JEE 488 SYSTEMS DESIGN PROJECT

SUBMISSION 2 DESIGN DOCUMENTATION SAFETY CASE REPORT

Australian Maritime College

National Centre For Maritime Engineering And Hydrodynamics

PROJECT INFORMATION

SUBMISSION INFORMATION

STUDENT LECTURER

M. JOHNSTON JOHN SEATON

WEIGHTING DUE DATE SIGNATURE

NA
DATED

UNIT COORDINATOR

JOHN SEATON

29/07/2011

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Contents
1. 2. Operators Contact Information ................................ ................................ ...................... 4 Brisbane Office ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 4 Introduction................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 5 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. Scope of Safety Case ................................ ................................ .............................. 5 Facility Layout and Location ................................ ................................ .................. 6 Safety Philosophy ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 8 Terminology Surrounding Risk ................................ ................................ ........ 9 Method of Assessment ................................ ................................ ..................... 9 Hazard Identification ................................ ................................ ..................... 10 Risk Assessment ................................ ................................ ............................ 12

2.3.1. 2.3.2. 2.3.3. 2.3.4. 2.4. 3. 4. 3.1. 4.1. 4.2. 4.3. 4.4. 4.5. 5.

Industry Involvement ................................ ................................ ............................ 13 Risks Present during Maintenance................................ ................................ ......... 13 Design Philosophy ................................ ................................ ................................ 13 Summary of Modifications ................................ ................................ ................... 14 Risks Present During Instalation ................................ ................................ ........... 14 Control Measures and Risk Mitigation ................................ ................................ .. 14 Workplace Policy ................................ ................................ ................................ . 14

Operations ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 13 Design Modifications ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 13

Compliance with Safety Case ................................ ................................ ...................... 14

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Abbreviations AISM ALARP AS Aton/AN CAP IALA Association of International Maritime Signilisation As Low As Reasonably Practicable Australian Standard Aid to Navigation Civil Aviation Authority (U.K) Internasionale Akademie vir Leierskap deur Avontuur (International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities) International Standards Organisation Major Accident Event Mean Sea Water Level National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority Occupational Health and Safety Safety Management System

ISO MAE MWL/MSWL NOPSA OH&S SMS

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1. Operators Contact Information

Australian Maritime Safety Authority Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR) Head Office: Canberra 82 Northbourne Avenue Braddon ACT 2612 Australia Postal GPO Box 2181 Canberra ACT 2601 Australia Courier AMSA Head Office Information Centre 82 Northbourne Avenue Braddon ACT 2612 Phone (02) 6279 5000 Fax (02) 6279 5950 Internet: RCC@amsa.gov.au

Brisbane Office Level 10, 410 Ann St Brisbane QLD 4000 Australia Postal PO Box 10790 Adelaide Street Brisbane QLD 4000 Australia Phone (07) 3001 6800 Fax (07) 3001 6801

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2. Introduction
Nardana Patches AN 307 is an IALA Category 1 Short Range Aid to Navigation located in the Prince of Wales channel in Torres Straight. According to AISM its inclusion as a Category 1 AtoN ranks it as a being of vital national significance (IALA, 2004) and as such the lighting system undergoes annual services. Additional to marking the safe shipping lane, the platform also hosts tide and current sensors, one of which requires bi-yearly services. It is for these maintenance periods that this safety case is intended, as these are the only times when personnel work on the platform. The term Safety Case was adopted in Australian Legislation shortly following the introduction in Britain of the 1992 Offshore Safety Act. Offshore safety cases in Australia are required under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety) Regulations 2009 and are submitted to the regulatory body National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority. While a document of this type is not required for a platform serving in the role of AN307, this document has been produced at the request of AMSA; the body responsible for operation of the platform. It is the intent of the following submission to bring together relevant requirements of a NOPSA specified safety case as well as to submit safe working guidelines in accordance with the Maritime Union of Australias recommendations. Future upgrades to the platform are also planned based around mitigating fatigue issues due to ongoing vibration of the structure and installation of a current power generation unit. Under subclause 4(7)(b) of Schedule 3 of the OPGGSA, operations on the platform and on any work vessel in a non-navigable condition engaged in this installation fall under the scope of the platforms safety case. Considerations relating to installation are included in the body of the safety case for general operation, but are titled separately so as to be removed upon revision of the safety case after completion of the upgrades. Considerations relating to operation and maintenance of the planned upgrades are to be included in the next revision.

