Review of Community-based Integrated Coastal Management:

Best Practices and Lessons Learned in the Bay of Bengal, South Asia

Ecosystems and Livelihoods Group, Asia

ReviewofCommunitybasedIntegratedCoastal Management: BestPracticesandLessonsLearnedintheBayofBengal,SouthAsia

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ReviewofCommunitybasedIntegratedCoastal Management:
BestPracticesandLessonsLearnedintheBayofBengal,SouthAsia

Dr.J.I.Samarakoon
withMaeveNightingale,Dr.RudiHermes,Mr.B.L.Joseph,Dr.V.Salagrama

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This document was produced under the project Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Project with provision of funds from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. The designation of geographical entities in this technical report, and the presentation of the material, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of IUCN, FAO or the BOBLME project concerning the legal status of any country, territory, or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of IUCN, FAO or the BOBLME project.

Published by:

Ecosystems and Livelihoods Group Asia, IUCN, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 2011, International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources and Food and Agriculture Organization. Samarakoon, J et al (2011). Review of Communitybased Integrated Coastal Management: Best Practices and Lessons Learned in the Bay of Bengal, South Asia. Colombo: Ecosystems and Livelihoods Group, Asia, IUCN. xxix + 116 pp. Reproduction of this publication for educational or other noncommercial purposes Is authorized without prior written permission from the copyright holder provided The source is fully acknowledged. Reproduction of this publication for resale or other commercial purposes is prohibited without prior written permission of the copyright holder.

Copyright:

Citation:

Cover Photo: Produced by:

Fishermen in southern India Raquibul Amin Ecosystems and Livelihoods Group Asia, IUCN

Available from:

http://www.iucn.org/about/union/secretariat/offices/asia/regional_activities/elg/ mcp/

The BOBLME Project is funded principally by the Global Environment Facility (GEF), Norway, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration of the USA. FAO is the executing agency. This document is also available as BOBLME2011Socioec01 on the BOBLME website. Please visit www.boblme.org

Contents
ABBREVIATIONSANDACRONYMS ....................................................................................................................... VIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................................................... X ABSTRACT............................................................................................................................................................... XI OVERVIEW............................................................................................................................................................. XII 1.INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 1 1.1COMMUNITYBASEDINTEGRATEDCOASTALMANAGEMENTANDSPECIFICOBJECTIVESOFTHISREVIEW ................................ 2 1.2CBICMANDCOMANAGEMENTDEFINED .............................................................................................................. 3 1.3METHODOLOGYANDSTRUCTUREOFTHEREVIEWREPORT ......................................................................................... 4 1.3.1Howtoreadthisreview......................................................................................................................... 4 1.4EVOLUTIONOFTHEBOBLMEPROGRAMMESTAGES1AND2 ................................................................................. 5 1.5COASTALGEOMORPHOLOGICALDIVERSITYANDFISHERIES ......................................................................................... 7 1.6FISHERYSTOCKS,STATISTICS,LAWENFORCEMENTANDLANDBASEDSOURCESOFIMPACTS............................................. 8 1.7THENATUREOFCOASTALFISHINGCOMMUNITIESANDSMALLSCALEFISHERIES ............................................................ 9 1.7.1Demography&SocioeconomicConditions........................................................................................... 9 1.7.2LackofInformationAvailableonContributionofSmallscaleFisheries.............................................. 13 1.7.3DevelopingCoastalLivelihoodsakeychallenge............................................................................... 13 1.8THECONTEXTFORTHEBOBLMEPROJECTIMPLEMENTATIONPHASE2................................................................... 14 1.9CBICMASUBCOMPONENTOFTHEBOBLMEPROGRAMMEIMPLEMENTATIONSTAGE ............................................. 16 1.10ECOSYSTEMAPPROACHTOFISHERYMANAGEMENT(EAF) .................................................................................... 16 1.11MARINEFISHERIES:THEATTRIBUTESOFSUCCESSFULMANAGEMENTCOMPONENTSOFTHEREFERENCEMODEL(RM) ... 17 1.12MAINSTREAMINGCOMANAGEMENT ................................................................................................................ 19 1.13IMPETUSTOIMPROVEMENTOFGOVERNANCEOFSMALLSCALEFISHERIES:THEUNFAOCOMMITTEEONFISHERIES(COFI) RESOLUTIONONSMALLSCALEFISHERIESINDEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES .............................................................................. 19 2.CASESTUDIESTOILLUSTRATECOMMUNITYBASEDINTEGRATEDCOASTALMANAGEMENT:BESTPRACTICES ANDLESSONSANDASPECTSOFLIVELIHOOD....................................................................................................... 21 2.1CASESTUDYBRIEFS .......................................................................................................................................... 21 CS1.Bangladesh:EmpowermentofCoastalFishingCommunitiesforLivelihoodSecurity(ECFC)............... 22 CS2.Bangladesh:LawEnforcementandSocialCost:Postlarvaeshrimpcollection..................................... 23 CS3.Bangladesh:FisheryCooperativeforSectorModernizationandLivelihoodUplift............................... 24 CS4India,AndhraPradesh:TheAndhraPradeshFishermenCooperativeSocietiesFederation(AFCOF) . 27 CS5.SriLanka:evolutionoffisherycooperativespoliticalimperativesversusfisherydevelopment. ....... 29 CS6.Maldives:Territorialuserightsinfisheries(TURF)forMaldivianNationalsintheCoastalFishingZone ...................................................................................................................................................................... 31 CS7.Maldives:Exclusiveuserightsofhousereefsassignedtopopulationsofinhabitedislands.............. 32 CS8.SriLanka:EstuarineStakenetFisheryinNegomboLagoon................................................................. 33 CS9.India,AndhraPradeshStakenetFisheryinBackwaters:BodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem(Salagrama, 2003b). ......................................................................................................................................................... 36 CS10.India,AndhraPradesh:ShoreSeineandBackwaterFisheriesSmallScaleFisheriesDealingWith ComplexityandChangeAComparison...................................................................................................... 36 CS11.SriLanka:ShoreSeineFishery,Western,SouthernandEasternCoastlines ....................................... 37 CS12.SpecialAreaManagement:SriLanka(IUCN,2009). .......................................................................... 38 CS13.Maldives:BaaAtollEcosystemConservation(AEC),PublicPrivateCollaborationwithinCorporate SocialResponsibility(CSR)Framework......................................................................................................... 40 CS14.India,TamilNaduFisherCouncilsJurisdictionTheGoverningSystem ........................................... 40 CS15.India,TamilNadu&AndhraPradesh,CBFMinPulicatLake............................................................. 43 CS16.SriLanka,CBFMintheNearshoreShrimpFisheryinNegombo ........................................................ 44 CS17.India:TheBlueRevolutionexperienceofVillageGoverningCouncilsTamilNadu ........................ 44 CS18.Bangladesh:CommunityBasedCoastalResourcesManagementintheSoutheastern ................... 46 2.2ANALYSISOFTHEBOBLMESACASESTUDIES:THEREFERENCEMODEL.................................................................... 47 2.3CLARIFICATIONOFMEANINGANDCONTENTOFTERMSINTHEREFERENCEMODELINACTUALPRACTICE .......................... 51 Example1:CS6.MaldivesExclusiveFishingRightsintheCoastalFisheryZone........................................ 51 Example2:CS8.SriLanka,EstuarineStakeNetFishery,NegomboLagoon................................................. 52

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Example3.CS14.India,TamilNadu.FisherCouncilsJurisdictionsTheGoverningSystem ...................... 52 2.4LIMITATIONSOFMAINSTREAMINGCBFM/COMANAGEMENTFORCBICM............................................................ 53 2.5ANALYSISANDLESSONS .................................................................................................................................... 54 2.6ALTERNATIVELIVELIHOOD ................................................................................................................................. 57 2.6.1RealityofLivelihoodandSmallscaleFisheries.................................................................................... 58 2.6.2Implicationsofprevailingconsciousnessindevelopmentplanningandlivelihood............................. 60 2.6.3PovertyandEconomicGrowth ............................................................................................................ 61 2.6.4EconomicGrowthandHumanDevelopment ...................................................................................... 61 2.6.5ImplicationsofOtherLandUsesforSmallscaleFisherLivelihood...................................................... 62 Coastalaquaculture ................................................................................................................................. 62 ProtectedAreas ....................................................................................................................................... 63 2.6.6ComprehensiveApproachestoLivelihood........................................................................................... 64 2.6.7CAREsUnifyingFrameworkforSustainableLivelihoodsandConvergencewithFAOsEAF(McCaston, 2005;FAO,2003).......................................................................................................................................... 66 2.6.8MicrofinanceInstitutionsandPovertyReduction .............................................................................. 67 Needforcautionandgoodgovernance................................................................................................... 69 2.6.9NGOsandCBOsTheBridgeBetweenGovernmentandLocalCommunities ..................................... 70 2.6.10RightsbasedRestorationofSmallscaleFisherLivelihoods. ............................................................. 71 3. ICMANDFISHERIESMANAGEMENTANDSOMEBASICCONCEPTSRELEVANTTOCBICMINTHEBOBLME SA........................................................................................................................................................................ 72 3.1COMPLEXITYANDNESTEDSOCIALECOLOGICALSYSTEMS......................................................................................... 72 3.1.1TheComplexNatureoftheBOBLMESouthAsia(BOBLMESA) ........................................................ 74 3.1.2TheBOBLMESouthAsia(BOBLMESA):ARegionofDisparities ....................................................... 74 3.2ICMINTHEBOBLMESA ................................................................................................................................ 75 3.2.1 Bangladesh:TheEvolvingNationalICZMProgramme.................................................................... 75 3.2.2 India................................................................................................................................................. 77 3.2.3 Maldives:Theemergingsituation................................................................................................... 78 3.2.4 SriLankaTheEvolutionofCoastalZoneManagement ................................................................ 79 3.3SMALLSCALEMARINEFISHERIES:TRENDANDIMPLICATIONSFORICM...................................................................... 80 3.3.1UnderstandingtheSubdivisionsofSmallScaleFisheriesfortheBOBLMESA .................................... 80 3.3.2Hiddenrelationships:SharedResourceSystemsandLivelihoodImplications..................................... 82 3.3.3Mappingfishingareasoncontinentalshelves .................................................................................... 83 3.4THECOUNTRYSTATEMENTSONTHEEXISTINGPOSITIONSOBTAINEDFROMTHEREPORTOFTHEAPFICSREGIONAL CONSULTATIONIN2008(APFIC,2008)................................................................................................................... 84 Bangladesh................................................................................................................................................... 84 India.............................................................................................................................................................. 85 Maldives ....................................................................................................................................................... 86 SriLanka ....................................................................................................................................................... 87 3.5INTERNATIONALDISCOURSEONMARINEFISHERIESANDIMPLICATIONSFORSMALLSCALEFISHERIESANDPOVERTYINTHE BOBLMESA....................................................................................................................................................... 87 3.6CANFISHINGEFFORTBEEXPANDEDINTHEBOBLMESAEEZS? .............................................................................. 90 ResourceRentinFisheries(DFID,2004) ....................................................................................................... 91 3.7RISK,EXPOSUREANDCHRONICDISASTER ............................................................................................................. 91 4.RETROSPECTION,CONCLUSIONSANDRECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 93 4.1RETROSPECTION .............................................................................................................................................. 93 4.2.CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 96 4.3RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 99 REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................ 102

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Abbreviationsandacronyms
Acronym AFCOF APFIC BCVPalem BFDC BJMSS BOBLME BOBLMESA BOBP BOBPIGO BRAC CB CBO CBICM CBFM CBIFM CBNRM CCD CCRF CEA CFZ CFZ CIA CMZ CO CODEC COFI CRZ CS CSR CZ CZMP DFAR DFID EAF EBM ECDPM ECF ECFC EEZ EIA ESBN EJF EU FAO FCA FMO FSI GBEF GDP GEF GNP GO Name AndhraPradeshStateFishermenCooperativeSocietiesFederation AsiaPacificFisheryCommission BodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem BangladeshFisheriesDevelopmentCorporation BangladeshJatiyaMatshyjibiSamabayaSamity BayofBengalLargeMarineEcosystem BayofBengalLargeMarineEcosystem,SouthAsia BayofBengalPrograme BayofBengalProgrammeInterGovernmentalOrganisation BangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee Communitybased CommunityBasedOrganization CommunitybasedIntegratedCoastalManagement CommunityBasedFisheriesManagement CommunitybasedIntegratedFisheriesManagement CommunityBasedNaturalResourcesManagement CoastConservationDepartment CodeofConductforResponsibleFisheries CentralEnvironmentalAuthority CoastalFishingZone CoastalFisheryZone CentralIntelligenceAgency CoastalManagementZone CommunityOrganization CommunityDevelopmentCenter UNFAOCommitteeonFisheries CoastalRegulationZone CaseStudy CorporateSocialResponsibility CoastalZone CoastalZoneManagementPlan DepartmentofFisheriesandAquaticResources DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment EcosystemApproachToFisheriesManagement EcosystembasedManagement EuropeanCentreforDevelopmentPolicyManagement EastCeylonFronts EmpowermentoftheCoastalFishingCommunities ExclusiveEconomicZone EnvironmentalImpactAssessment EstuarineSetBagNets EnvironmentalJusticeFoundation EuropeanUnion FoodandAgriculturalOrganization FisheryCooperativeAssociations FisheryManagementOrganizations FisherySurveyofIndia GangesBramaputraEstuarineFront GrossDomesticProduct GlobalEnvironmentFacility GrossNationalProduct GovernmentOrganizations

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GOB GS HACCP HDI HTL ICM ICSF ICZM IDRC IPCC IPO ISDR ITQ IUCN IUU LGA LTL LME MCPI MCS MDG MEEW MFI MOEF MoFAMR MPA MRAG MSSF NBFC NCDC NGO OAL OECD OTFWU PA PDO PRSP PSP RBI RM ROA RS RU SAM SAP SES SHG SIFFS TCBMS TEK TEV TURF UN UNISDR UNDP USSR WARPO WTO

GovernmentofBangladesh GovernanceSystem HazardAnalysisandCriticalControlPoint HumanDevelopmentIndex HighTideLine IntegratedCoastalManagement InternationalCollectiveinSupportofFishworkers IntegratedCoastalZoneManagement InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre InternationalPanelonClimateChange InitialPublicOffering InternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction IndividualTransferrableQuotas InternationalUnionforConservationofNature Illegal,UnreportedandUnregulated LocalGovernmentAdministration LowTideLine LargeMarineEcosystem MinistryofConstructionandPublicInfrastructure Monitoring,ControlAndSurveillance MillenniumDevelopmentGoals MinistryofEnvironment,EnergyandWater MicroFinanceInstitutions MinistryofEnvironmentandForests MinistryofFisheries,AgricultureandMarineResources MarineProtectedAreas MarineResourcesAssessmentGroup MyanmarShelfSlopeFronts NonBankingFinancialCooperation NationalCooperativesDevelopmentCorporation NonGovernmentalOrganization OverallLength OrganizationforEconomicCooperation OrissaTraditionalFishworkersUnion ProtectedArea ProgrammeDevelopmentOffice PovertyReductionStrategyPaper PalkStraitFront ReserveBankofIndia ReferenceModel RealityofAidOrganization ResourceSystem ResourceUnit SpecialAreaManagement StrategicActionPlan SocialEcologicalSystems SelfHelpGroups SouthIndianFederationofFisheriesSocieties TraditionalCommunitybasedManagementSystem TraditionalEcologicalKnowledge TotalEconomicValuation TerritorialUseRightsInFisheries UnitedNations UnitedNationsInternationalStrategyforDisasterReduction UnitedNationsDevelopmentPrograme UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics WaterResourcesPlanningOrganization WorldTradeOrganization

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Acknowledgements
This report has been undertaken by IUCN Asia for the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (BOBLME) Phase II Project. The report is a culmination of a process that began with a literature reviewandundertookfurtheranalysisandvalidationthroughdiscussionsataspecialworkshopheld in Colombo on July 2829 2010 entitled Best Practices in CBICM Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem, South Asia (BOBLMESA). We would like to thank all of the participants from India, Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka and our special guests, from WorldFish Center, Malaysia, for their participationintheworkshop. The main compilation and analysis in the report was undertaken by Dr. Jayampathy Samarakoon, lead consultant, and supported by Maeve Nightingale, Coordinator Coastal & Marine Programme IUCN Asia. The report has also benefitted significantly from reviews of Dr. Rudolph Hermes, Chief TechnicalAdvisor,BOBLME,Mr.B.L.Joseph,FisheryExpert,SriLankaandDr.V.Salagrama,Fishery andICMSpecialist,AndhraPradesh,India. WethanktheFoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO)fortheirgeneroussupport.

Abstract
Thisdocumentisacompilationandanalysisoftheliteratureonintegratedcoastalmanagementand smallscale fisheries in the BOBLME South Asia, Viz. Bangladesh, India, Maldives and Sri Lanka in relationto:(i)communitybasedfisheriesandhabitatsmanagement(ii)comanagementand(iii)the creationofalternativelivelihoodsamongfishercommunitiesforthepurposeofreducingimpacton coastalresources.ThecontentsofthereportwereinitiallyreviewedataWorkshopinColombothat brought together participants form the four South Asia countries. The final Review Report was reviewedbytwoexpertsfromIndiaandSriLankaandtheChiefTechnicalAdvisor,BOBLMEProject. The conclusions and recommendations in the report are based upon an analysis of eighteen case studies encapsulating the broad range of experiences in CBICM in the four counties including; a comprehensive approach to empowerment of coastal communities through comanagement (Bangladesh), the failure of imposed fishery cooperatives (Bangladesh, India Sri Lanka), the application of territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) on a large scale in the major part of the EEZ (Maldives), along extensive stretches of coastal seas (India), in more restricted coastal seas (Sri Lanka), and also in partially enclosed estuarine waters (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka). The managementofTURFsrangefromcommunitybasedpractices,throughtoinformalcomanagement, to formalized comanagement with legal support provided by the state. Although effective management institutions exist, physical ecosystem change undermines and diminished fishery populations. Areferenceframework(RM)wasdevelopedtosupporttheanalysisofthecasestudies.TheRMis basedprimarilyontheFAOfindings(includingtheecosystemapproachtofisherymanagement,and opinionsoffisheryscientists).Assessmentusingthereferencemodelrevealedbothpossibilitiesfor livelihood and environmental benefits from strengthening existing practices, and the need for informationtofillknowledgegaps.Acquisitionofinformationmaybemostappropriatelybasedupon thediagnosticapproachtomanagementofcomplexsocialecologicalsystems.Theexistingformsof ICM in the SA region may not be amenable to the incorporation of communitybased and co management fishery practices into multistakeholder institutional settings. It would be feasible to aimatsuchincorporationonlyintheeventthatsafeguardsareinplacetoensurethatthesmallscale fisherlivelihoodsdonotcontinuetobemarginalizedbytheunintendedconsequencesofplanned developmentoffisheriesandcoastalresourcesincomplexsocioculturalsettings,basedentirelyon an exportoriented economic growth model that inadequately addresses equity and rights issues including women. Inadequate recognition is given in these developement plans to the massive significance of traditional and smallscale motorized fisheries in local livelihood, national food security and nutrition. All South Asian fishery development planners envisage future expansion of fishing effort into unutilized parts of their EEZs and even beyond although the fishery science information may be inadequate. Illegal (IUU) fishing also remains to be addressed as a serious problem. Little evidence exists of smallscale fisheries being mainstreamed into national policy and the nationaleconomyexceptinthecaseofMaldives.InBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLankatheinterestof small scale fisheries is inadequately incorporated into national planning because of deficiencies in economicvaluation.Thenationalinterestandexpectationsfrommarinefisheries,andtheFAOvision for small scale fisheries, now supported by the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) proposed instrument for smallscale fisheries may converge through capacity building starting with a shared applied research agenda focused on livelihood (including adaptation to sea level rise), and the diagnosticapproachrequiredforassigningthepropereconomicvaluetorespectivesocioecological systems and promoting the protection of critical ecological systems as part of a long term spatial planningapproach.

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Overview
ThisoverviewpresentsasimplificationofthehighlytechnicalandcomplexsubstanceoftheReview of Communitybased Integrated Coastal Management: Best Practice and Lessons in the Bay of Bengal,SouthAsia.Itseekstocommunicatethatcommunitybasedintegratedcoastalmanagement is an evolving process that is significant for the large concentration of poor fishing communities mainly in Bangladesh, India and in Sri Lanka and to a lesser extent in the Maldives. The diversities withintheBayofBengal,SouthAsiaareconspicuousandthereforeeventualsolutionstoproblemsof livelihoodstemmingfromtheconflictsintheuseofcoastalenvironmentalresourceshavetoevolve throughpartnerships.Thesepartnershipscouldoccurbetweenlocalorganizationsandtheirdecision making processes, and higher level institutions including government organizations resulting in meaningful comanagement based upon the application of the ecosystem approach to fisheries management. 1. Introduction Thisreviewsynthesizesthestatusofcommunitybasedintegratedcoastalmanagement(CBICM)in theBayofBengalLargeMarineEcosystem,SouthAsia(BOBLMESA)consistingofBangladesh,India, MaldivesandSriLanka.Itspurposeis; topresentbackgroundinformation, toreviewexistingbestpracticesand to assess what enabling interventions are needed to strengthen CBICM in these four countriestoprovidesustainabilitytofisheriesandfisherydependentlivelihoods. The vision of the overall BOBLME Project is to Improve the lives of the coastal populations of the eight participating countries in South Asia and in Southeast Asia through improved regional managementoftheBayofBengalenvironmentanditsfisheries.Partnershipsbetweengovernment and local communities resulting in collaborative management (comanagement) which is mainstreamed as a part of government administration is seen as the mechanism to achieve sustainability in fisheries. An estimated population substantially in excess of 20 million in the BOBLMESAdependsonfisheriesforlivelihoodandfoodsecurity. The term CBICM, for the purpose of the review, is used as composed of (i) communitybased fisheries and habitat management; (ii) comanagement of fisheries, and (iii) the creation of alternativelivelihoodsamongfisherycommunities.ToavoidinternalcontradictionsCBICMisfurther expandedthus:

communitybasedfisheriesandhabitatmanagementiswhereagroupofpeopleguides the use of a fishery resource system and associated ecological structures with a minor roleplayedbygovernment. comanagement of fisheries is where a partnership among government, community of fishery resource users, external agents (NGOs, researchers, academics) and other stakeholders (boat owners, fish traders, tourism interest, etc) share responsibility and authorityfordecisionmaking(governance)inmanagingafishery. creationofalternativelivelihoodsistheimplementationofactivitiesdesignedtoreduce the adverse impact of harmful use of coastal resources, and to promote income opportunities within and outside the sector that contribute to enhanced wellbeing primarilyoffishersandtheirhouseholds.

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Themainobjectiveofthereviewistoextractlessonsfromcasestudiesofbestpracticesthatcould guideintegrationoffisherycomanagementincludingecologicalsystems,andsustainablelivelihoods into the national development processes of government, i.e. mainstreaming. In this review, therefore, comanagement describes the spectrum between the extremes of communitybased management (with full devolution of responsibility to communities) to governmentbased management (with full responsibility controlled by the government). What generally exists are arrangementalongtheaxisconnectingtheextremes. Thepreparationofthereportofthereviewofliteratureandexperiencesproceededinstages,with feedbackobtainedfromrepresentativesoftheBOBLMESAcountries,independentexpertcomment, reviewbytheChiefTechnicalAdvisor,BOBLMEProjectanddiscussionoffindingsataSEAworkshop. EachstageenhancedthesensitivityofthereporttothepriorityproblemsandissuesintheBOBLME SA. The report consists of four parts: Part 1: Background and Introduction, Part 2: Analysis of case studiesincommunitybasedmanagementandcomanagementoffisheriesinrelationtoareference modeldevelopedfromtheliterature,Part3:ExaminesaspectsofcomplexityoftheBOBLMESA,the statusofICM,the trendsinfisheriesandtherelevanceof internationaldiscourseonfisheries,and Part4:Includeskeylessons,conclusionsandrecommendations. The present implementation phase of the BOBLME evolved through a preparatory stage which included national reports which addressed threats to the structure and functioning of the bio physical systems associated with fisheries in relation to FAOs ecosystem approach to fisheries, as well as regional studies on critical habitats, landbased sources of pollution, shared and common stocks, legal and enforcement mechanisms and livelihoods. This review includes a review of the orientation provided by the national reports for Bangladesh, India, Maldives and Sri Lanka and regionalstudies. The geomorphologic diversity and its significance for fishery productivity and coastal livelihood in BOBLMESA is recognized. The major deltaic mangroves associated with the large rivers in BangladeshandIndiaprovidesignificantmultipleecosystemservicesincludingfisheries,agriculture andprotectionagainstcoastalhazards.Maldiveshasasmallextentofmangrovesmainlybiodiversity interest. Shorefront mangroves are nonexistent in Sri Lanka. The fringing mangroves that occur within barrierbuilt estuaries may sometimes impede the fishery function of these coastal ecosystemsthroughsedimentbuildup.Coralreefsconstitutethedominantcoastalecosysteminthe Maldives.TheyarealsosignificantintheAndaman andNicobarIslandsandintheGulfofMannar. Seagrass beds in the Gulf of Mannar are significant for fisheries and as a food source for the threatened dugongpopulationthere. CoralreefsareoflessersignificanceinBangladesh, mainland IndiaandinSriLanka.Thereforeonlycautiousregionalgeneralizationsarepossible. Fisherystatistics,exceptintheMaldivesgenerallyareunreliable.Thechangesfromyeartoyearmay not be statistically meaningful for Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. Progressive increases in production may be more for satisfaction of political objectives rather than to reveal actual trends. Uncertaintyinfisherystatisticspertainingtoartisanalandsmallscalefisheriesisaseriousconcern. Whereas, the coastal fishery stocks are either already overexploited or near the maximum sustainablelevel,thenationalreportssuggestscopeforcapacityexpansioninoffshorewaters.The coastalwatersthataresignificantforartisanalandsmallscalefisherylivelihoodsinBangladesh,India and Sri Lanka are seriously affected by pollution from landbased sources. Fishery management efforts need to adequately address negative externalities of industry, agriculture and urbanization withinanecosystemapproachtofisherymanagement.Enforcementofexistingfisherymanagement lawsrequiresstrengthening. BOBLMESAhasoneofthelargestconcentrationsintheworldofcoastalpoorlivingonlessthanUS$ 2perday.ThispopulationofartisanalandsmallscalefishersinBangladeshandinIndiaisincreasing, but at a diminishing rate. A decreasing trend in the population engaged in small scale fisheries is xiii

observedintheMaldivesandinSriLanka.Thetotalnumber,today,issubstantiallyinexcessofthe 20millionreportedbyFAOin2000.Artisanalandsmallscalefishingincoastalwaterscontinuestobe anactivityoflastresortinBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLanka.Increasinglyfishersinthesecountries are seeking employment as unskilled laborers in foreign countries. In the Maldives, however, povertyofacomparableformdoesnotexist. Women constitute about 50% of the total population involved in artisanal and smallscale coastal fishery activities. They are in serious states of deprivation in Bangladesh, India and In Sri Lanka causedbymanysocialfactors.InSriLankawomenfrompoorfishingcommunitieshavecontributed topovertyreductionthroughremittancesfromforeignemployment.Thepoorerartisanalandsmall scalefishersandtheirhouseholdsareincreasinglychallengedbydeepeningpoverty,foodinsecurity, as well as displacement. The differential adverse impact of fishery development policy on women requiresparticularattention. Income poverty (below US$ 2 per day) ranges from about 40% in Sri Lanka to about 80% in Bangladesh and in India. The global increase in food prices and the falling income from fisheries impose severe challenges upon mainly the coastal poor. In the Maldives where poverty does not exist,under5childmalnutrition,about30%,isachallenge. Theaxiomaticlawofunintendedconsequencesimpartsclaritytotherootcausesofthedeclinein livelihoodandincreasingpovertyinartisanalandsmallscalefisherydependentcoastalcommunities inBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLanka.Thishasoccurreddespiteoverallincreasesinruralincomeand purchasingpower.Marginalizationofartisanalandsmallscalefisherslargelymaybeexplainedasthe unintended consequences of planned fishery development through modernization, The simplistic application of modern technology as a development intervention in the context of highly complex, coastal fishery socioecological settings were affected by uncertainties that were not adequately understoodnoraddressedasrisks,ThisaspectisaddressedmoreanalyticallyinSection4inrelation to future plans for fishery development. It is important to note that in the Maldives, fishery modernizationdirectlyincludedthesmallscalefishersinthedevelopmentprocess.Marginalization of their livelihoods, therefore, did not result. Conversely they have contributed to about fivefold increaseinfisheryproductionsincemodernizationstartedintheearly1970s. Quantified information is lacking on the actual contribution of artisanal and smallscale fishers to poverty reduction and food security at the local as well as at the national level. Employment provided to those fishers and fishworkers directly involved with fishing, the nutritional benefits to consumers, benefit from the multiplier effects of fishing, foreign exchange earnings from exports requiretobesystematicallyincludedineconomicassessmentsofsmallscalefisheries. Transforming coastal livelihoods from progressive decline to a state of sustainability is the key challenge. This requires conditions that would enable members of coastal communities to benefit fromthefiveclassesofassets,Viz.human,social,physical,financialandpoliticalintheirrelationship withcoastalecosystems. The literature supports the strategic precedence given by the BOBLME Project to livelihoods. Sustainablemanagementofsmallscalefisheriesmeansmanagementofthepeopleinvolvedrather than fishery stocks. This implies improving the lives and livelihood of people following several generations of stagnation. Fishery development since the 1960s in BOBLMESA has relied upon modernizationofcraft,gearandinfrastructure,ratherthanthelivesofthepeopleinvolved,exceptin the Maldives. This approach has resulted in a significant increase in production both for domestic consumption and export. Meanwhile, the populations dependent on fisheries have more than doubled imposing growing pressure on the coastal environment. The attention of planners has increasingly shifted to integrated coastal management. Nevertheless, meaningful environmental safeguardsarerarelyenforcedbecauseofpoliticalimplicationsofthesocialcostofrestrictedaccess tofisheryresources.Thus,partnershipsbetweenfishingcommunitiesandthegovernmentleadingto xiv

comanagementbecome significantif sustainable managementistobeachieved.These carrylegal implications. In this context, the many informal and semiformal communitybased practices that have worked well need to become incorporated into a flexible and appropriate framework that safeguardsrightsofaccessandbuildmutualtrust.Atthesametimethelegalarrangementwouldbe required to give consideration to the global crisis in fisheries and the role of the World Trade Organization. AccordinglyTheImprovementofCoastal/MarineNaturalResourcesManagementandSustainable Use,including:promotingcommunitybasedmanagement,improvingpolicyharmonization,devising regional fishery assessments and management plans for hilsa, Indian mackerel and sharks, and demonstratingcriticalareamanagementinselectedareasisonecomponentoftheBOBLMEProject implementationwhichprovidestherationaleforthisreview. The greater part of the relevant literature encourages fundamental reform of the fishery sector which includes harmonization of the smallscale fishery sector with coastal ecosystems while discouraging industrial fishing. Such an approach does not imply a reduction in economic growth which is essential for poverty reduction. The literature argues that economic growth is possible withoutmarginalizingcoastallivelihoods.ThisissupportedbyFAOsVisionforSmallscaleFisheries. Thisvisionincombinationwiththeoutcomesofmanyregionalandinternationalmeetingsprovided thefoundationoftheReferenceModelusedinthisreviewforassessmentofcasestudies. Thereviewoftheliteratureandcasestudiesplacesthefuturemanagementofthesmallscalefishery sector in the BOBLMESA at a crossroad among (i) the existing situation with its trends, (ii) FAOs Vision,(iii)globalperceptionbasedontheexistingmarinefisherycrisis,and(iv)nationalperception ofthefuturetrajectory. TheReferenceModelforassessmentofcasestudiesfortheBOBLMESAincombinationwithrecent expertopinionincludethesevenelementsandthetoolsforsustainablemanagement,Viz.:

toolsofsustainablemanagement. Thetoolsofsustainablemanagementinclude: i. rights, ii. transparent,participatorymanagement, iii. supporttoscience,planningandenforcement, iv. benefitdistribution, v. integratedpolicy, vi. precautionaryapproach, vii. capacitybuilding, viii. marketincentives. The literature affirms that to proceed toward effective mainstreaming of fishery comanagement baseduponlessonsfromcasestudiesthefollowingattributesofafisherysocioecological;systems arerequired:

goodgovernance, appropriateincentives, reducingdemandforlimitedresources, eliminatingpovertyandprovidingalternatives, improvingknowledgeofcomplexsystems, interactionsofthefisheriessectorwithothersectorsandenvironment,and

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 1. 2. 3. 4. Anenablingpolicyandlegalframework, Theparticipationandempowermentofcommunities(andotherusers), Effectivelinkagesandinstitutions;and Resourcesaresourceworthmanagingandthepeopleandmoneytodoit.

Theresolutionacceptedatthe29thSessionoftheUNFAOCommitteeonFisheriesinFebruary2011 toimplementaninternationalinstrumenttosupportsmallscalefisheriesindevelopingcountrieshas thepotentialtorestoreeconomicstatusandlivelihoodsofcoastalcommunities. 2. Case Studies to Illustrate Communitybased Integrated Coastal Management: Best PracticesandLessons,andAspectsofLivelihood. Theobjectivesofthissectionare: 1. To present a selection of case study examples that illustrate best practices in community based fishery management (CBFRM), comanagement, and alternative livelihood developmentfromthedifferentecological,geographicandsociopoliticalcontextsfoundin theBOBLMESARegion. 2. PromoteadoptionofbestpracticesinCBFRM,comanagement,andtoassesstheenabling factors that are needed to strengthen and replicate recognized best practice, aimed at understandingtherequirementsformainstreaming. The case studies are not exhaustive. Others may be assessed to bring out nuances using the same ReferenceModel. Eachcasestudyrepresentsacomplexsocioecologicalsystem(seeSection3forexplanation).Each socioecological system may be characterized by four attributes: (i) the resource system which portrays the ecological relationships in particular geographic settings the ecosystem linkages, (ii) thenumberofresourceunitsgeneratedbythesystemsuchasthequantityoffishwhichthencanbe valued, (iii) the number of resource users involved which provides the scale of livelihoods that require management, and (iv) institutional / governance system in operation which would include informationpertainingtomechanismsthatexistforconflictresolutionandmaintainingtheintegrity oftheresourcebase. The case studies are referred to by the notations CS1 18. Only the reasons for selection of a particularcasestudyareprovidedinthisOverview.Detailsmaybeobtainedfromthenarrativeinthe maintextunderthecorrespondingnotation. CS1.Bangladesh:EmpowermentofCoastalFishingCommunitiesforLivelihoodSecurity The case study demonstrates a comprehensive approach taken by the government to mainstream fisherycomanagement.Assessmentofsustainabilitynotavailable. CS2.Bangladesh:LawEnforcementandSocialCost:Postlarvaeshrimpcollection. This case study demonstrates the futility of seeking to enforce laws based solely on technical considerations.Thesocialcostsoflawenforcementareintolerableinapoliticalcontext. CS3.Bangladesh:FisheryCooperativeforSectorModernizationandLivelihoodUplift. This case study demonstrates the inability of comanagement interventions to make positive contributions to social wellbeing when governance is flawed and decisions are imposed on fishing communities. CS4 India, Andhra Pradesh: The Andhra Pradesh Fishermen Cooperative Societies Federation (AFCOF)

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This case study demonstrates the inability of potential comanagement interventions to make positivecontributionstosocialwellbeingwhengovernanceisflawedanddecisionsareimposedon fishing communities. The information provided below is for the entire Indian coast of the Bay of Bengalsincethecooperativestructureisintendedtobenefitallthestates. CS5.SriLanka:evolutionoffisherycooperativespoliticalimperativesversusfisherydevelopment. Thiscasestudyillustrates,asinBangladeshandinIndia,themannerinwhichgovernmentimposed fisherycooperativesdrivenbypoliticalagendashavefailedtoimprovethewellbeingofartisanaland mostsmallscalefishers CS6.Maldives:Territorialuserightsinfisheries(TURF)forMaldivianNationalsintheCoastalFishing Zone This case study demonstrates the existence of fishery comanagement in an area (about 500,000 km2) defined for territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) which is about half the extent of the MaldivesEEZ. CS7.Maldives:Exclusiveuserightsofhousereefsassignedtopopulationsofinhabitedislands. This case study demonstrates the manner in which cascades of TURFs under CBFRM, can exist as nested,coupledandhydrologicallyinterconnectedoperationalentitieswithinthevastoceanspace ofanEEZ. CS8.SriLanka:EstuarineStakenetFisheryinNegomboLagoon. Thiscasestudydemonstratesthemannerinwhichacomanagementsystemwiththefivenecessary attributesforsustainabilityoperateswithalmostnotransactioncosttothegovernment.However, becauseofitsgeomorphologicattributesthesystemisbeingunderminedbynegativeexternalities fromnonfisherylanduse.Thesystemhasbeenextensivelyanalyzedbyseveralfisheryscientists. CS9.India,AndhraPradeshStakenetFisheryinBackwaters:BodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem. Thiscasestudyillustratestheconvergenceoffishingtechnologyandmanagementpracticesbasedon the similarity in geomorphologic settings. The resource system is relatively concentrated and definablewithinaspatialboundary.ThisfacilitatestheexerciseofTURFs. CS10. India, Andhra Pradesh: Shore Seine and Backwater Fisheries Small Scale Fisheries Dealing WithComplexityandChangeAComparison The state has a coastline of 900 km with an estimated 870,000 fishers living mainly in fishing communities.Widedifferencesexistamongthesecommunitiesinregardtofishingsystems,disposal, marketing,social,andpoliticalorganization.Traditionalfisherymanagementsystemshaveevolvedin relation to the geomorphology and ecology of the biophysical system. Geomorphologic drivers of twovillages,UppadaandBodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem(BCVPalem),illustratetheeffectivenessof traditionalCBFRMsystemsintheregulationoffishingpractices.Thespecificsvarybetweenthetwo systems. CS11.SriLanka:ShoreSeineFishery,Western,SouthernandEasternCoastlines This case study demonstrates the manner in which diminishment of restrictions on access rights imposes both economic and social costs. The situation is further undermined by facilitating unrestrainedcompetitionamongtraditionalandmodernfishingtechnologies. CS12.SpecialAreaManagement:SriLanka This case study was selected since it demonstrates that imposition of concepts that are not fully integrated with the structure and functioning of an ecosystem including geomorphology fails to providesustainableresultseveninanapproachwhichseekstobeparticipatory.

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CS13. Maldives: Baa Atoll Ecosystem Conservation (AEC), PublicPrivate Collaboration within CorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)Framework Thiscasestudywasselectedtodemonstratethepotentialformutualcooperationandcoexistence of both community interests and private sector interests, where the latter resort tourism, has becometheprimarydriveroftheMaldiveseconomy. CS14.India,TamilNaduFisherCouncilsJurisdictionTheGoverningSystem This case study demonstrates the manner in which organized fishing communities (artisanal, traditionalandsemimodernized)acquirethepoliticalstrengthtooperationalizeanextensiveTURF withoutformallegalsupport.Italsoillustratesthemannerinwhichorganizationandnumberscan providepoliticalpoweradequateforresistingmanipulationbygovernmentinterestcombinedwith thoseofhighlymodernized,commercialfisheries. CS15.India,TamilNadu&AndhraPradesh,CBFRMinPulicatLake ThiscasestudydemonstratestheneedforsocialandculturalflexibilityinCBFRMtobeabletoadapt tosocioeconomicchangesinthewidersociety. CS16.SriLanka,CBFRMinthenearshoreShrimpFisheryinNegombo This case study was selected to demonstrate the feasibility of TURFs in open, nearshore coastal waters (not partially enclosed by backwaters and estuaries). Traditional knowledge enables establishmentofaboundaryfortheTURF. CS17.India:TheBlueRevolutionexperienceofVillageGoverningCouncilsTamilNadu ThiscasestudywasselectedtodemonstratethatevenonthescaleofastatesuchasTamilNaduin India, appropriate participatory decisionmaking systems (governance) has the potential to exist withinnestedandcoupledjurisdictions. CS18.Bangladesh:CommunitybasedCoastalResourcesManagementintheSoutheast. ThiscasestudydemonstratedthatCBFRMdoesexistinBangladeshwhereasthegeneralliterature on fisheries states that such systems do not exist. This illustrates the need for searching field research. Analysisofthecasestudieswasdoneintwostages.Stage1:Screeningtodeterminetheextentof correspondencewiththeReferenceModel.Stage2:Evaluationtodeterminethepositionofacase studyasagoodoranimprovablepractice.Threecasestudies,CS6,CS8andCS14wereanalyzedas examplestoillustratetheformsofinterpretationofthetermsintheReferenceModelastheywere appliedtoattributesofparticularexamples. Four main classes of limitations to mainstreaming comanagement were illustrated by the above examples. (i) The geomorphological context and its influences on sustainability of comanaged and mainstreamed fisheries where the management area is a part of a larger ecological system. Sustainabilityinsuchsituationsismoreinfluencedbygeomorphologyratherthangovernance.This indicates the need for application of FAOs Ecosystem Approach to Fishery Management. (ii) The informalcomanagementoffisheriesintheMaldivesbasedupontheCoastalFishingZoneservingas aTURFhasprovidedmajorbenefitsbothtowardnationaleconomicgrowthandwellbeingoffishers. Its sustainability depends largely on the commitment of the state and its resilience in the face of pressurefromindustrialfishingintereststoremoveaccesslimitations.(iii)Thesustainabilityofsmall scale fishing and existing communitybased management based upon panchayats along the Indian coastlineisbeingunderminedbycommercialshrimptrawlingincontiguousareas.Thediscardsfrom shrimptrawling,appearstoerodeamajorpartofthesharedstocksbeingharvestedbytheartisanal andsmallscalefisherswhoaremembersofpanchayats.(iv)ThecasestudyfromBangladeshbased on the estuarine set bag net fishery demonstrates the need for intensified research on CBFRM in ordertomorecomprehensivelyunderstandtraditionalpractices. xviii

Themainfindingsandlessonsfromanalysisofthecasestudiesinclude: A majority demonstrate informal and formal TURFs, informal and formal government supportbypolicyand/orlegalmechanisms. Lesson:lackofgeospatialinformationforinclusioninnationalmapstoformalizeTURFsand toenablemeaningfulEAF. Afewcasestudiesthatclassifyasbetterandimprovablemanagementpracticesoccurinthe oceanic waters of the EEZs. The majority of case studies are located in partially enclosed watersofbackwatersandestuariesandininshorecoastalwaters. Lesson: The potential to increase production of artisanal smallscale fisheries from refinement of CBFRM toward comanagement in the coastal inshore waters where overexploitation is already evident is highly constrained or impossible. Simultaneously negative externalities from landbased sources of pollution and competing land uses are continuouslydiminishingtheeconomicvalueoffisheries(rentdissipation). Lesson: The Maldives case study is suggestive of the space into which inshore smallscale fishingmayexpandinBangladesh,IndiaandSriLanka.Inthesecountrieslandisthemajor limitingfactorthatkeepspushingincreasingnumbersintoartisanalfishingincoastalinshore waters. Reversalshaveoccurredintheapplicationoftechnology(switchingbackfrommechanizedto nonmechanized fishing) practices in some case studies where CBFRM exists. Therefore technologybyitselfisnotaguaranteeofimprovementinincome,thetotaleconomiccontext matters. Lesson:Introductionoftechnologymaybemoresuitableinthewidercontextofthesocial ecologicalsystemofsmallscalefishersandwithinamoreequitabledevelopmentprocess. AsubstantialincreaseinfisheryyieldshasoccurredfromoceanicfisheriesintheEEZinthe Maldives.Thismaybepartiallyattributedtotheoperationofrights/TURF.InIndiaandinSri Lanka,significantcontributionstonationalfisheryproductionhaveoccurredfromexpansion ofsmallscalefisheriesintooffshorewaterseven intheabsenceofTURFsofacomparable form. Lesson. The existing outlook that lives of smallscale fishers may improve mainly from refinement of management practices requires careful review. The potential of technology and capacity expansion into EEZs of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka in a manner that equitably benefits marginalized artisanal small scale fishers requires comprehensive testing byplannedaction. Diverse forms of rent dissipation are undermining traditional smallscale fisheries in estuaries,lagoonsandinshorecoastalwaters. Lesson: The diverse forms of rent dissipation have to be addressed, perhaps by way of rigorous application of EIA, law enforcement, and integrated land use planning / managementwithintheframeworkofICM. Fishery cooperatives that can be an effective element in comanagement become ineffectivewhenimposedonfishingcommunitiesbygovernmentsevenwiththeintentionof facilitatinglivelihooduplift. Lesson: Interventions that are excellent in concept and potential, fishery cooperatives entrainviciouscircles(insteadofvirtuouscircles)whenimplementationisflawed. The challenge of high concentrations of poor people in fishing as an activityof last resort sincetheyareplacedinanequitytraprequiresconcertedattention.Theydisregardthelaw

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toekeoutaliving.Thiscreatesaggravatedriskinthefaceofclimatechangeconsequences. Lesson: Recent catastrophes including the Asian tsunami 2004, Cyclones Sidr and Aila emphasizethatriskreductionforexposedcoastalpopulationsmustbeginnowratherthan later. Alternative livelihoods are an essential aspect of sustainable management of artisanal and small scalefisherswhosesourcesofincomehavediminishedthroughaprocessofmarginalizationoftheir roleinthefisherysector.Theobjectivesforthereviewinthisregardincluded: recognitionoftheopportunitiesandlimitationsforimprovingcoastallivelihoods,and understandingtheevolvingapproachtowardimpartingsustainabilitytocoastallivelihoods. Alivelihoodbecomessustainablewhenitbecomesresilienttoshocksandstressesbothnowandin thefuture.Alternativelivelihoods,formsofincomesubstitutionsuchascageculture,havebeenused inBangladeshforeffectivemanagementoftheHilsafisherywhichincludednofishingseasons.The alternativelivelihoodsmademanagementrestrictionsacceptable. The literature reveals that elimination of poverty is essential for sustainable fishery management. Thecomplexityofthetaskrequiresthatgovernmentsneedtoapplycompensationmeasuressuchas boat buybacks as well as, education and skills training programs to produce lasting results. Alternativescategorizeas:

Within a community or outside, and by being extractive and nonextractive. Extractive optionssuch asaquaculturemaynotbesustainablewherefishneedto be caughtasfeed, therebyincreasinginsteadofdecreasingfishingpressure. Policiestomovefishingoffshore,maynotlast,iftheyagainmoveinshorecreatingproblems inthelongerterm. Nonextractiveoptionssuchastourismmaybeavailable.Fishersneedtohavetheircapacity enhancedtobenefitfromthem.

