with his ruling statement, Next, the phrase in McGraws book does not copy the definition of Afrimerican, but rather uses only the term. (FAC 18.) Because the court in EXHIBIT D
Williams already addressed whether the term Afrimerican was entitled to copyright protection, Williams is essentially seeking to relitigate this same issue. Thus, the first element for issue preclusion is met in this case..
Appellant/Plaintiff never makes a claim for a word, or phrase, or term, or definition in Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended complaint. Judge Feess uses those identifiers, and falsely presents them in a manner that gives the impression Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint uses them when in truth it doesnt. The word definition appears in Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint only because it is in, and an actual part of the Afrimerican copyright protected text.
Judge Feess illegally alters evidence by extracting the word Afrimerican from the 29, word infringing text he is legally obligated to examine and rule on as a whole, and instead he falsely creates a false issue preclusion issue when in fact there is no issue preclusion issue. LINK: 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date November 16, 2010 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al 1 The registration number for this copyright is Txu 399-322. (FAC 15.) CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 4 Present: The Honorable GARY ALLEN FEESS Renee Fisher None N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: None None Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS I. INTRODUCTION On September 3, 2010, Plaintiff Bruce Ameil Williams (Williams) filed his First Amended Complaint (FAC) against McGraw-Hill Inc. (McGraw), Professor Daryl L. Frazell (Frazell), Professor George Tuck (Tuck), and University of Nebraska (collectively Defendants) for copyright infringement. (Docket No. 6, FAC.) On November 3, 2010, Williams dismissed his complaint against University of Nebraska. (Docket No. 36, Notice of Dismissal.) Pending before the Court is McGraws motion to dismiss. (Docket No. 17, Not.) In pertinent part, McGraw argues that its motion should be granted because Williams has already litigated this issue in a prior proceedingthe Court agrees. For the reasons discussed more fully below, the Court DISMISSES Williamss copyright infringement claim against McGraw WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. II. BACKGROUND Williams is the copyright owner of the text, Afrimerican that was registered 1 with the United States Copyright Office on December 26, 1989. (FAC 15.) Williamss copyright text reads as follows: AFRIMERICAN (AF/RI/Me/RI/CAN) - Noun Definition; A member of a race of Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 45 Filed 11/16/10 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:734 LINK: 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date November 16, 2010 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 2 of 4 mankind, Born in the United States, Descended from African Immigrants, Classified and Characterized according physical features such as skin tone, (Lite Brown to Dark Brown), Hair Texture, and Body Skeletal build, (i.e. Nose, Lips, etc . . .). (Id. 11.) The Afrimerican text became widely available to the public on September 19, 1991 when the Los Angeles Wave Newspaper printed this text in an article. (Id. 13.) On November 18, 2009, while Williams was conducting a regular weekly check for uses of the Afrimerican text on the internet, he discovered that Frazell and Tuck had created, and used a derivative of the Afrimerican text, in a book they authored titled, PRINCIPLES OF EDITING, A Comprehensive Guide for Students and Journalist. (Id. 8.) The book in questionthat is published by McGrawallegedly infringed Williamss copyright with the following passage: a three-person style committee in one of the authors classes decided that the proper way to refer to people of African descent was to coin a term Afrimerican. (Id. 18.) Williams alleges in the FAC that this purported infringement began in 1996, and continues to date because . . . [McGraw] . . . still collects, and has the life of copyright right to collect a royalty, and disperse a royalty to the other Defendants from the infringing work, and the Defendants continue, and can continue to benefit from the copyright infringement. (Id. 14.) III. DISCUSSION A. RULE 12(B)(6) LEGAL STANDARD On a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must accept as true all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint, and construe those facts and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 33738 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Stoner v. Santa Clara Cnty. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116, 112021 (9th Cir. 2007). A court may dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) only if it appears beyond a doubt that the alleged facts, even if true, will not entitle the plaintiff to relief on the theories asserted. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 56061 (2007); Stoner, 502 F.3d at 112021; see also Cahill, 80 F.3d at 338. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, the court is not Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 45 Filed 11/16/10 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:735 LINK: 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date November 16, 2010 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al 2 The court concluded as follows: Plaintiff asserts a copyright in the term Afrimerican and its definition. On its face, the term is simply a shortened version of African-American, excluding the can-A. Considering the overwhelming precedent and Copyright Office regulations stating that short words and phrases are not subject to copyright protection, this term lacks the necessary creativity to obtain a valid copyright. Williams, No. 2:07- CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at 6 (emphasis added). CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 3 of 4 required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added). In other words, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. . . . While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 194950 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the Supreme Court clarified in Iqbal that only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has allegedbut it has not shownthat the pleader is entitled to relief. 