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(page 6)
In Israel, a lesser share of people work than is common in the West. Those who are employed work more hours a week than do workers in most other OECD countries while the countrys average standard of living is lower than in the majority of OECD countries.
Israel has experienced a marked increase in the share of poor families headed by an employed person. The rise in the working poor has been to a large extent concentrated among Arab Israelis. The high rate of working poor among Arab Israelis reflects a challenging combination of disadvantages.
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developed countries? A graph published in 2003 by Ben-David and updated here compares Israel with 24 OECD countries in 2009. When it comes to standards of living the common measure for these is GDP per capita 21 of these 24 OECD countries have higher standards of living (this measure is shown as the horizontal axis of the graph). The share of Israelis who are employed is below all but four of the other OECD countries (see red triangles
on the graph). On the other hand, Israelis who work tend to put in more hours of work each week than do workers in all but two of the other countries, regardless of whether those countries are wealthier or poorer than Israel (the blue squares on the graph). The primary factor determining standards of living in a country is productivity. One measure of productivity is labor productivity (defined as GDP per hour worked). The strong link between productivity and standards of living that exists across countries and is visually evident in the figure (by the green circles) is not a coincidence. The more productive a worker is, the more he or she can be compensated and the higher the standard of living. This is a major reason why productivity is lower in the three OECD countries
with lower living standards than Israels and why it is increasingly higher in the wealthier OECD countries. This figure shows an interesting relationship that appears to hold across modern Western economies: in countries in which a greater share of the population is employed, and each person on average is more productive, then employed individuals tend to work fewer hours during the week and the countrys average living standards is nonetheless higher.
Lagging productivity
Israels productivity picture is one of a steadily increasing gap that has developed between itself and the G7 countries (the second figure on the next page). The relatively slower productivity growth since the
200
New Zealand G Greece M i Mexico
50
75
100
175
employment rates relative to Israel (ages 35-54) work hours per employed person relative to Israel Output per hour relative to Israel (labor productivity)
Source: Dan Ben-David (2003). Israels Long-Run Socio-Economic Trajectories. The Economic Quarterly, March (graph is updated to 2009). Data: Israels Central Bureau of Statistics, Bank of Israel and the OECD.
Norway y
Korea
175
Portugal
Ireland
200
1970s has translated into relatively slower economic growth, with Israels standard of living falling farther and farther behind the G7 countries. The irony is, as Dan Ben-David shows in the Taub Centers State of the Nation Report, that Israel invests extensively in research and development and, in certain areas, its creativity and innovation surpass those of the Wests leading economies. But while some sectors of Israels economy are cutting edge, the overall human capital and physical infrastructures have not kept pace. Increasingly congested roads (see January 2011 Bulletin) lead to higher transport costs and consequently lower productivity. Low levels of education and insufficient skills among large and growing segments of Israeli
society reduce their ability to produce and incomes tend to reflect this. As a result, even when there are some areas in which the Israeli economy can successfully compete on a global scale, the heavy weight of the unskilled population enters the calculations of the national average. It turns out that the more advanced sectors of Israels economy are unable, on their own, to raise the countrys average standard of living to the highest Western levels. On the contrary. The large unskilled population pulls the national growth path downwards, so it is no coincidence that Israels long-run economic growth path has been lower and flatter than those of the advanced Western economies.
45
G7
40 35 30 25 20 15 1970
Israel
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
* 2005 prices, according to purchasing power parity. Source: Dan Ben-David (2010). A Macro Perspective of Israel Society and Economy. in Dan Ben-David (Ed.). State of the Nation Report 2009, Taub Center for Social Policy Studies in Israel. Data: OECD, Bank of Israel, Israels Central Bureau of Statistics.
Low employment
The employment picture in Israel is a problematic one, particularly for men. Though Israeli unemployment rates are below the OECD average, they only measure the share of individuals who cannot find employment out of those looking for work. However, there is a very large segment of the Israeli population that is not even looking for work. Thus, the more relevant measure is non-employment which includes the unemployed, those who are not participating in the labor force and those not looking for work. As highlighted in the June 2010 issue of the Bulletin, the share of non-employed Israelis out of the primeworking age (35-54 year old) male population is more than half as much more than it is in the West: 19 percent were not employed in Israel in 2008, versus 12 percent non-employment in the OECD. Two groups stand out in particular in this regard, Arab Israeli and haredi (or ultraOrthodox) men. In 2008, 27 percent of prime working age Arab Israeli men were not employed (double the share in 1979) while 65 percent of haredi men of the same age were not employed (over three times the share of non-employed haredi men in 1979). It is important to note that even among non-haredi Jewish men, who are still the large majority in Israel, the share of non-employed (15 percent) is one-quarter more than the OECD average of 12 percent. Three decades ago, in 1979, the share of non-employment among non-haredi Jewish Israeli men was the same as the OECD average. This means that there has been a deterioration in relative male employment rates across the board in Israel. The marked increase in male non-employment has coincided with a multi-decade decline in the employment of lesseducated and unskilled Israelis and steady multi-decade increases in welfare benefits per capita. The result is that relatively fewer shoulders bear the weight of Israels economy and must work more hours to do so.
