Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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of Oriental systems cannot be derived from a close reading of his texts. Jiirgen Habermas, in his lectures on Foucault, suggests that "the contact with and the immersioninto the Orientalworld"is mediated by Schopenhauer, and that it constitutes, for Western rationality, one of the boundary experiences ("Grenzerfahrungen")Foucault undertook to explore (280-81). But Foucault's work also points to a more immediate and direct encounter with Oriental thought than could have been mediated by the philosophical tradition alone. As with other influences on Foucault, we are certainlydealing here with highly individualized appropriations and with often deliberate concealment. A case in point is the philosophy of Martin Heidegger.Many commentators see it as one of the more prominent influences on Foucault, and it goes a long way towardexplaining Foucault, as Manfred Frank has shown. Yet Foucault never mentions Heidegger, thus concealing a source and avoiding a specific positioning of his own discourse. Similarly, Foucault rarely refers explicitly to the Orient, while other Frenchthinkersof the poststructuralist generation publicly discuss their perceptionsof the East, modern as well as traditional, showing a keen interest in the subject and urging intensified study. One prominent example is Roland Barthes's book on Japan, L'empire des signes. It is because the Oriental discourse in Foucault's work is almost always hidden that I designate it a "subtext." Foucault would conceal such appropriated knowledge all the more rigorously if he considered it "subjugated" and "subversive" at the same time. For him, there is no dichotomy here. In his view repressed and forbidden knowledge can have the most explosive potential for subverting power. Much of his work is concerned with excluded and forbidden codes or discourses.They become hidden, according to Foucault, when interdictions are brought to bear against them within certain intellectual cultures. Thus they become the silent underground of the official discourses. Foucault himself has termed such concealed codes "esoteric in . . . structure"("La folie" 16). In the West, Orientalthought systems are indeed often regardedas esoteric theologies rather than as philosophies. Perhaps one reason Foucault concealed the Oriental element in his work was to avoid having his discourse stigmatized as "religious" or "metaphysical." In his book Orientalism, Edward Said surveys Western perceptions of the Orient, "one of [the
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West's] deepest and most recurring images of the Other" (1). While adopting Foucault's method of a critical discourse analysis (3), he follows Foucault only up to a point. All the Westerndiscourses Said considers under the term "Orientalism" support the politics of subjugation and domination of the Orient by a colonizing West. In his view even an East and Westin a Romanattempt at "integrating" tic concept of universal history, as in Friedrich der Schlegel's Uber die Spracheund Weisheit Indier, cannot quite escape complicity with domination (98-99). Said's argument is persuasive for many of the discourses he examines. But whereas Foucault allows for the emergence of counterdiscourses beneath the official discourse of power, Said ignores Western discourses about the Orient that oppose Westernexpansionismand subvert,ratherthan support, Western domination. Clearly, such antiexpansionist discourses have developed and circulated in the West over time and have not infrequentlygrown out of encounterswith the Orient. My argumenthere is that Foucault himself operates a counterdiscourse that appropriates Oriental lore in opposition to Westernstrategiesof control. It is in this form, albeit syncretic, that the modern Westerncounterculture has embraced the Orient. It was to the same end that some nineteenthcentury European thinkers adopted Orientalism as a position from which to criticize Occidental culture. Schopenhauer is one prominent example. Another is Nietzsche. Among his critiques of European civilization, Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy of Morals are the most influenced by Indian philosophy, especially that of the Veddnta (Glasenapp 103).They are also the ones most often cited by poststructuralists.Manfred Frank calls the Genealogy of Morals the "Bibleof neo-structuralist power theory" (235). Foucault was familiar not only with the philosophical tradition that leads from Schopenhauerto Nietzsche but also with the adaptations of Oriental thought and practicesthat flourished within the youthful counterculture of the sixties and early seventiesand helped shape its ideology. At the same time he feared that such adaptations would distort fundamental Oriental concepts. In an interview he gave during the aftermath of the May 1968 student revolt in France, he replied scornfully when he was asked to assess the currentinterest of young people in "mind expansion," the "new sensibility," and Oriental philosophy. Here Foucault revealsthe purism of his concern with Easternspirituality,criticiz-
