EN BANC

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners, - versus ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent. X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus LFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent. G.R. No. 154473 G.R. No. 155573 Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING,* YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, and BERSAMIN, JJ. Promulgated: April 24, 2009 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION NACHURA, J.:

the Philippines held at the Balay Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus, Quezon City.[5] The speech was subsequently published in the February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.[6] Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn t even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.[7] filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint[8] for libel. Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).[9] Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information[10] for libel against the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102. Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation,[11] contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondent s father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-02103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending with Branch 101 of the RTC. While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.[12] On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged Order[13] dismissing Criminal Case No. Q02-109407 and considering as moot and academic petitioner s motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts. On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case.[14] Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure questions of law, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari[15] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds: I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO DISMISS; II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE; AND III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.[16] G.R. No. 155573 On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were guests of the talk show Point Blank, hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show s episode that day was entitled COMELEC Wars. [17] In that episode, the following conversation transpired: Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a PR campaign against you? Is that what you are saying?

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 2002[1] and the June 23, 2002[2] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 2002[3] and the September 18, 2002[4] Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406. The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on different factual settings, thus: G.R. No. 154473 On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), delivered a speech in the Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in

Benipayo: No, I think [it s] not COMELEC funds, [it s] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly, according to [c]harg d [a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is what s been [so] happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] that s about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldn t tell me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think it s pretty obvious.[18] Petitioner considered respondent s statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit[19] for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.[20] The City Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case No. Q-02109406 by filing the corresponding Information[21] with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.

of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx.[33] [Underscoring and italics ours.] More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v. Endaya,[34] acknowledged the unmistakable import of the said provision: There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leave no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. What the law ordains must then be followed.[35] This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v. Estanislao,[36] where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous act is committed by similar means, [37] and despite the fact that the phrase by similar means is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360.[38] In these cases, and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases. Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,[39] we explained at length that: The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32 and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction over libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us, respondent judge s orders were nullified for lack of jurisdiction, as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent Court s Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995, and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for proper disposition. Another case involving the same question was cited as resolving the matter: Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in denying petitioner s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months (Art. 360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged within the Municipal Trial Court s jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom ** cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261, correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot be applied to libel cases. Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued. For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a

Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that, even if criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction rested with the Sandiganbayan.[22] On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed Order[23] dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02109406 for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed September 18, 2002 Order,[24] denied petitioner s Motion for Reconsideration.[25] Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners seasonably filed before this Court, on pure questions of law, another Petition for Review on Certiorari[26] under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following grounds: I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE ; AND II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW. III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT OUTRIGHT.[27] Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the same issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the recommendation of the Clerk of Court,[28] consolidated the cases.[29] The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts. The Ruling of the Court The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office. They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said question will ultimately determine which court the RTC or the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the criminal cases filed. The Court, however, notes that both parties are working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.[30] Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),[31] as amended by Republic Act No. 4363,[32] is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus: The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court]

general law. A later enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC. Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section 6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal libel. Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21 October 1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality: RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING, ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES. xxxx C LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS. (Underscoring supplied)[40] As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v. Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,[41] Manzano, and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in writing or by similar means.[42] The grant to the Sandiganbayan[43] of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249,[44] cannot be construed to have impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC.[45]

further proceedings. Having said that, the Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other issues raised in the petitions. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice (On official leave) LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional Trial Courts for

Associate Justice CERTIFICATION

maliciously utter the following defamatory statements, in a speech delivered at the University of the Philippines at its Diliman Campus in Quezon City, to wit: xxxx Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID solution that isn t even a requirement for voting. But reason intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag. xxxx that with the said statement, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in fact he did mean and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that Photokina Marketing Corporation is a cheater and has unreasonable (sic) and grossly took advantage of the government whom it has outwitted into entering into a disadvantageous contract, which insinuations and imputations are destructive of and tends to destroy the good name and reputation of said Photokina Marketing Corporation as a juridical person, with no good or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of maligning and besmirching the good name, honor, character and reputation of said Photokina Marketing Corporation, as in fact it was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and prejudice of said juridical person. CONTRARY TO LAW.

