EU EEM Final Report - 2008-10-30

EU Election Expert Mission to Zambia
Framework Contract no.2008/165534 Lot 7
Final Report
December 2008
The project is funded by the European Union
The project is implemented by European Consultants Organisation
The content of this publication is the sole responsibility of ECO and can in no way be taken to reflect the views of the European Union
Final Report EU EEM ZAMBIA

Presidential By-election 30 October 2008
Lusaka, 15 November 2008
EU Election Expert Mission Republic of Zambia Presidential By-election, 30 October 2008 Final Report
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Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................ 3 I. II. INTRODUCTION & ACTIVITIES OF THE EU ELECTION EXPERT MISSION................ 5 LEGAL FRAMEWORK.................................................................................................................. 6 Legal set-up......................................................................................................................................... 6 Election disputes ................................................................................................................................. 7 Electoral Offences............................................................................................................................... 8 III. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION ............................................................................................ 10 Structure and Composition of the Election Administration .............................................................. 10 Administration of the Election.......................................................................................................... 11 Voter Registration ............................................................................................................................. 13 Registration of Candidates ................................................................................................................ 14 Election Day...................................................................................................................................... 14 IV. CAMPAIGN .................................................................................................................................... 18 Violence/ Harassment ....................................................................................................................... 18 Vote buying....................................................................................................................................... 19 V. MEDIA............................................................................................................................................. 19 Media landscape................................................................................................................................ 19 Legal framework ............................................................................................................................... 20 Performance of the Media................................................................................................................. 21 Complaints and Conflict Resolution ................................................................................................. 24 Pressure against journalists ............................................................................................................... 25 VI. COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS................................................................................................... 26
VII. SUPPORT TO DIPLOMATIC WATCHERS.............................................................................. 27 Deployment....................................................................................................................................... 27
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Training............................................................................................................................................. 28 Observation strategy ......................................................................................................................... 28 Reporting system .............................................................................................................................. 29 Election Day and Election Night ...................................................................................................... 30 Debriefing ......................................................................................................................................... 30 Evaluation ......................................................................................................................................... 31 VIII. SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC MONITORS ................................................................................... 31 Pre Election support.......................................................................................................................... 31 Post Election Support........................................................................................................................ 32 Mapping of domestic monitors organization .................................................................................... 33 The Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) project..................................................................................... 34 IX. RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................................ 35 Legal framework ............................................................................................................................... 35 Election Administration .................................................................................................................... 36 Media ................................................................................................................................................ 38 ANNEXES ................................................................................................................................................. 40 Priority, timing and degree of difficulty in implementing proposed actions .................................... 41 Domestic Monitoring Groups ........................................................................................................... 44 Capacity building training modules .................................................................................................. 50 International and regional agreements signed by Zambia................................................................. 58
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The European Union Election Expert Mission (EU EEM) was established in Zambia on 8 October and finished its tasks on 15 November 2008. The missions mandate was threefold: (1) to assess the electoral process, (2) to support diplomatic watchers and (3) to support domestic monitoring organisations. The EU EEM met with local (electoral authorities, government, political parties, civil society organizations and media) and international stakeholders to assess the Presidential by-election.The main difference to an European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) is that the EU EEM is much smaller in size and duration and assesses the electoral process without releasing a public statement. This Presidential by-election did not meet a number of international standards, specially the right to vote, and can therefore hardly be assessed as representing the will of the people. The disenfranchisement of citizens who reached the age of 18 after the last voter registration exercise in 2005/06, together with the lack of professional and ethical behavior from the part of the media (state and private), represent the main issues leading to this conclusion. Some positive aspects were the increased transparency of the process and the better logistical implementation. The majority of the reports received from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) and other local stakeholders concerning complaints prior to Election Day, related to (1) the use of state resources by the governing party (MMD), (2) vote buying, (3) defamation and (4) intimidation. According to the information gathered by the EU EEM, most of the cases were dealt with to the satisfaction of the involved parties in the Conflict Management Committees (CMC). The CMC are composed of representatives of the ECZ, political parties, civil society and governmental institutions. While not mandatory for the complainant, being dealt with at the CMC meant that the cases did not reach the courts and the Electoral Code of Conduct was not applied for these offences. While Election Day took place in a peaceful atmosphere, and no major challenges were presented with regard to polling, the opposition challenged the process of counting and tabulation of results. The MMD candidate, Rupiah Banda, won the election with 40.09% of votes, against 38.13% by PF candidate, Michael Sata. Voter participation decreased by 25 percentage points, compared to the 2006 tripartite elections. Rupiah Banda was sworn-in immediately after the declaration of the results by the Chief Justice (2 hours later), on 2 November. Despite the requests from the ECZ, the Zambian government had not provided sufficient financial resources for continuous voter registration, as prescribed by the Electoral Act. This decision, together with the difficulties to have any type of voter registration implemented in the mandatory 90 days between the passing away of the President and the new election, led to the disenfrachisement of some 500.000 young people who had reached the age of majority, and could therefore not register as voters. In addition, a significant number of voters who had changed their place of residence since the 2006 elections could not re-
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register. Being the difference between the elected President and the next candidate some 35.000 votes, the outcome of the by-election might have been different if these potential voters would have been registered. The ECZ demonstrated its ability to find compromises over contentious issues, after consultation with political parties. However, the Commission did not develop a sound policy to inform election stakeholders and the general public on time, and provided only limited information regarding its minutes and decisions through its Public Relations department, falling therefore short on various issues with regard to the transparency of the elections (i.e. number of ballots to be printed). In spite of the problems which occurred during the tabulation and transmission of results during the 2006 elections, the ECZ was not able to significantly improve procedures in this respect. The decisions to post the protocol of the results at the polling stations, and to enable polling agents to follow the delivery and transmission of results from polling stations to the tabulation centres, had a positive impact on the transparency of the results. However, the ECZ did not release the presidential election results with a breakdown of each polling station, which would reduce doubts regarding the correctness of the tabulation of election results. The main opposition candidate, Michael Sata (PF), appealed the results to the Supreme Court on 14 November 2008, and asked for a recount in some constituencies. However, neither he nor other opposition political parties and domestic observer groups believe that his appeal will be fruitful, due to the alleged lack of independence of the judiciary from the Executive, as well as the time needed to resolve appeals. During the electoral campaign and after the election, the situation in the country was generally calm, apart from a few reports of isolated incidents in Copperbelt Province and Lusaka. Also, no incidents involving physical violence caused by an intentional policy by the state or stakeholders, with the purpose of hindering the citizens freedom to assemble, speak, movement or other fundamental Human Rights, were reported. Coverage of the elections by the media was perceived as showing a deterioration of journalists skills and ethics, compared to the pre-campaign period and the previous elections. During the deployment of the EU EEM, freedom of expression and the right to publish were generally respected across the country, although serious violations of Media Freedom (i.e. attacks against reporters) had to be noted. The Electoral Code of Conduct, which provides for fair and balanced coverage and maximum allowed airtime, was largely ignored by state-owned broadcaster, as well as private radios, apart from a minority of community radios. The reform of the Media Law, to provide a more liberal legal framework for media workers, is still not implemented, though encouraged by the recommendations of the EU EOM 2006 and recently by the UNHRC (May 2008). The private media provided live-programmes and listener call-ins, a platform for concerned citizens and critical voters. These programmes were banned twice by the Ministry of Information, and led to the arrest of a community radio manager, during the post-election period.
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Zambias fairly vibrant media landscape became polarized between the two major candidates, acting president Rupiah Banda (MMD) and Michael Sata (PF), with state media backing the acting president and private media favoring his major opponent. The private media was highly criticized for its unethical behavior. 189 diplomatic watchers from the EU Member States, Norway, Japan, Canada and the USA, were trained during 4 different sessions, which also involved the ECZ Training Unit. 89 diplomatic watcher teams were deployed during Election Day, to 753 Polling Stations for polling, 69 Polling Stations for counting, 35 constituency Collation Centres for tabulation of results, and 19 District Electoral Offices to observe the transmission of results. Domestic monitoring groups were supported by the EU EEM, with regard to their observation methodology, including editing of forms, participation in training sessions and, after Election Day, with training modules on various topics, in order to increase their capacity for the next elections. An assessment of the main four domestic election monitoring organisations, proved their preparedness and institutional capacity, including a reasonable regional presence to coordinate and utilize considerable donor funds to deploy large numbers of monitors, to achieve almost full coverage. On the other hand, it was noted that apart from FODEP, which profited from NDI guidance, the three remaining NGOs experienced difficulties applying a more standardized and reliable observation methodology.
I.
INTRODUCTION & ACTIVITIES OF THE EU ELECTION EXPERT MISSION
The Zambian authorities approached the European Union (EU) to request that a European Union Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) be sent to Zambia to observe the Presidential byelection. The elections were announced to take place on 30 October 2008. The EU decided that the time-frame was too short to implement an EU EOM for this election. Due to the interest by Member States and the EC Delegation in Zambia to observe the elections, as well as the European Unions keen interest in the democratic development of Zambia, the decision was taken to send a European Union Election Expert Mission (EU EEM) instead. The tasks of the EU EEM were threefold: (1) assess the electoral process and report about it to the EU institutions, (2) support the diplomatic watching exercise undertaken by EU Member States, the EC Delegation and some development partners, such as Canada, Japan, Norway and the USA and (3) support domestic monitoring organisations. The basic EU EEM is very limited in number of experts, observers and duration to properly assess the electoral process as compared to an EU EOM. It also does not make any public statements. In the case of Zambia, the EEM was composed of the Team leader/Legal expert, Electoral expert, Training expert and Deputy Training expert.It benefited from the contribution of seconded experts from Member States and Norway (Human Rights, Media, local observer coordinator and an observation roving team) and diplomatic observers for Election Day. The mission arrived in Zambia on 8 October 2008 and left on 15 November 2008.
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During its stay, the mission met with governmental officials, the Electoral Commission of Zambia, political parties, civil society organizations and other local stakeholders, as well as with the EC Delegation, EU Member States, international partners and international observer delegations. A considerable amount of time was spent in setting-up the mission and on administrative matters.
II.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Legal set-up A large number of laws, regulations and instructions, composed the framework for the 2008 presidential byelection. These were: the Constitution of Zambia (1996), the Electoral Commission Act (1996), the Electoral Act (2006), the Electoral Code of Conduct Regulations (2006); the amendment to the Electoral Regulations (27/10/2008)1, as well as administrative instructions and election manuals issued by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). Generally, it can be stated that the legal framework for the 2008 presidential by-election was largely similar to the one applied during the 2006 tripartite elections. Zambia is party to the following international instruments (which include special provisions on political participation and the conduct of genuine democratic elections): the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the Convention on the Political Rights of Women (CPRW). Zambia is also a member of the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and is committed to AU and SADC principles for conducting democratic elections. It must however be stated that none of the above instruments have been translated into national laws and can therefore not be invoked to appeal governmental and institutional decisions at the local court level. Regarding the adherence to international standards, the situation of detainees is clearly in breach with international conventions that Zambia is a party to. On this issue, the Supreme Court ruled (SCZ No. 11 of 2008) that detainees are not entitled to vote. In a similar case when one detainee was denied to stand for Parliament, the case was brought to the International Court for Human Rights where the plaintiff won the case and was elected. After the 2001 elections, President Mwanawasa appointed an Electoral Reform Technical Committee (ERTC) in 2003, to review the legal and electoral framework and propose electoral reforms. A Constitutional Review Commission (CRC) was also established to address possible improvements to the political system. The ERTC presented its report in July 2005 and made numerous recommendations on a range of issues, including reforms to the electoral system, public funding of political parties, gender equality and the creation of tribunals to resolve election disputes. Very few of the proposals from the ERTC were incorporated in the Electoral
1
Refers to posting of results at Polling Stations (PS), accompanying results from PS to Collation Centre by party agent and posting of results at Collation Centre
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Act of 2006, arguing that the new Parliament elected in the 2006 elections should deal with the key changes, some of which required a Constitutional Amendment. The CRC also presented their recommendations in 2006, but due to different approaches emanating from Government, political parties and civil society, regarding the procedures to be used to adopt the new Constitution, the decision was taken to create a National Constitutional Conference encompassing all members of Parliament, representatives from all districts of Zambia and civil society organizations (in total some 530 people), which would deal with possible amendments. The NCC was established in 2007. Since then, the NCC has been meeting in various sub-committees (11) to discuss the different aspects of the Constitution which need to be amended. Their work is based on the recommendations of the CRC, but also on the ERTC recommendations and other topics raised by the various members. One main issue relates to changes to Chapter 3 of the Constitution, which deals with the Bill of Rights. Civil society is particularly keen to see the Economic, Cultural and Civil Rights enshrined in the new Constitution. This faces opposition from other stakeholders and has been one of the main reasons for the delay in dealing with the amendment to the Constitution. Regarding the methodology used, once the 11 sub-committees have finished their work2, they will present it to the NCC plenary for discussion and approval. Once it is approved, the draft Constitution will be translated into the 7 major local languages for discussions with the citizens. The citizens will have 60 days to provide inputs to the draft. The draft will be reviewed by the NCC, discussing the new proposals, and the final draft will be given to Government to be submitted to the National Assembly. The National Assembly then has to discuss the draft and can act in two different ways: Some amendments can be approved by Parliament in three readings and with a 2/3 majority, while others require a referendum, especially all amendments touching Chapter 3 of the Constitution, plus all amendments where no agreement has been reached at the NCC. It is therefore possible that the amendments will be either approved separately by Parliament and a Referendum, or that all will be included in the Referendum to obtain more popular support to the new Constitution. During discussions with various stakeholders (spokesperson of NCC, chairperson of Democratic Governance sub-committee, experts invited to sub-committees), it can safely be concluded that the amended Constitution will not be approved earlier than 2010. Election disputes The ECZ has not been proactive in attempting to enforce the regulations included in the Electoral Code of Conduct regarding the media. The various violations of the Code should have led to stronger actions by the ECZ, rather than simply placing an advert in the newspapers stating the provisions in the Code of Conduct for the media. In general terms, the ECZ relies on the Conflict Management Committees (CMC) as the forum to resolve disputes between the various contestants. While the CMC provide a good instrument to deal with disputes, it somehow derails from bringing offenders to justice and the public is not informed about it as their dealings are confidential. In this sense, the penalties stipulated in the Electoral Act are not applied and further breaches can not be strongly deterred.
Until now 6 out of 11 finished their task
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The main activity of the legal department of the ECZ during the election consisted in defending cases presented by Anti Rigging Zambia against the ECZ and to prepare one regulation. The ECZ decided to transform the instructions given orally to election officials (posting of results at Polling Stations, start immediately with collation of results at constituency level), into an amendment to the regulations, in order to ensure firm legal standing. These regulations were gazetted on 27 October, three days prior to Election Day. The District Electoral Officers (DEO) and Returning Officers (RO) were trained on the new regulations. This step helped to avoid possible confusion and challenges on Election Day (for complaints, please refer to the Complaints section below). Under the Electoral Act of 2006, the ECZ is mandated to establish structures at both the national and district levels to resolve election-related disputes, prior to Election Day. A National Conflict Management Committee (NCMC) was set up, comprising various election stakeholders and including the ECZ, political parties, NGOs, the police, the Ministry of Justice and the AntiCorruption Commission. Committees have also been established at the district level (72). The legal provision for a conflict management structure was seen as a welcome development in 2006, but concerns were raised about the need for greater clarity over its role, as well as a stronger operational capacity. The time-frame for the filing and hearing of petitions over election results, does not correspond to the time-frame for the swearing-in of the President. Any petition filed is extremely likely to be heard after the elected candidate had taken office. The President has to be sworn-in within 24 hours of the declaration of the results by the Chief Justice, yet any petitions over the results are filled with the Supreme Court within 14 days of the declaration of the results. Electoral Offences The Electoral Act and the Code of Conduct detail a comprehensive list of prohibited activities, all of which can face criminal charges. These are seen as being in line with acceptable international standards. There are two categories of criminal offences: illegal practices and election offences. Illegal practices during the campaign period, such as bribery, treating or disruption of public meetings, can be punished with a fine of up to Kwacha 4.000.000 (720), a maximum of five years imprisonment, or both. In addition, anyone convicted of an illegal practice is prohibited from voting or standing as a candidate in any elections over the next five years. Complaints about electoral offences can be presented either to the High Court during the electoral period, or to the Supreme Court about the results only. Appeal procedures The procedures of the Supreme Court in dealing with appeals to the election results are being questioned by local stakeholders for two reasons: (1) The very short delay between the declaration of results and the swearing-in of the elected President (this time, it was less than 2 hours, by Law it has to be done in less than 24 hours) and
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(2) The Chief Justice acts as the Returning Officer, who declares the presidential results. For these reasons, the Electoral Reform Technical Committee proposed3 in 2005 to (1) have the Chairperson of the ECZ declare the results and (2) establish a specific Electoral Tribunal to deal in a fast manner with appeals. These ERTC recommendations are included in the current discussions of the National Constitutional Conference. Challenges ahead It is worth noting that the legal framework regarding the elections will change once the constitutional reforms, which have been discussed since 2003, take place. Some possible difficulties have been identified in this regard, which may have a direct impact on the next elections in 2011. They are as follows: 1) Time-frame According to the various counterparts (spokesperson of the National Constitutional Conference NCC, and the Chairperson of the sub-committee of the NCC on Democratic Governance), the results of the work of the NCC cannot be expected to be completed before the end of 2009. This implies that discussions at the National Assembly will only be held in 2010, touching some aspects which may have not been agreed upon at the NCC (i.e. electoral system for election of President) and will need to be addressed by referendum, together with reforms of Chapter 3 of the Constitution Fundamental Rights. Changing the electoral system one year prior to elections is not generally considered as appropriate, due to the confusion it can create among stakeholders. 2) Referendum In order for a referendum to be held, a prior census has to take place, as constitutional reforms must be approved by the absolute majority of adult citizens, not registered voters. To know this number (50% +1), the number of adults has to be assessed through a census, according to all interlocutors. 3) Voter registration Special efforts must be made regarding the registration of most eligible voters, to ascertain that the target figure of 50% +1 adults can be reached. Since, in order to vote, a person must appear on the voters rolls, only one portion of adults will be able to participate in the referendum, and thus the threshold will be automatically higher than 50% + 14.
i.e. currently, the voters register contains approx. 4 million voters. If we assume that the number of adults will reach 7 million in 2010, and the voters register would increase by 30%, the number of votes needed to approve the reform would not be 50%, but rather 74% of registered voters
Included in the EU EOM 2006 recommendations
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While discussing strategies to avoid entrapment by deliberations of the NCC, and moving the whole set of reforms to the National Assembly and referendum, it would seem advisable to advocate for reforms relating to the electoral process to be detached from the overall discussions regarding constitutional reforms, and be treated in a fast-track procedure. As these reforms do not touch Chapter 3 of the Constitution (Fundamental Rights), they can be passed by the National Assembly without the need for a referendum. One difficulty may be the need to agree on some delicate topics, such as the system to elect the President. While many interlocutors believe that there is a need to impose an absolute majority for the presidential elections with a two-round system, many politicians do not seem in favour of this option. If a consensus is not reached, this issue will also need to go to referendum. It is very unlikely that the National Assembly will approve this change with a 2/3s majority.
III. ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION Structure and Composition of the Election Administration All national and local elections and referenda are to be prepared, conducted and supervised by the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). The ECZ is an autonomous body, responsible for voter registration and the overall management and preparations of national and local elections. The current ECZ is chaired by Ms Florence Mumba, a former Justice of the Supreme Court, who replaced, only few months prior to this election, the previous Chairwoman, Justice Irene Mambilima. The other members are: Ms Grace Mulapesi and Mr Joseph Jalasi. The Commissioners are main policy makers and they are not in charge of any portfolio or department at the ECZ. The executive arm of the ECZ is its Directorate, led by Mr Dan Kalale, Director, who has been in this position since the internationally and domestically criticised 2001 tripartite elections. The directorate has some 100 permanent staff employed at its HQ in Lusaka. There are no permanent electoral officers at the provincial or district level. In practical terms, the same structure of the electoral administration was used in 2008, as during the previous general elections in 2006. The Provincial Electoral Officers in charge of coordination of electoral preparations in each province were appointed by the ECZ. Town clerks or council secretaries were appointed as District Election Officers in all 72 districts of Zambia. At the constituency level, one Returning Officer and Assistant Returning Officers and one IT officer, were appointed to each of the 150 constituencies. There has been only a small increase in the number of registered voters5, thus the ECZ identified the same number of polling stations as during the previous elections. In total, there were 6.456 polling stations with 9.320 polling streams. The splitting of polling stations with more than 650 voters into several streams became a good practice, meant to avoid long queues on Election Day. Polling station staff consists of five staff members: the presiding officer and four counting and polling assistants. In cases where more streams were needed, they were managed by an assistant presiding officer. Some 50.000 polling station workers were trained and had to pass a test in order to improve the quality of their performance during Election Day. Testing of polling
The ECZ added some 3.000 voters prior to the 2008 elections. This addition lead to an increase in the number of polling station streams from 9.314 to 9.320, but it did not affect the number of polling stations
5
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station staff led to a significant number of new polling station members6 and had a positive impact on the performance of the polling station committees. The ushers in charge of directing voters and controlling voters queues were recruited at polling stations with more than one polling stream. The Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) has informed that the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (with the significant contribution from international donors), has fully financed the Presidential Election budget of K231 billion (44 million). Administration of the Election Despite the short time-frame provided, the ECZ proved its capacity to meet all important deadlines and improve technical preparations of the Election Day process. Due to the large size of the country, the main challenge the ECZ continued to face was the distribution of materials from Lusaka to the districts and, the delivery and collection of polling staff and election materials to and from the polling stations. The ECZ introduced and followed the election calendar and decided to deliver all essential materials a day before the polling day, which had a positive impact on the timely distribution of election materials. The main area of concern was the absence of clear written instructions from HQ to the electoral officers at the district, constituency and polling station levels, regarding the various stages of the election process. The complex procedures for counting, packing and delivery of election materials were not simplified by the manuals7 and instructions for returning and presiding officers were revised and rewritten in parts, but did not provide detailed information. Speaking with various senior representatives about the same issue (i.e. start of tabulation, procedures for transmission of results), differing information were given. On the same note, information about the changes in procedures8 with regard to 2006, were given only orally, without supporting written instructions, which lead to confusion on Polling Day. A general lack of information exists regarding the electoral process, as ECZ meetings are not open to stakeholders, minutes of the meetings are not published and often, important Commission decisions are communicated to stakeholders with delay. The ECZ has not yet developed a policy on informing the public on time, and provided only limited information through its Public Relations department or on its website. The ECZs has been partly successful to improve this aspect through the holding of regular meetings with political parties and briefings for the representatives of domestic monitors. Nevertheless, the major opposition political parties complained about being informed late regarding some important commissions decisions (i.e. the printing of high number of additional ballots and the addition of 3.000 voters on the voters register). Domestic monitoring groups criticised the ECZ for organising only ad hoc meetings with representatives of civil society organisations and for not providing sufficient information regarding the electoral process.
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No exact figures have been released by the ECZ The election administration was using the same manuals for this presidential by-election as for the 2006 tripartite elections 8 There were no forms developed regarding the delivery and distribution of duplicate voters cards.
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One of the key controversies between the ECZ and the opposition political parties was caused by the ECZs decision to print and distribute a relatively high number of reserve ballots, which caused a lack of confidence among the opposition parties towards the electoral administration. The ballots for the presidential by-election were printed by Universal Print CO in Durban, South Africa, as was done for the 2006 election. The total number of ballots printed was 4,523,300, with a surplus of 579,150 ballots to the number of registered voters. The ballots were distributed according to the number of voters per stream, in stacks of 50 ballots. Therefore the total number of distributed ballots was already higher that the number of registered voters9. The same system of distribution of extra ballots, with an approximate 15% surplus, is standard practice in many countries. Nevertheless, this surplus was criticized as being too high by the opposition parties, despite the ECZs explanation for the need for reserve ballots, for cases of spoiled or damaged ballots. The ECZ understood that in order for the process to proceed in an orderly manner, consensus had to be reached with the political stakeholders on all major issues, including the number and method of distribution of the extra ballot papers10. The ECZ agreed, during a first stage, to change the method of distribution of extra ballot stacks. Instead of distributing them directly to the Polling Stations, they were to be stored in the district electoral offices. Later, the ECZ decided to store the remaining stacks of ballots (365,200) at the Lusaka airport, under their custody. The accreditation of domestic monitors and international observers was ongoing and often continued beyond the deadline set up by the Commission. The accreditation of polling agents was done at the district level and no significant problems were reported by political parties. On the other hand, the accreditation of domestic monitors was centralised, with accreditations cards issued at the ECZ HQ in Lusaka. The procedures for accreditation were complex, and often monitors complained that accreditation cards were not delivered on time or were printed with incorrect data. The ECZ did not accredit 3.000 activists from Anti-Rigging Zambia, as the leader of the organisation was charged by the police with spreading false information. The ECZs decision has not been seen as impartial, as the criminal charge was against a single person and there was no court decision on the matter. The Anti-Rigging Zambia activists were closely cooperating with the Patriotic Front. The ECZ did not issue Certificates of Authority for polling agents, domestic monitors as well as security personnel assigned to particular polling stations. This possibility is foreseen in the Electoral Act. The Certificates of Authority would have allowed those officials, agents and monitors who were on duty in polling stations where they were not registered, to vote. Thousands of polling agents and domestic monitors could not vote, as political parties and domestic monitor organisations were often not able to recruit their activists from polling stations where they were registered.
10
i.e. With 360 registered voters, 8 staks of 50 are delivered totalling 400 with an exces of 40 ballots Despite the fact that the same system of distribution was used in the previous elections, it did not become a matter of controversy
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The ECZ increased the level of transparency of the result process, compared to previous elections. The decision to post the protocol of the results at the polling stations was appreciated by all stakeholders, as well as the decision taken only few days prior Election Day, to allow polling agents to follow the delivery and transmission of results from the polling station to the tabulation centre. However, as the major political parties were not able to sufficiently control11 the polling, counting and tabulation of results, there was an urgent need to make public all polling stations results and thus avoid any doubts concerning the results process. Voter education activities were assessed by domestic monitors as having been insufficient. Mainly, voter education activities were carried out through the electronic media, which did not efficiently reach rural populations. Civil society criticised the ECZ for not cooperating with them in giving NGOs the opportunity and funds to spread messages about the importance of every persons right to vote, the possibility to replace lost cards, and to avoid illegal practices such as vote buying and treating. Voter Registration Since the 2005 registration, the ECZ has not been carrying out continuous voter registration, as required by the Electoral Act, due to financial constraints. After the presidential by-election was called, the ECZ announced that additional voter registration could not be conducted prior to the upcoming elections, due to time constraints. Despite the fact that at least 500.000 citizens12 reached the age of majority during the last two years, they could not register as no registration updates have taken place since 2005, as stated earlier. In addition, a significant number of voters13 have changed their place of residence and did not have the possibility to re-register in their current places of residence, and therefore many of them could not participate in the elections. It has to be stated that these aspects were not seen as a major issue in this by-election by the political parties and no special effort was done to solve them. While the Constitution states that there is a period of 90 days in which by-elections have to be held, the political parties were discussing the possibility to amend the Constitution to avoid the Presidential by-election to take place and find an alternative form to select the President. While they could not agree on this issue and the by-election took place, they could have extended the 90-day period provided by the Constitution for the by-election to allow for a voter registration exercise to take place. The voter register for the 2008 presidential election comprised 3.944.136 voters. Since 2006, the ECZ added some 3.000 voters who could not vote in the 2006 elections despite having registered and being in possession of voter registration cards, as their data had not been properly entered, or they were deleted or lost during data processing in the course of the last registration and verification exercise. According to demographic projections for 2008 provided by the Zambian
11
The two major opposition parties (Patriotic Front and UPND), have declared that they were not able to cover all 9.320 polling streams in the country with their polling agents. 12 The figures provided by the National Statistics Office enables the EU EEM to conclude that the number of young people who reached the age of majority is higher than figures mentioned by Zambian interlocutors and is closer to the number of 660.000.
13
According to Zambian interlocutors some 200.000 state employees have changed their place of residence since 2006
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Central Statistical Office, the number of Zambians 18 years and older was 6.272.140. This means that only approximately 63% of the eligible population14 was registered to vote. The last voter registration exercise was organized in 2005 prior to the 2006 tripartite elections. Every Zambian citizen that became 18 years old by 31 July 2006 and was in possession of the National Registration Card was eligible to register as a voter for the 2006 tripartite elections. Voter registration lasted from 31 October 2005 until 31 December 2005 and captured 4.015.639 entries. The inspection and verification period took place between 5 and 18 June 2006. Following the registration process, registered voters received a Voter Registration Card. As of 1 August 2006, the ECZ had captured 3.940.053 eligible voters, which represented a significant increase in the number of registered voters compared to 2.604.761 registered voters for the 2001 general elections. However, that figure only represented 71% of the targeted voter registration figure, as the projected total of adult Zambian citizens was 5.517.443 in 2006. On a positive note, the ECZ facilitated the replacement of lost voters cards in order to enable voters which had lost their voters card to participate in this Presidential by-election. The exercise was conducted country wide from 21 to 26 September 2008 and resulted in the printing of some 67.700 voters cards. However, significant numbers of voter cards15 were not picked up by voters on Election Day, due mainly to errors in the distribution of cards. Registration of Candidates The period for nominations lasted from 23 to 26 September 2008. All applicants who submitted their nominations were registered as presidential candidates. These included acting President Rupiah Banda of the ruling Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), Michael Sata of the Patriotic Front (PF), Hakainde Hichilema of the United Party for National Development (UPND) and Brigadier General Godfrey Miyanda of the Heritage Party (HP). Several small opposition parties withdrew from the race and decided to back the candidate of the ruling party Rupiah Banda. Election Day The diplomatic watching exercise did not allow for a deployment and coverage similar to a full fledged EUEOM. The following results, and possible comparisons with the previous EUEOM 2006 report in Zambia, are therefore only indicative. Polling Watchers, coordinated by the EU EEM, visited a total of 753 polling stations, representing 8% of the total. The overall assessment of the opening and polling procedures was rather positive, as more than 93% of the observed polling stations received a favourable evaluation. Generally, the opening of polling stations and the distribution of election materials went smoother than in the
14
Voter registration is based on active registration where eligible citizens have to apply for inclusion on the voter register and be in possession of a National Registration Card 15 Until 15 November, no exact data concerning the duplicate voters cards has been released by the ECZ. According to ECZ estimations, some 30% of voters cards were not picked up by voters on Election Day
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last elections, although close to 10% of polling stations opened with a delay of more than half an hour. Election Day proceeded well. Voter turn-out was lower than in the past elections. Polling took place in a calm and orderly environment, despite some problems encountered with the distribution of duplicate voters cards, particularly in Lusaka. The often large distances to the polling stations created uneven access to voting. The elderly and women were particularly affected by this situation. According to civil society interlocutors, monitors did not obtain Certificates of authority which would have enabled them to vote in a Polling Station different to the one at which they were registered to vote. Polling procedures were assessed positively in almost all polling stations visited, demonstrating improvements in staff training and in the overall conduct of election officials. Domestic monitors from NGOs were present in 84% of visited polling stations. Party agents from at least two political parties were present in 97% of polling stations, contributing to the transparency of the process. No special programme was put in place to facilitate the voting of the disabled. Official complaints to the Presiding officers were only lodged in 2% of the visited polling stations. Counting Compared to polling, the counting process was assessed less positively, due to the inability of polling staff to correctly complete all necessary forms. Nevertheless, it was conducted in a transparent manner, with election officials demonstrating commitment to their duties. The counting procedures were assessed positively in 82% of the polling stations visited (69). The widespread lack of ballot reconciliation before the opening of the ballot boxes, noted already in 2006, continued, as it was completed only in 56% of the observed polling stations. However, on a more positive note, adjudication on the validity of the votes was conducted in a reasonable and consistent manner, in practically each observed PS. In 12% of the polling stations, the results forms were not completed correctly, which might indicate some shortcomings in polling staff training. In contrast to 2006, when in 56% of the polling stations party agents did not receive a copy of the results; in 2008 this proportion was reduced to 17%, marking a very positive step towards further enhancing the credibility of the process. It must however be stated that, contrary to 2006, a new ECZ regulation was introduced stipulating that party agents should be issued copies of the results. Similarly, results were posted at the polling station in 91% of cases. Only one complaint about counting procedures was reported by the diplomatic watchers. While diplomatic watchers reported that there was a lack of understanding of procedures on the part of both election officials and domestic monitors/party agents, the principle of transparency was maintained throughout. Any minor numerical errors that may have occurred as a result of the complex procedures and lack of understanding would not jeopardize the integrity of the final results. Tabulation and Electronic Transmission of Results On election night, 35 teams of diplomatic watchers followed the process of tabulation of results, which commenced with the first delivery of polling station results on election night. The
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problems encountered at the tabulation centres were connected with the incorrect packing of election materials by the presiding officers, and with a poor organisation of the handover of the election materials. More than 25% of the visited collation centres were described as poorly organized and, in a similar number of collation centres, party agents could not fully observe all the proceedings. As in previous elections, most returning officers did not, due to a lack of clear instructions, decide on disputed ballots and, in most cases, only accepted the figures provided by the polling station presiding officer.16 This indicates some shortcomings in the training, and again brings forward the necessity to design detailed written procedures. Moreover, decisions overruling the validity of the disputed ballots17 are naturally perceived as a politically sensitive issue. The process of tabulation itself was assessed positively only in 66% of the visited collation centres, although diplomatic watchers did not report any discrepancies between results announced at polling stations and the tabulation of results at the constituency tabulation centre. In all collation centres visited, the results were publicly displayed outside. Returning officers announced the results of the presidential by-election at each constituency, after all polling station results had been tabulated. After the announcement of results, the protocols of the results were sent to the District electoral offices, where they were transmitted to the ECZ Headquarters. The key documents needed for the tabulation of results at the national level were: (1) the Protocol of election results per constituency and (2) the Records of proceedings with tabulated results per constituency, with a breakdown to the polling station level. These documents were sent by fax. Separately from this, specially designed OpticalMarked Recognition (OMR) forms, with individual polling stations results, were scanned and sent electronically to ECZ HQ, to enable a crosscheck of results announced at each constituency. The transmission process was assessed less positively by diplomatic watchers due to problems with equipment, connectivity and a lack of clear procedures. Functionality of the equipment for the transmission of results, together with the operation staffs lack of familiarity thereof, leaves much room for improvement, as in only 33% of the cases, the equipment was ready for use and, in 25% of the cases, the operations staff was reportedly not sufficiently familiar with the equipment. However, the faxing of results went smoothly in most district electoral offices. On the other hand, this could only be said for about 40% of OMR forms transmissions. It is our understanding that the crosschecking never took place at the ECZ between the OMR forms and the results protocol by constituency. Announcement of Results The ECZ set-up two venues to deal with the reception and announcement of results. One was at the ECZ HQ, where the results were received from the districts electoral offices, and another at the Mulungushi Conference Centre, where results were announced. The ECZ began to announce the partial presidential results on 31 October, several times per day. The last two constituency results, together with the final presidential results, were announced in the afternoon on 2
16
As the number of disputed ballots per constituency was very low, this issue did not raise any controversies at the tabulation centers 17 Disputed ballots are either valid or invalid ballots. The dispute relates to the decision of the presiding officer over their validity or invalidity, and this decision was disputed by the party agents present
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November, i.e. one day earlier than originally planned by the ECZ18. The MMD candidate Rupiah Banda was sworn in less than 2 hours after the declaration of results, as the Fourth President of the Republic of Zambia. Similar to the previous presidential election in 2006, the first partial announcements of results were mainly based on urban constituencies, as the collection of results and election materials from polling stations in remote rural constituencies lasted more than one day. As opposition candidate Michael Sata had more support in the urban areas, he was in the lead for two days. Rupiah Banda took the lead only after more than 130 constituency results were tabulated and announced on 2 November. In addition to the announcement and display of election results on two large screens, hard copies of the results were delivered to political party representatives, journalists and to monitors and observers. Only copies of protocols with total election results per constituency were distributed19 to party agents, and no results with a breakdown by polling stations were made public by the ECZ20. Presidential Election Results The MMD candidate, Rupiah Banda (40.09%), won the elections by receiving only 35.000 more votes than his main opponent, Michael Sata (38.13%) of the Patriotic Front. Michael Sata won the elections in four of nine of Zambias provinces but, in the remaining provinces, received comparatively a very low number of votes. Support for the ruling party candidate Rupiah Banda, was more evenly distributed among all provinces. The candidate of the UPND, Hakainde Hichilema (19.7%), who was the most successful candidate in the Southern province, came third as in the previous presidential election, although he obtained 5% less of national votes than in 2006. Brigadier Godfrey Miyanda of the Heritage Party (HP) received 13.683 votes, representing 0.76% of the national vote. The 2008 presidential by-election was marked by a low voter turn-out. Out of the 3.94 million registered voters, only 1.79 million voters cast their vote, i.e. 45.4% of registered voters in Zambia. In comparison to the 2006 tripartite elections, voter turnout decreased by 25 percentage points. The main reason for this decrease is, according to various sources: (1) voter apathy and (2) the tone of the campaign, including announcements by the Head of the Army and the Inspector General of the Police that they were ready to deal with any form of violent protest. However, between 5% and 10% of the decrease can be explained by: (1) voters who changed their residence since 2006 and could therefore not vote and (2) deceased voters. The decision of the ECZ not to carry-out the continuous registration process, as prescribed by the Electoral Act, eliminated an important number of voters which would have probably participated in the election. In addition, in cases where voters lost their voter cards, only a fraction of them
18
Presidential results should be announced as soon as possible after Election Day. According to the ECZs schedule, the results were expected to be announced from 3 November onwards. 19 According to the ECZ, not all protocols with results per polling station were faxed and received prior to the final declaration of the results 20 If present, party agents could compare the respective polling station results announced at polling stations to the results tabulated at the constituency centre. A similar crosscheck of polling station results could not be done at the national level
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(74,200) were able to apply for a duplicate card during the one-week period in September. Information regarding the possibility to request a replacement voter card was not effectively advertised and, not all applicants for a new card were able to collect them on Election Day. This was mainly due to problems the ECZ was experiencing with their production and timely distribution. Taking into account that the difference between the winner and the second candidate is of 35,000 votes and that some 700,000 people were not able to vote (potential new voters which could not register and voters who change their place of residence and were therefore not able to vote at their new locations), it is possible to envisage that the outcome could have been different if the right to vote would have been granted to all potential voters. The number of invalid votes decreased to 23.596 (1.3%), which is significantly lower than in the previous elections, where the total figure of invalid votes was 48.936 (1.75%) recorded in only 110 constituencies21instead of in all 150 constituencies.
IV.
CAMPAIGN
The campaign was generally conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner, with some isolated incidents taking place as explained below. Freedom of assembly was not constrained by police or other authorities. Public campaign activities were performed with a low profile and mediadriven, rather than in the streets. Rallies were the main campaign activity for all parties. The two main candidates were on tour around the country. Locally, according to the EU EEM roving team, mobilization was low. MMD was facing internal disputes after the heavily contested nomination of Rupiah Banda as their candidate, which influenced their campaign. The implementation of the Public Order Act did not raise major concerns among the stakeholders. A week ahead of Election Day, the campaign heated up, fueled by an opinion poll launched by market research company Steadman Group, stating that Michael Sata (PF) would be leading with 46% of support from the electorate. The candidates used Independence Day (24th October) to gain more support and attack each other. Acting-President Banda used the official ceremonies extensively to promote himself. A specific trait of the campaign in Zambia is the traditional endorsement of a candidate. The endorsements are announced in radio, television and newspapers by canvassing associations, trade unions, social groups, traditional chiefs and churches, for a party or candidate. Candidates may get a welcome present to show support or make promises in exchange for endorsements. Violence/ Harassment In the last two weeks before Election Day, attacks against PF supporters were reported on a daily basis in the media. PF campaign debates were disturbed (Journalist Forum on 17th Oct.). PF supporters displaying posters were beaten. In one occasion, in Munali constituency, the MMD
21
The 2006 presidential results of 40 constituencies were published with 0.0% of invalid votes. According to the ECZ, the returning officers mistakenly disregarded the figures when completing the results protocols per constituency
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speaker verbally attacked the PF, which was interpreted as a signal to attack reporters from Muvi TV and The Post. In several occasions when rallies of MMD and PF coincided, MMD tried to force PF to leave. MMD cadres in dispute with PF cadres called several times the police to get PF cadres arrested for provocation. According to The Times, UPND members tried to take a copy of the Voters Register from a group of MMD supporters doing door-to-door canvassing on 18 October. The case was reported to the Conflict Management Committee and resolved. Rupiah Banda (MMD) and his party cadres threatened several times certain parts of the population (i.e. provinces) that they would have to bear the consequences if they did not vote for him (...will be considered as useless, we shall say they are dull people). Michael Sata (PF) touched, during his campaign, a taboo topic which could open a Pandoras box. He called on the Western Region to review the Barotse Agreement, which declared the former Barotse colony as part of Zambia. This was perceived as a threat to the unity of Zambia because it could lead to the breakaway of the Western Province and other provinces could follow. Sata confirmed his stand in The Times on 25 October. Interlocutors stated that violent clashes were not always reported to the police or journalists, leading the EU EEM to assume that the number of incidents could be higher than reported. Vote buying Vote buying is an ongoing subject amongst NGOs interlocutors. Informants claimed the phenomenon to be widespread. The market price appeared to be Kwacha 50,000 (10) for a vote. The techniques described were either to simply exchange voters cards for money, or to invalidate voters cards by making the serial number unreadable. Another method was to simply exchange money for a promise to vote. The practice of handing-out food during rallies continued, which was reported by the media. This habit has, in the present socio-economic environment, an obvious voter-buying effect.
V.
MEDIA
Media landscape After the transformation of Zambia into a multiparty democracy in 1991, private print houses were established and a greater diversity in media outlets appeared. Today, state-owned Zambia National Broadcasting Cooperation (ZNBC) is still dominating the airwaves with The Post being the main oppositional voice in print. Information programmes are disseminated by two TV stations: ZNBC (state-owned) and Muvi TV (private). Muvi TV is supposed to have a 70% share of the TV audience in Lusaka and the area within 100km. According to ZNBC director Joseph Salasini, about 90 % of Zambians have access to television. In the rural areas, only ZNBC can be received.