129 S. Ct. at 1950. B. APPLICATION 1. ISSUE PRECLUSION McGraw argues in its motion that Williamss copyright infringement claim is barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion. (Mem. at 7-8.) Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding. Reyns Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)). In Williams v. Warner/Chappell Music, No. 2:07-CV-02683 SVW (CTx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007), Williams brought a copyright infringement claim against the defendant and asserted that he had a copyright in the term Afrimerican and its definition. Id. at 6. The court analyzed at length whether Williams in fact owned a legally valid copyright in the term. Id. at 5-9. The court ultimately concluded 2 that Williams did not own a valid copyright, and that any prima facie presumption of validity was rebutted by the defendant. Id. at 9. Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 45 Filed 11/16/10 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:736 LINK: 17 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date November 16, 2010 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 4 of 4 Here, similar to the prior proceeding, Williams is seeking copyright protection for the phrase Afrimerican and its accompanying definition. (FAC 15.) Williams, however, argues that the Williams case only addressed whether the term Afrimerican is entitled to protection and not the entire text. (Docket No. 38, Opp. at 4.) This argument is without merit. First, similar to his FAC, Williams alleged in the prior case that he was entitled to protection for both the term Afrimerican and its definition. Williams, No. 2:07-CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at 6. As such, the Court considered this entire text when resolving the copyright issue. Id. 5-9. Next, the phrase in McGraws book does not copy the definition of Afrimerican, but rather uses only the term. (FAC 18.) Because the court in Williams already addressed whether the term Afrimerican was entitled to copyright protection, Williams is essentially seeking to relitigate this same issue. Thus, the first element for issue preclusion is met in this case. Finally, the last two elements for issue preclusion are satisfied as well. The court in Williams rendered a final judgment on the merits of the case, Williams, No. 2:07-CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at 12, and Williamsthe party against whom McGraw is asserting issue preclusionwas the plaintiff in the prior case, id. at 1. Because all of the elements are met, Williamss copyright infringement claim is barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Williamss copyright infringement claim against McGraw WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. IV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS McGraws motion and DISMISSES Williamss copyright infringement claim against McGraw WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. The hearing presently scheduled for Monday, November 29, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. is hereby VACATED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 45 Filed 11/16/10 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:737 EXHIBIT F
EXHIBIT F Judge Feesss March 21, 2011 ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS FEES is a furtherance of Judge Feesss alteration of evidence, and misrepresentation of fact, and ironically it provides evidence to his previous federal law violations, because whereas before in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS, Judge Feess altered evidence in an effort to discard the Afrimerican copyright protected text, and the 29 word infringing text to illegally reduce the claim, and his ruling to the single word Afrimerican, contrary to the true evidence, and now in his ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS FEES, Judge Feess does the opposite by actually describing Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint as it was submitted and actually is, and he alters the false issue preclusion issue in his earlier ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS ruling from the single word Afrimerican, to now make it appear the Afrimerican copyright protection text is the issue preclusion issue, which it is not. This is irrefutable obvious evidence of Judge Feesss on going criminal acts of altering evidence. Judge Feess begins by accurately identifying, and procedurally acknowledging Appellants/Plaintiffs Afrimerican copyright protected text as it appears in Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint, AFRIMERICAN (AF/RI/Me/RI/CAN) - Noun Definition; A member of a race of mankind, Born in the United States, Descended from African Immigrants, Classified and Characterized according [sic] physical features such as skin tone, (Lite Brown to Dark Brown), Hair Texture, and Body Skeletal build, (i.e. Nose, Lips, etc . . .). (Docket No. 6, First Amended Complaint (FAC) 11, 15.). Judge Feess no longer refers to the Afrimerican copyright protected text as phrase, or a term, or a definition, or word, but actually, and accurately identifies it as text, as it is referred to by Appellant/Plaintiff in Appellants/Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint. Judge Feess uses his ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS FEES to portray the Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue, contrary to his prior ruling that the issue preclusion issue was the term Afrimerican. EXHIBIT F
Judge Feess begins his new acts of alteration of evidence, and misrepresentation of fact with the statement, Plaintiff subsequently filed a copyright infringement action in 2007 after discovering that a record company had used the text in one of its songs. Williams v. Warner/Chappell Music, No. 2:07-CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26,2007). That is egregiously false, and provable false because the song is all instrumental. The song which was the subject of the Warner Chappell lawsuit did not have lyrics, there was no text, it was all instrumental, Judge Feess tells an outright lie by his statement Plaintiff discovered the text in a song.
