Copyright

by

Saretta Ramdial

2007

E-Government Development and Implementation Patterns in Mexico

by

Saretta Ramdial, B.A.

Report

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas at Austin in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Public Affairs Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin May 2007

E-Government Development and Implementation Patterns in Mexico

APPROVED BY SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

__________________________ Joseph Straubhaar

__________________________ Gary Chapman

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank all my professors at the LBJ School who helped and advised me through tough math problems, seemingly intractable policy case studies, and everything in between. I am grateful to my professional report readers, Professor Joe Straubhaar and Professor Gary Chapman, for their advice and guidance on my year-long endeavor. Professor Sherri Greenberg was instrumental in my decision to focus on egovernment and I thank her for giving me the opportunity to work with her. I am especially grateful to Professor Gary Chapman for his encouragement and support throughout my career at the LBJ School and in my job search. Finally, I am indebted to my classmates who brought true joy and laughter to all of my experiences at the LBJ School.

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Abstract E-Government Development and Implementation Patterns in Mexico

by

Saretta Ramdial, M.P.Aff, M.A. The University of Texas at Austin, 2007 SUPERVISOR: Joseph Straubhaar

E-government in Mexico continues to be a contentious policy topic in terms of development, implementation, funding, leadership, and oversight. Much of the research focus has been on the implementation aspect of new programs, such as the E-Mexico project, rather than on the underlying organizational motivations and norms often founded in political, cultural, and bureaucratic history and attributes. In the course of egovernment development in Mexico, policy makers and e-government leaders have arguably overlooked some of the most integral factors necessary for increased usage and service levels. These include a lack of political will to link backend systems that could spur interagency horizontal integration, a failure to address the extremely limited competition in the telecommunications sector that maintains high service rates despite privatization, and a lack of investment in the domestic information technology sector that limits work opportunities for Mexican students and professionals. Additionally, the foundation for e-government in Mexico is weak because formal measures such as legislation and funding models have not adapted to digital services and new information systems. In any e-government initiative, organizational culture and history must be considered in planning e-government programs and policy makers must acknowledge that e-government is a potential tool for reform, but does not cause government reform.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1. Introduction to E-Government in Mexico....................................................... 1 Chapter 2. The Definition and the Importance of E-Government ..................................... 3 Phases of E-Government ..................................................................................... 5 Can E-Government Transform the Public Sector?................................................ 7 Chapter 3. Barriers and Strategies to E-Government Development................................ 11 The Two-Systems Problem ............................................................................ 11 Factions within Bureaucracy.............................................................................. 13 Funding Constraints .......................................................................................... 14 Planning Conflicts, Outsourcing, and Domestic IT Capabilities ......................... 17 Leadership......................................................................................................... 20 Corruption......................................................................................................... 22 Chapter 4. E-Government Development and Implementation in Mexico ....................... 29 Key Players in Mexicos E-Government System................................................ 30 Challenges to E-Government Implementation in Mexico ................................... 33 Chapter 5. The E-Mexico Project............................................................................... 41 Controversial Factors in the E-Mexico Project................................................... 42 Chapter 6. New Directions and Policy Recommendations ............................................. 52 New Directions.................................................................................................. 52 Policy Recommendations .................................................................................. 53 Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 63 VITA ............................................................................................................................ 67

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Chapter 1. Introduction to E-Government in Mexico

E-government research studies have increased tremendously in the past few years with the evolution of government information technology (IT) plans, international organization participation and funding, and the general trend to integrate information and communications technology (ICT) into government reform efforts. The overall trend is to compare programs on municipal, state, national, and international levels based on a set of criteria often including the number of online applications, facility of use for online services, and feedback times for Internet inquiries to name just a few. However, research on the development and implementation of e-government programs based on historical, cultural, and political norms is lacking due to the disassociation of ICT integration in government service provision and government reform in general. Many countries have jumped on the e-government bandwagon so to speak before actually planning and developing a roadmap for transforming the public sector through a government reform process. Trends to develop e-government portals and establish online service provision simply follow success stories in Asia, Europe, and North America. However, the results vary significantly in these regions due to the capacity of the public sector to incorporate new ICT into already established practices and routines. Moreover, the link between institutional capacity and social and political norms often goes unstudied and unevaluated leading to expensive projects that yield below average and unanticipated results. Given this scenario, it is essential for researchers, public administrators, and politicians to understand and acknowledge the connection between culture and political history and the capacity of e-government to genuinely influence public sector transformation. Although ICT can undoubtedly be used as a mechanism for change, it is limited to the level of institutional capacity within a given government. Thus, public officials in many instances must be retrained and re-socialized in order to fully 1

incorporate ICT into their daily routines and processes. Social and political hurdles that historically inhibit change must be overcome to facilitate the success and evolution of ICT and e-government programs. Due to Mexicos efforts to develop a countrywide e-government system in the past ten years and its colonial history, the country provides insight into the problems that arise during a period of great technological integration for many less developed countries. For example, institutionalized corruption and political patronage among public officials and politicians in the past has encouraged a deep mistrust among citizens towards government and influences how the public interacts with government officials to this day. Hence, a predisposition to focus on government-to-citizen (G2C) services in Mexico at the onset of e-government planning comes as no surprise. Arguably, this tendency undermines economic development efforts and the countrys ability to compete in the global market. As a result, the governments response to the legacy of political patronage and corruption has limited the impact of e-government efforts in Internet commerce and stifled the growth of IT firms and e-businesses. To overcome these challenges, common to many countries, policymakers must identify the barriers to e-government development and implementation in their countries and focus on solutions that are most appropriate given the political and historical reality of their countries. Presenting Mexicos story of e-government development, which spans all levels of government, allows for an analysis of programs on multiple levels including government-to-government (G2G) and government-to-business (G2B) as well as government-to-citizen (G2C). A focus on the e-Mexico program, specifically designed to increase access to information among citizens, lays out the main issues in administering and evaluating an ambitious nationwide e-government program in a country as large and diverse as Mexico. Understanding e-Mexicos strengths and weaknesses gives researchers perspective into the systemic problems found in many Latin American egovernment programs. Policy recommendations created to address these dynamic issues must be realistic and take into account the historical and political factors inherent in many Latin American political system. 2

Chapter 2. The Definition and the Importance of EGovernment

Prior to describing the benefits of e-government it is important to define the term itself and understand the different phases involved in e-government development. There are a multitude of definitions from different governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), non-profit groups, private firms, and researchers. In this discussion, the World Banks (WB) definition will be used because it is broad in nature but reveals the transformative process of e-government. It is as follows: E-Government refers to the use by government agencies of information technologies (such as Wide Area Networks, the Internet, and mobile computing) that have the ability to transform relations with citizens, businesses, and other arms of government.1 There are numerous technologies that are used for different purposes depending on the country and the goal of the program. For most countries, the overarching theme for e-government programs is improving service delivery for citizens. However, many countries also consider e-government as a method for improving government interactions with businesses and industries, empowering citizens with information, and enhancing efficiencies within the public sector in terms of management.2 Many governments also espouse certain benefits resulting from e-government programs such as more transparent processes, a decrease in corruption, increased convenience for citizens and public sector employees, revenue growth, and a reduction in costs compared to traditional service delivery systems.3 However, the benefits from egovernment investment are not set in stone. There are no guarantees that e-government will decrease costs, increase revenue, and accomplish all of the aforementioned results. In fact, many government agencies and countries find that e-government development and implementation requires long-term investments in infrastructure, training, and community awareness and marketing programs. It requires long-term vision because it is not simply

linked to technological advances but also to attitudinal and normative changes in how people work, interact with one another, and receive and provide services. E-government is important for social and economic development because it allows people to access information, communicate with each other, and provide knowledge and information to a broad community. An increase in communication and information between individuals allows for collaboration and networking opportunities among people who are otherwise disenfranchised from networks or simply do not have access to information. Many e-government programs encompass every aspect of government service provision such as education, healthcare, and social security programs. Thus, every citizen is affected, though not always equally, by the governments ability to develop and implement e-government. E-government not only empowers individuals but also small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) that would otherwise have limited access to the market. E-government and the Internet allow SMEs to develop web-based businesses and provide goods and services globally thus enhancing their ability to carve out niche markets. Additionally, business leaders and entrepreneurs can extract as well as provide information to their counterparts increasing knowledge networks and broadening their markets. Moreover, businesses can improve their own processes by interacting with other firms through email or blogs thus increasing competition between firms. Historically in Mexico, SMEs have lower access to the Internet hence they are less likely to come into contact with egovernment programs that can enhance their businesses.4 The ability of individuals and businesses to take advantage of e-government programs depends on the marketing of certain programs, the facility of use for the programs, and a certain level of training in using technology. However, underlying this capacity to use e-government are commonly accepted business, government, social, and communication practices that can inhibit uptake of new programs. For example, individuals and SMEs with limited access to the Internet in the past may not be able to conceptualize new types of communication and information gathering technologies. Someone who is accustomed to waiting in line at a government office to receive his or 4

her pension may be wary of receiving an online pension check. Other obstacles linked to cultures and values include a fear of providing personal information online that may be misused by public officials.

Phases of E-Government5
E-government programs are often categorized into different phases of development. Programs are likely to develop in ways that reflect a countrys political and economic history and circumstances. Although the tables below signal sequential phases, it is not uncommon for programs to skip certain phases. Additionally, some e-government programs may stay in a particular phase for a longer period due to funding constraints or political pressure to maintain the status quo.6 A Gartner Group Report from 2000 describes four phases of e-government development and explains the service delivery modes and examples of e-government services accompanying each phase.7 Table 2.1 offers a basic rubric for identifying the phases and accompanying services.

Table 2.18 Delivery of E-Services: Technologies and Examples by Stages of EGovernment Development

Stages of E-Government Development Presence

Service Delivery Modes Information access and delivery Document access and download Online mapping/ GIS applications Communication with officials Multimedia-streaming and playback Interactive discussions Online databases Online forms E-commerce applications

Interaction and Communication

Transaction

Transformation

Online mapping/ GIS applications

Examples of E-Government Services - Internet or Intranet Providing names and phone numbers of government officials. Allowing access to government documents. Email forms to allow citizens to send requests for services to government officials. Multimedia presentations. E-commerce transactions such as the purchasing of hunting or fishing licenses, renewal or drivers licenses, and the purchasing of government documents. Smart permitting involving online request submissions, GIS,

E-permitting/ wireless applications

document management, 3D modeling of proposed projects, and wireless applications.

The UN developed another way to evaluate different stages of development using a 5-phase model. In a 2002 report, the UN distinguishes between the five different phases by identifying e-government service capabilities in each phase. In Table 2.2, the UN report describes the applications, services, and information associated with each phase signaling the level of sophistication of e-government programs and websites.

Table 2.29 The Five Stages of E-Government

Stage of E-Government Emerging

Description of Government Websites Limited and static information

Applications and Services Website posts government information online but interactions and transactions are not possible for government inquiries and services. The number of websites increases and websites include frequently updated information. Updated information includes newsletters, publications, new legislation, search engines, and email capabilities. Many government service interactions are possible including message posting, email, document and data downloading, and document submissions. Passport, visa, birth/ death certificates, and payments for licenses, permits, fees, bills, and taxes are available online. Security measures and more sophisticated functions are available including digital signatures, encryption, and passwords. All services can be accessed from

Enhanced

Regularly updated information

Interactive

Downloading and communication is possible

Transactional

Payment of service is possible

Seamless

Total integration of all services

across administrative and departmental boundaries

one portal without differentiation between government agencies.