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Radio is the main source of information, particularly in the countryside. The ZNBC is holding 4 radio stations. Radio 1 is airing in all the 7 main language groups; Radio 2 broadcasts information in English and Radio 4 is an entertainment channel. Private Radio Phoenix is known and appreciated for a higher standard in reporting. Due to live call-ins, Radio Q-FM became the most popular radio in Lusaka. Hot-FM and 5-FM are also used as sources of information in Lusaka and popular for their live-discussions. Sky-FM is a private commercial radio which started as a community radio in Southern Province and is today also covering Eastern province and the Copperbelt. Sky-FM has been provided by the government with a strong transmitter. There are additionally four Christian radios, Radio Yatsani being an important voice. Altogether, 35 private (commercial and community) radios are providing their services. Community radios (including the Christian stations) are obliged to follow a non-partisan policy and not get involved in politics. Some received starting assistance from the donor supported Media Trust Fund or UNESCO. Their news reporting is mainly local. State-owned news agency (ZANIS) and ZBNC provide information and also audio-files by e-mail on national and regional topics. The major print outlets are Times & Daily Mail (state-owned) and The Post (private). According to Steadman Group, the last market analysis was conducted in 2005. All current numbers of outreach, circulation and coverage are estimations. The last comprehensive study on the media landscape in Zambia dates from 2005. ZANA (the Zambian News Agency) merged in 2006 with the Press Department of the Ministry of Information to ZANIS, and thus possesses a monopole with regards to information dissemination. ZANIS has branches in all districts and is providing information from all parts of the country. Community radios with no capacity to cross check information are particularly affected by this monopoly. Due to their small budgets, they cannot afford to subscribe to an international news agency and have to rely on ZANIS. ZANIS is better equipped with video cameras and editing facilities than the ZNBC news department, and is also able to determine news coverage by deciding where to send reporters. Legal framework Media associations have lobbied for years for the implementation of an Independent Media Authority and a Freedom of Information Act. Both have been introduced to Parliament after strong pressure from Civil Society in March/April 2008. Due to differing opinions on the composition of the Board, between Parliament and the media associations, it was withdrawn to be reintroduced later this year. The Zambian Penal Code and State Secrets Act are reportedly being used to silence the media and will be reviewed. Upon the recommendation of the Human Rights Council (Working Group on the niversal Periodic Review, Geneva, 19 May 2008), Zambia agreed to continue the reform of the Penal Code in relation to the prosecution of journalists, and consider taking steps to change the Defamation Act in the Penal Code, in order to broaden the space for exercising the freedom of expression and a swift adoption of the bill on Freedom of Information. Public media are incorporated into the Ministry of Broadcasting and Information. ZNBC (radio and television), the dailies Times and Daily Mail, as well as the news agency ZANIS, are
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departments of this Ministry. ZNBC Act 2002 states an obligation for fair and balanced coverage. Duties, obligations and conflicts in the private media sector are handled by the Media Council, a self-regulative body composed of the media houses. The only exemption is during the election period, where complaints are registered at the ECZ and their Conflict Management Committees (CMC) deal with the issues, instead of the Media Council. The Electoral Code of Conduct 2006 was applied for the by-election 2008, without further amendments. Article 12 and 13 describe in detail the duties and obligations of the media, the allocation of free air time for the candidates, and its quantity. Performance of the Media Zambias vibrant media landscape participated actively in the electoral process, through reporting and carrying campaign advertisements, as well as printing/ airing information material provided by the ECZ. Trends in the evaluation of the Steadman group media monitoring project show that, most of the election related articles were campaign reports (about 50 70 %) with a minority of reports dealing with the policies of the candidates or the electoral process. Only Hakainde Hichilema (UPND) received more attention and radio/television coverage for criticizing malpractices (in about 50% of the news items he was mentioned in radio/television) than for his campaign. Generally, media attention for his candidacy was very limited. Polarized Media were a major obstacle for the election process. According to interlocutors contacted, journalists standards and ethics in reporting deteriorated from the beginning of the campaign, and their performance shows lower levels of quality than in 2006. Most of the interlocutors blame the public presentation of the candidates for it. The editor of the opposition newspaper The Post was reported as pursuing a personal vendetta after his favorite candidate did not succeed in the primaries of the MMD party. The Post made a u-turn and reported extensively about the candidate of the PF party, who had been previously viciously attacked by its editor. The print media was divided into pro-Banda papers (state-owned Times and Daily Mail) and pro-Sata and contra-Banda dailies (The Post). The Daily Mail was relatively sober in its style, but still unbalanced in favor of Banda. The Post presented Banda in a bad shape by lining up quotations of him and putting them into a degrading context. The editorials were usually aggressive in word and content. President Banda won a court libel case against chief editor Frank Mmembe (27 September), trying to restrain The Post from further attacks. State Media was massively in favor of incumbent president. ZNBC TV and radio were powerful tools for disseminating government positions. ZNBC was, outside of Lusaka, the only televised information available. Only recently, the transmitters were enforced by technology provided by China. ZNBC, as part of the Ministry of Information, is clearly bound to produce stories on behalf of the government and the President22. ZNBC TV was covering the activities of Banda in length during the news programmes, documentaries and advertisements. Trends from the monitoring projects (Steadman Group, FODEP and Media Institute of Southern AfricaMISA Zambia) confirmed the observations of the media expert, that Banda always received more air-time on ZNBC (MISA: with 49 out of 85 election related stories in two weeks three times higher than any other candidate, FODEP: During the nomination period, Rupiah Banda
22
Interview Director General Salasini, 21 October
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received about 16 minutes (in a 30 minute program) of coverage), while the other candidates where more or less not covered at all. Throughout the month of September Banda (MMD) received an average of 8- 10 minutes of coverage per programme. In addition, the hierarchy of the evening news programme was predominantly in favor of Banda, who was always referred to as the acting President and never as the candidate, etc. According to the monitoring results of MISA, opposition candidates did not receive most of the times coverage including sounds/images23. Usually stories on candidate and acting President Rupiah Banda were the opener and were accompanied by footage. Most of the reports were single sourced.
Table 1/2: State-owned ZNBC television and ZNBC radio in favor of the acting President
Source: Preliminary Results of Steadman Group
MISA presentation at media workshop 11 November: MMD 32 out of their 49 stories including sound-bites; PF 8 out of 18; UPND 8 out of 17; HP 1 out of 1
23
Page 23
Source: Preliminary Results of Steadman Group
Political advertisements for the acting-President were far more numerous then for his opponents. The Times was allowing far more space for campaign advertisements for Banda (including supplements by MMD which were not sufficiently marked as political campaign material documenting reports in The Post about Sata). These adverts usually exposed the opponent (Sata), sometimes violating ethic standards (Satanic files; The one man government - Dictator). Article 13 (1) of the Electoral Code of Conduct stipulates that air-time should be equally allocated to all political parties, and article 13 (2) sets a limitation to bought airtime for 30 minutes, per medium, per week. ZNBC General Director Salasini stated that these provisions: do not make sense, it does not correspond to our reality (Interview on 22 October). Only some of the community radios resisted the temptation to earn good money by selling air time to different candidates, even though they are obliged by their constitutions to abstain from partisan politics. Some broadcasters (Catholic Yatsani Radio, Lusaka, interview 28 October), sold airtime to candidates, but insisted on a live debate following the campaign programme, with the candidates answering questions from the listeners.
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Table 3: Campaign spots based on Steadman Group Data
Source: Original data captured by Steadman Group, recalculated by EEM
Most of the broadcasters interviewed claimed they were not aware of the 30 minutes clause in the Electoral Code of Conduct. ZNBC, having being particularly obligated to ensure balanced programming and fairness according to the 2002 ZNBC Act, clearly violated their own principles in respecting the Electoral Code of Conduct. During nomination time, MMDs campaign spots were running, according to FODEP, for at least about 50 minutes per week, while the Electoral Code of Conduct limits them to 30 minutes. Overall calculations (based of the original data Steadman Group captured) show that ZNBC aired, in October, more than the double (average of 72 minutes per week) of the allowed airtime. Similar figures for ZNBC radio indicate that, the MMD campaign used intensively ZNBC to reach out to the rural population, where ZNBC is the sole information provider. This strategy seems to have been efficient, since the rural voters contributed vastly to gain the majority of votes for Banda. Interestingly, Q-FM, the most popular radio station in Lusaka, carried out a large number of spots for PF and also a considerable number of special programmes, probably contributing to the popularity of candidate Sata (PF) in Lusaka. Interestingly also UNZA, the University Radio, trained by the Department of Mass Communication, did not abide by this rule. It would have been very interesting to observe the monitoring of results for news dissemination of Q-FM and UNZA, compared to ZNBC, but the monitoring groups did not undertake this activity. In addition, election advertisements for Banda (MMD) and Sata (PF) in the electronic media were not identified as such, while Heritage Party and UPND informed the audience at the end of each spot of authorship. Complaints and Conflict Resolution The ECZ is the body mandated to receive complaints regarding election related incidents regarding the media. The ECZ legal department received complaints, had two police officers/ prosecutors to investigate the cases, and the Conflict Management Committee (CMC) to mediate between the conflicting partners. According to the ECZ, the body worked very well after first
Page 25
experiences in 2001 and 2006. Due to limited personnel capacity, they act in a passive position, waiting for somebody to complain. Two cases have been dealt with and transferred to the CMC. The result was an apology and a retraction (reply) in the newspaper. In addition, the ECZ reported that they had several meetings with newspaper editors, asking to restrain themselves from too aggressive reporting. During the post election period, the Media Council can deal with complaints regarding unethical reporting, as well as the Zambia Center for Interparty Dialogue, who served as a model to create the Conflict Management Committees. In September, acting President Rupiah Banda complained to the Media Council and High Court about The Post. On 27 September, the Lusaka High Court granted Rupiah Banda an injunction restraining The Post, and any of its agents, from publishing libelous words against him. On 13 October, Anti-Rigging Zambia filed a lawsuit, complaining against the extended coverage in favour of candidate Banda (MMD) by ZNBC, against the ECZ and the Ministry of Broadcasting and Information. The case was heard and dismissed (see Complaints and Appeals part below for more information). MISA, who was monitoring ZBNC programming, observed that there was a slight improvement towards more balanced reporting after the complaint. Pressure against journalists While state agents refrained from action against the media or journalists throughout the campaign period, several physical attacks against journalists had to be noted. MISA Zambia counted 16 cases of violations of media freedom during the electoral period (September October), compared to 6 cases from January to August. Mainly targeted were reporters from The Post, who were widely considered by the majority of national and international stakeholders as prejudiced and going too far, according to the Code of Conduct for journalists. After a couple of attacks while reporting MMD- activities in midOctober, the Inspector General of the Police reminded his officers to protect journalists and not hinder or attack them while fulfilling their duties. One main incident occurred on 18 October: Muvi-TV reporters were attacked with stones by MMD- supporters at an MMD rally, after the Lusaka Province Minister said that he would personally ensure the closing down of Muvi TV for being bought by PF (The Post 19.10., p.7). Also, Post reporters and vehicles passing by were attacked. On 19 October, the journalist association MISA-Zambia complained publicly about it. On Election Day, only one incident involving the violation of campaign silence was reported: In the village of Petauke, MMD cadres stormed the radio station Explorer for allegedly re-airing a programme featuring PF- candidate Michael Sata. Proprietor Wilson Phiri, denied having aired such a programme and complained about harassment. The day before the declaration of the final results, the Information Minister, Mike Mulongoti, issued a press statement, in which all radio stations were advised to desist from allowing live interviews with people wishing to comment on the on-going presidential election results. The Minister of Information stated that: the government is concerned that some people have been making inflammatory statements, protesting against the results released, which might incite violence by some members of the general public. Mulongoti indicated with this press statement,
Page 26
that radio stations could be prosecuted if they aired critical voices from listeners, during phone-in programmes. Sky FM, a private radio station, cancelled its live-programme on Monday morning, fearing repressions. In the post-election period, new physical attacks and threats against Post reporters were launched, which were criticized by PAZA (Press Association Zambia) and attributed to MMD cadres. On 12 November, the police tried to stop a post-election live-programme of community radio Icengelo (Copperbelt Province, proprietor: Bishop of Ndola). Station manager, Father Frank Bwalya, was arrested for interrogation for allegedly inciting the public and transferred to Kitwe police station.
VI.
COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS
As with other aspects of the electoral process, the EU EEM was not able to gather much information concerning complaints and appeals, due to a missing structure on the ground to obtain information about cases and their follow-up by competent authorities. The information assessed was provided by the ECZ and the High and Supreme Courts. Complaints related to the election process could be brought to the attention of either the ECZ or the High Court. If the case was presented to the ECZ, it would decide either to deal directly with it or refer it to the Conflict Management Committees (CMC). Conflict Management Committees were established at the national and district levels, and were composed of members of the ECZ, political parties, civil society, police and the Anti-Corruption Commission. The cases reported to the EU EEM related to (1) Gifts given by the MMD, (2) Intimidation by the PF, (3) Defamation by the PF, (4) Buying of voters card by the MMD, (5) Petitions by Anti Rigging Zambia against the ECZ with regard to voter registration, (6) Petitions by Anti Rigging Zambia against the Government for the use of resources for the MMD, (7) Petitions by Anti Rigging Zambia against the Government, Zambia National Broadcasting Commission (ZNBC), The Times and The Daily Mail newspapers. In the cases dealt with at the CMC, the accused parties recognised the accusations and the solution was to decide not to repeat these actions again. No additional follow-up took place in these cases, while the option to go to court remained open if the plaintiff was not satisfied with the outcome of the CMC deliberations. The cases presented to the High Court were either sojourned sine die, or rejected due mainly to lack of evidence,24 or because the case argued was not admitted25. The PF informed that they believed the elections were characterized by fraud and manipulations. The Electoral Act and Regulations were, according to the PF, disregarded by the Director of Elections and the Director of IT of the ECZ, the Commander of the Zambian Army, the Inspector General of the Police and Mr. Banda. They asked their lawyers to appeal the election results and to request a recount and scrutiny for 78 constituencies within 39 districts in 8
24
25
i.e. Anti Rigging Zambia vs. ECZ for not opening voter registration i.e. Anti Rigging Zambia vs. ECZ for not prohibiting chiefs to make public declarations supporting candidates
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provinces. Their argument is that, they believe vote rigging occurred in some polling stations in these constituencies with, according to them, more than 100% of registered voters actually voting. The appeal was presented on 14 November to the Supreme Court. While the PF mentioned that they did not believe that their case would be dealt with properly (they argue that the court system favours the ruling party), they stated that they wanted to make a point by using the judicial channels instead of street protests, which would only bring loss of life. In conversations with the Supreme Court, they stated that, depending on the number of witnesses both parties would present to argue their case, the duration of the case would last some months. The UPND mentioned, in conversations with the EU EEM, that they also contest the results, but they had decided to start working on improving their skills for the 2011 elections, instead of spending efforts and money in the courts now. They already approached the courts in 2001 whitout success and believe that it does not make any sense, particularly under the current conditions. They stated however that they were willing to provide the PF witnesses to sustain their case, if requested to do so.
VII. SUPPORT TO DIPLOMATIC WATCHERS Deployment In order to secure the best observation coverage, information was provided on how many teams should ideally be deployed to each province. Under the supervision of the training team, the local coordinator, contracted through DFID, was in charge of the liaison with the diplomatic observers, through designated focal points, regarding the logistical aspects of the deployment. However, reaching remote areas was hampered by time availability of the watchers and the long distances and bad road conditions, (many watchers were driving their own cars). Indeed, even thought it was important to secure balanced geographical coverage for a meaningful observation exercise, as stressed during the EU Head of Mission meetings, in the letters to the embassies focal points and during the training sessions, the final deployment plan showed a concentration of diplomatic watchers in Lusaka city, Central and Southern provinces. Two of the main MMD strongholds, Western and North Western provinces, were only covered by two and three teams respectively. Luapula Province, which is the main Patriotic Front stronghold, was observed only by two teams. Northern Province, where the competition was expected to be fierce among the two main candidates, was covered by only four teams. All these areas should ideally have been reached by internal flights. In order to secure a rational deployment for the seven constituencies of Lusaka, a precise itinerary, together with maps of the capital provided by the EC Delegation, was distributed to each diplomatic watcher team. In order to clarify the selection and recognition of itineraries by the diplomatic watcher teams, the EU EEM requested from the ECZ, through the UNDP focal point on governance, constituency maps. However, the ECZ provided only a limited number of district maps. As a result, some diplomatic watcher teams only received the tourist map provided in each ECZ accreditation pack.
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On Election Day, 89 teams were deployed in all the provinces with, as previously mentioned, a high concentration of teams in Lusaka, Central and Southern provinces. The diplomatic watchers deployment plan was shared with the international observer groups. Training The original training schedule which foresaw training to take place in the week prior to election day had to be adjusted to the availability of the diplomatic watchers and their number. It was impossible to organize training during the week 20 to 27 October as the 24 October was a national holiday and the majority of the diplomatic watchers went on leave. The first training session took place on 16 October with the participation of 54 trainees. The morning session, hosted by the Canadian High Commission, covered the legal and electoral framework, as well as the observation methodology. The afternoon session took place at the British Club and consisted of a mock exercise of polling procedures, counting procedures and an explanation of the aggregation and transmission of results at the collation centres (at the constituency level) delivered by the training unit and by one IT expert from the ECZ. The second training session took place on 20 October at the EC Delegation. The thirteen people who attended this session were invited to participate in one of the two mock exercises of polling and counting, led by the training unit of the Electoral Commission of Zambia scheduled to take place the following week. The majority of the diplomatic watchers were therefore trained on the 27 and 28 October. The two sessions, which were respectively attended by 59 and 63 diplomatic watchers, repeated the initial session which took place on the 16 October. However, no one from the ECZ IT department was available to explain, in detail, the electronic transmission of results procedures. The briefing venue for the afternoon session was the Alliance Franaise. As the diplomatic watchers deployed to remote areas left Lusaka before the national holiday, the EU EEM organized a delivery of training manuals and visibility material produced by UNDP, on the 23 October. This exercise proved to be a difficult task, as UNDP delivered the T-shirts and caps only 30 minutes before the closing of all embassies. Furthermore, the car stickers were delivered the following day, when all participating embassies were already closed for the long week-end. The rest of the maps and visibility materials were distributed during the two training sessions prior to Election Day. One handbook for European Union Election Observation and one Compendium of International Standards for Elections was distributed to each participating embassy. Observation strategy In order to meet the expectations of the diplomatic observers, and to contribute significantly to the assessment of the election process, the EU EEM decided to produce short and concise observation forms which covered all steps, from opening to the electronic transmission of results.
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As the EU EEM did not have the capacity to intake three rounds of reporting during election day, it was decided that the phoning of the consolidated observation results would take place, only once, as soon as counting was completed (in each polling station observed). The outcome of the observation of tabulation of votes and electronic transmission was to be transmitted, together with the completed observation forms, upon return to Lusaka for teams deployed in the provinces, and as soon as completed for the teams operating in the capital. As the totalling and transmission of results proved to be the weakest points in 2006, the diplomatic watchers were requested to particularly observe these two aspects throughout election night, and to check-in at the collation centre and at the District Election office the following day. Seven teams were asked to volunteer for night shifts, in order to fully cover the process for the seven constituencies of Lusaka city. Furthermore, the EU EEM suggested that when more than two teams were deployed in the same constituency, the teams should take shifts in order to secure maximum coverage of the observation of the totalling of the votes at the returning officers premises. In order to counter-balance the over representation of Lusaka city, Southern and Central provinces, the necessity to introduce a weighting coefficient in the database with the observation results was foreseen. As stated in the Terms of Reference of the mission, the EU EEM tried to ensure compliance with the methodology for observation as outlined in the Handbook for European Union Election Observation. However, the effective possibility to reconcile a joint diplomatic watching exercise of Election Day with the EU EOM methodology, proved to be impossible. Reporting system The reporting system put in place, catered for both quantitative and qualitative reporting. During the day, the teams were requested to report, through a hotline, on situations of missing essential materials, observed cases of vote buying, active campaigning and intimidation or tensions observed inside or outside the polling stations. Regarding the reporting of the quantitative data, as per the observation forms, reporting requirements varied, whether diplomatic watcher teams were deployed inside or outside Lusaka. Indeed, the teams operating in Lusaka, where one of the five night shifts were deployed, were asked to wait at the end of the count that the presiding officer was collected by an ECZ car, to follow the ECZ car to the collation centre, and to observe the hand-over and verification of the results for this particular polling station. When the intake of the polling station where the count had been observed was completed, and when the teams had checked that the results of their polling station has been tallied properly by the Returning Officer, the teams had go to the EC Delegation and hand over their observation forms. For the two remaining constituencies not covered by a night shift, the teams were asked to follow the Presiding Officer to the Returning Officer premises. It was left to the teams to take shifts in order to observe the process fully. When the observation of the totalling of votes was completed, the teams had to go to the EC Delegation and hand over their observation forms. One team had to return to the collation centre the following day, and inform through the hotline numbers, of the final results at constituency levels.
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The diplomatic watcher teams operating outside Lusaka were asked to call in the results of the outcome of the observation of opening, polling and counting (including results). All teams were supposed to wait at the end of the count that the presiding officer was collected by an ECZ car, follow the ECZ car to the collation centre and observe the hand over, verification of the results and totalling at the collation centre. Teams were encouraged to stay and observe as much as possible at the collation centre and later at the District Electoral Officers office to observe the faxing and the electronic transmission of the results. On Election Day + 1, teams were invited to check in at both locations and to complete the second Tabulation and transmission of results forms provided in the Training manual. Election Day and Election Night During Election Day, only eight phone calls were received through the hotline which pointed out the late delivery of the replacement voter cards in Lusaka city. The operations room set-up in the meeting room of the EC Delegation was fully equipped and provided for excellent working conditions. The Second Secretary of the Netherlands Embassy, who participated in the EU EOM Zambia 2006 as a locally recruited short term observer, had volunteered to help the EU EEM experts to receive the phone calls from the various diplomatic watcher teams. Her efficient support was greatly appreciated. At 04.00 am on October 31st, 37 teams were still due to check-in with the operation room, among them, the fifteen teams deployed by the US Embassy. At 08.00am when calling-in these teams to gather their results in order to be in the position to produce statistics, the EU EEM found out that a misunderstanding existed as to the extent of their collaboration in the joint watching exercise, and the fifteen teams reported directly and exclusively to their embassy. Opening procedures were watched at 64 polling streams. 753 polling streams were observed throughout the day, which represented 8% of the total number of streams. The count was observed in 69 polling streams. 35 totalling and transmission of results forms were returned to the EU EEM The experts seconded by the Embassy of Finland were present throughout election night as well as on the following days to watch the reception of results at ECZ and at the Mulungushi Conference Centre, where preliminary results were made public. Debriefing A general debriefing session was organised on 3 November, from 14.00 to 17.00. Prior to the debriefing session, a list of issues to be discussed was sent through the focal points, as well as an evaluation form covering the different aspects of the training provided. As agreed during the EU Head of Mission meeting, which took place on the 21 October, the focal points from the various participating embassies were asked to attend, while all the other diplomatic watchers were warmly invited. In total 43 watchers attended the debriefing. The debriefing was the occasion to present the outcome of the quantitative observation to the diplomatic watchers and to gather further information on some key comments written on the narrative reports.
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Evaluation Less than 10% of the diplomatic watchers filled in the anonymous evaluation form. The 17 forms received showed that generally the training was generally positively assessed, with a special mention for the quality of the training manual.
VIII. SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC MONITORS Pre Election support The 2008 Presidential by-election was monitored by dozens of Civil society organizations, yet only a few NGOs had sufficient experience and expertise to conduct effective monitoring and systematically cover a vast majority of polling stations. These were FODEP, ZNWL, SACCORD and AVAP, united in a loose consortium, within a common project financed through DFID. The EU EEM met their representatives with a purpose of identifying their training needs and to discuss their observation strategy, methodology and reporting. Representatives of FODEP were not available for the subsequent meetings as they were concentrating exclusively on the Parallel Vote Tabulation project conducted under the guidance of NDI. Therefore, the EU EEM focused on cooperating with the remaining three NGOs. The monitors acknowledged that, the observation of the tabulation of results and electronic transmission of results were their weakest point, thus the EU EEM resolved to assist them in preparing observation tools to cover the last parts of the process. Although the domestic monitors groups claimed to have adopted a common methodology, it turned out, after analysing the provided documents, that their forms had no common links. Moreover, the observation forms of SACCORD, ZNWL and AVAP heavily relied on narrative descriptions of a few topics focusing mainly on incidents, campaigning or gender issues, and largely avoided procedural elements of the polling. The EU EEM was asked to facilitate the design of comprehensive quantitative observation forms covering the opening, polling, closing, counting, tabulation and electronic transmission of results. Due to time constraints, only the ZNWL and SACCORD managed to distribute and implement the jointly designed forms alongside their own forms. Domestic monitors of these two NGOs and which were not involved in the PVT sample, completed these two observation forms. As the reporting system of the ZNWL and SACCORD, which had been designed to process their findings based mainly on narrative comments, proved inadequate for a quick transmission of the collected quantitative data, the need emerged to develop a new system of data retrieval. The EU EEM offered to provide further support. In order to facilitate swift data retrieval, specific consolidation forms were prepared, which could be used at various levels (constituency, province or national). It was expected that the new reporting strategy would greatly improve the capacity of election monitoring organizations to meet their goal to present their first assessments on Election Night. Unfortunately, time pressures did not allow to put this new strategy into practice and the new completed forms had not been processed until they were physically delivered to the respective headquarters and subsequently entered into a database and analysed. Additionally, a
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large portion of forms prepared for the observation of the tabulation procedures at the constituency level tabulation centres, as well as transmission of results at the district centres, were inexplicably distributed to regular monitors (ZNWL) and completed at the polling station level, which created confusion. Nevertheless, representatives from both NGOs expressed their appreciation for these new quantitative forms, which will provide a significantly better country-wide overview of Election Day events, as well as of the observed level of conformity with election procedures at the polling stations, even after their delayed retrieval and analysis. Post Election Support The EU EEM strategy to support post Election Day activities was: first to assess the possibility to facilitate debriefing and lessons-learnt sessions for the nine provincial coordinators of each organization. The proposal was welcomed, as donors had refused to finance any post-election activities. However, their demands proved exaggerated, amounting to over 7000 Euros per person for transportation, one nights accommodation and food allowances for 36 people from the provinces. On a more positive note, a second proposal to offer training sessions for five of their permanent staff was agreed to, enthusiastically. After a first glance at the content of the training modules proposed the three organisations declared that this was meeting their needs, in terms of sustainable capacity building of their permanent staff. Particularly, as the next elections will be in three years time, and they have already started their preparations. The EU EEM proposed to organise a series of workshops in order to build the capacity of permanent middle management staff of the four organisations. Six workshops were organized from 6 to 13 November on the following issues: Lessons learned from the 2008 observation exercise, International standards for Elections, Analysis of the Legal Framework, Monitoring of the Election Administration, Money in Politics and Media and Elections. The choice was to avoid lectures and to organise working groups and group discussions in order to secure interactivity, ownership of findings and conclusions, improved networking and cross fertilization of knowledge. Each of the four main organizations were asked to send five of their permanent middle management staff members. In addition, representatives of other organizations26, who had deployed monitors on Election Day, were invited to participate in some targeted workshops. Each participant received a copy of the EU Election Observation handbook and Compendium of International Principles for Elections, as well as a CD that contained a compilation of the various manuals and research studies from OSCE, NDI, IDEA and IFES. Representatives from the participating NGOs fully agreed with the proposed workshops and dates, without voicing any objections or demanding extra issues to be included in the training. However, they expressed some regret that such training sessions had not been organised one or two months before this election, adding that some refreshment courses before the 2011 elections would be extremely welcome.
26
Woman for Change, Council of Churches of Zambia, Amnesty International Zambia, Legal Resources Foundation
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Mapping of domestic monitors organization A brief mapping of some of the main actors in the field of domestic election monitoring was conducted by the EU EEM. The mapping covered their regular scope of programme activities, internal structure, funding, past monitoring experience, mode and coordination of the deployment of monitors, and their observation focus and methodology. The 2008 presidential by-election created a keen interest among Zambian civil society organizations and dozens of them applied to the ECZ for accreditation to monitor the election process. Yet, the most notable, was the loose consortium of four NGOs: FODEP, AVAP, ZNWL and SACCORD which had cooperated already during the 2006 tripartite elections. Moreover, FODEP is the direct successor of the first Zambian domestic monitoring association Zambia Elections Monitoring and Coordinating Committee, which observed the first multiparty elections in 1991. Apart from election monitoring, the main issues and activities the four NGOs normally pursue include: good/local governance, constitution/electoral reform, leadership, human rights and gender, conflict management and peace building, and civic education. All four NGOs are based in the capital, with some 10 paid staff in their HQs, and can boast a quite developed regional presence with volunteers at both the provincial and district levels. Even though these NGOs prepared and presented a common project, they did not create a steering committee or board of directors. Instead, they have met and coordinated only on an adhoc basis. Therefore, it is not surprising that each organization has issued its own separate statement, and the issuance of a common report was only enforced by the main donor (DFID). Nevertheless, the four NGOs launched the first discussions concerning the coordination of their monitoring activities as early as in mid-August, i.e. before the demise of the President. Since Zambian civil society organizations depend almost exclusively on grants from foreign donors, these four NGOs presented their project to DFID, which eventually, jointly with other donors, made available over 6 billion kwacha (around 1,6 Million USD). This money was channelled through FODEP to the remaining three NGOs, which substantially boosted their 2008 budgets. For instance, the 2008 funds of FODEP almost tripled, and the ZNWLs budget almost doubled after receiving the grant for election monitoring. However, FODEP has complained that it has become increasingly more difficult to secure funding for their regular activities, after the adoption of the Paris Declaration on Harmonization and Aid Effectiveness in 2005. The total amount of funds provided to each NGO reflected the approximate number of polling streams the NGOs committed themselves to cover. Subsequently, they agreed on the same allowance to be paid to their monitors (80,000 Kwachas - 20 USD). Yet, the total payment including transport/subsistence/communication costs, varied between 120,000 Kwachas (around 30 USD) with SACCORD to 230,000 Kwachas (60 USD) provided by AVAP, which provoked a number of deflections and shifts among monitors seeking the best deal. The monitors were not obliged to sign any NGO specific pledge or code of conduct, which could increase their loyalty and accountability. The overall direct costs paid to monitors did not exceed one third of the total funds received for the election monitoring by each NGO. As in 2006, the main four domestic monitoring NGOs partitioned the whole country in such a manner that each NGO completely covered whole election wards consisting of various polling stations. With the stated number of 8,765 monitors who actually observed on Election Day and
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reported to their organizations, it can be assumed that, despite some overlapping, the four NGOs might have covered some 85-90% of all polling streams. A representative sample of 10% of all polling stations was observed by specially trained monitors from all four NGOs within the Parallel Vote Tabulation Project. Other NGOs involved in election monitoring seldom exceeded the number of 100 monitors. The complicated and lengthy ECZs procedures for acquiring accreditations for election monitoring presented serious hurdles for the involved NGOs, but did not impede their successful deployment, particularly due to numerous cases of ad-hoc solutions in which District Electoral Officers signed affidavits for monitors whose accreditations could not be distributed on time. However, it remains unclear why the official ECZ data inflates the actual number of accreditations collected by respective NGOs participating in the election monitoring27. Moreover, the representatives of the involved NGOs estimated that due to a lack of will in issuing Certificates of Authority to monitors, 70 to 90% of their staff had not been allowed to vote, as they observed in other polling stations other than at which they had been registered. Despite the fact that the monitoring exercise included the mobilization and deployment of thousands of monitors on Election Day, the methodology employed by the SACCORD, ZNWL and AVAP did not allow for the effective assessment of the level of compliance with electoral procedures at the polling stations. Instead, their rather vague narrative forms focused mainly on gender issues, violent incidents or campaigning, and would have been suitable rather for a long term observation mission than for monitoring procedural issues on Election Day. However, the ZNWL and SACCORD successfully managed to distribute standardized quantitative forms which had been designed together with the EU EEM. Unfortunately, the system for repatriation of the forms suggested by the EU EEM could not be fully implemented due to time constraints and the fact that the retrieval of the results took unnecessarily long. For the same reason, the AVAP could not employ these forms and instead used only their own narrative forms which proved difficult to collect, process and analyse. This whole process took them more than two weeks to complete. On the other hand, all FODEP monitors used standard observation forms designed for the PVT project, in collaboration with NDI. The Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) project As indicated above, apart from regular monitoring, all four main groups were, to some degree, involved in the DFID funded and NDI supported project of Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT). However, after several years of cooperation with NDI, FODEP naturally became the leading organization in this project, which has already been implemented in a number of African countries. The PVT project which gathered data on the conduct of polling, election results and possible incidents during Election Day, proved to be a success, since FODEP and their partner organizations managed to collect data from 95% of their randomly selected sample of polling stations. At a press conference on 1 November, (i.e. before the tendencies could be officially confirmed), FODEP appealed to politicians and the public for a calm reception of the results, as they predicted a very close outcome. Likewise, they urged that the ECZ maintain strict
27
e.g. the NGO Women for Change officially collected 3,000 accreditations, yet in reality they had only 6 monitors
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transparency, as every single vote might be decisive. After the official declaration of the results by the ECZ, FODEP presented their estimation of the election outcome, which very closely matched the official results. Controversies Unfortunately, the PVT project generated a great deal of dissatisfaction and divided the participating NGOs. While all four NGOs took part in the project and supplied their share of monitors, FODEP presented a statement at a press conference, independently, without mentioning the partner NGOs. FODEP, in turn, complained about other NGOs withdrawing, without notice, a portion of their agreed monitors from the project. Likewise, most NGOs were not satisfied that all funds had been channelled through FODEP. Some financial issues related to the PVT remain reportedly unsolved. Aditionally, some NGOs suspect that AVAPs spearheading the division of election wards was guided by their wish to select for their own monitors easier accessible places, thus reducing transportation costs. Conclusion Despite some methodological shortcoming, Zambian civil society organizations demonstrated that they are able to reasonably conduct a large scale election monitoring exercise. It is expected that the advise and training sessions provided by the EU EEM will strengthen their capacity to assess the Zambian electoral system and their advocacy for necessary reforms. They should also subsequently design better and more comprehensive observation tools, as well as a more functional reporting system. Profiles of the four above-mentioned NGOs and of two other organizations Women for Change and Council of Churches Zambia - involved in the monitoring of the 2008, election are presented in the annex.
IX.
RECOMMENDATIONS
After a review of the recommendations done by the EU EOM 2006, the majority of them are still relevant and are therefore included in the recommendations below, with additions by the EU EEM. Legal framework 1. As no major improvements have taken place since the 2006 elections, the recommendations presented by various groups (including the EU EOM 2006) should be implemented immediately, with special attention to the recommendations on limiting campaign expenditures and regulating the financing of parties. In this sense, the work of the subcommittees of the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) is of special importance. 2. Regulations adopted by the ECZ, and which do not require amendments to the Electoral Act, could be improved without major delays. These refer particularly to provisions in the
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Electoral Act, compared with the various regulations and Code of Conduct adopted by the ECZ, in order to avoid conflicting information between them. Election Administration Increase the independence and capacity of the ECZ 3. The ECZ must become an independent, autonomous body, in terms of the appointment of its members, its funding and performance. Instead of the President proposing members for their ratification by Parliament, at least two-thirds of the National Assembly could put forward candidates for confirmation by the President. The remaining two vacant seats should be filled prior to the 2011 elections. The ECZs funding should be guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance, as per fixed budget allocation. Decentralize the ECZ 4. Full-time provincial and district election officers should be recruited, in order to improve coordination between the ECZ, its Directorate and the field. A permanent, decentralized presence in the field would enable the ECZ to conduct continuous voter registration, engage in civic education and training and capacity-building at a local level. Increase the transparency of the ECZ 5. The ECZ should adopt a clear set of internal procedures to ensure its full transparency, in the eyes of stakeholders. In particular, the ECZ should publish immediately its decisions, minutes and internal procedures, and create an archive of this material which is open for public scrutiny. It should hold regular, open meetings, for all stakeholders, provide details of all formal complaints received, and place all important information on its webpage. Results management 6. At the time when final presidential results are officially announced, the ECZ should make public all results, including a break-down by polling station. The ECZ should not announce final presidential results, before receiving all polling station results either by fax or electronically. 7. The delivery of sensitive election materials from the polling stations to collation centres should be organised ideally within one day to enable the tabulation and announcement of constituency election results, during the day after the election. Constituencies where the collection of results from polling stations will take more than one day should be identified and made public prior to Election Day. 8. The process of transmission of results can be significantly shortened if constituency collation centres transmit the results directly to the ECZ HQ. A hybrid computer system with fix, mobile and satellite connections could be introduced at the constituency centres.
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Ensure efficient and accountable election preparations 9. In order to ensure fast, efficient and accountable election preparations, a detailed election calendar, incorporating all legal and operational timelines, should be produced for future elections. Such a calendar would regulate dates and time periods for all aspects of the voter registration process, candidate nominations, election campaigning, the accreditation of monitors, observers and the media, as well as a timetable for the filing and resolution of petitions. This recommendation from the EU EOM 2006 was partially implemented. 10. A thorough operational plan should precede each future election. It should address the timely purchase, storage and delivery of election materials, the training of electoral staff and voter education activities, and determine clearly which section of the ECZ is responsible for their implementation. 11. Appropriate departments should be established within the ECZs Directorate, including one specifically for the training of electoral staff. Each department should have sufficient decision-making capacities to reduce the burden of the director and his/her deputies, and each electoral officer should work on the basis of clear terms of reference. Certificate of Authority 12. Polling agents and domestic monitors, as well as security personnel assigned to particular polling stations, are entitled to receive the Certificates of Authority to vote on Election Day, as many of those who are on a duty are not registered in that particular polling district. This measure should be implemented by the ECZ and will enable thousands of polling agents and domestic monitors to vote, as political parties and domestic observer organisations are not able to recruit their activists in all polling districts. Introduce continuous voter registration 13. The eventual goal of the government could be the introduction of an effective civil register, from which the voter register can be extracted. Voter registration should, in the meantime, be conducted on a continuous basis, or at least ad-hoc registration exercises should be implemented annually, prior to the 2011 elections28. An audit of the current voters register should take place before embarking in any update to assess the degree of accuracy and based on this information decide on the best way to create the best possible voters register. 14. Coordination between the Ministry of Home Affairs Department of National Registration and the ECZ should be enhanced so that all eligible citizens are issued with a National Registration Card (NRC) before voter registration. To this end, the Department of National Registration could be supported to computerize its operations. 15. Mobile voter registration units should be used to reach voters who are unable to reach stationary locations. Special provisions could also be introduced to register the homebound, hospitalized and, possibly, voters living abroad.
28
There is a draft project financed mainly by the EC to allow for a continuous voter registration from 2009 on
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16. Voter registration and verification should end much closer to Election Day, in order to give the electorate maximum opportunity to participate. The quality control of the voter register should be strengthened to ensure that corrections made during the verification period are accurately incorporated into the register. Improve the quality of ECZ manuals and the training of electoral staff 17. The training of electoral staff needs further improvement. The manuals for election officials need to be revised to ensure that procedures for polling, counting, delivery of election materials, tabulation and transmission of results are clearly explained, and can be followed by presiding and returning officers. All additional instructions issued by HQ regarding elections should be written and made public. Continue and enhance effective voter education 18. Greater efforts should be made to extend voter education activities to both rural and remote parts of the country. The ECZ should involve Civil Society organizations in voter education activities to a larger extent. Facilitate further the crucial role of Civil Society 19. Domestic monitors should be able to receive their ECZ accreditation at a much earlier stage in the electoral process, to cover voter registration and the nomination of candidates. The accreditation of monitors should be decentralized and be conducted at a district or constituency level, in order to make it more accessible for domestic observers and to reduce the workload of the ECZ Directorate. 20. Civil society organizations should be supported in their efforts to enhance the procedural knowledge of domestic monitors across all stages of the electoral process, from voter registration to candidate nomination, polling, counting and the aggregation of results. Civil Society organizations should be offered technical assistance, as soon as possible, in order to strengthen their analytical capacities and their participation in the ongoing process of electoral reform. Media Legal reform 21. The Media Law reform should be completed as a matter of urgency and priority, and laws passed should be implemented. The Independent Broadcasting Authority should receive sufficient funding, personnel and a functioning board to take up its duties. The Freedom of Information Bill should be resend to the National Assembly for enactment. 22. The punitive measures contained in the Electoral Act and Electoral (Code of Conduct) Regulations 2006 should be removed in respect of their application to the media sector and replaced with a limited set of measures such as right of reply and correction. The procedures for criminal investigation should also be withdrawn and replaced with a more suitable set of tools. A body vested with funds, instruments and personnel to enforce compliance should be established.
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23. In line with the increasing trend in international law, consideration should be given to decriminalizing the offence of defamation. Other offences related to printing or publishing and protection of character should be removed from the register of criminal offences and articles in the penal code. Subsequently the civil courts should be made the appropriate mechanism for redress. 24. More refinement and legal certainty should be developed for the provision of free access slots on ZNBC for candidates and parties. This should clearly establish the amount of airtime each candidate is entitled to during the campaign period. ZNBCs internal programme guidelines should also be refined to ensure proportional access to candidates in important programmes such as news bulletins. An agreement should be reached on time slots for electoral coverage/ advertisement in all media, with equal space and airtime for each candidate. The 30 minutes clause should be reconsidered if there should be an amendment to regulate the buying of airtime for whole programmes. Structural reform 25. In light of the failure to establish the Media Council of Zambia as a credible and operational body, the media community should revise it and develop measures to ensure that a functional and effective self-regulatory body is established. ZNBC should demonstrate real and tangible improvements in its standards and levels of diversity if it is to be transformed into a public service broadcaster, as indicated in the legal reform of the sector. 26. ZANIS agencys status and mandate should be transformed to separate the news collection and provision, and governments public relations arm. Failing this, the agencys public relations activities should be suspended during campaign periods and its resources should be made available to candidates on a proportional basis. 27. To coordinate above-mentioned recommendations and others submitted by various stakeholders (including the EU EOM 2006), coordination between all interested stakeholders is necessary to delineate all areas in need of support and establish priorities and division of work as a matter of urgency in view to establish a proper and functioning electoral media landscape well in advance to the next elections in 2011.
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ANNEXES
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Annex 1 Priority, timing and degree of difficulty in implementing proposed actions
Action Yes CONSTITUTION/ELECTORAL ACT 1. Constitutional reform fast track on electoral provisions 2. Dedicated Electoral Tribunal 3. Electoral system 4. Appointment of ECZ Commissioners 5. Funding as % of total budget 6. Declaration of presidential results by ECZ instead of Chief Justice 7. Women quota 8. Secure secrecy of vote ELECTORAL COMMISSION 1. Restructuring of ECZ 2. Clarify lines of communication between Commissioners and Directorate 3. Decentralize tasks 4. Continuous voter registration, including mobile teams 5. Allow marginalize to register/vote 6. Support Department of Public Registration in processing and distributing of national registration cards
Priority No 2009
Time 2010 2011 High
Difficulty Medium Low
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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Action 7. Review delimitation of constituencies to balance the number of voters 8. Consistency between various legal instruments 9. Revise malpractices and penalties of Code Of Conduct 10. Improve manuals 11. ECZ to hold open meetings, publish reports on meetings 12. Publish Electoral Calendar 13. Increase time to deposit candidatures for all elections 14. ECZ to be more proactive in dealing with breaches of Code of Conduct 15. Improve accreditation of monitors 16. Facilitate forms used for counting 17. Revise use of OMR forms 18. Establish a packing chart and floor plan at Collation Centre 20. Publish individual Polling Station results at national level 21. Wait for hard copies of results forms to be delivered to declare final results 22. Deliver Certificates of Authority POLITICAL PARTIES 1. Adoption of political party law, including finance regulations 3. Improve training of polling agents
Priority Yes No X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
2009 X X X X
Time 2010 X
2011
High X
Difficulty Medium
Low
X X X X X X X X
X X X
X
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Action 2. Candidate requirements for NA to be revised to allow public servants to apply CIVIL SOCIETY 1. Undertake permanent civic education 2. Support civil society in electoral reforms advocacy MEDIA 1. Amendment of Electoral Code of Conduct (articles 13, 14) 2. ECZ: Body equipped with funds, instruments and personnel to monitor & enforce compliance or Media Monitoring House 3. Diversify and strengthen work of the PR department of ECZ 4. Media Law reform: Independent Broadcasting Authority, Freedom of Information Act 5. Transformation of ZNBC into a public broadcaster including parts of ZANIS 6. Transform Media Council into working body 7. Joint effort of the donor community to support media performance through training 8. Monitoring of professional quality
Priority Yes No X X X X X X X X X X X X
2009 X X X X X
Time 2010 X X X X
2011
High
Difficulty Medium X
Low
X X X
X X X X
X X X X X X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
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Annex 2 Domestic Monitoring Groups The Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP)
General overview Establishment date: 1992 emerged from the 1991 founded Zambia Elections Monitoring and Coordinating Committee, the firsts monitoring organization in the country The Mission: To promote and strengthen the institutions and operations of democracy. Programme activities: 1. Elections and electoral process (strengthening and advocacy preparation of a draft Electoral Act; member of the past Electoral Reforms Technical Committee) 2. Local Governance and development (focusing on accountability of leaders and decentralization fieldwork in the districts of Mumbwa, Kapiri Mposhi, Kaoma, Solwezi, Kafue, Chongwe) 3. Human Rights (focusing on advocacy, community radios discussions) 4. Monitoring of the AUs African Peer Review Mechanism (pressuring the government to follow the APRM) 5. Capacity Building (mainly oriented on its own structures) Main Donors: GTZ and Irish Aid 2008 budget: around 350 thousand USD Internal resources: none Internal structure: - 11 paid staff (3 programme officers) in the secretariat - unpaid provincial committee members (9 in each) and unpaid district committee members (8 in each) Registered Members: 7,000 (in 2001 around 10,000) Cooperation with other NGOs: with Zambian Centre for Interparty Dialogue, and the Citizens Forum Election Monitoring Past Election Monitoring Activities: 1991 as ZEMCC 1996 with around 10,000 monitors 2001 with around 6,000 monitors 2006 with around 2,000 monitors an coordinated exercise with Saccord, ZNWL and Avap 2008 Monitoring Coverage: Covering all 150 constituencies Some 2,560 monitored and have reported (all received the PVT training) including over 800 monitors involved in PVT (Parallel Vote Tabulation) Funding for Election Monitoring/education: DFID 1,4 Billion Kwacha ( around 370,000 USD) for regular monitoring DFID 352,000 USD for the PVT Note: the election monitoring grants amounts to some two thirds of Fodeps 2008 budget
Election Monitoring Focus: Election day procedures, atmosphere and incidents
Election Monitoring Methodology: - a standard E-Day observation form designed in the cooperation with the NDI for PVT - all FODEP monitors used the same PVT forms All forms quickly sent to the HQ, where recorded and analysed Any specific Code of Conduct or Pledge: Prepared but not distributed and signed Allowances paid to monitors: 40,000 meal 80,000 for E-day (for PVT monitors 100,000) 10,000 Talk time 30,000 Transport
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Zambia National Womens Lobby (ZNWL)