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"for the moment, and as far ahead as I can see, my discourse, far from determining the locus in which it speaks, is avoiding the ground on which it could find support" (205). This formulation does not negate the existence of a supportive ground (or subtext); it merely states a resolve to avoid that ground. Even so, how could Foucault have succeeded in this resolve without falling into the trap of pure negativism and irreverence,as some of his critics maintain he did? How can a condition of what he has termed "nonpositive affirmation" be attained (Language 36)? Oriental, especially Buddhist, systems furnish such a possibility. Unlike most forms of Christianity and Westernhumanism, they aim to support through denial of support, operating around an empty center: nirvava, sunyata. Because this center is at the same time full of presence and empty of content, the "other"can remainempty,open, unthinkable, and unspeakable while providing the ground for a critique of its counterpart. The concept of an empty presence permits application of a radically subversive methodology without the need for working out an anthropological theory or an ethics. And, perhaps most important, Buddhist systems offer the spirituality of a theology without god-a theology nearly indistinguishablefrom philosophy. This possibility is no longer availablein the West unless one casts aside all interdictions against intermixingphilosophical and religious discourses, as the younger Frenchthinkersincreasinglydo. Examples are Julia Kristeva and the nouveaux philosophes Glucksmann and Levy, who openly discuss their concern with a current "crisis of spirituality." Like Jacques Derrida, Foucault occasionally contributed to Telquel during the sixties and thus had some association with Julia Kristevaand others in her group. That association, transitoryand loose though it was, should be taken into account when questions are raised about Foucault's involvement with Oriental philosophy. As Barbara Johnson recalls, individual writerswho later became important "didn't stand out from the Tel quel group at that point" (156). Although Foucault never explicitly endorsed Oriental philosophy, he nevertheless must have been aware that it served as the grounding for the group's critical subversion of Westernintellectual traditions. A closer look at Tel quel may therefore be helpful. The Telquel group surroundingPhilippe Sollers and Julia Kristeva constituted a veritable intellec-
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tual movement whose influence remained considerable up to the mid-seventies. It assumed, from its outset, a decidedly programmaticstance in espousing not only a new literary language but also new forms of thinking, which wereintended to promote an entirely new understanding of reality and ultimately to effect a radicaltransformation of the human condition. Foucault was later to call that movement "a swan song" (Power/Knowledge 127), but as John Rajchmannotes, "literarytheory in the 1960smay have been a swan song, but Foucault was part of it" (12). The extent to which this avant-garde ideology was informed by Oriental concepts can be clearly seen in Kristeva'sand Linnart Mall's contributions to the 1968 Winter issue of Telquel. Kristeva'sessay, "Distance et anti-representation," introduces Mall's, "Une approche possible du sunyavada." These two texts analyze fundamental concepts of Buddhism and apply them in a critique of the West. The analysis is Mall's, its programmaticapplication chiefly Kristeva's. The main purpose of Mall's essay is to promote understanding and acceptance of the central concept and ultimate focus of Buddhist contemplation: sunyata, emptiness,the void. Sunyavadais the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Primarily concerned with distinguishing the Buddhist concept of emptiness from Westernconcepts of nothingness, nonsense, and absence, Mall explainssunyatdby means of the mathematical concept of zero and its properties. Just as zero, in its original Indian conception, signifies not absence or negation but ratherthe suspension of any opposition between affirmative and negative judgments, between + and -, emptiness is not to be thought of as "nothing" or pure negativity. In Mall's view, Westernphilosophy thinks of being and nothingness as mutually exclusiveopposites and knows of nothing in between. Buddhism, however, can think of coexisting opposites. Mall is in agreement here with the scholarship of Buddhism, which generally points to the greater tolerance that Buddhist doctrines have for paradoxes, for a coincidentia oppositorum that the West often associates with mysticalspeculation as the opposite of science. Sunyata, in Mall's presentation, takes on such seemingly mystical properties: it is being-in-between; it is that which extends between and connects two opposites, without, however,having any spatial properties. Lacking spatiality, it is also devoid of temporality; occupying no space, it