Both the Gartner and the UN report deconstruct e-government development phases and explain the accompanying technology, applications, services, and information offered in each phase. Although the reports mention a transformative and seamless phase (the last phase in both tables), there are few countries that have reached either phase for a number of reasons. Social, cultural, and political trends and legacies can facilitate egovernment development but more often than not inhibit buy-in from e-government stakeholders. For this reason, comparing national e-government programs in different phases can empower policymakers to research and present innovative ideas and approaches to their own governments based on international e-government experiences.

Can E-Government Transform the Public Sector?

There are a number of schools of thought in organizational theory addressing the ability of e-government to transform or reform the public sector. When it comes to IT projects in general, most experts usually fall into one of two camps. Where some researchers believe IT can fundamentally change organizational behavior, others argue that IT can only do so much given the intent of organizational leaders and the limitations built into bureaucratic structures. Information technology for reform is accepted to a certain degree when it comes to changing procedural and routine-like work behaviors. For example, using email as a legitimate form of communication between professional colleagues has, to a certain degree, changed the way in which people in a work environment function. In this way, IT can shape agency behavior and routine structures that can ultimately lead to significant change. However, where some believe IT can change the fundamental nature of a government agency or organization, others believe it cannot.

For the purposes of this report, the latter school of thought will be the basis for the following arguments and research because it is backed by multiple scholars, practitioners, and subject matter experts across the world, including people in Mexico and other parts of Latin America. As is pointed out in much of the e-government literature, proponents of IT for reform sake have little evidence to use in their defense because studies and empirical evidence tend to not go beyond administrative and incremental change. Thus, the transformational aspects of IT projects are not realized due to a number of factors such as organizational culture, degree of political will, and citizen sentiment toward government in different regions and countries. That is not to say that IT projects should not be incorporated into reform processes. Rather, researchers argue that the impetus for reform must precede the development of an IT project because IT itself is not a catalyst.10 Thus, IT application does not cause reform.11 One common theme in e-government literature, in terms of government reform, is the nature of government agencies to strive to maintain autonomy within government and to secure power and funding through legislation. Many researchers argue that government structures are inevitably embedded in IT projects regardless of the type of project. Thus, developing a virtual state or a ubiquitous e-government system is not about technological capability but about overcoming entrenched organizational, social, and political institutions.12 For this reason, IT is considered to bring administrative and incremental change but it is not a catalyst for institutional change today any more than it was before the Internet came into use.13 Other arguments supporting the inability of IT to instill reform in the public sector are based in case studies from the past four decades involving different types of technology. In academic studies, researchers have found that IT applications bring little change to organizational structures, and seem[s] to reinforce existing structures.14 Additionally, it is argued that those at the top of organizations define agency goals leading to the unequal distribution of IT applications across the public sector. Thus, the primary beneficiaries have been functions favored by the dominant political-

administrative coalitions in public administrations, and not those of technical elites, middle managers, clerical staff, or ordinary citizens.15 Although there are many factors that affect the outcome of an IT project, management and organizational interests are arguably the most important areas affecting any project. In fact, some experts claim that IT projects could be more beneficial to the public and to the organization if they were better managed and if organizational interests, rather than the self-interests, were promoted by managers and leaders. Many IT projects, especially in the case of e-government, are based on admirable goals such as transparency and accountability of government agencies and officials. However, poor management of these projects often leads to ineffective IT programs that can often be traced to a lack of expertise and experience in project management. Understanding the genesis of IT projects and their relationship to broader government reform trends will help policy makers and implementers guide projects using IT not as a panacea but as a tool that fits into a larger and longer reform process.

In the e-government planning process, policy makers often look to other countries programs to identify strategies for overcoming obstacles linked to cultural norms of an agency, funding models available for financing the program, and target audiences that will be affected by the initiative. In the Latin American region, and for less developed countries in general, there are a number of distinct challenges that should be acknowledged prior to starting an e-government program. The next chapter focuses on some of the more common hurdles in e-government development in less developed countries with a focus on Latin American cultural, political, and historical attributes. These obstacles are essential to understand for the case of Mexico because they have been overlooked or underestimated in the development of the nationwide e-Mexico project and the overall e-government program.

Notes

World Bank, Definition of E-Government. Online. Available: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATIO NANDTECHNOLOGIES/EXTEGOVERNMENT/0,,contentMDK:20507153~menuPK:702592~pagePK:1 48956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:702586,00.html. Accessed: November 15, 2006. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Elizabeth Muller and Mariano Gutirrez, OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2005), p. 71. 5 Saretta Ramdial, Phases of E-Government Development. In State E-Government Strategies: Identifying Best Practices and Applications, Congressional Research Service, p. 12-13. (Draft.) 6 Saretta Ramdial, Phases of E-Government Development. In State E-Government Strategies: Identifying Best Practices and Applications, Congressional Research Service, p. 12. (Draft.) 7 R. Sood, The Four Phases of E-Government in the Public Sector Market, (Gartner Group Report, 2000). Resource ID:308459. In Digital Government: Principles and Best Practices, Alexei Pavlichev and David Garson, (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2004), p. 173. 8 Adapted from R. Sood, The Four Phases of E-Government in the Public Sector Market, (Gartner Group Report, 2000). Resource ID:308459. In Digital Government: Principles and Best Practices, Alexei Pavlichev and David Garson, (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2004), p. 173. 9 Adapted from S.A. Ronaghan, Benchmarking e-government: A global perspective, assessing the progress of the UN member states. (New York: United Nations Division for Public Economics and Public Administration and American Society for Public Administration, 2001). In Digital Government: Principles and Best Practices, Alexei Pavlichev and David Garson, (Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing, 2004), p. 38-39. 10 Kenneth Kraemer and John King, Information Technology and Administrative Reform: Will the Time After E-Government Be Different?(paper presented at the Heinrich Reinerman Schrift fest, Post Graduate School of Administration, Speyer, Germany, September 29, 2003.) Online. Available: http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:4OHGXfvGNWQJ:www.crito.uci.edu/publications/pdf/egovernment .pdf+Information+Technology+and+Administrative+Reform:+Will+the+Time+After+EGovernment+Be+Different%3F&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us&client=safari. Accessed: April 7, 2007. 11 Ibid. 12 Kaifeng Yang, Neoinstitutionalism and E-Government: Beyond Jane Fountain, Social Science Computer Review, vol. 21, no. 4, Winter 2003. pp. 432-442. Online. Available: Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/. Accessed: April 7, 2007. 13 Kraemer and King, Information Technology and Administrative Reform: Will the Time After EGovernment Be Different? September 29, 2003. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.

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Chapter 3. Barriers and Strategies to E-Government Development

The following challenges encompass difficulties all countries face in egovernment development and implementation.1 However, many of these areas are more pronounced in the Latin American region because of low country GDPs, the historical relationship between the public and private sector, and the relationship between government and citizens.2 In the case of Mexico, many of these challenges affect the development and implementation of e-government systems and should be considered by policy-makers and researchers in the planning and evaluation of programs. Arguably, many of these obstacles have been overlooked by policy makers in the past and need to be revisited if Mexicos e-government program in to progress in the future. In addition to these challenges are steps to resolving various problems linked to a fear of change in employment, cultural barriers, and budget constraints.

The Two-Systems Problem

There is a clear digital divide in Mexico that places those with limited financial resources, those living in rural areas, and those with limited educational experience at a disadvantage for digital access. In 2005, the Internet penetration rate in Mexico was approximately 16.3% or 17.1 million people.3 This is a significant increase from 2.7% in 2000 and reveals a large shift in Internet use. In terms of teledensity, only 18% of Mexicans have fixed land lines, which is in line with most Latin American countries, and approximately 43% have mobile phones in 2007.4 However, despite the large increase in Internet and mobile phone use, there are certain patterns that reveal large disparities between rural and urban areas and high and low-income locations. Thus, there are two competing parallel systems that cater to different populations with a variety of usage patterns.

11

Politicians and supporters of e-government argue that it reduces costs and can make public service provision more effective and efficient. However, this prediction does not prove to be true until a substantial number of users start using e-government.5 In fact, the sunk costs of developing and creating e-government programs are very high. Thus, if there are any cost savings they are the result of a long-term investment in ICT. Not only is starting a program very costly, but also maintaining multiple channels of information such as face-to-face office time, mail, and telephone inquiries in addition to online help can tax public agencies.6 Financial costs are only part of the problem because changes in organizational functions can also create rifts between different groups within a department. There are often many differences between the traditional workers in a public agency and workers coming in to undertake and manage e-government programs. Generally, digital workers tend to be more highly educated, used to working in informal settings, and tend to be paid more than their traditional counterparts.7 There is a clash between the traditional workers in an agency and new workers who are hired for technology integration.8 These two sides, representing the old-economy and the new-economy, often jockey for political position and budgetary resources.9 Friction between groups can hinder egovernment integration and limit ICT use in the public sector in general. In Latin America, this two-systems problem is further compounded by cultural expectations and education deficits. Many Latin Americans rely on government processes for socializing and interacting with their community members.10 For example, waiting in an office or line affords a person the opportunity to catch up on the happenings of the day with their neighbors and friends as well as receive news and current events from other towns and cities. Thus, running errands encompasses more than simply checking items off a list. It affords community members a chance to interact with each other. Education deficits in the form of qualified and experienced IT professionals also hinder the ability for e-government programs to permeate government processes. It is difficult to find professionals to develop, implement, and maintain e-government programs because many public education systems are under-funded and lack an IT 12

focus.11 This problem stems from the low penetration of Internet and PC use in the region and a lack of educational opportunities for students interested in IT areas. Thus, governments in the process of developing domestic e-government programs must search externally for IT expertise. Once experts are contributing to the system, the two-systems clash can be aggravated because e-government expertise comes from a foreign source and because the existing culture lacks the technical expertise to understand and analyze recommendations.

Factions within Bureaucracy

It is hasty for an agency to assume that investing in e-government applications and promoting new programs will win over public officials and convince them that change works to their advantage. In contrast, technology adoption can be very slow and difficult depending on how accepting public officials are of the new product. Thus, officials must be cognizant of making concrete choices to share knowledge, adopt technology, and use technology to further their organizations goals.12 Public agencies and bureaucrats are slow to accept changes in how they function and manage within their workspace. This not only applies to e-government but to every aspect of organizational change within an agency. In the case of e-government, cross agency coordination is the optimal way to share, disseminate, and coordinate data among different groups. However, this perspective is not typically found among bureaucrats who strive to differentiate their performance and functions from other agencies often in the hopes of receiving more funding and organizational legitimacy. Thus, public agencies sometimes prefer to perpetuate data silos or areas where only one or a limited number of agencies have access to specific data. This can also cause turf wars during the data decentralization process because certain agencies identify themselves with specific functions, constituents, and missions of the government. Despite these bureaucratic attributes, there are many government agencies that are able to overcome agency identity problems.