Generallyitisassumedthatraisingincomethroughalternativeemploymentisanadequateresponse to the problem of poverty. However, experts note that raising incomes of marginalized smallscale fishersisnottheonlythingthatcountsinimprovingtheirlives.Arangeofbasicservicesincluding educationandhealtharealsorequired.Itisalsothecasethatfisherspreferdiversificationwithinthe sector. In the immediate aftermath of the Asian Tsunami 2004, fishers who had suffered from the impact chose to remain in the sector despite persistent exposure and risk since it outcompeted otheroptionsinthefishersthinking. RecentregionalconsultationintheAsiapacificregionconcludedthatdiversificationoptionshadto achieveoneormoreofthreeobjectives:

Economicaccumulation:improvedincomes,assetbasewellbeingoffishingandaquaculture dependentpeople,povertyreductionandeconomicgrowth. Reducedvulnerability:reducedriskoffailure,bufferagainstseasonality,shocksandadverse trends,e.g.climatechange. Reduced pressure on natural resources: reduced fishing effort, reduced demands of aquacultureonecosystemservices. In parallel the consultation noted that evidence of successful diversification was limited becauseofweaknessinmonitoringofimpacts.

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The literature reveals a gap between the outlook of development planners and implementation of plans for livelihood development in the fishery sector. Problem of fisher marginalization was unintended outcome of development planning. This is because the consciousness that prevailed duringthecreationofaproblemcannotbeappliedtowardfindingasolutiontoit.Thedivergencein consciousnessbecomesclearinacomparisonbetweenBangladesh,IndiaandSriLankacollectively withtheMaldives.ThedevelopmentplannersinBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLankaassumedthatthe demonstration effect of increased efficiency in fishing through modernization was adequate for transformingthetraditionalfisherstomodernmechanizedfishers.Intheprocessanunevenplaying fieldwascreatedwhereaprivilegedfewwereprovidedincentiveswhilethemajority(thetraditional fishers)werelefttofindtheirownway.Thelatterfailedandlanguished.IntheMaldives,incontrast, the traditional fishers constituted the human core that was trained and provided with capacity to modernize.Thusmodernizationdidnotresultinmarginalizationoftheexistingtraditionalfishersin theMaldives.WhetherornottherequiredchangeinconsciousnessnowexistsinBangladesh,India and in Sri Lanka to overcome marginalization of artisanal and smallscale fishers remains a moot question. Studiesofthelinkagebetweeneconomicgrowthandlivelihoodenhancementinthefisherysectorin BangladeshandIndiarevealedthat:

economicgrowthisessentialforpovertyreduction,andinprinciplegrowthassuchdoesnot seemtoaffectinequality, growthaccompaniedbyprogressivedistributionalchangeisbetterthatgrowthalone,and

education,infrastructureandmacroeconomicstabilityseemtopositivelyaffectbothgrowth anddistributionofincome. Therefore,achangeintheconsciousnessofplannersoffisheriesdevelopment,nowinaglobalized world,topromoteeconomicgrowthcoupledtoequitabledistributionofincome. Solutions to the prevailing problem of marginalization of coastal livelihoods, through economic growth, must incorporate opportunities from other coastal land uses including aquaculture and protectedareaslinkedtoconservationofmarinebiodiversity.Thismaybeachievedbyminimizingor eliminating unintended consequences of planned development in the sector. Recent history demonstrates that both these areas of development and investment have resulted in aggravated marginalizationofpoorercoastallivelihoods: Coastalaquaculture(shrimp):shrimpcultureinBangladeshbeganasasmallscaleeconomicactivity withmanylocalbenefits.Itwaslatercooptedbydevelopmentplanning,supportedbymultilateral developmentbanks,tobecomeapredominantlyprivatesectorinvestmentactivityaccompaniedby brutalityandcriminalitytowardthesmallscaleshrimpfarmers.Thisscenariowasalsoplayedoutin IndiaandinSriLanka.Theopportunitiesfromcoastalaquaculturethereforerequiresfutureplanning andimplementationtosafeguardequitabledistributionofbenefitsfromeconomicgrowth. Protectedareas:Expertopinionisdividedontheroleofmarineprotectedareasasaninstrumentin fisheries management. Evidence exists that inadequately implemented protected areas further marginalizes artisanal and smallscale fishers where they are denied access to traditional fishing areasinordertoconservebiodiversity. Comprehensive approaches to livelihood enhancement through poverty eradication instead of povertyreductionarenowbeingpromotedprimarilybytheNGOsectorwhichincorporatesrights basedeconomicgrowthandecosystembasedenvironmentalsafeguards.Oneexampleisillustrated in the unifying framework of CARE International. The unifying framework includes (i) Social

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Positionsimprovingsocialequity,(ii)HumanConditionsincreasingopportunity,and(iii)Enabling Environmentimprovinggovernance. Microcredit interventions:smallloans issuedwithout collateral topoorgroups,primarily women; andmicrofinanceinstitutions(MFIs):organizedlendinginstitutionssuchasbanksthatextentcredit tothepoorbasedoncollateralprovidedbyorganizedruralentitiesareincreasinglybeingrecognized as mechanisms that can reduce income poverty. The NGOs play a major roleinimplementationof these interventions. These institutions reveal differing levels of organization and regulation in Bangladesh,IndiaandinSriLanka.Thehighestleveloforganization,regulationandeffectivenessis visible in Bangladesh. In India microcredit and microfinance, less regulated than in Bangladesh combinedwithselfhelpgroupsarealsoprovidingmeasurablebenefitstotheruralpoor.Thelowest level of organization and regulation exists in Sri Lanka. Ambivalent impacts of MFIs are now being reported,althoughrare,includingsuicidescausedbyusuriousinterestrates,inabilitytorepayloans and pressure from the lender. Beneficial impacts of microcredit and MFI loans are realized where intensive training, handholding and monitoring are provided by participating NGOs. Necessarily, therefore,thetransactionscostsincreaseinproportiontotheeffectivenessofinterventions. The literature is inadequate about the benefits of microcredit and MFIs in remote and illiterate coastal fishing communities. Nevertheless, cooperative movements such as the South Indian Federation of Fishermens Societies (SIFFS) are demonstrating the delivery of benefits based upon cooperativeoperationalprinciplestobothmenandwomeninsmallscalefisherysector.Thismaybe suggestiveofpossibilitiesthatexistthroughcooperativeinterventionsbasedonvoluntarism. 3. ICM and Fisheries Management, and Some Basic Concepts Relevant to CBICM in the BOBLMESA. Thissectionprovidesclaritytothematerialintheprecedingtwosections.Itsobjectivesareto:

provide a view of BOBLMESA as a complex socioecological system in which exist coupled andnestedsubsystems, indicatenationaldisparitiesandpitfallsofregionalgeneralizations, diversityinstatusofICM, the trends in marine fisheries and hidden complexity of smallscale fisheries in their relationshipwithnationalexpectationsofsectorgrowth, assesstherelationshipbetweenthenationalpositionsinrelationtotheglobaldiscourseon theprevailingfisherycrisis, indicatetherelationshipbetweenincreasingriskandinadequaterecognitionofthechronic disasterthatalreadyexistsinregardtoenvironmentalsecurity, indicate the manner in which rent dissipation is further marginalizing the poorer coastal residents and exposing them to coastal hazards as unintended consequences of planned development.

The complexity of the BOBLMESA flows from the combined effects of natural change, historical events,developmentplanning,demographicchange,landusepressure,fishingtechnology,scientific uncertaintyandglobalization.Withinthesecomplexrelationships,effectiveCBICMseekstoenhance coastal livelihoods. Therefore it is appropriate to understand complexity as attributes of socio ecologicalsystems(SESs)andtoadoptadiagnosticapproachtowarddeterminingtherootcausesof fisherydeclineandecosystemdegradation.Baseduponthisapproachdiagnosismayproceedonthe basis of definition of SESs in terms of attributes of (i) the resource system, (ii) the number of

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economic resource units provided by it, (iii) the number of resource users, and(iv)the institutions involvedingovernance. TheBOBLMESAisaregionofextremedisparities. Regional generalizations matterlittle sinceboth theproblemsofcoastalecosystemsandmajorityofsmallscalefisherlivelihoodsaresituatedwithin nationaljurisdictions.Povertyappearstobethemostsignificantsharedfeatureofthethreelarger nations,Bangladesh,IndiaandSriLanka. ICMexistsindifferentformsofdevelopmentintheregion: BangladeshseekstoformalizeICMgraduallyinitsvast,definedcoastalzonewhichcoversanareaof about 47,000 square kilometers (32% of the country) in which live about 35 million people. About half of the population of the coastal zone live in the segment demarcated as the exposed coastal zone. The policy goal of ICM is to to create conditions, in which the reduction of poverty, development of sustainable livelihoods and integration of the coastal zone into national processes cantakeplace. India declared a legal Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) in 1991 which assigned the responsibility of accordingly developing coastal zone management plans to each coastal state. The CRZ provides jurisdictionoveranarrowstripoflandextending500metersfromhightideline.TheCRZhasbeen reinstatedrecently(2009)andprovidestighterregulationofdevelopmentandlanduses.Thisform of enforcement, however, will be more tolerant of land uses within the CRZ by coastal fishing communities. Maldives with its widely scattered 200 inhabited islands regards the entire state as being an archipelagiccoastalzonealthoughaformalICMprocessdoesnotexist. Sri Lanka has a dedicated Coast Conservation Department (CCD) which is mandated with responsibility for implementing the national Coast Conservation Act since 1981. A narrow strip of landandsea,extending300meterslandwardand2kilometersseawardconstitutesthelegalCoastal Zone.TheCCDregulateslandusesmainlywithinthelegalcoastalzonewithcommunityparticipation wherenecessaryinregardtocriticalcoastalhabitats. Informationpertainingtosmallscalefisheriesisprovidedmainlytoindicatetrendsandrelationships with, coastal shrimp trawling, illegal, unreported and unregistered fishing carried out with private sectorpartnershipsintheEEZs,andtheexporttradeinfisheryproducts. AllfisheriesintheBOBLMESAclassifyassmallscalefisheriesbybeingbelowtheoveralllength(OAL) of about 25 meters, although the precise definition continues to be debated at the WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/forums_e/ngo_e/posp72_www_e.pdf). However this hides internal differences that are significant to coastal livelihoods. The smallscale fisheries in Bangladesh, India andSriLankaconsistmainlyoftwoclasses: CategoryAartisanalnonmotorized craft,motorizedtraditionalcraftandmotorizedmoderncraft whichareengagedinnearshorecoastalfishing,and CategoryB:themoremodernizedcoastalshrimptrawlersandoffshorefishingcraft. The main interest in development planning in the fishery sector as well as investment in infrastructurehasbeenfocusedonCategoryBwhichmainlyserveseliteinterestsandbringsforeign exchangethroughexportearnings. TheMaldivianfishingfleetisalmostentirelycomposedofsmallscale,modernized,motorizedcraft engagedinoceanicfishing. xxiii

CBICMinBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLankadirectlywillimpactthepopulationsengagedinCategory Afishing.TheyfaroutnumberthoseincategoryBintermsofprovidingemploymentandlivelihoods, producemorefishthatdirectlyentersthesupplychaintolocalandnationalconsumersasfood,use arelativelyinsignificantquantityoffossilfuel,theyarelesscapitalintensive,andappeartohavea lesserimpactoncoastalecosystems.CBICMalsowouldhaveasignificantimpactonshrimptrawlers thatconstituteapartofCategoryBwhilehavingalesserimpactontheotherpart,thefishingcraft that operate offshore. Despite the major contribution to employment and food security by small scale fishing in Category A, national development planning has focused almost exclusively on CategoryBbecauseitserveseliteinterestandearnsforeignexchangethroughexports.Intheevent that this dichotomy persists, Category A fishing will continue to be marginalized with dire consequencesforamajorityofcoastallivelihoods.Someadverseimpactsthatmayemergefromthe relationshipbetweenCategoryAandCategoryBfishingifnotmanagedwithintheframeworkofCB ICMinclude:

erosion of fishery stocks on which the Category A fishing depends by expanded shrimp trawlinginBangladeshandinIndia, fishingdownthefoodchain,alreadydemonstratedinIndiamaycontinue,althoughthismay contributetoanexpansionofshrimpstocks, quantityofdiscardsthroughshrimptrawlingcouldincreaseinIndia, intheeventthatcapacityforshrimpfishinginBangladeshisexpandedasintendedwithout safeguards,artisanalfishersmaydecline,

displacementoffishercommunitiesbycompetinglandusesincludingindustryandtourism, Mapping of coastal fishing areas, as it has been partially done in Bangladesh, demonstrates a techniqueforcharacterizationofsensitive,nearshorecoastalseabedsforintegratedmanagementof competingfishingmethodswithdifferingefficiencies,withinaCBICMframework.Suchdemarcated areas supported by allocation of use rights (limitation of access) may contribute toward balancing impactsofcompetingfishingmethodsaimingatsustainablecoexistence. All BOBLMESA countries are planning expansion of fishing effort to benefit from export markets. Bangladesh and India already rank among the top ten fish and fishery product exporters for the international market. Their main increased export is expected to be shrimp from their extensive continentalshelves.Thenationalreportssuggestthatallfourcountriesarealsoplanningexpansion of offshore fishing both in their unutilized parts of the EEZs as well as beyond. At present considerableIUUfishingisreportedtobeoccurringtherebecauseoftheirlimitednationalcapacities formonitoring,controlandsurveillance(MCS).Thetechnicalinformationandtrendstatisticsarenot clear that support the potential for expansion, and the equitability of benefits that may flow expandedproductiontowardenhancementofcoastallivelihoods.Thegrowthoffisheryproduction fromoffshorefishingintheMaldivessincetheearly1970s,andthemorerecentpositiveresultsof expansion of offshore fishing by Sri Lankas smallscale, multiday boats appear to be attractive to BangladeshandIndia. International discourse has increased about the growth of the marine fishery sector in developing countriesanditsconsequences.Theimportanteventsinthisprocessinclude: spilling over of fishing interests from industrialized countries to developing countries followingpeakingofproductionintheformersincethe1970s, operationalizationofEEZsundertheUNLawoftheSearegime, massivesubsidizationofthemarinefisherybybothindustrializedanddevelopingcountries, the reduction by almost an order of magnitude of the catches of large fish since industrial fishingbegan, xxiv

the increasing flow of seafood from developing countries to industrialized countries and associatedforeignexchangeearnings, theincreaseinproportionoftheworldsforagefishbeingdivertedasaquaculturefeedfor highvaluecarnivorousfish.

The prevailing crisis in the marine fishery is partially masked by aspects including, massive over reporting of catches by China, decreasing wild catches being pooled with aquaculture production, seafood demand in developed countries being met increasingly by imports from developing countries,andassertionbygovernmentaffiliatedscientiststhataproblemdoesnotexistbyignoring contradictory evidence. Proposed remedies include marine protected areas, marketing of eco labeled products from sustainable fisheries, removal of subsidies among others. Erudite reviews of theproblemandsolutionsintherecentliteratureconcludethatnosinglemanagementprocessfrom among the ten standard approaches in fishery management provide an adequate answer, and thereforeaconsolidated,combinedapproachisneeded. Resource rent is noted as the key concept that drives overexploitation in fisheries, while simultaneously determining the potential economic and social benefits that can be derived from a managed fishery. Where inadequately recognized, the tragedy of the commons results from competition and through rent dissipation. This implies the need for property rights and rules of access to fishery resources. Implementation of adequate and sustainable solutions depends upon botheconomicandpoliticalconsiderations. Recent catastrophes caused by the 2004 Asian Tsunami, cyclones and other hazards provide compellingevidencefortheneedtoaddressrisk,exposureandchronicdisaster(incontrasttoacute disasters)inrelationtocoastallivelihoodintheBOBLMESA.Bangladesh,IndiaandSriLankaalready have chronic disasters on their hands in the form of increasing concentration of the poorest populationsincoastalareasforthelackofopportunitytoliveinsaferareas,despiteanimpending increaseinfrequencyofcoastalhazardsassociatedwithglobalwarming. 4. Retrospection,ConclusionsandRecommendations Retrospectionservestoensurethefocusandemphasisonlivelihoodofcoastalcommunitiesasthe core problem. The five decades, since the 1960s, include three distinct stages of fishery development: (i) premodernization; (ii) modernization, and (iii) postmodernization coupled with globalization.Thequestionspertainingtochangeduringthesestagesare: 1. Why has the wellbeing of traditional and partially mechanized marine smallscale fishers declined,whiletheintendedgoalwasimprovedlivelihoodthroughmodernization? 2. Haveanycountriesimprovedthewellbeingofsmallscalefishersthroughpolicy? 3. Whatkeyconceptssupportedpoliciesthatimprovedthewellbeingofsmallscalefishers? 4. Whatkeyingredientsindevelopmenteconomicpoliciescontributedtoenhancedwellbeingof smallscalefishers? 5. What conclusions may be warranted with regard to reliability of similar changes during the BOBLMEStage2Programme? Theanswersanddiscussionrelatedtothesequestionsformthebasisfortheoverallconclusionsin thisreview,andprovidesinformationforfurtherdiscourseatregionalandnationallevel. Thefollowinganswers15followthesequenceofquestionsastheyarepresentedabove: 1.Whyhasthewellbeingoftraditionalandpartiallymechanizedmarinesmallscalefishersdeclined, whiletheintendedgoalwasimprovedlivelihoodthroughmodernization? Answer:Theparticipationoftraditionalsmallscalefisherswasregardedasameanstoanend,i.e. theirparticipationwouldincreasefisheryproductiononanationalscalethroughmodernization.The xxv

socioeconomicwellbeingofthefisherswasinadequatelyregardedasanendinitselfinparallelwith increased fish production. Introduction of modernization technology was a simple approach to development within a socialecological system which was complex and contained many uncertainties. Therefore marginalization of smallscale fisher livelihood was an unforeseen consequenceofplanneddevelopment.Thecausesthatleadtosuchunforeseenconsequencesare includedinthemaintext. 2. Haveanycountriesimprovedthewellbeingofsmallscalefishersthroughpolicy? Answer:Theanswermustbeconsideredincombinationwithacaveattheroleofsubsidiesinthe particularexamplesarenotprovidedasjustificationforcontinuationofthesameastheynowexist, particularly in small scale commercial, and industrial fisheries. The development of fisheries and fishery livelihood in Canada, Norway and Iceland during 1930 1980 included subsidies, both physicalandfinancial,tofishingcommunitiesandfishprocessingplantworkersforimprovementof the socioeconomic conditions and provision of social security arrangements. These state interventionshadasignificantimpact andgreatlyenhanced the livelihoodsecurityofcommunities dependentonfisheries. 3. Whatkeyconceptssupportedpoliciesthatimprovedthewellbeingofsmallscalefishers? Answer: The key conceptual factors include: (i) Development planning in fisheries inclusive of interventions targeting the small scale fishers as beneficiaries; and (ii) Capacity development to adjust out of the fishery when fishery stocks diminish, or the provision of livelihood resilience independentlyoffluctuationsinnaturalstocksandgrowthincoastalhumanpopulations. 4. What key ingredients in development economic policies contributed to enhanced well being of smallscalefishers? Answer: The key development economic policies can be regarded as: (i) A law and order situation which guarantees property safeguards and the application of resource rents that prevent rent capturebypoliticallyorientedinterestsattheexpenseofthesmallscalefishers.(ii)Organizationof smallscalefishers,theirempowermentandawarenessbuildingleadingtoadequatepublicpressure thatcompelslegislatorstoreact. 5. What conclusions may be warranted with regard to reliability of similar changes during the BOBLMEStage2Programme? Answer:Publicpolicywithregardtosmallscalefisheriescannotremaintobethedomainofpolitical authorities.Intheabsenceofpublicpressurethereisinsufficientreason,motivationorincentivefor policychangestobemadeonthebasisofscientificevidencealone.Capacitybuildingwouldresultin empowerment,organizationandadvocacyleadingtocompellingpublicpressure. Conclusions The conclusions are drawn from the case studies in relation to the FAO Vision for Smallscale Fisheries,andthereferenceModelforcasestudyanalysis. 1. Economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty at the national level. Integrated coastal development planning is necessary to ensure equitable sharing of benefits from coastal resources.Intheabsenceofamechanismforintegrationoftraditionalfishersthisresourceuser group will continue to be marginalized despite their significant contribution to food security, despiteeconomicgrowthatthenationallevel. 2. Community Based Integrated Coastal Management (CBICM) which implies the integration of coastalresourcesmanagementandfisheriesmanagementwithinFAOsEcosystemApproachto Fisheries(EAF)doesnotexistintheBOBLME.

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3. CBICM with stewardship of local communities is adequate where the ecological system and competing uses are limited. Where the scale of the ecological system and uses increase, co managementpartnershipwiththegovernmentbecomesnecessary. 4. A variety of different approaches to coastal resources management (ICM) exist in the four BOBLMESAcountries;lackofuniformityisassociatedwithdifferingnationalpriorities. 5. The examples of CBFRM and Comanagement analyzed in the review (except the fishery cooperatives) embody limitations of access in various forms. This is the precondition for sustainabilityoffisheries.Comanagementwillconsolidatesustainability. 6. The coastalresourcesmanagement processesarenotintegratedwiththelandusesthat cause negativeexternalities(e.g.landbasedsourcesofpollution)asrequiredinFAOsEAF. 7. OverfishingisevidentfromapplicableindicatorsinthenearshorecoastalwatersofBangladesh, India and Sri Lanka which has adverse impacts on the livelihood interests of traditional mechanizedandnonmechanizedfishers. 8. Fishery modernization has resulted in increased production which has disproportionately benefitted the external investors in production and marketing rather than the traditional producers.Thisprocessofchangemaycontinueunlesslivelihoodsafeguardsareavailabletothe marginalizedtraditionalproducersandassociatedwomeninthesupplychain. 9. Marginalization of the smallscale fishery sector through the lack of their representation in developmentdecisionmakingprocesseswillcontinueuntildeliberatepolicychoicesaremadeto reversethispattern. 10. Theexistenceofpropertyrights(informaland/orformal)alonedoesnotguaranteeareversalin marginalization trends. In spite of the existence of CBFRM and comanagement practices the vastmajorityoftraditionalfisherslackrecognition.Measuresarerequiredforprovidingidentity tothemintermsoftheireconomicroleinfoodsecurity,andtheirfishingareastowardproviding definitiontotheirsocialecologicalsystems. 11. The livelihood problem associated with traditional fisheries is massive and looming in terms of socioeconomics,andinthefaceofincreasingriskfromcoastalhazardslinkedtoclimatechange andsealevelrise.Thisproblemhastobeaddressedfirmlyandsteadfastlybywayof:education, health,infrastructureforlifeandsecurity,empowermentincludingwomen,marginalizedgroups, andaccesstoupwardsocialmobility. 12. Many marginalized coastal/ fisher communities are in a chronic poverty trap which results in progressiveincreaseintheirlevelofdeprivation(creepingnormalcy).Thisrequiresrecognitionat thenationallevelasachronicdisasterwhichmaycombinewithacutecoastalhazards(thoseto whichatimeanddatecanbegiven)resultingincatastrophes. 13. The remote and dispersed nature of coastal/ fisher communities/settlements which are inadequately serviced with infrastructure has obstructed movement into other occupations i.e. pooraccesstoeducation,health,alternativeemploymentopportunitiesetc. 14. High levels of income poverty and lack of access to alternative means of income have caused displacement and transfer of responsibility for family health and nutrition to women heads of households.ThisisparticularlythecaseinBangladeshandinsomeoftheIndianstates. 15. Inthecontextofnationaldevelopment,expansionoffisheriesintooffshorewaterswithinEEZsis perceived as an approach to benefitting from global fishery trade. The process of expansion is eitherbeing plannedoritisalreadyoccurringalthoughreliable trendstatisticsandmeaningful information on the complexity of ecological systems are lacking. A precautionary approach is required. Recommendations 1. CBFRM and comanagement practices exist in traditional fishing communities at different geographicandinstitutionalscales.Despitetheimpactsoffisherymodernizationandeconomic growthinthefisheriessectorthesepracticeshavedemonstratedresilience.Theirconsolidation will contribute toward realization of their full potential to support sustainable livelihood for coastal/fishercommunities.Theyneedtobeprovidedwithanidentity.

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 2. Theprocessofchangeincoastalresourceuseresultsfromasharingofresourcesamongmany sectors and needs to be planned. In development planning there is a need to create equitable opportunityfortraditionalfisherstobenefit.Appropriategovernancewithparticipatorydecision makingisrequiredtominimizeconflictandensureequityinbenefitssharingforallstakeholders. Enablingmechanismsneedtobeimplementede.g.integratedplanningprocesses,localcapacity buildingtorespondtoopportunities,toencourageparticipationsincechangethatbenefitsthe powerlesscannotoccurspontaneously. 3. It is important to take measures to consolidate and safeguard existing CBFM and co managementpractices(whetherformalorinformal)toensurethattheybecomeeffectiveeven in the absence of fully fledged national ICM mechanisms/ policy. This must be a priority. It is feasible to anticipate that the political (group) demand for ICM would emerge from the stakeholders currently participating in CBFM and comanagement processes as they become knowledgeable about the ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAF). A number of practicalstepscanbetakentoconsolidateandstrengthenexistingCBFRMandcomanagement practices; i. AwarenessandknowledgeworkshopsmaycontributetotheaccelerationofCBICM. ii. ResearchtodefinesocialecologicalsystemsthatdemonstrateCBFRMandcomanagement. Research would incorporate four fundamental attributes: (i) the resource system and its ecologicallinkages,(ii)thenumberofresourceunitsgeneratedbytheresourcesystem,(iii)the numberofresourceusersand(iii)theinstitutionsthatsupportmanagement. Mapping processes that recognize and document the nature of existing CBFM and co managementpracticesinBangladesh,IndiaandSriLankaarecriticalstepstowardsestablishinga foundation for sustainable resource management. Such mapping (which would include information on fishing areas, distance from the shore, bathymetry and sea bed features) will result in the allocation of a geospatial identity for the traditional fisheries sector. This is an essentialfirststeptowardsempowerment.Nationalpolicyreformsarerequiredformappingthe distribution and resource use patterns of coastal resources by the traditional mechanized and nonmechanizedfisheriessector. iii. Socioecologicalentities(groupsandorganizations)empoweredbyknowledgeofthesystem attributesprovideasteptowardthedevelopmentofnetworksandfederationsthatthen have thesubsequentabilitytoacquirepoliticalpower. iv. Economic valuation of the contribution by traditional fisheries (to employment, nutrition/ foodsecurity,genderaspectsetc.)needstoberesearchedanddemonstratedtonationalpolicy makers.DemonstratingeconomiccontributionofCBFRMandcomanagementpracticestothe localandregionaleconomiesintermsoffoodsecurityandemploymentwouldbepersuasivefor the state to support dedicated policy promoting comanagement practices and to bear the transactioncostsofformalizingcomanagement. v. In the Maldives consolidation of existing comanagement in the coastal fisheries zone requiressafeguardsagainstIUUfishingandotherformsoffishingdrivenbyvestedinterestssuch asindustrialfishing. 4. Reversalofthemarginalizationoftraditionalmechanizedandnonmechanizedfisheriesrequires therecognitionoftraditionalfishersasasectorintheirownrightandthetargetingofinitiatives that will support their needs and interests. The key steps towards achieving this include: (i) providing geospatial identity to each entity which embodies CBFM and (informal) co management. (ii) policy reforms that target these recognized geospatial entities. (iii) zonation

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5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

that accommodates coexistence of such entities alongside other competition for resource use andspace(iv)monitoringandenforcementofregulations. Regulationsarerequiredtoprovideterritorialuserightsinfisheries(TURFs)tostakeholderswho are participating in CBFRM and comanagement. Local understanding of legislation governing resource management is an essential underpinning for this to take place because regulations pertainingtofisheriesandtocoastalresourcesmanagementfallwithinambitsofmanyagencies. Thisrequiressupportthroughcollaborationamongresponsiblegovernmentagenciesbothatthe nationalandlocallevel. Improving livelihoods. Initiation of processes for the provision of identity to migratory households/groupslocatedinremoteareas.Thisisimportantsincemanyofthemdonothave permanent addresses. This is particularly important for itinerant or migratory groups that are mobileinordertobringthemintopovertyreductionsupportprogrammes.Nationalprogrammes are now underway for poverty reduction in the context of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other similar interventions. Transfers of benefits can occur to marginalized fisher communitiesonlytotheextentthattheycanbeidentified. Capacity development to enable communities to access services provided by microfinance institutionsisakeypracticalstepwhichcanallowhouseholdsandcommunitygroupstheoption todiversifylivelihood/incomegeneratingopportunities.Thiscanbecomethebasisofvoluntary cooperativedevelopmentasaprocessthathasthepotentialtooffersignificantpositivechange forcommunitygroupsthrougheconomicandpoliticalempowerment. Potential exist for publicprivate partnerships between coastal tourism investors and fishing communitiesthroughmutuallybeneficialrelationshipbetweenthetwosectors,thepublicright offishingcommunitiestoaccesstheseaandtheculturalinterestfactorfortourismthatfishing communitiesbring.Governmentpolicycouldprovideafoundationforcoexistence. Global/exportdemandforaquacultureproductscanleadtolandcapturebyinvestorsandthe marginalization of traditional inhabitants, often fisher communities. Therefore policies that promoteexpansionofaquaculturemustbedesignedwithinstitutionalizedsafeguards. Thedesignandimplementationofprotectedareasshouldbedoneinaparticipatorymannerand bebaseduponconsiderationsofaccessfortraditionalfisherstothefisheries. Microfinanceinstitutions(MFIs)/microcreditinterventionsaredemonstratingeffectivenessfor providing financial support for alternative employment and diversification of livelihood. The initiatives of NGOs have acquired support from government and banks because of proven effectiveness. Many traditional fishing communities lack capacity to access such financial programmes because of inadequate training and/ or education. Regulation coupled with incentives, however, is required to ensure that the MFIs do not resort to usurious practices as suggestedbyrecenteventsofsuicides.

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1.Introduction
This review aims to synthesize the status of communitybased integrated coastal management (CBICM) in the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem, South Asia (BOBLMESA) consisting of Bangladesh,India,MaldivesandSriLanka.Itspurposeis; Partnershipbetweengovernmentandlocalcommunitiesresultingincomanagementisregardedas anecessarymechanismtoachievesustainability.Mainstreamingstrengthenssustainability.Itoccurs whenthecomanagementpartnershipsareinstitutionalizedasapartofgovernmentadministration. Bywayofmainstreaming,relianceonadhocprojectsandunsystematicinterventionsiseliminated (APFIC,2005). Governance and institutions are terms frequently used in this review and therefore require clarifications. Governance represents the process through which decisions are made. It is different fromgovernmentwhichconsistsofagroupofpeoplewithinasovereignstateresponsibleformaking andenforcingpoliciesandlawsbywayofadministrativeorganizations.Fisheriesgovernanceisthe sum of the legal, social, economic and political arrangements used to manage fisheries. It has international,nationalandlocaldimensionsandincludeslegallybindingrulesaswellascustomary social arrangements (FAO, 2001). The establishment of institutions, policies and processes through whichmanagementmayberealizedisfundamentaltoeffectivefisheriesgovernance.Institutionsare the sets of rules and arrangements (public and private, formal and informal) affecting a fishery, as well as the organizations that develop and implement those rules (Fishery Management Science ProgrammePolicyBrief5,http://www.mrag.co.uk/Documents/PolicyBrief5_Governance.pdf). Implicit in exploring best practices in the management of marine resources is increased understandingofthehumanityofthetotalevent,i.e.thenatureoftheexperienceofpeoplewhose livesareembeddedintheuseandinthemanagementofcoastalresources.Thesearetheresources that support their own survival, expectations for their families and enhancement of wellbeing in termsoflivingthelifetheyvalueandhavereasontovalue(Sen,1995;1999).Thisisencapsulatedin thevisionofthecurrentBayofBengalLargeMarineEcosystemProgrammeStage2,viz.Toimprove the lives of the coastal populations of the eight participating countries through improved regional management of the Bay of Bengal environment and its fisheries. The estimated population in the BOBLMESA dependent on fisheries for livelihood and food security was about 20 million at the beginning of the decade of the 1990s (Hotta, 2000). This number would increase sharply today as greaterclarityisprovidedtothemanywaysinwhichdependencyonfisheriesshouldbedefinedin thecontextofthecomplexityofthefisheryenterprise. AparallelreviewisbeingconductedfortheSouthEastAsiancountriesoftheBOBLME.Integrationof theinformationamongallcountriesconstitutingtheentireBOBLMEcommunitywillfollow. Inthiscontextofcoastalresources,fisheriesandlivelihooditisnecessarytostartfromanawareness ofthepositionofperceptionsofscientistsonsustainabilityoffisheries,althoughultimatelythekey decisions are made on political and trade priorities. Hilborn (2007) summarizes There are two diverging views of the status and future of the worlds fisheries. One group represented largely by academic marine ecologists sees almost universal failure of fisheries management and calls for the use of marine protected areas as the central tool of a new approach to rebuilding the marine ecosystems of the world. The scientists working in fisheries agencies and many academic scientists see a more complex picture, with many failed fisheries but also numerous successes. This group topresentbackgroundinformation, toreviewexistingbestpracticesand toassesswhatenablinginterventionsareneededtostrengthenCBICMinthesefourcountriesto providesustainabilitytofisheriesandfisherydependentlivelihoods.

arguesthatweneedtoapplythelessonsfromthesuccessfulfisheriestostopthedeclineandrebuild thosefisheriesthreatenedbyexcessfishing.Theselessonsarestoppingthecompetitiveracetofishby appropriateincentivesforfishingfleetsandgoodgovernance.Themajortoolofresettingincentivesis granting various forms of dedicated access, including communitybased fishing rights, allocation to cooperatives,andindividualfishingquotas. Manyofthefailedfisheriesoccurinjurisdictionswhere central governments are not functional, and local control of fisheries is an essential part of the solution. This expert perception, based mainly on the experience of developed countries, acknowledges the need for collaboration between developing country governments and resource users.ThissituationisreviewedlaterinthissectionvisvisPitcherandLam(2010),toconveythe complexityofthetaskthatliesaheadofBOBLMEProjectimplementation..

1.1 Communitybased integrated coastal management and specific objectives of this review
For the purpose of this review the BOBLME Project/FAO definition of communitybased integrated coastalmanagement(CBICM)isused.BOBLMEdefinesCBICMintermsofthreesetsofactivities: 1. communitybasedfisheriesandhabitatmanagement; 2. comanagementoffisheriesand 3. thecreationofalternativelivelihoodsamongfishercommunitiesintheregion. Some considerations pertaining to the conceptual basis of CBICM, as presently applied by FAO, particularlytheroleofthestateintheexistingsituationintheBOBLMESAarepresentedinSection 3. In a simplified manner, the term state is used in the sense that includes government and associatedentitiesincludingcivilsociety,bureaucracy,privatesector,religiousorganizationsthatare togetherrecognizedasforminganation. Theobjectivesofthereview,therefore,are: 1. Toidentifyandevaluatetherelevantsectionsofthelargeanddiversebodyofinformation andexperienceinBangladesh,India,MaldivesandSriLankaassociatedwith: (i) communitybased fisheries and habitat management (CBFM) this is where a community(agroupofpeople)providesstewardshipintheuseofafisheryresourcesystem includingsupportingecologicalstructures.CBFMisnarrowerinscopethancomanagement, becausegovernmenthereoftenplaysaminorrole(Berkesetal.,2001;IDRC,2001); (ii) comanagement of fisheries: a partnership arrangement in which government, the communityoflocalfisheryresourceusers,externalagents(NGOs,researchers,academics), and other coastal resource stakeholders (boat owners, fish traders, tourism interests, etc.) sharetheresponsibilityandauthorityfordecisionmaking(governance)inthemanagement ofafishery(IDRC,2001); (iii) the creation of alternative livelihoods among fisher communities in the region, i.e., activitiesdesignedtoreducetheadverseimpactoftheharmfuluseofcoastalresourcesand toprovideincomeopportunitieswithinandoutsidethesectorthatcontributetoenhanced wellbeing, and in parallel reduce deprivation, resulting in the provision of conditions that enable people to acquire a quality of life in terms of valued activities and the capability to achievetheseactivities(Townsley,2004;Sen,1995;1999;Jentoftetal,2010). 2. To extract lessons from case studies of best practices that could guide the integration of fisheries comanagement including the associated ecological system (CBICM) and sustainable livelihoodsintothenationaldevelopmentprocessesofgovernments,i.e.,bymainstreamingfisheries comanagement.

1.2CBICMandComanagementDefined
The term communitybased in CBICM as defined above creates a contradiction in its practical implications.Comanagementisusedinthisreviewinthesenseinwhichitwasdiscussedin2005at the APFIC Workshop on Mainstreaming Fisheries Comanagement in AsiaPacific (APFIC, 2005; Brown, Staples and FungeSmith, 2005). One of the four pillars considered essential for successful comanagement is an enabling policy legislative environment (Brown, Staples and FungeSmith, 2005). Only government can provide the required legislative environment required in ICM where effectivelandusemanagementisthekey.Therefore,althoughthetermCBICMisusedinthisreview because it is required by the consultants Terms of Reference, the intended practical connotation does not imply that communities are in a position to ensure legal access and security of tenure. However,CBFMandcomanagementmayberegardedasamixtureofcommunityandgovernment participationinvaryingdegreealongacontinuum(Figure1)(Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005). Comanagement describes the spectrum of shared management between the extremes of full communitybased management (with full devolution of responsibility to communities/fishers) through to governmentbased management (with full responsibility controlled by government) (Figure 1). In this review, the terms communitybased management and governmentbased managementrefertothetwoextremeendsofthespectrum.Itisnecessarytorecognizethatthese extremesrarelyexistinrealityandthattypically,thereissomeformofintermediatearrangement. Fishers and governments are not entities that can be linked directly because they are already embedded in complex socioeconomic and sociopolitical systems. Therefore effective fishery co managementimpliestheformationofamutuallysupportivenetworkofrelationshipsamongfishers, governmentandassociatedstakeholders(Figure2).
Figure 1. The relationship between comanagement, communitybased management and governmentbased management (Pomeroy and Williams, 1994. as adapted in Brown, Staples and FungeSmith, 2005). The relationship between Communitybased management and Government based management results in co managementofvaryingdegrees. Mainstreamingestablishessetsofcollaborativepartnershipsbetweenfisher communities and the relevant levels of government administration. These partnerships promote better governancebasedonshareddecisionmaking.Traditional,artisanalandmodernizedsmallscalefisheriesthat dominate the sector in the BOBLMESA include diverse and complex forms of CBFM, comanagement and alternativelivelihoodsdevelopment.Mainstreamingeliminatesrelianceuponadhocprojectsandunsystematic interventions.

Figure2.Thekeyplayersincomanagement(PomeroyandBerkes,1997).

1.3MethodologyandStructureoftheReviewReport
Thereviewwascarriedoutintwostages: Stage1:Preworkshop,inanticipationoftheRegionalWorkshopheldinColombo,SriLanka,2829 July2010;and Stage 2: Postworkshop to give consideration to the recommendations in extracting best practices and lessons from case studies. The Workshop Report constitutes a companion document to this review. During preparation of the review effort was given to highlighting viewpoints of the governmentagencies,theNGOs,andcivilsocietyorganizations,and,potentially,theprivatesector. Itistheconsultantsexperiencethatamixtureofperceptionsandargumentsfromthesefoursides willcontributetoamorebalancedviewofthebroadscalepictureoffisheriesandcoastallivelihood withinthecontextofirreversibleglobalization. 1.3.1Howtoreadthisreview. ThereadermayproceedfromtheOverviewtotheConclusionsandRecommendations.Alternatively the reader may move from the Introduction to the Case Studies and proceed directly to the ConclusionsandRecommendations.ThesectiononICM,FisheriesandConceptsprovideperspective for the case studies and the conclusions. The form of concise presentation adopted in this review assumessomefamiliaritywiththetechnicalliterature.Wherenecessary,somecitedreferencesmay beaccessedonline.However,itmaybenecessarytoobtainassistancefromappropriatespecialistsin regardtoconclusionsandrecommendationstounderstandlegalimplications. Thereviewreportispresentedinfourparts: Part1: Provides background and introduction to the review; the methodology, summary of information from BOBLME Stage 1 National Reports and thematic Study Reports, and reflections on aspects of livelihood stemming from the literature since completion of BOBLMEStage1in2004.Part1alsointroducestheattributesorelementsoftheReference Model(RM)orframeworkforassessmentofthecasestudies.

Part2: Presents an analysis of selected best practice in communitybased management and co managementcasestudiesfromthefourcountriesusingtheReferenceModel(RM). Part3: PresentsaspectsofcomplexityoftheBOBLMESAsubregion,thestatusofICM,thetrendsin fisheries,therelevanceofinternationaldiscourseonfisheriesandtherelationshipoffuture uncertainty. Part4: Provides the key lessons, conclusions, and recommendations from the review and considerationsforimplementationintheBOBLMEProject.

1.4EvolutionoftheBOBLMEProgrammeStages1and2
Beginningin2009,theBayofBengalLargeMarineEcosystem#34BOBLME(Figure1)Projecthas been implemented by the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, supported by the World Bank with a Global Environment Facility (GEF) Block B grant. The BOBLME includes Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand, to which Maldives has beenadded.Thisisanimplementationstagefollowingthepreparatorystagecompletedin2004. ThePreparatoryStageincludedaconsensualprocessbasedonregionalmeetingsandstudieswhich resulted in a framework for the Implementation Stage. The longterm vision for this large marine ecosystem places the coastal fisher and linked populations as the stakeholders central to policy making and governance, i.e., To improve the lives of the coastal populations of the eight participating countries through improved regional management of the Bay of Bengal environment and its fisheries. National reports were prepared for the four countries during the BOBLME Programme Stage 1 (Bangladesh: Hossain, 2004; India: Sampath, 2003; Maldives: Ali, 2004; and Sri Lanka:Joseph,2004). Thesereports 1. addressedthemainthreatstothestructureandfunctioningofthebiophysicalsystemsand the associated fisheries in relation to the ecosystem approach to fisheries management EAF(FAO,2003)and 2. considered implications for transboundary problems and issues. Less attention was accordedtoissuesoflivelihoodassociatedwithICMandsustainablefisheries. TheNationalReportsweresupportedbythemereportsoncriticalhabitats(Angell,2004),landbased sourcesofpollution(Kaly,2004),sharedandcommonstocks(Preston,2004),legalandenforcement mechanisms (Edeson, 2004) and livelihoods (Townsley, 2004). The national reports and theme reports provided a partial foundation for this review. However, thinking on the status of CBICM, includingsmallscalefisheriesandcoastallivelihoods,hadproceededbeyondthescopeassignedto the national and theme reports since their completion in 2004. This review includes the major orientations that have occurred since 2004. However, summary background information from the Stage 1 reports and studies could, here, be useful to enable better understanding of relationships amongcoastalhabitats,fisheriesandlivelihood.

Figure3.A(Ai).TheBayofBengalLargeMarineEcosystem#34(BOBLME#34)extendsfromtheseaaroundthe MaldivestoanextentbeyondtheMalaccaStraitsintotheGulfofThailand(Aii).Thefisheryproductivityofthe BOBLMESA is influenced by four seasonally reversing freshwaterinfluenced fronts (solid curved lines) which inducesmoderatelyhighprimaryproductivity(150300gC/m2yr),andentrainmentofsmallpelagicfishinthe coastalwaters.TheGangesBrahmaputraEstuarineFront(GBEF)andtheMyanmarShelfSlopefronts(MSSF) aresituatedtothenorth,whilethePalkStraitFront(PSF)andEastCeylonFronts(ECF)aresituatedtowardthe southwest. Water depth in the central reaches of the BOBLMESA beyond the continental shelf increases to several thousand meters. Nutrient upwellings are not reported for the BOBLMESA although upwellinglike eventsarementioned(VinayachandranandMathew,2003;MohanandAli,1995).Amoreinformativeprofile oftheBOBLME#34isaccessibleat:http://www.lme.noaa.gov/LMEWeb/LME_Report/lme_34.pdf Ai
Bangladesh India

Maldives

SriLanka

Aii

Fig3.BIncreasingseasurfacetemperaturesintheBOB19602005.

1.5CoastalGeomorphologicalDiversityandFisheries
Itisimportanttorecognizegeomorphologicdiversityanditssignificanceforfisheryproductivityand coastal livelihood in the BOBLMESA. The shorefront deltas, some with extensive mangroves, associatedwiththelargeriverssystemsinBangladesh(GangesBrahmaputraMeghnariverssystem) and along the east coast of India (including Ganges, Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, Kaveri) support significant smallscale fisheries and forestrybased livelihood activities. Some case studies in this reviewarefromthetidalriversandestuariessituatedinthesegeomorphologicformations.Bothin Bangladesh and in India some shorefront mangrove forests provide security to life and property (Hoanh et al, 2010). Coastal agriculture on these deltas is also highly significant in the regional economies.Mangrovesonasimilarscale,asgeomorphologicentities,areabsentinSriLankaandin the Maldives. In Sri Lanka, however, the geomorphological systems that support significant small scale fisheries are the barrierbuilt estuaries. In these microtidal systems, the relatively minor extents of mangroves create problems for hydrology by accelerating sedimentation. These small mangrove extents do not provide protective barriers of any significance, although false generalizationssoattest(Samarakoon,EpitawatteandGalapatti,2008). Inregardtocoralreefs,thesituationintheMaldivesisunique.Herethecoralreefsconstitutethe dominant coastal ecosystem. Some coral reefs have been declared as marine protected areas becauseoftheirsignificanceinfisheriesandintourism.CoralreefsoccurinMahatmaGandhiMarine NationalPark,inAndamanandNicobarIslands.Bangladeshhascoralreefsassociatedwithasingle offshore island, St. Martins Island. In Sri Lanka corals occur as relatively small fringing and patch reefs.Thesecoralreefsarenotafoundationoffishstocksasitisinthecaseofsomefisheriesinthe Maldives(BOBP/REP/76,1997a).Nevertheless,thefishresourcesassociatedwithcoralandseagrass habitats in the Gulf of Mannar support significant smallscale fisheries. The Indian segment of the GulfofMannarhasbeendeclaredaMarineBioshpereReserve. Angell (2004) concluded that mangroves (through habitat loss) and coral reefs (through habitat degradation)arethetwomainhabitatsfacingmajorthreatsintheBOBLMEregion.Itisdoubtfulif such a generalization is applicable uniformly to the BOBLMESA. For instance, in the Maldives managed coral mining occurs because it provides necessary construction material. Concurrently measuresarebeingimplementedforprotectionandmanagementofexceptionalcoralreefsfortheir valuesthatcombinetourism,fisheriesandbiodiversity.OnthedeltaicenvironmentsinBangladesh

and in India, where mangroves also occur, efforts are underway to combine interventions toward foodsecurityfromagriculture,aquacultureandbiodiversityconservation,insteadofonlyprotecting mangroves.