This can easily be proven, by looking up the Afrimerican song (The Original 2004/5) on the internet. This misrepresentation and alteration can also be verified by the Warner Chappells Attorneys motion, (to follow), which specifies the song has no text. This again evidences Judge Feesss criminal acts.
Judge Feess continues to misrepresent facts, and alter evidence, by again making it appear Judge Wilson ruled against the validity of the Afrimerican copyright protected text, which he didnt, then Judge Feess outlines Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint, corresponding with what Appellant/Plaintiff actually wrote, but now Judge Feess is claiming the copyright text is the issue preclusion issue, when before he altered evidence and ruled the issue preclusion issue was the single word Afrimerican.
Judge Feess writes, In that action [Williams v Warner Chappell], the court analyzed at length whether Plaintiff was entitled to copyright protection, and ultimately concluded1 that Plaintiff did not own a valid copyright, and that any prima facie presumption of validity was rebutted by the defendant. Id. at 9. Here, Judge Feess furthers his misrepresentation by again making it appear Judge Wilson ruled to invalidate the Afrimerican copyright protected text, which he didnt, Judge Wilsons ruling Id. at 9 actually states, The Copyright Act also provides for this presumption by stating that a certificate of registration "made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright .17 U.S.C. 410(c). Plaintiff appears to admit that he has not published the work, which would make the presumption inapplicable under 410(c). (See Pltf. opp. 5.} Even assuming, however, that there was some form of publication alleged, Defendant Warner/Chappell has overcome any prima facie evidence of copyrightability by demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot copyright the term Afrimerican. Defendant Warner/Chappell has overcome any prima facie evidence of copyrightability by demonstrating that Plaintiff cannot copyright the term Afrimerican. . Judge Feess misrepresents Judge Wilsons actual statement which was solely in reference to the single word Afrimerican, not the copyright protected text. EXHIBIT F
Then Judge Feess goes on to describe Appellants/Plaintiffs current complaint as Appellant/Plaintiff actually wrote it in Appellants/Plaintiffs complaint, contrary to his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS ruling, Judge Feess states/writes , Undeterred by the courts ruling, Plaintiff once again sought to find alleged infringements of the Afrimerican text and discovered on November 18, 2009, that Professors Daryl L. Frazell (Frazell) and George Tuck (Tuck) from the University of Nebraska had created, and used a derivative of the Afrimerican text, in a book they authored titled, PRINCIPLES OF EDITING, A Comprehensive Guide for Students and Journalist. (FAC 8.) The book in questionwhich was published by McGraw-Hill Inc. (McGraw)allegedly infringed Plaintiffs copyright with the following passage: a three-person style committee in one of the authors classes decided that the proper way to refer to people of African descent was to coin a term Afrimerican. (Id. 18.)
Based on this, Plaintiff filed suit for copyright infringement against the University of Nebraska, McGraw, Frazell, and Tuck in August of 2010. (Docket No. 1.)
Judge Feess describes the current complaint how it was submitted, but contrary to how he described it in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS, now, unlike before, Judge Feess is depicting the Afrimerican copyright text as the issue preclusion issue, when his own prior ruling in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS was of the single word Afrimerican as the issue preclusion issue.
In Judge Feesss ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS FEES Judge Feess details Appellants/Plaintiff current complaint truthfully with the exception he now alters the evidence, and misrepresents the facts by claiming the text was the issue preclusion issue. Judge Wilson did not make a ruling on the Afrimerican copyright protected text, except to rule it inapplicable to the prior complaint, Judge Feess does not use the grammar, phrase, term, word as he did before. Judge Feess now focuses solely on the Afrimerican copyright protected text, and now, falsely presents the Afrimerican copyright protected text as the issue preclusion issue, contrary to his own ruling to dismiss here he ruled that the single word Afrimerican was the issue preclusion issue.