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structure of this new discourse, he asserts, is nondualist, unlike the traditional mode of Western thinking, whose method is a logic of antagonistic contradictions. In accordancewith his nondualism, he rejects a dialectics that works in exclusionary pairs. Indeed he develops, in contrastto Westerndialectics, a paradoxical style that he calls nondialectic and that he claims has "ontological status" (Language 56). His is not a dialectics that wishes to prove a proposition but, rather,one that wishes to subvertthe single-minded confidence in the possibility of proofs. Instead of taking and defending a position, he tries to avoid or elude fixed positions. His style thus is central to his enterprise;it is, once more, a praxis (which unsettles immutabilities and certainties) rather than a theory (which by its nature aims at immutability). Foucault therefore has to insist on the inseparabilityof discursivethought and style. Rhetorical style thus becomes the message; it is intended as a "tool kit" to work change (Language 208); it is not descriptive, nor is it representational. Finally, what has been considered "the crux of the Mahayana or Buddhism in general" (Inada 153)-the belief that samsara, the world of things, and nirvana, the void, become indistinguishablein the ultimate monistic emptiness of all thingsenables Foucault to deny emphatically any involvement with metaphysicswhile permittingmetaphysics to pervade his subtext. He can thus enter the edifice of modern philosophies, those of Nietzsche and of Marxist materialism, and simultaneously contest positivism and eschatology. For this reason Dreyfus and Rabinow can charge him, some thirty pages apart in their book, with both "extreme phenomenological positivism" (52) and "extreme nihilism" (87). The correspondencesbetween Foucault'swriting and Oriental concepts can also be seen in some of his earlier texts. In his 1963 "Preface to Transgression," he endorses a new philosophy that he labels "nonpositive affirmation" (Language 36). Seeminglyparadoxical,nonpositive affirmation becomes understandableas a Buddhist subtext where the presence of the void can affirm, as zero can. Such a philosophy does not negate; it merely "contests." In explaining how contestation differs from negation, Foucault seems to characterizeand enact his own enterprise, although he is describing Blanchot's:
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Contestation does not implya generalized negation,but an affirmationthat affirmsnothing,a radicalbreakof Ratherthanbeinga processof thoughtfor transitivity. contestation theactwhich is existence values, and denying carriesthem all to their limits and, from there,to the Limitwherean ontologicaldecisionachieves end;to its contest is to proceeduntil one reachesthe emptycore the wherebeingachieves limitandwhere limitdefines its limit,the "yes"of conbeing.There,at the transgressed
testation reverberates. . . . (Language 36)
Foucault here operates the paradoxical logic of Buddhism where opposites can coexist without recourse to any notion of evolution or "transitivity" and wherethe limit is recognizedand thought capable of transgressionat the same time. The once-only capitalization of "Limit" is obviously significant. Foucault's subtext works through orthography. It delineatesthe radicallyother,the "emptycore,"into which one can only be initiated by transgression. The spiritual aspect suggested by the capitalization is borne out as Foucault continues: and afTransgression opensintoa scintillating constantly firmedworld,a worldwithoutshadowor twilight,without thatserpentine "no"thatbitesinto fruitsandlodges theircontradictions theircore.It is the solarinversion at of satanicdenial.It was originallylinkedto the divine, or rather, fromthis limitmarked the sacredit opens by the spacewherethe divinefunctions. (37) This text, with its biblical imagery, seems to suggest a familiar paradise-that of the Old Testament-while pointing to its essential imperfections. Denial, interdiction,and temptation werebuilt into the Eden of Genesis. Paradiseregained,as Foucault sees it here, would be the indivisible nirvana rather than the precariousGardenof Eden, whereindividuation constantly threatensdivision and alienation. His text evokes a rapturous experience of total affirmation comparable to mystical experiences. What becomes clear in these works is that the Foucauldian transgressionhas an essentially initiatory and soteriological function. It is not an ethically defined transgression, nor is it a victory over limits set by social antagonisms. Foucault denies both these associations emphatically (Language 35). Rather, it is mystical initiation into unity and wisdom, the goal of Oriental religious practice. Such initiation is often likened to a "leap" without trajectory,spaceless and timeless, although describable only in terms of space and time: "Transgres-