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Instead of developing a lone agencies infrastructure and service delivery model, egovernment bureaucrats must work together across agency lines and build an infrastructure that is not particular to a single agency.13 This goal proves to be extremely difficult due to the historical and political attributes of bureaucratic systems. In the case of resistance to e-government programs, leaders within agencies must overcome the inertia typical in many offices and get people to think outside the box in terms of new ways of delivering services to the general public and the business community.14 This is admittedly a very difficult hurdle for public agency leaders and is often the most complex barrier for agencies to overcome. However, one way to mitigate the problems associated with technology adoption is to put external pressure on bureaucrats to perform more efficiently and effectively. In Latin America, politicians and political parties can influence agency leaders to adopt e-government development as a new policy goal. The public sector is highly politicized and many bureaucrats are linked to the party in power.15 Thus, enforcing the party objectives can further ones political career. Other methods include altering incentives within the organization and creat[ing] new mechanisms of organizational accountability that change how workers think about and perform their job functions.16 Additionally, there are certain qualities associated with technological innovation and egovernment that aid in the adoption process. They include the ease of usage [of new technologies], compatibility with agency mission, and existence of a relative advantage in the use of the technology.17 If in the promotion of e-government agency leaders can maximize these factors, new projects are likely to be more accepted and integrated in the agencys culture on all levels.18

Funding Constraints
Funding for IT projects can potentially be very expensive due to high upfront costs. Depending on the funding model, costs can be met by different agencies within government that are enthusiastic about providing services and interacting in new ways. 14

National and state budget expenditures can be in the multi-million dollar range for infrastructure development, training of personnel, development of software applications, and security settings. For the most part, IT expenditures make up approximately one to two percent of a national budget but this depends on the affairs of the state in the specified year and whether or not there were budget cuts that affect IT programs.19 Egovernment programs are usually planned with the goal of recouping costs over time as they are amortized and spread over more users.20 E-government programs are normally financed through general tax revenue, user fees, or commercial advertising. In addition, some governments may combine all three methods depending on the public adoption rates and tax revenue cycles.21 In Latin America, there are many countries with high foreign debt and extremely limited state revenue that cuts into the IT spending budget. In these countries, such as Honduras and Nicaragua, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) has provided funding for graphical information systems (GIS) and updating accounting systems to enable the countries to maintain and improve their poverty reduction programs and debt reduction accounting.22 The influence of international organizations is a major driving force behind government Internet use in the [Latin American] region.23 For many international organizations, e-government is seen as a method for combating corruption. For example, in El Salvador, various IADB funds were provided to allow the government to track emergency aid funds following the corrupt activities during Hurricane Mitch relief efforts.24 Funding constraints in the Latin American region can be more pervasive when compared to the U.S. or East Asian countries because many countries lack basic infrastructure that is the foundation for e-government programs.25 Internal government information systems and security infrastructure may be non-existent or antiquated making the purchasing of equipment, maintenance of qualified personnel, and capacity building within the public sector an even greater fiscal constraint.26 International organizations have put pressure on some Latin American countries to improve their IT capabilities. These improvements are often seen as part of a larger scheme to modernize the public 15

sector, increase democratic mechanisms in the state, and provide for more interaction between public, private, and civil society groups. Given this scenario, it is difficult to gauge the level of enthusiasm among public officials about e-government programs because the impetus for change does not stem entirely from an internal realization that government needs to improve its communication with citizens. The pressure from international organizations can curb internal discussions about IT because projects may be seen as foreign rather than domestically developed solutions to public sector problems. In contrast, a recent piece of legislation called the Declaration of Santo Domingo signals a turn for the better in terms of multilateral support for e-government development in Latin America. The declaration outlines e-government goals and challenges in the region and was signed in June of 2006 by ministers from all the Organization of American States (OAS) countries (a total of 34) indicating a public political commitment to furthering IT goals in the participating countries.27 Another challenge particular to the region is the relatively new shift towards social program improvement among governments, international organizations, and academicians. The debt crisis of the 70s and 80s caused severe cuts in social program spending that hurt poor and middle-class groups more than any other segment of the population. Currently, the region is plagued by inequalities in income, a lack of access to high quality public institutions, and the bifurcation of the economy in terms of education, health care, and other publicly provided services. Unless public administrators stress that e-government investment is part of a larger program to better disperse public services, they will be hard pressed to find support within governing bodies to fund expensive IT projects.28 E-government spending can go through different cycles depending on the overall welfare of the country. For example, a country with a strong economy and abundant resources will find that budgetary trade-offs with other spending categories are less intense.29 However, in countries with failing economies e-government spending competes with public assistance programs, education, and healthcare spending.30 In a weak economy, it is difficult to make the case that tax revenues should go to e16

government programs rather than education or healthcare especially when these programs positively affect the population most vulnerable to economic downturns. Given the instability of many Latin American economies, competition for funding e-government programs can at times be overcome by strong leadership, an effective promotional and marketing campaign, and internal funding and external expertise that supports IT investment.

Planning Conflicts, Outsourcing, and Domestic IT Capabilities

The delegation of e-government service development, delivery, and evaluation is a common conflict in all governments. Public agencies struggle to find economically and politically acceptable solutions that often include in-house development, outsourcing to private firms, or public-private partnerships with non-profits such as universities or with the private sector. Within public agencies, employees may fight over whether or not technical development and IT services should be completed in-house or outsourced. When governments resort to outsourcing, there is often conflict within the IT area as to who is most capable and prepared to offer particular services whether it is website design or program management. Winning a bid can depend on how much power a company has in the IT field. In this case, power is interpreted as expertise, financial clout, or political connections that gives one company an advantage over other bidding companies.31 For e-government development, the government often turns to creative and knowledgeable organizations such as research institutions and universities. These organizations are the part of society explicitly designed for knowledge creation and technology transfer to other organizations.32 Additionally, these institutions are the incubators that produce new inventions for government agencies.33 Public agencies do not rely on bureaucrats to innovate new technologies for their agencies thus these knowledge incubators are integral to the modernization of state processes in IT and service delivery. As aforementioned, in Latin America there is an IT expertise deficit that curbs the states ability to use universities and research institutes for e-government

17

programs. Thus, expertise often comes from foreign sources such as international organizations. Different projects require different types of expertise. Public agencies may rely on in-house services for systems that are simple and straightforward. Employees would work with their in-house technical staff and projects would be covered by their agency budget. Likewise, the agency would retain control over the implementation of the project and the complementary technology.34 However, for more complex e-government systems, public agencies most likely rely on private sector firms. This involves some loss of control and decline in autonomy on the part of the bureaucratic agency.35 In the case of more complex e-government systems, the private sector is extremely important for technological innovation. In Latin America, the private sector may not choose to become involved in egovernment development because of the perceived limited use of new programs by citizens and businesses. Some high revenue areas, such as customs and trade egovernment programs, may offer profit-generating opportunities that match common business models.36 However, programs that are not based on revenue through foreign trade are often not worthwhile business pursuits. Thus, it is difficult to find businesses that will cover the upfront investment costs because adoption is slow and profits are minimal. Portal development or one-stop-shopping for government services is a common trend in e-government. Portal development and maintenance can be very complex because it involves multiple services, applications, and public agencies. Adding services and maintaining the website portal can be very technical and time consuming so governments often avoid putting more burden on in-house staff by outsourcing the entire portal project. Private companies can have an edge over the public sector because they have the means to become very specialized in certain tasks. For example, a public agency that is trying to develop a portal that is accessible to all citizens may hire an outside firm to add services and sites that are more user friendly and accessible to the disabled.37

18

Thus, outsourcing projects depends on the level of complexity and the kind of expertise needed for the project. In terms of government contracts and outsourcing, Latin Americas history of clientelism and political patronage does not offer a model relationship on which to base future IT project development and management. Pursuing any type of government contract or public-private partnership will require a new perspective among officials, particularly among [governments in] emerging economies.38 In many Latin American countries there is mistrust between the public and private sector not to mention between citizens and the government. Maintaining high standards and transparent bidding processes can help to reduce any misgivings civil servants and the public hold against these partnerships or outsourcing. The ICT sector in many Latin American countries is often weak. Thus, government agencies can be role models for IT development and use by effectively using ICT in government sponsored projects. Governments can enhance the capacities of local ICT firms by encouraging capacity-building partnerships between local and multinational companies.39 E-government planning should involve the ICT sector regardless of the level of development and expertise because public agencies can create important relationships with private companies and draw on business connections later on when the companies have matured.40 The long-term development of the tech sector can work to the governments advantage if businesses are aware of e-government projects, hurdles, and future goals. The prospect of winning a large government contract can encourage small IT companies to be more innovative and creative, many times finding new ways to offer services. Proving themselves as viable IT companies can put them in the running for more contracts and stronger relationships with multiple agencies. In the short-term, contracts that partner small companies with multi-nationals not only offer more comprehensive services, but also invest in future domestic IT capabilities.

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Leadership
Political will among e-government leaders is necessary to uphold active political leadership, the financial resources, inter-agency coordination, policy changes and human effort required to plan and implement e-government.41 In order to be effective, egovernment leaders must be risk takers, have sufficient authority to undertake projects, be able to make large time commitments, and have the clout to publicly endorse and promote e-government projects. Officials must acknowledge the difficulty in undergoing any type of IT project because all projects are bound to have bugs or problems in system coding and implementation. Additionally, resistance within bureaucracies occurs on multiple levels for a number of reasons including: A fear of losing a job because it will be replaced by technological advancements; Fear that agency employees will lose power within the system by losing their turf through a change in agency function or mission; Fear of not understanding how new technologies work and appearing ignorant in front of colleagues and supervisors; Fear that new technology will mean more work such as answering constituent e-mail; Belief that there is nothing to gain in learning about new technology, thus there is nothing to lose; And a concern that automated processes will mean fewer opportunities to receive unofficial payments of bribes in return for using their [government employee] discretion to help certain parties.42 Any combination of these fears adds to the difficulty of implementing new egovernment programs. However, there are ways to mitigate public employee and constituent fears. The first is to present politicians with a way to sell e-government initiatives. For example, using projects from within the region as templates for new programs can bring a local sentiment to the project and provide hope for success if there is substantial support. One laudable example is Chiles online application program for affordable housing. This project enabled poor people to avoid the red tape of traveling a long way to an office and waiting in line by providing 70 service centers with customer 20

support.43 In this way, housing vouchers and subsidies, part of a public assistance program, were provided to people who have very little access to computers and the Internet.44 The advantage of this program is that service centers are dispersed among different communities offering people multiple location options for applying for government assistance. A second approach to increasing support among different parties is to start small with a modest e-government project. It can be a new project or an application that is already in use in another Latin American country. The ability to push for support is completely dependent upon the success of the project thus e-government leaders should collaborate with private businesses and the public to ensure that all parties have a vested interest in the project.45 Once the project is complete, politicians can use its success to take credit for positive gains in society and government.46 E-government leaders can then perpetuate the excitement about new projects by introducing more complex or interagency programs that include more stakeholders. This method of increasing support can create excitement among government leaders and the public while providing worthwhile new public services. A third way to push for e-government investment is through a large promotional campaign that highlights all the benefits people will receive once the program is in place. This can be done through posting billboards on major roads, using signs on public transportation, and producing public service announcements that show people what, where, and how to use the new e-government programs.47 In order for the campaign to promote a strong message, projects should benefit a large number of people such as receiving tax information online or renewing certain permits and licenses for businesses. 48 A successful promotional effort can create excitement among constituents and strengthen an administrations political will to engage in new e-government projects. E-government leaders can use the media to highlight top priorities and marshal the financial resources that are necessary for the implementation of technical improvements.49

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Unfortunately, when it comes to technology investments there are many leaders who do not support e-government programs. There are a number of reasons why leaders are not supportive: IT investments are expensive and risky and often do not save the state money; Alternative issues such as social programs are considered more important; Legislators may bow to vested interests who often fear that implementing new technology will change the status quo.50 Many scholars argue that when there is a technological innovation in government, there is usually a mayor, governor, or legislator who had the political will and authority to support it through the decision making process.51 E-government leaders in Latin America must acknowledge the reasons why government employees would be opposed to technological investments. They must lay out in their campaign why the benefits of egovernment programs are greater than its associated costs and risks and how technology investments accomplish agency goals more effectively and efficiently in the long-term.