General overview Establishment date: 1991 as National Women Group The Mission: to promote women representation and participation in decision making at all levels through advocacy, lobbying and capacity building for women in Zambia Programme activities: 1. Governance (by lobbying political parties and MPs) 2. Women's leadership (programmes to educate women in rural areas to become community leaders or local councillors; and support to female candidates for councillors or MP positions from all parties 3. Analysing legal framework (lobbying for constitutional/electoral reform) 4. Information campaign concerning gender issues with a special focus on domestic violence (plus lobbying MPs, President for strengthening sanctions against rapists) Main Donors: DanChurchAid (Governance project) NGO Coordinating Council Basket Fund Hivos (NL) One World Action (GB) (Womens leadership) 2008 budget: around 400 thousand USD Internal resources: negligible less than 1% from Registered Members contributions (2,5 $ annually) Internal structure: National board composed of chairperson, vice chairperson, legal advisory, treasury and 9 representatives of provinces (one from each) elected by the General Assembly, Paid staff: 12 persons in the secretariat plus 9 provincial representatives in the National Board. In all 72 districts - unpaid chairperson, vice chairperson and secretary Registered Members: 3,500 throughout the country, over 90% women Cooperation with other NGOs: Mainly within NGO CC ( Coordinating Council) unifying 94 womens organizations; cooperation on domestic violence with Young Womens Christian Association Election Monitoring Past Election Monitoring Activities: 2006, with some 1100 monitors in an coordinated exercise with Fodep, Saccord and Avap 2008 Monitoring Coverage Present in 140 (out of 150) constituencies with 2370 accredited monitors, 50 in the PVT Project. Some 2000 actually observed and have reported their findings Funding for election monitoring/education: DFID 1,2 Billion Kwacha (around 315,000 US Dollars) NGO CC Grand Basket 350 Millions Kwacha (around 92,000 USD) DanChurchAid 9,000 USD (for Voter education programmes in community radios) Note: the election related funds represent around 50% of WZNLs 2008 budget Election Monitoring Focus: Strict gender perspective: - share of women among PS staff, - Participation of women in the campaign (abusive role as dancers etc.) - intimidation Limited focus on election procedures substantially improved with adoption of the forms jointly designed with the EU EEM Training Team Election Monitoring Methodology: - a gender focused narrative form - the jointly designed quantitative Election Day form All forms sent to and analysed at HQ.
Any specific Code of Conduct or Pledge: None Allowances paid to monitors: 70,000 for training 80,000 E-day 80,000 when forms delivered
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Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Saccord)