Uta Liebmann Schaub accident that he mentions Dionysius the Areopagite, the Pseudo-Dionysius, as the transmitter of that mystical knowledge which "subsisted at the boundaries of Christianity; perhaps it was preserved for a millennium or almost as long in the guise of a negative theology" ("Pensee" 526). Not only has Dionysius's Mystical Theology been the basis of Westernmysticism since its translationinto Latin by John Scotus Erigena in the ninth century ("a millennium" ago), but it also representsone of the closest links between Westernand Indian thinking. In the estimation of the noted Orientalist Edward Conze, some passages in Dionysius's text "may well be called a Christianversion of the Heart Sfitra"(220). In "La folie, l'absenced'oeuvre," Foucault evokes the Buddhist sunyavada in announcing a Western rebirth of this lost thinking: "an experience is being born that concerns our thinking; the imminence of this experience, already visible, but still absolutely empty, cannot yet be named" (21). He perceivesit as emerging in "a configuration that retains and suspends meaning and that is the ordering principle for a void in which only the as yet unrealizedpossibilities remain"(18). The European Enlightenment not only stigmatized and excludedthe philosophical contemplation of the noumenal, it also exalted the autonomy of the individual subject. In contrast, most Oriental systems of thought hold that perfect wisdom is synonymous with the cessation of self. Thus the insistence on the supremacy of the individual, as in Enlightenment philosophy, would make such wisdom impossible. It will become possible only after the limited subject of "anthropological" thinking (Kristeva's "sujet-individu") has ceased to exist. This is the disappearance that Foucault forecasts. According to "The Anthropological Sleep," the space that this disappearance will leave open is nothing negative, no gap of any sort. It is, once more, the positive void of Oriental provenance,the "space" of a superior philosophy. The Orderof Things is not the first of Foucault's works to advocate the disappearance of the individual. Three years earlier,in his 1963"Prefaceto Transgression,"Foucault had announced the "new language of thought that makes us aware of the shatteringof the philosophical subject";it is "at the center of the subject'sdisappearancethat [the new] philosophical language proceeds." This new language would be "the exact reversalof the movement which has sustained the wisdom of the Westat least
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since the time of Socrates"(Language 43). In 1964, in "La folie, l'absence d'oeuvre,"Foucault made even clearer who this "subject" is: "dialectical man," a product of the Westernlogic of contradictions and antagonism, and "alienatedman," whom Foucault seems to have considered a mere figment of Hegelian-Marxistdiscourse. His nominalism allows Foucault to treat the production and the disappearance of "man" (a term he uses generically) as matters of discourse: He soon will die, is alreadydyingwithinourselves (his in deathbeingmanifested ourcontemporary discourse): homodialecticus-embodiment separation, return, of of of time;that beingwhichloses his truthand then finds it again,purified; stranger himselfwho becomes the to familiar himselfagain.Thismanwassubject-master with in and servant-object all the talkthat has beencirculating for a long time about man and especiallyabout alienatedman. Fortunately, is dyingin this drivel. he
(13)
Referencesto a new language as the substance of a new way of thinking are ubiquitous in Foucault's early work, and they are consistent. That most statements about this new language are tentative is explained by its purpose and relative position in a teleology of knowledge.Foucault sees this language as only beginning to emerge, first of all in literature and poetry, but also in criticism. It is the "nondialecticallanguage of the limit"(Language44), the transitory stage between two distinct forms of discourse that correspond to the forms of knowledge they support. The discourse that thinks of itself as "true" is characterized and structured by the prescriptivedemands of dialectics, representation, coherence,and continuity;the new language will be nondialectical, nondescriptive,incoherent, and discontinuous. It will operate in paradoxes. Foucault contrasts the bankrupt language of the past with a new or "rejuvenated"language that is only beginning to surface or to take shape but that will be, Foucault predicts, the language of the future (Language 33). Whereverit has begun to manifest itself, this language operates on the precipice of silence. Silence is consistent with Foucault's subtext, in which perfect wisdom is beyond words as are even the glimpses of it attained in the initiatory experience of transgression.In the final analysis, Foucaultcannot wish merely to replace one discourse with another, as Westernculture has done in the past. It is