1.6FisheryStocks,Statistics,LawEnforcementandLandbasedSourcesofImpacts
FisherystatisticsintheBOBLMESAareunreliable.Theproportionofthecatchtobeidentifiedatthe individual species level has tended to decrease over time, while unidentified fish account for an increasing share as fisheries diversify and large stocks are depleted. The general availability of statisticshasnotimprovedsignificantlyoverthepasttwodecades,andstatisticsfromartisanaland subsistence fisheries which dominate in the BOBLME region are a particular source of concern becauseofthelackofreliabledata.Asaresult,althoughtheavailablestatisticsprobablydoreflect general trends such as growth in production, annual figures and assessments involve considerable uncertainty,andchangesfromoneyeartothenextmaynotbestatisticallymeaningful(FAO2002; Preston,2004).FisherydevelopmentplanningintheBOBLMESAistherebyfacedwithdatagapsfor governance,therebycreatingagapbetweendecisionsandsustainablemanagement(Hilborn,2007). Theunreliabilityofavailablestatisticsiscomplicatedbyanofficialdesire,withintherelevantnational bureaucracies, to show progressive increases in marine and freshwater fishery landings to satisfy political objectives of the governments (Sivasubramaniam, 2000). As a consequence a divergence mayoccurbetweenplannedproductionandthequantitiesactuallyachievedfromyeartoyear.The statusoffisheryproductionbytheBOBLMESAcountrieswasestimatedin2002tobeintheregion of1.6millionmetrictons (Table1).Thenationalreportsindicatescopeforsubstantialincreasesin productionbyexpandingtheoperationofnationalfishingfleetsintotheexclusiveeconomiczones (EEZs) and beyond. Nevertheless serious consideration must be given to whether or not the assumptions and expectations in the national reports are substantiated by reliable and verifiable data. A study on legal and enforcement mechanisms in the BOBLME (Edeson, 2004) revealed that most laws, while adequate in terms of achieving certain limited objectives such as controlling fishing withintheEEZ,arenonexistentwhenitcomestodealingwiththehighseas.Thereisaneedtogive effecttorecentagreements,inparticular,the1995UNFishStocksAgreementandFAOCompliance Agreement. More importantly, there is an absence of modern management concepts in the basic marinelawsconcerningtheobjectivesoflongtermsustainableuse,theprecautionaryapproachand theneedforecosystemperspectivestounderpingovernmentalactionsinthemarinesector.These shouldbeintroduced,possiblyasclausesinkeylegislationstatingtheobjectivesoflawsapplyingto themarinesector. ThecoastalwatersthataresignificantforfisheryproductioninBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLankaare seriously affected by landbased sources of pollution (Kaly, 2004). As a consequence fishery managementwhichseekstoaddressfishingeffortandfisherylivelihoodcannotbeeffectivewithout adequatelyaddressing negativeexternalitiesfromindustry,agricultureand urbanization withinthe FAOEAFframework.ThisrequiresmanagementofprioritizedlanduseswithintheframeworkofICM. Edeson(2004)notedthatmostcountriesoftheBOBLMEregionhavelawswhichprovideabasisfor controllinglandbasedpollution.However,enforcementisweak.Insomeinstances,asinIndiaandin SriLanka,thedecentralizationofregulatorypowerstolocalgovernmentbodiescomplicateseffective enforcement.

Table1. Fisheryproductionduring19992002whichrevealsadisparitybetweenFAOstatistics(FAO,2002) and the national reports (Preston, 2004). National fishery development plans are generally based upon the countrystatistics. Country Bangladesh India Maldives SriLanka Total 1999 137,345 716.753 134,423 241,005 1,229,526 FAOdata(tonnes) 2000 162,037 781,223 135,342 260,010 1,338,612 2001 258,700 741.656 125,575 247,890 1,373,821 BOBLMESANationalReports Tons 367,000 820,000 141,000 274,760 1,602,760 Year 200001 1997 2002 2002

1.7TheNatureofCoastalFishingCommunitiesandSmallScaleFisheries
1.7.1Demography&SocioeconomicConditions DemographictrendsinBangladeshandinIndiarevealthatpopulationofsmallscalecoastalfishersis increasing but at a diminishing rate compared to previous decades (Tietze, Groenewold and Marcoux, 2000). Decreasing demographic trends are observed in the Maldives, as increasing numbersfromoutlyingislandsmigratetothecapitalMale,andthemoredevelopedandurbanized islandswhichhavesuperiorinfrastructure.InBangladesh,IndiaandSriLanka,thedecreasingtrendis driven by poverty, urban migration, competition for shared coastal fish stocks and emigration for foreignemploymentmainlytotheGulfCountries,asituationsharedbyotherdevelopingcountriesin AsiaandinAfrica(Campbell,WhittinghamandTownsley,2006;Pramod,2010). BOBLMESAhasoneofthelargestconcentrationsofcoastalpoor(thoselivingonlessthanUS$2per day). The number in the 1990s was in excess of 20 million (Hotta, 1996; Sivasubramaniam, 2000) (Table2),ofthosewhoselivelihoodsdependdirectlyontraditionalsmallscalefishing.Thenumberof fishersinvolvedinthecoastal/marinefisherywasestimatedas3.2millionatthebeginningofthe decade(Sivasubramaniam,2000).Neithertheactualnumbersofsmallscalefishersareknownwith adequatecertainty,northeiroperationalareaswithinboundariesofresourcesystemsinwhichthey operate. This population is distributed predominantly along the Bangladesh and Indian coastlines, and to a lesser extent along Sri Lankas coastal area. The Maldives is the exception since it has succeededineradicatingpoverty,onlywithsomeresidualconcernsforthewellbeingofresidentsof themostdistantinhabitedislands.

Table2. Thepopulationsofsmallscalefishermendirectlyinvolvedinfishinginthenearshorecoastalwatersis reflected in the numbers of fishing craft. The trawlers and gillnetters, the modernized fishing craft, with significantlyhigherefficiency,whichinteractwiththeformercontributetothehighratesofdiscardsatseaand trash fish. An estimated three kg of trash fish / fish discards occur for each kilogram of shrimp captured for export(Pramod,2010).

Lengthof Coastline (km) 1076 974 Areaof Totalfishing ContinentalShelf craft(2005) (km2) 41,000 33.000 54,420 41,039 Traditional/ partially mechanized craft 47,760 38,449 Modernized Remarks craft(Trawlers /gillnetters etc. 7,617 Discards reported 1802(trawlers) do

India / Tamil Nadu India / Andhra Pradesh India/Orissa India / West Bengal

480 158

26,000 17,000

23,740 18,646(?)

Bangladesh

About700

66,400

>600,000

1340(trawlers) do 610 do Note disparity in numbers Over90%ofall 100(2003) Level of craft discards not known

20,163 24,049

The process of poverty eradication in the Maldives is driven by the distribution of benefits from combinedeconomicgrowthintourismandfisheriessectors(WorldBank,2010a).Thepopulationof Maldives, however, represents less than 2% of the total coastal population associated with small scalefisheriesintheBOBLMESA.Theneedforimprovingcoastallivelihoodthereforeisaproblem mainly facing Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. The enhancement of livelihoods requires targeted interventionsbythestatebaseduponeconomicgrowthwithinthesector(Alam,2005;DFID,2005; Salagrama,2005). Mainstreaming of CBFM and comanagement must also give consideration to the differential impacts of overfished coastal resources on women, men and children. The women and children in coastal fishing communities in Bangladesh constitute more than 50% of the population owing to a combination of effects including migrations of male heads of households, abandonments, and variousotherpovertyrelatedeffects(AlamandGiassudin,2005;SalagramaandKoriya,2008).Some womenfacegreathardshipbecauseofincomepoverty.Menwhocannotanylongerearnanincome from fishing also face displacement and hardship. Migrations of men from fishing communities in Bangladesh and India sometimes occur to distant locations such as the Gulf Countries resulting in flows of remittances that benefit both national coffers and dependents (Bhattacharya, 2006). Whereas in Bangladesh and in India migration of women is restricted, in Sri Lanka, migration of women to these countries and their remittances contribute substantially to poverty reduction including in coastal communities (World Bank, 2008). Thus the influences and relationships that shapelivelihoodsincoastalcommunitiesarediverseandcomplex. WithintheBOBLMESAsubregion,withtheexceptionoftheMaldives,incomepovertyrangingfrom about 40% in Sri Lanka to about 80% in Bangladesh and India, in the context of rising food prices (OECD/FAO,2010;WorldBank,2011),islikelytobethemostsignificantchallengeformarginalized smallscale fisher livelihood (Table 3). Even in the absence of income poverty as in Maldives, indicators such as the percentage of underweight children (age to 5 years) associated with the Human Development Index (HDI), reveal the form of challenges faced. Despite several decades of

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fisheries development through modernization that have produced rapid increases in fishery productioninSouthAsia,manyimbalancesappeartoexistwithinthesectorinregardtothesocio economicconsequencesforthesmallscalefisherysubsector.Thisraisesaquestionthatpertainsto distributionofbenefitsofdevelopment. DevelopmentofFisheriesandUnintendedConsequences Planned development of fisheries has been proceeding in the SA countries spanning a period of aboutsixdecades.During thisperiodpovertyreductionintermsofenhancedpurchasingpowerin rural communities has been visible (Ferguson, 2005). Communications have improved providing access to expanding markets for rural agricultural produce. However, poverty reduction in rural fishing communities in Bangladesh and in India, to a lesser extent in Sri Lanka, has lagged behind positive change in the rural agricultural sector. It appears that planning and implementation on behalf of the artisanal coastal smallscale fishery, which provides livelihood to the vast majority in coastalcommunities,haveresultedindiversenegativeunintendedconsequences(APFIC,2009). Unintended consequences are outcomes that are not the results intended by a particular action. Theymaybepositiveornegative.Theconcepthaslongexistedbutwasnamedandpopularizedin the 20th Century by the American sociologist, Robert K. Merton (Merton, 1996). The law of unintendedconsequencesisanidiomaticwarningthatacarelessinterventioninacomplexsystem always creates unanticipated and often undesirable outcomes. It is commonly used as a warning againstthearrogantbeliefthathumanscanfullycontroltheworldaroundthem. Most fishery development interventions in South Asia occurred following independence under the rubric of fishery modernization in the 1950s1960s (India and Sri Lanka), and post 1970s in BangladeshandtheMaldives(seealsoSection2.7.2).Modernizationusuallyincludedmotorizationof newortraditionalfishingcrafttogofurtherandstaylongeratseawithlittlerestrictionsonwhere fishingwasdone.Itwasassumedthatthetraditionalfishermenwouldbesoimpressedbythelarger catches of the motorized boats that they would rush to motorize their own traditional craft or purchase modern boats. The planners appear not to have understood that the coastal fishery is highlycomplexwithcraftandgearadaptedtositespecifictopographies,targetspeciesandseasons. Thetraditionalfishersgenerallyhadtheirownsocialandculturalpracticesandmanagementsystems for sharing resources in their complex local ecosystems (Kurien, 2003, 2005). The capacity of traditionalfisherstomakethetransitionwasnotgivenseriousattention. The unintended consequence of simpleminded planning that was not attuned to the prevailing complexity of fishery socioecological systems (see Section 3) was the marginalization of the traditional fishers who had little training and no capital to invest in modern boats and engines (Kurien,2003,2005;SalagramaandKoriya,2008).Thecausesofunintendedconsequencesstemming fromplannedsocialactionwereidentifiedbyMerton(1996),Viz. 1. Ignorance(Itisimpossibletoanticipateeverything,therebyleadingtoincompleteanalysis). Most planners did not understand the structure and functioning of coastal ecosystems nor thebehavioroftargetfishspeciesinrelationtoseabedtopography.Theyperceivedthesea asauniformresourcewaitingformoreefficientharvestingbytechnologies(Pauly,2006). 2. Error(Incorrectanalysisoftheproblemorfollowinghabitsthatworkedinthepastbutmay notapplytothecurrentsituation).Itwasassumedthattechnologiesthatwereeffectiveon trawling grounds in the waters of developed countries would produce similar benefits in South Asia although the sociocultural and socioeconomic contexts differed (Kurien, 2003, 2005). 3. Immediateinterest(greed),whichmayoverridelongterminterests.Tradeintechnologiesas invest opportunities (inboard and outboard engines, trawlers, etc.) appears to have

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motivatedthedevelopmentdecisionsbothatthepolicylevelandattheaidproviderlevels (Samarakoon,2007;Kurien,2003,2005). 4. Basic values may require or prohibit certain actions even if the longterm result might be unfavorable(theselongtermconsequencesmayeventuallycausechangesinbasicvalues). 5. Selfdefeating prophecy (Fear of some consequence drives people to find solutions before theproblemoccur,thusthenonoccurrenceoftheproblemisunanticipated.). 6. Relevanceparadoxwheredecisionmakersthinktheyknowtheirareasofignoranceaboutan issue,andgoandobtainthenecessaryinformationtofillthatignorance,butneglectcertain other areas of ignorance, because, due to not having the information, its relevance is not obvious. Inmuchofplanninginthemodernizationoffisheriesthecausesofunanticipatedconsequencesare evident through complex pathways. While the possibility of impact of modernization through unanticipatedconsequenceswasinadequatelyunderstoodinrelationtofishermen,theimplications forwomeninfisherhouseholdswere altogetherignored.Whileitistruethatwomenrarelywent outtoseainfishingcraft,itisincorrecttoignoretheirsignificanceinother roles.Inparticularthe role and contributions of women in the supply chain as processors and retail sellers are rarely appreciated. Women&Livelihoods Khatun (2004) describes the differential consequences for women and households from the impositions of conditions flowing from the liberalization of shrimp exports from Bangladesh, and accesstomarketsintheEuropeanUnion(EU).Theseinclude: disruptionoffamilies; changeinthehouseholdeconomy;and increasedlivingexpenses. As a remedy, Khatun (2004) observes that mainstreaming of the livelihood concerns of fishermen andwomenfishworkersshouldbereflectedinthe povertyreductionstrategypaper(PRSP)ofthe country.Abalancedstrategyhastoincorporatetheissueoffoodsecurityandequalopportunitiesfor alltheparticipantsofthesector.Especially,poorfishermenandthemarginalisedwomenwhohave beenthelosersoftheEUbanshouldbeprovidedwithcreditfordevelopingalternativesourcesof income. TheobservationofKhatun(2004)highlightsthetendencytoinadequatelyaddresstheproblemsand issuesofwomeninsmallscalefishingcommunities.Womenlivingandworkingintraditionalfishing communitieshavehistoricallyplayedaverysignificantroleinthedevelopmentofthefishingindustry aswellasinthesustenanceofcoastalcommunities,familiesandtheirlivelihoods.Muchofthework thatwomenhavedoneinthepast,andcontinuetodo,isnotvisible,norisitregardedasvaluable. Society tends to assume that the term fisher refers to a fisherman, and womens role and their contributiontothefisheriesisseldomrecognized.Thisisasituationthatrequirescarefullyplanned interventiontoensureequitabledistributionofbenefitsincludingwomen.

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Table3. Some development indicators for the four countries in the BOBLMESA which shows the significant changethathasoccurredfrom1993to2007.TheincreaseinpercapitaGDP,theimprovementintheHDIrank inMaldivesreflectthevirtualeliminationofpoverty. Country HDI (1993) HDI (2007) Children underweight: %ageto5yrs GNP per capita (US$) 1993 SriLanka Maldives India 0.663 0.497 0.309 0.759 0.771 0.612 0.543 29 30 46 48 470 450 360 210 4,243 5.196 2,753 1,241 GDPper capita (US$) 2007 GNPrank 1993 /GDP Index 2007 118/102 119/95 133/134 145/146 %population belowincome povertylineless thanUS$1.25/2 day 14.0/39.7 Nil/Nil 41.6/75.6 49.6/81.3

Bangladesh 0.189

SourceUNDP1993;UNDP,2009. 1.7.2LackofInformationAvailableonContributionofSmallscaleFisheries Whilethereisoftenverylittlepreciseinformationontherealcontributionofsmallscalefisheriesto livelihoods and economies in developing countries, and although many smallscale fishing communitiesarepoorandvulnerable,itisnowwidelyacknowledgedthatsmallscalefisheriescan generatesignificantprofits,proveresilienttoshocksandcrises,andmakemeaningfulcontributions topovertyalleviationandfoodsecurity,inparticularfor: those involved directly with fishing (fishers, and fishworkers in both pre and post harvest activities); the dependents of those involved directly with fishing (fishingrelated households and communities); thosewhobuyfishforhumanconsumption(consumers); thosewhobenefitfromrelatedincomeandemploymentthroughmultipliereffects; nationalsocietiesingeneralandthosewhobenefitindirectlyasaresultofnationalexport revenuesfromfisheries,redistributivetaxationandothermacrolevelmechanisms (Bene,McFadyenandAllison(2007). 1.7.3DevelopingCoastalLivelihoodsakeychallenge The key challenge underlying the problems and issues in smallscale fisheries in the BOBLMESA is livelihood. National plans for fishery development and modernization since the 1950s in the BOBLMESAcountriesuniformlyproceededfromapolicyofimprovingthewellbeingoftraditional fishers whose lives were regarded as being in danger because their traditional crafts were inadequate (Raghavan, 1961; Government of Ceylon, 1951; Kurien, 2003, 2005; Islam, 2004). Nevertheless, the literature reveals that poverty and vulnerability of an expanding coastal fishing population, with the exception of the Maldives, have increased instead of decreasing despite modernization (Salagrama and Koriya, 2008). Unfortunately, the commitments made by the governments in the BOBLMESA, except the Maldives, have not been able to make adequate progress in their commitment to reducing poverty by 50% by 2015 (MDG Monitor http://www.mdgmonitor.org/). ThestudyofcoastalandmarinelivelihoodsintheBOBLMEduringStage1(Townsley,2004)defines livelihoodas: A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activitiesrequiredforameansofliving.Alivelihoodissustainablewhenitcancopewithandrecover

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fromstressesandshocksandmaintainitscapabilitiesandassetsbothnowandinthefuture,while notunderminingthenaturalresourcesbase(Carney,1988). Understandinglivelihoodsstartsfromdifferentiationofbasicsthatincludewhetherpeoplearemen orwomen,howgenderinfluencestheircapacitiesandrolesinsociety,theirage,ethnicity,caste,and socialclassthatdefinetheirrelationshipswithinsocietyandthemannerinwhichtheserelationships influence their wellbeing. Some of these attributes may be controlled by people in creating well being for themselves, while other aspects are directly and indirectly controlled by the state and wider society. Together these complex relationships determine the manner in which people can benefitfromfiveclassesofassets(human,social,physical,financialandpolitical)intheirrelationship with the natural productivity of coastal ecosystems. Those aspects that people cannot change including societal institutions as well as natural events, such as coastal hazards, define their vulnerabilitycontext(Townsley,2004).

1.8TheContextfortheBOBLMEProjectImplementationPhase2
BOBLME Programme Stage 2, in its strategic approach, seeks to improve the lives of coastal populations through improved management of the environment and fisheries. A growing body of research(e.g.McClanahanetal.,2009)isnowbeginningtodemonstratethatinastrategicapproach, people and their livelihood must take precedence in order to facilitate improved environmental managementasthelongtermoutcome.ThevastmajorityofcoastalpeopleintheBOBLMESAhave lives and livelihood embedded in smallscale fisheries. Sustainable management of smallscale fisheries means management of the people involved in exploiting the fishery rather than the exploitedfishstocksthemselves(IDRC,2001;APFIC,2005).Thissimplymeanseffectivemanagement of the traditional and smallscale fishers operating in coastal waters. These are people whose lives and livelihoods have changed little for many generations since the national fishery development processeshavebenefitedthemmainlybydefault(Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005). DevelopmentofthefisherysectorintheBOBLMESA,sincethe1960s,hasrelieduponmodernization of craft, gear and infrastructure. This has resulted in significant increases in production both for domestic consumption and for export. However, populations in all the countries have more than doubledduringthesameperiodwithproportionateincreasesincoastalpopulationsandthedemand for fishery resources. Because of growing pressure on the coastal environment the attention of plannersisnowbeingdirectedbothatintegratedcoastalmanagement(ICM)andfisherlivelihoods (Ali,2004;Hossain,2004;Joseph,2004;Sampath,2003).Inviewofthemagnitudeand diversityof coastallivelihoodsinvolvedandtheirpoliticalimplications,thenationalgovernmentsarereluctantto implement policies that include environmental safeguards if they entail a heavy social cost. In this context, CBICM supported by comanagement and mainstreaming acquire significance. Co managementandmainstreaming,however,havelegalimplications. Jentoft et al. (2009) argue that the future of effective comanagement and the participation of governments in maintaining legal order will depend on how legal pluralism is dealt with. Legal pluralismariseswhendifferentlegalideas,principlesandsystemsareappliedtothesamesituation (Vanderlinden,1989;Jentoftetal.,2009).Fisheriesisonesectorwhere,inmanycountries,thestate hasabstainedfromexercisingauthorityandwherenoorlimitedfisherieslegislationexists.Insome instances,thisisadeliberatechoicebasedontheobservationthatlocallegalsystemsseemtowork sufficientlywell.Inotherinstances,thestateislaggingbehindandhasnotbeenabletorespondto newsituationsandneeds,suchasthecurrentenvironmentalcrisisinfisheries.Thisisasituationthat isevidentin Indiaandin SouthAsiaingeneral(Jentoftetal.,2009).The casestudiespresentedin Section 2 reveal more explicitly the existence of many informal and formal legal systems in the BOBLMESA. On top of this existing complexity at local and national levels, additional legal requirements may arise in future from considerations pertaining to the global crisis in marine fisheriesandtheroleoftheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).

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Theglobaloutlookmainlyencouragesfundamentalreformsinthesectorbaseduponmanagement offishingeffortinharmonywiththesupportingecosystemsaimedatstabilizationand/orrestoration ofstockstooptimizeeconomicgains(WorldBank/FAO,2009),anddrasticallycurtailingtheimpactof industrialfishinginthisprocess(Clover,2004;Chuenpagdeeetal.,2006).Inboththeseperceptions, persuasive arguments are provided for economic growth and/or gains, and for safeguarding the livelihoodsofthemillionsofsmallscalefishers.Navigatingthroughtheseperceptionsandarguments requiresameaningfulguidingframeworkwhichisprovidedbyFAOsVisionforSmallscaleFisheries (Box 1). The Reference Model, used in this review, is developed from a foundation composed partially of the scientific literature that has emerged after completion of BOBLME Stage 1. The complexity of viewpoints provides little scope for generalization that applies to BOBLMESA requirements.PitcherandLam(2010)provideacomprehensiveassessmentofthescientificfishery managementsolutionsthathaveemergedinamillennialperspective(seeSection3). AcarefulweighingofthestatusofnationalfisheriesintheBOBLMESA,theassessmentofthestate of global fisheries both in terms of economics and fishery science, the vision of the FAO for small scale fisheries (Box 1) places this review at a crossroad (Figure 4). National perceptions expect expansionoffishingefforttomoreeffectivelybenefitfromresourcesintheEEZs,ashareofwhichis nowbeingtakenbyillegal,unreportedandunregulated(IUU)fishing(Berkesetal.,2006;Flothmann et al., 2010; MRAG & University of British Columbia, 2008; Gianni and Simpson, 2005). The global perceptionsindicaterestraintandimprovedgovernancetosustainoptimalbenefitsfromtheexisting leveloffisheryproduction(e.g.WorldBank/FAO,2009).ThestepstakenbyBangladesh,Indiaand SriLanka,perhapswiththeexceptionoftheMaldives,towardbenefittingfromthefisheryresources intheEEZsmaylargelydetermineifmistakesmadeinotherregionsoftheworld,suchasresortingto unregulatedindustrialfishing(Berkes,2003;2006;Clover,2004;GianniandSimpson,2005)wouldbe repeatedintheBOBLMESA.JacquetandPauly(2008)assertthatendingindustrialfishingisneeded forimpartingsustainabilitytothemarinefisheryasawhole.Hilborn,2007adoptsanapproachwhich seekstoengageinadaptivelearningtobenefitfromlessonsinsustainablefisherymanagement.
Box1.FAOsVisionforSmallscaleFisheries The vision for smallscale fisheries is one in which the contribution of the fisher community and other stakeholderstosustainabledevelopmentisfullyrealized.Itisavisionwhere: they are not marginalized and their contribution to national economies and food security is recognized,valuedandenhanced; fishers, fish workers and other stakeholders have the ability to participate in decisionmaking, are empowered to do so, and have increased capability and human capacity, thereby achieving dignity andrespect;and povertyandfoodinsecuritydonotpersist;andwherethesocial,economicandecologicalsystemsare managedinanintegratedandsustainablemanner,therebyreducingconflict. The vision for smallscale fisheries is couched in human and development terms. The means to address the visionthereforeliestronglyinthe: strengthening of the profile of the subsector and protection of the current assets of smallscale fisheries, establishingtheirappropriateplacementvisvisfisheriesasawhole,and establishingsmallscalefisherieswithinothersectoralanddevelopmentcontexts. Fulfillmentofthevisionrequiresthatpolicyandsocioeconomiccriteriagoverningsmallscalefisheries,fishers and other stakeholders be established and met. Improved resource and environmental management are implicitintheproperandeffectivefunctioningofsmallscalefisheries(Staplesetal.,2004).

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 1.9CBICMAsubcomponentoftheBOBLMEProgrammeImplementationStage
TheBOBLMEProgrammeStage2isaimedatimprovingthelivesofcoastalpopulationsandhealthof fisherystockstheydependonforlivelihood.ThecompleteBOBLMEprogrammeismadeupofthe followingcomponents: 1. ThedevelopmentofaStrategicActionPlan(SAP)toprotectthehealthoftheecosystemand manage the living resources on a sustainable basis to improve the food and livelihood securityofthe regionscoastalpopulationetc.; 2. The improvement of Coastal/Marine Natural Resources Management and Sustainable Use, including: promoting communitybased management; Improving policy harmonization; devisingregionalfisheryassessmentsandmanagementplansforhilsa,Indianmackereland sharks;anddemonstratingcollaborativecriticalhabitatmanagementinselectedareas; 3. ThedevelopmentofbetterunderstandingoftheBOBLMEEnvironmentetc.; 4. Themaintenanceofecosystemhealthandmanagementofpollutionetc.;and 5. Project management, including: developing a monitoring and evaluation system for the projectetc. This review is undertaken as a foundation activity for component 2.1 a core part of the implementationprocess.

1.10EcosystemApproachtoFisheryManagement(EAF)
The BOBLME Project aims to demonstrate the ecosystembased process while progressing with CBICM.Thecomponentsoftheprojectthereforefitintotheframeworkoftheecosystemapproach tofisherymanagement(EAF)(FAO,2003).TheEAFaddressessocial,environmentalandgovernance goals,andisanintegratedapproachthatpromotessustainabledevelopmentthatstrikesabalance betweenhumanwellbeingandecologicalwellbeing. The EAFincludesallimportantaspectsofan ecosystemanddifferentactivitiesthatimpactonit(BOBLME,2009):

People/communities; Habitats(marineandcoastal); Fisheriesresources(bothtargetspp.andassociatedspecies); Vulnerableplantsandanimals(biodiversity); Impactsoffisheriesharvestingandotherhumanactivities(pollution,degradationofhabitats etc.)

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Figure 4. The BOBLMESA Programme has arrived at a crossroad where the choices by national planners in regard to moving forward in the marine fishery sector to acquire optimal benefit from global trade could determine the long term health of coastal and marine ecosystems, and sustainabilityoflivelihoodsofcoastalsmallscalefisherswhoconstituteamajorityofparticipantsin thesectorslaborforce. Existingnationalperceptions: Complexoceanlandpeoplesystem 20millionpeopleinmarinefishery Majorityinextremepoverty Coastal&inshorefisherydeclining Exposuretohazardshighrisk,sea levelrise&climatechange Weakcoastalresourcesmanagement Progressiveexpansionofsmallscale fishingintheEEZs FAOvision: Ecosystemapproachtofisheries management ICM/CBFM/comanagement/ governanceforsustainablelivelihoods Mainstreamsmallscalefisheriesin economicplanning Propertyrightsandlandtenure Nationalvisionfuture: Increasedfishproduction/export Expandedaquaculture Acceleratedeconomicgrowth Enhancedhumandevelopment includingsmallscalefishers Subsidies&incentivesexpansion beyondEEZWTOnegotiations Benefitingfromglobalization Globalperception: Overfishedseas Ecosystemsinneedofconservation Removalofsubsidiesandincentives Reductionofindustrialfishing Cannotgeneralizefromoceanicfish stockstocoastalinshoreabundances (Hilborn2007).Fisheryreforms requiredincludingrigorousapplication ofresourcerent

The components constituting the EAF contribute toward making the BOBLME (Stage 2) implementationaprocessthataddressesacomplexsystemwithnestedsubsystems(Holling,1973; Ostrom,1990;Ostrometal.,1999;Ostrometal.,2007;Serrat,2009).Thefocusherehastobeon multiplerelationshipsinsteadoflinearcauseeffectrelations.Also,bothcontinuousnaturalchange in ecosystems, and the potential for human use of the productivity of component subsystems are inherent attributes of a complex system such as an LME. Diversity of human perceptions and the rulesunderwhichgroupsofpeoplebehaveistheaspectthatisnotstatedexplicitlyintheapproach todealingwithacomplexsystem.Thisdiversityofexpectations,problems,issuesandsolutionsand thedivisionofpowerassociatedwiththemwillultimatelydefineconcreteactionandwhobenefits fromthemand,importantly,wholoses(Pauly,2006).

1.11 Marine Fisheries: the attributes of successful management Components of the ReferenceModel(RM)
The examples of CBFM, comanagement and alternative livelihood selected for analysis in this review would acquire value if they can be placed in a broader framework that would enable meaningful generalizations for successful fishery management within FAOs Vision for Smallscale Fisheries (Box 1). Such a framework is provided by the outcome of two international meetings convened by FAO to explore the relationships pertaining to unsustainable fishing and over exploitation (Greboval, 2002; Swan and Greboval, 2003). The factors of unsustainability and overexploitation of fisheries, and implementation instruments that could contribute toward sustainabilityprovidetheappropriateframework(Hilborn,2007),viz.:

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Goodgovernance:Manyoftheworldsfisheriesaremanagedinanonsustainablemannerbecause realgovernanceisabsent.Theappropriategovernancesystemrequirestheconsensusoftoomany, or the system is corrupted by bribery. Successful fisheries management systems enjoy governance that is deemed transparent by the participants with a scale of decisionmaking appropriate to the fisheriesbeingmanagedandinwhichtheregulatedstakeholdersfeelrepresentedintheprocess. Appropriate incentives: Fishermen respond to the incentives of the system; in open access, or Olympic systems, the race to fish demands more and bigger vessels and pressures management agencies for larger catches. In dedicated access fisheries, fishermen cannot catch more fish with moreorbiggerboats,andsotheincentivesfavorreducingcosts,higherqualityproduct,andbetter information to improve management of the fishery. The simple method used in Pacific Islands is tenure a right of ownership (Johannes, 1981). Hilborn (2007) regards it as probably the most valuable fisheries management measure ever devised. Quite simply, the right to fish in an area is controlledandnooutsidersareallowedtofishwithoutpermission. Reducingdemandforlimitedresources:Quiteoften,thereisamismatchbetweenfishingcapacity, demand,andtheproductivecapacityoftheresource.Successfulfisherieshavefoundwaystobetter match the demand to the productive capacity of the resource, using removal of subsidies and appropriateincentivesastools.Unfortunately,reducingdemandforresourcesalmostalwaysresults inloweremploymentandthusconflictswithgovernmentalfisheriespolicy. Eliminationofpovertyandprovidingalternatives:Inmanyregionsoftheworld,fishingisoneofthe fewformsofemploymentopentotheverypoor.Pauly(2006)calledthisproblemMalthusianover fishing. As populations grow and the agricultural resources per capita decline, the pressure on marine resources increases. Although it is difficult and complex, elimination of poverty is an important step to sustainable fisheries, and it is no coincidence that many of the worlds well managed fisheries are found in countries with little poverty and many alternative forms of employment. Improving knowledge of complex ecosystems: Some of the nonsustainable fisheries can be attributed to poorly understood, complex ecosystems, whereas most wellmanaged fisheries are characterizedbywellfundeddatacollectionprogramstoprovideinformationontheresourcebeing managed. Interactions of the fisheries sector with other sectors and environments: Fisheries management agencies are usually only one player in a potential success story, and their wellintentioned efforts are often subverted by other government agencies through subsidies or poor environmental regulationsthatbadlyaffectfishorfishhabitat,especiallyinfisheriesthatstronglydependoncritical coastalhabitat. Toolsofsustainablemanagement:Asetofrecommendedtoolsandapproachesthataresupported broadlywithinthefisheriescommunityemergedfromtheFAOworkshops.Inorderofimportance, givenbyFAO,theseare: 1. Rights:Thegrantingofsecurerightstoresourceusers(individuallyorcollectively)foruseof aportionofthecatch,space,orotherrelevantaspectsofthefishery. 2. Transparent,participatorymanagement:Thegrantingofameaningfulroletostakeholdersin thefullrangeofmanagement(e.g.,planning,science,legislation,implementation). 3. Support to science, planning, and enforcement: Providing the resources necessary for all aspectsofmanagementofthefishery. 4. Benefitdistribution:Usingeconomictoolstodistributebenefitsfromthefisherytoaddress communityandeconomicsustainability.

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5. Integratedpolicy:Planningfisheries,includingsettingexplicitobjectivesthataddressallthe dimensionsofsustainabilityandtheinteractionsamongthefactorsofunsustainability. 6. Precautionaryapproach:ApplicationaccordingtoFAOguidance. 7. Capacitybuildingandpublicawarenessraising:Developmentandapplicationofprogramsto betterinformpolicymakersandthepublicatlargeaboutmainfisheriesissues. 8. Market incentives: Using market tools in situations in which they are appropriate for addressingfactorsofunsustainability.

1.12MainstreamingComanagement
Achieving sustainable fisheries, as the above findings demonstrate, depends upon integration of coastalresourcesandfisheriesmanagementwithinnationaldevelopmentprocesses,notdepending on ad hoc projects i.e. mainstreaming (Figure 1). Mainstreaming establishes sets of collaborative partnerships between fisher communities and the relevant levels of government administration. These partnerships promote better governance based on shared decisionmaking. Traditional, artisanal and modernized smallscale fisheries that dominate the sector in the BOBLMESA include diverse and complex forms of CBFM, comanagement and alternative livelihoods development. Mainstreamingeliminatesrelianceuponadhocprojectsandunsystematicinterventions. Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith(2005)analyzelessonslearntfrommanystudiestoshowthatthe problems faced by those implementing comanagement programmes are usually variants of the generic problems that face all types of common property resource management, although manifestationsoftheseareoftenveryspecifictoculturalandsocioeconomiccontextsinparticular cases(Sternetal.,2002).Theseissuesandlessonslearntcanbecategorizedunderfourmainpillars forthesuccessfulcomanagementoffisheries: Anenablingpolicyandlegalframework; Theparticipationandempowermentofcommunities(andotherusers); Effectivelinkagesandinstitutions;and Resourcesaresourceworthmanagingandthepeopleandmoneytodoit. The recent decision made at the UNFAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) at its 29th Sessions in February 2011 in regard to an international instrument in support of smallscale fisheries in developingcountrieshasthepotentialtocontributetowardsignificantimprovementsinsmallscale fisheriesinrelationtofoodsecurityandlivelihoods. 1. 2. 3. 4.

1.13 Impetus to Improvement of Governance of Smallscale Fisheries: The UNFAO CommitteeonFisheries(COFI)ResolutiononSmallscaleFisheriesinDevelopingCountries

Much of the material in the present review for BOBLMESA resonates with the results of deliberationsatCOFI29thSessionheldinFebruary2011. As the outcome of discussions at the 29th Session of COFI, agreement was reached on the introductionofaninternationalinstrumentinrecognitionoftheimportanceofthissectorforfood security and poverty reduction. Challenges faced by smallscale fisheries including lack of infrastructure and vulnerability to natural disasters were highlighted during discussions. Other relevantmattersdiscussedincluded: theneedforcautionagainstcreatingtradebarriersforsmallscalefishersintheinternational instrument, providingbuffersystemsandcreatingmodelsformarketdevelopment, theneedforintegratingsubsistencefisheriesinnationaleconomicdevelopmentplans, theimportanceofmarketaccess,

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the need for localscale action, including on: empowering smallscale fishers in local economic decisionmaking processes; communitybased management; microfinance and creditforsmallscalefisheries;andtechnologytransfertothissubsector, theculturalimportanceofsmallscalefisheriestocommunities, achievingappropriatebalancebetweenartisanalandsmallscalefishingboats, the need for caution against blurring the borders between smallscale and industrial fisheries, linking global assistance programmes to good governance, application of ecosystem approaches to fisheries management, and disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Integration of internationally shared stocks into national and international management systemsandpolicies, recognitionofthemuchlowerenvironmentalimpactthanothertypesoffishing, the need for technical support to prevent overexploitation and provision of economic alternativestoensuresustainability supportingcontrol,surveillanceanddatacollection, improvinginstitutions;educatingfishers,especiallywomen, improvingvesselsandprovidingbetterconditionsforlandingoffish. A number of intergovernmental organizations, including the Bay of Bengal Programme highlighted their work relating to smallscale fisheries, with some supporting the creation of a subcommittee and inclusion of governance and labor issues in an international instrument. The International CollectiveinSupportforFishworkersurgedCOFItoagreeonanegotiatedinternationalinstrumentto complementFAOsCodeofConductforResponsibleFisheries(CCRF). TheSecretariatsummarizedthediscussionsnoting, interalia: therecognitionoftheimportanceof smallscalefisheriesandtheneedforintegratingtheminnationalpolicies;theheterogeneityofthe smallscalefisheriessector;theroleofSouthSouthcooperation;andtheneedforFAOtocooperate withotherorganizationsontheseissues.Ontheinternationalinstrument,consensuswasnotedon thevoluntarynatureandtheneedtofocusondevelopingcountries,andguidelinesasthepreferred optionforsuchaninstrument.www.iisd.ca/vol29/enb2905e.html.

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2. Case Studies to Illustrate Communitybased Integrated Coastal Management: Best PracticesandLessonsandAspectsofLivelihood

The Introduction concluded with FAOs findings related to the factors leading to the lack of sustainability and overexploitation of fisheries, the tools for sustainable management, the requirements for mainstreaming, and the recent decision at the 29th Sessions of COFI (Greboval, 2002;SwanandGreboval,2003;Hilborn,2007;APFIC,2005;Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005). Mainstreaming establishes sets of collaborative partnerships between fisher communities and the relevantlevelsofgovernmentadministration.Thesepartnershipspromotebettergovernancebased onshareddecisionmaking.Traditional,artisanalandmodernizedsmallscalefisheriesthatdominate the sector in the BOBLMESA include diverse and complex forms of CBFM, comanagement and alternative livelihoods development. Mainstreaming eliminates reliance upon adhoc projects and unsystematicinterventions. Best practice and lessons have been extracted and generalized from the complex and diverse examplesofCBFM,comanagementandalternativelivelihoodsdevelopment.TheReferenceModel inTable4isasimplifiedanalyticalframeworkderivedfromtheinformationpresentedintheFAOs findings(Greboval,2002;SwanandGreboval,2003). Theobjectivesofthissectionare: 1. To present a selection of case study examples that illustrate best practice in CBFM, co management, and alternative livelihood development from the different ecological, geographicandsociopoliticalcontextsfoundintheBOBLMESAsubregion. 2. Promoteadoptionofbestpracticesincommunitybasedmanagementandcomanagement. Toassesstheenablingfactorsthatareneededtostrengthenandreplicaterecognizedbest practice.Tounderstandtherequirementsformainstreamingbestpracticesinamannerthat governmentsmaysupportwithpolicy,legislationandfundsforcomprehensiveandinclusive CBandcomanagement. The selection of case studies presented in the review is not exhaustive. The case studies were selected to provide a representative set of examples of lessonsand best practices and to facilitate further thinking about smallscale fisheries and coastal resource management in the BOBLMESA subregion.OtherexamplesofCommunitybasedmanagementandComanagementmayexistthat can be assessed using the same Reference Model. Analysis of further case studies will enrich the lessonsthatemerge.Despitethefactthateachcasestudyisauniqueentityitisnecessarytoidentify commonalities and draw generalizations between them in order to draw out lessons and best practices.

2.1CaseStudyBriefs
Thissectionpresentsaselectedsetofcasestudybriefsthatdemonstrateelementsofbestpractice inCBCoastalResourcemanagement/FisheriesManagementandComanagement.Eachcasestudy representsacomplexsocioecologicalsystem(Ostrom,2007a,b).Themixofcasestudiesrevealsin sequence aspects of complexity and uncertainty, the unintended consequences of fishery cooperatives, the existence of TURF systems on a range of geographic scales, highly sophisticated institutions for comanagement and CBFM for common property resource systems, effective communitybased governance that applies to vast extents of coastal seas, the need for co management in the face of persistent use conflict, and finally communitybased management practicesstillawaitingdiscoveryanddescription.Thesampleofcasestudiesalsoshowstheneedfor concertedexplorationandresearch.

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Some examples have particular geographical settings and can be characterized by four sets of informationthatexplaintheinteractingecologicalandsocialprocessesbothatthesitespecificlevel andatthenationalpolicylevel.Thesefoursetsofinformationprovideidentitytothemanagement processes that would enable tracking of change over time. Where information is lacking effective managementisdifficult. Each socialecological system, regardless of scale, is composed of four main interacting ecological and social processes (Ostrom, 2007a, b). The four main interacting ecological and social processes are: 1. the resource system which portrays the ecological relationships in particular geographic settingstheecosystemlinkages; 2. thenumberofresourceunitsgeneratedbytheresourcesystemsuchasthequantityoffish whichthencanbevalued, 3. the number of resource users involved which provides the scale of livelihoods that require management,and 4. institutional/governancesysteminoperationwhichwouldincludeinformationpertainingto mechanisms that exist for conflict resolution and maintaining the integrity of the resource base. Thenotationassignedtoeachcasestudy(CS117)isusedinthesummarytableforclassification intogoodandimprovablepractices. CS1.Bangladesh:EmpowermentofCoastalFishingCommunitiesforLivelihoodSecurity(ECFC) (GovernmentofBangladesh.2005) Thiscasestudydemonstratesaninterventionbythenationalgovernmentwhichhasimplicationsfor mainstreaming comanagement of coastal resources. An FAO/UNDP project implemented over a periodoffiveyearsfrom20022006soughtspecificallytoweavecomanagementoffisheriesintoa comprehensive development approach. Results of postproject evaluations, although not presently available,couldrevealsustainability. It is only when human wellbeing has improved sufficiently that any progress toward improved ecologicalwellbeingcanbetackled.Throughtheformationofvillageorganizations(bothwomens and mens organizations), the project assisted in improving basic cleanliness, provision of multipurposevillageresourcecentrecumschoolbuildings,salaryofteachers,trainingofhealthfocal points, training of villagebased natural resource conservation/management activists, training in safety at sea and the initiation of savings. Most of these provisions have been made on matching supportbasis.Subsequently,itwaspossibletoformanetworkofvillageorganizationsatsubdistrict and district levels. It was through these organizations that decisions to increase mesh size and to removedestructivegearssuchasshrimpfrycatchingnetswaspossible.Thecommunitiesalsobuilt upenoughconfidenceandcapabilitytointeractbetterwithbothlocalandcentralgovernment.Akey tothissuccesswasthegrassrootslevelinvolvementoflocalfisheryofficersfromtheDepartmentof Fisheriesaswellasprojectstaff(Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005). ResourceSystem: Coastal marine waters accessed by fishing craft as well as shallow estuarine waters suited for collectionofshrimppostlarvae.Thelatteractivity(prohibitedbylaw)isdiscouragedasincomefrom alternative project activities compensate. Maps are not available for understanding ecosystem linkages.