Corruption
Corruption exists in every country regardless of the level of development and socioeconomic and cultural variables. Arguably, there are different forms of corruption that tend to be more prevalent in countries at different levels of development. In the case of less developed countries, corruption takes the form of retail corruption including nepotism, bribery, and tips among others.52 This type of corruption is highly manifest, annoying and ubiquitous in many less developed countries.53 In contrast, more developed countries exhibit a type of corruption that is more likely to be less ostensiblemore institutional, legal and selective wholesale corruption.54 Where retail corruption is often at the administrative and street level in the form of monetary bribes, wholesale corruption tends to occur through a sphere of intra-elite exchanges at the political level where under the veneer of legality and formality, the currency is mainly political and the economic stakes extremely high.55 In terms of e-government 22

development, corruption is one of the areas that can be reduced through more transparent service provision and inter-agency communications. In the case of Latin American and Caribbean countries, Transparency International reports indicate that the region is corruption prone though corruption appears in different forms depending on the country in question.56 In many of the countries, there are specific terms for different kinds of bribes (e.g. coima and mordida)57 and the term el que no tranza no avanza (one that does not act ethically does not succeed)58 indicating that corruption is in many ways institutionalized in the social, cultural, and economic spheres. Corruption in the region has its roots in the historical and cultural patrimonial legacy dating back to the beginning of European colonialism in the 1500s.59 Accordingly, cultural remnants from the colonial legacy have been adopted into the administrative customs in many countries in Latin America affecting the modernization of the public sector. As identified by Jorge Nef, a regional historian, there are several characteristics that fit into an ideological cultural construct helping to explain corruption in the administrative system.60 The following characteristics can negatively influence e-government program development and implementation. According to Nef, the core of the administrative culture in Latin America is defined by the persistence of amoral familism or particularism.61 This is exhibited in the manifestation of patrimonial practices that reveal built-in particularism leading to insular communities, limited transparency, and a distrust of strangers surrounding the performance of public functions.62 Formalism is another characteristic of corruption in the region. It is dependent on the rigid hierarchical class structure in Latin America which is more often than not preoccupied by official titles and officialdom in general. This comes as no surprise as official titles serveas a mechanism to access private consultancies and alternative (and not always transparent) sources of income.63 Thus, there are two sides to public officialdom. The first is a front of legality and formality seen by the public and the second is a private zone of exceptionality for insiders.64 According to Nef, relationships can be explained by time in that delays, waiting, and 23

slowness are selectively used to define the importance of the relationship and delineate power and hierarchy.65 The last two characteristics are corporatism and centralism. Corporatism in Latin American countries occurs when elite interests [are] grossly overrepresented [in government], with wide access to decision making.66 This is due in part to the weak relationship between the public and the state in terms of public representation of interests within government processes. 67 Although public officials are not equated with the landed and commercial oligarchy, they are still considered elites and can become part of the upper crust of society.68 However, a public officials experience with undemocratic processes in governmental decision making can lead to a lack of preoccupation with the public in future deliberations perpetuating systemic corruption and patrimonialism. Additionally, centralism conveys a hierarchical system of governance where decisionmaking occurs at the top of the pyramid with little delegation of responsibility.69 Nef argues that in this environment influence peddling flows upstream, at times creating a system of pyramidal corruption.70 The corruption characteristics described in this section will affect e-government program buy-in among citizens and government officials as well as influence the uptake of programs and procurement processes. For many WB and UN officials, e-government is a measure governments can take to decrease corruption in the public sector. However, for anti-corruption measures to be successful, public officials at all levels must acknowledge and understand the necessary changes in relationships and responsibilities. Thus, e-government development and implementation not only requires training but also a change in attitudes about the role of government in society. Although this applies, in principle, to all countries undergoing e-government projects, it is especially important for those with a history of institutionalized corruption and colonial legacies that further hinder government reform processes.

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These are only a few of the numerous challenges that arise when new programs and ideas are introduced into the government system. They have been described in general terms and, as witnessed, some can be overcome with strong leadership and effective planning that involves key stakeholders while others are more difficult to overcome because they are more nuanced and require time, resources, and attitudinal change. It is important to remember that the aforementioned challenges are specifically described in a Latin American context based on the focus of this discussion. However, every government needs to consider the problems associated with e-government development and implementation based on country-specific characteristics such as cultural, socioeconomic, and historical factors. While there are similarities between egovernment development and implementation among all countries, there is no perfect model or one-size-fits-all program that works in every country. Thus, identifying and acknowledging strengths and weaknesses within government systems and areas that require reform is essential to e-government planning. In fact, this is arguably the first step in the e-government planning process for many countries.

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Notes

Chapter 3 is part of an unpublished paper entitled E-Government Challenges in Latin America by Saretta Ramdial. July, 2006. (Draft.) 2 Interview with Miguel Porra Vign, Program Coordinator for E-Government Development at the Organization of American States, Washington. D.C., June 27, 2006. 3 Search Engines, Directories, and Internet Usage, Internet World Stats. Online. Available: http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/mx.htm. Accessed: April 15, 2007. 4 Ibid. 5 Darrell West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 30. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Interview with Miguel Porra Vign, Program Coordinator for E-Government Development at the Organization of American States, Washington. D.C., June 27, 2006. 11 Ibid. 12 Maria Christina Shcarf, Knowledge Flows and the Use of Internet-Related Information Technologies in Public Sector Organizations: A Comparative Case Study, in Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance, ed. Darrell West. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 31. 13 Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services in Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. ed. Darrell West. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 31. 14 West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 31. 15 Interview with Miguel Porra Vign, Program Coordinator for E-Government Development at the Organization of American States, Washington. D.C., June 27, 2006. 16 West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 31. 17 Louis Tornatsky and K. Klein, Innovation Characteristics and Innovation AdoptionImplementation: A Meta-Analysis of Findings in Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. ed. Darrell West. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 31. 18 Ibid. 19 Class lecture by Gary Chapman, Professor, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, Spring 2006; Darrell West. Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 32. 20 Ibid. 26

21

Gant, Gant, and Johnson, State Web Portals, in Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. ed. Darrell West. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 32. 22 Katherine Reilly, Government, ICTs and Civil Society in Central America: Is National Government ICT Use Contributing to More Democratic States? Online. Available: http://www.undp.org/surfpanama/egov/docs/publications_n_resources/pubs/government_icts_cso_CA.pdf Accessed: March 10, 2007. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Interview with Miguel Porra Vign, Program Coordinator for E-Government Development at the Organization of American States, Washington. D.C., June 27, 2006. 26 Katherine Reilly, Government, ICTs and Civil Society in Central America: Is National Government ICT Use Contributing to More Democratic States? Online. Available: http://www.undp.org/surfpanama/egov/docs/publications_n_resources/pubs/government_icts_cso_CA.pdf Accessed: March 10, 2007. 27 Organization of American States. Draft Resolution: Support the Implementation of the Declaration of Santo Domingo. Presented at the 36th Regular Session of the OAS General Assembly, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, June 4-6, 2006. Online. Available: http://www.oas.org/consejo/GENERAL%20ASSEMBLY/ResolucionesDeclaraciones.asp. Accessed: November 10, 2006. 28 Interview with Miguel Porra Vign, Program Coordinator for E-Government Development at the Organization of American States, Washington. D.C., June 27, 2006. 29 Darrell West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 33. 30 Ibid. 31 Darrell West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 36. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Darrell West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 37. 35 Ibid. 36 Interview with Miguel Porra Vign, Program Coordinator for E-Government Development at the Organization of American States, Washington. D.C., June 27, 2006. 37 Darrell West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 38. 38 The Working Group on E-Government in the Developing World. Roadmap For EGovernment in the Developing World: 10 Questions E-Government Leaders Should Ask Themselves. Los Angeles, Pacific Council on International Policy, 2002. Online. Available: 27

http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan005030.pdf#search= %22roadmap%20for%20egovernment%20in%20the%20developing%20world%2C%20pacific%20council%20on% 20international%20policy%22. Accessed: October 12, 2006. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Darrell West, Digital Government: Technology and Public Sector Performance. (Princeton University Press, 2005,) p. 39. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Jorge Nef, Government Corruption in Latin America, Where Corruption Lives (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2001,) p. 160. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Cecilia M. Arruda, Business Ethics in Latin America. Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 16, no. 14 (1997), pp. 1597-1603. Online. Accessed: January 10, 2007. 59 Jorge Nef, Government Corruption in Latin America, Where Corruption Lives (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2001,) p. 160. 60 Jorge Nef, Government Corruption in Latin America, Where Corruption Lives (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2001,) p. 167. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Jorge Nef, Government Corruption in Latin America, Where Corruption Lives (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2001,) p. 168. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 28

Chapter 4. E-Government Development and Implementation in Mexico

By the end of the 1990s, the Mexican government was increasingly using ICT for government processes and functions. There were some initial steps taken in the 1990s to further the use of technology such as the 1995 Telecommunications Law, the 1998 Electronic Declarations Legislation Package, and development of the e-procurement tool Compranet in 1996. However, during this time period there was no e-government framework or overarching policy that legislated coordination among agencies and government branches in terms of ICT use. As in many countries, e-government in Mexico was developed and has been implemented using a top-down approach. Originally, e-government was the responsibility of the Institute for Statistics, Geography, and Informatics (INEGI) which was the authority for the federal governments IT policy. However, with the growing importance of e-government as part of government reform on a worldwide scale, authority was transferred from INEGI to the Presidents Office in 2000. Although e-government programs include multiple stakeholders, in recent years it has been the executive office that sets the guidelines for e-government programs. The Presidents Office delegated responsibility to the Ministry of Public Administration to implement specific policies and strategies between 2000 and 2003. In 2003, the Presidents Office transferred authority to the Ministry of Public Administration following the creation of the Good Government Agenda. E-government in Mexico was formally introduced in November of 2002 when the administration created the Good Government Agenda encompassing six areas for political reform. The Agenda includes improving the quality of government, increasing professionalism among government agencies and employees, improving regulatory processes and functions, and creating an e-government component of governance that 29

supports good governance goals. It is argued by experts, however, that there are many problems with the implementation of e-government in Mexico because of the countrys legal formalism and the lack of federal government legislative coordination.1 In this sense, a legal framework for e-government remains unclear because of the passing of some laws but resistance to others among different entities in government. These legal problems are described as patchworks and loopholes that hinder the full implementation of e-government processes throughout all government agencies. As seen in Chapter 3, the main challenges to e-government development in the Latin American region stem from a number of cultural, historical, and socioeconomic factors affecting the government system and bureaucracy. However, there are variables specific to Mexico influencing the uptake of e-government programs among citizens, businesses, and government agencies. The following section focuses on the key players in Mexicos e-government development and implementation and the most pervasive problems in implementation.