General overview Establishment date: 2000 The Mission: To work towards the realisation of peace and security through constructive conflict management Note: The original idea to serve as a regional advisor/ consultant for the SADC countries failed. Currently functions as a national NGOs network with partner NGOs in other countries in the region Programme activities: 1. Building Local Democracy (focusing on decentralization, fulfilment of the 5th National Development Plan) 2. Constitutionalism and Rule of Law (focusing on constitutional and electoral reform, policy and legislative tracking, civic and human rights education, election monitoring) 3. Conflict Management and Peace Building (focusing on The Public Order Act, The Societies Act, and conflict transformation) Working with communities in Itezhi-Tezhi, Kalomo, and Choma (Southern Province), Petauke, Mambwe and Chipata (Eastern Province), Solwezi (North-western Province), Sesheke (Western Province) Main Donors: HIVOS (HR and capacity building) MS Zambia (Local democracy and decentralization) DanChurchAid (constitution and legal reform) Diakonia GTZ ( monitoring of the 5th National Development Plan) Osisa Danida 2008 budget: around 700 thousand USD Internal resources: none Internal structure: - 9 paid staff (4 programme officers) in the secretariat - 9 provincial and 98 constituency coordinators volunteers paid on ad hoc basis - around 200 promoters ad hoc paid in Itezhi Registered Members: NA Cooperation with other NGOs: with the Oasis Forum and the Collaborative Group on the Constitution in discussions on Constitution making; with the Civil Society for Poverty Reduction in monitoring of the implementation of the 5th National Development Plan Election Monitoring Past Election Monitoring Activities: 2001 within the Coalition 2001 group with some 300 monitors 2006 with some 2000 monitors in an coordinated exercise with Fodep, ZNWL and Avap 2008 Monitoring Coverage: Originally planned to observe in 103 constituencies, later adjusted to 98 constituencies in 7 provinces (Luapula and Northern Province not covered) 1700 planned. Yet only 1520 actually monitored and have reported, including 40 mobile "rowing teams and 60 monitors in the PVT project Funding for Election Monitoring/education: DFID - 880 Million Kwacha (around 230,000 USD) Note: the election related funds represent around about one fourth of Saccords 2008 budget
Election Monitoring Focus: 75 constituency coordinators monitored campaign, misuses of state resources, violent incidents.
Limited focus on election procedures substantially improved with adoption of the forms jointly designed with the EU EEM Training Team Election Monitoring Methodology: - a narrative form focused on conflict/intimidation/campaign - the jointly designed quantitative E-Day form All forms sent to and analysed in the HQ Any specific Code of Conduct or Pledge: None Allowances paid to monitors: 20,000 Transport 20,000 meal 80,000 for E-day
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Anti-voter Apathy Project (Avap) General overview