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

* [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]

On official leave. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109407), pp. 129-138. Id. at 175-177. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109406), pp. 108-111. Id. at 157-158. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109407), p. 3. Id. at 12-18. Id. at 14. Id. at 6-9. Id. at 34-41. Id. at 1-2. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

[11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]

Id. at 55-58. Id. at 69-78. Supra note 1. Supra note 2. Rollo (G.R. No. 154473), pp. 18-41. Id. at 26-27. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109406), p. 6. Id. at 1. Id. at 6-8. Id. at 9-15. Id. at 1-2. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about the 4th and 5th day of February 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with malicious intent of impeaching the honor, virtue, character and reputation of PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, a juridical person, represented by Atty. Rodrigo Sta. Ana with office address at 117 West Avenue, Quezon City, and with evident intent of exposing the said juridical person to public dishonor, discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and

That on or about the 13th day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with malicious intent of impeaching the honor, virtue, character and reputation of PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, a juridical person, represented by Atty. Rodrigo Sta. Ana, with office address at 117 West Avenue, Quezon City, and with evident intent of exposing the said juridical person to public dishonor,

discredit, contempt and ridicule, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously utter the following defamatory statements, in response to the question of Cez Drilon, to wit: Cez Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are being used for a PR campaign against you? Is that what you are saying? Chairman Benipayo: No, I think [it s] not COMELEC funds, [it s] Photokina funds. You know, admittedly, according to [c]harg d [a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to me in July of 2001, it is what s been so happening to the Photokina deal, they have already spent an excess of 2.4 [m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] that s about 120 [m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldn t tell me, you see. Now you asked me, whose funding this? I think it s pretty obvious that with the said statement, the said accused meant and intended to convey, as in fact he did mean and convey, malicious and offensive insinuations and imputations that Photokina (Marketing Corporation) funds are being used to destroy the respondent and that 2.4 [m]illion US dollars (P120 [m]illion [p]esos) (sic) have already been spent for the Photokina deal, which maliciously and publicly imputed and suggested a certain vice on the part of Photokina Marketing Corporation such as bribery and rigging of bids, as well as a defect on the Photokina VRIS contract, which insinuations and imputations are destructive of and tends to destroy the good name and reputation of said Photokina Marketing Corporation as a juridical person, with no good or justifiable motive but solely for the purpose of maligning and besmirching the good name, honor, character and reputation of said Photokina Marketing Corporation, as in fact it was exposed to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, to the damage and prejudice of said juridical person. CONTRARY TO LAW. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] Id. at 34-44. Supra note 3. Supra note 4. Records (Crim. Case No. Q-02-109406), pp. 118-127. Rollo (G.R. No. 155573), pp. 3-21.

Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published: Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice versa: Provided, furthermore, That the court where the criminal or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: And provided, finally, That this amendment shall not apply to cases of written defamations, the civil and/or criminal actions to which have been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this law. Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in this chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article. No criminal action for defamation which consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de oficio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. [34] No. L-23894, January 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261. Id. at 263. No. L-30458, August 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 520, 523.

Id. at 8-9. [35] Memorandum of the Clerk of Court dated July 22, 2003. [36] Resolution dated July 29, 2003. [37] Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code states the other means of committing libel similar to writing. The provision reads: Art. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party. [38] Bocobo v. Estanislao, supra note 36, at 523-524.

[30] Escobal v. Justice Garchitorena, 466 Phil. 625, 635 (2004); Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 393 Phil. 143, 155 (2000). [31] Act No. 3815, as amended, entitled An Act Revising the Penal Code and Other Penal Laws, which took effect on January 1, 1932. [32] Entitled An Act to Further Amend Article Three Hundred Sixty of the Revised Penal Code, which was approved on June 19, 1965. [33] Article 360 of the RPC reads in full:

[39] [40] [41] [42]

354 Phil. 66 (1998). Id. at 74-77.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

G.R. No. 123263, December 16, 1996, 265 SCRA 645. Manzano v. Hon. Valera, supra note 39. (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14A, issued in 1986. In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the