Key Players in Mexicos E-Government System

There are numerous agencies and organizations involved in the development and implementation of e-government programs in Mexico. Many of them have been charged with new responsibilities following the creation of the Good Government Agenda. Table 4.1 describes the roles and functions of each entity in Mexicos e-government development and implementation. Although many of the key players and agencies have a government mandate to be involved in the e-government planning and implementation process, some are not formally integrated into the process but still provide important services and advice.

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Table 4.12 Main Agencies Involved in E-Government

Agency Presidents Office

Description of Program/ Organization Office of Innovation

Responsibilities It sets the guidelines for egovernment, coordinates egovernment within the Good Government Agenda framework, provides guidance for egovernment accountability, facilitates negotiations among agency heads to devise performance measures, and provides leadership and political support for e-government initiatives. Guides strategic initiatives for the entire federal public administration system, develops policies, guidelines, strategies, and harmonizes [sic] practices and standards.3 Creates a forum of e-government officials at the federal ministry and agency level to discuss goals and strategies. Provides officials with the opportunity to share best practices and solutions to egovernment challenges. Is not legally constituted as an administrative body but will become a CIO council with specialized committees if the draft agreement for an egovernment framework is ratified. Launched in 2001 to help end the digital divide in Mexico Created to help build a regulatory framework for electronic media and e-commerce. Created to establish e-learning applications, an e-health system, and to digitize government services.4 A privately managed government organization that offers guidance and advice

Ministry of Public Administration

E-Government and IT Policy Unit

E-Government Network

Ministry of Communications and Transportation

e-Mexico

National Council of Science and Technology

INFOTEC

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regarding e-government plans. It is not a formal policy making entity but is highly tied into the strategy and implementation phases of e-government because the organization undertakes many public projects with the Mexican government.

Based on Table 4.1, it is clear that the Presidents Office and the Ministry of Public Administration are the top key players because they set and implement the egovernment agenda. This trend is similar to other countries where the e-government push has been top-down rather than starting at the grassroots level. For example, President Bushs Presidential Management Agenda (PMA) of 2001 included five main government reforms that pushed the federal government to become more efficient and accountable to citizens and more results-oriented.6 The aim of the PMA was to integrate ICT into President Bushs government reform plan using a number of different strategies. One of the methods for incorporating technology was supporting the development of a comprehensive federal e-government program. In the case of both countries, Presidential leadership and support throughout the buy-in and development process is essential for pushing new ideas through other branches of government. As e-government continues to evolve, it is likely that the role of each agency or organization will change based on preferences among new administrations, new technologies, and different methods for collaboration among government agencies. Likewise, entities may emerge in the form of merged agencies or entirely new agencies because of unanticipated needs of the government and the public. Additionally, as egovernment progresses in Mexico, there will most likely be a need for increased coordination in terms of regulations and laws that allow for coordination between these entities.

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Challenges to E-Government Implementation in Mexico

Chapter 3 outlines a variety of challenges that all governments face when developing and implementing e-government programs such as overcoming corruption and navigating through controversy over outsourcing. However, it is important to also describe some of the country-specific variables that influence agencies in Mexico. The following challenges are limited to problems in the budgeting and funding system, a lack of collaboration among government agencies, and an overuse of INFOTEC among public sector entities. These factors will be considered at a more micro-level in the following sections with a discussion on the e-Mexico project.

Budgetary Barriers Budgeting for e-government projects can be extremely expensive and difficult to predict because there are no guarantees that software programs, technology investment, and training will result in more efficient and productive agencies. Indeed, a fear of projects becoming runaway projects is understandable and should be acknowledged by agency leaders. This is especially important for agencies that have experienced runaway projects and are wary of undertaking expensive ICT changes that could result in a similar negative outcome. According to the OECD, there are a number of problems with budgeting structures for many countries because of the nature of ICT projects in general. It argues that budget time horizons of e-government projects require commitments over long periods and countries focus on single year expenditures.7 Additionally, budgetary rigidities prevent shared funding arrangements maintaining redundancies and duplication within the government system.8 There are also difficulties in measuring the costs and benefits of programs because of the intangible nature of e-government programs.9 In Mexico, the largest agencies involved in the e-government budgeting process are the Ministry of Public Administration, which coordinates and defines program changes, the Federal Regulatory Improvement Commission which develops e33

government regulations, and the Ministry of Finance, which sets the budgetary guidelines for all government agencies.10 According to a study completed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 2005, 45% of e-government officials in Mexico argue that budgetary barriers are very important and 32% argue they are important.11 This makes budgeting for e-government projects one of the largest external barriers to egovernment development in the country. Mexicos funding structure, argued to be very inflexible, allows for the budgeting of individual projects, however, this causes problems when agencies are collaborating and sharing responsibilities for a cross-agency project.12 In Mexico, many agencies indicated that a lack of funding was a problem for them in developing and implementing e-government projects. This is not an uncommon issue for most agencies across the board, but it is often linked to different causes when it comes to e-government funding. For one, non-e-government officials may not conceptualize IT investments as part of a government reform process because of the lack of exposure or training they may have in the technology field.13 However, e-government officials in this case are also to blame for budgetary problems because they may not present their IT expenses as part of a larger more comprehensive business case that is applied across the entire organization.14 For many agencies, future funding is uncertain and makes programs difficult to plan since budgets are on a one-year cycle. One option that has been used by many agencies in this predicament is the e-Mexico trust fund which allows agencies to transfer unused IT funds that can be withdrawn the subsequent fiscal year. However, this solution is temporary and ad hoc and does not help with the process of institutionalization [sic] of e-government in Mexico.15 Another option for funding is a multi-year budget plan which must be approved by multiple entities such as the Ministry of Finance and a congressional sub-committee.16 The timeframe for a multi-year budget is very long and, according to OECD data, there is a low approval rate which deters agencies from entering into the process.17

34

Inflexibility also arises within agency budgets. For most agencies, it is difficult to reallocate funds to high priority areas because leftover funds must be used within the same budgetary line.18 For example, if funds were not allocated by the Ministry of Finance as IT expenditures or investments, they cannot be used for IT purposes thus discretionary spending on the part if the agency is extremely limited. This can also be problematic for cross-agency projects where one agency may use all available funds and the other agency is unable to expend funds because of the budget allocation restrictions. The end result of the inflexible IT and e-government budgets can arguably lead to less collaboration and coordination because of the inability of agencies to follow through and change course if operational or technical problems arise.

Lack of Collaboration As seen in Chapter 2, there are multiple phases of e-government development that signal a certain degree of information sharing, collaboration, and seamlessness in functions and processes. Collaboration in projects can decrease and sometimes eliminate redundant information and programs, saving time and resources for multiple agencies. In Mexico, there has been an effort to collaborate on some levels including one-stop shops (eSAT), whole-of-government call centers (chambatel), information kiosksand government portals.19 However, based on OECD research, agencies have yet to collaborate on higher levels including the development of e-government programs and service delivery methods.20 Although Mexican agencies are undoubtedly coordinating in many ways by starting to share information and developing e-government portals, interagency collaboration has yet to occur due to a number of factors. Information sharing has been advanced through the E-Government Network which allows agency heads to share technical issues in developing and implementing agency plans.21 Arguably, this group can also exchange knowledge of e-government best practices, major challenges, and administrative hurdles taking information sharing a step further. Due to the lack of institutionalization of e-government regulations and structure,

35

collaboration at the agency level has yet to be mandated through legislation. If mandated, performance measurements and goals regarding collaboration may be built into legislation causing agency heads to work with other agencies on collaborative projects. More advanced coordination is seen in portal development which allows agencies to provide hypertext links to other entities related to similar services and information. However, much of this portal development is limited to national and federal ministry portals with local agencies (state and municipal) going un-represented.22 In terms of collaboration, Mexican agencies have yet to advance from coordination among agencies to collaboration among agencies. This is in part due to the idea that Mexico is still in the initial phases of e-government development. It is also linked to budgetary inflexibility that does not facilitate cross-funded e-government projects or multi-year budgets for programs with a life span of longer than the traditional one year.23 The OECD outlines a number of obstacles to collaboration which includes a lack of common vision and understanding of e-government across agencies, the habit of non-collaboration, internal resistance, and performance measures that do not recognize the value of collaboration.24 Taken in combination, these obstacles inhibit the development of e-government in Mexico. They also reveal the importance and necessity of institutional transformation on all levels in the e-government development and implementation process. Thus, the transformational aspect of e-government is not only in ICT use but also in the organizational culture of an agency and the history of traditional relationships between agencies. Ultimately, positive changes in outlook and action regarding inter-agency collaboration in the organizational culture of Mexican agencies will advance e-government on a municipal, state, and national level. The lack of collaboration among Mexican agencies undertaking e-government projects is problematic because one of the goals of e-government is to reduce redundancies in service provision and information gathering. The fact that only a handful of agencies participate in collaborative projects is disturbing because agencies do not have in-house examples to follow when the opportunity for collaboration arises. Collaboration is also not part of the evaluative process where it could be presented as a 36

feasible performance measure for all agencies. If collaboration was incorporated, it could be expanded with budgetary incentives for agencies that participate in inter-agency projects.