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ResourceUnitsGenerated: Informationnotavailabletoenableaneconomicvaluetobeassignedtoprojectoutputs. NumberofResourceUsers: Fishing communities of 117 coastal villages are organized into 248 village level organizations (123 menand125womencoveringabout20,000households).Villageorganizationsconnectedandlinked throughthenetworkofUpazilaandDistrictlevelfederations.Realizingthebenefitoforganization,8 newvillageshavecomeforwardtojointheproject.StepshavebeentakenforregistrationofCOs. GovernanceSystem: VillageOrganizationswereformed,oneformenandanotherforwomen.Theyhavebeentrainedfor participationinplanningandimplementationofprojectactivitiesinallcomponentsofthedecision makinghierarchy.Increasedsavingsandownershipofassetsbywomenhavecontributedtotheirself confidenceandwillingnesstoparticipateindecisionmakingforums.Mechanismsforaccountability andforsecuringdemocraticdecisionmakingareunclear. Thepossiblecontributionfromtheinterventiondescribedabove,spanningaboutfiveyears,needsto bestudiedandcomparedalsowiththeachievementsofCODEC(CommunityDevelopmentCenter) whichhasbeenworking with marginalized coastal communitiesinthesame geographicsettingfor thepasttwodecades(SenguptaandGiassudin,2006). CS2.Bangladesh:LawEnforcementandSocialCost:Postlarvaeshrimpcollection. This case study demonstrates the futility of seeking to enforce laws based solely on technical considerations.Thesocialcostsoflawenforcementareintolerableinapoliticalcontext. ResourceSystem: ThelowerestuarinewatersofPasurRiverinsouthwestBangladeshindicatesthatonaverage40%of total annual income of the poorest coastal fishers comes from postlarvae fishing during the few monthsinvolved.However,indiscriminatefishingofwildpostlarvae,withhighlevelsofbycatch,has an impact on biodiversity in coastal ecosystems. This has provoked imposition of restrictions on postlarvae collection. The ban has, however, not been firmly enforced because of the lack of alternative livelihoods for coastal poor (Ahmed et al., 2010). The prevailing situation demonstrates themannerinwhichinnocentpeoplearemadevirtualcriminalsbyunenforceablelaws.In2000,the GovernmentofBangladeshimposedregulationtostopshrimpseedcollectiontoprotectthefisheries resources.Butthousandsofpeopleinvolvedinpostlarvaecollectionaredefyingtheban.Thereisan apprehension that strict implementation of the banning ordinance may displace the people who depend upon the income from catching the larvae (Azad, Lin and Jensen, 2007). Maps of the geographiclocationsarenotavailableforunderstandingecosystemlinkages. Theresourceunitsgeneratedbythesystem: It has been estimated that approximately 2 billion shrimp fry are collected annually from wild sources.Theoutputfromshrimppostlarvaecollectioncollectorsin2000/2001was2,500metrictons withavalueof1,377milliontaka,sharedby185,000collectors.Theearningsperdayin2001/2002 were25taka,convertingtoaboutUS$0.5(FlewellingandHosch,2003a). ResourceUsers: The185,000resourceusersrecordedin2000/2001morethandoubledto420,000by2006.Thevast majority of the people involved, including a majority of women, and schoolage children, are from poorhouseholdsinthevicinityofestuariesandthecoastline.Theirfishingdevicesaresimpledrag

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netspulledinwaistdeepwaterevenduringthewinterseason.Aminorityamongthemoperatebag netsfromboats. Governanceandinteractions: Researchshowsthatpoverty,migration,creditsystemsandlackofcoordinationofserviceproviding agencies all have important influence on shrimp fry collection in the coastal zone. With an ever increasing demand for sustainable use of coastal fisheries resources there is a need for consensus among the stakeholders. Alternative employment opportunities for fry collectors, community participation and an integrated coastal zone management approach are proposed for the developmentoffisheriesresourceswherethepoorbecomeparticipantsindecisionmaking. CS3.Bangladesh:FisheryCooperativeforSectorModernizationandLivelihoodUplift. This case study demonstrates the inability of comanagement interventions to make positive contributions to social wellbeing when governance is flawed and decisions are imposed on fishing communities. Compare with the positive Japanese experience of fishery cooperatives in co management(Box2). Resourcesystem: Theentiretyofthecoastalandmarinefisheryindiversegeographicsettingsthatmaybeamenable tointroductionofmoderntechnologies,aswellaspovertyreductioninterventions. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Inexcessof589,000metrictonsin2000/2001(Flewellingand Hosch,2003a). Numberofresourceusers: Inexcessof352,369including(185,000shrimppostlarvaecollectors)in2000/2001(Flewellingand Hosch,2003a). Governance: A comprehensive range of laws exist for fisheries management but enforcement is weak. Participatory approaches to decisionmaking are absent. The voluntarism that generally imparts sustainabilitytocooperativesismissing. The Directorate of Cooperatives of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperativesisresponsiblefortheorganizationoffishermenintocooperativesandtheregistration ofcooperativesocieties.Fishermencooperativeshavebeenorganizedintothetraditionalthreetier pyramidalstructure:primary,intermediaryandapexsocieties.Thenationalapexorganizationisthe Bangladesh Jatiya Matshyjibi Samabaya Samity (BJMSS). There are 88 intermediary and 4,243 primarysocietieswithamembershipof540,000asof1983.Itprovidesdirectsupervisiontotheapex cooperativesocietywhichisauthorizedtointroduceinnovationsinthefishingfield:crafts,gears,ice plants,coldstorageunits,etc.Thefisherycooperativessubscribetofisheriesdevelopmentobjectives whichinclude: improvingtraditionalandemploymentorientedtechnologies, organizingandmobilizingtherurallaborforce, improvingthesocioeconomicconditionsoffishermenandfishfarmers, increasingfishproduction,raisingtheconsumptionoffishandthelevelofnutrition, developmentofselectedfisheryproducts.

Themajorfunctionoftheapexsocietyistheexecutionofthesupplyandserviceprogramme.BJMSS importsfishing materials fortheir members. Theseimportsare exemptfromalltaxesanddues.In

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theperiod197277,itimportednylonrope,marinedieselengines,floats,etc.,withatotalvalueof Taka50million(US$2million).Presentlythemajoractivitiesconcerntheestablishmentoffishery infrastructure,coastalfishingwithmechanizedandnonmechanizedboats,marketing,twoiceplants (each 33t capacity), processing (dressing, packaging, and freezing) and export of processed fish, shrimpandfroglegs.ThemajorsourcesoffinanceforBJMSSconsistofsharecapitalandsavings.It hastheexclusiverighttoobtainloansfromtheGovernmentorfromtheBangladeshBankona100% guaranteebytheGovernment. Foreignaidplaysaveryimportantroleinthedevelopmenteffort.Anumberofnationalandregional projectsarebeingexecutedbytheFAO(FoodandAgricultureOrganizationoftheUnitedNations). Amongthebilateralaidprogrammes,theDanishassistance,mostofwhichis directed throughthe BangladeshFisheriesDevelopmentCorporation(BFDC),constitutesthelargestcomponentinmarine fisheries.Intheestuarineandcoastalregions,fishislandedanddistributedthroughmunicipaland privatemarketsandwholesalefishmarketandfishlandingterminalsofBFDCsituatedatChittagong (fishharbor),CoxsBazaarandKhulna.Toimprovemarketingofthecatchesfromtheestuarineand coastalareas,BFDChasrecentlyestablishedwholesalefishmarketsandfishlandingterminals,one eachatKhepuparaandPatherghata.Themosthighlypricedfishissilverpomfretfollowedbybhekti, hilsaandtheIndianthreadfin.Nextinthecategoryofvaluedfishesaretheblackpomfret,croakers and catfish. In the estuarine and coastal regions fishermen sell their catch to the fish traders (mohajon) through agents (dalals). These dalals act as brokers between the traders and the fishermeninthenegotiationofprices.Fishermenareoftenobligedtoselltheircatchatalowpre determined price to the fish traders or money lenders to whom they are socially and financially indebted.Fishermenselltheirfisheitherbycountorbyweight. Marketing charges in BFDC wholesale fish market are six per cent of the sale proceeds. In private, municipal and cooperative wholesale fish markets, arathdars/mohajons conduct the auction on a commissionbasisrangingfromthreetosixpercentoftheproceeds. Bilateral aid and trade interests appear to be interlinked and diverse (BOBP, 1985). The major importsofequipmentsince1972consistoftrawlers(fromUSSR,UK,Japan,SouthKorea,Denmark), marine engines (from USSR, Denmark, Japan, Sweden, Germany), synthetic twine and ropes (from South Korea, Denmark, Japan, Norway), boatbuilding timber (from India, Burma), refrigeration equipment(fromUSSR,Japan,Denmark),iceplants(fromDenmark,Japan,India,Norway,Rumania), plants for making fishmeal and shark liver oil (from Denmark), two fully equipped fishing research vessels(fromJapan,Denmark),refrigeratedandinsulatedlorries(fromRumania,Japan,Korea)and trainingequipmentfortrawling(fromUSSR). Resourceusers: Traditionally, marine fishing was practiced at subsistence level by the Jaladas of the Hindu communities. They have been operating and living in isolated villages along the coast. Within the fishingcommunities,therearetwodistinctgroups:thosewhoownboatsandfishinggearandthose who work only as fishing crew. Most fishermen are landless, and are, therefore, employed only duringthefishingseasonsinceotheremploymentpossibilitiesarealmostnonexistent.Afewrevert toestuarinefishingwhenthemarinefishingseasonisover.Amajorityofthefishermenthusrelyon moneylendersduringofffishingseasontomeettheirsubsistenceneeds.Thishasinvariablyledmost fishermentobechronicallyindebted,mostlytofishtraders. With the increasing commercialization of marine fisheries, and the rise in landlessness due to population pressure on limited agricultural lands, a large number of Muslims began taking up fisheriesasafulltimejob.MostofthemotorizedsmallscalefishingboatownersnowareMuslims andtheyhireHinduorMuslimfishermenascrewsonashareofcatchbasis(andinafewcaseson wagebasis).Themostcommonpracticeisforaboatandgearownertopayanagreedpercentageof thevalueofeachcatchaftercoveringoperatingcosts(i.e.thecostoffuel,iceandfoodforcrew).The

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sharingarrangementvariesfromareatoarea,onthetypeoffisheryandbetweenperiodsinafishing season. Around Chittagong and Coxs Bazaar, the most common practice is for the boat and gear owner to take 60% of the value of each catch after covering operating costs, and for the crew to share the remaining 40%. The entitlement of each crew member varies depending on the type of functionheperforms. Fishing is traditionally a lowstatus occupation and the majority of the fishing families belong to sociallyneglectedclasses.Only14%ofthetotalfishingpopulationmaybeconsideredasliterate;no morethanonepercenthavesecondaryorhighereducation.Thelowliteracyandmarginaleconomic positionoffisherfolkmakethemhighlydependentonmiddlemen.Mostareeitherindebtedtofish merchantsorlocalcontractorstowhomtheyareboundtoselltheircatchbelowthemarketrates. Theyborrowmoneydrawingonfuturecatches,inordertoequipthemselveswithcraftandgearfor the coming fishing season or just to maintain their family. In the absence of mutual organization, they have little scope to liberate themselves from a continuing cycle of indebtedness. Living conditions of fisherfolk, particularly in the slums of urban areas, leave much to be desired. These areasarecharacterizedbycongestion,substandardhousingandinadequatemunicipalfacilitiessuch as water, refuse disposal and sanitation. In the rural areas housing and basic infrastructure are equallyinadequate.
Box2.FisherymanagementinJapanasamodelthatdemonstratesCBFMandcomanagement(Uchidaand Makino,2008;Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005) The evolution of management of the coastal fishery in Japan demonstrates the practical value of co managementasthefoundationofsustainability(Uchida,2008).Intermsofemployment,94.7percentofactive fishers(definedasafisherybusinessowner,oftenavesselowner,engagedinfisheriesformorethan30daysin acalendaryear),areinvolvedincoastalfisheries.Historically,conservationofmarineresourcesinJapanhas beenadministeredunderrulesthatfishermenimposedonthemselves(MakinoandMatsuda,2005).Individual fishingvillagesestablishedtheirownrulesregardingtheuseofcoastalresourcesintheirarea. Fisherycooperativeassociationsandterritorialuserightsforfishing Japanese coastal fisheries are governed by fishery cooperative associations (FCAs). The associations jurisdictional boundaries are defined geopolitically, rather than biologically on the characteristics of the targeted species. FCAs play one unique rolethey manage fishing rights. Fishing rights are analogous to territorialuserightsforfishingTURFs(Christy,1982),whicharegrantedbythegovernmentandprotectedby law. EvolutionofComanagement CoastalwatersweredefinedinJapanaspublicareasbylegalcodesdatingbackasfarastheyear701AD. TheideaoffishingrightsinancientJapanwasnonexistent. ii. During the feudal era in the seventeenth century, the rule changed such that only residents of coastal villagesthatdidnothaveenougharablelandonwhichtogrowricewerepermittedtofish.Suchvillages were given a certain area of coastal waters for exclusive use and harvester guilds were formed in the villagestoprotecttheresourcefromoutsidepoachers. iii. Inthelate1870s,thenewMeijigovernmentattemptedtoconvertthefisherymanagementsystemtoa topdown style with feebased licensing. Nationwide opposition eventually forced the government to reversetheprocess. iv. Governance regressed back toward selfgovernance by local resource users. In 1901, enactment of the FisheryCooperativeLawlegallyrecognizedtheseadhocuserrights.FisherguildsevolvedintoFCAs. i. FisherymanagementorganizationsComanagementInstitution Comanagementofcoastalfisheriesiscarriedoutbyfisherymanagementorganizations(FMOs).AnFMOisa group of fishers who share the same fishing ground and/or operate in the same fishery and are collectively

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engagedinresourceand/orharvestmanagementaccordingtomutuallyagreedrules. Selfregulation AnFMOtypicallyadoptscombinationsofmanagementmeasures.SomeFMOssimplysetlimitstofishingeffort (suchasdaysatseaorvesselsize),whileothersadoptsophisticatedfishingeffortcoordinationmeasuresasif thegroupisbehavingasasoleresourceowner. New entries to the fisheries are typically tightly controlled. First, most coastal waters are included in TURFs belonging to FCAs and hence it is illegal to fish commercially within these waters. Among the legal fishers, entriestospecificfisheriesareoftenrestrictedbythelicensesystemadministeredbyeitherthelocalorcentral government. More and more FMOs are getting involved in market coordination activities. FMOs that are activelyengagedinmarketingactivitiestendtoearnhigherrevenuepermember.

Sincethemid1980stheworkforceinextremepovertyinvolvedinthecoastalfisheryhadexpanded to more than 4.2 million in 2006 (Nesar et al, 2010). This segment of the population is among the mostexposedtoclimatechangeimplications. CS4 India, Andhra Pradesh: The Andhra Pradesh Fishermen Cooperative Societies Federation (AFCOF) Thisnarrativeisbasedon:AReviewofFisheriesDevelopmentSchemesinThreeFishingVillagesin VisakhapatnamDistrict,AndhraPradesh(Salagrama(2003a). This case study demonstrates the inability of potential comanagement interventions to make positivecontributionstosocialwellbeingwhengovernanceisflawedanddecisionsareimposedon fishing communities. Compare with the positive Japanese experience of fishery cooperatives in co management(Box2).SimilarexamplesexistfortheotherstatesalongIndiasBOBcoastline. The information provided below is for the entire Indian coast of the Bay of Bengal since the cooperativestructureisintendedtobenefitallthestates. Resourcesystem: The entirety of the coastal and marine fishery amenable to introduction of modern technologies withinarangeof12kilometerstosea. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated: Inexcessof173,254metrictonsin2000/2001fromthecoastalcommercialfishery.(Flewellingand Hosch,2003b).Thequantityisnotreportedfromthecoastalartisanalfisherywhichemploysfivefold morefishers(FlewellingandHosch,2003b). Numberofresourceusers:Inexcessof860,660(FlewellingandHosch,2003b). Governance: A comprehensive range of laws exist for fisheries management but enforcement is weak. Participatory approaches to decisionmaking by the central and state governments are vague or absent. However, the decisionmaking processes at the local level (panchayats) are adequately strongtomaintainterritorialuserightsinfisheries(TURFS). The Andhra Pradesh State Fishermen Cooperative Societies Federation Ltd. (AFCOF) is the apex fisheries cooperative society in the state. It provides loans in kind i.e., as fishing tools and equipment,whichitroutesthroughtheprimarycooperativesocieties.TheFederationisfundedby the National Cooperatives Development Corporation (NCDC), and is administered by the

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Department of Fisheries, Government of Andhra Pradesh. The main findings of the review of performanceofAFCOFaregivenbelow.TheobjectivesofAFCOFhavebeencitedas: Toimprovethelivelihoodsofthefishingcommunitiesbyprovidinginkindloansi.e.fishingtools andequipment, Routingthe benefits through the primarycooperativesocietiesinthestate,soastoenablestrong andsustainablegrassrootslevelstructurestocomeupinthefishingcommunities. Asset generation for improving livelihoods: AFCOFs emphasis on improving livelihoods focused strongly on the principle of enhancing the physical assets boats and fishing gears aimed at maximisingthereturnsfromexploitationofthenaturalassets.Unfortunately,therewaslittleorno supporttoharnessingtraditionalknowledgeandskills,ortoenhancepeoplesabilitytodiversify.The resulthasbeenthatwhenthetechnologyprovedtobetooefficientandendedupoverexploitingthe naturalresources,limitedrecoursewasavailabletothefisherstodiversifyatshortnotice.Besidesits negative impacts upon the natural resources and the sustainability of operations, technologyled development had another shortcoming. Access to new technology was dictated by the entrepreneurshipofthepotentialusers,andforestablishedtechnologies,therewereissuessuchas political and bureaucratic patronage, ability to invest sizeable sums and social standing in the communityetcthatplayedadeterminingrole.Inmostcases,therealpoorbenefitedonlyfromthe trickledowneffects.Bymakingequitysecondarytogrowth,theschemesmightnothavecontributed asmuchastheycouldhavetothelivelihoodsofthepoor. Besides,theprovisionofhardwaresupportasassetswasnotbackedupbydevelopingsuitable systemsoforganisation,discipline,knowledgeandawarenessthesoftware.Fromtheperspective of the Federation, as well as the fishers, it was all rather cutanddry one gives, while the other takes.Unfortunately,theintegratedcontextinwhichthesocial,economic,technical,biologicaland environmentalissuesformapartofdailyexistenceofthefishingcommunitieswasnotconsidered. Obviously, things are more complicated than that, particularly when it is remembered that the beneficiarieswerealargelyilliterategroupofpeople.Ultimately,theyearsofhardworkandhuge amountsofmoneyspentappeartohaveachievedmuchlessthancanbereasonablyhoped. RepresentativenessoftheSocieties:Onhindsight,theexpectationthattheSocietieswouldactasa link between the communities and the Federation in a just and transparent manner was rather exaggerated. The leaders of the Societies often came from the socially influential, politically active andeconomicallypowerfulsectionsofthecommunities,anditwouldbeoptimistictothepointof being nave to believe that they allowed genuinely democratic decisionmaking processes to take rootintheSocieties.Obviously,someoftheseleadersstrovetomaintainthesocialcohesionofthe village, ensured equality of opportunities wherever they could, and represented the majority viewpointwhenitcametodealingwiththeoutsiders,butthiswasseldomademocraticprocess.For thememberstoopentheirmouthsagainstanyoftheleadersdealingswouldmeaninvitingtheirfull wrath, which manifested in many ways. Thus, all dealings between AFCOF and the actual beneficiarieshavecometobecarriedoutbytheSociety,meaningtheleadersoftheSociety. Sustainability of the Societies operations: A key point about the Cooperative Societies, which emergesfrominteractionswiththemembers,isthattheformationofaSocietyisinvariablylinkedin peoples minds to receiving government support. Cooperative societies are regarded entirely as channels for receiving government funds. Unfortunately, this is a view that had been fostered and actively encouraged in several instances by the government agencies themselves. Two Societies begantoreceiveloansrightfromtheyearoftheirinceptionindicatesthattheyhadhardlyanytime tobecomeconsolidatedasanorganisationalentity.Asitstood,theprocessofformationofaSociety was not very rigorous, the delays in giving recognition to the Society being mainly administrative than a conscious way of fostering strong organisation at the grassroots level. The Department of

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Fisheries recognition automatically allowed the Society to receive a host of benefits, which were mostlycreditlinked. Accountability of the Societies: The selfassured manner in which the new Societies went about distributingwhatwasobviouslyAFCOFsmoneymakesonesuspectthatatleastsomeofthemcame intoexistencemotivatedmorebythemoneythatformingaSocietybroughtin,ratherthaninareal spiritofcooperation.BecauseSocietieswithsuchmotivesplayedsocentralaroleintheprocess,the systems of developing schemes, identifying beneficiaries, generating awareness about the programmes,service deliverymechanisms,qualityofinputsprovided,postdeliveryservices,credit delivery and recovery mechanisms, monitoring the performance of inputs and necessary backup serviceshaveallbeenaffectedadversely.Peoplesimplytookwhatevertheyaregivenbecausethey aresuretheywillneverhaveto,orbemadeto,pay. Summary: From the available information, one can only conclude that issues such as institutional strengthening,truecooperativeandparticipatorymodesoffunctioning,decentralisationofdecision making,sustainabilityofinstitutionsandactivities,andestablishingpropersystemsofaccountability havenotreceivedasmuchattentionfromAFCOFastheyneeded.Rather,ahighlyidealisedpicture of the structure (egalitarian) and functioning (democratic, transparent and accountable) of the Societieswasallowed todominate the perceptions ofthe people,inspiteofrepeated evidenceto thecontrary.Theresulthasbeenthatmostactivitieshavecometoastandstill,yieldingfewifany positive benefits to the fishers. The cooperative movement appears to have come to a halt in the fishingvillages.AFCOFnowfindsitselfinthered.Thereisaneedforurgentmeasurestoimprovethe conditionsatthebeneficiarylevel,attheSocietylevelandattheAFCOFlevel. CS5. Sri Lanka: evolution of fishery cooperatives political imperatives versus fishery development. (Joseph,B.L.personalcommunicationanddraftpaperfortheupcomingpublicationonthehistoryof SriLankasfishery). Resourcesystem:Theentiretyofthecoastalandmarinefisheryindiversegeographicsettingsthat maybeamenabletointroductionofmoderntechnologies. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Theartisanalsmallscalefisheryproduced145,382metrictons (FlewellingandHosch,2003c). Numberofresourceusers:105,027in2000/2001(FlewellingandHosch,2003c). Governance: A comprehensive range of laws exist for fisheries management but enforcement is weak.Participatoryapproachestodecisionmakingarevagueorabsent.Mostdecisionsaredrivenby politicalpriorities(Josephpers.comm.) Thefirstattemptsatorganizingfisherycooperativesundercolonialrule,precededindependencein 1948,asameansof: upliftingthesocioeconomicconditionsofthefishermen, providingcredittoenablethemtopurchasetheircraftandotherneededinputs,and assistingtheminmarketingtheirproduction.

Thesecooperativesocieties,hurriedlyorganizedbytheDepartmentofFisheries,werenotbasedon genuine, cooperative principles. They were established for channeling of loans to agents of fish merchantstoincreasefishsupplytomeetwartimeshortage.Theloansandadvancesenabledagents topurchasingfishdirectlyfromthefishermenfordistributioninColombo.Followingindependence, theDepartmentofFisheriesreorganizedcooperativesocietiestoassistthesmallscalefishermento markettheircatches.Twotypesofcooperativesocietiesresulted:(i)CooperativeCreditandSales Societies these were limited mainly to those types of fisheries where the working unit was small 29

such as outrigger canoes, log rafts, and (ii) Cooperative Fishing Societies these were meant for fisherieswithlargeworkingunits,suchasbeachseines,whichcollectivelyownedthenets.Inboth types of societies the catch was sold jointly through the society and proceeds were shared among thepartiesconcernedaccordingtoprevailingcustom. Between 19521958, supported by a Canadian Programme, the necessary training in cooperative principlesandoperationswereprovidedtotheprospectivememberspriortobeginningasociety.By 1956, there were as many as 181 village level cooperative study circles with a membership of around 3,000 established under the project. In 1956 there were a total of 93 societies with a membership of 3,681. This represented 4.6 % of a population of 76,000 engaged in fishing. These societies together had some share capital and physical assets, less than initially anticipated. The reasonsforrelativefailurewere: 1. Inadequateknowledgeoffishingrightsandcustomsonthepartoforganizersofthesociety whichleadstoinsufficientoutputorfrequentfishingdisputes. 2. Capitalshortageforrepairsandreplacementattheendofanunsuccessfulseason. 3. Insufficiencyofcatchesinaparticularoperationalarea. 4. Theinadequacyoftechnicalexpertisewithinagroupoffishermenwhoformthesociety. 5. Inefficiencyofacooperativesocietyoffishermen,withafeelingofequalityamong them, being notassuccessfulasahierarchicalorganizationintheprivatesector. Anewpolicyonfisheriescooperativeswasformulatedin1959underwhich,governmentappointed FisheryInspectorswererequiredtoorganizeandtoregistercooperativesocieties.Alargenumberof societies were registered almost overnight for issuing mechanized boats. This caused widespread disillusionment in the numerous cooperative study circle groups which were previously organized and trained under the Canadian Cooperative Training Programme. They could not acquire registration. This was a great blow to the building of a genuine cooperative movement in the fisheries sector. The government was compelled to reverse its policy, and loans were once again extended to nonmembers of cooperative societies. Many cooperative societies became bankrupt and ceased to function during the transition. However most new societies which consisted of a membership that benefited from the initial training survived because they were committed to self improvement. In1968,followingrecommendationsofaRoyalCommission(LaidlowCommission),inactivesocieties wereliquidated,smallvillagelevelsocietieswereamalgamated graduallyintoasmallernumberof viable primary societies, and a regional union was established for the southern coast. The Ceylon Cooperative Federation then followed, and the fisheries credit schemes were revised to fall in line withtherulesapplicableinagriculturalandindustrialsectors. By1972,thegovernmentagaindecidedtogobacktothepolicyofprovidingthecooperativeswith the monopoly of issuing loans to the fishermen. This brought in its wake another fundamental reorganization of fisheries cooperative societies. It resulted in the formation of 45 large primary societiesbyhastilyrecombiningtheexisting292villagelevelsocietieswhichexistedatthetime.This reorganizationcontravenedtherecommendationsoftheRoyalCommission,andpredictablyfailed. Thefishermenresistedthereorganizationandinthecourseofeventsmostofthesesocietiescame to be badly mismanaged. A committee of office bearers where the majority were government appointees could not win the trust of fishermen. The repayment on loans diminished, staff was in excessoftheactualneeds,andmostsocietiesshowedoperatinglosses.Irregularbusinesspractices andfinancialmismanagementeventuallyresultedinmassiverepaymentdefault.Someimprovement inrepaymentinrespectofinboardmotorizedcraft(3.5tonboats)occurredonlyaftertheownership ofboatswastransferredfromthesocietytotheactualskippers. The Fishery Master Plan 197983 departed from the earlier government policies with regard to cooperativeorganizationstomeetthenewchallengespresentedbytheliberalizedeconomicpolicies

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implemented after 1977. Policy orientation was stated as: The role of fishery cooperatives as producers in their own right have been modified. Cooperatively owned boats have been less productive than privately owned boats; consequently, the cooperatively owned boats will be transferred to private ownership when loans from the government have been repaid. Greater emphasis will be placed on assisting individual fishermen to undertake the direct purchase of new vesselsandfishinggear".Despitethesestatementstherewasnomajoroverhaulofthecooperative societies.Onlypoliticallymotivatedtamperingoccurred. A policy based on the pledge given by the government party in the 1977 election to "set up organizationsofthepoorfishermenandfisherwomen"cameintooperation.Itenvisagedtheactive involvement of cooperatives in the industry areas ranging from fish production, supply of fishing inputs,settlementoffishingdisputes,facilitatinginsuranceandpensionschemework,channelingof stateassistancetofishingcommunities,marketinganddistributionoffish,managementoffisheries servicecenters,fishingcommunitycenters,servicesandfacilitiesatharborsandanchorages.Thusa freshwaveofcooperativesocietiescameintobeingintheimmediateaftermathoftheParliamentary Election of 1988 at four levels: village, local government, district and national levels. The National FisheryDevelopmentPlan19901994wenttotheextentofsettingouttheformationofVillageLevel cooperativesocietiesasoneofthemaintargetstobeachievedforimplementationofthePlan.The targetsetforthisfiveyearperiodwas850societieswithamembershipof850,000andasubstantial totalcapitalreservethroughthesavingsofitsmembers.Activefishersconstituteabout10%ofthe membership.Variouschangescontinuetooccurinthefisherycooperativesmainlybaseduponthe requirementsoftheministerinchargeofthesubject. Conclusion:Fromthegovernmentsperspectivecooperativeshavethepotentialtobeamechanism for linking with the people. Successive governments have used this mechanism for taking its programmestothepeople.Successesareseeninthecaseoftheconsumercooperativemovement inthecontextofgraveshortages,controlsandrationing.However,intheabsenceofsuchconditions cooperatives havefailed miserablyandthisisno moreamply demonstratedthanbythehistoryof fisheries cooperatives in Sri Lanka. The initiative to form these organizations never came from the peoplebutwasfoistedonthem.Thustheywerenevergenuinepeoplesorganizations.Generallyco operativesbecamevictimsofthewhimsandfanciesaswellasthepoliticaldoctrinesofthegoverning political parties. Following economic liberalization subsidies and state assistance decreased to a trickle.Fisherycooperativeshavefailedtocontributetothedevelopmentofthefishingcommunities asinitiallyintended.

CS6. Maldives: Territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) for Maldivian Nationals in the Coastal FishingZone (Source:BOBPIGO,2009) This case study demonstrates the existence of fishery comanagement in an area (about 500,000 km2) defined for territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) which is about half the extent of the Maldives EEZ. Hilborn (2007) asserts TURFs as the simplest and most effective approach that contributestosustainablefisherymanagementworldwide.TheextentofthisTURFisaboutthesize oftheIndianEEZalongtheBOBcoastline,ortheentiretyofSriLankasEEZ,orthreefoldlargerthan theentireEEZofBangladesh. Resourcesystem: Theoceanicwatersboundedby75nauticalmilesfromtheatolls(seeSection3).Themainclassesof fishharvestedaretunasandsharks. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:140,851metrictons(Adam,2004).

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Numberofresourceusers:Inexcessof15,390(Adam,2004). Governance: A comprehensive range of laws exist for fisheries management but enforcement requires strengthening. All decisions are made in consultation with respective leaders / representativesofatollsandislands. The dominant component of the Maldivian fishery occurs in the Coastal Fishing Zone (CFZ) which provides territorial use rights in fisheries (TURF) for Maldivian nationals. Intruders are taken into custody by the Maldivian Coast Guard supported by monitoring information provided by the Maldivianfishers.OverallfisheryproductionfromtheCoastalFishingZonehasbeenincreasing. Althoughthefishingindustryisthesixthhighestemployeratthenationallevel,itremainsthethird major economic activity in the atolls, providing livelihoods for the majority of the atoll population. Next to tourism, it employs the second highest number of males (19% of employed males). The fishing industry in the country operates as a smallscale (informal) enterprise. A majority of the fishers(88%)havenofixedlocationofworkastheyoperatefromfishingvesselsoutatsea.Overa thirdofthefishers(36%)operateasgroupworkers,aroundonefourthasownaccountworkersand contributing family workers. Only 16 percent of the fishermen work as employees. Other primary industries:agricultureandsandminingalsohavesimilarattributesintermsoftheinformalnatureof operation. The increasing fishing power and efficiency of fishing vessels has resulted in increased catches of both skipjack and yellow fin tuna. Skipjack unit yield has increased almost consistently in recent years; from about 270 kg/ day in 1997 to over 600 kg/ day during 2006. Yellow fin tuna yield has been also being increasing from 50 kg/ day in 2000to over 100kg/day in 2006. Apart from this, a foreignlicensedlonglinefleetoperatesintheEEZoftheMaldives(75milesandbeyond).About40 vessels are licensed to operate in the EEZ, although the numbers that actually operated in recent yearsmaybelower. Almosttheentirecatchcomesfromwithinaradiusof75milesoftheislands,anareareservedfor the local fishers. The extent of the EEZ situated beyond the CFZ contributes only 2 percent of the catch (2007), which largely comprises yellow fin tuna. In terms of fishing methods, pole & line accounts for 88 percent of the landings, followed by hand line and trolling. Pole and line fishing vesselsoperatemainlyaroundthefishaggregatingdevices(FADs)fixedatabout12milesfromthe atollrims.Depthattheselocationsvariesfrom2000to3000meters.Occasionally,thepoleandline tuna fishermen also fish the freeswimming tuna schools. In terms of fishing vessels, mechanized Masdhonis accounted for about 97 percent of the landings in 2007. The relevant legal enactment describes the conditions for licensing of foreign vessels or joint ventures in the EEZ, provides for apprehensionofvessels,arrestandpenalties,anddescribestheCoastalFisheryZone(CFZ). CS7.Maldives:Exclusiveuserightsofhousereefsassignedtopopulationsofinhabitedislands. This case study demonstrates the manner in which cascades of TURFs under CBFM, can exist as nested,coupledandhydrologicallyinterconnectedoperationalentitieswithinthevastoceanspace ofanEEZ(BOBP,1997a). Resource system: The coral reefs associated with inhabited and uninhabited islands, and island chains. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequiredforeachhousereefsystem. Numberofresourceusers:Thefisherpopulationoftheislandtowhichthehousereefbelongs.The sizeofthesepopulationsarenotreportedinrelationtoislandsandparticularhousereefsassociated withthem. Governance:DecisionsaremadebytheIslandChiefinconsultationwithelders.

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The coral reefs surrounding every inhabited island (200 inhabited islands) are nested within the MaldivesCFZ.Fishingatthesereefs,termedhousereefsistheexclusiverightofinhabitantsofthe islands under the supervision of the Island Chief. Thus, about 200 TURFs operating under informal conventionalsoexistasnestedandcoupledentitieswithintheCFZ. CS8.SriLanka:EstuarineStakenetFisheryinNegomboLagoon. Thiscasestudydemonstratesthemannerinwhichfiveessentialattributesforsustainablecommon pool resources management when combined with formal legal support operates as a co management entity with almost no transaction cost to the government. However, because of its geomorphologicattributesthesystemcanbeunderminedbyrentdissipation(Samarakoon,2007). Resource system: The semienclosed tidal channels that connect the Negombo Lagoon (a barrier built estuary) to the sea. Mainly a penaeid shrimp fishery where juveniles are captured during migrationtothesea.Fishingoccursatdesignatedstationsofappropriatedepth.Adverselyaffected bynumerousnegativeexternalitiesoflanduses. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequired. Number of resource users: About 285 members of respective fishery societies (CEA / Euroconsult, 1994;personalcommunicationSebastianFernando). Governance: All decisions are based on democratic principles in keeping with a code of conduct guidedbyasetofrules.DeclaredbytheGovernmentofSriLankaasalegalentitywithexclusiveuse rights. TheestuarinestakenetfisheryinNegomboLagoondatesbackseveralcenturies(Amarasingheetal., 1997).Itembodiesalltheattributesrequiredforsustainablecommonpoolresourcesmanagement bywayofformalizedcomanagement(CEA/Euroconsult,1994).Thissystemisbrieflydescribedprior to comparison with the padu fixed net fishery in Cochin, India (Berkes, 2006). The five necessary andessentialattributes(Ostrom,1990)are: Democracy: A general meeting of the entire membership is held annually, under the chairmanship of a senior Roman Catholic priest, without fail, and an effective democratic systemofelectionofofficebearersforafixedtermofoneyearisheldbyasecretballot.The systemoperatesinasetofcommunitiesthatareentirelyRomanCatholic,butbelongingto different occupational castes. A spiritual aura permeates every aspect of management includingimpositionofpenalties,usuallybyaparishpriest. RulesandEnforcedPenalties:Anoperationalcodeofconductexistsspellingoutpenaltiesfor infringements.Allpenaltieshavebeenenforcedwithoutfail. EquitableBenefitSharing:Themechanismsforequitablesharingofbenefitsistheallocation ofrotatingstakenetstationsbyablinddrawoflots(lottery)thepadu. Limitation of Access. Access to membership is limited by hereditary rights and strict conditions for new entrants where the society decides on admission of new members for variouspredeterminedreasons. Freerider Elimination: Conventional safeguards against freeriders have protected the integrityofthesystemalthoughpersistenteffortsaremadebybothhostileinterestsandby proxiesofpoliticalinterestwhoseektocashinontheshrimpfishery.

Despite the superlative institutional arrangements, the fishery is gradually attenuating because of thelossofstakenetfixingstations.Theprimarycauseoflossofnetfixingstationsissedimentation andinfillingdrivenbybothnaturalprocessesandbylandcaptureforillegalhousing.Inadditionto

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physicalshrinkageofthewaterbody,negativeexternalitiesofwatershedlanduseincludeindustrial pollution from the discharge of untreated wastes. Sediment entrapment as an unintended consequences of mangrove planting, as a conservation measure, increases the infilling rate (CEA / Euroconsult,1994;IUCN,2009).Thusunintendedconsequencesarisefrom: nonfisheryrelatedlandusesthatareerodingtheresourcerentfromthefishery,and conservation related land uses driven by fallacies such as argument by false analogy in relationtomangroveplantingwhichhaveacceleratedsedimentationprocesses.

Theadaptiveevolutionoffishingsystemsbaseduponsharingofresourceshasbeendemonstratedin many other location in BOBLMESA including Cochin, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh, Pulicat Lake among others that have an appropriate geomorphology. Three communitybased fisher associations, i.e., sanghams,intheCochinEstuaryofKerala,SouthIndiathatusethepadusystemwereinvestigated byBerkes(2006).Thesanghamsadministeredtherotationalallocationofshrimpfishingspots,fished withstakenetsthatarerowsofbaglikenetsfixedtostakesdrivenintotheground.Theyoperated under a set of welldefined rules serving livelihood, equity of access, and conflict resolution needs amongtheirmembers. Asacommonsinstitution,thepadusystemoftheCochinestuaryonlydatesbackfromthelate1970s (LobeandBerkes,2004).Tracingtheiroriginsshowedthattheyaroseoutoftwoevents.Thefirstwas theglobalizationofshrimpmarkets.Shrimpbecamepinkgold,asmanysmallscalefishersinSouth India abandoned other resources in pursuit of shrimp (Kurien, 1992). The second factor was the centralizationoffisheriesmanagementinKerala.In1967,theKeralaFisheriesDepartmentstartedto institute a new licensing arrangement, replacing an older system of land and fishing site holdings. Beginningin1974,statelegislationrequiredlicensesforallfishers,butthestatelackedthemeansto enforcethenewlaw.Becauseshrimpfishingwaslucrativeandattractednewentrants,theresource effectively became open access, forcing the fishers to selforganize to consolidate what they considered to be their rights in a large and crowded estuary and lagoon system (Lobe and Berkes, 2004).
Figure5.CrossscalegovernanceinlagoonshrimpmanagementcasesinSriLankaandKerala,India.Notethe absenceofarrowsintheKeralacase.

EachpaduassociationintheCochinestuarydealtwiththeexclusionissuebylimitingtheaccessof nonmembers, and the subtractability issue through rules that provide for equity, social responsibility,andconflictmanagementamongitsmembers.However,theKeralaStategovernment does not recognize the three associations in the study area, nor does it license the fishers. They continue to fish only because of a 1978 court order establishing them as fishers by profession

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(LobeandBerkes,2004),andongoingstatelevelpoliticalactionbytheirDheevaracasteorganization toprotecttheirrights(K.T.Thomson,personalcommunicationreportedinLobeandBerkes,2004). Berkes(2006),inhisconclusion,commentsthatthechallengeofpluralityispervasive,andresources arecontestedbymultipleactorsineachcase.Keralaisthemostcrowdedandcontentiouscase,and itispossiblethatthelackofinstitutionalsolutionsisrelatedtothepessimismoftheactorsthatwin winsolutionsarepossible.Commonstheoryholdsthatsolvingthe'subtractability'problemdepends, among others, on the users having workable relations for monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution(Ostrom,1990). TheIndiacasealsoillustratessomeofthechallengesrelatedtoscaleinacommunitybasedsystem thatappeartohaveemergedasaresponsetocertainexternaldrivers.SouthernIndiaishometoa number of traditional community institutions for coastal resource management. What have been calledpadusystemsarefoundinSriLankaandthesouthernIndianstatesofKeralaandTamilNadu. These are lagoon and estuarine resource management systems, mainly for shrimp fisheries, characterizedbytheuseofrotationalfishingspotsallocatedbylottery.Theyarespeciesandgear specific,withrulestodefinefishingsitesandrightsholders,oftenaccordingtosocialorcastegroups (LobeandBerkes,2004).SomepadusystemsinSriLankagobacktoatleasttothe18thandpossibly the15thcenturies(Amarasingheetal.,1997). The sanghams seem to be effective in dealing with the subtractability problem; they have well definedandclearrulestoregulateresourceuseamongmembers.However,regardingtheexclusion problemtheyareonlypartiallyeffective.Theycontrolthestakenetsthatareintheirrowsofnets andhaveasayaboutwhofishesthem,includingthosethatareleasedout,buttheyhavenocontrol overtheotherfishersinthearea.Thethreesanghamscontrolonlyaboutonehalfofthe289stake nets owned locally, and that in turn is only a small fraction of some 13,000 stake nets used in the entire lagoon and estuary system. In the heavily used estuary and lagoon system in Cochin, there appearstobenosystematicdatacollectionorstockassessment,butthereissomeenforcementof restrictiveregulations.Thelackofstaterecognitionandmechanismsforcrosslevelcoordinationhas limitedtheabilityofthethreesanghamsintheCochinestuarytocontributetomanagementatthe regionallevel.However,thereisnoeffectiveregionallevelmanagement. Giventhelackofresourcesinmostdevelopingcountries,isitrealistictoexpectthemanagementof such resources as used by padu systems of South Asia? There are, in fact, wellfunctioning padu systems with both local and regionallevel management, and they are found in the wellstudied NegomboLagoonofwesternSriLanka(Amarasingheetal.,1997;Amarasingheetal.2002).Figure5 sketches the differences between these two lagoon management cases that use variations of the same padu system. Both are species and gear specific, with rules defining sites and rights holders, and both use a lotterybased, rotational use system for fishing sites. The differences are organizational. Bothcasesgrapplewiththetendencytodefineissuesatonlyonescale.InKerala,andSriLanka,the local level is the focus of management. The other levels are present in Kerala but not effectively engagedasalsoobservedinsomeothercountries,exceptinthe SriLanka case.TheKeralacaseis unusualinthatitlacksevenanattemptatforgingverticalinstitutionallinkages.However,thescale issuetranscendsinstitutionsandlinkstheSriLankacasetrajectorytochangesoccurringatthelevel ofthebarrierbuiltecosystemanditshydrology(IUCN,2009).Inthissense,FAOsEAF(FAO,2003) becomes a significant step in the direction of incorporating the physics and chemistry of coastal waterbodiesintothecommunitybasedandcomanagementframeworks.

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CS9. India, Andhra Pradesh Stakenet Fishery in Backwaters: BodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem (Salagrama,2003b). Thiscasestudyillustratestheconvergenceoffishingtechnologyandmanagementpracticesbasedon the similarity in geomorphologic settings. The resource system is relatively concentrated and definablewithinaspatialboundary.ThisfacilitatestheexerciseofTURFs. Resourcesystem:Godavaribackwaterstidalchannelsintheshorefrontdelta. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceusers:Informationrequired. Governance:Communitylevelgovernancethroughmembershipinpanchayats,accessrestrictedby territorial use rights regulated by the community. No record of legal status provided by the government. BodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem(BCVPalem),isalocationwherefishingactivitiesarecarriedoutby a number of fishing systems confined to the creeks and the backwaters, the traditional systems of management and control related to fisheries and fishing are elaborate and have an important economicfunction(seeCaseStudyofStakeNetFisheryinSriLanka).Fishingincreeksinbackwaters hasafirmrelationshipwithgeomorphologyandspacerestrictionforoperationofthefishingdevices. Accessrightsarecontrolledbywayofmembershipofthepanchayat(alsoseeCS10). CS10.India,AndhraPradesh:ShoreSeineandBackwaterFisheriesSmallScaleFisheriesDealing WithComplexityandChangeAComparison (Salagrama2003b) The state has a coastline of 900 km with an estimated 870,000 fishers living mainly in fishing communities.Widedifferencesexistamongthesecommunitiesinregardtofishingsystems,disposal, marketing,social,andpoliticalorganization.Traditionalfisherymanagementsystemshaveevolvedin relation to the geomorphology and ecology of the biophysical system. Geomorphologic drivers of twovillages,UppadaandBodduChinnaVenkatayaPalem(BCVPalem),illustratetheeffectivenessof traditionalCBFMsystemsintheregulationoffishingpractices.Thespecificsvarybetweenthetwo systems. Resourcesystem:Coastalstretches. Numberofresourceunits:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceusers:Informationrequired. Governance:Informationrequired. InUppada,wherethereisoftenconsiderablecompetitionforspaceforbeachseineoperationswhich oftenrequirelargegroupsofpeople,thereisagreateremphasisonsocialissuesandrelationships. ThecommunitybasednatureoffishingoccupationsinUppadaseemstobeareasonfortheinclusive natureofitsmembership.Shoreseines,boatlaunchingandlifting,areallmoreorlessdependenton theinvolvementofalargenumberofpeopleintheactivity.Thepredominanceofsmallpelagicfish speciesinthecatchesmeansthatduringcertainpartsoftheyear,theentirecommunityhastowork asoneunittobeabletodisposeofthefishproperly. In BCV Palem, fishing pressure in the shallow creek waters was higher within a defined boundary, conflictsmorelikely,theexistenceofuserightsthataresharedequallyamongstthemembershas meant that there are more incentives to keep people out than in. So why have traditional communitybased management systems (TCBMS) survived in Andhra Pradesh and why have they been so successful at managing fishing activity? Firstly, they are directly connected to the specific conditions of natural and social environment in the area and so are flexible enough to cope with 36

change and locally relevant so as to engender support. Panchayats are holistic and crosssectoral. Theydevelopsystemsthatemphasizesecure,sustainableandequitableaccesstoresourcesanddo thisthroughtheintegratedandholisticnatureofgovernanceconcerningresourceallocation.Finally, thedecisionmakingprocessisparticipatory. CS11.SriLanka:ShoreSeineFishery,Western,SouthernandEasternCoastlines (Panayotou,1982) This case study demonstrates the manner in which diminishment of restrictions on access rights imposes both economic and social costs. The situation is further undermined by facilitating unrestrained competition among traditional and modern fishing technologies. The shore (beach) seine fishery contributed about 60% of the total supply of marine fish in the country prior to the onset of fishery modernization and competition with inshore mechanized fishing starting in the 1960s. Today it contributes about 10% to the fish supply and provides employment to a proportionatelysmallernumberoffishworkers. Resource system: Coastal stretches extending to about two km from shore. Nets operated from shore.Atnumerouslocationsalongwestern,southwestern,southernandeasterncoasts. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:19,920metrictons(FlewellingandHosch,2003c). Numberofresourceusers:39,840employedinoperationofthenets(FlewellingandHosch,2003c). Governance:Beachseinenetsareregisteredandoperationrightsarebasedonlicenses.Government participatesinconflictresolutionasneeded. SriLankancoastalfisherieshaveahistoryoftraditionalpropertyrightsintheformofrightsofaccess andclosedcommunities.Inearliertimes,beachseineownerscontrolledtheaccesstocoastalwaters and had associated fishing rights which, along with other property, were subject to bilateral inheritance (by descent or marriage). Although, at the start, each beach seine owner had his own beachinwhichhehadexclusiverightstooperate,eachofhischildrenhadonlyafraction,notofhis beach,butofhisrighttofishoffthebeachalongwithhisbrothersandbrothersinlaw.Whilethere wasnolimitonthenumberofnetsthatanyoneholdingrightstoaccesscouldhaveconstructed,the fishermeninagivenbeach,beingasinglekinshipgroup,refrainedfromconstructingadditionalnets unlesstheycouldbringinacatchwhosevaluewouldhavebeenhigherthanthecostofthenet,that is they acted as a single economic unit. However, following successive inheritance and population growth,eachgroupwhichhadaccessrightstoabeachhasgrownsolargeandremoteinkinshipthat owning a net became gradually the means of exercising one's rights to the resource. Alexander (1995) (revised from Alexander 1980), who studied the Mawella beach seine fishery, illustrates convincinglythisdevelopmentwhichtransformedthebeachseineintocommonproperty: Ifthereweretwentynets,amanwithonenetwouldreceive1/20thoftheannualcatch.Butafterhis death his two sons take joint ownership of his net, they each receive only 1/40th of the catch, whereasifoneconstructsanewnettheyeachreceive1/21st.Thus,althoughtheconstructionofnew nets was clearly uneconomic from the viewpoint of the community as a whole, there were good reasonswhyindividualfishermen,especiallythosefromlargefamilies,shouldconstructnewnets.The optimumnumberofnetswasreachedbefore1920andtheconsequentincreaseinvolvedadditional investmentforwhichthemarginalproductwaszero. Thus, the right of access system, while effective in blocking entry by outsiders, failed to limit the effort(numberofnets)employedbythemembersofthecommunityitself.Althoughthefishermen wereawarethatonlyafractionoftheexistingnumberofnetswouldhaveobtainedthesamecatch while generating substantial profits, they had no way of rationalizing their fishery. Instead, they accepted the ownership of nets as a distributional device and they attempted to give equal opportunitiestoallnetsthrougharotationsystemwhichenabledeachnettobeusedinalllocations

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and seasons every so many years. This meant equitable sharing of increasing poverty to the point thatownershipofasharecouldnotprovideforsubsistence. Thegovernment,inresponse,introducedalicenseschemewhichlimitedthenumberofbeachseines at each community to those existing in 1933, thus destroying the rights of access concept; new entrantscouldparticipateinthefisheryonlybybuyingsharesinexistingnets.Whilethelegislation opens the door for the sale of shares to people without hereditary rights, it did not prevent the constructionofnewnets;predictablyenough,mostshareswereaccumulatedinthehandsofasmall elitewithaccesstocapitalwhichconvertedasubsistencetechnologyintoaprofitableenterpriseby limitingthenumberofnets.Atpresent,beachseining,thoughoutrunbymoderngear,stillremains profitable in some locations where it is controlled by one or two licensees who own the nets and employ crew on a wage basis (Alexander, 1995). In relation to the five attributes of sustainable commonpropertyresourcesmanagement(Ostrom,1990),describedinCS8,thebeachseinefishery appearsnowtobemoreopentopenetrationbyfreeriderswhodonothavehereditaryrights. In Sri Lanka, traditional property rights are not peculiar to the beach seine fishery. A recent study (Fernandoetal.,1982ascitedinPanayotou,1982)foundthatSriLankancoastalfishingvillagesare generally closed communities in the sense that persons from outside the village are not allowed accesstothefishinggroundsofthecommunity.Outsidersarenotallowedtoanchororbeachfishing boatsalongtheshorelineofthecommunityandlaborisnotrecruitedfromoutsidethevillage.These restrictionsonentryhelptoexplainwhySriLankancoastalfishermen,unlikemanyothersmallscale fishermeninAsia,earnincomesappreciablyabovetheiropportunitycosts.However,theconceptof aclosedcommunitymightbegraduallyerodedbyitsverysuccess:laborshortagesandtheensuing highlaborcostsareencouragingtheemploymentofoutsidersascrewmenwhosoonareaccepted bythelocalcommunityandoftenintermarryacrosscastes: Outsidersbythusbecominginsidersprovidesociologicalbridgesformoreoutsiderstofindentry into what would have once been a closed fishing community which jealously guarded its resources fromoutsiders.Whilethisbringsaboutanindividualgainforthecraftownerthisisasocialcost beingincurredatthesametime;bybreakingtheconstraintonentry,thecommunityasawholeloses bythesettinginmotionofaprocessthatwillpotentiallyincreasethenumberofcompetitorsonthe fishinggrounds.(Fernandoetal.,1982ascitedinPanayotou,1982)). Atthisstage,itcannotbepredictedwhethertheSriLankanclosedcommunitybarriertoentrywill eventually break under the pressure of labor shortages. As an institution which has exhibited considerable resilience in the past, it might adjust itself to accommodate the new circumstances shortofopeningthedoortothetragedyofthecommonswhichappearstohavebeenkeptatbay. sofar.However,reducedcatchesandahighproportionofjuveniles,hintatresourcedestructionby wayofoverfishing. CS12.SpecialAreaManagement:SriLanka(IUCN,2009). This case study was selected since it demonstrates that imposition of concepts that are not fully integrated with the structure and functioning of an ecosystem including geomorphology fails to providesustainableresultseveninanapproachwhichseekstobeparticipatory. Resourcesystem:Amixofbarrierbuiltestuaries,lagoonsandcoralreefs. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceusers:Severalthousandmoredetailedinformationrequired Governance:Conceptuallybasedoncommunitybasedcoastalresourcesmanagement. The concept of Special Area Management (SAM) involves a collaborative, adaptive and flexible approachtoresourcemanagementwithinageographicallydefinedarea.Itisnow,anintegralpartof

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national coastal zone management policy. It was first introduced to Sri Lanka, in the 1980s, to addresstheadverseimpactsofeconomicgrowthinenvironmentallysensitiveareassuchascoastal wetlands, which require new management tools and greater collaboration with other agencies (acrossdevelopmentsectors)andthepublic(CCD,2006).SAM,morethananyotherpolicy,provides thegeographicscopetoaddresscomplexecosystemsinrelationtostructureandfunctioning.SAM plansandprocesseshavealreadybeenpartiallyimplementedatninesites. Sorensen and McCreary (1990) explained special area planning and management, of which the distinguishingfeatureisgeographiccoverage,asrequiring: 1. Boundary demarcation of a special area, which is larger than a local jurisdiction, e.g. local governmentadministration(LGA)area,andsmallerthantheentirenation.Ithastwopurposes:

to capture national resource or development issues that cross states or local governmentboundaries; to encompass a significant natural resource, an embayment, estuary, watershed or a comparablehydrologicunitinitsfunctionalentirety.

