Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
July 2011
Real GDP
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
CPI
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
2011
and where financing of external deficits was not (seen as) a problem
10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Source: Haver
CA % of GDP
Source: Haver
1500
GR
1000 500 0
PT
FR NL IT FI AT DE BE
ES
500
2000
2500
10
11
12
13
14
Shifting exposures
GIP: Public Debt by lender (EUR bn) 2009 Total public debt Domestic banks Foreign banks National central banks Other domestic investors Other foreign investors EU / IMF assistance ECB SMP 531.1 68.0 137.0 13.0 51.4 261.8 0.0 0.0 2010 623.5 133.5 106.5 18.8 39.0 220.6 31.5 73.5 2011E 678.3 117.0 95.5 18.8 33.5 198.0 148.4 66.8
15
Ireland 2.5 4.8 0.2 0.6 4.8 1.1 1.1 2.7 0.5 18.3
Portugal 6.0 11.8 6.4 0.7 1.9 0.9 1.2 5.7 1.1 35.6
Total 27.7 31.0 7.1 3.1 9.1 2.4 3.6 19.9 2.7 106.5
19.2 14.5 0.4 1.9 2.3 0.4 1.3 11.5 1.1 52.6
16
17
Real GDP
EUR bn, base year = 2000
Source: DB Research
Deutsche Bank DB Research 7/1/2011 Thomas Mayer Chief Economist 2010 DB Blue template 18
19
1.4 8.1
7.8
3.7
1.8
140 4%
105 4%
89 4%
20
SGP reform omits automatic fines; Pact for the Euro vague if not firmly anchored in national legislation; Rise in EFSF lending capacity without clear purpose; Purchase of government bonds in primary market only a marginal improvement; Operational details of ESM unclear (how is liquidity problem distinguished from solvency problem).
Basic flaw: Present insolvencies continue to be treated as liquidity problems. Consequence: Continuous pressure for austerity in insolvent countries and continuous payments by solvent countries will create public resistance against EMU in both country groups. Risk of EMU breakup increases.
21
Creditor nations
Consolidation programmes
Debtor nations
Less social spending
Nationalistic movements
More transfers
Without clear assignment of responsibilities of 1. national governments for national debt and 2. ECB for price stability a Eurozone break-up cannot be excluded.
Deutsche Bank DB Research 7/1/2011 Thomas Mayer Chief Economist 2010 DB Blue template
22
Big bang Capital flight leads to unsustainable Eurosystem imbalances Eurosystem creditor central banks refuse payment to debtor central banks Locally held money in debtor countries (deposits and cash) depreciates against core euro
Adapted from Garber (1998, 2010)
Deutsche Bank DB Research 7/1/2011 Thomas Mayer Chief Economist 2010 DB Blue template
Gradual dissolution Discontent in hard currency countries leads to emergence of privately issued parallel currency Parallel currency crowds out euro in hard currency countries When credit is created in parallel currency hard currency central bank takes over
Adapted from All Saints Day Manifesto 1975
23
Italy
Strong north Weak south Medium centre Weakish government
EMU
Strong centre (Germany, et al.) Weak periphery (Greece, et al.) Medium middle circle (France et al.) Weakish government (in Brussels)
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Deutsche Bank DB Research Thomas Mayer Chief Economist 25