Reliance on INFOTEC A large part of Mexicos government reform efforts is centered on transparency and accountability among public sector employees and agencies. One of the major legal changes in this area occurred in 2000 when the Law of Acquisitions, Leasing, and Services of the Public Sector (LAASP) was passed to make government procurement more transparent.25 In general, the law requires that public sector agencies make bids for projects open and public so any appropriate supplier can bid and so that the selection process can be reviewed by interested parties. At face value, the law signals a major change in the government procurement process. However, an unanticipated consequence of the LAASP is that it can add two to six months the to procurement process making it difficult for agencies to respond quickly to ICT problems.26 As a result, the organization most agencies turn to for IT procurement is INFOTEC, a privately managed government research organization. INFOTEC is a major e-government player because it is familiar with public sector processes and does not have to go through the open bidding process other firms legally must go through to be a supplier to the Mexican government.27 This is because of its status as a quasigovernmental agency. While INFOTECs status regarding the LAASP law allows for a quicker procurement process, it is undoubtedly influencing private sector firms that are viable procurement alternatives. Many government agencies prefer going to INFOTEC because they claim the organization is familiar with government needs, has experience working with public agencies, and is easier to work with in the procurement process because of the time constraints built into the LAASP.28 However, the current situation is not stimulating the ICT industry in Mexico to become more competitive because INFOTEC arguably has an 37

advantage over private firms due to its status as a government enterprise. Thus, although the LAASP procurement laws have made the procurement process more transparent, it has also built in an anti-competitive component that offers an easy out for agencies seeking immediate results. Private sector firms that could potentially compete with INFOTEC by offering better prices and service are cut out of the procurement process. As in many countries, government contracts are highly coveted because of the spending power of the state. In the case of Mexico, the procurement process has technically become more transparent but, in practice, has not allowed for increased competition. The private sector would receive a large boost if the LAASP time frame was shorter and involved all potential contractors. The ICT industry in Mexico would also learn how to manage government ICT problems and provide results if it were awarded more contracts. Although the LAASP is a positive start, reforming the procurement process even more would force the ICT private sector to grow, to improve its products and service, and influence the public sector in terms of ICT possibilities for new egovernment projects. Additionally, it could also lower the costs of projects and allow agencies to save more resources or use leftover funds for different projects.

These challenges are specific to Mexicos e-government system yet reveal many shortcomings that are apparent in systems around the world. They are also some of the most difficult problems to overcome due to the necessary shift in mentality among public sector employees and the much-needed investment in domestic start-up companies to spur development and IT sector growth. Looking more closely at e-government programs, such as the e-Mexico project, allows researchers to pinpoint administrative problems in implementing a nationwide program across a very diverse population. The following chapter focuses on the development of the e-Mexico project and alerts researchers to some of the underlying problems in program implementation in terms of funding, the overall telecommunications sector, and targeting historically disenfranchised communities with varying backgrounds. 29

38

Notes

Mariano Gutirrez and Elizabeth Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD eGovernment Studies: Mexico. (OECD Publishing, 2005,) p. 28. 2 Adapted from Mariano Gutirrez and Elizabeth Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. (OECD Publishing, 2005,) p. 30. 3 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 30. 4 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 32. 5 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 28. 6 Office of Management and Budget, The Presidents Management Agenda, 2002. Online. Available: www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf. Accessed: June 10, 2006. 7 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 50. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 49. 12 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 50. 13 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 52. 14 Ibid. 15 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 55. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 57. 19 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 114. 20 Ibid. 21 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 117. 22 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 119. 23 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 125. 24 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 139.

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25

Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 60. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Gutirrez and Muller. Directed by Edwin Lau and Christian Vergez. OECD e-Government Studies: Mexico. p. 62.

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Chapter 5. The E-Mexico Project

In analyzing the e-government push in Mexico, it is easy to generalize program development and implementation characteristics making problem identification vague and often simplistic. Thus, evaluating a program such as the e-Mexico project reveals some of the specific issues associated with the administration of e-government programs in Latin America. The e-Mexico project is a comprehensive plan that includes projects in education, health, e-commerce, and e-government.1 Due to its breadth and depth, it encompasses many of the systematic failures that plague e-government development in all countries and is symbolic of the power struggles and political battles fought out in large and expensive technology projects. The e-Mexico project was created as part of President Foxs Good Governance Program in the early 2000s to increase access to information, promote digital participation, create a technology-friendly and savvy public, and to stimulate growth in the economy.2 President Fox set out on an ambitious plan to bring computer services to 9 out of 10 Mexicans by 2006 (by the end of his six-year term).3 This was indeed a lofty goal and deemed unrealistic by many skeptics of the program. In 2001 and 2002, there were only 12.47 phone lines per 100 inhabitants and 56.55 Internet hosts per 10,000 inhabitants.4 Additionally, there were only 2.74 Internet users per 100 inhabitants and 5.06 personal computers per 100 inhabitants.5 Presumably, those with access to telephones, computers, and the Internet belong to the high-income bracket in Mexico; a country with perpetually high income inequality despite being categorized as an advanced middle-income country by the World Bank.6 The e-Mexico project is carried out through a variety of venues including public health and education facilities as well as community centers. These facilities offer computing centers, numbering more than 7,000 in 2007, called community digital centers (CCDs) where citizens can access different kinds of e-government services, educational programs, and other information.7 By the end of 2007, the number of CCDs throughout

41

Mexico is slated to be approximately 10,000.8 In terms of funding and administration, eMexico is federally funded and is administered primarily by the Ministry of Education.9 However, state governments and the federal government coordinate management and administration sometimes leading to inefficiencies in program implementation. While funding from private companies such as Microsoft and Intel have boosted the programs development, it has also resulted in a highly politicized debate over neutral funding sources and the sustainability of the program. As with most expensive and national level development projects, many researchers and policy experts are highly critical of the e-Mexico project when it comes to the administration of the program and the funding models used to finance it. However, few argue against the need for a national program that enables ICT use among historically disenfranchised communities. Moreover, the possibility of growing the economy to compete with more technologically advanced countries is seen by many as an essential step in Mexicos development. That said, the following controversies reveal the difficulties in planning a nationwide program to bridge the digital divide, the politicized nature of the e-Mexico project, the influence of the private sector in public policy, and the lack of coordination in administering the multi-million dollar program.

Controversial Factors in the E-Mexico Project

How to Bridge the Digital Divide There is much controversy surrounding the e-Mexico project when it comes to how to target those with little to no access to the Internet. Researchers claim that those with access to telecommunications services are mostly people in the middle and highincome bracket that already had access to Internet service prior to the e-Mexico project.10 In the past five years since the beginning of the project, approximately 20% of the population has access to digital connectivity.11 However, to reach the next 20% of people the government will most likely have to develop different approaches to digital access because of the great disparities in income between the top 20% and the remaining 80%.12 42

New approaches may focus on combining traditional face-to-face interactions with a variety of telecommunications services depending on the needs of the specific community. Penetrating the remaining 80% is arguably more expensive because it could require increased investments in infrastructure, planning, and research since many of those in abject poverty live in rural areas with extremely limited telecommunications options.13 One alternative to the CCD model is to invest more in enhancing the face-to-face transactions by making the backend network more integrated and efficient. Based on the history of interaction between citizens and government in the country, many Mexicans will continue to be wary of electronic services. This is also in part due to low credit card penetration rates and the inability of some government agencies to accept digital signatures for certain documents.14 Thus, developing a way to retain face-to-face interaction with more access to multiple services is key to spreading the growth of electronic services even if citizens do not personally access services themselves. 15 However, as is seen in Mexicos overall e-government initiative, agencies have made strides to integrate vertically but not horizontally. This can be traced to bureaucratic culture and the desire among agencies to maintain data silos that legitimate their government mission and raison d'etre. For many agencies, sharing data involves a power struggle at the highest levels of management because agencies want to retain their uniqueness in the government apparatus while ensuring funding for agency-specific projects. Mexicos federal funding structure does not at the moment offer any incentives for inter-agency collaboration in projects thus the impetus to coordinate databases and share information is non-existent. The lack of legislation requiring agencies to collaborate on projects may change under Mexicos new President, Felipe Caldern, inaugurated in 2006. In spite of any new legislation, though, the most difficult setback to overcome will be changing the mentality among middle and high-level managers that collaboration does not lead to the death of an agency. Additionally, a focus away from simply putting services online to actually

43

sharing data between agencies is necessary to realize efficiencies in e-government and make the user experience more enjoyable and hopefully less time-consuming.16 This disinclination to integrate data affects the e-Mexico program because many citizens use CCDs for e-government, education, and health services. The disjointed nature of online service provision in all areas of government results in a time-consuming and often frustrating process for citizens. The over-arching unfortunate trend, one that is seen in many e-government programs, is that the country-specific political characteristics (in this case, a lack of horizontal integration) are actually ingrained in the e-government and e-Mexico system making the program dichotomous in nature. Where the mission of the e-Mexico project is to enhance the telecommunications experience for citizens and spur Internet use, institutional and organizational culture, in contrast, limits the project by transferring traditional bureaucratic norms to the structures and functions of the system.

Political Environment and Funding The introduction of the e-Mexico project came at a time when Mexico was in great political transition. President Fox, a member of the National Action Party or PAN, broke a 70-year rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party or PRI.17 Often described as a businessman turned politician, Fox was a Coca-Cola executive prior to his governorship of the state of Guanajuato.18 His party, often termed pro-business, had an advantage in terms of timing as many Mexicans were still suffering from the peso-crisis that occurred in the late 90s.19 Additionally, many were distrustful of the power structure the PRI established during its long rule further weakening the partys chances in the 2000 presidential elections. President Foxs successor, Felipe Calderon, also belongs to the PAN and was elected in 2006 through a highly controversial election that resulted in temporary destabilizing civil unrest for months. The push for e-government was one of Foxs largest public works projects in terms of administration and funding. These factors in combination with the timing of the elections made e-government in Mexico especially prone to criticism and debate. Some 44

of the most contentious issues concerning the e-Mexico project were sources of funding and equipment (software and hardware) that would be used nationwide for increasing digital access. The debate over whether or not to use open source software or proprietary software and where funds come from is still a hot topic among research circles and policy makers for a number of reasons. Mexicos IT sector is fledgling at best. For this reason, many foreign IT companies including IBM, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard made large donations in the form of equipment, expertise, and funding to the e-Mexico project at the outset.20 However, no company faced such high resistance to its involvement in the project as Microsoft. Microsoft has supported the project through discount-price software, training and support[and] train[ing] 20,000 technicians and engineers to set up and run hundreds of e-Mexico public computer centers across the country.21 While Mexico values the donation at $30 million, Microsoft values it at $6 million.22 Regardless of the final donation amount, many congress people in Mexicos legislature argue that the donation of software and expertise gives the company a long-term advantage over the provision of IT services in the public sector. Opponents argue that the donations will require the government to pay fees and royalties for proprietary software impinging on future social welfare and education programs.23 Other arguments against Microsoft include the desire among legislators to keep costs low and implement open-source software that can downloaded for free and help to stimulate the domestic IT sector. This has been the trend among many Latin American countries such as Brazil and Argentina where Linux has been promoted as a cost saving measure that does not contractually bind governments to expensive proprietary software.24 Many in Mexico argued for open source software for the e-Mexico initiative for the same reasons. In terms of Mexicos IT sector, the possibility of winning some of the contracts would have given the sector a much needed boost and perhaps drawn on the expertise of many talented Mexicans engineers who left the country for higher paying jobs and employment opportunities in the Unites States. The governments move away

45

from open-source software and its reliance on foreign companies further proved to many PAN opponents that the party is pro-business. Despite internal resistance to the way the project was funded, the e-Mexico project was such an expensive initiative that it would have been difficult to push through congress given the incredible funds needed to start the program. President Fox arguably found a way to finance the project and receive technical training and expertise without having to go to congress for permission. He did this by using his business experience and know-how to establish connections between Mexico and large American companies. Though a democratic country, it can be argued that given the political environment in which the e-Mexico project was introduced, it would have taken a very long time to develop and implement a nationwide program without the help of international firms and their funds. As evidenced, e-Mexico has not succeeded in rallying Mexican politicians together despite its end goal of providing more information and digital access to citizens. The program is not unlike any other large project, such as a public works project, in that the more expensive it is, the more debate there is surrounding the funding model, the method for evaluation, and the political motivations behind the project. Due to the size of the project, it is virtually impossible to gain support from everyone involved. However, continued scrutiny and evaluation of e-Mexicos funding structure and software applications will hopefully charge people with becoming involved in improving the program and legitimizing it as it grows.