2. Specialareaorregionalplanshaveamultisectoralperspective.Sometimesasinglesectorsuch astourismmaybethefocus,butinterconnectionsaremadewiththeotherrelevantsectors. Specialareamanagement,aspracticedinSriLanka,fallsintotwodifferentclasses: 1. Special area management as advocated by the CCD, which is a deviation from the conceptualization by Sorensen and McCreary (1990), and fits into community based natural resourcesmanagementCBNRM(CCD,1997;WhiteandSamarakoon,1994). 2. Subregional planning more in harmony with its original conceptualization, and includes developmentissuesofnationalsignificance(CEA/Euroconsult,1994). TheCBNRMvariantofspecialareamanagementinSriLankaishighlylimitedinscopeandtherefore cannot become meaningful to the national development process. Clemmett, Senaratne and Ranaweera Banda (2004) based on a comparative study reported in general it has not been demonstratedthatSAMisaviableandeffectivetoolforCoastalZoneManagement(CZM)asithas notachieveditsdesiredobjectivesandhasbeentimeandfinanceconsuming.Perhapstheproblem was the political nature of SAM implementation where it was assumed that a coastal community alonecandriveamanagementprocess(WhiteandSamarakoon,1994). CBNRMisanalternativetotopdownapproachestomanagementofnaturalresources(Community Based Natural Resources Management Network. http://www.cbnrm.net/). It has been highly effective where enabling conditions have been provided by way of adequate legislation, advocacy and awareness. Philippines is an example where CBNRM in coastal settings has contributed significantly to the sustainable uplift of livelihood as well as maintaining the health and quality of coastal resources by way of appropriate laws and participatory mechanisms (Eisma et al., 2005; Oracionetal,2005). The notion of community based natural resource management" is most appropriate when examiningthecommunitylevelaspectsofthemicromacrocontinuum.Thecloselyrelatedconcept of "comanagement of natural resources" on the other hand, may be more appropriate when it is necessary to emphasize more evenly the various components of the micromacro continuum, including non communitybased stakeholders. CBNRM does not take place in a vacuum; communities operate within policy and legal frameworks, and can exert some influence upon it. Perhaps, in Sri Lanka the challenge is to establish the enabling conditions for comanagement for coastalecosystems.

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CS13. Maldives: Baa Atoll Ecosystem Conservation (AEC), PublicPrivate Collaboration within CorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR)Framework (UNDPMaldives,2006;AEC,2009) Thiscasestudywasselectedtodemonstratethepotentialformutualcooperationandcoexistence of both community interests and private sector interests, where the latter, resort tourism, has becometheprimarydriveroftheMaldiveseconomy.CSRprovidestheconceptualfoundationforthe collaborativeapproach. Resourcesystem:BaaAtoll,anadministrativedistrictofMaldives,cconsistsofthreeseparatenatural atolls. Situated on the west of the Maldives atoll chain, it consists of 75 islands of which 13 are inhabited with a population of over 11,000 people. The remaining 57 islands are uninhabited, in additiontofiveislandsbeingdevelopedasresorts. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationnotavailable. Number of resource users: Includes populations of inhabited islands as well as the populations of touristresortislands. Governance: Consultative decisions among governments, atoll / island administrators and resort operatorswithintheframeworkofcorporatesocialresponsibility. Theobjectiveofthisprojectistheconservationandsustainableuseofgloballysignificantbiological diversityinthe Maldives BaaAtoll.In the Maldives,atollecosystemsliterallyprovidethe basisfor the countrys existence as well as lifesupporting services such as shoreline protection and goods uponwhichtheeconomyentirelydependssuchasfishandtourism.However,socialandeconomic change is altering consumptive behavior and livelihood strategies, outpacing institutional capacity and sectoral programs to adequately manage them. This in turn is threatening the natural endowment that is essential to maintaining the structure and function of atoll ecosystems, the viabilityofgloballysignificantbiologicaldiversity,andthelivelihoodsandenvironmentalsecurityof thepeople. Most important policy decisions affecting biodiversity are taken at the level of individual sectors, suchasinfrastructure,fisheries,andtourism.Governmentinitiativestomanagechangeandmitigate the impacts caused by it are rooted in sectorbysector approaches, resulting in narrow, sectoral institutions,policies,andinterventions.Theprojectsthreeprongedstrategyisto: 1. mainstream biodiversity conservation objectives into sectoral policies and programs and reinforcemultisectoralinstitutionalcollaboration; 2. conserve biodiversity in the water and on the ground by establishing protected areas and managingthemthroughinnovativenationallocalandpublicprivatepartnershipsinBaaAtoll; and 3. relievelivelihoodrelatedpressureonbiodiversitybyenhancingreeffisherypropertyrightsand enablinglocalpeopletopursuemoresustainable,alternativelivelihoods. By the end of the project, modified sectoral policies and programs will enable institutions to more effectively manage biodiversity. Government, local communities, and the private sector will be partneringtosecurethelongtermconservationofthreeprotectedareasinBaaAtoll.Additionally, local people will be applying new knowledge and accessing new sources of financing in pursuit of alternativelivelihoods. CS14.India,TamilNaduFisherCouncilsJurisdictionTheGoverningSystem (BavinckandSalagrama,2008) 40

This case study demonstrates the manner in which organized fishing communities (artisanal, traditionalandsemimodernized)acquirethepoliticalstrengthtooperationalizeanextensiveTURF withoutformallegalsupport.Italsoillustratesthemannerinwhichorganizationandnumberscan providepoliticalpoweradequateforresistingmanipulationbygovernmentinterestcombinedwith thoseofhighlymodernized,commercialfisheries. Resourcesystem:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceusers:Informationrequired. Governance:Informationrequired. TheTamilNaduinshorefisheriesarecharacterizedbyalargevarietyoffishchains(sequenceofinter connected activities that link fish capture to the consumer), varying by subregion, season, and markets. The export market has expanded in volume as well as in scope since the 1960s, with the mostimportantspeciesbeingshrimp,finfish,cuttlefishandsquid.Thedomesticmarkettooislarge andintricate,andisservedviaalargenumberofchannels.Acomplicatednetworkofprocessorsand tradersisresponsibleforthedistributionofproducefromfishlandingcenterstothevariouscenters ofconsumption. With the exception of several trade ports, the coastline of Tamil Nadu has historically been peripheral. The marine fishing population of the state, although numerous, is settled in small, homogeneous fishing villages, governed by its own councils and headmen. These authorities take chargeoveralargerangeofvillageaffairs,includingfisheries.Eachvillagecouncilisacknowledgedas enjoyingjurisdictionoveranareaoflandandanadjacentseaarea,theboundariesofwhicharefixed inmutualagreementbyneighboringvillages. The interest of the British colonial government in marine fisheries was extremely limited in nature and scope. In the postindependence period, the state government of Tamil Nadu, which was grantedauthorityoverfisheriesintheterritorialseas,initiatedachangeinthelate1950sthatlater became known as the blue revolution. This intervention created semiindustrialized, mechanized fisheries constituting a new group of fishers, in addition to the existing smallscale fisheries. The tensionsthatcommencedbetweenthesetwogroupsoffishershavecontinuedtothepresentand aretheprimarytriggerforgovernmentinvolvementinfisheriesregulation(Bavinck,2003,2005). The formal government structure (Fisheries Department) seeks to meet the challenge of conflict management mainly through regulations although they are not adequate for fishery resource management. Additionally, fishermen resent the infringements of officials on their domain. For thesereasons,Bavinck(2001a)concludedelsewherethattheartisanal[smallscalefisheries]system isthemosteffectiveindevelopingandenforcingfishingregulations. The unwritten, yet fundamental clause of smallscale fisheries is that village councils have prerogativeoveradjacentwatersandseashore.Astheaveragedistancebetweenvillagesalongthis coastlineisapproximately2km,andfishingtendstoconcentrateinabelt5kmwide,eachcouncil enjoysexclusivecontroloveranaverageof10km2.This,however,doesnotmeanthatfishersalways staywithinvillagewatersinfact,thereisalargemeasureofmobilityupanddownthecoast,and fishers regularly encounter strangers on their and others fishing grounds. This is taken to be a normalcourseofaffairs;afterall,asfisherspointout,thefishdoesnotsticktoboundaries,sohow canwe?Theonlyconditionforfishinginotherthantheownfishingterritoryisthatonefollowsup localrulesandinstructions. Herevillagecouncilsandheadmencomein.Thesenonstateauthoritiesoftentermedpanchayats orcastecouncilslackoffices,uniformsandregularmeetingtimes,andinfactconstituteavariation

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ofanolderIndianpatternofdecisionmaking(Mandelbaum,1970).Villagemeetings,inwhichcouncil membersandheadmenpreside,providelocalfisherswiththeopportunitytotalkoverimportant topics and to arrive at an acceptable decision. Furthermore, such meetings provide a favored platform for tabling disputes and for speaking justice. (Bavinck, 2001b; Diamond, 2005). Village councilsregularlytakeactiontoregulatefishing,focusingontheprocessoftechnicalinnovation. The introduction of new fishing gears or fishing practices often provokes deliberations on their desirabilityandpreferredmodesofimplementation.Itisnotunusualforafishinggeartobebanned, orforitsimplementationtobecurtailed(BavinckandKarunaharan,2006a;2006b).Therearethree reasonsforbanningorcurtailinganewfishinggearorpractice:harmtothefishinggroundsandthe future of fishing, harm to the style of fishing practiced by the majority of fishers, and harm to the community. The first motive in particular is relevant to the concerns of contemporary fisheries management. It means in practice that a village council or, as is frequently the case, a chain of village councils takes action to prevent a fishing practice that it considers deleterious for the ecosystem.Thisruleappliestolocalfishersaswellastostrangersworkinginthelocalseaterritory, andisenforcedbythebodyoflocalfishers. ThelocusofgovernanceactivityinthesmallscalefisheriesofTamilNaduthusliesatthevillagelevel. Forproblemsatahigherthanlocallevel,thefishersofthisregionhavefoundaspecialinstitutional solution, called a panchayat circle (Mandelbaum, 1970). According to this oldtime practice, councilsfromupto20villagesgatheronanadhocbasistodiscussanddecideoncommonproblems. More recently, fishers in the region have also formed newstyle organizations for political representationandlobbying.However,sofarthecompetenceoftheseorganizationshasfluctuated significantly with changes in leadership, causing them to be ineffective in influencing fisheries regulations. Althoughthesmallscalefishersystemofregulationcontinuestostandfirm,thereisevidencefora gradualweakeningofcontrol.Governmentalnonrecognitionandoppositionisoneimportantcause. The fact that semiindustrialized fishers transgress into village fishing grounds with impunity also underminescouncilauthorityfromtheoutside.Internalfactorstoohaveweakenedvillagedecision making.Particularly,theincreasedintegrationofthefishingvillageswithinmainstreamsociety,the differentiation of village economies, and doubts as to the legitimacy of council decisions have all affectedperformance. Evaluatedaccordingtothecriterionofrepresentation,thegoverningsystemofthevillagecouncilsof Tamil Nadu possesses noteworthy qualities. The first is that the governing system matches the geographical diversity of the system to be governed. Being located at the level of the individual fishing village, governors are able to react to variations in the fish chain as they occur along the coastline. The systems comprehensiveness too has a positive bearing on governability. Every fishing village along the coast possesses a governing system moreorless of the type described above, and togethertheycovertheinshorewatersofthecoastuptoapproximately5kilometersdistance.The mostproductivefishinggroundsalongtheSoutheastIndiancoastlinearethereforeundersomeform of management. It has been argued elsewhere that a closely woven regulatory framework of this kindoffersimportantopportunitiesforgovernance(Bavinck,2001b). The fact that the governors are part of the system tobegoverned also stands out. Fishers jointly takedecisionsfortheregulationofthefisheries,andareresponsibleforthemonitoringofrulesand the judgment of offences. At the same time they are the ones being monitored and judged. The involvementoffishersingoverningactivityisoftenpromotedbecauseitincreasesthelegitimacyofa governingsystem(Jentoft,1989).Fromthisperspective,villagecouncilsmakeausefulcontribution.

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Buttherearefactorstoothatdetractfromthegovernabilityofthefisherysystemasawhole.The governing system suffers from a lack of fit with the contours of the ecosystem. Each village unit covers a limited sea territory, the boundaries of which were not constructed to coincide with ecosystem boundaries. This means that many ecosystem changes are beyond the influence of the village council. The same holds true if one takes the village councils together. The inshore marine ecosystem of the coast of Tamil Nadu is part of a larger land and marine ecosystems. The village councilsareabletocontrolonlyasmallpartofthislargersystemtobegoverned. Fromtheviewpointofinstitutionalconnectionstootherearedisadvantages.Althoughthegoverning system at the village level is geared to maximize interactions through the institution of village meetings,atotherlevelsinteractionsarefewinnumber.Thusthenestingofvillagecouncilsinlarger nonstateunits,suchaspanchayatcircles,isweak.Ifsuchlargerunitsexistedinthepast,theyhave largely been worn away. The connections with government agencies, on the other hand, are contradictory and infused with distrust. Although government officers realize that they cannot bypassthevillagecouncilsindailyaffairs,genuinecooperationisrare. Takenasawhole,thegovernabilityofthisfisherysystemisuneven.Therearemanypositiveaspects infishercouncilsgoverningsystem,however,thatdeserveattentionandmightbebuiltupon. CS15.India,TamilNadu&AndhraPradesh,CBFMinPulicatLake (Coulthard,2008) Thiscasestudydemonstratestheneedforsocialandculturalflexibilitytobeabletoadapttosocio economicchangesinthewidersociety. Resourcesystem:Segmentofestuarinesystem. Numberofresourceunits:Informationrequired Numberofresourceusers:Informationrequired. Governance:Informationrequired. Traditional community based fisheries management (CBFM) at Pulicat Lake, a threatened coastal lagoon in South India, demonstrates the difficulty of fishing communities to adapt to change. At Pulicat Lake, a traditional network of fishing rights and regulations known as the Padu system has enhanced sustainability of the lagoon fishery for many generations. Long established Padu fishing villages inhabited by Pattinaver (traditional fishing caste) fishermen are relatively rich in terms of fishingcapacity,socialstatusandfiercelydefendedaccesstowelldefinedfishinggrounds.However, access to the best parts of the fishery comes at a cost and despite a greater fishing capacity; Pattinaver fishermen have become trapped within their profession and are unable to cope with a highly fluctuating resource and diminishing fishing access through Padu restriction. Evidence presentedheresuggeststhatcaste,cultureandtraditionplayanimportantroleinpeoplesabilityto cope with changes in the fishery. Livelihood supported by CBFM does not necessarily guarantee enhanced wellbeing. Supportive interventions are required to meet the expectations of growing populationsthatareconstrainedbytraditionalculture. Aswithmanynaturalresourcesystems,informationonthesustainabilityofthebiophysicalfishery resourceisscarce.Existinginformationdoesnotrevealwhetherthelakefisheryisundergoingareal decline, or whether the current poor fish catches are part of the natural cycle of the lagoons interactionswithmonsoonrains.Thedeclineofthefisheryandpossiblecausesarehugelycontested issues.Evidenceisscattered,uncoordinatedandlargelyinsufficienttoderiveanyconclusion.Within such confusion on the state of the fishery and its future, livelihood coping mechanisms of fishing familiesincreasinglyseemlikeavitalonlypathformanagerstofollow.

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CS16.SriLanka,CBFMintheNearshoreShrimpFisheryinNegombo (Jayawardenaetal.,2004) This case study was selected to demonstrate the feasibility of TURFs in open, nearshore coastal waters (not partially enclosed by backwaters and estuaries). Traditional knowledge enables establishmentofaboundaryfortheTURF. Resourcesystem:Nearshoreseabed.Informationrequired. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceusers:Informationrequired. Governance:Informationrequired. A study was conducted to evaluate the shrimp trawl fishery in the seas off Negombo and Hendala duringtheperiodJanuary1998toDecember1999.Intheshallowseasoffthewestcoasttrawlingis conducted by two types of crafts viz. 3.5 t wooden boats (motorized trawls) and traditional sail driven large dugout canoes (nonmechanized trawls). The total catch effort and the catch per unit effortshowedseasonalvariations.Aseasonalityinthetrawlfisherywasobservedwithapeakperiod fromJune/JulytoOctober/November,whichapparentlycoincidedwiththesouthwestmonsoonand theintermonsoonperiodsoftheisland. TheoriginofcoastaltrawlinginSriLankadatesbacktoaboutahundredyears.Initially,netsusedby thelocalfishermenweresimplesquareortriangularshapedbags(Lensudela,Kathumaramdela) whichweremadeupofnaturalfibers(Cotton,Hempetc.)andusedtraditionalcraftsforoperations (Weerasooriya,1977).IntheseaoffSriLanka,trawlingisrestrictedtosmallscaleshrimptrawlingon smooth muddy areas of the continental shelf, especially near the estuarine and coastal waters (JayawardaneandDayaratne,1998).Wheremodernizedtrawlingdoesnotcompeteandenterinto conflictoveratraditionalresource(i.e.penetratetraditionalTURFs)conflictisminimized. In recent times (1992) shrimp trawling in the seas off Chilaw was banned as a result of a dispute betweenthetwofishingcommunities(traditionalandmotorizedtrawlfishermen)sharingthesame resource. Therefore, shrimp trawling is now restricted to Negombo and Hendala, in the western coastal waters of Sri Lanka. In addition trawling is the major fishing activity taking place in the shallow coastal waters off Negombo and Hendala, exploiting the parent stock of shrimps, which utilizeNegomboLagoonforcompletionoftheearlyphaseoftheircomplexlifecycle. CS17.India:TheBlueRevolutionexperienceofVillageGoverningCouncilsTamilNadu (Bavinck,2003;Menon&Viswanathan,2009) ThiscasestudywasselectedtodemonstratethatevenonthescaleofastatesuchasTamilNaduin India appropriate participatory decisionmaking systems (governance) has the potential to exist withinnestedandcoupledjurisdictions. Resourcesystem:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceunitsgenerated:Informationrequired. Numberofresourceusers:Informationrequired. Governance:Informationrequired. TamilNaduisthesouthernmostIndianstate,intheBOBLMESA,thatalreadyboastedastrongand sizeable artisanal fishing sector prior to the Blue Revolution. The artisanal sector was divided over threefishingregionstheCoromandelCoast,thePalkBay,andtheGulfofMannar.Havinglargely been left to themselves, the fishing population of the state had evolved a distinct legal system

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governingfisheriespracticeovertheages.Thislegalsystemhingedontheinstitutionofpanchayat (village councils) (Bavinck 2001a, 2001b). These are not connected to the system of government administration.Villagelaw,thus,providedforterritorialuserightsandemphasizedtheregulationof fishing technology. While technical innovation was generally encouraged, village councils regularly bannedtheuseofharmfultechnologyforecologicalorforsocialreasons. TheBlueRevolutionbroughtaboutanewfisheriessectorinTamilNadu,basedontrawling.Trawler fishers were concentrated in harbor towns and soon created professional organizations, which fashioned their own versions of fishing law. These associations established daily courts, delivering justice on disputes that took place with regard to trawler fishing, espousing principles at variance with panchayat practice. Thus, while aiming primarily at technological development, the Blue Revolution sowed the seeds of legal pluralism, which became more intricate again with the emergenceofstatefisherieslaw. Although a part of Tamil Nadu is subject to the same developments mentioned above, Ramnad Districtpossessesspecialfeatures.ThedistrictissituatedmidwayalongtheshorelineofTamilNadu, bridgingthePalkBayandtheGulfofMannar.Itisanareaotherwiseknownmainlyfordroughtand rainfedagriculture.Thefishingpopulation,whichcounted30,304in1957,hadincreasedto105,464 in2005dueinparttosubstantialimmigrationintofishing.Thispopulationinhabits141settlements ofmixedcomposition.TheinterspersedChristian,Muslim,andHindufishingpopulationsofvarying castesandoriginsisoneofthedefiningcharacteristicsofRamnadfisheries.Researchshowsthatthis heterogeneityhasaffectedthestrengthofpanchayatlawinartisanalfishing.Ithasalsocontributed tothefragmentationoftrawlerfisherpopulations,andoftheirprofessionalorganizations.Allinall, fisherlawislesseffectiveinRamnadDistrictthanitisinotherpartsofcoastalTamilNadu. The proximity to Sri Lanka is another defining characteristic of Ramnad District. This has given the areaareputationforsmugglingand,morerecently,forviolentclashesinvolvingvesselsfromTamil NadufishinginSriLankawaters.ThesevesselsareregularlypursuedbytheSriLankannavy,thesea wingoftheTamilTigerguerillamovementor,byextension,theIndiannavy.Theenduringcivilwarin Sri Lanka, and the tendency of the Indian trawler fleet to search out underfished grounds, has causedthecentralgovernmentofIndiatobaseasubstantialcontrolsysteminRamnad.Althoughthe Fisheries Department is the main governmental agency regulating fishing, the security interests in Ramnadhavereinforced thestatespotentialforexertingrealcontrol.Comparedtootherpartsof TamilNadu,therefore,thestatelegalsystemismorepowerfulandeffectiveinRamnad. FollowingcessationoftheethnicconflictbetweentheLTTEandtheSriLankanmilitary,thenorthern waters on the Sri Lankan EEZ again became accessible to the Sri Lankan fishers. This required withdrawal of the Indian fishermen who had benefitted from illegally fishing in Sri Lankan EEZ. However, voluntary withdraw is apparently not forthcoming. In the face of increasing competition the legal Sri Lankan fishers have begun agitating for a solution. The Indian and Sri Lankan governments are now negotiating for a peaceful resolution of a transboundary issue that may otherwiseescalateintoviolence,asreportedintheSriLankanmedia. TheTamilNaduMarineFishingRegulationActof1983wasdevisedtocontaintheconflictbetween trawlerandartisanalfishers,whichspreadallalongthecoastline.Ithadlittleeffect,however,asthe measures it introduced were difficult to implement, and the feuding parties did not support them sufficiently. It was only when the government, via a system of implicit comanagement, started involving the fishing industry in devising agreements suited to the circumstances in the various regions,thatameasureofeffectivenesswasattained. InRamnadDistrict,themainagreementisabouttimezoning.AsintheotherdistrictsofPalkBay, following a series of debilitating conflicts, the trawler fisher associations of Ramnad agreed with artisanalfishingorganizationsandlocalgovernmentauthoritiestoasystemwherebytrawlerswould fish three days a week, leaving four days to artisanal fishers. This measure is enforced through a

45

tightly controlled system of tokens, passes, and identity cards, implemented by the Fisheries Department,butwiththetacitsupportfromthecentralgovernmentagenciesmentionedabove.The systemwouldnotwork,however,withoutreceivingendorsementfromthefishingindustry.Thisis monitored partly through a system of monthly meetings, in which the District Collector (the chief administrator)gatherswithrepresentativesofthefishingindustrytodiscusscurrentaffairs. In conclusion the situation of legal pluralism in Ramnad District has evolved towards a form of co management, where the various parties, coordinate their regulatory activities focusing on core issues. This act of coordination, it must be emphasized, has emerged only after significant conflict and power struggle. Comanagement is still incomplete, however. There are many issues about whichthepartiesstillfundamentallydisagree.Moreover,althoughstateagenciesinformallyinvolve fisherpartiesintheirdecisionmaking,theirroleisnotformallydefined.Inotherwords,thereisno explicitstructureofcomanagementinplace.Whatevercomanagementoccursisinformalinnature. CS18. Bangladesh: Community Based Coastal Resources Management in the Southeastern Bangladesh(Deb,2008;2009). Thepurposeofthiscasestudyistodemonstratetheinadequacyofinformationinregardtofishing methodsthatcontributesignificantlytomarinefishproduction.GenerallyitisstatedthatCBFMand CBICMarerareorabsentinthecoastalwatersinBangladesh.Artisanalcapturefisheriesgenerally are portrayed as open access, unregulated, multigear and multispecies fisheries (Flewlling and Hosch,2003a)..Thisimpliesthatartisanalfisheriesgenerallytendtooverexploitanddestroyavailable stocks. The fisher management authorities tend to regard some fishing methods such as estuarine setbagnets(ESBN),thesubjectofthisnarrative,withconcernsinceitisassumedtocontributeto overexploitation of white shrimp resources (Flewelling and Hosch, 2003a). The following narrative fromaparticularvillagesuggeststhatthesituationcouldbemorecomplex.Closerstudyiswarranted inordertodetermineifwidespreadtraditionalmanagementpracticesexistandtoidentifyhowsuch practices maybe improved. These practices if suitable may be consolidated with adequate support fromgovernmentforcomanagement. Thisnarrativeprovidesinformationthatsuggeststheneedfor vigorousresearchtofilltheexisting knowledge gap. The traditional CBFM referred to in this narrative occurs in Maizghona fishing village,SaharbeelUnionofChakariaUpazillainCoxsBazaarDistrict.Thevillageisalmost100%caste basedHinduconsistingof121householdswithatotalpopulationof898(Deb,2008).Thisvillagewas includedintheEmpowermentofCoastalFishingCommunitiesforLivelihoodSecurity(seeCS1).The fishingmethodusedistheESBNreferredtopreviously.ThetraditionalCBFMconsistsofthefaar system.Thefaarreferstothemanagementsystemaswellastothefishinggroundscontrolledby thecommunities.Withinafaarexistsubdivisionstermedpataswhichrepresentspecificareasfor setting nets irrespective of time limit. This strictly exercised management institution (rules of operation)grantsfishingentitlementstomembersthroughrotatingfishingsites.Thefairnessofthe allocation system imparts sustainability to traditional management. The management system is sociallyrecognized,therulesofoperationareenforced,andexclusivebasedonhereditaryrights.It operatesonTURFprinciplesalthoughnotlegallyrecognized.Thenetfixingsitesareallocatedona fortnightly and/or yearly basis. Governance is under the control and supervision of village elders (sarders). ResourceSystem: The lower estuaries of tidal rivers which permit the operation of ESBN fishing. This is a vast and complexnetworkofwaterwayswhereearlystagesofpenaeidshrimpsseekrefugeandgrowbefore migratingbacktotheseaforbreeding. Theresourceunitsgeneratedbythesystem:

46

The total production from ESBNs was 121,251 metric tons, contributing 6% to total marine fishery production(FlewellingandHosch,2003a). ResourceUsers: Information is not disaggregated by villages. In 2000/2001 the number of fishers directly engaged wasreportedas100,000(FlewellingandHosch,2003a). Governance: Information inadequate. In particular villages such as Maizghona referred to in this narrative, decisionsaremadebyvillageelders(sarders).

2.2AnalysisoftheBOBLMESACaseStudies:TheReferenceModel
The analysis of case studies has been undertaken using the Reference Model (RM) or analytical framework represented in Table 4. The elements presented in the RM serve as evaluation criteria. Theanalysishasbeencompletedintwostages: Stage 1: Screening. The case studies are screened in relation to the elements or criteria in the Reference Model (RM) (Table 4) to identify the extent of correspondence with the required attributes. Stage 2: Evaluation Analysis of the good and improvable practices. Based on the level of correspondence tothe criteriathe casestudiesarefurtherclassifiedintothosethat exhibitGood andImprovablepractices(Table5). These practices provide snapshots of fisherybased coastal land uses. Lessons were extracted from ananalysisofthegeographicsettingandthedecisionmakingprocess.Thelessonsareexpectedto demonstratethefoundationwhichcancontributetolearninginCBICM.Thecontextforlessons,for thepurposeofthisreview,isprovidedbygeography,demography,technology,socioeconomics,and sociopolitics.

47

Table 4. The Reference Model (RM) represents findings of FAO (Greboval, 2002; Swan and Greboval, 2003, Hilborn,2007),andAPFIC(2005),amultipartnerconsortiumincludingFAO,supplementedwithWorldBank/ FAO (2009) and IPCC (2007a,b) which shows the elements that facilitate sustainable fisheries by way of mainstreaming. SustainableFisheries ToolsforSustainable FisheriesinOrderof Importance(FAO, 2002) Rights. Transparent, participatory management. Supporttoscience, planning,and enforcement. Benefitdistribution. Integratedpolicy. Precautionary approach. Capacitybuildingand publicawareness raising. Marketincentives. PillarsofMainstreamedComanagement disaggregated (APFIC,2005;Hilborn,2007;WorldBank/FAO,2009) 1)Anenablingpolicyandlegalframework; 2)Theparticipationandempowermentofcommunities (andotherusers); 3)Effectivelinkagesandinstitutions;and 4)Resourcesaresourceworthmanagingandthe peopleandmoneytodoit. Disaggregatedas(attributesAIoftable: empowermentofcommunities(A) agreedrolesandresponsibilitiesofthedifferentplayers (B) legalandpolicybackingatalllevels,(c) peoplewithskillsincommunication,naturalresource managementandproblemsolving,(D) useoftraditionalknowledge,traditionalsocial structures,(E) adequateresourcesafisheryresourceconsidered worthmanaging,andthepeopleandfinancesto implementthesystem,affordabletransactioncostsof implementingmanagement,(F) safeguardsagainstrentdissipation(WorldBank/FAO, 2009).(G) stronggovernmentroleinequitablelawenforcement andmaintenanceoflawandorder(Hilborn,2007).(H) mitigatingthechronicdisasterembodiedascreeping marginalizationandimpoverishmentofasegmentof traditionalandartisanalfishingcommunitiesintermsof theirexposureandrisk.(I)

GoodGovernance Appropriate Incentives ReducingDemand forLimited Resources Eliminationof Povertyand Providing Alternatives Improving Knowledgeof Complex Ecosystems Interactionsofthe FisheriesSector withOtherSectors andEnvironments

48

Table5.AcomparisonofcasestudieswithattributesoftheReferenceModel(RM)toenableclassificationof particularpracticesasGoodandImprovable.ThenotationsAI*refertotheattributesprovidedatthebottom ofthetable.Therelevantcasestudynarrativesaregivenundercorrespondingnumbers(e.g.CS1CS18).Key: Yespresentwithlegalbacking;Informalpresent,nolegalbacking;Nilabsent,notmentionedinliterature; Unclear information inadequate; Transitory confined to project life; Included arrangements exist for consultation/application).Thefarrighthandcolumnsignifiesoveralllivelihoodimpactofeachcasestudyas: positive (+), negative () or (+/) signifying that the impact on livelihood is unclear based on the literature provided.
Case Studies fromthe BOBLME SA
CS1. Bangladesh: ECFC Project CS2. Bangladesh: Shrimp/ prawnpost larvae fishery CS3. Bangladesh: fishery cooperative CS4.India, Andhra Pradesh: fishery cooperative CS5.Sri Lanka: fishery cooperative CS6. Maldives: Coastal Fishery Zone fishery CS7. Maldives: exclusive rightsat house reefs CS8.Sri Lanka: estuarine stakenet fisheryin Negombo Lagoon CS9.India, Andhra Pradesh: backwater

AttributesofReferenceModelUsedinClassificationofCaseStudies(seefootoftable forexplanationofnotationsAI)

A
Unclear

B
Unclear

C
Nil

D
Unclear

E
Include d

F
Unclear

G
Unclear

H
Unclea r

I
Unclea r/Nil

Classificati onasGood and Improvable Practices

Premature for classification . Activity banned scoring irrelevant. Enforcement weak. Improvable.

Impacton Livelihood

Nil

Nil

Yes

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Nil

Unclear

Nil

Yes

Unclear

Nil

Yes / Unclear

Nil

Nil

Nil

Unclear

Nil

Yes

Unclear

Nil

Yes / Unclear

Nil

Nil

Nil

Improvable

Unclear

Nil

Yes

Unclear

Nil

Yes / Unclear

Nil

Nil

Nil

Improvable

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Nil / Unclea r

Yes / Unclear

Yes

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Yes

Unclea r

.Better/ bestpractice TURF

Informa l

Yes

Inform al

Yes

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Inform al

Yes

Unclea r

Better practice. Verysmall spatial scale.TURF

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Nil

Yes

Unclea r

Better practiceto beusedin learning. TURFin operation

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Inform al

Yes / Informal

Yes

Yes

Nil / Unclear

Nil

Unclea r

Better practiceto beusedin learning.

49

stakenet fishery CS10.India, Andhra Pradesh: shoreseine fishery Yes Yes Nil / Inform al Yes / Informal Yes Yes Nil / Unclear Nil Unclea r

TURFin operation Better practiceto beusedin learning. Potential roleof TURF? Better practiceto beusedin learning. Potential roleof TURF? Improvable practicewith appropriate institutional adaptations. +

CS11.Sri Lanka: shoreseine fishery,W, S,Ecoasts

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Yes

Unclea r

CS12.Sri Lanka: specialarea manageme nt(SAM)of ecosystems CS13. Maldives: fisheryand tourism interaction CS14,India, TamilNadu TURFin nearshore coastal fishery CS15,India, TamilNadu, Pulicat Lake. CS16,Sri Lanka, Negombo, nearshore shrimp fishery CS17,India, TamilNadu Blue Revolution

Transito ry

Unclear

Yes / Unclea r

Unclear

Unclea r

Nil / Unclear

Nil

Unclea r

Unclea r

+/

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Unclea r

Yes / Unclear

Yes / Unclea r

Yes

Unclear

Unclea r

Unclea r

Better practiceto beusedin learning

Yes

Yes

Nil / Unclea r

Yes

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Nil / Unclear

Unclea r

Unclea r

Better/best practicefor learningin exerciseof grouppower

Yes

Yes

Nil

Yes

Yes

Unclear

Unclear

Unclea r

Unclea r

Improvable practicefor learning

Yes

Yes

Inform al

Yes

Yes

Yes / Unclear

Unclear

Unclea r

Unclea r

Better/best practice, incorporates TURF.

Yes / Unclear

Yes / Unclear

Inform al

Yes / Unclear

Yes

Informa l / Unclear

Unclear

Unclea r

Unclea r

Better practicefor learningin political advocacy and negotiation Improvable with supportfrom the government aimedatco management

CS18, Bangladesh CBICMon South eastern coast ESBN

Yes

Yes

Inform al

Yes

Yes

Yes / unclear

Unclear

Unclea r

Unclea r

*MeaningofnotationsAI

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A. Empowerment(abilityofindividualstomakechoices,leveloforganizationofgroups,ability of groups to negotiate rights with government, capacity to resist change imposed by governmentorelites,inclusivenessinplans,etc B. Responsibilities/rules/rolesofstakeholders,whereresourceuserorganizationsbehavein waysthatlimitpressureonaresource C. Legalandpolicybackingfromgovernmentthatsecuresrightsseekredressthroughcaselaw, safeguardpropertyrights,etc. D. Skill availability in terms of personnel who understand the resource and its dynamics, communication, techniques of natural resources management, mapping, monitoring, assessing,research,etc E. Traditionalknowledgeuse,extenttowhichinformationbasedonlongtermexperiencewith fisheryresourcesareusedindecisionsleadingtogoodgovernance F. Adequacyofresourcesaresourcethatisworthmanaging,transactioncostsareacceptable forsustaininginnovations. G. Safeguardsagainstrentdissipationthevalueofthefisheryresourcemaybediminishedby variousfactorsincludingpollutionandcorruption. H. Strengthofgovernmentthewillandcapacitytoenforcelawsanddevelopmentfairly. I. Existence of measures to reduce risk in marginalized coastal communities to safeguard life andpropertyinthefaceofclimatechange.

2.3 Clarification of Meaning and Content of Terms in the Reference Model in Actual Practice
ThecontentandmeaningofthetermsusedintheRMarenotuniforminpractice.Theydemonstrate nuances, for example rights are considered a factor of highest importance in terms of tools of managementmaybeidentifiedinanumberofdifferentways;(a)individualized(butnotasIndividual Transferrable Quotas (ITQs)) by virtue of hereditary membership in registered, licensed societies supported by formal legislation and territorial boundary as in the case of the Sri LankasNegombo Lagoonstakenetfishery(CS8),or(b)collectiverightasinthecaseoftheCoastalFisheryZoneinthe Maldives (CS6), relatively less formal without backing but enforced by the government, or (c) informal and traditional but adequately strong to survive even in the face of weak government support(bytheStateGovernment)asinthecaseofTamilNadu(CS14).ManytermsusedintheRM are similarly nuanced and complex. The following examples of case studies serve as examples that clarify and illustrate the wide range in application of the terms and attributes in the RM. Similar interpretationappliestoallcasestudies,butforthepurposeofthisreview,itisdeemedadequateto summarizeasshowninTable5. Thefollowingthreeexampleshavebeenincludedtoprovidefurtherclarificationofthetermsusedin theReferenceModel(RM): Example1:CS6.MaldivesExclusiveFishingRightsintheCoastalFisheryZone TheMaldiviansmallscalefishersareprovidedexclusiveuseoftheCoastalFisheryZone(CFZ).They donotrequirealicense.TherebyarighttofishisprovidedtotheMaldiviannationalbyexclusion andpenalizationofnonnationals.TheCFZthusservesasanareawithinformalterritorialuserights infisheries(TURF).Thisrightensuresprimarilythatthedemandforthelimitedresourcethatcould potentiallyensueisreducedbypreventingnonnationalsfromcompetingwithMaldiviannationals.

51

Reportedly, the government through the Department of Fisheries, consult with the political leaderships of the Atolls and other relevant regional leaders while making decisions. This demonstratessharingofdecisionmakingthatembodiesgoodgovernance.Somelossofvalueofthe fishery stock occurs when various forms of preferential / illegal practices provide access to elite interestsresultinginrentdissipation.ThesmallscalefishershavebeenempoweredbytheTURF,and byresponsivenessoftheMaldivesCoastGuardintermsofreceivingcomplaintsandapprehending violators. Thus the government develops mutual confidence and trust with the smallscale fishers, who operate by using traditional knowledge, and they in turn contribute to more effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS). The government bears the transaction cost of apprehendingviolatorsbymaintainingaresponsivecoastguardsincethetunaresourceintheCFZis worth managing and contributes 7% to GDP, 17% to employment and 66% by value of export commodities.Thefisherysectorandthetourismsectorarenowbeginningtocollaboratewithinthe frameworkofcorporatesocialresponsibilitydemonstratinginteractionwithothersectorsincluding biodiversityconservation.ThisinteractionwithothersectorsisfurtherillustratedinCS13. Example2:CS8.SriLanka,EstuarineStakeNetFishery,NegomboLagoon. TheGovernmentofSriLankahasallocatedexclusivefishingrightstotheStakeNetFisherySocieties of Negombo to operate their appliances in the channels that connect with the sea, from dusk to dawn, by way of a gazette notification thereby providing formal legal and policy backing. The particularspotsatwhichthestakenetsareoperatedarefixedanddonotshift.Theseserveasthe TURFs. The stake nets operate in keeping with a strict set of rules with agreed roles and responsibilities that incorporate traditional knowledge. Violations are invariably punished. The management which is entirely traditional is transparent and participatory based upon democratic principles.SincethegovernmentformalizedanexistingpracticeinCBFMtheservicesareutilizedof people with existing skills in natural resource management. The government contribution toward managementofthefisheryinvolveslittleornotransactioncostexceptwhereconflictresolutionis necessitated and where national agencies conduct research. Overall the resource is regarded as adequateforformalizedpolicyandlegalbacking.Themembershipofthestakenetfisherysocieties are empowered to a high extent by government policy and legal backing. As a group it exercises politicalpowerandresistsallchangesimposedbyotherpoliticalgroupsincludingintereststhatseek tounderminetheauthorityofitsdemocraticallyelectedleadership.Thiscontributessubstantivelyto maintaining incomes and reducing poverty of the stake net society members, and to equitable distribution of benefits. However, negative externalities of industrial pollution, land capture that impingesonfishingstationsandmangroveplantingforlandcapturethatcausessedimentationand destructionofnetfixingstationsarepersistentandcauserentdissipation.Thegovernmentposition isstronginregardtothefisherybutweakinrelationtomanagementoffactorsofrentdissipation. Example3.CS14.India,TamilNadu.FisherCouncilsJurisdictionsTheGoverningSystem (BavinckandSalagrama,2008) The coastline of Tamil Nadu (excluding several trading ports) has historically been occupied by marine fishing villages (homogeneous communities) governed by their own village councils and headmen.Thecouncilstakechargeoffishing,basedmainlyontheirtraditionalknowledgeandsocial structures, which includes an area of coastal land and adjoining sea, about 10 km2, thereby establishinganinformalright.Theseareasoverwhichthecouncilsacquireexclusivecontrolsupport a TURF for a village. However, village members sometimes operate in the TURFs of other villages. This is in keeping with agreed rules and regulations. These rules and regulations are developed by nonstate authorities, the panchayats, where village councils and their representatives come together,discussandarriveatmutuallyacceptabledecisionsgovernance.Thustheboundariesare establishedinconsultation,sharingofdecisionmaking(governance),withneighboringvillages.The State Governments, although backed by legislative authority, do not directly become involved in fishery management other than conflict resolution between traditional fishers and recently developed commercial (modernized) fishers. Thus the management system by village councils and panchayats demonstrate capacity in using the services of people with traditional skills in

52

communication. Village councils may take decisions to regulate and / or ban types of fishing gears thereby reducing demand for limited resources. Enforcement is by a body of local fishers. Higher leveldecisionswhichcoverlargerareasoflandandseaaredonethroughconsultationatpanchayat circleswhichagainshareindecisionmakinggovernance.Thetraditionalsystemofgovernanceby villagecouncilsappearstobeweakeningbecauseofnonrecognitionandoppositionbygovernment demonstrating its own weakness in government (i.e. inequitable administration of laws). As a corollary,theabsenceofstronggovernmentresultsinindustrialfishingencroachingintotraditional fishing grounds (TURFs) of artisanal fishers, violating agreed panchayat rules and remaining unpunished.Theoverallconsequencecouldbereductionofthequalityoffishinggroundsleadingto rentdissipationandincreasedsocialcosts.