Establishment date: 1995 The Mission: To promote democracy, political and voter participation, respect for human rights and other issues related to good governance Programme activities: 1. Democracy information centres (public "libraries specializing on HR and governance in total 18 in provinces and 5 in Lusaka) 2. Leadership training for young people in politics (4 to 5 workshops annually in province capitals) 3. School based democratic governance roundtable discussions (held at primary, secondary schools and colleges) 4. Community civic education (discussions with local leaders in 18 districts) 5. Managing democracy forums (monthly discussions in urban centres with politicians and opinion leaders) 6. Weekly community radios/ZNBC programmes (discussions) Main Donors: GTZ and Irish Aid (for running Democracy information centres) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung MS Zambia 2008 budget: around 790 thousand USD Internal resources: negligible contributions from the "Friends of Avap Internal structure: - 13 paid staff (2 programme officers) in the secretariat - 41 staff in Democracy information centres - 3 provincial coordinators (Luapula, Eastern, Northern Province) Registered Members: NA
Election Monitoring
Past Election Monitoring Activities: 2001 within the Coalition 2001 group 2006 in 6 provinces in an coordinated exercise with Fodep, ZNWL and Saccord 2008 Monitoring Coverage: 2685 monitors accredited, the number of monitors actually involved not known yet. Around 10 involved in the PVT (even though some 70 planned) Voter education Go vote goal" conducted in 18 districts Funding for Election Monitoring/education: DFID - 1,4 Billion Kwacha (around 370,000 USD) Note: the election monitoring grants represent some 30% of Avaps 2008 budget Election Monitoring Focus: A bit vaguely defined: acts of violence, irregularities Limited focus on election procedures.
Election Monitoring Methodology: - a narrative form focused on basic polling/counting procedures and irregularities, instances of violence and breaches of conduct - Forms analysed and synthesized at constituency, subsequently district and later at provincial level. All 9 reports from the provincial coordinators sent to HQ (12 days after elections not arrived yet). Later all forms sent to the HQ Any specific Code of Conduct or Pledge: None Allowances paid to monitors: 50,000 transport for training 20,000 meal 80,000 for E-day 50,000 E-day transport 40,000 deployment costs
Cooperation with other NGOs: No, just making available materials of Fodep, Saccord, ZNWL and TIZ in the Democracy information centres
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Women for Change General overview