2.1. Scope of Safety Case

NOPSA itemises platforms according to facility type in order to more clearly define elements to be covered in the safety case. Apart from drilling and hydrocarbon production facilities, the installation can be categorised under Item 1 of the Scope of Validation. A Validation Policy in this context is defined by NOPSA to cover the platforms facilities rather than operations, which fall under the scope of the safety case itself. Relevant elements to be covered for an unmanned non-production platform are most clearly outlined in the parallel UK safety case guidelines. Particulars from this list to be covered are:
        

Name and address of the owner of the installation; Summary of how industry representatives were consulted; Layout and configuration of the facility; Exit routes and evacuation facilities; The maximum number of persons catered for on the facility; Description of how the duty holder will ensure compliance with regulation; Inventory of toxic and hazardous substances on site; Access to medical facilities; Limits of the environmental conditions beyond which the facility cannot safely be manned;  Details of combined operations including co-ordination and management systems as well as hazards created by the joint operation.

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Additional to these, a separate set of recommendations are made for a design notification, some of which are pertinent to the planned upgrades to AN 307. Relevant particulars to be included are:
    

A description of the design process and design philosophy; How risks inherent in the new design were kept as low as reasonably practicable; The criteria used to select the concept; The location of the modification within the system layout; The meteorological and oceanographic conditions which the installation may experience;  Particulars of the type of operations necessary to complete the installation;  A general description of how the duty holder will ensure compliance with relevant statutory provisions including OH&S conditions.

It is noted in the guidelines that vessels being moored in location for production purposes must be deemed suitable for service in the new location by the duty holder, however this is not the case where vessels are being moored to conduct maintenance or upgrades to the platform. In this circumstance it is the responsibility of the operator of the vessel to ensure its fitness for service in the new location. Additional to the relevant NOPSA requirements, the AISM makes certain recommendation regarding safety in relation to Aids to Navigation. While these do not cover operations occurring on the installation, they are briefly discussed as they pertain to vessel collision.

2.2. Facility Layout and Location

The Nardana Patches Aid to Navigation is located approximately 9.5 nautical miles North East of Hammond Island in 12.8 metres of water at co-ordinates: Latitude Longitude Chart Datum 10 30.2850 S 142 14.6290 E WGS 84

Structurally the platform is a mono-pile structure with the first of two decks fixed to the top of the column at 7.5 meters above chart datum. The structural framework for the upper deck originates at the perimeter of the work-deck and supports the helideck at a height of 12.8 meters above chart datum. This arrangement leaves the interior of the lower deck clear for operations and equipment storage. The AtoN is visible to passing ship traffic by way of navigation lighting and a radar reflector, both mounted on the lower of the two decks. The lower deck also hosts a glass reinforced polymer cabinet containing batteries for power storage and the control system for the oceanographic equipment mounted on the platform. The platforms upper deck is a helipad used for drop off and pick up of work crews to the installation. An elevation representation for the as built structure has been included in Figure 2-1, showing access ways connecting the two decks and berthing position.

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Figure 2-1 Nardana Patches Elevation Drawing

Several ladders are used to connect the berthing location to the workdeck and the workdeck to the helideck. The berthing ladder runs between the fenders and exits through a manhole through the grating of the workdeck. This ladder is vertical and extends from lowest astronomical tide to the workdeck. The ladder joining the workdeck and helideck extends only 3 meters vertically and is oriented at 20o from vertical.