2.4LimitationsofMainstreamingCBFM/ComanagementforCBICM
Thediversityinthestructureandoperationalareasofthesmallscalefisheriessituatedinthemany ecosystemswithinnationaljurisdictionshaveasignificantinfluenceontheimpactofmainstreaming oncoastalproductivityandonlivelihood.Someexamplesprovideclarity:

The stakenet fishery in Negombo Lagoon, Sri Lanka (see Case Study CS8) is an example of mainstreamed comanagement. The decline in the average productivity of each direct stakeholder in this system is influenced by the other forms of fishing within the resource system, and more importantly the negative externalities from nonfishery land uses. Therefore mainstreaming of particular fisheries in isolation within small ecosystems, does not guarantee that livelihood aspects (e.g. income) are automatically safeguarded unless government takes responsibility to mitigate negative externalities of land uses from the widerecosystemthatdissipatesfisheryresourcerent. The national fishery in the Maldives that occurs in the Coastal Fishery Zone (CFZ) demonstrates mainstreamed comanagement by a combination of formal and informal institutionalmechanisms(seeCaseStudyCS6).Becauseofthesizeoftheoperationalareaof theCFZandthefisherycontributionfromittoeconomicgrowth,thesmallerfisheriesfrom nestedsubsystemssuchasislandcoralreefsarealsosafeguarded.Thepropertyrightstothe island coral reefs and collective rights in the CFZ have acquired balanced coexistence. The integrity of CFZ as a TURF may endure to the extent that the state (government and associated interests including the multinational corporate sector) remains firm in its commitmenttothelivelihoodsofthenationalfisherpopulation(Hilborn,2007). CBFMandinformalcomanagementoccursinthetraditional/partiallymechanizedcoastal smallscalefisheryinWestBengal,Orissa,AndhraPradeshandTamilNadusituatedinabout a five nautical mile stretch of its broad continental shelf (CS9, CS10, CS15). This same continentalshelfissharedbymodernizedshrimptrawlingandgillnetting,etc.Theshrimps have a life cycle that is spent partially in the inshore estuaries and in coastal waters. Modernized shrimp trawling results in a total quantity of discards at sea estimated to be about 600,000 tons/year (Pramod, 2010). In the event that the discards are a part of the catch that would have been otherwise taken by the traditional smallscale fishery, mainstreaming of existing CBFM and comanagement within this segment of the coastal fishery alone may provide little positive livelihood impact. The problem stems from competition for a shared resource system between more efficient and relatively less efficienttechnologieswhereboundariesoverlapexcessively. Management does not exist of the coastal smallscale fishery that occurs on the broad continental shelf in Bangladesh. However, interventions are being tested in empowering coastal communities to promote comanagement (CS1). The smallscale fishery occurs almost entirely on the continental shelf including shrimp trawling. At the same time a populationofabout500,000ofthepoorest(includingwomenandchildren)areinvolvedin

53

shrimp post larvae collection (CS2). The potential interactions between the traditional / modernizedsmallscalefisheryandpostlarvaecollectionandtheirlivelihoodimplicationsare notknown. Similar interactions are at play on diverse scales within national jurisdictions in the BOBLMESA as wellaswheretransboundaryeffectsoccur.Thenatureofsharedresourcesystemsandtheircomplex interactions will determine livelihood implication of mainstreaming CBFM and comanagement. Theserelationshipsalsowilldeterminewhobenefitsandwholoseswhereinterplayoccursbetween less efficient traditional fisheries activities and more efficient modernized fisheries. The traditional andpartiallymechanizedsmallscalefisherscouldtypicallybethelosersinsuchacontestresultingin greater marginalization. Imparting a political voice to the potential losers is one option that may contributetomoreequitablesharingofresourcesystemswithintheframeworkofCBICM.

2.5AnalysisandLessons
The case studies, based upon screening (Table 5), allow the following generalizations and lessons pertaining to management of the coastal and marine fishery sector in the BOBLMESA. Additional perspective may be obtained from the publication by a group of researchers (McClanahan, et al., 2009)whohaveexaminedthegloballiteratureinrelationtolivelihoodsandbiodiversity(Section4, 4.1,5):
Fifteen out of eighteen (83%) of the case studies classify as better and improvable fishery

management practices since they combine elements of empowerment, informal and formal TURFs, informal and formal government support by policy and legal mechanisms at the minimum.Thisrevealsthatarangeofinformalandformalinstitutionalarrangementscoexist to support management practices, and lend themselves to more refined comanagement where policy and legislation may contribute to their consolidation. These demonstrate extremes(Figure1,Introduction)ofCBFMwithlittleornoroleforthegovernment(CS7,CS9, CS10,CS14,CS15,CS16,CS18)toasignificantroleofthegovernmentwhich,mayormaynot, seek to exclude resource user participation (e.g. CS3, CS4, CS5). CBFM, where it exists, is invariably linked to diverse forms of TURFs. This is a fundamental and significant element requiredforsustainabilityinCBFMandincomanagement(Hilborn,2007). Lesson: geospatial information for the 70% of case studies to enable their placement on nationalmapstoenablemeaningfulEAFisweaktolacking.
Onlyone(6%)ofthecasestudiesthatclassifyasbetterandimprovablemanagementpractices

occur in the oceanic waters of the EEZs, Viz. fishing in the Maldives CFZ. The geographic locations of the other 93% of case studies are located in partially enclosed waters of backwaters and estuaries (CS8, CS9, CS15) and in inshore coastal waters (CS16). The spatial scale on which CBFM and comanagement exist, therefore, span a few hectares (CS7) and square kilometers (CS8, CS9, CS15, CS18) to about 500,000 km2 (verification required), the CoastalFisheryZoneoftheMaldives(CS6).TheextentoftheMaldivesCoastalFisheryZoneis largerthanBangladeshsEEZ,about50%ofIndiasEEZcomponentoftheBayofBengal,and almostthesizeSriLankasentireEEZ. Lesson:Thepotentialtoincreaseproductionofartisanalsmallscalefisheriesfromrefinement of CBFM toward comanagement in the coastal inshore waters where overexploitation is alreadyevidentishighlyconstrainedorimpossible.Simultaneouslynegativeexternalitiesfrom landbased sources of pollution and competing land uses are continuously diminishing the economicvalueoffisheries(rentdissipation).

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Lesson: The Maldives case study (CS6) is suggestive of the space into which inshore small scale fishing may expand in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka. In these countries land is the majorlimitingfactorthatkeepspushingincreasingnumbersintoartisanalfishingincoastal inshorewaters.

Reversalshaveoccurredintheapplicationoftechnology(switchingbackfrommechanizedto nonmechanized fishing) practices in some case studies where CBFM exists. Therefore technologybyitselfisnotaguaranteeofimprovementinincome,thetotaleconomiccontext matters.Modernizationduringthepastthreeormoredecadeshascontributedsubstantially towardexpansionofopportunitiesaswellastomarginalizationofartisanalcoastalinshore fishersinBangladesh,IndiaandSriLanka(Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005;Salagrama andKoriya,2008). Lesson:Introductionoftechnologymaybemoresuitableinthewidercontextofthesocial ecologicalsystemofsmallscalefishersandwithinamoreequitabledevelopmentprocess.

AsubstantialincreaseinfisheryyieldshasoccurredfromoceanicfisheriesintheEEZinthe Maldives.Thismaybepartiallyattributedtotheoperationofrights/TURF(CS6).InIndiaand in Sri Lanka, significant contributions to national fishery production have occurred from expansion of smallscale fisheries into offshore waters even in the absence of TURFs (see Section3). Lesson. The existing outlook that lives of smallscale fishers may improve mainly from refinementofmanagementpracticesrequirescarefulreview.Thepositionoftechnologyand capacityexpansionintoEEZsofBangladesh,IndiaandSriLankainamannerthatequitably benefitsmarginalizedartisanalsmallscalefishersrequirescomprehensivereevaluationnot throughmoreanalysesbutbyplannedaction(NationalReportsBOBLMEStage1;Halletal., 2010).

Diverseformsofrentdissipationareunderminingtraditionalsmallscalefisheriesinestuaries (e.g. CS8, CS12), lagoons and inshore coastal waters. These include natural change, land based sources of pollution (CS14), negligence of authorities, corruption, land capture for competingformsofdevelopment,amongmanymorefactorsthatmayemergeinsitespecific analyses(CS8,CS12,CS14). Lesson: The diverse forms of rent dissipation have to be addressed, perhaps by way of rigorous application of EIA, law enforcement, and integrated land use planning / managementwithintheframeworkofICM.

CS3,CS4andCS5demonstratethatfisherycooperativesthatcanbeaneffectiveelementin comanagementbecomeineffectivewhenimposedonfishingcommunitiesbygovernments even with the intention of facilitating livelihood uplift. In the absence of voluntarism, and participatorydecisionmakingtheinterventionisfacedwithhighriskofselfdestruction.They maysurvivemainlywithgovernmentpatronage. Lesson:Interventionsthatareexcellentinconceptandpotential,fisherycooperatives(CS3, CS4,CS5)entrainviciouscircles(insteadofvirtuouscircles)whenimplementationisflawed. Potentialexistsforrestorationbasedonidealsofvoluntarismandgoodgovernance.

CS2 demonstrates the challenge of high concentrations of poor people in fishing as an activityoflastresortsincetheyareplacedinanequitytrap.Theydisregardthelawtoeke out a living. This creates aggravated risk in the face of climate change consequences (see Section3).Theequity traprequires breachingbywayoftargeteddevelopmentthatwould create enabling conditions for these poor to acquire security of life and property. CS1 demonstratesapotentiallyappropriateintervention.SeethefollowingsectiononLivelihood.

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Lesson: Recent catastrophes including the Asian Tsunami 2004, Cyclones Sidr and Aila emphasize that risk reduction through adaptation interventions for exposed coastal populations must begin now rather than later to avoid prohibitive costs resulting from postponedaction(HMTreasury,2006).

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2.6AlternativeLivelihood
The purpose of this section is to examine the creation of alternative livelihoods among fisher communities in the region; i.e. activities designed for the purpose of reducing impact on coastal resources.TheIntroductioncontainedthedefinitionusedduringtheBOBLMEStage1afterCarney (1988).Thisdefinition(Box3.)drawsonarangeofexperiencesandsuitstheevolvingframeworkthat matches FAOs Ecosystem Approach to Fishery Management EAF (FAO, 2003) and the concept of resilience(Adgeretal.,2005).Importantly,asustainablelivelihoodmustnotbecomeavictimofwell intentioned policies, which when implemented, result in unintended outcomes such as environmental degradation, marginalization of smallscale producers and their families or see benefits capturedbyotherinterestgroupsorelites (seeIntroduction;APFIC, 2009).TheReference Model (Section 2.3) used in the assessment of case studies in this review, indicates that the participation and empowerment of communities is one of the pillars of mainstreamed co management(FAO,2003;APFIC,2005).Inthiscontexttheobjectivesofthissectionare: Recognize the opportunities and limitations for improving coastal livelihood including: povertyeradication,contributiontoeconomicgrowth,alternativeanddiversifiedlivelihoods, aquaculture,protectedareamanagement,andriskreduction(FAO,2005;APFIC,2005;FAO, 2007a,b). Understandtheevolvingapproachtowardimpartingsustainabilitytocoastallivelihood(FAO, 2007a,b;McCaston,2005).

Box3.Livelihoodiscomplexandincludesrelationshipsbothinthepresentandinfuture(Carney,1988) A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities requiredforameansofliving.Alivelihoodissustainablewhenitcancopewithandrecoverfromstressesand shocksandmaintainitscapabilitiesandassetsbothnowandinthefuture,whilenotunderminingthenatural resourcesbase.

The recent implementation of the management plan for the Hilsa fishery in Bangladesh illustrates aspects of mainstreaming comanagement through collaboration among government, smallscale traditional fishers and NGOs, as well as the significance of alternative livelihood in imparting acceptabilitytoseasonalrestrictions(Box4).
Box4.ImplementationofthemanagementplanfortheHilsafisheryinBangladesh. Mohiuddinetal.(2009)revealthemannerinwhichalternativelivelihoodincorporatedintotheEAFsupported bycomanagementhascontributedtoa40%increaseinthecatchesofHilsa(Tenualosailisha)fromthecoastal fisheryinBangladesh.HilsaisthemostimportantsinglespeciesfisheryinBangladeshcontributing50%oftotal marinecatch(and5060%ofglobalHilsacatch).Thecombinationofissuesaddressed,baseduponinter Ministerialdiscussion,participationofJatkafishermenandNGOs,andcoordinatedbytheDepartmentof Fisherieswere: Thegovernmentallocatedsignificantfundsforalternativelivelihoodincludingcagecultureduringtheseasonal bans.NGOsplayedakeyroleintrainingforalternativeincomeactivities,monitoringofcompliancewith regulationsandinbuildingawareness. protectionofdryseasonriverflows, establishmentofnationalfishsanctuariesforHilsa, enforcementoffisheryregulation(e.g.ofartisanaltrawlfishing), integratedcoastalmanagement(ICM),and monitoringformaintainingecosystemhealth

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2.6.1RealityofLivelihoodandSmallscaleFisheries TheFAO(Greboval,2002;SwanandGreboval,2003)recognizesthattheeliminationofpovertyand providing alternatives are essential for the promotion of sustainable smallscale fisheries. APFIC (2009)notes,baseduponthecollectiveexperienceofcountriesintheAsiaPacificregion,thatmany fishing communities are caught in a poverty trap because they are dependent on a resource base that is declining. This requires more fishing and increased costs, which drives them further into poverty.Findingalternativelivelihoodsforthesepeopleisnoteasy.Mosthavelimitedaccesstoland, capitalorassetsandliveinremoteareas.Manyofthesolutionsofferedareusuallyverysimplistic andarenotbasedonafullanalysisofthecostsandbenefitsofthesealternatives. Duringregionalconsultationaviewpointthatemergedbasedonrealityisthatitistimetofaceup tosometruths,includingthatagrowingnumberofcoastalfishersaregoingtostruggletomaintain their livelihoods. Many do not want their children to take up their occupation and although diversificationmaybeabletomaintainstatusquo,itwillnotbesufficienttomovethesepeopleout of poverty. The solution is much more long term and governments have a responsibility to assist fishers to move away from their dependency on fishing and assist with compensation, e.g. fishing boatandgearbuybackprogrammes.Mostimportantly,educationandskillstrainingisneededfor the next generation so that this group is prepared to adapt to future opportunities and options (APFIC,2009). Alternativescanbecategorizedasbeing(APFIC,2009):

Within a community or outside of the community and being extractive or nonextractive. However,extractiveoptionssuchasaquaculture haveanumberofnegativeimpacts,including the fact that sustainability is questionable. Because fish need to be caught as feed for aquaculturethiscanincreaseratherthandecreasefishingpressure. Policies such as moving fleets to fish farther offshore can provide alternatives, but increased fishingcapacitythatdevelopsoffshorecanmovebackinshoreandcausemoreproblemsinthe longerterm. Nonextractive options such as tourism may be available, but a number of prerequisites are required and many fishers are not in positions to benefit. Other resourceindependent options such as small shops and business are a possibility, but need business skills. Handicrafts and village industries are one such option. Most fishing communities do not have access to capital and credit. Formal credit systems see lending to these communities as too high a risk and are reluctant to lend. To offset this, many schemes such as revolving funds have emerged (APFIC, 2009).

Raisingtheincomeofmarginalizedsmallscalefishersisnottheonlythingthatcountsinimproving theirlives(Jentoft,OnyangoandIslam,2010).AsSen(1983)argues,whenitcomestohealth,or education,orsocialequality,orselfrespect,orfreedomfromsocialharassment,incomeismilesoff the target. Neither would increase in catch necessarily provide any secure supply of such entitlements,asstressedalsoinanFAOreport:Povertyinfisherydependentcommunitiesisnot solelyrelatedtotheabundanceofthecatch,marketopportunitiesorthestateoftheresource.Itis alsocriticallydependentonhowthebenefitsfromtheuseoffisheryandotherresourcesareused andwhetherarangeofbasicservices(e.g.inhealthandeducation)areprovided(FAO2006). Muchofthefisheriesliteratureassumesthattheprovisionofalternativeemploymentisanadequate response to the problem of poverty in fishing communities faced with depleting resources (Pauly, 2005; Hilborn, 2007; Hall et al. 2010). Recent research shows that this assumption does not necessarily match the perceptions of active fishermen (Pollnac and Poggie, 2008; Pollnac et al., 2001). Providing alternative employment which ensures equal or even higher income does not

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guaranteethatfishermenwouldleavetheirfisheryoccupation(WorldBank,2000)sincetheconcept ofhappinessalsoentersintoperceptions(Easterlin,2003;Kahnemanetal.,2006). APFIC (2009) noted that there is a need to find alternatives for unsustainable fishing within the fisheriessectorasmanyfishersdonotwanttomoveoutofthesector(Box5).Itwasacceptedthat educationandskillstrainingforyoungpeoplemightbealongtermsolution,butoptionswithinthe sectorareneedednow.Forsomepeoplefisheriesisalreadyanalternativelivelihood.Takingupwork onlargerfishingvesselsisoneexample.Whenlookingforalternativestofishingitwasnotedthatit is important to remember there is also an increased demand for fish both globally and locally and somepeopleneedtodothefishing.
Box5.Tsunamiaffectedfishersprefertoremainincoastalfishing ThefindingsofSalagramaandKoriya(2008)fromtheirstudyofpost2004IndianOceanTsunamiinTamilNadu uphold the reluctance to leave fishing for alternative livelihood. This finding is significant since the affected fishercommunitiesapparentlywereinamoodtochoosesafetyforlifeandpropertyoverexposuretofuture hazards. However, their choice was eventually motivated by greater certainty of putting food on the table ratherthatlongtermexpectationfromreducedrisktolifeandproperty.SalagramaandKoriya(2008)report that: The majority of affected coastal communities chose to stay in the fishery sector for two reasons: (i) the robustnessofcoastalfisherystocks,and(ii)absenceofemploymentopportunitieselsewhere. There is a strong case to support existing livelihood activities by enhancing peoples access to the necessary assetsandpolicyinstitutionalmechanismsinordertohelpthemmakemoreviablelivelihoodchoices. Optionsfordiversificationarereallyfewandnotreallymuchmoreviablethanthosethefisherswouldleave behind.Thisisnottodiscounttheideaoflivelihooddiversificationaltogether:ithasallalongbeenanintegral part of life in fishing communities. This makes developing appropriateresponses to their need for livelihood diversification urgent and essential. However, livelihood diversification cannot be based on simple A to B calculations,andrequiresamorenuancedunderstandingofthepeopleandtheirchoices.Mostimportantly,it requires building upon the fishers strengths, and developing the responses as organic outcomes of their choicesratherthanasartificialaddonsimposedfromoutside. Oneotherpointneedstobenoted:therehavebeenveryfewsuccessfulexamplesoflivelihooddiversification outside fisheries. Even an activity like brackish water aquaculture, which deals with the same products as marinefishing,hasfailedtobeaviablealternativebecauseithasafarmingratherthanfisheriesorientation.

APFIC (2009) during regional consultation on best practices in livelihood noted that the choice of targetbeneficiariesandidentificationofdiversificationoptionsinaprojectorprogrammetosupport livelihoods of fishingdependent people will depend on the main objectives of the programme and the orientation of wider economic development and environmental management policy. Typically, diversificationinafisheriescontextispromotedtoachieveoneormoreofthefollowingoutcomes:

Economicaccumulation:improvedincomes,assetbaseorwellbeingoffishingandaquaculture dependentpeople;povertyreductionandeconomicgrowth; Reduced vulnerability: reduced risks of failure, buffer against seasonality, shocks and adverse trendse.g.climatechange;and Reducedpressureonnaturalresources:reducedfishingeffort,reduceddemandsofaquaculture onecosystemservices.

APFIC (2009) further noted evidence that diversification has achieved its resource governance and livelihoodenhancementobjectivesislimitedbecausetherehasbeenlittlesystematicmonitoringof 59

project and programme impacts. Based on different case studies, there are conflicting views on whether promoting diversification leads to reduced fishing pressure, with some studies indicating that household livelihood diversification leads to unsustainable fishing. Other studies point to alternativesleadingtoareductionintimespentfishingandofgreaterlikelihoodthatfishingactivity will be reduced when stocks are low and when people have alternative means of securing income andfood.Linking diversificationtoimprovedfisheriesgovernanceisessentialifanysuchsynergies aretobemaintained. 2.6.2Implicationsofprevailingconsciousnessindevelopmentplanningandlivelihood The literature reveals that a gap exists between the outlook of development planners and the outcomeofimplementationofplansforsectordevelopmentinrelationtolivelihood.Theproblemof marginalization of traditional smallscale fisheries was the outcome of development planning in Bangladesh,IndiaandinSriLanka(Kurien,2005;Marga,1981;BOBP,1997).Animportanthistorical considerationherearises.Whatwastheconsciousnessthatprevailedamongdevelopmentplanners attheonsetoffisherymodernizationwhichresultedinthemarginalizationoftraditionalsmallscale fishers? This is because, generally, the consciousness that creates a problem cannot be applied toward its solution. Issues of unintended consequences follow from deficiencies in consciousness (see Introduction, Section 1.7). A historical perspective shows that two forms of contrasting consciousnessappliedattheonsetofmodernizationtoBangladesh,IndiaandSriLankaontheone hand,andtoMaldivesontheother: IndiaandSriLanka:Theexistingproblemofmarginalizationofsmallscalecoastalfishersarosefrom theplanning attitudethatprevailedinthe1960s.Itwasassumedthatthedemonstrationeffectof fishery modernization would induce the traditional smallscale fishers to voluntarily abandon their risky seagoing fishing craft in preference for the safer, more efficient modern boats (e.g. Government of Ceylon, 1951; Raghavan, 1961; Kurien, 2003; 2005). The playing field was uneven, and the traditional smallscale fishers did not receive assistance to develop capacity to make the transition. Bangladesh: Fishery modernization, mainly for export, occurred since the 1970s. The development attitude that prevailed was to promote investment with little consideration to the livelihood of traditionalmarinefisherswhoweremainlyHindus(Deb,2008,2009).Consequentlytheownershipof the resource moved out of the hands of fishermen into the hands of wealthy businessmen and traders (BOBP, 1997). The independent, smallscale traditional fishers became labourers on investorsboats. Maldives: Modernization started in the 1970s based upon building the capacity of existing fishers. Marginalizationdidnotoccurrelativetoelitescaptureofsomebenefits.Manysmallscalefishers,in responsetomodernization,havechangedtheirbehaviour,eventotheextentofstayingmanydays at sea. They are the backbone of the existing modernized fishery where production has increased almostsixfoldtoitspresentlevelofabout200,000tonnesperyear(Adam,2004;BOBPIGO,2009). An altered consciousness is emerging in Bangladesh (BOBP, 1997). The actions needed for safeguarding livelihood and production are identified as the need to ensure resource access on a priority basis to poor shorebased fishermen, then to offshore fishermen, then to commercial fishermen. However, some elements of the same consciousness that existed in Bangladesh, India and in Sri Lanka at the onset of modernization appear to still persist in the latter two countries (Kurien, 2003; 2005). Further exportoriented fishery expansion is envisaged without adequate geographic integration (and zoning safeguards) for inshore coastal fisheries. Perhaps alternative employment and employment diversification may become more appropriate within an ICM frameworkforabsorbingexcessfishingcapacity.IntheMaldives,acontradictionmaytaintthepast andprevailingconsciousness,intheeventthatvestedinterestsareallowedtoinfluencethefuture expansionofitsfisheryinamannerthatresultsinrentdissipation(seeSection3).

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2.6.3PovertyandEconomicGrowth Thelinkagesamongfisheries,povertyandeconomicgrowthwereexploredbyDFIDin2005through a study across eight countries including Bangladesh and India (Alam, 2005; Salagrama, 2005). The mainfindings,inrelationtopolicyimplicationsforBangladeshandIndiareflectdisjuncturebetween economic growthandthewellbeing oftraditionalsmallscalefishers.DFID(2005)initspolicybrief presented consensus among these countries as follows: From the viewpoint of natural resource exploitationandmanagement,oneimportantchangeinthinkinghasbeentherenewedrecognition of the role of economic growth in development, with greater emphasis being placed on the distributionofbenefits(propoorgrowth).Researchintopropoorgrowthcontinues,butconsensus hasemergedinsomekeyareas:

Economicgrowthisessentialforpovertyreduction,andinprinciplegrowthassuchdoesnot seemtoaffectinequality; Growthaccompaniedbyprogressivedistributionalchangeisbetterthangrowthalone;

Education,infrastructureandmacroeconomicstabilityseemtopositivelyaffectbothgrowth anddistributionofincome. Generalagreementexiststhateconomicgrowthbenefitsthepoor(DollarandKray,2000;Sen,1999; Weisbrotetal.,2000).Thedebateontherelationshipofeconomicgrowthtopovertypivotsonthe policies and implementation measures that drive growth. The poor do not benefit from economic growth in the absence of equity (World Bank, 2006). Ellis & Allison (2004) argues that equitable economic growth in the fishery sector holds promise for poverty reduction in future. At a national level,theexistingformsofeconomic growthdrivenbyglobalizationappearincapableofdelivering equitablebenefits(Stiglitz,2006). Clearly, economic growth occurred in the modernized segment of the smallscale fishery in Bangladesh, India and in Sri Lanka since the 1960s, while parallel marginalization also continues to increase in the other segment, the traditional / artisanal smallscale fishery which operates in the coastal and inshore waters (see Section 3). Economic growth alone does not ensure equitable distribution unless meaningful mechanisms exist for equitable distribution of benefits. The main contributions to economic growth in these countries are from exports based on coastal shrimp fishery and offshore fisheries (including cuttlefish/cephalopods). Pramod (2010) demonstrates the possibilityofcontradictionsbetweenmodernizedshrimptrawlingandincomesoftraditionalinshore fisherswhomaybesharingthesamefisherystockinIndia.SomecasestudiesinSection2,e.g.Tamil Nadudemonstratethatinformalzoningalreadyoperates.Thesignificantquestioniswhetherfuture increasesinproductionfromthesesegmentscouldbesustainedinamannerthatcontributestoward fishery sector growth that also benefits the poor. One part of the answer lies in national fishery policylinkedtoequitablegrowth,whiletheotherpartisincludedintheconceptualframeworkthat supports planning and policy implementation that links the welfare aspects of fishery to growth in othersectorssuchastourismasintheMaldives. 2.6.4EconomicGrowthandHumanDevelopment Livelihoodenhancementasreflectedinchangesinthehumandevelopmentindex(HDI),growthof theeconomyasshowninthegrossdomesticproduct(GDPpercapita)andlevelofincomepoverty indicatetheimpactofeconomicpoliciesaswellasgrowthincoastaldevelopmentsectors.Table1 reveals that the Maldives achieved impressive growth in the economy, while eliminating income poverty. The most significant contribution to growth in the Maldives economy was from coastal tourismaswellasfromthemodernized,offshoresmallscalefishery.Eliminationofincomepoverty, however,doesnotensureenhancementinalltheindicatorsassociatedwiththeHDI.Forinstance, underweightchildren(agedunder5years),anindicatorassociatedwiththeHDI,continuestoreveal theneedforimprovementinchildnourishmentintheMaldives(Table1).

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2.6.5ImplicationsofOtherLandUsesforSmallscaleFisherLivelihood Coastal land use other than direct smallscale fishing has the potential to contribute to both economicgrowthingeneralandlivelihoodenhancementofsmallscalefishers.APFIC(2009)provides comprehensivecoverageofalternativelivelihoodsaswellasopportunitiesfromdiversificationinthe AsiaPacificRegion. Inthisreviewexamplesofcoastalaquacultureandprotectedareasarebrieflyexaminedbecauseof theconsequencesofpolicythatdidnotproduceintendedresults(alsoseeIntroduction,Section1.7).
Coastal aquaculture

BangladeshShrimpCulture An example from Bangladesh illustrates both the potential in aquaculture and some entrained contradictions.Bangladeshmademajoradvancesinshrimpcultureinthe1970sand1980sthrough smallscale enterprise conducted by poor coastal communities that partially depended on coastal fisheries(Box6).Thecomplexnetworkofproductionbasedinteractionsmadepositivecontributions torurallivelihood(Bene,McfadyenandAllison,2007). SeveralgrantandloansupportedfisheriesprojectsinBangladeshcontributedtofurtherexpansionof thissubsectorinthe1990sthroughinfrastructuredevelopmentforenhancedwatermanagement. The final report of the Fourth Fisheries Project (World Bank, 2007) conveys a sense of mixed outcomesfrominterventionsinfurtherdevelopmentofshrimpaquaculture,particularlyinregardto delivery of targeted livelihood benefits to the poor, the very group who initiated the activity, including:

In terms of shrimp farming, the distribution of relative benefits of improved water management (and so production increases) is likely to go to larger farms that had better productiontostartwith,andarethuslesslikelytobepoor. Nevertheless, with the project, all groups benefit from the improved water management capacityandmanagement. Theestablishmentofavoiceforthelandlessthroughtheircommitteesandrepresentationin blockandpoldercommitteeshasbeenaconsiderableachievement. Thelandlesshavegainedfishingaccesstocanals(khasland)throughcommitteeagreements. They have also been engaged to a greater extent in labour on gher (pond) and canal rehabilitation. Initiallytherewasasubcomponentonimprovedshrimpfrycollectionmethodswithtraining of 30,000 shrimp fry collectors, most of whom are very poor, women and children. This componentwasdroppedwhenthegovernmentbannedwildfrycollection. Thegovernmentwasunwillingtolookintofurthercapacitysupporttoformerfrygatherers (manyofwhomareinfactcontinuingduetolackofalternateactivities),despitethembeing amongtheextremelypoor,sincewildfrycollectionhadbecomeanillegalactivityunderthe governmentban.AGEFfundedstudyalsofoundthatthesesmallscaleshrimpfrycollectors donothaveamajorimpactonfisheryresources,comparedtolargernets.

ShrimpaquacultureinBangladeshasasustainablealternativelivelihoodrequirescarefulevaluation basedonlongtermoutcomes.Shrimpfarmingphysicallyinvadesfarmland,andsaltwaterintrusion canchangesoilcompositionandpollutewatersupplies.Shrimpaquaculturehashaddirectimpacts oncropproductivity,onthehealthandlivelihoodsofruralfarmingcommunitiesandavailabilityof

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seasonal jobs of smallscale fishers (Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF) 2003; Samarakoon, 2007).Duringthelate1990s,riceproductioninthecoastalzonedecreasedby26percent,whilethe cultivated area decreased by only 1 percent (Islam 2004). Recent research (Alamgir Choudhury, personal communication) suggests that reversion to rice cultivation is occurring in some coastal polders in Bangladesh where adequate irrigation water is available from shallow tube wells (Samarakoon,2007). Land use conflict stemming from expansion of shrimp in Bangladesh and in Andhra Pradesh, India have caused severe adverse impacts. Land seizures have occurred on a grand scale, affecting hundreds of thousands of poor inhabitants of coastal communities. In Bangladesh, an estimated 120,000 people have been driven from their farmland in the Satkhira region alone, either due to declines in food availability or under direct pressure from shrimp farming interests (Box 7). In the IndianStateofAndhraPradesh,48,000peopleweredisplacedinjustthreeyears(EJF,2003). Aquaculture, such as shrimp farming, does not guarantee livelihood opportunities for smallscale fishingcommunitiesnorforpoorcoastalcommunitiesingeneral.Bothpoliciesandlawenforcement need to come together within an implementation framework that is designed to benefit the poor (Joffreetal.,2010).
Box 6. The significance of shrimp in the rural economy of Bangladesh prior to development of the industry throughdiversedevelopmentassistance. ADFIDfundedstudyin2001mappedthesupplychainforbagdashrimpproductioninBangladeshanactivity thatissolelysmallscaleinnatureexceptfortheexportorientedprocessingcompanies.About50,000shrimp farms existed providing direct employment for 166,485 people and generated valueadded/income of 5.6 billion Takka*. The indirect employment was calculated as an additional 141,642 people with value added/income of 1.75 billion Tk. For the supply chain as a whole 86% of people were in unskilled/poor category,revealingtheimportanceofbagdarelatedactivitiesforthepoor.Similarly61%(of4.45billionTakka) oftheincomeaccruedtotheunskilledpoor,27%tothesemiskilled,middleincomeandonly12%tothe rich. Input/output analysis showed the value of the output multiplier was such that for a million Takka expansion of shrimp exports, total output of the economy would increase by 2.153 Takka million. The estimatedpercentageofhouseholdincomeinthesupplychainwas60%revealinghighdependenceonshrimp relatedactivity(Bene,MacfadyenandAllison,2007). US$1equalledapproximately58Takkain2001.

Box7.BangladeshHumanrightsviolationsandshrimpculture InBangladesh,murder,kidnapping,bombattacks,violentintimidationandrapeslinkedtotheexpansionofthe shrimp industry have became regular occurrences. Since 1980, over 150 people have been killed in violent clashesrelatedtoshrimpfarming.Thetruefigureisunknownasdeathsarenotalwaysreportedtoorbythe police, but it is thought by a nongovernmental organisation, Nijera Kori, to be close to 200. Frequently implicatedinmurderareBangladeshsmusclemenhiredenforcerspaidbyshrimpfarmerstoprotecttheir interests and further their ambitions. At demonstrations, clashes have occurred between landless protestors and police or musclemen. Shrimp farm guards have caught and beaten to death innocent fry collectors and adolescentspassingthroughthefarms,suspectingthemofcomingtostealshrimp.Musclemenhaveattacked andkilledpoorvillagersandseizedtheirlandforshrimpfarming.Witnessesinlegalcaseslinkedtotheindustry havebeenmurdered.Deathshavealsoresultedfromrivalrybetweengroupsofshrimpfarmersormusclemen. (Source:EJF,2003) Protected Areas

Expert opinion is divided on the scientifically testable contribution of protected areas toward safeguarding fishery stocks. Pauly (2008) presents arguments as a proponent of protected areas.

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Hilborn (2002; 2006) regards protected areas as lacking scientific evidence. The role of protected areasasadirectinstrumentinfisheriesmanagementitselfmayrequiremoreresearchbeforeafirm scientificallytestablepositionemerges(PitcherandLam,2010).Opinionalsoisdividedontheimpact ofprotectedareasonlivelihood. Protected areas serve multiple functions and their contribution to coastal livelihood requires assessment within each local context. Maldives has twenty five reef protected areas that serve recreationalinterestsoftouristswhilecontributingtowardenhancedincomesofsmallscalefishers in associated islands. Protected coral reef systems in Sri Lanka also provide income to smallscale fishersbywayoftourismrelatedservices(CCD,2006).Theextensiveshorefrontmangrovessuchas in the Sunderbans Protected Area, Bangladesh, and more restricted extents in the Indian Sunderbans, West Bengal are known to contribute significantly toward deflecting and partially absorbing the energy of cyclones and storm surges, as it did during the 2007 Cyclone Sidr. The defensive function of extensive and appropriately dense shorefront mangroves and the relevant complexitiesaredocumentedbyFAO(FAO,2007a;2007b). ThelivelihoodconcernsofsmallscalefishersinregardtomarineprotectedareasinIndiadiscussed recently at a workshop convened by the International Collective in Support of Fishworkers ICSF (http://www.icsf.net/icsf2006/jspFiles/mpa/index.jsp) are relevant to BOBLMESA in general. The case studies discussed at the meeting, highlighted that large numbers of men and women in fishing communitiesan estimated 10 per cent of marine fishers in Indiaare facing loss of livelihoodsduetorestrictionsonfisheriesincoastalandmarineprotectedareas.Moreover,feelings of victimization and alienation due to the manner in which regulations are implemented are common,whileeffortsatcreatingalternativelivelihoodopportunitieshaveremainedlimited.Also, therehashardlybeenanysystematicefforttoimproveaccesstobasicservicesforenhancinglong term livelihood options. The focus has been mainly on regulating fisheries, while serious issues of degradationandpollutionbynonfisheriesfactorshavenotbeendealtwith,whichcompromisesthe veryobjectivesforwhichtheprotectedareas(PAs)weresetup. Protectedareaspertainingtobiodiversitysuchasturtleconservationhaveadirectimpactonsmall scale fisher livelihood. The Orissa Traditional Fishworkers Union (OTFWU) pointed out that in the Gahirmatha(Marine)WildlifeSanctuary,nearly30,000activefishersareaffectedbyturtleprotection measures, 43 per cent of whom are below the poverty line. OTFWU has put forward several proposals to protect the fishers livelihood interests while simultaneously meeting conservation objectives. Therepresentativesofartisanalandsmallscalefishworkerorganizations,organizationsinsupportof fishworkers, environmental groups, and the scientific community, committed to equitable and sociallyjustconservation,useandmanagementofcoastalandmarinelivingresourcesparticipatedin theworkshoponSocialDimensionsofMarineProtectedAreaImplementationinIndia:DoFishing CommunitiesBenefit?inChennaiin2009.Theymadethefollowingrecommendations:

Integrate fundamental principles of participation, environmental justice, social justice, and humanrightsintotheimplementationofmarineandcoastalprotectedareas. Addressthreatstocoastalandmarineecosystemsfromnonfisherysources. Enforcethemarinefishingregulationactinallthestatesandunionterritories. AdoptlegislationtoconserveandmanagelivingresourcesoftheEEZ.

Adoptanintegratedapproachforthemanagementofcoastalandmarinelivingresources 2.6.6ComprehensiveApproachestoLivelihood TheneedforimprovingcoastallivelihoodisaproblemmainlyfacingBangladesh,IndiaandSriLanka since it has stemmed, at least, partially from failed development policy and the unintended

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consequences of implemented projects (see Introduction Section 1.7). A major commitment is requiredbytherespectivegovernmentstorectifythedevelopmentfailurethatisnowaggravatingin theformofcreepingnormalcy.Creepingnormalcyoccurswheredirectionalchangeinameasurable attributeofasocialecologicalsystemoccursgraduallyuntilitcrossesanirreversiblethreshold.The enhancementoflivelihoods,byarrestingcreepingnormalcyrequirestargetedinterventionsbythe governmentbaseduponsharingbenefitsfromeconomicgrowthwithinthesector(DFID,2005).This may be achieved to an extent by mainstreaming CBFM and comanagement (APFIC, 2005; APFIC, 2008).CaseStudy(CS1),EmpowermentofCoastalCommunitiesforLivelihoodSecurity(Government of Bangladesh, 2005) demonstrates the meaning and content of a comprehensive approach to addressinglivelihoodenhancementonapilotscale(Brown,StaplesandFungeSmith,2005). Mainstreaming of CBFM and comanagement must also give consideration to the differential impacts of overfished coastal resources on women, men and children. The women and children in coastalfishingcommunitiesinBangladeshandinIndiaconstitutemorethan50%ofthepopulation owingtoacombinationofeffectsincludingmigrationsofmaleheadsofhouseholds,abandonments, andvariousotherpovertyrelatedeffects(Box8; AlamandGiassudin,2005;SalagramaandKoriya, 2008).Some womenface greathardshipbecauseofincome poverty. Menwhocannotanylonger earn an income from fishing also face displacement and hardship. Migrations of men from fishing communitiesinBangladeshandIndiasometimesoccurtodistantlocationssuchastheGulfCountries resulting in flows of remittances that benefit both national coffers and dependents (Khatun et al., 2005). In Sri Lanka, migration of women to these countries and their remittances contribute substantially to poverty reduction in coastal communities (World Bank, 2008). Thus the gender influencesandrelationshipsthatshapelivelihoodsincoastalcommunitiesarediverseandcomplex.
Box8.Bakul:AMothersStory(AlamandGiassudin,2005). BakulBegumlivesinBargunaSardar,Bangladesh.Duetoextremepovertyasafisherman,herfatherarranged marriageonthepreconditionofadowrypayment.Monthsafterthemarriage,Bakulshusbandstartedtoclaim extramoney.Paymentboughttemporarypeaceforthenewlyweds.Soonafterthefirstchild,agirl,wasborn thehusbandbecamephysicallyabusive.AsaconsequenceBakulreturnedtoliveinherfathershome.Shortly thereaftershestartedacateringbusinesswithborrowedmoney,paidoffloansandsetupashop.Withher newfoundassetsshereturnedtolivingwithherhusbandandgavebirthtoaseconddaughter.Herhusband now become her fairweather companion during periods when her income rises and gets abusive at other times.Outofconcernsforthefutureofherdaughters,anddespitefrequentphysicalabuse,shepersistwith hertorturedlife.

Bene, McFadyen and Allison (2007) in the FAO Technical Report 481 based on consultation with smallscalefisheryandlivelihoodspecialistsprovideadetailedanalysisoftherelationshipsbetween smallscale fisheries, poverty alleviation, food security and economic growth. They list the factors thatcontributetosmallscalefishervulnerability,allofwhichcontributeininteractingwaystothe fragilelivelihoodsofsmallscalefishersinBangladesh,IndiaandinSriLanka:

Globalizationandgreaterinvolvementinmarketeconomies. The foregoing narrative demonstrates that addressing the challenge of livelihood requires both a comprehensiveapproachaswellastargetedinterventionsthatcaneradicateincomepovertyinthe

Reducedfishstocklevelsasaresultofoverfishing. Pollution. Climatechange. Increasingprevalenceofdiseaseinfisherycommunities. Increasingpressureonlandandcoastalresourceuse. Marginalization.

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shortterm. A comprehensive approach is reflected in the synthesis of experience of organizations that have been involved with grass root level development (McCaston, 2005). The experience of Oxfam International in the PostIndian Ocean Tsunami affirms the significance of microfinance institutionsinreducingpovertyintheshortterm. 2.6.7 CAREs Unifying Framework for Sustainable Livelihoods and Convergence with FAOs EAF (McCaston,2005;FAO,2003) FAOsEcosystemApproachtoFisheryManagement(EAF)addressesthelivesofcoastalcommunities andsmallscalefisherswithinaframeworkofecologicalandsociallinkages(FAO,2003).Thinkingon the subject of livelihoods has been evolving during the past decade based upon development experience of organizations such as CARE International. This has resulted in a new and more comprehensiveapproach,thegoalofwhichgoesbeyondpovertyalleviationtopovertyeradication and social justice, resulting in greater and more sustainable impact. This approach, the unifying framework(Figure6.)convergeswithFAOsEAF. Theunifyingframeworkincludesinstitutionalreformsthataddresspoliticalandsocialrelationships withinthelargersocietalprocessesinwhichcoastalcommunitiesareembedded.Thesecontributeto thestructuralchangesinthecascadeofadministrativeentitiesthroughwhichthenationalplanning andallocationprocesseslinkwiththelocalsmallscalefisheryunits.Theselinkagescreateenabling conditions leading to empowerment, one of the pillars in mainstreaming traditional smallscale fisheries by way of strengthened comanagement (Table 4. Reference Model). The unifying frameworkcorrespondstoFAOsEcosystemApproachtoFisheriesManagement(EAF).Theshiftto povertyeradicationintheunifyingframeworkincludes,symbolically,(i)teachingpeoplehowtofish imparting skills for asset building, (ii) ensuring that people have access to the river (or coastal waters)asaresourcewhichincludesmainstreamedpropertyrights,and(iii)ensuringthatcompanies upriverarenotpollutingthewatersource,i.e.buildingsafeguardsagainstrentdissipationstemming from negative externalities (see Section 3). Natural disasters constitute one set of the causes of povertyaddressedintheunifyingframework(Figures6&7).
Figure6.TheunifyingframeworkdevelopedbyCAREInternationalwhichrepresentsacomprehensiveapproach topovertyeradicationasthenecessaryattributeofdevelopment.

All gains from livelihood enhancement could be lost if the marginalized smallscale fisher communitiesmustcontinuetoresideinlocationsthatexposethemincreasinglytonaturalhazards

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sincetheycannotchoosesaferlocations,oriftheyarenotsupportedbymeasurestoreducerisk,i.e. theprobabilityofharm(seeSection3).The2004IndianOceanTsunamiforcedtheattentionofthe worldcommunityonthemannerinwhichanacutedisaster(aneventtowhichadateandtimecan be given), changed a chronic disaster into a catastrophe where more than 230,000 members of coastal communities perished across the region. This event virtually wiped out the coastal marine fishery along the northern, eastern and southern coasts of Sri Lanka including fisher lives (GovernmentofSriLanka/FAO,2006.Thelossofpropertyincludingfishinggearreducestheability to sustain livelihood (Pomeroy et al., 2006). A chronic disaster occurs where marginalization and progressively increasing poverty (creeping normalcy) places communities at increased risk (see Section3)(Adametal.2009;DonnerandRodriguez,2008;Hoffman,2003). Risk=Hazard(frequencyandseverity)xVulnerability(exposure/capacity)(UNISDR,2004;U.S.Indian Ocean Tsunami warning System Program. 2007). The relationships among livelihood, vulnerability, exposureandriskarepresentedinsomedetailinSection3fortheBOBLMESA.Thechallengeisthe continuinganonymity/amorphousnessofthedispersed,smallscalefishercommunities,particularly alongthecoastsofBangladesh,IndiaandSriLanka.
Figure 7. CARE Internationals Unifying Framework for Poverty Eradication and Social Justice. Note Risk and VulnerabilitymanagementunderHumanConditions(McCaston,2005).