This is in glaring contrast to the myriad of misrepresentations Judge Feess makes in his ORDER RE: MOTION TO DISMISS where he alters, discards the text, except for the single word Afrimerican to make a false issue preclusion issue, when he should have ruled on the text, which is not an issue preclusion issue because Judge Wilson only ruled on the single word Afrimerican. EXHIBIT F
The two contradictions evidence no issue preclusion, and criminal acts by Judge feess.
LINK: 80 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date March 21, 2011 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al 1 The court concluded as follows: Plaintiff asserts a copyright in the term Afrimerican and its definition. On its face, the term is simply a shortened version of African-American, excluding the can-A. Considering the overwhelming precedent and Copyright Office regulations stating that short words and phrases are not subject to copyright protection, this term lacks the necessary creativity to obtain a valid copyright. Williams, No. 2:07- CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 6 Present: The Honorable GARY ALLEN FEESS Renee Fisher None N/A Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: None None Proceedings: (In Chambers) ORDER RE: ATTORNEYS FEES I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND The facts pertinent to this lawsuit arose in 1989 when Plaintiff Bruce Ameil Williams (Plaintiff) registered the following text with the United States Copyright Office: AFRIMERICAN (AF/RI/Me/RI/CAN) - Noun Definition; A member of a race of mankind, Born in the United States, Descended from African Immigrants, Classified and Characterized according [sic] physical features such as skin tone, (Lite Brown to Dark Brown), Hair Texture, and Body Skeletal build, (i.e. Nose, Lips, etc . . .). (Docket No. 6, First Amended Complaint (FAC) 11, 15.) Sometime after this text was printed in a newspaper article in September 19, 1991, Plaintiff began to check for uses of the Afrimerican term on the internet, (id. 8, 13), and subsequently filed a copyright infringement action in 2007 after discovering that a record company had used the text in one of its songs. Williams v. Warner/Chappell Music, No. 2:07-CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007). In that action, the court analyzed at length whether Plaintiff was entitled to copyright protection, and ultimately concluded 1 that Plaintiff did not own a valid copyright, and that any Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 87 Filed 03/21/11 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:1451 LINK: 80 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date March 21, 2011 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at 6 (emphasis added). CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 2 of 6 prima facie presumption of validity was rebutted by the defendant. Id. at 9. Undeterred by the courts ruling, Plaintiff once again sought to find alleged infringements of the Afrimerican text and discovered on November 18, 2009, that Professors Daryl L. Frazell (Frazell) and George Tuck (Tuck) from the University of Nebraska had created, and used a derivative of the Afrimerican text, in a book they authored titled, PRINCIPLES OF EDITING, A Comprehensive Guide for Students and Journalist. (FAC 8.) The book in questionwhich was published by McGraw-Hill Inc. (McGraw)allegedly infringed Plaintiffs copyright with the following passage: a three-person style committee in one of the authors classes decided that the proper way to refer to people of African descent was to coin a term Afrimerican. (Id. 18.) Based on this, Plaintiff filed suit for copyright infringement against the University of Nebraska, McGraw, Frazell, and Tuck in August of 2010. (Docket No. 1.) At the outset, however, it was evident that there was no merit to Plaintiffs complaint. First, realizing that there was no viable cause of action against the University of Nebraska, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the University from the case on October 18, 2010. (Docket No. 36.) Next, on November 16, 2010, the Court granted McGraws motion to dismiss and held that Plaintiffs copyright infringement claim was clearly barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion based on the courts holding in Warner/Chappell Music. (Docket No. 45.) Still adamant about pursuing this action, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the infringement claim against McGraw and continued to maintain its causes of action against Frazell and Tuck. (Docket No. 47.) On January 20, 2011, the Court addressed Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and the subsequent motion to dismiss filed by Frazell and Tuck. (Docket No. 74, 1/20/11 Order.) The Court first held that Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration was without merit because it simply rehashed the same arguments raised in the opposition brief to McGraws motion to dismiss and failed to present any new developments in the law that would require this Court to set aside its prior judgment. (Id. at 4.) Next, the Court, referencing its November 16, 2010 order, also granted the motion to dismiss filed by Frazell and Tuck under the doctrine of issue preclusion. (Id. at 3-4.) Finally, on January 27, 2011, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal and a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, which the Court denied and found to be in bad faith and frivolous. (Docket Nos. 75, 77, 78.) McGraw, Frazell, and Tuck (collectively, Defendants) now move Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 87 Filed 03/21/11 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:1452 LINK: 80 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date March 21, 2011 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 3 of 6 for attorneys fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 505 of the Copyright Act. (Docket No. 80.) Based on the reasons discussed in further detail below, the Court GRANTS the motion. II. DISCUSSION A. LEGAL STANDARD Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a district court has the discretion to award a reasonable attorneys fee to the prevailing party. Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 614 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 17 U.S.C. 505)). The applicable test is set forth in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994): (1) the degree of success obtained; (2) frivolousness; (3) motivation; (4) the objective unreasonableness of the losing partys factual and legal arguments; and (5) the need, in particular circumstances, to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. Love, 611 F.3d at 614 (citation omitted). While all of these factors can be considered, they need not all be met, and attorneys fee awards to prevailing defendants are within the district courts discretion if they further the purposes of the Copyright Act and are evenhandedly applied. Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 558 (9th Cir. 1996). While the discretion to award fees and costs does not require an explicit finding of bad faith or blameworthiness on behalf of the losing party, any improper motives or culpability in bringing or pursuing the action may also influence this determination. Scott v. Meyer, 2010 WL 2569286, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2010) (quoting Fantasy, 94 F.3d at 555-58). B. APPLICATION 1. THE FOGERTY TEST In sum and substance, Defendants contend that an evaluation of the Fogerty factors favors granting them an award of reasonable attorneys fees in this case. (Mem. at 6-11.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, opposes essentially by rearguing the merits arguments that have been repeatedly rejected by this Court. (Opp. at 3-5.) As discussed below, the Fogerty factors strongly support Defendants claim for attorneys fees. a. The Degree of Success Obtained Here, Defendants achieved complete success in this case when the Court granted their motions to dismiss without leave to amend and denied Plaintiffs motion for reconsideration. Moreover, because the motions to dismiss were granted pursuant to the doctrine of issue preclusion, Defendants also clearly established that Plaintiff could not assert new copyright Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 87 Filed 03/21/11 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:1453 LINK: 80 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date March 21, 2011 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 4 of 6 claims against them or any other party based on the use of the Afrimerican text. This factor clearly favors Defendants position. See Yue v. Storage Tech. Corp., 2008 WL 4185835, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2008) (holding that the first factor weighs in favor of granting fees because Defendants obtained a dismissal of the entire action with prejudice, the court denied Plaintiffs motion for relief from judgment, and Defendants established that Plaintiff could not assert new copyrights against Defendants. . . .) b. The Frivolousness and Objective Reasonableness Factors The Court next considers the frivolousness and objective reasonableness of Plaintiffs copyright infringement claim. For both of these factors, the Court must consider whether Plaintiffs claims were lacking in both legal and factual basis. Gilbert v. New Line Prods., Inc., 2010 WL 5790688, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010). Here, there is little doubt that Plaintiffs lawsuit against Defendants was frivolous in nature and objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff knew from the outset that there was no legal basis for pursuing the copyright infringement claims against Defendants based on the prior action in 2007, where the court in Warner/Chappell Music unequivocally held that Plaintiff did not own a legally valid copyright to the Afrimerican text. No. 2:07-CV-02683 SVW (CTx) at *9. Moreover, this Court further notified Plaintiff that his copyright infringement causes of action lacked merit when it granted McGraws motion to dismiss pursuant to the doctrine of issue preclusion. (Docket No. 45.) Despite being apprised of the groundless nature of his copyright infringement claims, Plaintiff continued to maintain the action against Frazell and Tuck, and even filed a motion for reconsideration that merely rehashed his previously rejected arguments. (Docket No. 47.) Accordingly, the Court holds that this factor also favors an award of attorneys fees in the case at hand. c. Motivation Courts generally hold that a finding of bad faith can be based on not only the actions that led to [the] lawsuit, but also [] the conduct of the litigation. Gilbert, 2010 WL 5790688, at *3 (quoting Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973)). Here, there is evidence to suggest that Plaintiff pursued this action in bad faith. In October 26, 2010, after McGraw filed its motion to dismiss, Plaintiff called Defendants counsel and stated that he ha[d] nothing else to do for the next 12 months and threatened, if you want to play games with these motions, thats what well do, after Defendants refused to settle the case. (Mem., Kohn Decl. 6.) This statement, the Court notes, when viewed in light of Plaintiffs groundless pursuit of the action despite the Courts clear holding that the claims were barred under the doctrine of issue preclusion, supports Defendants contention that Plaintiff used this lawsuit to extort a nuisance payout. . . . (Mem. at 9.) Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs pursuit of this action was influenced by improper Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 87 Filed 03/21/11 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:1454 LINK: 80 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date March 21, 2011 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 5 of 6 motives, which further supports awarding attorneys fees to Defendants. d. Considerations of Compensation and Deterrence As Circuit law teaches, an award of attorneys fees should advance considerations of compensation and deterrence. Fantasy, Inc., 94 F.3d at 558 n.2 (citation omitted). Here, the Court determined that Plaintiffs lawsuit was objectively unreasonable, frivolous, and motivated by bad faith. A fee award in this case is justified in order to deter Plaintiff, and those similarly situated, from prosecuting such meritless copyright infringement claims. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of Defendants motion as well. e. Conclusion re: Fogerty Factors In sum, after considering the factors set forth in Fogerty, the Court holds that an award of attorneys fees is justified in this case. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion and proceeds to consider whether the amount of attorneys fees sought is reasonable. 2. WHETHER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEYS FEES REQUESTED IS REASONABLE Here, Defendants seek $52,119.48 in attorneys fees, which represents 166 hours of work that was billed by Defendants attorneys while defending this lawsuit. (Mem. at 12, 14.) In sum, the law firm that represented Defendants staffed the case with one partner, Alonzo Wickers (Wickers), and one associate, Lisa J. Kohn (Kohn), who respectively charged $508.25 and $266 per hour in 2010, and $527.25 and $294.50 per hour in 2011. (Id., Kohn Decl. 11-15.) The Ninth Circuit has specified that [d]espite a district courts discretion in determining the amount of a fee award, it must calculate awards for attorneys fees using the lodestar method. Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The lodestar figure is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 978. Thus, the amount of attorneys fees must be [based] on the facts of each case. Id. (citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983)). While in most cases the lodestar figure is presumptively reasonable, in rare cases a district court may make upward or downward adjustments to the presumptively reasonable lodestar on the basis of those factors set out in Kerr v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975), that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation. Id. at 982 (quoting Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1402 (9th Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 87 Filed 03/21/11 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:1455 LINK: 80 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Case No. CV 10-06062 GAF (SHx) Date March 21, 2011 Title Bruce Ameil Williams v. McGraw-Hill Inc. et al 2 The relevant Kerr factors that have not been subsumed in the lodestar calculation include: (1) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (2) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (3) the amount involved and the results obtained in the case; (4) the undesirability of the case; (5) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (6) the amount of attorneys fees awarded in similar cases. Camacho, 523 F.3d at 982 n.1 (citing Kerr, 526 F.2d at 70). CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 6 of 6 Cir. 1992)). 2 Here, the Court holds that the hourly rates charged by these attorneys were reasonable. The Court has addressed numerous attorneys fees motions and is thoroughly familiar with billing rates charged by counsel in the local legal community. The rates reflected in the bills submitted to the Court are within the range of what attorneys in similar cases charge their clients. In addition, after reviewing the charges made in the bill, the Court holds that it does not need to make any deductions from the final sum that was requested by Defendants. The billing statements submitted by Defendants do not contain, for example, excessive or unnecessary charges or duplication of effort. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants a total of $52,119.48 in attorneys fees. III. CONCLUSION In sum and substance, because all of the Fogerty factors support Defendants motion, the Court GRANTS Defendants motion for an award of $52,119.48 in attorneys fees pursuant to 505 of the Copyright Act. IT IS SO ORDERED. Case 2:10-cv-06062-GAF -SH Document 87 Filed 03/21/11 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:1456
Rule: Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 and Protect Act; record-keeping and record inspection provisions: Depiction of sexually explicit performances; inspection of records