Figure 2-2 Plan Veiw of Helideck

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2.2.1.Site Infrastructure Summary

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Information on a number of specific fields is specifically suggested in safety case guidlines. This information is presented in the table below; where appropriate the information is expanded on in Section 2.2.2.
Field Max Number Of Personnel Day-Shift Number of Personnel Overnight Accommodation Catering Facilities Production Infrastructure Drilling Infrastructure Hazardous Chemicals Mechanical Hazards Number on Platform 5 0 None None None Hydraulic fluids; Petrochemical cleaners Winch; High pressure cleaner; Equipment on berthed vessels; Helicopter rotors Work at Height Accessway from berthed vessel to workdeck exceeds safe height
Table 2-1 Recommended Fields

2.2.2.Installed Equipment

Radar Reflector:

AGA SR166

CHARACTER:

Fl(4) 12.0 secs Flash: 0.5 sec Short Eclipse: 1.5 sec Long Eclipse: 5.5 sec

ARC of VISIBILITY:

Red: 235 - 122 (247) Obscured: 122 - 235 (113)

COLOUR OF LlGHT:

Red

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2.3. Safety Philosophy

NOPSA mandates a safety approach centred on minimising risks to their lowest practicable level; this is given the acronym ALARP for As Low As is Reasonably Practical. Within this framework it is important that the safety case reflects the actual safety measures in place on the platform or what can realistically be implemented following submission of the safety case.
2.3.1.Terminology Surrounding Risk

Guidelines published by NOPSA encourage the use of terminology relating to safety documentation within strict interpretation. These interpretations have been adopted in the following discussion and are given by the National Government agency ComCare as follows: Hazard: is the potential to cause harm. Anything that may cause harm or an adverse health effect on a person is hazardous. Risk: is the likelihood that a hazard will cause harm, through injury or ill health, to anyone at or near a workplace. The level of risk to health increases with the severity of the hazard and the duration and frequency of exposure to the hazard. Exposure: Occurrence of a person coming into contact with a hazard. (Australian Government, 1999) Likelihood: in qualitative analysis of risk is the number of incidents compared with the number of exposures. A number of qualitative scales of likelihood also exist but these are generally industry specific (the automotive and space industry for example have different measures of rare). Consequence: is the harm caused or cost of an accident. It can include medical, operational or financial consequences.
2.3.2.Method of Assessment

In construction of the Formal Safety Assessment it is attempted to follow a linear structure, with hazards being first identified and then assessed according to the risk they pose. This generally involves identification of the control procedures surrounding the hazard and a subsequent assessment of the likelihood of the events leading to a Major Accident Event occurring. Where a Major Accident Event is identified, a Formal Safety Assessment is then required; should no Major accident Events stem from the hazard then the hazard is dealt with in the Safety Management System. This process flow is neatly described in the diagram provided by NOPSA, reproduced in Figure 2-3. Determine Likelihood & Consequences

Hazard Identification

Identify Controls & Screening

Asses Risk Posed by Hazard

Implement Additional Controls

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2.3.1.Hazard Identification

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Several hazard identification techniques were found useful during the construction of the safety case. In general the more complex techniques were not used, since workflow on the platform was not inherently complex or dangerous. Of the techniques suggested by NOPSA those used were:
  

Brainstorming Event Tree What-if

Given the manual nature of the maintenance tasks performed on the platform, integrating human factors is considered very important to develop a complete list of hazards present. Llyods register present some key principals to remember when considering human factors in safety assessment:
     

Caution in including human intervention in hazard mitigation Staffing level and workload Training/competence Actual rather than intended organisation structure Communications Expectation of human error

Regarding human intervention in hazard mitigation, it is understood that workers responses during an incident will be unpredictable and should thus not be relied upon. Expectation of immediate action or action which would endanger the individual is not made in the safety assessment as it is understood to be unrealistic. (Donovan, 2008)
2.3.2. Identification of Controls/Screening

The Screening provided by safety procedures will be different depending on the path from hazard to MAE.

Hazard 1

Screening

Hazard 2

Screening

MAE

Hazard 3

Screening

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Figure 2-3 NOPSA Screening Process (N-04300-GN0165, 2010)

Screening of hazards is conducted according to a hierarchy of controls. This hierarchy attempts to provide protection from hazards on the most permanent basis possible. This hierarchy governs both the implementation of screening from hazards as well as their identification.