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this cycle that he wants to change. For him the ultimate goal has to be the cessation of verbalcommunication. It is the final point of a teleology of mystical knowledge. The language of the limit then has to be a paradoxical"languageof silence."What it articulates "places us at the limits of all possible languages" and causes us to "lose language in a deafening night." In Bataille's words, which Foucault quotes, the ultimate communication is "an immense alleluia lost in the interminable silence" (Language 32-33). Foucault refers to the mystics' "secret language of prayer,"which is "embedded and choked by a marvellous communication which silences it" (Language 48). This communication, or communion, is not only one in which the speaker ceases to speak but also one in which there is no listener. It too points to the Oriental void ratherthan to the personalism of Westernmysticism. In an essay republishedin Language but dating back to his association with Telquel, whereit appearedin 1963, Foucault calls the new language "this unique Discourse which no one, perhaps, will be able to hear," "this Saturnianlanguage [that] devoursall eventual words" (Language 61). The suspension of the final stage affects language as it does thought. Before the "unique Discourse"(with capitalD as orthographic signifier), there are still discourses. The emerging language is "neither complete nor fully in control of itself, eventhough it is sovereignfor us and hangs above us" (Language 39). Its telos, silence, remains to be mastered,but until we attain that end, we must ceaselessly speak the self-destructive language of our awakening in order to "succeed-if not in silencing and mastering it-in modulating its futility" (Language 60). The function of this language is no longer the representation of the world; it is, instead, selfreflection (self-representationor reduplication).As in Kristeva,this language now speaks only of itself. In the encounter with its "futility,"its incapacity to articulate truth, it finds its only meaning in constantly consuming itself. The rhetorical means to such relentless self-consumption is the paradox. What has just been said is not contradicted but revoked and suspended. Thus Foucault endorses a "slightly monstrous" language "wherea division in two signals itself" (Language 59). Foucault has also called it "perverse."As he extols this paradoxical, illogical language, it has the same goal as does the practice of Zen, where meditation on a seemingly meaningless koan is supposed eventuallyto precipi-
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to videdfor?Analogous theBuddhist sangha,is theliteralibi it uses, supportedby a whatever ary community, mercantilesociety, not for what the writerproduces
( . .. nothing), but for what [the writer]consumes? Su-
(23)
Barthes, much more than Foucault, was concerned with an aesthetics of the literary text and a sociology of the Westernliterary community. But Foucault's Oriental subtext supports a much broader critique: a critique of Westerncivilization as a whole. In view of the fundamental shortcomings that Foucault ceaselessly exposes, this civilization needs to recognize and produce its positive counterimage. He is not the first writer to stop at criticism and to refrain from describing that counterimage and the means of realizing it. This limitation should not be held against him. His discourse has certainlyachievedmuch of what it set out to do. It has unsettled fossilized modes of discourse and has indeed stimulated new thinking that attempts to push beyond the boundaries of the Western philosophical traditions. Thus, in his way, through his style, Foucault has been a "teacher" and a "moralist"-one who neitherteaches nor moralizes. Trueto his concealed pedagogy, he has not left behind prescriptions of how to proceed, or methods to apply, or a theory to stand on. In that sense at least, his enterprise can be called emancipatory. University of Toledo Toledo, Ohio
Note
1Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine.
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