2.6.8MicrofinanceInstitutionsandPovertyReduction Thecombinedimpactofeconomicmarginalizationofcoastalfishercommunities,andgraverimpacts on women and children have resulted in the recognition of the urgent need to reduce income poverty among women. The NGO sectors in Bangladesh and in India initially played a key role in deliveringmicrocredittoruralpoor,particularlythewomen(Islam,2004;Karmakaretal.,2009).In recentyears,thegovernmentsofBangladeshandIndiahaveinstitutionalizedmajorinterventionsfor

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reducing primarily the income poverty of women and in parallel facilitate their integration into mainstreamdevelopmentprocesses. Womensparticipationinprogrammesofmicrofinanceinstitutions(MFIs)rangesfromabout60%in Sri Lanka to over 80% in Bangladesh and in India. The total gross loan portfolios of MFIs in these threecountriesin2007werereportedasexceedingthirtymillionUSdollars(Karmakaretal.2009).In the same year the total number of participating women exceeded 32 million with the size of the average loan being in excess of a hundred US$ 100 (Karmakar et al., 2009). Clearly substantial potential exists for microfinance/microcredit to further develop into an effective instrument for reducingincomepoverty,thecrucialelementindaytodayfoodsecurity. APFIC(2009)notedthatdespitetheincreasingimportanceofmicrofinanceasapovertyalleviation tool and the consequent rapid growth in microfinance loans and borrowers in Southeast Asian countries,theruralpoor,particularlythetraditionalsmallscalefishers,stillrelyprimarilyonprivate moneylenders and other informal sources of loansand continue to have noaccess to the financial servicesofbanksandotherfinancialinstitutions.IsthesituationsimilarintheBOBLMESA?Howcan smallscalefishingcommunitiesbecomepartnersinthemainstreammicrofinanceprocessesthatare regulated and have the potential to contribute toward poverty reduction among the smallscale fishingcommunities? APFIC (2009) noted that some obstacles to enrolment of smallscale fishers in bankbased micro finance/creditinSouthEastAsiaare: inadequatephysicalandlivelihoodassetsforcollateral, absenceoforganization(andcriticalmass)toovercomebarrierstoeconomiesofscale, stemmingfromtheabove,theinabilityofbanksto(a)establishreliabledatabases,and(b) minimizetransactioncoststoanacceptablelevel. AsacontributiontodeliberationsattheAPFICRegionalConsultation(APFIC,2009),Karmakaretal. (2009) present a review of microfinance and microcredit processes in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka with recommendations for its broader application of small scale fishery and aquaculture households. The model developed by the South Indian Federation of Fisheries Societies (SIFFS) spanning several decades for supporting traditional smallscale fishers (Table 6.) demonstrates the possiblescopeofactivitiesandfuturedirections(Karmakaretal.,2009).
Table 6. The scope of financial support provided by the South Indian Fisheries Societies (SIFFS) for traditional smallscalefisherylivelihoodactivities(Karmakaretal.,2009). Purposeofloan Purchasingfishingequipment (motorized) Purchaseoffishingequipment(non motorized Supplyofice Workingcapitalforfish vending/processing Establishmentofsmallbusinesses (nonfisheryeconomy,etc.) Purposeofloan category Production Production Postharvest Postharvest Alternateemployment BeneficiaryClass Men Men Men/women Women Women Group/Individual Individual Individual Individual/group Individual/group Individual

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The efforts made by Bangladesh and its pioneering approaches to address extreme poverty are acclaimedasholdingpromiseinthewidercontextoffundamentalrightsandenvironmentalsecurity (UN General Assembly: Human Rights Council, 2010). The microfinance institutions (MFIs) arm of organizationssuchastheBangladeshRuralAdvancementCommittee(BRAC),havebeentheleaders amongNGOsintakingmicrofinance(apackageincludingloancreditandinsurance)andmicrocredit (generally small grants/loans) to the rural poor, particularly women in coastal communities. Community Development Center (CODEC), among others, in collaboration with BRAC and other NGOs has developed mechanisms for addressing the needs of marginalized coastal fishermen (Box 9).
Box9.Commentsonimplementationofmicrofinanceatthefieldlevelforcoastalfishers (personalcommunicationMs.SagaricaAhmed,BRACCountryDirector,SriLanka) WorkinginthecoastalareasofBangladeshisdifficultandextremelytimeconsumingbecauseofproblemsof access and communications. The NGO sector has been highly effective in their outreach because of trained, dedicated staff. The high illiteracy and cultural obstacles make women in smallscale fisher families very vulnerable.Theirlivesarefraughtwithuncertaintyanddestitutioniscommonbecauseofhusbandsbecoming victims of natural hazards. Boat owners may provide oneoff compensation which is inadequate. The key to successfulparticipationofwomeninmicrofinanceinterventionsistargetingandmonitoring.Womenrequire handholding by dedicated staff to enable regular participation until benefits of microfinance become intrinsicallyattractive.Themicrofinancerequirementsoffisherwomenarecomplexandheterogeneouswhich implies that supply has to be tailored to need. Consequently transaction costs of outreach are very high. Criticismofhighinterestratesinmicrofinanceisthereforeillfoundedcriticism.Thestaffneeds(travel,field expenses,etc)forprogrammeimplementationrequiresdesigningbaseduponfrequencyofmonitoring. Need for caution and good governance

MicroCredit Ratings International Ltd., a leading specialist microfinance rating agency, reviewed Indianmicrofinanceandreleasedareportin2009(M.Cril,2009).IntheconclusionitstatesWhile thisimprovementintheperformanceindex(ofmicrofinance)isapparentlyamatterforcelebration, itmayregrettablyresultinlament.Theconcernisthattheimprovementhasbeenachieveddueto an emphasis on increasing yield and minimizing portfolio at risk in order to boost the equity valuations of MFIs. As such it may be a short term phenomenon achieved at the expense of relationships with clients and, as discussed above, likely to trigger political intervention with long term adverse consequences for the microfinance sector. An immediate refocussing of MFI operationsonthedoublebottomlinebalancingfinancialreturnsandsocialvaluesclientprotection and social mission is essential to ensure the future of Indian microfinance as an instrument of financialandsocialinclusionandnotasanothermeansofexploitingthepoorforfinancialgain(M. CRIL,2009). ComparativeperformanceofMFIsandSelfhelpGroups:SuicidesandInterestRates Recent research (Singh, 2011) reveals the need for great caution in placing excessive trust on the performance of MFIs in relation to benefits delivered to the poor. The recent suicides by over 60 poorborrowersintheIndianstateofAndhraPradeshhavebroughttheoperationsofmicrofinance institutions (MFIs) under public scrutiny. It is well documented by both print and electronic media thatthesedebtdrivensuicideswereduetocoercivemethodsofloanrecoveryusedbycommercial MFIs. The commercialMFIsoperateasprofitmakingnonbankingfinancial corporations(NBFCs)in India.ThemajorityofsuicidestookplaceinWarangaldistrictofAndhraPradeshandasmanyas17 borrowersofSKS Microfinancewereamongthose whoreportedlycommittedsuicide. Forthepast few months, the SKS Microfinance (the largest commercial MFI in India) has been in the news. In August2010,itraisednearly$380millioninanInitialPublicOffering(IPO)thefirstfromanIndian MFI.ThankstotheIPO,promotersandprivateequityinvestorsofSKSMicrofinancebecameinstant millionaireswhiletheirborrowersremaindesperatelypoor.

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ContrarytopublicposturingthatMFIsaresavioursofthepoorandchargereasonableinterestrates, severalbigMFIsinAndhraPradeshhavebeenchargingveryhighinterestrates,closertotheones charged by traditional moneylenders. Until and unless commercial MFIs revisit their pure market driven business model aimed at generating super profits for their investors, their operations will remainquestionableandunjustifiableinIndiawhere77percentofpopulationsurvivesonlessthan Rs.20perday(lessthanUS$1). Postsuicides, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has formed a highlevel committee to look into the functioningofcommercialMFIs.Thereportofthecommitteeisexpectedbyearly2011.Inaneraof deregulatedinterestrates,itisunlikelythattheRBIwillputacaponinterestrateschargedbythe MFIs.AlthoughBangladesh,thehomeofmicrofinance,decidedtocapmicrofinanceinterestratesin November2010. In contrast, there are plenty of selfhelp groups (SHGs) and micro lenders in India who follow a balanced approach between financial sustainability and social objectives. The SHG model serves manymore poorhouseholdsinIndia thantheMFImodel.The microfinanceinterventionsbySHGs and similar groups have produced better results than MFIs because of their integrated approach towardsbuildingsustainablelivelihoods. Ms. Sagarica Indu (BRACCountry Director, Sri Lanka, personal communication) commented that jumpingtoconclusionsisnotwarrantedintherelationshipofMFIsandsuiciderates.Herpersonal experiencesuggeststheneedforcarefulidentificationofunderlyingcauses.Additionally,inviewof thepracticalneedforhighinterestrates,theproportionofsuicidestothosewhohavegainedfrom MFIsmustserveasareference. 2.6.9NGOsandCBOsTheBridgeBetweenGovernmentandLocalCommunities ThestudybytheWorldBank(2002)basedupontheviewsofmorethan60,000poorpeoplefrom fourteencountriesrevealedinsightsintohowthepoorpeopleperceivedtheirposition,including: Amajorityfelttheyareworseoffandmoreinsecurethaninthepast; Corruption,irrelevanceandabusivebehaviouroftenmartheformalinstitutionsofthestate; Nongovernmentalorganizationsneedtobemoreaccountabletothepoor; Interactionswithtradersandmarketsarestampedbytheirpowerlessnesstonegotiatefair prices. Thechallengeisworkingwiththecoastalpoorinhelpingthemsucceedintheirownefforts(World Bank, 2002). Despite shortcomings, the better NGOs constitute the frontline of organized interventionstobridgethegapbetweendispersedandremotecoastalcommunitiesandthestate. TheGOB/UNDP/FAOprojectEmpowermentofCoastalFishingCommunitiesforLivelihoodSecurity (see Section 2, CS1) demonstrated the need for the facilitation role of NGOs in the field. A major challengethenrestswithstrengtheningtheroleofNGOsasintermediariesintheempowermentof fishingcommunities.BothinAndhraPradesh,IndiaandinBangladeshNGOshavetakenakeyrolein empoweringwomeninthepoorestcommunities(WorldBank,2002). InclosingitsstudyWorldBank(2002)focusedonthestatefailuretoreducepovertyandhuman suffering in this age of plenty and of technological marvels. In this context we (the editors) define state failure as a failure to serve poor people. We focus on states rather than other development sectorsbecausegovernmentssettheessentialpolicyenvironmentthataffectthespeedandqualityof development. Government policy shapes the actions of poor people, the private sector, NGOs and donors. TheeffectivenessofNGOsorlackofitisdeterminedbythecombinedinfluenceofthestateaswell asdonors.MuchofNGOeffectivenessisdeterminedbyfundsmadeavailablebydonors.The2009 reportfortheAsiaPacificRegionoftheRealityofAidOrganization(ROA,2009)statesDemocratic

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ownership under the current aid architecture is more rhetoric than reality. Many of the steps forwardintermsofaidallocationareaccompaniedbystepsbackascountriesfaceindebtednessand loss of development resources and policy space. The use of tied aid and policy conditionalities imposed by donors have direct and negative impacts on the lives and livelihood of the poor, particularly in the Asia and Pacific region where more than 600 million people still live in absolute poverty. 2.6.10RightsbasedRestorationofSmallscaleFisherLivelihoods. Progressiveconsiderationhasbeengiventoimprovingthestatusofsmallscalefisheriesbyassisting in their transition to a rightsbased approach including access to resources, markets and social empowerment.TheprinciplessupportedbyCOFIduringitssessionsin2007include: A rightsbased approach, in defining and allocating rights to fish, would also address the broader human rights of fishers to an adequate livelihood and would therefore include povertyreduction criteria as a key component of decisions over equitable allocation of rights, including in decisions overinclusionandexclusion,genderequality,andtheprotectionofsmallscalefishworkersaccessto resources and markets. It would also include addressing deficiencies in fishing peoples rights of equitable access to health care, education, justice and the rule of law. Transition to rightsbased fishingrequiresrelationshipsbetweenfishingrightsholdersanddutybearers(suchasgovernments) to be transparent and based on mutual trust and accountability. This requires empowerment of fishing communities, both through their social inclusion and building their capabilities. There is a specific need to protect the poor from adverse impacts of the transition to rightsbased fisheries management(http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16152/en). The rightsbased approach to restoration of smallscale fisher livelihood may acquire practical supportbywayoftheinternationalinstrumentrecentlyincludedintheresolutionsoftheCOFI29th Session(www.iisd.ca/vol29/enb2905e.html).

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3. ICMandFisheriesManagementandSomeBasicConceptsRelevanttoCBICMinthe BOBLMESA.
Thissectionprovidesclarity,wherenecessary,tothecontentsofSection1:Introduction,Section2: Case Studies, and further supports Section 4: Conclusions and Recommendations. Additional clarificationisnecessarybecauseof(i)thediversityofthestatusofintegratedcoastalmanagement andfisheriesintheBOBLMESA,(ii)therichnessofthescientificdiscoursethathasdevelopedonthe subject of interactions among fishers, markets and the ocean resources in the context of the prevailing global fishery crisis and (iii) the need to examine the reasoning that underlies the conclusions,lessonslearnedandrecommendations. Theobjectivesofthissectionareto: 1. IntroducethecomplexityoftheBOBLMESAandtoconveytheneedtolookatthesubject ofcommunitybasedintegratedcoastalmanagement(CBICM)asacascadeofnestedand coupledsubsystems(socialecologicalsystems). IndicatethenationaldisparitiesthatexistwithintheBOBLMESAandthepitfallsofbiased generalizations. IndicatethediversityinstatusofintegratedcoastalmanagementintheBOBLMESAsince the primary goal of this review is associated with communitybased integrated coastal management(CBICM). Indicatethetrendinmarinefisheries,andthehiddencomplexityofsmallscalefisheries, theirrelationshiptothe coastalenvironmentandthenationalexpectationsofexpanding sectorgrowth. Assess the relationship of national positions on fisheries in relation to the international discourseontheglobalfisherycrisis. Indicate the relationship between increasing risk and inadequate recognition of the chronic disaster that is already on the hands of Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka and implicationsinthecontextofenvironmentalsecurity. Impartsomeclaritytothemannerinwhichrentdissipationinthecoastalresourcesector is further marginalizing the poorest coastal communities and increasing both their vulnerabilityandexposuretoacutehazardsstemmingmainlyasunintendedconsequences of planned development within inadequately understood complex socialecological systems.

2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

3.1ComplexityandNestedSocialecologicalSystems
TheinherentcomplexityoftheBOBLME,composedofbothbiophysicalandhumanmadeattributes providesthefoundationfromwhichplanningforeffectiveCBICMmustproceed.Littlecanbedone aboutbiophysicalcomplexityandinherentnaturalchangeexceptadaptingtoit.Whatispossibleis situated in the realms of the other attributes of complexity including consequences of historical change, development planning, demography, land use pressures, fishing technology, scientific uncertaintyandconsequencesofglobalizationthatcombineandinfluencesocialecologicalsystems (SESs). EffectiveCBICMimpliesthattheoutcomewillcontributetosustainablefisheriesmanagementand enhancedcoastallivelihoodwhichareinseparablylinkedwithaharvestablestockoffish,crustacean andmolluscpopulationssupportedbyhealthycoastalecosystems.MacClanahanetal.(2009)assert onthebasisofananalysisofbettermanagedsmallscalefisheriesworldwidethatsolutionsarise fromahistoricaltrialanderrormanagementprocessasproblemsbecomedire.Wefindhighsuccess

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in the social organization and regulation of resources among these progressive fisheries but poor evidence for improved ecosystems. This carries the implication that in order to make smallscale fisheries sustainable, the social needs initially must take center stage to enable integration of ecosystemconsiderationsonafoundationofcommunitydemand. Theliteratureisexpandingontheneedtounderstandsituationsofmultiplerelationshipsofpeople withnature beforethey canbeadequatelymanaged.Ostrom (2007)presentsapractical approach thatwouldenablethatunderstandingthroughadiagnosticapproach(Figure8).Thefourcategories ofinformationrequiredfordiagnosisofrelationshipsthatinfluencethestructureandfunctioningof SESsareclarifiedinthenextparagraph.
Figure 8. A socialecological system is composed of a set of interacting relationships including biophysical ecosystemattributes,socialrelationships,anddecisionmaking(governance)relationshipssandwichedbetween nationalsocioeconomicandpoliticalsettingsandtheevenwiderecologicallinkages(Ostrom,2007a,b;Ostrom etal.,1999;Ostrometal.,2007)).Thusasocialecologicalsystemcannotexistasanentityisolatedfromthe surrounding influences. Both FAOs EAF (FAO, 2003) and mainstreaming of CBICM (APFIC, 2005) mirror the dynamicsofsocialecologicalsystems.

As an example, the coastal waters of Bangladesh with its vast and diverse smallscale fisher population have local characteristics that enable demarcation of geographic areas that constitute interconnected subsystems based upon their operation depths. Sets of smallscale fishers that share some common features operate at different depths. The fishing gear of the operators of estuarinesetbagnetssetthemapartfromtheshrimppostlarvaecollectorswhoearnanincomein thesamegeneralarea.ThustheestuarinesetbagnetfishersconstituteanSESdistinctivefromthat of the post larvae collectors. The problems and issues of the individual SESs must be diagnosed beforemanagementandintegrationwithinthewiderecosystembecomespossibleinthecontextof ICM. The wider ecosystem including rivers and coastal waters includes the Hilsa fishery, the managementofwhichiscriticalbecauseofitsnationalsignificance. DistinctivenessmaybeimpartedtoanSESwhenitsattributesarerecognizedanddefined,Viz.(i)the properties of the resource system, (ii) the number of resource units generated, (iii) the number of resource users and (iv) the institutional relationships that contribute to resolution of conflict and harmonioususeoftheresourcesystem(Ostrom,2007a,b).Thecoastalzonesorregionsofindividual countriesintheBOBLMESAareheterogeneouswheresubclassesofsmallscalefisheriescoexistor compete. Some CBFM and comanagement practices described in Section 2 characterize diverse SESs.

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3.1.1TheComplexNatureoftheBOBLMESouthAsia(BOBLMESA) The Environmental Profile of the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem (Heileman, Bianchi and FungeSmith, 2010) conveys the complexity of the system under consideration within which some aspects, fisheries, coastal environment and livelihoods are reviewed. In terms of the diverse relationshipsdescribedintheprofile,thedefinitionofCBICMusedinthisreviewmayappeartobe anoversimplification.Infact,CBICMisastrategicapproachwhichrecognizescomplexity,butseeks to focus directly upon fishery sustainability, food security, and livelihoods as the three priority problems. Asignificant partoftheBOBLMESAis situatedwithinnationaljurisdictionsofindividual countries. Therestsituatedoutsidenationaljurisdictionsisimportant,inadditiontofisheries,intermsofthe global economy in relation to marine transportation, bioprospecting, undersea communication systemsamongothers(FAO,2005a,b;WorldBank,2005).Consequently,numerouspressuresexist intheoceansegmentoutsidenationaljurisdictionsthatimpact processeswithinit.Simultaneously significanttransboundarylinkagesareassociatedwithlivelihoodintheBOBLME(Samarakoon,2004). Additionally, the Bay of Bengal is likely to become significant as geopolitical interactions in the coming decades acquire prominence in the Indian Ocean (Kaplan, 2009). Dealing with complex systems requires recognition of the inherent attributes of complexity, especially change, unpredictability and emergence (Holling, 1973; ECDPM, 2005a,b; ADB, 2009; FAO, 2003; Ostrom, 2007a,b). 3.1.2TheBOBLMESouthAsia(BOBLMESA):ARegionofDisparities ThefourcountriesconstitutingtheBOBLMESAarecharacterizedbymanydisparities.Bangladeshis a delta, India is a subcontinental land mass with deltas and an archipelago, Maldives is an archipelago,whileSriLankaisalargeisland.Maldives,asthecountrywiththesmallestpopulationin theBOBLMESA,hasabout3%ofIndiaspopulationwhileitsEEZisslightlylargerthantheeastern segment of Indias EEZ. The average populations of Indias states are larger than that of Sri Lanka. Moredisparitiesoccuralongother dimensions,including thenatureoffisheries.Thestructureand ecologicalattributesoftheircoastalzonesarealsoextremelydiverseasistheirgeography(Table7). The disparities in distribution and magnitude of critical constituents of coastal ecosystems, mangroves and coral reefs are provided in the BOBLME Stage 1 National Reports and in Angell (2004). Poverty is the foremost, shared livelihood feature of coastal communities in Bangladesh, IndiaandSriLanka.Maldivesistheexceptioninregardtopoverty(seeSection2).
Table7.SelectedattributesoftheBOBLMESAsubregionthatdemonstratediversity.(CIATheWorldFactbook, WorldResourcesInstitute2010;UNDP,2009) Attribute Bangladesh Landarea(km2) 144,000 India 3,287,590 7,100 615,000 153,000 300 Notapplicable 1,000,000 Minor(not available) Country Maldives SriLanka 65,610 1,340 517,000 Averagewidth 25km

Lengthofcoastline 580 ExtentofEEZ(km2) Extent/average widthof continentalshelf (km2) Compositionof fishery 141,000 66.400

98%/2%

90%/10%. Growing modernizedsmall

Almost100% 65%/negligible. mechanized Growing offshoresmallscale modernizedsmall

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%coastal traditional/% modernizedshrimp trawlingetc. National population (thousands) 147,365

scaleoffshore

fishery

scaleoffshore fisheryabout25%.

1,095,351

359,000

20,222

Population 81.3 segment(%) regardedaspoor (income<US2/day) HDI(2007) Lifeexpectancyat birth Rateofpopulation growth Populationdensity (2002)people/ km2(tobeverified) GDP/percapita (US$PPP)* 0.543 65.7 2.06

75.6

Nil

39.7

0.612 63.4 1.38

0.771 71.1 2.78

0.759 74.0 0.78

1100

325

2000

550

1,241

2,753

5,196

4,243

*GDP/percapita(US$purchasingpowerparity):ThisindicatorisusedtocomparehowmuchaUSdollarspent inBangladesh,India,MaldivesandSriLankawouldbuyrelativetowhatthesamedollarwouldpurchasewhen itisspentintheUnitedStates.Hence,asanexampleaUSdollarspentinBangladesh,oranyotherSouthAsian country,wouldbuymorehaircutsthanintheUnitedStates.Thisindicatorreducesthevastgapsinincomeper person that are observed in numbers that represent GDP per capita (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purchasing_power_parity).

3.2ICMintheBOBLMESA
The information for ICM provided here is adequate for recognition of challenges in integrating ecosystemmanagementwithfisheriesmanagement.UniformICMdoesnotexistintheBOBLMESA. Case studies in Section 2 demonstrated the existence of various forms of informal and formal propertyrightsinsmallscalefisheries.PracticalICMmustproceedfromtheprincipleofintegrated land use where various forms of property rights may correspond with the diverse socialecological systems where the dominant economic activity is fishery. Therefore mapping and recognition of boundariesofdiverseresourcesystemsisacorerequirementforeffectivenessofCBICM. Themajorityofcasestudiesaresituatedincoastalsettingswhicharenestedwithinlargersegments of the continental shelf. Thus an EEZ and the coastal zone are composed of many layers of social ecologicalsystems(Figure8;Ostrom,2007a,b).Eachofthesesubsystemswhichsupportsafishery requires geographically specific management. This means that the needs of a subsystem must be diagnosedbeforemeaningfulsolutionstoanyproblemsmaybeimplemented.TheICMbriefsforthe member countries of BOBLMESA serve to convey this diversity and complexity of geographic settings. 3.2.1 Bangladesh:TheEvolvingNationalICZMProgramme The coastal zone of Bangladesh covers an area of 47,201km2, or 32% of the country, being the landmassof19districts.About35millionpeople,representing29%ofthenationalpopulation,livein the coastal zone (Figure 9.). The Government of Bangladesh established a program development

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officein2001locatedwithintheWaterResourcesPlanningOrganization(WARPO)oftheMinistryof WaterResourcestofacilitatetheIntegratedCoastalZoneManagement(ICZM)process(Islam,2004). Thecoastalsegmentofthedeltaonwhichthecountryissituatedishighlydynamic.Themacrotides, in some places, with amplitudes ranging in excess of six meters, create changing landforms (morphodynamicfeatures)associatedwiththenumeroustidalriversthattraversethecoastaldelta. Humanactivitiesareshaped,ontheonehand,byrivermorphodynamics(themannerinwhichland formsarechangedbyriverflowandsedimentation),whileontheother,majorcoastalengineering projects have created islands of stability (polders surrounded by embankments). Some long term consequencesofcoastalengineeringhavecreatedseveresocioeconomicchallengesinsomeparts, suchastheSouthwest.Thepopulationinhabitingthecoastalzoneisexpectedtoexceed60million by 2050 (Ahmad, 2005). About half of this population may continue to live in the exposed coastal zonesituatedoutsidepolderswhichwouldplacethemathighriskfromcoastalhazards. The Programme Development Office (PDO) completed the initial preparatory phase of integrated coastal zone management in Bangladesh from 20022005. As a result, the Cabinet adopted the CoastalZonePolicyandtheCoastalDevelopmentStrategy.Ahugebodyofknowledgeonproblems andopportunitiesinthecoastalzonewasproducedunderthisproject(www.iczmpbangladesh.org, Islam, 2004). A new phase of ICZM is in preparation. The foundation for the new phase was developedinearly2009.Thisisanticipatedtoleadtodevelopmentofadequatelegislationforland usemanagementthatwouldalsofacilitatecomanagement.
Figure9.TheBangladeshCoastalZoneoftheBayofBengalshowingtheinnerandexposedsegments(blueand greenrespectively).Anestimated19millionliveintheExposedCoastalZonesituatedcontiguouswiththeBay of Bengal where landsea interactions are highly dynamic. The Sunderbans Forest Reserve, the largest continuousmangrovetractintheworldissituatedintheleftquarterofthemap(green).Theonlycoralreefin BangladeshisassociatedwithStMartinsIslandsituatedabouteightkilometerswestofthenortheastborderof Myanmarunshaded(Islam,2004)

The policy goal of integrated coastal zone management is to create conditions, in which the reductionofpoverty,developmentofsustainablelivelihoodsandintegrationofthecoastalzoneinto nationalprocessescantakeplace.Fisheryisthekeyeconomicactivityoflastresortthatsupports livelihoodsofthemajorityofpoorerresidentsinthecoastalzone.

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3.2.2 India The east coast of India, extending from the international border of India and Bangladesh in the northeasttoKanyakumariinthesouth,is4,645kmlong,coveringthestatesofWestBengal,Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Pondicherry (Figure 10.). The archipelagic Andaman and Nicobar Islands are included. The population is over 225 million. The Indian states situated along Bay of Bengalhaveacontinentalshelfareaof153,000km.ThetotalareaoftheEEZ(ExclusiveEconomic Zone) of India in the Bay of Bengal is 615,500 km. The sub continental coastline is enriched with many river deltas and estuaries. The periodic nutrient discharges and soft bottom marine environments associated with river flows support diverse fishery organisms. The deltas support extensive mangrove habitats. The Indian Segment of the Sunderban mangroves extends into West Bengal.PulicatLakeandChilkaLakearesignificantestuarinelagoonsthatsupporttraditionalfishery managementpractices. TheCoastalRegulationZone(CRZ),orthezoneunderthepurviewoftheCRZNotification1991,was declaredtoincludethecoastalstretchesofseas,bays,estuaries,creeks,riversandbackwaterswhich areinfluencedbytidalaction(onthelandwardside)upto500mfromthehightideline(HTL),and thelandbetweenthelowtideline(LTL)andtheHTL.Inthecaseofrivers,creeksandbackwaters,the notificationstatesthattheCRZappliestobothbanksofthewaterbody,butthedistanceoftheCRZ fromtheHTLmaybereducedfrom500monacasebycasebasis,withthereasonsforthereduction being recorded in the Coastal Zone Management Plan (CZMP) of a particular state (Joseph & Balchand,2000;Ramachandran,2008;Ramachandran,EnserlinkandBalchand,2005;Ramachandran andEnserlink,2008).
Figure 10. The coastline and the EEZ of India included in the BOBLMESA. Several major rivers including the Mahanadi,Krishna,Godavari,KaveriandbranchesoftheGangesdrainintotheseaalongthiscoastline.Large agriculturalandurbanpopulationsandtheirwasteloadsinfluencecoastalwaterquality.Deltasandestuaries areassociatedwiththecoastalreachesofthemajorrivers(mapsourceICSF,2010).

TheMinistryofEnvironmentandForests(MOEF)in2008issuedarevisedCoastalZoneManagement Notification.Thisnotificationeliciteddiversepublicresponsesincludingprotestsfromcoastalfishing communities. On 22nd July, 2009 the MOEF issued a public notification captioned Lapsing of the Coastal Management Zone (CMZ) Notification, 2008. Thereby the CRZ Notification, 1991 as amended, continues to be in force and implemented. The notification of lapsing included the

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statement The Minister of Environment and Forests has already decided to have necessary consultationwithvariousstakeholdersincludingtraditionalartisanalfishersandcivilsocietytoseek theircommentsforstrengtheningtheCRZNotification,1991.Adetailedplanfortheconsultationis beingprepared. In a critique of the attempted revision ofCRZ 1991, the conclusion stated The analysis above also shows that the proposed CMZ Notification (2008) does not deliver on its own objectives of sustainable development, sustainable livelihoods and conservation. The CMZ Notification in its present form exemplifies the recent negative trend of regulatory capture a conscious process where environmental governance is influenced by commercial lobbies and environmental laws are dictatedbyinvestmentpriorities.Thenotificationremainswhatitwaspredictedtobeaselloutof thecoast(Menonetal,2007;Sridhar,2007;Sridharetal,2008). Eachcoastalstateisrequiredtoproduceitsowncoastalzonemanagementplanincompliancewith the CZR 1991. Technical support for capacity building in integrated coastal management in Tamil Nadu was recently carried out under a Government of India/World Bank Project (http://www.span.nl/en/projects). Government of India/World Bank projects in integrated coastal managementareinvariousstagesofpreparationandimplementationinAndhraPradesh,Orissaand West Bengal (http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/97985 ; http://news.oneindia.in/2010/03/25/cabinetgivesnodtointegratedcoastalzone managementproj.html). AndamanandNicobarIslands: TheAndamanandNicobarCoastalZoneManagementAuthoritywasestablishedin2008underthe EnvironmentActbyaGovernmentofIndiaGazettenotificationon18August2008.Thisauthorityhas avalidityofthreeyears.Itsresponsibilitiespertainmostlytolandzoning. ICZMprojectsincorporatingfisheriesandlivelihood EQUATIONS, an Indian NGO committed to equitable tourism made the following observation in regard to the World Bank financed ICZM Project in Andhra Pradesh (Orissa) and West Bengal. Through the ICZM project the government proposes to use ecotourism and tourism for providing livelihood security to fisher communities. The proposal acknowledges the detrimental impacts of tourismandunplannedgrowthoftourisminfrastructureonthecoastalecologysuchasdegradation of the coasts, conflicts amongst stakeholders and increased pressure on coastal areas. However, it again adopts tourism (smallscale or ecotourism) to provide livelihood security to coastal communities, who are most vulnerable to not only developmental activities but also to effects of climatechange(http://www.equitabletourism.org/stage/files/fileDocuments782_uid13.pdf. Andhra Pradesh and Orissa states reportedly face serious environmental problems stemming from shrimp aquaculture by the private sector including multinational corporations (Rao, 2008 http://www.nlsenlaw.org/crz/articles/). Some Supreme Court rulings in relation to the Coastal RegulationZoneareaccessibleat:http://www.nlsenlaw.org/crz/caselaws/supremecourt/). 3.2.3 Maldives:Theemergingsituation The archipelago consists of 26 natural atolls with about 1,200 islands. Of these, 200 islands are inhabited.Thetotallandareaislessthan1%.Theislandsarerelativelysmallinsize,withanaverage areaof25ha.Thelargestislandisjustover5km2. Coastalareasareusuallydefinedasanentityof land and water affected by the biological and physical processes of both the sea and land and defined broadly for the purpose of managing the use of natural resources. As reef islands in atoll systems are products of marine biological and physical processes, coral reefs should be treated technically as coastal systems (Nasser, 2007). Because the whole country is considered a coastal zone,anumberofnationallawsandauthoritiesdirectlyorindirectlygovernandadministercoastal managementinthecountry.Thethreeagenciesprimarilyresponsibleforcoastalmanagementinthe 78

Maldives are the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water (MEEW), the Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Marine Resources (MoFAMR) and the Ministry of Construction and Public Infrastructure(MCPI).ApartoftheEEZisdesignatedastheCoastalFishingZonewhichextendsto75 kmfromtheislands.Thisisessentiallyanoceanicregimewheretheinfluenceoflanduseisnegligible (Figure11).
Figure11.TheboundariesoftheCoastalFisheryZoneandtheEEZoftheMaldives(Adam,2004).

3.2.4 SriLankaTheEvolutionofCoastalZoneManagement Coastalzonemanagementinitscurrentsensebeganintheearly1960swhencoastalissuesreceived greater attention of the government. The Coast Conservation Act No. 57 of 1981 vested the administration,control,andcustodyoftheCoastalZoneintheRepublicofSriLankaandappointeda Director of Coast Conservation to be responsible for this. It also conferred the legal responsibility upontheDirectortoprepareaNationalCoastalZoneManagementPlan(CZMP).ThefirstCZMPwas prepared in 1990, its second revision occurred in 2004 giving consideration to the intervening updates(CCD,2006).TheobjectivesoftheCCDare(i)toimprovestatusofthecoastalenvironment; (ii)todevelopandmanagethecoastline;(iii)toimprovethelivingstandardsofcoastalcommunities and resource users; and (iv) to promote and facilitate economic development based upon coastal resources. The CCD balances many land uses including tourism with fisheries among others within a narrow legallydeclaredcoastalzone(Figure12).Thelandusepressureshavedirectandindirectimpacton marine smallscale fishing from the standpoint of operation of gear and craft (for example beach seinefishing)andbeachlanding.TheCZMPaddressescoastalfisherieswithaviewtointegratingthe sector with ICM. The CCD collaborates with the Department of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DFAR)inthisregard.

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Figure12.TherelationshipbetweenthelegalCoastalZoneandtheEEZSriLanka(CCD,2006).Thelegalcoastal zoneextendsto2kmfromtheshorelineandconstitutesaminutefractionoftheEEZ.About65%ofnationalfish supplyisobtainedfromcoastalwatersoverlyingthe25kmwide(averagewidth)continentalshelf.

The legal Coastal Zone has relevance to the area in which the beach seine fishery occurs, and to estuaries and lagoons. Fishing activities themselves are excluded from CCDs legal purview. The CZ has littlerelevancetotheEEZ.

3.3SmallscaleMarineFisheries:TrendandImplicationsforICM
Thepurposeofthissectionistoprovidesomeinformationwithregardtorecenttrendsinfisheries developmentintheBOBLMESAcountriesthathaverelevancetotheReferenceModelpresentedin Section1:Introduction,Section1.11andwhichisappliedtotheanalysisofcasestudiesinSection2. More detailed information may be obtained from BOBPIGO (2009). The following attributes are likelytoholdsignificantimplicationsforCBICM:

thecomplexityofsmallscalefisheries anticipatedexpansionofshrimptrawling/coastalfishingforexport, implications from illegal fishing (IUU) and stateprivate sector partnerships with multinationalcorporateaffiliationtoexploitdeepsearesourcesintheEEZs,and exporttradeinfisheryproducts.

3.3.1UnderstandingtheSubdivisionsofSmallScaleFisheriesfortheBOBLMESA MarineandcoastalfisheriesintheBOBLMESA,forallpracticalpurposes,canbeclassifiedassmall scalefisheries(Box10).Howeveritisimportanttorealizeforthepurposeofthisreviewthatsmall scalefisheriescanalsobefurthersubdividedtorevealthesignificantinternaldifferencesthathave evolvedduringthepastseveraldecadessincethemodernizationoffisheriesbygovernmentsbegan in the 1960s (Figure 13). Understanding the subdivisions within small scale fisheries begins with recognizingthedistinctionbetweeninshorecoastalfisheriesandoffshorefisheries(Figure13).This separationplacestheartisanalandinshorefishersintheclassthatisimpactedbycoastallanduses and decisions of multiple stakeholders since they operate within that particular geographic realm (Figure13).Theiroperationalsitesarediverse,theymaybescatteredandrelativelyinaccessibleor they may even be urban. Their markets are local and they play a key role in nutrition and food security (Kurien, 2005; Hall et al., 2010). Generally, as a consequence artisanal and inshore fishers wouldreceiveprimaryconsiderationinCBICMsincetheyhavedirectrelationshipwithmultipleuses

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ofcoastalresources.Bysimplifyinginthismanneramentalmodelmaybecreatedofartisanaland inshoresmallscalefisheriesthatfitsfirmlyintoFAOsecosystemapproachtofisheriesmanagement (EAF),andtoenabletargetingofentitiesthatrequiresupport. The offshore smallscale fishers on the other hand operate in small but highly modernized fishing craft, generally about 20 meters overall length (OAL), from sites of concentration including fishery harbors and anchorages. Their evolution has been driven by government policy combined with development assistance and international investment. Sometimes, they target high value inshore speciessuchasshrimpswithdirectlinkstocoastalecology,butmorecommonlyoceanicfishspecies that have limited relationship with coastal landforms and habitats. These operations employ, laborersdrawnmainlyfromtraditionalsmallscalefisheries,whosewellbeingrequiresimprovement. Theoperationsofoffshoresmallscalefisheries,ifunregulated,haveadverseimplicationsforinshore coastal fishery stocks. Their interest is mainly in export markets, with partial contribution to local nutritionandfoodsecurity.

Box10.Characterizationofsmallscalefisheries(Staplesetal.,2004) Smallscalefisheriescanbebroadlycharacterizedasadynamicandevolvingsubsectoroffisheriesemploying labourintensiveharvesting,processinganddistributiontechnologiestoexploitmarineandinlandwaterfishery resources. The activities of this subsector, conducted fulltime or parttime, or just seasonally, are often targeted on supplying fish and fishery products to local and domestic markets, and for subsistence consumption.Exportorientedproduction,however,hasincreasedinmanysmallscalefisheriesduringthelast onetotwodecadesbecauseofgreatermarketintegrationandglobalization.Whiletypicallymenareengaged in fishing and women in fish processing and marketing, women are also known to engage in near shore harvestingactivitiesandmenareknowntoengageinfishmarketinganddistribution.Otherancillaryactivities suchasnetmaking,boatbuilding,enginerepairandmaintenance,etc.canprovideadditionalfisheryrelated employmentandincomeopportunitiesinmarineandinlandfishingcommunities.Smallscalefisheriesoperate atwidelydifferingorganizationallevelsrangingfromselfemployedsingleoperatorsthroughinformalmicro enterprises to formal sector businesses. This subsector, therefore, is not homogenous within and across countries and regions and attention to this fact is warranted when formulating strategies and policies for enhancingitscontributiontofoodsecurityandpovertyalleviation.

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 Figure13.SmallscalefisheriesintheBOBLMESAdonotconstituteaunitaryentity.Theycanbedisaggregated to artisanal / traditional inshore and offshore classes. The former is generally marginalized in national developmentpolicieswhereasthelatterenjoysahighdegreeofpolicyandinvestmentsupport.Thisdistinction requires recognition since it is important for addressing livelihood issues within CBICM. Jentoft et al., (2010) regardstheinshoresmallscalefishersasecosystemfishersandoffshoresmallscalefishersasglobalfishers.

DichotomyinSmallscalefisheriesintheBOBLMESA

Traditional,artisanalandpartiallymodernized fisheriesininshorecoastalwaters(ecosystem fishers)focalinterestlivelihood,localmarket, foodsecurity,multiplevulnerabilities,high exposureandriskinrelationtoclimatechange, graveincomepoverty,powerlessness.Caughtin anequitytrap. Strongimpactsfromcoastallandusesandmultiple stakeholders,particularlycoastaltourism, aquaculture,negativeexternalitiespollution, rentcapturebycompetinglanduses

Modernized fisheries mainly in oceanic waters EEZ and beyond (global fishers) focal interest fishery infrastructure, export trade, livelihood concernsareless,laborincomeshigher

Relativelylowimpactfromcoastallanduses.May have significant impact on artisanal and inshore coastalfisheriesthroughcompetitionforshrimps

Supportedbygovernmentpolicyorientedmainly toward export earnings, weak law enforcement

Partiallysupportedbygovernmentpolicy,but mainlymarginalizedinmainstreamfishery developmentpolicy

Carriessignificantexposuretoglobalfinancingand trade relations, may shape future fishery policy in association with interests of industrial fishing, carries potential for harm to inshore smallscale fishery

3.3.2Hiddenrelationships:SharedResourceSystemsandLivelihoodImplications Significant interactions exist between fisheries such as shrimp trawling in Bangladesh and in India andtraditionalcoastalfisherlivelihood(Pramod,2010).Thesearetheaspectsthatimpartcomplexity and induce unintended consequences (see Introduction, Section 1.7). These interactions are based on sharing of resource systems between more efficient and less efficient harvesting technologies. Someaspectsinsummaryare: Bangladesh and India are countries with extensive continental shelf areas (Table 7) where muchofthesmallscalefisheryproductionoccurs.Considerableoverlapappearstooccurin theshelfareasaswellasspeciescompositionofcatchesofthetraditionalsmallscalefishers andmodernizedshrimptrawling. The demand for shrimp is driving the expansion of trawling. Hilborn (2007) argues that expansion of coastal shrimp populations and their fishery are a logical ecological consequenceaspredatorpopulationsdecreasebywayofoverfishing.Bhathal(2005)studied historicaltrendsandshowedthatfishingdownthefoodchainisevidentinIndia. InIndia,Pramod(2010)presentsevidencetoshowanestimateofthequantityofdiscards(at sea)fromincreasedshrimptrawlinginWestBengal,Orissa,AndhraPradeshandTamilNadu exceeds600,000tons/year.Thecatchesoftraditionalsmallscalefishersinthesestatesare falling. The relationship between the composition of discards and the species generally harvested in the traditional smallscale fishery is not known. Does this situation represent rentdissipation? Bangladesh plans to expand commercial fishing in the coastal areas, including shrimp trawling.Theconsequencesforthecoastalsmallscalefishersrequireunderstanding.

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CompetinglandusesinIndiancoastalareasareresultinginincreasingconcentrationoffisher populationsasfishingareasdiminish.Somefishersareforcedtomigratetootherstatesto providefisherylabor(Pramod,2010).Theinteractionswithinsmallscalefisheriesappearto increasevulnerabilityofthemarginalizedfishingcommunities. Maldivesdoesnothaveacontinentalshelfwhereshrimptrawlingmayoccur.Itssmallscale fisheryisalmostexclusivelyoffshore. SriLankascontinentalshelfranksverylowinproductivity(Swan,1983;IUCN,2009).Shrimp trawling in some areas is governed by traditional CBFM. Shrimp fishing does not include modernized shrimp trawling as in India. Since modernization began, catches of traditional coastalfisherieshavediminished(Marga,1981).Thisisareflectionofthelawofunintended consequences (see Introduction, Section 1.7) where modern craft and gear intended to boosttotalfisheryproductionunderminesanexistinglayeroffishcapture.

3.3.3Mappingfishingareasoncontinentalshelves Management of shared resources on continental shelves in Bangladesh and in India within a framework of CBICM would require maps supported by technical information pertaining to the extents of bottom geomorphologies and overlap in catch compositions among the fisheries that apply technologies of different efficiency. Bangladesh has already made advances in this regard (Figure 14). At present, fishery management zones are demarcated on the basis of distance from shore.TheneedtoimprovethisapproachtofurtherconsolidateEAFisshowninthescientificstudy ofGarcesetal.(2006).Theyconclude: therewouldbesubstantialbenefitinfurtherregionalanalysesofassemblagestructure,usingthe available scientific trawl survey data and related information. These should focus on: (1) local and regional changes in assemblages through time to determine temporal stability and examine the impactofanthropogeniceffects,particularlyfishing(e.g.theworkofPauly,1988;Suvavepun,1991); (2) using the spatial assemblage patterns in the construction and articulation of spatiallyexplicit ecosystemmodelsandtoolstodescribetheirfunctioningandlikelyresponsestochangesinfishing pressure; (3) provision of scientific insights to assist in the management of marine resources and biodiversityconservationincludingidentifyingconservationareasforspeciesorstocksbasedontheir spatialdistributionandabundances,e.g.siteselectionofmarineprotectedareasorfishsanctuaries. (Garcesetal.,2006).

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Figure14.InitialmappingoffishingareasonthecontinentalshelfofBangladeshtoadepthof100meters.

3.4TheCountryStatementsontheExistingPositionsObtainedFromtheReportofthe APFICsRegionalConsultationin2008(APFIC,2008).
Bangladesh Advancesinmainstreamingcomanagementincludedevelopingnewlegislationtoaccommodateco management,andanewpolicytopromotecommunitybasedmanagementandtheinvolvementof stakeholders, especially women. The leasebased system has largely been replaced by community ownership. The emphasis is on human capacity building and a focus on environmentfriendly management to ensure sustainability and conserve biodiversity. Achievements include better communitybasedfisheriesmanagement,betterlinkageswithgovernmentorganizations(GOs),non

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governmentalorganizations(NGOs),improvedlivelihoods,increasedincomesofwomen.Bangladesh continuestocooperatewithinternationalandregionalorganizationsandencouragestheirsupport. PotentialforExpansion TheonlyindustrialfishingdevelopedinBangladeshoperatesoutofChittagongontheeastcoast.It targets mainly shrimp resources. The artisanal fishery (including motorized boats) contributes over 90percentofthetotallanding.Khatumetal.(2005)concludethatthepotentialrevenuefromthe marine fisheries sector could be increased through the implementation of a proper management regimetoensurethatthesubstantialpotentialwithinthesectorisexploitedonasustainablebasis. Thiswouldbenefitalargesegmentofthepopulationwhoselivelihoodsaredependentonfisheries production. IUUFishing Available information reveals that the Bangladesh EEZ is subjected to IUU fisheries both from domesticandforeignfishingvessels.Khatumetal.(2005)arguethatBangladeshneedstostrengthen itsmonitoring,controlandsurveillancecapacityin itsterritorialwaterwithaviewtostoppingIUU fishingastheseaffectsustainability. FishExportTrade The fisheries export includes frozen shrimp and fish. These products together comprise about 83 percent of the countrys total export in quantity terms, and 88 percent in value terms. During the period (200006), the total export of various fish and fish products to the European Union (EU) increased nearly twofold from 16,192 tons to 31,477 tons. Planners envisage future growth in exportstotheEU. India Thefisheries sectorisanimportantresourceforsocioeconomic development.In2005,morethan 3.51millionpeoplewereinvolvedintheindustry.AnumberofstatisticsontheIndianfishingfleet were presented. The challenge of maritime safety when dealing with large numbers of smallscale vessels was discussed. A national level review committee was constituted in 1997. The use of zonation in coastal waters for regulation of fisheries is successfully used. The Government of India has, together with BOBPIGO, implemented a number of very useful projects related to improving thefisheriessector. TheMinistryofAgriculture,in2001estimatedthepotentialyieldfromthemarinewaters(EEZ)tobe about3.92milliontons(FisherySurveyofIndia(FSI),2001,2009.http://www.fsi.gov.in/LATESTWB SITE/fsiressurvfrm.htm).Themajorshareofresourceslieswithin050mdepth.Timeseriescatch composition of marine fishery shows considerable variation through the period 19502006. These changesare:(1)increaseinnumberofspeciesharvested,(2)changesincatchcomposition,and(3) decline in population of some species. Broadly speaking, during the 1950s and 1960s, Indian oil sardines, shrimp, mackerels and Bombay duck constituted the majority (more than 1/3rd) of the landings.Since1970s,theshareofBombayduckincatchcompositionhasdeclinedsteadilytogether withotherdominantspeciessuchasclupeidsandhairtails.Ontheotherhandaphenomenalrisein landingofshrimpsandothermarinecrustaceanstookplaceduringthesameperiod.Bhathal(2005) presents evidence of fishing down the food chain from a historical analysis of Indias marine fish catches.Recentstudiesarerevealingthattheincreaseinshrimpproductionfromtrawlingforexport hasbeenachievedwithaveryhighcostintheformofdiscards.Daviesetal.,(2009)arguethatthe totaldiscardswouldbeabout600,000tons.Pramod(2010),inacountrywidestudy,estimatesthe quantityofdiscardstobeinexcessof1milliontons/year.Ofthisquantity,almost50%discards(i.e. 537,088tons)occurfromshrimptrawlingintheBOBLMESA(Viz.WestBengal4,440tons;Orissa 99,247 tons; Andhra Pradesh 207,232 tons; Tamil Nadu 212,969 tons; Andaman and Nicobar Islands13,200tons). 85

Pramod (2010) reported that displacement of smallscale fishers all along the mainland coast has increased during the last decade due to industrial development, pollution, formation of new dead zones (where fishers could no longer catch fish largely due to dumping of sewage and industrial wastes near major cities). To compensate for decreasing catches, the smallscale fishers are compelledtoincreaseeffort,withtheinevitableconsequenceoflowercatchperuniteffort(CPUE) andreallosses.Anothernoticeablechangethathasreducedincomefromsmallscalefishermenwas thatmorecrewworkoneachvessel,soprofitfromeachtripisreduced.Thebulkofrevenuefroma trip is paid to the agents who fund the fishing trips, fuel costs and fishing gear. Incomes have declinedforfishermeninallcoastalstates,asfishersnowearnhalftheamountofmoneythatthey earned10yearsback,andthusunabletooffsetincreasesincoastofliving. PotentialforExpansion The Fishery Survey of India (2006) reported substantial scope for expansion of production by increasingfishingcapacityintheoffshorewaters.Themajorfishingactivitiesnowareconcentrated inareaswithinthe0to50meterdepthzone. IUUFishing Pramod (2010) reported IUU fishing on various scales in the EEZ. It is more frequent in Andhra Pradesh,OrissaandWestBengal,andprobablyunderreportedforAndamanNicobarUTgiventhe proximitytoMyanmarandThailand.TheIndianCoastGuardisprimarilyresponsibleformonitoring oftheEEZ.Sinceitsinceptionin1978,theCoastGuardhasapprehendedover1,200fishingvessels belonging to nine Asian countries for violation of the Maritime Zones of India. Since the Marine FisheriesRegulationActswereenactedbythecoastalstate/UnionTerritoryGovernments,theCoast GuardisnotauthorizedtoundertakeMCSfunctionintheterritorialwaters. ExportTrade Duringtheperiod(200006),thetotalexportofvariousfishandfishproductsfromIndiatotheEU alone has increased more than twofold from 69,015 tons to 142,736 tons. It is emerging as an importantandgrowingmarketforIndia. Maldives A position presentation did not occur at the APFIC meeting, as the Maldives are not an APFIC Membercountry. PotentialforExpansion The total fishery production in Maldives, almost entirely tuna, has increased about six fold from 30,000 tons in the 1980s to 184,000 tons in 2006 by way of modernization. Almost the entire nationalcatchcomesfromwithinaradiusof75milesoftheislands,anareareservedforthelocal fishers. The EEZ (beyond the Coastal Fishery Zone) contributes only 2 percent of the catch (2007), whichlargelycomprisesyellowfintuna.Furtherexpansionisenvisaged. IUUFishing Monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) in the Maldives is carried out by many institutions. Between 2000 and 2008 Maldives apprehended 28 foreign fishing vessels both from neighboring countriesanddistantwaterfishingnations(orvesselsflyingflagsofconvenience). ExportTrade Abouttwothirdsofthecatchisexportedincanned,fresh/chilled,frozen,dried,andotherforms.The totalexportearningsinrecentyearswereinexcessofUS$100million.