[43] This court was created on June 11, 1978 by the issuance of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1486. On December 10, 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was issued to revise and repeal P.D. No. 1486. Throughout the years, P.D. No. 1606 underwent a series of amendments on January 14, 1983, by P.D. No. 1860; on March 23, 1983, by P.D. No. 1861; on March 30, 1995, by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7975; and on February 5, 1997, by R.A. No. 8249. [44] Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, entitled An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, reads: SECTION 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned. [Italics ours] [45] See De Jesus v. People, 205 Phil. 663, 670 (1983), in which the Court ruled that the provision of the law stating the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, which is phrased in terms so broad and general, cannot be legitimately construed to vest the said court with exclusive jurisdiction over election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office. Neither can it be interpreted to impliedly repeal the exclusive and original jurisdiction granted by Section 184 of the Election Code of 1978 to the court of first instance (now, the RTC) to hear and decide all election offenses, without qualification as to the status of the accused.

THIRD DIVISION VICENTE FOZ, JR. and DANNY G. FAJARDO, Petitioners, - versus PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 167764 Present: CARPIO, J., Chairperson, CARPIO MORALES,* VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, and PERALTA, JJ. Promulgated: October 9, 2009 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION PERALTA, J.: Before the court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, dated November 24, 2004 in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Iloilo City, dated December 4, 1997 in Criminal Case No. 44527 finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel. Also assailed is the CA Resolution[2] dated April 8, 2005 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration. In an Information[3] dated October 17, 1994 filed before the RTC of Iloilo City, petitioners Vicente Foz, Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo were charged with the crime of libel committed as follows: That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN, quoted verbatim hereunder, to wit: MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN PHYSICIAN (sic) are duly sworn to help to do all their best to promote the health of their patients. Especially if they are employed by a company to serve its employees. However, the opposite appears to be happening in the Local San Miguel Corporation office, SMC employees are fuming mad about their company physician, Dr. Portigo, because the latter is not doing well in his sworn obligation in looking after the health problems of employees, reports reaching Aim.. Fire say.

One patient, Lita Payunan, wife of employee Wilfredo Payunan, and residing in Burgos, Lapaz, Iloilo City, has a sad tale to say about Dr. Portigo. Her story began September 19 last year when she felt ill and had to go to Dr. Portigo for consultation. The doctor put her under observation, taking seven months to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation. Subsequently, the family sought the services of a Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at Doctor's Hospital. Incidentally, where Dr. Portigo also maintains a clinic. Dr. Portigo got angry, sources said, after knowing that the family chose a surgeon (Dr. Celis) on their own without his nod as he had one to recommend. Lita was operated by Dr. de los Reyes last March and was released from the hospital two weeks after. Later, however, she again complained of difficulty in urinating and defecating[. On] June 24, she was readmitted to the hospital. The second operation, done by Dr. Portigo's recommendee, was devastating to the family and the patient herself who woke to find out her anus and vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side. This was followed by a bad news that she had cancer. Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the disease was already on the terminal state. The company and the family spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong diagnosis of the company physician. My sympathy for Lita and her family. May the good Lord, Healer of all healers, be on your side, May the Healer of all healers likewise touch the conscience of physicians to remind them that their profession is no license for self-enrichment at the expense of the poor. But, sad to say, Lita passed away, July 2, 1994.

Upon being arraigned[5] on March 1, 1995, petitioners, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the Information. Trial thereafter ensued. On December 4, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision[6] finding petitioners guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the facts obtaining and the jurisprudence aforecited, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered finding both accused Danny Fajardo and Vicente Foz, Jr. GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT for the crime of Libel defined in Article 353 and punishable under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentencing aforenamed accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) Months and Eleven (11) Days of Arresto Mayor, as Minimum, to One (1) Year, Eight (8) Months and Twenty-One (21) Days of Prision Correccional, as Maximum, and to pay a fine of P1,000.00 each.[7] Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order[8] dated February 20, 1998. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed an appeal with the CA. On November 24, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution dated 2005. Hence, herein petition filed by petitioners based on the following grounds:

April 8,

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE SUBJECT ARTICLE LIBELOUS WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENDMENT OF ARTICLE 353 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.

Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes, Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices. The (sic) shun breast feeding and promote infant milk formula although mother's milk is many times cheaper and more nutrious (sic) than the brands they peddle. These hospitals separate newly born from their moms for days, conditioning the former to milk formula while at the same time stunting the mother's mammalia from manufacturing milk. Kadiri to death! My deepest sympathy to the bereaved family of Mrs. Lita Payunan who died July 2, 1994, Her body lies at the Payunan residence located at 236-G Burgos St., Lapaz, Iloilo City. May you rest in peace, Inday Lita. wherein said Dr. Portigo was portrayed as wanting in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a physician, which imputation and insinuation as both accused knew were entirely false and malicious and without foundation in fact and therefore highly libelous, offensive and derogatory to the good name, character and reputation of the said Dr. Edgar Portigo. CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE EXISTENCE OF MALICE IN THIS CASE AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED AS PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS. III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER FAJARDO WHO HAPPENS TO BE MERELY PUBLISHER OF PANAY NEWS AND COULD NOT POSSIBLY SHARE ALL THE OPINIONS OF THE NEWSPAPER'S OPINION COLUMNISTS.[9] Petitioners argue that the CA erred in finding that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when petitioner Foz, as columnist, portrayed Dr. Portigo as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself at the expense of the poor. Petitioners pose the question of whether a newspaper opinion columnist, who sympathizes with a patient and her family and expresses the family's outrage in print, commits libel when the columnist criticizes the doctor's competence or lack of it, and such criticism turns out to be lacking in basis if not entirely false. Petitioners claim that the article was written in good faith in the belief that it would serve the public good. They contend that the CA erred in finding the existence of malice in the publication of the article; that no malice in law or actual malice was proven by the prosecution; and that the article was printed pursuant to the bounden duty of the press to report matters of public interest. Petitioners further contend that the subject article was an opinion column, which was the columnist s exclusive views; and that petitioner Fajardo, as the editor and publisher of Panay News, did not have to share those views and should not be held responsible for the crime of libel.

The Solicitor General filed his Comment, alleging that only errors of law are reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45; that petitioners are raising a factual issue, i.e., whether or not the element of malice required in every indictment for libel was established by the prosecution, which would require the weighing anew of the evidence already passed upon by the CA and the RTC; and that factual findings of the CA, affirming those of the RTC, are accorded finality, unless there appears on records some facts or circumstance of weight which the court may have overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, may alter the result of the case a situation that is not, however, obtaining in this case. In their Reply, petitioners claim that the first two issues presented in their petition do not require the evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners raise for the first time the issue that the information charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City. The Court finds that the threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 23, had jurisdiction over the offense of libel as charged in the Information dated October 17, 1994. The Court notes that petitioners raised for the first time the issue of the RTC's jurisdiction over the offense charged only in their Reply filed before this Court and finds that petitioners are not precluded from doing so. In Fukuzume v. People,[10] the Court ruled:

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363, provides the specific rules as to the venue in cases of written defamation, to wit: Article 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised the issue of the trial court s jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal. Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. While an exception to this rule was recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.[11] The Court finds merit in the petition. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The Court held in Macasaet v. People[12] that: It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. (Emphasis supplied.)[13]

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and first published x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Agbayani v. Sayo,[14] the rules on venue in Article 360 were restated as follows: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.[15] Applying the foregoing law to this case, since Dr. Portigo is a private individual at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, the venue of the libel case may be in the province or city where the libelous article was printed and first published, or in the province where Dr. Portigo actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.