Hierarchy of Controls: Eliminate: Where possible the process which presents the hazard is eliminated. This requires removing the process from the facility (including facilities connected even on only a temporary basis). Substitute: If the function must be performed on the facility, it may be possible to find an alternate means which does not present the same level of hazard. Engineer: Were performing the hazardous process cannot be avoided, solutions can be engineered to limit the exposure of personnel. Administrate: Administrative approaches to safety management commonly take the form of restricted access, minimum training requirements and limiting conditions of operation. Application of administrative procedures is kept to a minimum where engineered solutions can be found as an alternative. PPE: Personal Protective Equipment mainly refers to products worn to limit exposure to low level hazards such as small dropped objects or hot shards. PPE is also implemented in

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conjunction with administrative procedures in the form of height access equipment or survival equipment.

Further classification of screening procedures is then recommended based on whether the procedures are proactive of reactive. This is summarised in the bow tie diagram produced by NOPSA and reproduced in Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-4 Bow Tie Classification of Screening Procedures

The ultimate aim of this classification system is to ensure that sufficient layers of protection exist between a hazard and a Major Accident Event.

2.3.3.Risk Assessment

The assessment of risk for work-crews operating on the Nardana Patches Platform is conducted quantitatively where possible. This most often takes the form of a risk assessment criteria table, combining the likelihood of an incident with its predicted consequences. This is in actual fact a semi-qualitative method but it does allow for easy comparison of risks. Likelihood is most often expressed as a return period for the event, which is convenient for the Nardana Patches Installation as scheduled maintenance is organised in a similar way. Assessment of the consequence is also conducted quantitatively where possible, such as expressing operational losses as percentage time spent non-operable. Some consequences however do resist quantitative categorisation and these are usually ranked on a sliding scale.

Level 1 2 3

Descriptor Rare Unlikely Moderate

Example Detail Description Occurs only in exceptional circumstances Could occur at some time Will occur at some time

Return Period Less than 1 in 10 years At least 1 in 10 years At least 1 in 5 years

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4 5 Likely Almost Certain Will occur in most circumstances The event is expected to occur
Table 2-2 Likelihood Assessment

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1 in a year More than 1 a year

The rationale behind the development of a safety case is given by NOPSA as: that those who create the risk must manage it. It is the operators' job to assess their processes, procedures and systems to identify and evaluate risks and implement the appropriate controls , because the operator has the greatest in-depth knowledge of their installation.

Since the installation is an existing structure, the implications to safety can no longer be considered at the design stage

2.4. Industry Involvement

3. Operations
Work over and routine maintenance. Max number of persons present during maintenance operations. Helideck designed to UK CAP 347 which is the offshore industry norm and is recognised for insurance and legal coverage. The standard contains an effective inspection regime for structural integrity and operational considerations; aluminium platforms being covered in detail.

3.1. Risks Present during Maintenance

Meteorological and oceanographic conditions which the installation is subjected too and limits placed on conditions

4. Design Modifications
Purpose

4.1. Design Philosophy

NOPSA suggests the inclusion of the design philosophy as a means to demonstrate that all potential uses of the facility have been considered; specifically the hazards presented by each use of the facility. The implications of these Options considered. Basis of decision How risks were minimised during the design process: Avoid welding during installation. Confine to fabrication. Reduction of vibration increases safe working window. 13

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4.2. Summary of Modifications

Location within installation layout Technology to be used Structural coupling required.

4.3. Risks Present During Installation

Hot works in form of angle grinders will be necessary. Review of original safety case hazards associated with modification. Hazards associated with installation.

4.4. Control Measures and Risk Mitigation

Temporary refuge Fire fighting facilities Escape routes evacuation facilities First aid facilities Rescue equipment

4.5. Workplace Policy

AMSA Hazard/incident Report Form PPE

5. Compliance with Safety Case

Site specific induction before each maintenance visit Ensure that all personell have valid work site safety cards (Queensland Construction White Card or equivilant)

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