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SriLanka Improvedmanagementoffisheriesincludesmorelegalactionsagainstillegalfishersandprohibition ofsomegearsinsomeareas.Meshsizeregulationhasalsobeenintroducedininlandfisheries.Long line technology is also being encouraged. Fisheries management areas have been declared and closed areas/seasons introduced to protect juvenile areas. Alternative income activities are also being introduced. Improved postharvest fish handling on vessels and in harbors have been encouraged also, including training programmes to improve food quality, e.g. training on Hazard AnalysisandCriticalControlPoint(HACCP).However,manyproblemsarestillpresentandincreased effortsareneeded. PotentialforExpansion Amongthemarinefisheriessubsectors,coastalfisherycontributesnearly65percentofthetotalfish landing in the country. The offshore and deep sea fishing is steadily emerging as an important contributor to the total fish production (Table 8). The share of this sector (offshore & deep sea fishing)intotalmarineproductionhasincreasedfrom8percentin1990toabout30percentin2008. Thenumber offishingvesselshasalsoincreasedfromatotalof31,619in2004to42,678in2007. Furtherexpansionisenvisaged. IUUFishing The fisheries legislation, while adequate in terms of addressing local and foreign fishing within the EEZ,doesnotprovideeffectivelyforhighseasfishingwhichisamajorproblemareaforcontrolling IUUfishing. FishExportTrade The fisheries export of Sri Lanka (20002006) mainly comprises frozen shrimps and fish (including yellowfintuna).Duringthisperiod,thetotalexportofvariousfishandfishproductsfromSriLanka to the EU increased nearly fourfold from 2,158 tons to 9,278 tons and presently (2008) stands at 13,816tons.Thegovernmentprovidessupportforexportgrowth.
Table8.ExpandingoperatingrangeoftraditionalsmallscalemultidayboatsinSriLanka(Amarasinghe,2001).

3.5InternationalDiscourseonMarineFisheriesandImplicationsforSmallScaleFisheries andPovertyintheBOBLMESA
Recentsynthesesoftheglobalstatusoftraditionalsmallscalefisheriesareinstructiveforenriching the framework for assessing case studies from the BOBLMESA. Worm at al. (2009) recognize that rebuildingsmallscalefisheriesindevelopingcountriesisasignificantchallengewheremostfishers donothaveaccesstoalternativesourcesoffood,incomeandemployment.Tomeetthechallenge developmentplanningintheBOBLMESAmustfirstlookathowthissituationcametobeinorderto avoidrepetitionofpastmistakesandtolearnfromexistinggoodpractices(seeIntrocuction,Section

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1.7 on Development and Unintended Consequences; and Section 2, Case Studies). Pauly (2008), statestheevolutionaryevents,thefactorsthatmaskthepresentcrisis,andpossibleremedies: Mainevents:

Following the peaking of production in industrialized countries in the 1970s, the fishery interestsspilledoverintotropicalwatersofdevelopingcountries(AlderandSumaila,2004). The200nauticalmileEEZcameintooperationinthe1980sbutdidnotleadtoimprovement ofthegraduallydegradingstatusofworldfisheries.Ratherluredbythepromiseofmarine richeswhichwerenowtheirs,mostcountries,developedanddevelopingalike,encouraged throughmassivesubsidizationschemesthedevelopmentoftheirfisheriesPauly(2008). Both developed and developing countries alike increased capacity by way of massive subsidies to motorized fishing fleets, some of which continued to be smallscale as in the BOBLMESA. Thebiomassoflargefishtraditionallytargetedbyfisheriesreducedtoatenthorlessofthe levelithadattheonsetofindustrialfishing. Seafoodnowflowsincreasinglyfromdevelopingtodevelopedcountries,resultinginreduced suppliesinproteindeficient,developingcountries. An increasing fraction of the worlds forage fish are being diverted to feed carnivorous farmedfishsuchassalmon,groupersandtuna.

Phenomenamaskingthecrisis:

Sincethe1980sChinahasbeenmassivelyoverreportingfishcatchestotheFAOdatabase. Decreasingcatchesfromfisheriesarepooledwithincreasingproductionfromaquaculturein theFAOdatabaseatthehighestlevelofaggregation. Seafood demand in developed countries is being increasingly met by imports from developingcountries. Governmentsaffiliated scientists assert that fisheries are fine by ignoring contradictory evidence.

Remedies:

ExpansionofMPAs,predictableaccessrights,ecolabelingtoenableconsumerstobuyfish from sustainable fisheries for which validation as a marketbased instrument is required (JacquetandPauly,2008),andabolitionofsubsidies.

The highly instructive expert analyses and opinions suggest the complexity of the way forward toward improved marine fishery management. Some of the premises need careful examination in thecontextofdevelopingcountries.PitcherandLam(2010)provideasummaryofthecontradictions that emerge when the ten most common management approaches are considered (Table 9). Additionally the form of consciousness that prevailed of marine resources when fishery modernization began was based upon the simple application of technology toward efficient harvestingofanunlimitedstockoffish.Thecomplexityofthecoastalandmarineenvironmentwas inadequately understood hence the unintended consequences of fishery development 88

(Introduction,Section1.7).Thechallengeistheapplicabilityofthesemanagementsolutionsinthe context of the complex dimensions of poverty in Bangladesh, India and in Sri Lanka where the imperativeisgrowthinallprimaryproductionsectors.IntheMaldivesthecontributionoffisheriesto employmenthasdiminishedfrom17%atthebeginningofthedecadeto9%in2006.Thisisbecause jobsintherapidlygrowingtourismsectorprovideattractivealternativejobopportunities.
Table9.Thetencommonlyadvocatedfisherymanagementsolutionsandtheassociatedlogicalandscientific contradictions that reveal their inadequacies if applied alone and piecemeal (Pitcher and Lam, 2010). The primaryreference(PitcherandLam,2010)isaccessibleonlineandprovidesextensivecitationsrelevanttothe textinthetable.Thistableincludesonlyindicationsofcontradictions.

FisheryManagementSolution PrivatizationofResources:e.g. ownershiprightssuchasindividual transferablequotas(ITQs). Assumption:ownershippromotes stewardship. TotalEconomicValuation(TEV): Assumption:TEVassignsvaluetofish stockswhichexceedmarketprices.This servesasaneconomicdisincentive. Laissezfaire: Assumption:Managementimproves whencommercialfisheryisallowedto managetheirownfisherieswithout governmentinterference. Selectivefishingtechnology: Assumption:Fishinggearselectedfor regulatedspecies,causingnodamageto benthicspeciesetc.,willreduceharmto overfishedstocks MarineProtectedAreas(MPAs): Assumption:Protectedareasofocean wherehumanactivitiesarerestricted conservebiodiversityandhedgeagainst scientificuncertainty. Singlespeciesstockassessment: Assumption:Rigorous,modeleddata enablescatchestobemadesustainable. Ecosystembasedmanagement(EBM): SimilartoFAOsEAF. Assumption:Aholistic,approach incorporatingthehumandimension improvesmanagement. Communitybasedmanagement(CBM): Assumption:Lessoverfishingoccurs wherelocalecologicalknowledgeis used. Traditionalecologicalknowledge(TEK): Assumption:Incorporatingtraditional knowledgeimpartssustainability Historicallybasedrestoration: Assumption:Reversingtoanearlier ecosystemstateenablessustainability ScientificContradictionsandLogicalInadequacies(PitcherandLam,2010 supportedbyreferences) Assumptionisafallacy,onlyaccessrightsareprovidedwithinatotalallowable catch(TAC),andnotownershipoftheresource.InIceland,economicefficiency increasedasinitiallyallocatedITQsbecameconcentratedintolargerfirms.The socialcostwasthemarginalizationofsmallscalefisheriesandcrews. TEVendowstheecosystemvaluebeyonditsmarketablelandedcatchvalue,but doesnotvaluepublicgoodswithconsiderationsofecologicalsustainabilityor socialequity.Asecosystemgoodsandservicesbecomescarcerandmore valuable,theymayacquiremarketvaluesthatmaycompromisethebasicneeds ofthepoorwhilecreatingopportunitiesfortherich. Privateinterestgroupswithpoliticalpower,suchascommercialfishermen,often influencefisheriesmanagementandpolicydecisionsagainstconservation creatingperverseeconomicincentivesnotablysubsidies.Thisenablesfishery enterprisestofishwhenitwouldbeotherwiseuneconomicalifcostsandbenefits werestrictlymarketdeterminedorinternalized. Fishingtechnologyhasevolvedovermillenniatoincreasefishcatch,numberof targetspeciescaught,totravelgreaterdistancestonewhabitatsandgreater depths.Theeffecthasbeenserialdepletionofspeciesandfishedareas,while fishermenbenefitfromglobalizationofmarkets.Improvedfishingtechnology aloneisunlikelytoaddressconservationissues. MPAsarenowrecognizednotaspanaceas,butasusefulecosystembased managementtools.Hilborn(2007)assertsabsenceofscientificevidence.An analysisofcomplianceofthetop53fishingnationswithMPAprovisionsofthe UnitedNationsCodeofConductforResponsibleFisheriesawardedonly15% good,andover80%failgrades. Singlespeciesfisheriesscienceneglectscomplexmultispeciesandhuman interactions.Suchstockassessmentanalysesoftenmisscriticalfactorsinthereal fisheriesdynamics.Theapproachrequiresintensivedataformanyparameters. NoknowncaseswhereEBM(orEAF)hasproducedtheexpectedbenefits. ImplementingFAOsEAFrequiressimpletomeasureindicators.Evenwhere necessaryecosysteminformationisavailable,complexmultispeciesinteractions withmultiplestakeholderscaninadvertentlyheightentheexploitationof resources.EvaluationofEBMin33topfishingnationsrevealeddismalresults. Traditionalsocioeconomicsystemsgovernedbycustomarypracticesandlaws reducesomeoftheenvironmentaldamageoflargescale,industrial,mixedstock fisheries.CBMdoesnotnecessarilyproduceitsoftenclaimedbenefitsincluding moreequitabledistributionsofpower,economicreturnsandsustainableuse. TEKcanbeprofound,butthemorediverseandnumerousthestakeholders,the morechallengingthemanagementandgovernance.Lackofcrosscultural understandingoftenarisesfromdifferingculturalvaluesofnaturalresources. Couldthisbeanaturalisticfallacy?Fromamorerealisticandcomplex perspective,thisstrategyisacompositeofmanyofthepreviouslydiscussed instruments.Lessonsfromhistoryrevealthatfisherieswereseriallydepleted.

Pitcher and Lam (2010) conclude that the tradeoffs among the ten common fishery management strategiesneedtobeunderstoodwithcaretoarriveatacompositepolicyapproach.Theystatethat Aspects of all ten fisheries management strategies will likely need to be implemented, but none alone is sufficient to avert the growing global fisheries and looming food crises. The historical

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imperativetellsuswhathappenedinthepastandhelpsusdecidewhatwewantforthefuture,by informing how we design socioeconomic incentives and policy goals today. Human demands and impacts on the sea are intensifying with global population growth, industrialization, and climate change. By examining historical ecosystems and customary practices and norms, by returning to traditional food sources and communitybased management, by considering judicious use of plankton resources in an ecosystembased context, and by the selective and efficient use of technology, we may intentionally shift global society to a more desirable future. With scientific insight, powered by political will and consumer awareness, we can rebuild fisheries ethically, addressingthebasichumanrighttofoodwhileleavingbiodiversemarineecosystemslargelyintact.

3.6CanfishingeffortbeexpandedintheBOBLMESAEEZs?
The National Reports from BOBLME Stage 1 recognize generally the scope for expansion of fishing effort, by way of improved technology in combination with incentives, monitoring, control and surveillance(MCS).Kurien(2006)arguesthatincentivesmayincludesubsidies.Chang(2002;2003) uses a historical perspective to demonstrate that subsidies in fisheries that were key to fisheries developmentandhumanwellbeingincoastalcommunitiesinindustrializedcountriesmaybeuseful in developing countries. Trade in fishery products has grown since 1961 in a manner where the developingcountriescontributed60%toglobalfishproductionin2001.InacontextwheretheEEZs of the BOBLMESA countries are only utilized partially, intensification of fishing effort through subsidiesisperceivedasanopportunity(Table10).However,giventheseriousshortcomingsinthe scientific understanding of the state of fishery stocks based on the complex relationships among oceanographic, biological and socioeconomic aspects, in the South Asian countries, the perceived opportunity could be misleading. It is precisely the oversimplification of complex fishery environments that has precipitated both the intended and the undesirable, unintended consequencesofplannedinterventions.Therefore,cautioniswarranted.
Table10.ThedivergenceinperceptionoftheexistingsituationinregardtofisheriesintheBOBLMESAbased uponprevailinginformation,andthepossiblefutureinrelationtothesegmentoftheBayofBengalsituated outside national jurisdictions, global trade prospects and potential contribution to national development (see textforexplanation).
BOBLMESA Patternofutilizationofresourcepotential 50%asEEZsasnationaljurisdictions Country 50%situatedoutsidenationaljurisdiction

Bangladesh India Maldives SriLanka

Inshore (%) on Offshore (%) beyond the continental Reportedsituation:Distantwaterfleets continentalshelf shelf fromindustrializedandsomenon industrializednationstargetinghighvalue 98 Notreported species,sometimes,withalargebycatch, totheexclusionofnationalfleets 90 10 (BOBLMEStage1:NationalReports). 2 65 98(CoastalFishingZone) 10

Perception of utilization and management need: overexploited, fishery should Perceptionofopportunity:theSAnations bemanaged,subsidiestobeeliminated(FAO,2005a;b),habitatsandpollution couldexpandproductionwithappropriate tobemanaged. supportfromstateincentives,including subsidies,technologyflowingfrom Reported situation: expanding utilization by distant water fishing fleets from globalization,andadherenceto industrializednations,includingIUU(BOBPIGO,2009;MRAG,2008). internationalconventions(Kurien,2006). Theperception,however,isscientifically Perception of opportunity: offshore exploitation and utilization of resources unverified. couldbeexpandedthroughdeepseafishing,jointventuresetc(Kurien,2006). ChallengetoBOBLMESA:benefitingfromtheavailablefisheryresourceopportunitybywayofappropriatenegotiationsat

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the WTO, and broadening the equitable distribution of benefits toward livelihood development, particularly poverty (deprivation) reduction, and adaptation to climate change. Minimizing resource competition between modernized shrimp trawling(classifiedassmallscalefishery)andtraditional/artisanalsmallscalefisheryparticularlyinIndia(Pramod,2010).

ResourceRentinFisheries(DFID,2004) Resourcerentisakeyconceptinfisheriesexploitationandmanagementbecauseontheonehand,it is the driving force behind the widespread overexploitation of fisheries, and on the other, it determines the potential economic and social benefits that may be derived from well managed fisheries.Managementsystemshavetypicallypaidinsufficientattentiontoresourcerent,afactthat hasbeenamajorreasonforthefailureofmanysuchsystems.Whereresourcerentisnotdealtwith explicitly,theincentiveforeachfisher toattempttocatchfishbeforeothersdoensuresthatsuch rent is eventually all dissipated i.e., it is invested in excess fishing capacity leading to over exploitation in both economic and biological terms (Hardin, 1965). The issue of resource rent is relatedstronglytoaccessconditionsinthefishery.Thefreeandopenaccessnatureofmanyfisheries leadstooverexploitation.Therefore,itraisesquestionsofdefiningownershipandpropertyanduse rights. Ownership issues, in turn, lead to problems of who is able to charge' for the use of the resource, who bears the costs of use and who reaps the benefits. Management objectives in a fishery are ultimatelyofasocialandeconomiccharacter,andtheirachievementonasustainablebasisrequires the explicit consideration of resource rent its generation and distribution. The achievement of theseobjectivesissubjecttoconstraints,especiallyecologicalsustainability.Becauseofwidespread overexploitation,thislatterconstraintoftenfeaturesasapolicygoal.Policydecisionsmustbemade abouthowthewealthfromthefisheryiscollectedandhowthatwealthisdistributed. WorldBankandFAO(2009)havefocusedattentiononresourcerentanditssignificanceinplanning foroptimaluseoffisheryresources.Thecharacterofcommonpoolresourcesrequiresrecognition forpropermanagement(Berkes,2006).SomecasestudiesinSection2demonstratethattraditional practicesalreadyexistformanagementofcommonpoolresources.

3.7Risk,ExposureandChronicDisaster
The relationship of the BOBLMESA to natural hazards, emerging uncertainties associated with climate change, and the ongoing demographic trends, place coastal populations at increasing risk. ThisrequiresrecognitioninallinterventionsrelatedtoCBICM.Riskistheproductofthefrequencyof hazardsandthepotentialfordamagetolifeandproperty.Thus,riskincreasesproportionatetothe density of population and property in an exposed area. Accordingly Bangladesh ranks as the most vulnerablecountrytotropicalcyclonesbasedupondeaths/100,000ofpopulationexposedtofloods and cyclones (GOB 2008). The impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in India and Sri Lanka demonstratedthehigherprobabilitythatextremeeventsdestroylifeandpropertyofpoorersmall scale fishing populations along exposed coasts (Kasperson and Kasperson, 1991; Kelman, 2007; OKeefeetal.,1976;Sachs,2005). In the context of CBICM, recognition is required for the distinction between acute and chronic disasters.Theformerarethosetowhichadateandtimemaybeassignedasinthecaseofthe2004 IndianOceanTsunami.Chronicdisastersarethosewheresocialandpoliticalfactorscontributetothe gradual concentration of human populations at locations that are unsuitable for secure habitation, and which because of low income cannot invest in housing that adheres to minimum safety standards. The primary driving forces of chronic disaster are poverty and political marginalization (Lemos et al., 2007; Sieh, 2000; 2006). Where acute and chronic disasters combine catastrophe is inevitableasamplydemonstratedbytherecent2004IndianOceanTsunami,CycloneSidr2007,and Cyclone Nargis 2008. The latter two conveyed powerful lessons on the need for preparation to securelifeandpropertyofpoorcoastalpopulations(Box10).

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Box10.PreparationforHazardsReducesLossofLife CycloneSidrhitthesouthwesterncoastofBangladeshintheeveningof15November2007asacategory4 supercyclonewithpeakwindsat250kilometersperhour.Approximately30ofBangladeshs64districtswere affected by the storm. A total of 3,295 people were reported dead and approximately 53,000 people were reportedmissing.Across30districtsofBangladesh,8.7millionpeoplewereaffected. Cyclone Sidr that hit Bangladesh in November 2007 was similar to Cyclone Nargis, the cyclone that has devastated much of Myanmar since 2 May 2008. Yet the impacts from these events are worlds apart Bangladesh lost 3,000 people while it is estimated that Myanmar will have more than 100,000 deaths. With similar Human Development Index rankings, similar poverty levels and similar annual GDP, the lives and vulnerabilities of communities in Myanmar and Bangladesh living on extensive coastal tributary systems are remarkablyalike.Whythendidsimilarcycloneeventsaffectingsimilarcommunitiesresultinstrikinglydifferent disasters? The answer: Bangladesh has incorporated early warning systems, mitigation measures and community preparednessactivitiesintoitsdevelopmentprogram,andMyanmarhasnot.Threekeydisasterriskreduction measuresinBangladeshare: 1.Effectiveearlywarningsystems:Bangladeshhasa48hourearlywarningsystemthatadvisespeopleatrisk toevacuatetosafecyclonesheltersbeforecyclonesmakelandfall.Myanmarhadnoearlywarningsystemand informationwasnotcommunicatedtocommunitiesindanger. 2.Embankments:Bangladeshhasinvestedinfloodandstormsurgeembankmentsinhighriskareas.Myanmar hasnosuchstructuralmitigation. 3.Preservedmangroveforests:Bangladeshhasworkedwithkeypartnerdevelopmentagenciesover10years to protect the Sundarbans, the worlds largest mangrove system and world heritage site. Myanmar has destroyeditsmangroveforestsystem,losingitsnaturalbuffer. This event demonstrated that size of a hazard event does not matter, since the samesized cyclone had differentimpactsinBangladeshandMyanmar. http://www.ausaid.gov.au/hottopics/pdf/AIDRF_Feasibility_Study_Report_annex610.pdf

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4.Retrospection,ConclusionsandRecommendations 4.1Retrospection
Retrospection is warranted before the transition can be made to conclusions from the material presented in the preceding sections. The material was wideranging and complex but necessary to bringclaritytothechallengeofCBICM,ormorepointedly,toimpartingsustainabilitytothesmall scalefisheryintheBOBLMESA.Retrospectionwouldservetoensurethatthefocusandemphasisis retainedonlivelihoodofcoastalcommunitiesasthecoreproblem.Thisbecomesmoremeaningful when the problem of livelihood is looked at from an evolutionary standpoint, i.e. the manner in whichchangehasoccurredduringaperiodofaboutfivedecadessincethe1960s.Thesefivedecades constituteanappropriateperiodsinceitallowsacomparisonofchangesduringthreedistinctstages of fishery development: (i) premodernization; (ii) modernization, and (iii) postmodernization coupled with globalization (Kurien, 2003; 2005; Neiland, 2004; Salagrama and Koriya, 2008). The changes brought about by the expansion of adequately serviced modernized small scale fishing fleets, paralleled with the decline in the traditional and partially mechanized small scale fishery livelihood, appear to have occurred in complex and indirect ways associated with geomorphology, policy disjuncture contributing to inequity, and negative externalities (rent dissipation). The questions relevant to the evolutionary change process as demonstrated by the case studies during thesethreestagesare: 1. Why has the wellbeing of traditional and partially mechanized marine smallscale fishers declinedfromimpactsofnationalfisherydevelopmentpolicy, whiletheintendedgoal was improvedlivelihoodthroughmodernization? 2. Are there countries in which the wellbeing of smallscale fishers has been deliberately improvedbywayofappropriatepolicy? 3. What are the key concepts that have contributed to enhanced wellbeing of small scale fisherswheredevelopmentpolicyproducedtheintendedresult? 4. Whatarethekeyingredientsindevelopmenteconomicpoliciesthatcontributetoorenable theopportunitiesforenhancedwellbeingofsmallscalefishers? 5. Whatconclusionsmaybewarrantedwithregardtoreliabilityofsimilarchangesduringthe BOBLME Stage 2 Programme? What key lessons can be drawn from the initiatives in community management, comanagement and livelihoods development in the South Asian BOBLME countries? How can the best practices and lessons from these community driven experiencesberecognized,furtherstrengthened,adapted/replicated? Preliminaryanswerstothesequestionsareprovidedbelow.Theanswersanddiscussionsrelatedto these questions form the basis for the overall conclusions presented in this review and provide important information for further discussion and debate at the regional level and national level. It must be remembered, however, as Arthur C. Clark, one of the greatest minds of our time noted, information is not knowledge, knowledge is not wisdom, and wisdom is not foresight, but informationprovidesthefoundationforallothers. Thefollowinganswers15followthesequenceofquestionsastheyarepresentedabove: 1. Why has the wellbeing of traditional and partially mechanized marine small scale fishers declined from impacts of national fishery development policy, while the intended goal was improvedlivelihoodthroughmodernization?

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The participation of traditional small scale fishers was regarded as a means to an end, i.e. their participation would increase fishery production on a national scale through modernization. The socioeconomicwellbeingofthefisherswasinadequatelyregardedasanendinitselfinparallelwith increased fish production. Benefits of modernization were meant to trickle down even in the absence of the necessary enabling mechanisms. Sen (1995; 1999) clarifies the distinction. Human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress, but they also happen to be directlyorindirectly,theprimarymeansofallproduction.Thisdualroleofhumanbeingsprovidesa rich ground for confusion of ends and means in planning and policy making. Indeed, it can and frequentlydoestaketheformoffocusingonproductionandprosperityastheessenceofprogress, treatingpeopleasthemeansthroughwhichthatproductiveprogressisbroughtabout(ratherthan seeingthelivesofpeopleastheultimateconcernandtreatingproductionandprosperitymerelyas means to those lives) http://tek.bke.hu/korok/sen/docs/development.pdf. Jentoff et al. (2010) arguethatSens(1995;1999)thoughtsonfreedom,developmentandpovertyrequireincorporation into perceptions and interpretation of small scale fisheries. During the past most interventions in supportofmarginalizedsmallscalefishersweredrivenbyaidprogrammeswithgovernmentsbeing bystanders (APFIC, 2005) while artisanal fishers continued to be entrenched in declining fisheries (Cinneretal..2008).Stiglitz(2002;2006)hasshownthateconomicgrowthinitspresentformneither reducespovertynorincreaseshumanwellbeingunlessmechanismsexisttopromoteequity. 2. Are there countries where the wellbeing of small scale fishers has been deliberately improvedbywayofappropriatepolicy? Thefollowinganswermustbeconsideredincombinationwithacaveattheroleofsubsidiesinthe particularexamplesarenotprovidedasjustificationforcontinuationofthesameastheynowexist, particularly in small scale commercial, and industrial fisheries (Jacquet and Pauly, 2008). The developmentoffisheriesandfisherylivelihoodindevelopedcountriesincludingCanada,Norwayand Iceland during 1930 1980 were driven by appropriate national plans, policies and state support. This support included subsidies, both physical and financial, to fishing communities and fish processingplantworkersforimprovementofthesocioeconomicconditionsandprovisionofsocial securityarrangements.Thesestateinterventionshadasignificantimpactandgreatlyenhancedthe livelihood security of communities dependent on fisheries. The following two examples suffice to make the point that it is possible and feasible for the state to plan fishery development while ensuringthewellbeingofthefishersandfishercommunitiesinparallelwithintroductionofmodern technologytoincreaseproduction(WorldBank,2006;Kurien,2006). In Canada when fishermen incurred losses due to bad weather the government introduced a subsidized vessel insurance plan. When the cod fishery collapsed in 1992, a massive adjustment programmehelpedindividualsandcommunitiestoadjustoutofthefishery,largelythroughtraining, retirementandlicensebuybackprogrammesthatwereintroduced(Schrank,2003). InNorway,thenaturalfluctuationofthenorthernfisheryledtohardtimesforfishermen.Asearlyas 1933,thegovernmentestablishedafisheriesbank,andprovidedloansatbeneficialratesandeven sometimes interest free in emergencies. A health insurance scheme was introduced in 1936. Between1959and1964, basedona MasterAgreementfortheFishingIndustry,severallivelihood security measures were adopted. These included wage equalization measures, vacation support, unemploymentinsurance,damagecompensationamongothers.Thesesubsidieswereeliminatedin the mid1990s after the coastal communities achieved a standard of living on par with that of the averageindustrialworker(Schrank,2003). 3. What are the key concepts that have contributed to enhanced wellbeing of small scale fisherswheredevelopmentpolicyproducedtheintendedresult? The key conceptual factors that can be considered to have contributed to enhanced wellbeing of smallscalefishersinclude:

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 i. ii. Developmentplanninginfisheriesinclusiveofinterventionstargetingthesmallscalefishers asbeneficiaries;and Capacity development to adjust out of the fishery when fishery stocks diminish, or the provisionoflivelihoodresilienceindependentlyoffluctuationsinnaturalstocksandgrowth incoastalhumanpopulations.

Targetedinterventionshavetobeunderpinnedbypoliciesthatensureequityindistribution(World Bank,2006),andacknowledgingdevelopmentasfreedomexplainedingreaterdetailinSection2of thisreport(Sen,1995;1999). 4. What are the key ingredients in development economic policies that contribute to or enabletheopportunitiesforenhancedwellbeingofsmallscalefishers? Thekeydevelopmenteconomicpoliciesthatcontributetoorenabletheopportunitiesforenhanced wellbeingofsmallscalefisherscanberegardedas: i. A law and order situation which guarantees property safeguards and the application of resource rents that prevent rent capture by politically oriented interests at the expense of thesmallscalefishers(WorldBank/FAO,2009;CommissiononLegalEmpowermentofthe Poor,2008) Organization of small scale fishers, their empowerment and awareness building leading to adequatepublicpressurethatcompelslegislatorstoreact(JacquetandPauly,2008;Kurien 2005;Chomsky1999).

ii.

5. Whatconclusionsmaybewarrantedwithregardtoreliabilityofsimilarchangesduringthe BOBLMEStage2Programme? Public policy with regard to smallscale fisheries cannot remain to be the sole domain of political authorities. In the absence of public pressure based on awareness (from smallscale fishery stakeholders)thereisinsufficientreason,motivationorincentiveforpolicychangestobemadeon the basis of scientific evidence alone, since the junk science label may be fixed on even the best scientificevidenceifeliteinterestsarechallenged(BenYami,2004;Chomsky,1999;Herman,2003; Hilborn,2007;Pauly,2005).Sciencecanonlyprovidetheknowledgefoundationforpoliticalactivism. The necessary changes could result from data gathering, training, capacity building which would resultinempowerment,organizationandadvocacyleadingtocompellingpublicpressuresuchthat legislatorsreactinamannerthatnarrowstheexistinginstitutionalandgovernancedistancebetween governmentandsmallscalefisheryinterests. McClanahanetal.,2009,researchingfisheryexploitationsystemsassocialecologicalsystems(SESs), encourage the promotion of social institutions. They assert that socioeconomic development of coastalcommunitiesmusttakeprecedenceoverbiodiversitybasedconservationefforts.Facilitating development and catalyzing locallevel adoption of rules that create limits to appropriation and technology,sinceitisincreasinglyrecognizedthatsuchlimitsarekeysolutionstothethreatscould serve both socioeconomic and conservation interests. They predict that addressing the four priorities given below would also provide benefits in relation to management of biodiversity and ecosystemservices.Thiswillbeachievedifpolicyandactions: 1. Encourageprofessionalism(formationofsocieties,settingstandards,certification, self policing,appropriatetechnology,etc.), 2. Create forums where all opinions about solutions, the status of targeted species, and environmentalrequirementsarerepresented, 3. Promotesocialrulesthatconsidertherealitiesandlimitsofthehouseholdsandlocalsocial economy,and

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4. Craftsolutionstailoredtothespecificandagreedupondiagnoses.

4.2.Conclusions
The conclusions are drawn from the case studies in relation to the FAO Vision for Smallscale Fisheries(Staplesetal.,2004),thefisheriessustainabilityframeworkmodel(Greboval,2002;Swan and Greboval, 2003) and the APFIC recommendations for mainstreaming traditional smallscale fisheriesmanagement,theglobalperspective,andfieldexperienceoftheconsultant.Thepreceding retrospective serves to provide reference for the conclusions in terms of indicating possibilities for thefuture.Theseconclusions,initiallydevelopedfordiscussionattheBOBLMESAWorkshop,2829 July 2010 in Colombo, were revised on the basis of recommendations put forward by the country delegations. 1. Economic growth is necessary to reduce poverty at the national level. Currently the process and trendsofeconomicgrowtharemarginalizingtraditionalfishersbecauseofculturalfactors,because of the absence of opportunities from which this sector of fishers can benefit, and the absence of policythatisdesignedtoprovideequitabledevelopment.Integratedcoastaldevelopmentplanningis necessary to ensure equitable sharing of benefits from coastal resources. In the absence of a mechanism for integration of traditional fishers this resource user group continues to be marginalizeddespitetheirsignificantcontributiontofoodsecurity. 2. CommunityBasedIntegratedCoastalManagement(CBICM)whichimpliestheintegrationofcoastal resources management and fisheries management within FAOs Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (EAF) does not exist in the BOBLME since Integrated Coastal Management (ICM) is not practiced uniformly. 3. CBICM with stewardship of local communities is adequate where the ecological system and competingusesarelimited.Wherethegeographicscaleoftheecologicalsystemandusesincrease, partnershipwiththegovernmentbecomesnecessaryinordertoresolveresourceuseconflicts. 4. A variety of different approaches to coastal resources management exist in the four BOBLMESA countries;Bangladesh,India,MaldivesandSriLanka.Thedifferentapproachestocoastalresources managementarebasedupon: Bangladesh an intersectoral collaborative development process without a declared legal coastalzone India a land use regulation process (which is in process of transition since the coastal regulatoryzoneisbeingrevised). Maldives In the absence of a continental shelf of the form that exists in the other three countries,acoastalfisherieszonehasbeendeclaredastheoperationalarea. Sri Lanka a narrow legal coastal belt encompassing both land and sea which partially overlapswiththefisherymanagementjurisdiction

5. TheexamplesofCBFMandComanagementanalyzedinthereview(exceptthefisherycooperatives) embodylimitationsofaccessinvariousforms.Thisisthepreconditionforsustainabilityoffisheries. The strengthening of existing management mechanisms through comanagement will consolidate sustainability. 6. The coastal resources management processes are not integrated with the land uses that cause negativeexternalities(e.g.landbasedsourcesofpollution)asrequiredinFAOsEAF. 7. Overfishing is evident from applicable indicators in the near shore coastal waters of Bangladesh, IndiaandSriLankawhichhasadverseimpactsonthelivelihoodinterestsoftraditionalmechanized andnonmechanizedfishers.

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8. Fisherymodernizationhasresultedinincreasedproductionwhichhasdisproportionatelybenefitted the external investors in production and marketing rather than the traditional producers. This process of change may continue unless livelihood safeguards are available to the marginalized traditionalproducers.Fisherymodernizationhasalsoleadtothetransformationoftheroleoffishers fromproducerstolaborersandthemarginalizationofwomeninthesupplychain. 9. Lack of development policy that supports the interests of traditional mechanized and non mechanized fishers has resulted in the marginalization of this sector through the lack of their representation in development decision making processes. The existing trends suggest that traditional fishers shall continue to be marginalized unless deliberate policy choices are made to reversethispattern.

10. The existence of property rights (informal and/or formal) alone does not guarantee a reversal in thesetrends.InspiteoftheexistenceofCBFMandcomanagementpracticesthevastmajorityof traditionalfisherslackrecognitionandhavebecomemarginalized:

In terms of opportunities for acquiring economic benefits from coastal resources proportionate to the services they provide in terms of food security and the local and nationaleconomies. Intermsoftheircapacitytoparticipateintheprocessesofdecisionmaking thataffectthe health of coastal resources (land competition, pollution from land uses, biodiversity conservation/protectedareasmanagement) Becauseoftheirlackofidentityanchoredtogeographiclocationsofhabitationandresource use; small scale fishers are not on the map or currently recognized. There is very little informationontheirdistributionandtheirpatternsofresourceuse.

11. Thelivelihoodproblemassociatedwithtraditionalfisheriesismassiveandloomingintermsofsocio economics,andinthefaceofincreasingriskfromcoastalhazardslinkedtoclimatechangeandsea levelrise.Thisproblemhastobeaddressedfirmlyandsteadfastlybywayof:

education, health, infrastructureforlifeandsecurity, empowermentincludingwomen,marginalizedgroups,and accesstoupwardsocialmobility.

12. Many marginalized coastal/ fisher communities are in a chronic poverty trap which results in progressiveincreaseintheirlevelofdeprivation(creepingnormalcy).Thisrequiresrecognitionatthe nationallevelasachronicdisasterwhichmaycombinewithacutecoastalhazards(thosetowhicha timeanddatecanbegiven)resultingincatastrophes. 13. Theremoteanddispersednatureofcoastal/fishercommunities/settlementswhichareinadequately serviced with infrastructure has obstructed movement into other occupations i.e. poor access to education,health,alternativeemploymentopportunitiesetc. 14. High levels of income poverty and lack of access to alternative means of income have caused displacement and transfer of responsibility for family health and nutrition to women heads of households.ThisisparticularlythecaseinBangladeshandinsomeoftheIndianstates.

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15. In the context of national development expansion of fisheries into offshore waters within EEZs is perceivedasanapproachtobenefittingfromglobalfisherytrade.Theprocessofexpansioniseither being planned or it is already occurring. The expansion into offshore waters and export oriented coastalfisheryproductionmeasuresmaybewarranted,ifsupportedbyscientificstockinformation, to safeguard the ecological structure of near shore coastal waters on which traditional coastal fisheriesdepend.Aprecautionaryapproachisrequired. 16. Iffisherydevelopmentisplannedandimplementedasithasoccurredduringthepastfivedecades, i.e. without adequately understanding the complexity of the particular socioecological systems, undesirable unintended consequences will be inevitable with the severest socioeconomic impacts beingbornebytheweakestactorsinthesector.

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4.3Recommendations
1. CBFM and comanagement practices exist in traditional fishing communities at different geographic and institutional scales. These practices operate on a basis of informal and formal limitations of access, sets of rules that have developed to support institutional cohesion, consultativedecisionmakingandlivelihoodsafeguardsforparticipatinghouseholds.Despitethe impacts of fishery modernization and economic growth in the fisheries sector these practices havedemonstratedresilience. A policybased strengthening of existing CBFM and comanagement practices is necessary for therealizationofthepotentialforthesepracticestosupportsustainablelivelihoodforcoastal/ fishercommunities. 2. Theprocessofchangeincoastalresourceuseresultsfromasharingofresourcesamongmany sectors and needs to be planned. In development planning there is a need to create equitable opportunityfortraditionalfisherstobenefit.Appropriategovernancewithparticipatorydecision makingisrequiredtominimizeconflictandensureequityinbenefitssharingforallstakeholders. In this respect coastal planning needs to recognize all players in order to maximize opportunitiesforintersectoralcooperationandtoavoidtheerosionoftraditionallandusesand livelihood. The management of the near shore fisheries is an important aspect of Integrated CoastalManagement(ICM)andrequirestheengagementoffisherstoparticipateintheplanning and decision making processes as equal partners. Enabling mechanisms are required e.g. integratedplanningprocesses,localcapacitybuildingtorespondtoopportunities. 3. It is important to take measures to consolidate and safeguard existing CBFM and co managementpractices(whetherformalorinformal)toensurethattheybecomeeffectiveeven in the absence of fully fledged national ICM mechanisms/ policy. This must be a priority. It is feasible to anticipate that the political (group) demand for ICM would emerge from the stakeholders currently participating in CBFM and comanagement processes as they become knowledgeable about the ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAF). A number of practicalstepscanbetakentoconsolidateandstrengthenexistingCBFMandcomanagement practices; i. Workshops that build awareness and knowledge may contribute to the acceleration of CB ICM. ii. ResearchtodefinesocialecologicalsystemsthatdemonstrateCBFMandcomanagement. Research would incorporate four fundamental attributes: (i) the resource system and its ecologicallinkages,(ii)thenumberofresourceunitsgeneratedbytheresourcesystem,(iii) thenumberofresourceusersand(iv)theinstitutionsthatsupportmanagement. Mapping processes that recognize and document the nature of existing CBFM and co management practices in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka are critical steps towards establishingafoundationforsustainableresourcemanagement.Suchmapping(whichwould include information on fishing areas, distance from the shore, bathymetry and sea bed

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features) will result in the allocation of a geospatial identity for the traditional fisheries sector.Thisisanessentialfirststeptowardsempowerment. Nationalpolicyreformsarerequiredformappingthedistributionandresourceusepatterns ofcoastalresourcesbythetraditionalmechanizedandnonmechanizedfisheriessector. iii. Socioecologicalentities(groupsandorganizations)empoweredbyknowledgeofthesystem attributes provide a step toward the development of networks and federations that then havethesubsequentabilitytoacquirepoliticalpower. iv. Economic valuation of the contribution by traditional fisheries (to employment, nutrition/ food security, gender aspects etc.) needs to be researched and demonstrated to national policy makers. Demonstrating economic contribution of CBFM and comanagement practices to the local and regional economies in terms of food security and employment would be persuasive for the state to support dedicated policy promoting comanagement practicesandtobearthetransactioncostsofformalizingcomanagement. ThetechnicalinformationthatisrequiredforeconomicvaluationofexistingCBFMandco management are; (i) the resource system and its ecological linkages, (ii) the number of resourceunitsgeneratedbytheresourcesystem,(iii)thenumberofresourceusersand(iv) theinstitutionsthatsupportmanagement. v. In the Maldives consolidation of existing comanagement in the coastal fisheries zone requiressafeguardsagainstIUUfishingandotherformsoffishingdrivenbyvestedinterests suchasindustrialfishing. 4. Reversalofthemarginalizationoftraditionalmechanizedandnonmechanizedfisheriesrequires the recognition of traditional fishers as a subsector in its own right and the targeting of initiatives that will support their needs and interests. The key steps towards achieving this include: (i) providing geospatial identity to each entity which embodies CBFM and (informal) co management. (ii) policy reforms that target these recognized geospatial entities. (iii) zonation that accommodates coexistence of such entities alongside other competition for resource use andspace(iv)monitoringandenforcementofregulations. 5. Regulationsarerequiredtoprovideterritorialuserightsinfisheries(TURFs)tostakeholderswho are participating in CBFM and comanagement. Local understanding of legislation governing resource management is an essential underpinning for this to take place because regulations pertainingtofisheriesandtocoastalresourcesmanagementfallwithinambitsofmanyagencies. Thisrequiressupportthroughcollaborationamongresponsiblegovernmentagenciesbothatthe nationalandlocallevel. 6. Improving livelihoods: Initiation of processes for the provision of identity to migratory households/groupslocatedinremoteareas.Thisisimportantsincemanyofthemdonothave permanent addresses. This is particularly important for itinerant or migratory groups that are

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

mobileinordertobringthemintopovertyreductionsupportprogrammes.Nationalprogrammes are now underway for poverty reduction in the context of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and other similar interventions. Transfers of benefits can occur to marginalized fisher communitiesonlytotheextentthattheycanbeidentified.Thepracticalrecommendationisthe mobilizationofNGOstoachievethistask. Capacity development to enable communities to access services provided by microfinance institutionsisakeypracticalstepwhichcanallowhouseholdsandcommunitygroupstheoption todiversifylivelihood/incomegeneratingopportunities.Thiscanbecomethebasisofvoluntary cooperativedevelopmentasaprocessthathasthepotentialtooffersignificantpositivechange forcommunitygroupsthrougheconomicandpoliticalempowerment. The potential for publicprivate partnerships between coastal tourism investors and fishing communities. There is a mutually beneficial relationship between the two sectors, the public right of fishing communities to access the sea and the cultural interest factor for tourism that fishingcommunitiesbring.Itisgovernmentpolicythatenablesorensureswhetherthiskindof coexistencehasthepotentialtothrive. Global/exportdemandforaquacultureproductscanleadtolandcapturebyinvestorsandthe marginalization of traditional inhabitants, often fisher communities. Therefore policies that promote expansion of aquaculture must be designed with institutionalized mechanisms for equitabledistributionofbenefitsincluded. Thedesignandimplementationofprotectedareasshouldbedoneinaparticipatorymannerand bebaseduponconsiderationsofaccessfortraditionalfisherstothefisheries. Microfinance/ microcredit interventions are demonstrating effectiveness for providing financial supportforalternativeemploymentanddiversificationoflivelihood.TheinitiativesofNGOshave acquiredsupportfromgovernmentandbanksbecauseofproveneffectiveness.Manytraditional fishing communities lack capacity to access such financial programmes because of inadequate training and/ or education. Measures need to be in place to prevent exploitation of credit recipientsfromusuriousinterestandtoprotectthemfromunscrupulousMFIs.

12. Inventoriesareneedtobedevelopedformembersoffisherhouseholdswhoarenowemployed inothercountriesandsendbackremittances.Thisclassofforeignexchangeremittersarenow acquiringrecognitionasasignificantcontributorofforeignexchange,thatevenexceedsforeign direct investment (FDI). Such remitters require organization as a class to lobby and negotiate healthandeducationinvestmentsintheirowncommunities.

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