Establishment date: 1992 transformed from the former "Women's Development Programme" of the Canadian University Services Overseas The Mission: Working with and empowering remote rural communities, especially women to contribute towards sustainable development and the eradication of all forms of poverty. Programme activities: 1. Education on Human Rights 2. Good leadership making leaders both elected/ traditional accountable to their electorate/ communities Operating in selected rural communities in the districts of Mazabuka, Choma, Sinazongwe, Kalomo in the Southern Province; Mumbwa, Kaipiri-Mposhi, Mkushi in the Central Province; Kaoma and Senanga in the Western Province Note: a visible shift from focusing on gender issues to rural communities development Main Donors: NGO Coordinating Council (NGO CC) Basket Fund Norad DanChurchAid 2008 budget: 600 thousand USD Internal resources: none Internal structure: 30 permanent paid staff out of which 25 programme staff acting as field workers (3 weeks in the field, one week in Lusaka) Registered Members: NA Cooperation with other NGOs: Women for change see themselves as a pioneer organization preparing grounds in communities for other NGOs that come and cooperate with them at a later stages Election Monitoring Methodology: - the jointly designed quantitative E-Day form Findings from the 6 monitors compiled in the HQ Any specific Code of Conduct or Pledge: None Allowances paid to monitors: NK Election Monitoring Focus: Only E-day monitoring
Election Monitoring
Past Election Monitoring Activities: none in 2006 only Civic education 2008 Monitoring Coverage: The plan to have 450 monitors failed due to delayed funding and the ensuing late request for accreditation. Only 6 monitors from the HQ under the umbrella of Saccord deployed in Luapula, Eastern, Northern, Southern and Central Provinces Funding for Election Monitoring/education: None for election monitoring DanChurchAid around 25,000 USD for Voter education programme
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Council of Churches Zambia General overview