The relevant portion of the Information for libel filed in this case which for convenience the Court quotes again, to wit: That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnists and Editor-Publisher, respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty, integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN.... The allegations in the Information that Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first published in Iloilo City. In Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[16] which involved a libel case filed by a private individual with the RTC of Manila, a portion of the Information of which reads: That on or about March 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused [Baskinas and Manapat] conspiring and confederating with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with malicious intent of impeaching the honesty, virtue, character and reputation of one FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, former Solicitor General of the Philippines, and with the evident purpose of injuring and exposing him to public ridicule, hatred and contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and maliciously cause to be published in Smart File, a magazine of general circulation in Manila, and in their respective capacity as Editor-in-Chief and AuthorReporter, ....[17] the Court ruled that the Information did not sufficiently vest jurisdiction in the RTC of Manila to hear the libel charge in consonance with Article 360. The Court made the following disquisition: x x x Still, a perusal of the Information in this case reveals that the word published is utilized in the precise context of noting that the defendants cause[d] to be published in 'Smart File', a magazine of general circulation in Manila. The Information states that the libelous articles were published in Smart File, and not that they were published in Manila. The place Manila is in turn employed to situate where Smart File was in general circulation, and not where the libel was published or first printed. The fact that Smart File was in general circulation in Manila does not necessarily establish that it was published and first printed in Manila, in the same way that while leading national dailies such as the Philippine Daily Inquirer or the Philippine Star are in general circulation in Cebu, it does not mean that these newspapers are published and first printed in Cebu. Indeed, if we hold that the Information at hand sufficiently vests jurisdiction in Manila courts since the publication is in general circulation in Manila, there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other locations where Smart File is in general circulation. Using the example of the Inquirer or the Star, the granting of this petition would allow a resident of Aparri to file a criminal case for libel against a reporter or editor in Jolo, simply because these newspapers are in general circulation in Jolo. Such a consequence is precisely what Rep. Act No. 4363 sought to avoid.[18]

In Agustin v. Pamintuan,[19] which also involved a libel case filed by a private individual, the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, with the RTC of Baguio City where the Information therein alleged that the libelous article was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Baguio and the entire Philippines, the Court did not consider the Information sufficient to show that Baguio City was the venue of the printing and first publication of the alleged libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place. Again, in Agustin v. Pamintuan,[20] where the Information for libel alleged that the offended party was the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club and of good standing and reputation in the community, the Court did not find such allegation sufficient to establish that the offended party was actually residing in Baguio City. The Court explained its ruling in this wise: The residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time of residence is required. However, the residence must be more than temporary. The term residence involves the idea of something beyond a transient stay in the place; and to be a resident, one must abide in a place where he had a house therein. To create a residence in a particular place, two fundamental elements are essential: The actual bodily presence in the place, combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time. While it is possible that as the Acting General Manager of the Baguio Country Club, the petitioner may have been actually residing in Baguio City, the Informations did not state that he was actually residing therein when the alleged crimes were committed. It is entirely possible that the private complainant may have been actually residing in another place. One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.[21] Settled is the rule that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.[22] Considering that the Information failed to allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the court of competent jurisdiction. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 24, 2004 and the Resolution dated April 8, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22522 are SET ASIDE on the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Iloilo City. Criminal Case No. 44527 is DISMISSED without prejudice. SO ORDERED.

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[12] G.R. No. 156747, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 255, 271, citing Uy v. Court of Appeals, 276 SCRA 367 (1997). DIOSDADO M. PERALTA [13] Macasaet v. People, supra, at 271. Associate Justice [14] 178 Phil. 579 (1979). WE CONCUR: ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Chairperson CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice CERTIFICATION [15] Id. at 580. [16] G.R. No. 125813, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 279. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice [17] Id. at 282. [18] Id. at 290-291. [19] G.R. No. 164938, August 22, 2005, 467 SCRA 601. [20] Id. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court s Division. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Acting Chief Justice [21] Id. at 611-612. [22] Id. at 609.

* Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 720 dated October 5, 2009. [1] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr., with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, concurring; rollo, pp. 37-46. [2] Penned by Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr,, with Associate Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Isaias P. Dicdican, concurring; rollo, p. 47. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] Records, pp. 1-3. Id. Id. at 56. Penned Judge Tito G. Gustilo; CA rollo, pp. 13-28. Id. at 28. Records, pp. 429-430. Rollo, pp. 15-16.

[10] G.R. No. 143647, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 570. [11] Id. at 583-584.

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