Domestic Telecommunications Industry According to some, the e-Mexico project will never succeed because of the nature of the telecommunications industry in the Mexico.25 Although it was privatized in 1996, it continues to be monopolistic with customers having little to no options for telecommunications services. Arguably, the lack of competition in the industry undermines the goal of universal digital access because rates have not been lowered 46

substantially to allow for greater uptake of different services including telephone and Internet.26 The telecommunications industry in Mexico is highly politicized and the largest provider of services, Telmex, works in tandem with e-Mexico winning multiple contracts for service provision throughout the country.27 Universal Internet access will be next to impossible without an overhaul of the telecommunications sector that would stimulate competition and, in turn, lower rates and make more services available to more low-income citizens.28

Program Administration and Oversight The e-Mexico project is often criticized for the way in which individual programs are administered. The federal government, through the Ministry of Education, manages almost half of the CCDs while other ministries manage facilities outside of the education domain (i.e. health clinics, hospitals, and community centers). According to researchers, state governments are not involved in the administration of the CCDs and are left out of the information loop when changes in funding or programs occur.29 There is also an overlap of state and federal government initiatives to bridge the digital divide which often leads to the duplication of programs and ineffective use of government funds.30 For example, many states, such as the state of Colima, have developed e-government kiosks that serve the same function as the e-Mexico program.31 However, the kiosks are managed by administrators at the state level through state government funds, rather than direct federal funding. The overlapping of programs is a cause for confusion among policy analysts because it makes program evaluation complicated. There is little to no data about the networking that occurs between different CCDs, state-run programs, and individual initiatives to spur digital access.32 There is even less information about how each program functions on its own whether it is a collection of CCDs in one region or a network of digital community centers run by the state.33 This limits the ability of policy makers to modify programs in accordance with the needs of a different community or state.

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Another setback to the administrative functioning of e-Mexico is the way CCDs are managed on the ground. Each CCD, whether it is in a school or other type of facility, has a promoter who helps train people to use computers and the Internet. Promoters are usually staff members that already work in the facility, such as a teacher or health administrator, thus they usually have other functions within the organization.34 Promoters are not paid for their work in the CCDs, though they receive salaries from their place of employment. Thus, their primary job is to teach or manage within the facility, not run the CCD. For this reason, there is a wide range of abilities among promoters. Where some promoters are familiar with computers and have the capacity to train new users, others are not well suited for the job and do it because no one else in the organization is willing or wants to.35 Promoters are perhaps the most important aspect of the e-Mexico project because they are the ones who encourage and teach new users how to use the computers and interact with the government through the new programs. However, a lack of investment in better training or monetary incentives limits e-Mexicos success in a number of ways. First, the people who are on the ground working with new users have responsibilities to their primary jobs. Although they receive training, they are unable to devote all of their efforts to the CCDs. Second, there is a wide range of abilities among promoters making CCD services inconsistent and unpredictable.36 This affects e-Mexico project uptake within a community and could leave people skeptical of the program. Finally, expecting promoters to fulfill their management and training duties in addition to their regular duties on a voluntary basis is unrealistic in the long-term. Since the program is nationwide, there is a chance that over time even more discrepancies in administrative ability will affect the quality of support in the CCDs, the main component of the eMexico project.

The administrative problems that exist in the e-Mexico project are linked to a number of factors including bureaucratic and political culture, the nature of the telecommunications sector in Mexico, and a variety of different funding models. Some 48

problems are linked to factors that can be changed through policy whereas others, such as public sector mentality and political culture, require more time and a real change in attitude and behavior. As with all government initiatives, consensus building is an integral part of the development process as it secures funding and support. However, as with the e-Mexico project, there are often many differences of opinion when it comes to large technology projects. Creating realistic and applicable policy solutions to these issues can be timeconsuming and difficult as there are many ways to approach the problems depending on various factors linked to country culture and politics. However, there are some overarching themes that policy makers in Mexico can work towards to improve the quality of the implementation and evaluation of an IT program such as the e-Mexico project.

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Notes

Karen Coppock, Romulo Sanchez, and Alberto Loyo, Country Profiles: .mx. In The Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-02. Online. Available: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cr/profiles/Mexico.pdf. Accessed: March 13, 2007. 2 Julio Cesar Margain y Compeon, The National e-Mexico System: A System of Digital Participation, Towards an Information and Knowledge Society, Online, Available: www.emexico.gob.mx/work/resources/ LocalContent/12328/5/Cont7inglesbis.doc, Accessed: March 14, 2007. 3 Presidency of Mexico. Office of the President. E-Mexico on fast track: Microsoft embraces Fox plan to bridge digital divide. April 25, 2002. Online. Available: http://fox.presidencia.gob.mx/buscador/?contenido=2945&pagina=81&palabras=presupuesto+del+2006. Accessed: March 10, 2007. 4 Karen Coppock, Romulo Sanchez, and Alberto Loyo, Country Profiles: .mx. In The Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-02. Online. Available: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cr/profiles/Mexico.pdf. Accessed: March 13, 2007. 5 Ibid. 6 World Bank. Mexico Country Brief, Online. Available: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/MEXICOEXTN/0,,contentMD K:20185184~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:338397,00.html. Accessed: March 14, 2007. 7 Interview with Andres Hofmann (General Editor of Poltica Digital magazine) by Saretta Ramdial, Mexico City, February 5, 2007. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Karen Coppock, Romulo Sanchez, and Alberto Loyo, Country Profiles: .mx. In The Global Competitiveness Report, 2001-02. Online. Available: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cr/profiles/Mexico.pdf. Accessed: March 13, 2007. 15 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. 16 Ibid. 17 Ray Suarez, Online Focus: Vicente Fox. PBS Online NewsHour, March 21, 2000. Online. Available: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june00/fox_3-21.html. Accessed: March 12, 2007. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Graham Gori. Fears About Microsoft Return in Mexico. The New York Times (April 24, 2002). Online. Available: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C04E1D71F3FF937A15757C0A9649C8B63. Accessed: March 12, 2007. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

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23 24

Ibid. Ibid. 25 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. Interview with Carla Bonina, Telecommunications and Information Technology Researcher, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas, Mexico City, Mexico, February 6, 2007. Interview with Julio Cesar Margain y Compeon, Chief Exectuive Officer, Margain Consulting, Mexico City, Mexico, February 8, 2007. 26 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. Interview with Carla Bonina, Telecommunications and Information Technology Researcher, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas, Mexico City, Mexico, February 6, 2007. 27 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. 28 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. Interview with Carla Bonina, Telecommunications and Information Technology Researcher, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas, Mexico City, Mexico, February 6, 2007. 29 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. 30 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. Interview with Carla Bonina, Telecommunications and Information Technology Researcher, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas, Mexico City, Mexico, February 6, 2007. 31 Interview with Victorico Rodriguez Reyes, Chief Executive Officer, Zona Zero, Mexico City, February 6, 2007. 32 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. 33 Interview with Carla Bonina, Telecommunications and Information Technology Researcher, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas, Mexico City, Mexico, February 6, 2007. 34 Interview with Andres Hofmann, General Editor, Poltica Digital magazine, Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 2007. Interview with Carla Bonina, Telecommunications and Information Technology Researcher, Centro de Investigacin y Docencia Econmicas, Mexico City, Mexico, February 6, 2007. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid.

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Chapter 6. New Directions and Policy Recommendations

New Directions
President Felipe Calderon came to power in the midst of a highly contested election between himself and his opponent, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, in June 2006. He ran his campaign on a platform of pro-business and free-trade, a far cry from his rival Obrador. Although he has been in office for only a few months, Calderon has expressed long-term goals for Mexicos development revealing certain trends such as decreasing inequality between the rich and the poor and fighting crime through tough law enforcement.1 Calderon has articulated the need for more job opportunities especially for lowincome poor Mexicans. One of his initiatives to increase job access includes a push to help small business through providing microloans and shortening the government approval time for establishing a small business.2 In his first months in office he has focused on economic development and the need for more competition in the Mexican market signaling a possible change in the private virtual monopolies in telecommunications (Telmex), television networks (Televisa), cement (Cemex), bread and tortilla manufacturing (Bimbo and Maseca, respectively), and banking (Banamex/ Citigroup and Bancomer/ Banco de Bilbao).3 During his first address to the nation, President Calderon told Mexicans he wanted to remove the barriers inhibiting economic growth and new business growth and create a level playing field in terms of competition.4 However, he faces many challenges in taking on big business. Despite his political platform to grow the economy through increased competition, many analysts have pointed to his inability to follow through based on his cabinets veto of an anti-monopoly reformer for his cabinet.5 Based on this incident and the close relationship between Temex and the Mexican government, it is difficult to predict the state and shape of e-government during Calderons six-year term.

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Policy Recommendations
In addressing the multiple issues that have been brought up in Mexicos overall egovernment program and the e-Mexico project, it is important to note that the programs are not static. Like many ICT projects, there is an evolution of ideas, practices, and goals that continue to change the longer a program is in place. Thus, the following policy recommendations are meant to be a guide for policy makers to use in the future to think about their respective projects, the roles they play in influencing policy, and the overarching goals of e-government and universal digital access programs in general. They range from passing new legislation for funding models to integrating incentives into program design that stimulates more collaboration and horizontal integration. They are also separated into short, medium, and long-term recommendations in terms of the time frame needed for implementation and the political complexity and degree of organizational change involved. In the short term, many of these recommendations are not suitable given Mexicos current circumstances in terms of public sector apprehension to share information and the publics fear in using IT for government services. However, in the long-term, Mexico must undergo some of these policy suggestions in order to spur economic development and build social and human capital. These changes are more likely to be carried through when pressure is applied from the top down or from the executive branch and high office holding positions. Yet, involvement from new groups of entrepreneurs, IT specialists, and students will stimulate even more change and increase the likelihood for change in the future.