Establishment date: 1914 The Mission: To serve as an ecumenical organization to strengthen Christian unity and promote social justice, peace and development
Election Monitoring
Past Election Monitoring Activities: 2006 with some 200 monitors 2008 Monitoring Coverage: 25 monitors in North-western Province 25 in Luapula 50 in Lusaka All members of local church communities Limited mainly due to lack of funding Funding for Election Monitoring/education: DanChurchAid - 10,000 USD Diakonia 3,000 USD
Programme activities: 1. Education and Development 2. Gender justice and youth 3. Communication, social Justice and Peace 4. Theology and Ecumenical Engagement 5. HIV/AIDS and health Main Donors: Norwegian Church Aid DanChurchAid Christian Aid Diakonia Australian Council of Churches Internal resources: 10% from renting offices in the CCZs buildings, sale of farming products, Registered Members fees Internal structure: 40 permanent staff in the secretariat Local Christian Council at district levels unpaid meeting groups Registered Members: NK Cooperation with other NGOs: NA
Election Monitoring Focus: campaign, misuses of sate resources, violent incidents Limited focus on election procedures.
Election Monitoring Methodology: - a narrative form focused on conflict/intimidation/campaign designed by Saccord Any specific Code of Conduct or Pledge: None Allowances paid to monitors: 100,000 for E-day in Lusaka (50,000 elsewhere) 300,000 E-day transport outside Lusaka
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Annex 3 Capacity building training modules
Module 1: Lessons learned from the 2008 exercise Recruitment and training of monitors, observation methodology, repatriation and analysis of results, reporting timeline. Objective: identify good practices; identify what could be done better; identify how it could be done better Overall objective: Strengthening institutional capacity, improving the observation methodology, underline the importance of networking
Timeline 14.00 14.15 Activity Introduction of trainers and participants Setting the workshop rules Presentation of the workshop agenda and of the 3 main objectives of the first workshop 14.15 14.45 Divide the trainees in two working groups: Group 1: recruitment and training of monitors Group 2: accreditation and deployment Techniques: List 5 positive and five negative points 14.45- 15.05 15.05 15.30 One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group Common discussion Trainers input: offer the same level of allowance to avoid competition Consider the possibility of national training days Advocate as a group for decentralization of the accreditation process Advocate as a group for certificate of authority Cross fertilization of experience Expected outcome Break the ice
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Coffee/tea break 15.45 16.15 Divide the trainees in two working groups: Group 1: Observation methodology & repatriation of results Group 2: Report writing & going public Techniques: List 5 positive and five negative points 16.15 16.35 16.35 17.00 One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group Common discussion Trainers input: quantitative data allow for fast repatriation of results Timeline for reporting Strategy to engage with international observer missions. Cross fertilization of experience
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Module 2: International standards for Elections Review of International and regional standards, Challenges for implementation of the standards, Assessment of inclusion of standards into national legal framework. Objective: identify loopholes, search for common grounds for advocacy
Time 14.00- 14.10 14.10- 14.30 Topic Introduction Identify election related incidents and structures which can be assessed as HR/Gender issues Overview of relevant int. /reg. HR/Gender agreements. Two working groups selecting two cases each. PPP, EU EOM Handbook, Compilation of International Standards for Elections, Compilation of HR agreements Case based Flipchart Tools Material
14.30-14.40
14.40 15.30 15.30 15.45 15.45 16.30 16.30 -17.00
Workshop, Plenum presentation/discussion break Workshop, Plenum presentation/discussion Open floor discussion regarding future strategies and cooperation
Case based Discussion
Flipchart Distribution of Zambia HR Com. Annual rep. 2007 How to advocate for domestication of international covenants & treaties already ratified
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Module 3: Analysis of legislation Importance of legal analysis, developing an election disputes table, monitoring the resolution of disputes and analysing Election Disputes. Objective: developing a national framework of analysis of legislation, identify loopholes to address through advocacy strategy.
Time 14:00 14:15 14:15 14:45 Activity Presentation of the agenda Overview of legal framework Divide trainees in two working groups to assess the 5 major offences during past election based on the Electoral Code of Conduct and redress One spokes person per group present the findings Expected outcome Overall idea of session Exchange of ideas
14:45 15:15
Compare selected offences by two groups and assess the most mentioned: Bribery, treating by political parties and offences by media houses, no redress Understanding of the various attempts for electoral reform in Zambia Exchange of ideas
15:15 15:30 15:30 15:45
15:45 16:15
16:15 16:45
Coffee / tea break Work of Electoral Reform Technical Committee, Constitutional Review Commission, National Constitutional Conference Divide trainees in two working groups to assess based on a checklist the 5 major improvements needed with regard to legal framework One spokesperson per group present the findings
Compare selected amendments and assess the most mentioned: Appointment of election commissioners, continuous voter registration, electoral system
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Module 4: Assessment of Election Administration Discussion over the composition and structure of the electoral administration in Zambia. What are the methodology and principles for assessment of election administration? Identification of main shortcomings, analysing positive and negative elements of the current election administration using principles for genuine elections.
Objective: identify main problems and shortcomings; identify what can be done to improve performance Overall objective: Strengthening capacity, improving knowledge of how to assess performance of election administration, underline the importance of NGO regular contacts with ECZ and identification of future NGO projects aimed to improve the electoral process.
Timeline 14.00 14.15
Activity Introduction of trainers and participants Setting the workshop rules Presentation of the workshop agenda and of the 3 main modules of the workshop
Expected outcome
14.15 14.45
Divide the trainees in two working groups: Module 1: Electoral Commission composition, method of nomination of commissioners, structure, permanent staff
Better understanding the structure and composition of the electoral administration in Zambia
Group work - how ideal ECZ should look like? 14.45- 15.05 15.05 15.45 One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group Module 2: Assessing Electoral Administration Against principles :Transparency, impartiality, professionalism Group work - assessing ECZ performance us Techniques: List several positive and negative points using principles
The suggestions how to improve the structure and composition of the ECZ
Understanding of methods and criteria used in assessment of electoral administration
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14.45- 15.05 16.00 16.30
One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group Module 3: What needs to be changed? Shortcomings and problems of election administration Recommendations from previous elections Identification of the main shortcomings Using the election report of previous EUEOM Outline possible future activities and projects which can have a positive impact on the performance of the election administration
16.30 17.00
One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group
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Module 5: Monitoring Politics Candidate and party registration, Monitoring the election campaign, strategy to monitor and document money politics Objective: developing checklist to document abuses of state resources and vote buying/treating, formulate proposals for transparent financing of political campaign.
Timeline 14.00 14.15 Activity Introduction of trainers and participants Setting the workshop rules Presentation of the workshop agenda and of the 3 main objectives of the first workshop 14.15 14.45 Divide the trainees in two working groups: Group 1: definition and examples of abuse of state resources, how to document those malpractices Group 2: definition and examples of vote buying & treating, how to document those malpractices 14.45- 15.05 15.05 15.30 One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group Common discussion Coffee/tea break 15.45 16.15 Divide the trainees in two working groups: Group 1: case study of Benin, Bulgaria, Nepal, Uganda & Ghana Group 2: Peru, South Africa, Romania, Senegal & Tanzania Country information extracted from NDIs Money in Politics, a case study of 22 countries 16.15 16.35 16.35 17.00 One spokesperson per group present the results of his/her working group Common discussion List of best practises from case studies, formulation of proposals for transparent financing of political campaign in Zambia. How to advocate for a Political Party Act. Cross fertilization of experience Develop checklists for monitors in the field Common definition of abuse of state resources and vote buying Trainers input: fact finding tips, model of allegations/incident report form Expected outcome
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Module 6: Media and election Assessment of the legal framework governing media, media monitoring Objective: identifying tools for assessing the level of fairness of candidates/parties' access to media, impartiality of their coverage, and developing instruments for detecting possible restrictions in the work of media.
Time 14.00- 14.10 14.10- 14.20 Topic Introduction Complaints about the media Role Play: Journalist, citizen, government, ECZ, womens health organization complain Own experience Reflect different perspectives on media performance Tools Material Expected outcome
14.20-14.30 14.30 15.00
Presentation of the complaints Legal framework PPP
Flipchart to gather complaints Overview International Laws and Codes on Media Freedom
15.00 15.15 15.15 16:00
Break Complaints: which violations of which laws, codes? Group work, Role play using the above complaints Checklist media ethics, Electoral codes. Getting acquainted to use laws in defending freedom of speech, freedom of media Getting insight into fundamental principles of MM for NGOs MM for NGOs: ideas for 2011
16.00 16.30
Media Monitoring
PPP
16.30 -17.00
NGOs how to use media monitoring
Discussion
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Annex 4 International and regional agreements signed by Zambia
ORG UN
AGREEMENT The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, 16 December 1966 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty (New York, 15 December 1989 International Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination New York, 7 March 1966 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 18 December 1979 Amendment to article 20, paragraph 1 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (New York, 22 November 1995) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women New York, 6 October 1999 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, New York, 13 December 2006 Convention on the Rights of the Child
SIGNED RATIFIED 10/04/68 (accession) 10/04/68 (accession)
10/04/68 (accession) 11/10/68 17/07/80 04/02/72 13/06/85
29/09/08 9/05/08 30/09/90 17/01/83 12/07/00 10/04/08 28/02/92 09/06/98 30/05/96 06/12/91 10/01/84 21/02/01
AU
African (Banjul) Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lome, Togo 11.July 2000 African Youth Charter African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 10 June 1998 Protocol to the African Charter on Human And Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Maputo, Mozambique, 11July 2003
03/08/05
02/06/06
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SADC Declaration and Treaty of SADC The treaty of SADC, as amended Declaration on Gender and Development Charter on Fundamental Social Rights in SADC Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004)
17/08/92 17/08/93 26/08/03 14/08/00
This compilation may not cover all agreements relevant to elections. Dates for signing and ratification are copied from the UN, AU and SADC internet pages
Reservation: 3. International Covenant on Economical, Social and Cultural rights of 1966 The Government of the Republic of Zambia states that it reserves the right to postpone the application of article 13 (2) (a) of the Covenant, in so far as it relates to primary education; since, while the Government of the Republic of Zambia fully accepts the principles embodied in the same article and undertakes to take the necessary steps to apply them in their entirety, the problems of implementation, and particularly the financial implications, are such that full application of the principles in question cannot be guaranteed at this stage