While the Israelis who work do so for more hours a week than is common in the West, the trend among Israeli men is towards fewer weekly work hours today than a decade ago (third figure, on the next page). In his study that will appear in the upcoming State of the Nation Report, Ayal Kimhi finds that non-haredi Jewish men, who represent the largest group of males in Israel, worked an average of 49.3 hours a week in 1998. By 2009, this fell by more than three percent, to 47.6 hours. Weekly work hours among Arab Israeli men were below those of the non-haredi Jewish men in 1998 and in 2009, falling by one percent over this period, from 45.8 hours a week in 1998 to 45.3 hours in 2009.
increases. Ultra-Orthodox children represent one-fifth of all primary school pupils today, with an increase in enrollment of 51 percent over the past decade alone compared to a decline of three percent during this same decade in the State non-religious schools (whose share fell to just 39 percent of the total in 2008). As this major segment of the population rapidly increases, their ability and willingness to be engaged in a modern competitive society has become a major issue that needs to be reckoned with by Israeli society and its leadership. When this is coupled with the fact that the haredim refuse to allow their children to study core curriculum subjects at levels that could facilitate their integration into a
modern and competitive economy, the implications for future labor productivity growth that would enable higher compensation are not encouraging. The combined result of problematic employment habits and poor education is that there are increasing pressures for raising overall government assistance to these families, with all of the attendant tax and welfare implications that this has for the rest of Israeli society. In light of the fact that the haredi population is increasing at a faster pace than all other segments of Israels population, what happens to this group is beginning to have wider repercussions on the average standards of living for Israeli society as a whole.
37.5
36.8
37.8
37.4 34.8
29.7 29.7
1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009 1998 2009
Jews haredim r di
Jews haredim r di
men
women
Source: Ayal Kimhi (2011). forthcoming in the State of the Nation Report 2010. Data: Israels Central Bureau of Statistics.
In terms of net incomes that is, after taxes and welfare payments Israel has a very high poverty rate, among the highest in the developed world, and poverty rates have risen considerably since the beginning of the decade. The proportion of poor families headed by an employed person (among those headed by a person between the ages of 25 and 64) has also risen considerably, so that overall, the number of working poor has seen a particularly sharp rise. The first figure shows the total portion of poor households headed by a person at work. In Israel today, the majority of poor families in this age group fall into this category. One reason for this trend is the deliberate government policy of encouraging poor people to work rather than to live off of public assistance. The objective of this policy was to help people escape poverty, but so far one effect has been to move many families from the idle poor to the working poor, without much change in their standard of living. It is likely that the inducements to work involved too much stick (reduction of benefits) and too little carrot (improving the compensation from the return to work) and as a result, the program
Poor households headed by a wage earner as percent of all poor households, 1995-2009 for families headed by person aged 25-64
60%
55%
50%
45%
Source: Haya Stier (2011). forthcoming in the State of the Nation Report 2010. Data : Israels Central Bureau of Statistics.
may have saved money for the Treasury but has not made a major impact on poverty levels. Using disaggregated data, Stier discovered that the rise in the working poor has been to a large extent concentrated among Arab Israelis. The second figure shows that among Jewish Israelis, the proportion of working poor is considerably lower, and virtually unchanged. But among Arab Israelis, the share of poor rose since 1995 from about 20 percent to about 40 percent. Among the reasons Stier finds for the high rate of working poor among Arabs are: 1 Low labor force participation rates for women. In those Arab households where the woman is employed, poverty rates are actually quite low. Thus, the gap in working poor between Jewish and Arab Israelis is due in large measure to the low proportion of two-earner couples among Arab Israelis. 2 Deterioration in earnings. Arab men are concentrated in low-skill jobs which have faced sharply lower demand in recent years, and in addition have faced competition from cheaper foreign workers who, in many cases, are employed in virtually
identical jobs. (See the March 2011 Bulletin which presents findings that foreign workers have been displacing Arab men.) 3 Demographic differences. As a whole, the Arab population is younger and a larger proportion of household heads in this community are younger. Forty-two percent of Arab household heads are under 35 years old and thus before their peak earning years, compared to only thirty three percent of Jewish household heads. Furthermore, the Arab families have more children on average, and for a given household income, households with more children are poorer. 4 Loss of child allowances. Since Arab households with a working head of household tend to have more children than comparable Jewish households, the marked decline in child allowances in recent years has had a disproportionate impact on Arab Israeli working poor. The complete findings of Professor Stier also include a detailed study of poverty in families with a working single-parent. Her study will be published in full in the Taub Center State of the Nation Report 2010.
Poverty rate in the population and amongst household headed by a wage earner, 1995-2009 by sector, head of household aged 25-64
60%
Source: Haya Stier (2011). forthcoming in the State of the Nation Report 2010. Data : Israels Central Bureau of Statistics.
Established in 1982 under the leadership and vision of Herbert M. Singer, Henry Taub, and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), the Center is funded by a permanent endowment created by the Henry and Marilyn Taub Foundation, the Herbert M. and Nell Singer Foundation, Jane and John Colman, the Kolker-Saxon-Hallock Family Foundation, the Milton A. and Roslyn Z. Wolf Family Foundation, and the JDC. 15 Ha'ari St., PO Box 3489, Jerusalem 91034 Tel. 972-2-567-1818 Fax: 972-2-567-1919 Visit us online at www.taubcenter.org.il Email: info@taubcenter.org.il