Short-term Recommendations Expanding Flexibility in Funding Models Due to a funding structure that is inherently prohibitive of collaboration and extensive IT investment over multiple years, it is difficult for agencies to become involved in new projects or prolong projects because of insufficient funds. There have 53

been minimal changes to the funding structure of IT programs because each one is different in terms of timing, program goals, and level of expertise. Likewise, many IT projects are difficult to evaluate because they have results that may not be quantifiable. For example, it is relatively easy to keep track of the number of services that are available online but it is more complicated to keep track of customer satisfaction and ease of use for public officials. It is too simplistic to rely on the number of hits on a website, yet other methods of evaluation have yet to be developed and fine-tuned to link website use to quality of service provision. For this reason, it is difficult to change the funding model to meet agency IT needs because it is a somewhat nebulous area with very little consistency in purpose and scope of projects. The current funding model is on a one-year time frame though at the moment there is an e-Mexico trust fund that is also used to finance some programs. However, the fund will most likely be exhausted within the next few years and agencies will have to go back to the traditional funding model that does not account for multi-year projects. President Calderon has presented a decree that will undoubtedly alter the nature of the current funding model. In December of 2006, he introduced an austerity decree listing three overarching goals that will apply to all federal agencies. The goals include the consolidation of purchases where systems can be shared by multiple agencies cutting down on duplication in the procurement process. The decree also prohibits agencies from buying anymore IT services. In future years, agencies will have to contract services from IT providers meaning they will not be able to buy hardware such as computers. The last part of the austerity decree requires agencies to have an IT office, with the emerging figure of Chief Information Officer (CIO), who will manage buying and outsourcing. These services that are procured must be bundled together with other agencies needing the same items, services, or expertise. Thus, Calderon has forced collaboration in funding for at least the next six years that he is in office. The austerity decree does not lead to an increase in flexibility in funding. However, it does push agencies to think more carefully about IT projects because they 54

will have to interact with multiple organizations to bundle services and streamline procurement processes in addition to contracting services for at least three years. For many agencies, this is a long-term commitment that requires background research and a true understanding of what is really needed within the agency to carry out IT goals in the future. In the long-term, the austerity decree may influence how agencies interact to manage IT projects and problems. Yet, the feeling among many researchers is that the private sector, of which the government makes up for 40% of its clients, will come up with strategies that counter Calderons decree. Although it will take time to see how the new law will be accepted and carried out among government agencies, it will most likely change the way federal agencies consider IT investments and future e-government projects. Despite the decree and the e-Mexico trust fund, there is a dire need among public officials to better understand and articulate funding needs. This communication about funding is not necessarily in terms of money, but in terms of historically unconventional projects that require different funding approaches. Once there is more collaboration and investment in database sharing, finding more appropriate funding timeframes will be even more integral to projects because more people and agencies will be involved. Deciding on the actual structure of the funding models will be difficult because of the diversity in programs. One option is to develop a completely separate funding model for IT projects which would allow for multi-year expenditures without having to go back to ask for funds every year. Another option is to decrease the amount of time needed for special funding approval, what agencies must go through now, so agencies can receive faster approval for new projects and implement them closer to the time that services are actually needed. More important than the specific strategy is the federal governments need to respond to and acknowledge modern funding needs that will increasingly include ICT projects and inter-agency collaboration.

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Investment in the Domestic IT Sector Mexico, unlike many countries with heavy investment in e-government, experiences a deficit in expertise and knowledge in the IT sector. This deficit is linked to a lack of funding for start up companies, below average salaries for engineers and other IT professionals within the country, and limited public private partnerships that encourage entrepreneurs to enter into the IT business. Another factor that hinders IT sector growth is the governments reliance on INFOTEC for IT projects because it requires a shorter approval process and the organization is familiar with public sector IT projects and processes. Other countries, such as Korea, have simultaneously encouraged economic growth in the IT sector while investing in e-government. In the early 2000s, President Fox started the e-government program with a similar agenda in mind. However, there has been limited advancement in spurring e-commerce and encouraging students and entrepreneurs to join in on the initiative making the e-government program shortsighted and counterproductive. To stimulate domestic IT growth and expertise, the Mexican government should develop a plan that incorporates public-private partnerships, gives more funding to start up companies, and encourages companies to pay more competitive salaries to woo engineers who have left the country for work to return home. Creating links between government and universities, small businesses, and research centers would give these struggling institutions an infusion of funds for continuing their work. Due to a lack of funds, small businesses and universities are often unable to invest in new projects. However, with government funds and contracts, graduate students and researchers would be able to contribute to their own research while carrying out various projects for government purposes. This would strengthen ties between the public and private sector and bolster much needed IT expertise in Mexico. Initiating a strong relationship between multiple parties also gives engineers and IT 56

professionals opportunities to work in their own country rather than immigrating to other countries where salaries are higher and they have more options in terms of companies and projects. Another policy move that would stimulate the domestic IT sector is to encourage government agencies, through legislation or incentives, to seek out small and new businesses that can provide services and expertise. One way to do this would be to identify some potential projects of the slated projects in a one-year time frame and open bidding up to only small and medium sized companies. The Mexican government already has a program that provides funding and business expertise to small and medium-sized businesses. Thus, those that have been through the program could have the first crack at fulfilling a government contract depending on the nature of the project. That is not to say that government standards need to change. Rather, it can be used as a method for small and medium sized businesses to attain a foothold in some types of government projects making the sector more competitive and open to more players. In creating these policies, the government should look at the new partnerships as an opportunity to tap into and take advantage of domestic talent. Establishing strong ties between multiple institutions can lead to a symbiotic relationship between the government, in terms of its research and service needs, and universities and small and medium sized business in terms of extra funds that go towards improving quality of research and facilities. These partnerships would potentially spur research and development in Mexico leading to economic development in the high tech field and increased capabilities to compete in a global economy.

Mid-term Recommendation Incentives for Collaboration The lack of collaboration in the e-government system in Mexico is inefficient and undermines the purpose of the program. However, as mentioned in past chapters, there are multiple reasons for apprehension on the part of administrators and managers. Due to 57

the need to maintain distinct policy mandates by the government, it is difficult for middle and upper management to justify collaborative projects because it involves sharing information, funds, and personnel. Despite the hesitancy on the part of agency heads, there are strategies the government can use to stimulate more collaboration. Agencies will have to find a balance between continuing to fulfill their obligations and initiating new relationships with other agencies. The most effective way to spur coordination in programs is to offer different kinds of incentives that range from financial gains to public recognition. Speaking in financial terms, the funding approval process could spur collaboration by categorizing projects as collaborative and fast tracking the process since there are multiple agencies involved. Agencies would be encouraged by the time they could save in the approval process. As collaboration between agencies increases, stronger ties between different parts of government are established and it is no longer a strange concept to coordinate ICT projects. Additionally, collaboration can make the funding process more efficient by supporting programs that have little to no duplication. Agencies can share best practices and exceptional projects can be used as templates for future initiatives. Another option for encouraging collaboration is publicly acknowledging their endeavors through giving prestigious awards, noting their efforts in publicly circulated documents, and publicizing their achievements on government websites. This strategy is useful because it rewards agencies for collaboration through different channels. It shows the public that certain agencies are making strides in e-government and sets a standard and tone for agencies that are hesitant to collaborate. There is both internal and external recognition for the shift in agency culture which could spur more interaction and collaboration especially if the executive office is involved in the publicity process.

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Long-term Recommendation Decrease Barriers to Digital Access Mexicos approach to e-government is contradictory and counterintuitive when reconciling the status of the telecommunications sector with the goal of universal digital access. Many researchers believe the recent e-government initiative will never reach the intended population, those who have been historically marginalized from information networks and channels, because telephone and Internet rates have not been lowered enough. Arguably, the most disenfranchised communities will continue to lack digital access because there are multiple factors involved in the uptake of e-government. There are cultural, educational, political, and societal barriers to access requiring e-government policy to be multidimensional and adaptive. When conceptualizing e-government, policy makers should consider a number of methods to reach disenfranchised communities. For example, identifying the factors that affect uptake, such as access to capital, level of training, level of education, rural and urban localities, and gender, to name a few, adds layers of difficulty to developing a onesize-fits-all policy. Thus, a multi-pronged policy approach that addresses the most prohibitive factors is more useful than a limited policy that may only take education and training levels into account. Some hurdles that are integral to e-government uptake are extremely politically sensitive, such as the state of the telecommunications industry in Mexico. Any changes in this arena will require political finesse and buy-in among multiple stakeholders in bureaucratic and business circles. It is difficult to tell whether or not President Calderon will have an impact on this sector. However, based on his austerity decree, it seems his party is moving towards more competition in all sectors which will be formalized through legislation. Unfortunately, where the telecommunications sector is the most politically sensitive to change it is also one of the essential factors in bringing down rates and increasing the uptake of IT and e-government.

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Even if the telecommunications sector was to remain unchanged, there are policy improvements that could increase digital access. Acknowledging that government services are used differently in various locales and evaluating usage methods would save the government money depending on the project. For example, in some localities citizens are comfortable using a computer kiosk in a commercial center or public transport station. However, in other locations, citizens may prefer face-to-face contact with a public servant who uses a horizontally integrated database that pulls information from multiple agencies. Improving the level of service and quality in face-to-face interactions while simultaneously investing in new computerized functions for citizens covers a wider range of functions and uses within e-government. By offering multiple channels to receive information, the government is taking into account differences in use yet still allowing for advancement in information sharing and e-government in general. That is not to say that every local requires a different system. Rather, it may be useful for policy makers to choose from a series of different established methods based on the needs and comfort levels of the community in question. It may be helpful for policymakers to distinguish between policies that require more political maneuvering, such as lobbying for changes in the telecommunications sector, and those that are more plausible given the current political environment such as starting an intra-governmental campaign to increase project collaboration and data integration. Some even more plausible options for policy changes are to increase promoter training and offer incentives for community members to become involved in egovernment. This would increase awareness of programs and could lead to a high demand for better quality services and citizen participation in the planning process. However, regardless of which policies are chosen to address digital access initiatives, egovernment can only do so much. It can prove to be a method or tool for reform within

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certain functional areas, yet it is not capable of changing organizational behavior without the political will of agency leadership.

Significant developments in all of these policy areas will be necessary if Mexico plans to move ahead in its e-government program. In the end, the most important factor in reforming the e-government system will come down to the political will among middle and high level manager, as well as leaders in the executive office, to push for institutional change. This would involve identifying the drawbacks of the current telecommunications system and opening the sector to competition that will allow for greater uptake and use of e-government programs and services.

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Notes

James McKinley, Mexico Leader Swiftly Embraces Policies of His Leftist Opponent, The New York Times, December 8, 2006. Accessed: March 4, 2007. 2 Mark Stevenson, Mexicos president bests on small businesses to lift economy, North County Times, March 5, 2007. Online. Available: http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/03/06/business/news/17_11_263_5_07.txt. Accessed: April 9, 2007. 3 Louis Nevaer, For Calderon, Reversing Mexicos Brain Drain Is Key to Success, New America Media, January 3, 2007. Online. Available: http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=27a45c9fad7a2a1c1 31ac487c9670465. Accessed: April 7, 2007. 4 James McKinley, Mexico Leader Swiftly Embraces Policies of His Leftist Opponent, The New York Times, December 8, 2006. Accessed: March 4, 2007. 5 Editorial. Mexicos New President, The New York Times (December 2, 2007). Accessed through LexisNexis, April 4, 2007.

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VITA
Saretta Ramdial was born on Kibbutz Gezer, Israel on August 21, 1980. She is the daughter of Beverly Rose Hugo and Roopnarine Ramdial. After completing her work at Deering High School in Portland, Maine, in 1998, she traveled for two years completing volunteer work in Australia, New Zealand, Trinidad, and Costa Rica. She received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin, in June of 2004. In August 2004, she entered the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs and the Lozano Long Institute of Latin American Studies at The Graduate School at University of Texas at Austin.

Permanent Address:

13328 Lamplight Village Ave. Austin, TX 78727

This thesis was typed by the author.

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