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EU Election Expert Mission to Zambia

Framework Contract no.2008/165534 Lot 7

The project is funded by the European Union

The project is implemented by European Consultants Organisation

Final Report EU EEM ZAMBIA

Lusaka, 15 November 2008

VII. SUPPORT TO DIPLOMATIC WATCHERS.............................................................................. 27 Deployment....................................................................................................................................... 27

INTRODUCTION & ACTIVITIES OF THE EU ELECTION EXPERT MISSION

Until now 6 out of 11 finished their task

Included in the EU EOM 2006 recommendations

Interview Director General Salasini, 21 October

Source: Preliminary Results of Steadman Group

Source: Preliminary Results of Steadman Group

Table 3: Campaign spots based on Steadman Group Data

Source: Original data captured by Steadman Group, recalculated by EEM

COMPLAINTS AND APPEALS

Annex 1 Priority, timing and degree of difficulty in implementing proposed actions

Time 2010 2011 High

Difficulty Medium Low

Election Monitoring Focus: Election day procedures, atmosphere and incidents

Zambia National Womens Lobby (ZNWL)

Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (Saccord)

Anti-voter Apathy Project (Avap) General overview

Women for Change General overview

Council of Churches Zambia General overview

Annex 3 Capacity building training modules

14.40 15.30 15.30 15.45 15.45 16.30 16.30 -17.00

Case based Discussion

15:15 15:30 15:30 15:45

Timeline 14.00 14.15

Understanding of methods and criteria used in assessment of electoral administration

14.45- 15.05 16.00 16.30

14.20-14.30 14.30 15.00

Presentation of the complaints Legal framework PPP

15.00 15.15 15.15 16:00

NGOs how to use media monitoring

Annex 4 International and regional agreements signed by Zambia

SIGNED RATIFIED 10/04/68 (accession) 10/04/68 (accession)

10/04/68 (accession) 11/10/68 17/07/80 04/02/72 13/06/85

17/08/92 17/08/93 26/08/03 14/08/00

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